THREE REASONS SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF KNOWING CONSENT: (1) COERCED CONFESSIONS ARE UNREALIABLE AS TESTIMONY; (2) INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS OFFEND CERTAIN SOCIETAL VALUES; AND (3) ACCUSED PERSONS MUST BE GIVEN WARNINGS, REQUIRED BY THE MIRANDA VERSUS ARIZONA CASE, WHICH INFORM THEM OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF JUVENILES THAT MUST BE PROTECTED TO SATISFY THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT ARE NOTICE OF CHARGES, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION, PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-DISCRIMINATION, RIGHT TO A TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, AND RIGHT TO APPELLATE REVIEW. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. SUPREME COURT REQUIRES THAT SPECIAL CARE AND SCRUTINY BE TAKEN IN JUVENILE CASES, STATES ARE GIVEN LATITUDE TO EXPERIMENT WITH METHODS THEY CONSIDER SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE A YOUTH'S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. BOTH STATUTORY LAW AND JUDICIAL LAW HAVE DEVELOPED TO PROTECT JUVENILE RIGHTS, THROUGH THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, THE STANDARD CONCERNING THE ENVIRONMENT WHERE JUVENILES ARE QUESTIONED, THE MANDATORY PRESENCE OF PARENTS OR COUNSEL DURING QUESTIONING, AND PROVISIONS OF STATE JUVENILE COURT ACTS. ALTHOUGH JUVENILE COURT ACTS AIM TO CARE, PROTECT, AND REHABILITATE CHILDREN WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF JUVENILE COURTS, MOST JURISDICTIONS ALLOW THESE ACTS TO BE VIOLATED WITHOUT THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS. EXISTING LAWS ON JUVENILE CONFESSIONS ARE NOT CAREFULLY ANALYZED IN RELATION TO THE GAULT DECISION, AND JUVENILE CONFESSIONS ARE OFTEN HANDLED IN THE SAME MANNER AS ADULT CONFESSIONS. CASE LAW IS CITED. (DEP)