TO EXAMINE THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM AS IT MAY DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE, SEPARATE TERRORIST GROUPS ARE STUDIED ACCORDING TO THE ACTIONS WHICH SUCH GROUPS HAVE ALREADY CARRIED OUT. EXTRAPOLATING FROM KNOWN SITUATIONS, SUCH AS THE OPERATIONS OF THE JAPANESE RED ARMY AND THE BAADER-MEINHOF GANG, TRENDS SHOW AN INCREASING TRANSNATIONAL CHARACTER TO BOTH THE TERRORISTS AND THEIR TARGETS. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE TERRORISTS ARE SEEN TO BE EXPANDING AS TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION ARE PROVIDED BY NATIONS WHICH LIKEWISE HAVE PROVIDED SAFEHAVENS TO TERRORISTS AND HAVE SUPPLIED INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. TECHNOLOGY OFFERED TO TERRORISTS PROVIDES A FAR GREATER POTENTIAL FOR CAUSING MASS DISRUPTION, PARTICULARLY IN THE USE OF ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSLES OR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. IT IS FELT THAT POSSIBLE TARGETS FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY CAN BE DETERMINED BY ASSUMING THE VIEWPOINT OF A 'PSEUDO-TERRORIST' AND BY IDENTIFYING BOTH THE INTENDED VICTIM GROUP AND OPTIMUM IMPACT. THESE SECURITY AND CONFLICT-RESOLUTION COUNTEREFFORTS ARE COMPLICATED, HOWEVER, BY THE VARIED METHODS OF ATTACK EMPLOYED BY THE TERRORIST GROUPS, AND BY THE FAILURE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT APPROACHES FULLY TO PROVIDE DECISIONMAKERS WITH THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TERRORISTS. ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL INTERGROUP COORDINATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OCCURRED, THE GROUPS HAVE EXCHANGED BOTH PERSONNEL AND WEAPONS. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ARE OFFERED CONCERNING THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK JUXTAPOSED WITH TARGET ATTRACTIVENESS, AND THE DILEMMA OF GOVERNMENTS IN CHOOSING BETWEEN OVERREACTION TO TERRORISM AND INSUFFICIENT RESPONSE, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO FIND IDEAL SOLUTIONS. REFERENCES ARE NOTED. (TWK)