THE CONFLICT MODEL FOR EXPLAINING THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW MAINTAINS THAT THE SOCIOECONOMIC VALUES WHICH RECEIVE THE PROTECTION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW ARE THOSE WHICH SERVE THE INTEREST OF DOMINANT ECONOMIC AND POWER GROUPS. USING THE GENERAL THESIS OF THE CONFLICT MODEL, THIS STUDY HYPOTHESIZES THAT THE MORE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC POWER IN A GIVEN JURISDICTION, THE MORE ONE CAN EXPECT THAT THE CRIMINAL CODES WILL BE ADMINISTERED IN A WAY THAT PLEASES MONIED ELITES. FURTHER, IT IS THEORIZED THAT WHERE ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES ARE DISTRIBUTED UNEQUALLY, VIOLATORS OF THE PROPERTY CODES WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO BE PUNISHED. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPRISONMENT FOR PROPERTY CRIMES (BURGLARY, LARCENY, AUTO THEFT) AND DISPARITY OF ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION WAS EXAMINED WITH A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN STATES, USING DATA COLLECTED IN 1960. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY WAS MEASURED WITH A GINI INDEX COMPUTED ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOMES IN 1959 BY AL-SAMMARIE AND MILLER (1967) FROM STATISTICS PROVIDED BY THE CENSUS OF POPULATION. THE RATE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR EACH PROPERTY CRIME CONSIDERED WAS OBTAINED BY DIVIDING IMPRISONMENTS FOR EACH CLASS OF CRIME IN 1960 BY THE MEAN OF THAT CLASS OF CRIME KNOWN TO THE POLICE IN 1959 AND 1960. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBABILITY OF IMPRISONMENT FOR CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY WERE CONTROLLED IN THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS. USING MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, IT WAS FOUND THAT BURGLARY AND LARCENY IMPRISONMENTS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY RELATED TO UNEQUAL ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT TRUE FOR AUTO THEFT. THE RELATIONSHIP WAS SHOWN TO BE PARTICULARLY STRONG IN SOUTHERN STATES WHERE THE RELATIVELY WEALTHY WERE MOST LIKELY TO BE THE VICTIMS OF PROPERTY CRIMES. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FINDINGS ARE CONSIDERED. TABULAR DATA AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (RCB)