NCJ Number
177967
Journal
University of Chicago Law Review Volume: 65 Issue: 1 Dated: Winter 1998 Pages: 35-114
Date Published
1998
Length
80 pages
Annotation
When Congress fundamentally restructured drug forfeiture laws by allowing agencies to keep most of the assets they seize, it did so without considering the costs of such changes to both the public welfare and the justice system, and the drug war is viewed as a failure because drugs are now more available in the United States at higher purity levels and lower prices.
Abstract
Congress has legislated financial benefits to State and local law enforcement agencies directly through block grants earmarked for drug law enforcement and indirectly through forfeiture provisions authorizing law enforcement agencies to seize drug-related assets. These forfeiture provisions have distorted government policymaking and have produced self- financing law enforcement agencies that are not subject to meaningful legislative oversight. Many police agencies choose law enforcement strategies that will take maximum advantage of forfeiture laws, placing economic interests ahead of fairness and crime control issues. The destructive impact of forfeiture laws is discussed in terms of the economic basis of current drug law enforcement policies. 295 footnotes