WITH THE DECLINE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF EUROPEAN PURE WHITE HEROIN DUE LARGELY TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TURKISH POPPY BAN IN 1972, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET FOR MEXICAN BROWN HEROIN BEGAN INCREASING; BY 1975 THE PERCENTAGE OF DOMESTIC BROWN HEROIN IN THE HEROIN MARKET WAS MEASURED BY DEA AT 89 PERCENT. IN 1976 THE DEA UNDERTOOK A 10-POINT PROGRAM TO COMBAT THE MARKETING OF MEXICAN HEROIN: (1) TRIZO, COOPERATION WITH MEXICAN AUTHORITIES IN THE SPRAYING OF HERBICIDES TO DESTROY OPIUM POPPY FIELDS; (2) JANUS, A PROGRAM TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON MAJOR HEROIN TRAFFICKERS FOR PROSECUTION BY THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT; (3) COORDINATION OF DEA RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ROUTE INTERRUPTION WITH BORDER INTERDICTION BY THE U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE; (4) CENTAC (CENTRAL TACTICAL UNITS), TARGETING MAJOR VIOLATORS FOR PROSECUTION UNDER U.S. CONSPIRACY LAWS; (5) THE ASSIGNMENT OF SPANISH-SPEAKING AGENTS TO THE MEXICAN HEROIN PROGRAM; (6) TARGET CITY OPERATIONS, SINGLING OUT DETROIT, CHICAGO, SAN ANTONIO, PHOENIX, SAN DIEGO, AND LOS ANGELES AS FOCAL POINTS FOR INTENSIFIED ENFORCEMENT EFFORT; (7) COORDINATION WITH STATE AND LOCAL POLICE; (8) FULL SUPPORT FOR DEA OFFICES OF INTELLIGENCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND TRAINING; (9) SAO/MEX (SPEICAL ACTION OFFICE FOR MEXICO), ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW ALL HEROIN CASES REPORTED FROM THE FIELD, MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS, COORDINATE INTERREGIONAL CONSPIRACY INVESTIGATIONS, AND ALLOCATE FINANCIAL RESOURCES ON A PRIORITY BASIS; AND (10) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE THE NECESSARILY RAPID EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE. THESE TACTICS TO REDUCE SUPPLY AND INCREASE ARREST HAVE PROVEN EFFECTIVE, AS STATISTICS SHOW A REDUCTION IN THE AMOUNT OF BROWN HEROIN ON THE MARKET, ALONG WITH INCREASING NUMBERS OF ARRESTS. EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL ENFORCEMENT ARE INCLUDED. (RCB)