During the late 1980's and early 1990's, international toll fraud at these telephones was an entrenched criminal enterprise involving millions of dollars per year. People wanting to call outside the United States could make contact with a hustler at the terminal who knew how to obtain illegal access to toll lines and who would connect the call for them at a fraction of the usual cost. This business helped attract many criminals to the building. The fraud was highly resistant to police action and was eliminated only through a comprehensive effort. Two groups of consultants recommended strategies. Actions included reducing the number of pay telephones, restricting access to high-risk pay telephones outside rush hours, removing the international dialing capacity of telephones, and disabling the telephone keypads to prevent the routing of fraudulent calls through the exchange systems of private businesses. The experience demonstrated that effective countermeasures depend less on developing solutions and more on overcoming barriers such as lack of cooperation with the telephone service providers. The providers were not experiencing the costs of the fraud, because they passed these onto customers. The effort suggested the need to focus on pride and shame rather than profit in motivating corporations to cooperate. Figures, tables, notes, and 31 references (Author abstract modified)