THE PROCESS INVOLVED IN FOUR POLICE DEPARTMENTS WHICH HAD EXPERIENCED SCANDAL OVER ORGANIZED POLICE CORRUPTION AND IMPLEMENTED SOME REFORM OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL POLICIES WAS ANALYZED. THE FOUR CITIES STUDIED WERE OAKLAND (CA), NEWBURGH (NY), MIDWESTERN 'CENTRAL CITY,' AND NEW YORK CITY. THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF POST-SCANDAL ATTEMPTS TO REFORM CORRUPT POLICE DEPARTMENTS IS LAID BY PLACING POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL POLICIES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER DETERMINANTS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND BY PRESENTING A MODEL OF THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC SCANDAL OVER DISCLOSURES OF POLICE CORRUPTION. DIFFERENCES IN CORRUPTION CONTROL POLICIES ARE THEN EXAMINED. TWO MAJOR CATEGORIES OF POLICIES ARE IDENTIFIED: MANAGERIAL CONTROL OVER THE DEPARTMENT'S PERFORMANCE OF POLICE TASKS, AND THE DETECTION AND APPREHENSION OF CORRUPT POLICE OFFICERS AND GROUPS BY INTERNAL POLICING UNITS. BOTH CATEGORIES ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES - PREMONITORY POLICIES, WHICH ATTEMPT TO PREVENT CORRUPTION FROM OCCURRING OR PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES STILL IN PROGRESS, AND POSTMONITORY POLICIES, WHICH DEAL WITH CORRUPTION AFTER IT HAS ALREADY OCCURRED. DATA IS PRESENTED INDICATING CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THREE FACTORS ARE TESTED FOR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THESE CHANGING LEVELS OF CORRUPTION ORGANIZATION - SCANDAL, POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL POLICIES, AND SANCTIONS. IT IS FOUND THAT SUCCESSFUL SCANDAL REDUCES THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION ORGANIZATION IN THE SHORT RUN AND THAT PREMONITORY CORRUPTION CONTROL POLICIES REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION ORGANIZATION OVER THE LONG RUN. AN INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SANCTION RATE AND THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION ORGANIZATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED. ALSO CONSIDERED IS THE EFFECT OF DEPARTMENT SIZE ON CORRUPTION CONTROL POLICIES. A SEVEN-PAGE REFERENCE LIST IS INCLUDED.