AT ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: PATTERSON V. NEW YORK; IN RE WINSHIP; AND MULLANEY V. WILBER. IN WINSHIP, THE COURT APPEARED TO UPHOLD THE EXISTING STATE OF AFFAIRS, IN WHICH EVERY JURISDICTION EMPLOYS THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD IN CRIMINAL ADJUDICATIONS, WITH ONLY THOSE EXCEPTIONS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR BY STATUTE OR COMMON LAW. HOWEVER, IN MULLANEY, THE COURT STRUCK DOWN THE STATE OF MAINE'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF PROVOCATION ON THE GROUND THAT REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE PROVOCATION BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE VIOLATED WINSHIP'S REQUIREMENT THAT THE STATE PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 'EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME.' WRITTEN WITHIN 2 YEARS OF ONE ANOTHER ON FUNCTIONALLY IDENTICAL STATUTES, THESE TWO DECISIONS, ONE STRIKING DOWN AND THE OTHER UPHOLDING THE STATUTORY SCHEME, CREATE SOME UNCERTAINTY AS TO 'THE LAW' IN THIS AREA. THAT UNCERTAINTY IS ANALYZED, AND A THEORY THAT JUSTIFIES AS WELL AS LIMITS THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD IS PRESENTED. THE COURT'S ATTEMPT IN PATTERSON -- IN WHICH NEW YORK'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE IS UPHELD -- TO DISTINGUISH MULLANEY IS EXAMINED, WITH A VIEW TO GAINING INSIGHTS INTO THE COURT'S PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND PRESUMPTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED -- LKM)