The author has serious reservations about using sentencing as an incentive by way of discount or a sanction by way of increase to regulate pretrial cooperation (guilty plea) and disclosure (revealing evidence of guilt). He acknowledges, however, that such an approach to guilty pleas is now too well-entrenched to be eliminated; however, the author argues that it is necessary to be aware of the pitfalls of the process to ensure that even in the case of the guilty-plea discount, the process is not misused by the prosecutor to erode a defendant's rights and the principles upon which the justice system is based. On another issue -- a sentence that involves diversion from formal processing when a defendant admits guilt -- prosecutors also play a significant role. Diversion typically involves agreement by the defendant/offender to participate in treatment designed to modify the behavior that caused the crime. Such diversion requires that appropriate treatment be available and that the treatment achieves the intent of the diversion sentence. This requires that prosecutors who support or recommend such a sentence be aware of the various treatment options available and whether they are appropriate for particular offenders. Further, there must be some indication that the designated treatment will achieve what is intended. In addition, diversion sentencing must be used fairly regarding the disposition of similar cases. 96 notes