A number of papers note that Europe is caught between the extreme diversity of national systems and the increasing complexity of supranational institutions. Some fear that this diversity increases European Nations' vulnerability to transnational crime, since the sanctions for the same crime vary considerably from one country to another. A number of authors conclude that several years of experience has shown that in cases of transborder crime, the development of mutual assistance pacts has improved the efficiency of the national systems in combatting such crime. Beyond this, they apparently agree that it is inevitable that at least in the area of frauds against European Community financial interests there will be a system of Community penal and administrative sanctions to meet the demand of the European Parliament, on the condition that the sanctions respect the democratic principles of legality and an independent judiciary. Starting from the plurality of European legal sources (Community law, the Conventions of the Council of Europe, the Schengen Accords, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation) and their underlying logic (national interests, European interests, and security/protection of fundamental rights), this volume examines their impact on the subjects of the Maastricht Treaty. After describing practices of control and sanction, as well as procedures and guarantees, it addresses the ultimate issue of common guiding principles. Subject index