THIS DECISION LEFT OPEN A NUMBER OF QUESIONS CONCERNING THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THIS RIGHT: WHETHER THE DEFENSE MUST REQUEST THE INFORMATION; AT WHAT POINT IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS THE INFORMATION MUST BE DISCLOSED; WHAT CONSTITUTES SUPPRESSION; AND THE STANDARD TO BE USED IN DECIDING WHAT EVIDENCE MUST BE DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENSE OR TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCING THE DUTY THAT IT IMPOSED ON PROSECUTORS. THIS COMMENT EXAMINES THE CASES THAT HAVE FOLLOWED, INTERPRETED, AND EXPANDED THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN BRADY AND EXAMINES THEIR RESPONSES TO THESE QUESTIONS. IT CONCLUDES THAT THE COURTS HAVE, ON THE WHOLE, BEEN TOO MUCH CONCERNED WITH ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL, AND TOO LITTLE WITH THE CENTRAL INQUIRY REQUIRED BY BRADY'S RATIONALE: WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ACCORDED A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE DUE PROCESS STANDARD. IT SUGGESTS THAT IN LIGHT OF BOTH THE FAIR TRIAL RATIONALE OF BRADY AND THE STATE INTERESTS INVOLVED IN OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, THE PROSECUTOR'S ENTIRE FILE SHOULD, EXCEPT IN SPECIAL CASES, BE OPEN TO DEFENSE INSPECTION. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT)