IN CRIMINAL CASES, THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION USUALLY IS PLACED ON THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE WEIGHT OF THAT BURDEN IS PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. THE REASONABLE DOUBT RULE WAS GIVEN CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY THE SUPREME COURT IN 1970. HOWEVER, DESPITE WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE OF THE RULE, CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT REMAINS OVER ITS PROPER SCOPE. TWO DISTINCT FUNCTIONS GENERALLY ARE ATTRIBUTED TO THE REASONABLE DOUBT REQUIREMENT: (1) AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF INDIVIDUAL CASES, THEREBY REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF ERRONEOUS CONVICTION; AND (2) SYMBOLIZING FOR SOCIETY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION. EXAMINATION OF THESE FUNCTIONS PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR EFFORTS TO DEFINE THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE RULE. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR EXEMPTING ISSUES FROM THE REASONABLE DOUBT RULE INCLUDE THE FAIR COMPROMISE SITUATION AND THE NEED TO ALLEVIATE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PROOF. IF A LEGISLATURE CONTEMPLATES ESTABLISHING A NEW AND CONTROVERSIAL DEFENSE (E.G., EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE), PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS MAY SEEK TO COMPROMISE BY EXEMPTING THE ISSUE AT HAND FROM THE REASONABLE DOUBT RULE. CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER ARGUMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE FAIR COMPROMISE SHOULD BE REJECTED AS A GROUND FOR EXEMPTING ISSUES FROM THE REASONABLE DOUBT RULE. OFTEN THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION HAS BEEN SHIFTED TO THE DEFENDANT FOR AN ISSUE ON THE GROUND THAT DEFENDANT HAS BETTER ACCESS TO EVIDENCE OR THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE. EXAMINATION OF THESE ARGUMENTS SUGGESTS THAT, ON RARE OCCASIONS, SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PROOF MAY SUPPORT AN EXEMPTION FROM THE RULE, BUT THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCH AN EXEMPTION SELDOM ARE MET. A DISTINCTION MAY BE DRAWN BETWEEN THE ISSUES IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL THAT IMPLICATE THE VALUES SERVED BY THE REASONABLE DOUBT RULE AND THE ISSUES THAT DO NOT. ON THE ONE HAND ARE THE ISSUES OF FACT THAT DETERMINE THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THE DEFENDANT OR THE WRONGFULNESS OF HIS CONDUCT; ON THE OTHER HAND ARE THE ISSUES OF FACT THAT DETERMINE THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OR THE PROPRIETY OF HOLDING A TRIAL. AMONG THE FACTS THAT DETERMINE GUILT, DISTINCTIONS CAN SELDOM, IF EVER, BE JUSTIFIED RELATIVE TO THE PURPOSES OF THE REASONABLE DOUBT RULE. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED).