This article argues that this apparent paradox is a false paradox. The author stresses that the focus must be on the basic distinction between bias crimes--such as racially motivated assaults or vandalism--and racist speech. Problems left unresolved by R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) are discussed in light of this distinction. The article is divided into four parts: Part I explores the false paradox of hate crime and hate speech and discusses briefly the context of bias crime laws and the explosion of legislation and enforcement in this area; Parts II, III-A, and III-B develop a theory by which bias crimes may be prosecuted while racist speech is not; and Part IV addresses the two prime arguments that have been advanced against the punishment of bias crimes. The author concludes that bias crime laws, properly understood, do not attack racist beliefs. Rather, they penalize intentionally or knowingly causing harm to a victim on the basis of his or her ethnicity, race, religion, or sexual orientation. The author concludes that bias crime statutes are not only constitutional, they represent the highest expression of a societal commitment to racial, religious, and ethnic harmony. Footnotes