THE VOLUME UNDERTAKES TWO TASKS: (1) AN EXAMINATION OF THE MORAL RULE AGAINST HOMICIDE--ITS LOGIC, ITS STRUCTURE, THE ARGUMENTS THAT SUPPORT EXCEPTIONS TO IT, ITS RELATIONSHIP TO VARIOUS TRADITIONS OF NORMATIVE ETHICS, AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE WORD 'HOMICIDE' TO SUCH WORDS AS 'MURDER'; AND (2) AN ANALYSIS OF CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS IN THE ETHICS OF HOMICIDE. THE UNDERLYING THEME IS A PRESUMPTION AGAINST KILLING. WHAT MAKES HOMICIDE PRESUMPTIVELY WRONG IS THAT IT PRODUCES THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM; THAT DEATH IS AN EVIL INCOMMENSURABLE WITH OTHER EVILS (SUCH AS THE SUFFERING OF PAIN); THAT UNJUSTIFIED KILLING IS WRONG NOT REDUCIBLE TO INJUSTICE OR CRUELTY; AND THAT DEVELOPMENT OF AN ETHICS OF HOMICIDE AS A BRANCH OF MORALITY IN ITS OWN RIGHT, RATHER THAN AS PART OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE OR AS A SET OF COROLLARIES TO A UTILITARIAN OR OTHER COMPREHENSIVE MORAL THEORY, IS JUSTIFIED. CHAPTERS ON THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST HOMICIDE CONCERN THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE KILLING OF CERTAIN CREATURES IS, MORALLY SPEAKING, HOMICIDE. THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL CONCLUSION HERE IS THAT NORMAL AND EVEN MOST DEFECTIVE HUMAN FETUSES FROM THE SIXTH WEEK OF GESTATION ARE PERSONS WITH A RIGHT NOT TO BE KILLED, AND THAT THE CASE FOR CONSIDERING YOUNGER FETUSES AND EMBRYOS TO BE PERSONS IS BY NO MEANS WEAK. TWO DISTINCTIONS--DIRECT AND INDIRECT KILLING, AND KILLING AND LETTING DIE--ARE DEFENDED AND APPLIED IN A DISCUSSION OF TWO KINDS OF JUSTIFICATION OFFERED FOR HOMICIDE: THAT IT IS REQUIRED FOR THE SAKE OF OTHERS (E.G., DETERRENCE); AND THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF, OR CONSENTED TO BY, THE PERSON WHO IS KILLED. THE BOOK'S DELIBERATE AVOIDANCE OF RELIGIOUS OVERTONES OR ASSUMPTIONS IS EMPHASIZED. A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY IS INCLUDED. (LKM)