Since advocates of capital punishment cannot justify it on the ground of deterrence, because empirical evidence does not support the deterrence effectiveness of capital punishment, the recent emphasis on retribution as the primary objective for all sentences has drawn the advocates of capital punishment to its side. Unlike deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation, which are fundamentally forward-looking objectives based on the greater or lesser probability of some future conditions, retribution has as its point of reference a past condition presumably fixed and known. Punishment is then established as the goal of society's response to crime. Still, the concept of retribution does not in itself justify the imposition of the death penalty. Retribution must still come to the subjective conclusion about the punishment appropriate for particular crimes. Such a decision is essentially arbitrary in the absence of a generally accepted retribution principle, such as an 'eye for an eye.' With the inherent ambiguity of just deserts as a ground for penalty, it is not surprising that supporters of capital punishment overwhelmingly favor the exercise of discretion in sentencing. The sentence can then be proportioned not only according to the seriousness of the given act but also to the relative culpability of the particular offender. Under current sentencing statutes, assessment of such culpability is guided by a variety of criteria. Yet, the arbitrariness and caprice inherent in assignation of relative guilt have been perpetuated. Without clear justification for execution, the death penalty stands as a symbol of the state's power to extinguish human rights absolutely, and as a symbol, it is particularly susceptible to contamination by self-serving judgments about what or who is most abhorrent. About 530 bibliographic entries are provided. (Author summary modified)