The Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program began in July 1997 with a workshop to establish the infrastructure, goals, and objectives of the program. In 1999, several exercises were conducted. The Baltimore Exercise in January 1999 was designed to address the long-term recovery and remediation issues following a chemical weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) event. It focused on issues a community would face reestablishing normal day-to-day operations. The Health and Safety Tabletop Exercise in April 1999 examined key requirements for hospitals, police, and fire departments to deal with the medical consequences of a WMD event. The Baltimore Exercise in May 1999 updated participants on issues functional groups had been addressing over the past year, and presentations were given on areas, such as firefighting protective equipment and chemical detectors. The Baltimore Exercise in October 1999 introduced participants to innovative procedures, such as mass casualty decontamination, coming out of a series of emergency response technical studies. The Baltimore Exercise in November 19999 examined the response to a chemical attack on a subway. The Law Enforcement Functional Group made recommendations to issues that challenged the effective implementation of law enforcement activities after a chemical WMD event. Officers lack respirators, enhanced training, and SWAT protective clothing. The Emergency Management Functional Group addressed issues related to coordination and support and public relations. The Emergency Response Functional Group focused on ways to improve the response capabilities of first responders to a chemical attack. The Health and Safety Functional Group focuses on maximizing the impact of hospital care following a chemical attack. An assessment of the firefighter protective clothing found that a breathing apparatus gives first responders sufficient protection from nerve agents to allow 30 minutes of rescue time. A study of positive pressure ventilators found they dramatically decreased the interior chemical agent vapor concentration of structures and provided greater protection for first responders. Water flushing generally was the best mass decontamination method. Chemical detectors were not sensitive enough to determine what type of protective equipment was needed, and they were subject to false alarms. A study evaluated equipment alternatives to give law enforcement officials sufficient information to make informed decisions about how to equip their departments. A triage study was conducted to challenge a health department's ability to respond to a chemical attack.