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NCJ Number: 63607 Find in a Library
Title: POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NPT (NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY) SAFEGUARDS (FROM PREVENTING NUCLEAR THEFT - GUIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT, 1972, BY ROBERT B LEACHMAN AND PHILLIP ALTHOFF - SEE NCJ-63601)
Author(s): L SCHEINMAN
Corporate Author: Praeger Publishers
United States of America
Date Published: 1972
Page Count: 13
Sponsoring Agency: Praeger Publishers
Westport, CT 06881
Format: Document
Language: English
Country: United States of America
Annotation: SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS ARE ADVOCATED WHICH WOULD BALANCE THE POLITICAL FACTORS OF CREDIBILITY IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY WITH ACCEPTABILITY OF THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES.
Abstract: THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS APPLY TO ALL FISSIONABLE MATERIALS WITHIN THE PARTICIPATING STATE OR AREAS OF ITS CONTROL, AND OBLIGE THE STATE NOT TO DIVERT MATERIALS FROM PEACEFUL USES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE VALUE OF AN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEPENDS UPON ITS CAPACITY TO SATISFY THE TWO CRITERIA OF CREDIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY. THESE CRITERIA ARE FREQUENTLY ANTAGONISTIC BECAUSE HIGHLY CREDIBLE SYSTEMS INTRUDE UPON A NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY AND ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE ADHERED TO BY THE STATE. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL UTILITY AND LIMITATIONS OF SAFEGUARDS INDICATES THE IMPORTANCE OF BALANCING AND MODIFYING THE TWO CRITERIA IN THE 'REALPOLITIK' OF WORLD AFFAIRS. DESPITE THE POSITIVE FUNCTION OF SAFEGUARDS IN INDICATING WHICH NATIONS WISH TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION, THE RESTRICTIONS CAN DETECT BUT NOT PREVENT THE DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS CANNOT SEEK OUT CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR FACILITIES; THEY MAY ONLY VERIFY COMPLIANCE AT DECLARED FACILITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE PROBABILITY CAN BE REDUCED THAT STATES WITH THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE WEAPONS WILL DO SO. ANCILLARY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS CAN REDUCE THE EMPHASIS PLACED UPON THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY PRESSURING NON-WEAPONS-POSSESSING COUNTRIES TO JOIN TEST BAN CONVENTIONS AND BY PENALIZING NATIONS WHICH DEVELOP WEAPONS SYSTEMS. CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE WOULD MAKE INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SINGLE STATES AND WOULD BE AN ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE SAFEGUARD. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)
Index Term(s): International agreements; International cooperation; Nuclear energy; Nuclear facility security; Nuclear terrorism; Political influences; Radioactive material
Note: PAPER PRESENTED AT A SYMPOSIUM OF IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SPONSORED BY THE DIVERSION SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM ON THE CAMPUS OF KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 25-27, 1971
To cite this abstract, use the following link:
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=63607

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