A professor of law argues that white-collar criminals should be punished with fines only rather than with imprisonment or other punishments. This approach is socially preferable, he argues, because a fine would be less costly and no less efficacious than imprisonment. However, another law professor contends that fines are an inefficient means by which to deter organizational crimes. Instead, he urges a focus on the individual decisionmaker and a system of competitive bids with respect to the choice of a fine as an alternative punishment. Another essay is based on a field study, part of which was designed to determine how judges approach sentencing in actual white-collar crime cases. The authors conclude that, while judges take a serious view of white-collar crime, they are often influenced by several factors to find a nonincarcerative disposition. Judges also tend to rely predominantly on general deterrence as a rationale for sentencing in cases of white-collar crime. Finally, a law professor examines justice administration. The system overcriminalizes neutral corporate behavior and underprosecutes truly culpable corporate misconduct. He evaluates criminological studies which purport to measure the extent of corporate crime, discusses the limits of conventional criminal sanctions when applied to corporate crime, and suggests several possible areas of future research on corporate criminality. A book review is included. Footnotes, graphs, and a table are provided. (Author abstract modified)