Because economic crime often is undetected and economic legislation is frequently inadequately enforced, the extent of economic crime can only be estimated on the basis of prosecutions and nonpenal trade statistics. Studies of foreign trade, subsidy, and tax fraud and antitrust violations in France and Sweden suggest that most likely whole branches of trade and industry are involved in economic lawbreaking. Estimates based on prosecutions in Germany suggest that reported cases of grave economic crime represent no more than 15 percent of such known cases, and that costs of such crimes may be as high as 50 million deutsche marks. Studies of trade statistics indicate widespread subsidy fraud and notorious violations of the steel quota system by the European community. In examining causes of economic crime and controls, consideration must be given to econometrics, the definition of the State's role, incentives for success in business life, and the philosophy of human development. Studies of the efficacy of penal sanctions have elucidated the very great extent of economic crime, but have had difficulty in clearly showing a deterrent effect. Some findings suggest that increasing civil and criminal liability may be effective in increasing convictions and decreasing lawbreaking. Analyses of crimes by multinational enterprises have revealed acts of corruption, trade restriction violations, graft, bribery, currency and tax offenses, environmental offenses, and violations of safety and labor norms. An examination of economic law reforms in Germany, in such areas as subsidy fraud, unfair competition, and environmental crime, reveals that these new prosecutorial techniques display many uncertainties and have not received unanimous assessments by law theorists and criminal justice authorities. Included are 36 references.