MAIN ELEMENTS OF THIS MODEL INCLUDE THE 'DECISION STRUCTURE,' 'SELF-INTEREST GOALS,' AND 'PUBLIC-INTEREST GOAS.' THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON VARIOUS GROUPS RELATED TO THIS POLICY AREA IS EXAMINED. IT IS NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH A POLICY MAY BE AIMED PRIMARILY AT GROUPS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT (E.G., CRIMINALS) IT ALSO WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON THOSE ASKED TO CARRY IT OUT (E.G., POLICE). WHEN THE EFFECTS BENEFIT THE NONGOVERNMENT GROUPS (SOMETIMES CALLED THE CLIENTELE), THE POLICY ACHIEVES PUBLIC-INTEREST GOALS. WHEN THE BENEFICIARIES ARE OFFICIALS, SELF-INTEREST GOALS ARE BEING ATTAINED. ONE OF THE MAIN THEMES OF THIS PAPER IS THAT THE EXTENT TO WHICH PUBLIC-INTEREST GOALS CAN BE REACHED DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON HOW WELL THEY SERVE THE SELF-INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXECUTING THE POLICIES IN QUESTION. THUS, WHILE THE ARTICLE PROPOSES THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM SHOULD BE THE EQUALIZATION OF THE BURDEN OF CRIME, IT EMPHASIZES THAT THE MEANS OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS GOAL ARE UNCERTAIN BECAUSE TRADITIONAL CRIME-CONTROL STRATEGIES (E.G., DETERRENCE) HAVE MAJOR FALLACIES. MOREOVER, EVEN IF PROMISING STRATEGIES ARE DISCOVERED, THE SELF-INTERESTS OF PERSONNEL IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM MOTIVATE THEM TO SUBVERT SUCH POLICIES. THE AUTHORS ARGUE THAT ONLY THROUGH CONSCIOUS MANIPULATION OF WORK INCENTIVES CAN BE VESTED INTERESTS OF MANY CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSONNEL IN THE STATUS QUO BE ALTERED AND THE EQUALIZATION OF THE COSTS OF CRIME BE OBTAINED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)