THE POLICY STRATEGIES WHICH ARE DISCUSSED INCLUDE NON-SPECIFIC RESPONSES THAT APPLY TO ALL FIRES, WHETHER INCENDIARY OR ACCIDENTAL, AND SPECIFIC RESPONSES INTENDED TO CONFRONT INCENDIARISM PER SE. THE SPECIFIC RESPONSES WOULD DIMINISH THE RATE OF FIRESETTING BY MAKING THAT ACTIVITY MORE COSTLY OR LESS GAINFUL FOR THE FIRESETTER. THIS CAN BE DONE BY EMPLOYING MORE RESOURCES IN DETECTION AND IN THE INVESTIGATION OF FIRES, AND IN THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF FIRESETTERS. FIRESETTING CAN ALSO BE MADE COSTLY FOR FIRESETTERS BY CHEAPENING THE SOCIAL COST OF DETECTING THAT FIRES WERE DELIBERATELY SET AND THE PAPER SUGGESTS, FOR THIS PURPOSE, THAT FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH BE UNDERTAKEN INTO THE PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF FIRE IN THE PRESENCE OF PETROLEUM DISTILLATE ACCELERANTS AND INTO THE MINIATURIZATION OF LOW-COST AND STURDY INSTRUMENTS OF DETECTION THAT WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR SENSORY PERCEPTION. THE PAPER ALSO ADDRESSES THE PROPERTIES OF THE MARKET FOR FIRE INSURANCE AND OF THE BEHAVIOR OF INSURANCE COMPANIES THAT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR INSURANCE COMPANIES TO REDUCE INCENTIVES FOR THE SETTING OF FIRES TO COLLECT FRAUDULENT INSURANCE PAYOUTS; IT DOES SUGGEST, HOWEVER, SOME CHANGES IN INSURANCE PAYOUT PRACTICES AND IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS THAT MIGHT BE FEASIBLE AND MIGHT REDUCE INSURANCE FRAUD FIRESETTING. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT)