One new provision of the statute makes evidence of refusal to submit to chemical testing admissible. In Texas courts, admitting evidence of refusal to be tested previously was considered a violation of the right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court recently held that the fifth amendment does not require that evidence of refusal be excluded. Because Texas courts held that the right against self-incrimination is coextensive with the Federal right, Texas courts should now find that admitting such evidence does not conflict with the right against self-incrimination. Another new provision makes having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 percent or more a definition of intoxication. Due process issues raised by this provision are (1) whether the definition is too vague, because an ordinary offender cannot gauge his/her compliance, and (2) whether the definition allows conviction upon less than the reasonable doubt standard by directing a finding of guilt on the element of intoxication. Vagueness should not be a problem, because the warning given need not be judged harshly when its effect is to discourage undoubtedly dangerous drunk driving. The new definition also does not change the requirement that convictions be based on the reasonable doubt standard. Proof of alcohol concentration itself must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and although the focus of factfinding has shifted, the burden of proof remains unchanged. Thus, both new provisions of the statute should be upheld as constitutional.