IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE RATE OF 'ACQUISITIVE CORPORATE CRIME' (ACTS ENGAGED IN FOR THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE OF INCREASING CORPORATE, AS OPPOSED TO PERSONAL, WEALTH) ENGAGED IN ON BEHALF OF ANY LARGE, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATION WILL (1) VARY DIRECTLY WITH THE EXPECTATION OF NET GAIN AND (2) VARY INVERSELY WITH THE CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF THE PERSONAL IMPACT OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION ON THOSE WHO FORMULATE CORPORATE POLICY. ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT BECAUSE OF THE PRESENTLY INSUBSTANTIAL NATURE OF THE CRIMINAL FINE AND THE UNCERTAIN IMPACT OF THE PRIVATE DAMAGE SUIT, THE CORPORATION CONTEMPLATING ACQUISITIVE CRIME HAS A HIGH EXPECTATION OF NET GAIN. LIKEWISE, BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF PINPOINTING GUILT ABOVE THE LEVEL OF OVERT ACTORS, THE REAL FORMULATORS OF CORPORATE POLICY HAVE LITTLE CAUSE TO FEAR CRIMINAL PENALTIES. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE EXISTING INEFFECTIVE SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO ATTACH ILLEGAL PROFITS; RETURN TO ANY INJURED PARTY COMPENSATION FOR ANY DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE CRIME; AND IMPOSE AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY ON CORPORATE EXECUTIVES TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE IN PREVENTING ACQUISITIVE CRIME....ELW