The past decade's failure to eradicate organized crime is attributed to mistaken beliefs that such crime was parasitic on American society rather than symbiotic with the political economy. The nonselective law enforcement strategies that have been used were also often ineffective or counterproductive. Specification of enforcement priorities based on thorough understanding of the problem and on the realization that some strategies may be counterproductive is recommended. The movement of traditional elements of organized crime into new areas of enterprise marked by quasi-legitimacy and increased sophistication is described. The growing involvement of youth gangs and counterculture members of the 1960's in such previous areas of organized crime as the narcotics trade is discussed. Law enforcement organizations' needs for organization, intelligence, and cooperation with other policing agencies to combat organized crime are outlined. The use of proactive intelligence to combat combat organized crime in Rocky Mountain and Sunbelt States is delineated. The activities of Charles 'Lucky' Luciano, Vito Genovese, and others during World War II are described. The nature of organized crime in small communities and strategies available for local law enforcement officials in the identification, prevention, or termination of illicit activities are explained. Finally, the roles and need for cooperation between tax investigators and local law enforcement personnel in the investigation of tax evasion are discussed. For separate article, see NCJ 80021.