A GENERAL DUE PROCESS FRAMEWORK IS USED TO EXAMINE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN PATTERSON V. NEW YORK (1977). THE DECISION IS BELIEVED TO REPRESENT THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO NARROW THE RANGE OF MITIGATING AND EXCULPATORY FACTS TREATED AS ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. IT IS FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THE COURT HAS ENTRENCHED THE CONCEPT OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES BY ITS INSISTENCE THAT THE DECISION IN MULLANEY V. WILBUR (1975) DOES NOT INVALIDATE EVERY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. THE MULLANEY CASE EMPLOYED A FUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLDING IN IN RE WINSHIP (1970), ORIENTED TOWARDS THE EFFECT OF THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED'S VITAL INTERESTS, AND MAY BE SEEN TO HOLD THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING ANY FACT AFFECTING GUILT, OR THE DEGREE THEREOF, MUST BE BORNE BY THE PROSECUTION. THE PATTERSON CASE INVOLVED AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE IN WHICH THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING INTENT AND CAUSATION WAS ON THE STATE, BUT WITH THE DEFENDANT HAVING THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE MITIGATING CONDITION. THE SUPREME COURT WAS UNWILLING TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROVING LACK OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE TO THE STATE. THE COURT'S DISTINGUISHING OF THE MULLANEY AND PATTERSON DECISIONS IS DISCUSSED WITH REFERENCE TO THE APPLICABLE STATE LAWS OF NEW YORK AND MAINE, AND TO THE TRADITIONAL DEFENSE DOCTRINES. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION CONCERNS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATTERSON DECISION, AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. AN ALTERNATIVE MODE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF SUCH CONSTITUTIONALITY IS PROPOSED. IT IS FELT THAT A DUE PROCESS FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE USED TO GAUGE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES WITH A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD THAT CONSIDERS WHAT IS FAIR AND JUST FOR THE DEFENDANT. THE STATUS OF DEFENSES SUCH AS ENTRAPMENT AND PROVOCATION ARE ALSO DISCUSSED. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)