| NCJ Number: |
182801  |
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| Title: |
Separating the Allocation of Punishment From Its Administration: Theoretical and Empirical Observations |
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| Journal: |
Current Issues in Criminal Justice Volume:11 Issue:2 Dated:November 1999 Pages:153-176 |
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| Author(s): |
Paul Moyle |
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| Date Published: |
November 1999 |
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| Page Count: |
24 |
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| Type: |
Legislation/Policy Analysis |
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| Format: |
Article |
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| Language: |
English |
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| Country: |
Australia |
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| Annotation: |
There is an important theoretical and practical issue governments
must consider when introducing the private sector into custodial
corrections; this paper explores the source of the power to
punish, the boundaries between the allocation and administration
of punishment, and the appropriate regulatory and accountability
arrangements to achieve a satisfactory separation of those
functions, particularly in the context of research undertaken in
Queensland (Australia).
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| Abstract: |
The author argues that the theory of social contract provides the
most useful way to justify a distinction between the allocation
and administration of punishment. Significant, relevant writings
from Australia, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe are
evaluated. This provides a more sophisticated understanding of
the historical development of this distinction and groundwork for
a jurisdictional approach. The paper maintains that an Australian
understanding can only be based on an analysis of its nature and
scope in other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. Identification of the
proper limits for the delegation of powers to private companies
must be formulated in each place in accordance with the local
history of that place and in accordance with the political
demands of that time. This is illustrated by highlighting how
disciplinary decisions and classification decisions raise
sociopolitical and legal issues in Queensland. The key issue is
whether allowing private companies to be involved in
sociopolitical and legal delegations in the way identified
empirically in this paper is appropriate. When the process of
decision making was closely recorded, especially regarding the use
of discretion, it was clear that employees of the private
corrections company allowed commercial interests to influence
them. A regulatory arrangement that enables a State-appointed
controller to perform all the elements of decision making that
involve discretion would solve many of the problems identified in
this paper. This would approximate the British approach, although
that model should be subjected to careful empirical evaluation. 2
figures, a list of 10 court cases, and 28 references
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| Main Term(s): |
Corrections policies |
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| Index Term(s): |
Corrections in foreign countries; Corrections management; Privatization in corrections; Punishment |
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To cite this abstract, use the following link:
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=182801 |
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