The first author defends the thesis that drinking and driving is deterrable and has been deterred by strict legislation in Norway and Sweden. The next paper reports on a 1977 ethnographic study of bar settings in San Diego, Calif., which found that fear of legal punishment was not a relevant consideration among drinkers when they left these establishments. The author notes that the admonition 'If you drink, don't drive' takes no account of nor leads to any provision of specific alternatives. A survey of the literature on the deterrent effects of automobile insurance and tort law shows that the threat of penalties does deter drivers from adopting certain types of accident-causing behavior, such as speeding and drunk driving, and that it is possible to design liability schemes which relate drivers' behaviors to their insurance premiums. The next two articles focus on crashes involving youthful drivers. One provides empirical evidence that young males are disproportionately likely to be involved in fatal crashes, possibly because of the macho culture of teenaged males. The other examines curfew laws in 4 of the 12 States with such statutes and finds they diminsh crashes directly by lowering the number of young drivers on the road during high-risk hours and possibly indirectly by reducing the incentives for young people to obtain drivers' licenses. The final paper uses statistical analyses to disprove Sam Peltzman's theory that any auto regulation is ineffective because safer cars instill a feeling of protection in motorists that encourages them to drive more recklessly. References accompany individual papers.