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NCJ Number: 68211 Find in a Library
Title: THREE MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CORRUPTION IN AGENCIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Journal: SOCIAL PROBLEMS  Volume:27  Issue:4  Dated:(APRIL 1980)  Pages:478-491
Author(s): L W SHERMAN
Date Published: 1980
Page Count: 14
Format: Article
Language: English
Country: United States of America
Annotation: THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THREE MODELS OF HOW ORGANIZATIONAL CORRUPTION MAY DEVELOP IN AGENCIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL, WHILE ILLUSTRATING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH EACH MODEL IS FOUND AND SUGGESTING TASKS FOR FUTURE WORK
Abstract: THE PAPER DEFINES ORGANIZATIONAL CORRUPTION AS THE ILLEGAL MISUSE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS FOR THE PRIVATE GAIN OF SOCIAL CONTROL AGENTS OR OTHERS PARTICIPATING IN THE AGENCY'S DOMINANT ADMINISTRATIVE COALITION. THE FIRST MODEL IS COOPTATION, OR THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SUBJECTS OF CONTROL IN THE POLICYMAKING OF THE AGENCY, USUALLY FOUND IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES AND LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS. ANOTHER MODEL IS CAPTURE, OR THE EXPLOITATION OF THE AGENCY'S AUTHORITY FOR THE FINANCIAL GAIN OF OUTSIDERS WHO CONTROL SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES OF THE AGENCY AND USED BY POLITICIANS TO CONTROL JOBS. THE THIRD MODEL IS INTERNAL DOMINATION BY EXPLOITERS OF CONTROL WHO SUPPORT THE GOAL OF PERSONALLY PROFITING FROM THE SALE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS WHEREVER ORGANIZATIONS COMBINE REGULATORY POWERS AND A RELATIVELY SHELTERED SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL. THIS IS USUALLY FOUND IN CERTAIN POLICE DEPARTMENTS AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. THE MORE SOCIAL CONTROL AGENCIES DEPEND UPON THEIR SUBJECTS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR GOALS, THE MORE LIKELY CORRUPTION WILL ARISE THROUGH COOPTATION OF THE SUBJECTS OF CONTROL. THE MORE VULNERABLE AGENCIES' PERSONNEL DECISIONS ARE TO EXTERNAL MANIPULATION, THE MORE LIKELY CORRUPTION WILL ARISE THROUGH EXTERNAL CAPTURE OF THE AGENCIES FOR THE SALE OF ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS. FINALLY, THE MORE SHELTERED AGENCIES ARE FROM DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDERS, THE MORE LIKELY CORRUPTION WILL ARISE THROUGH INTERNAL DOMINATION BY SELLERS OF ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS. THE TWO THEORIES ARE THAT (1) CRIMINOLOGICAL CONCEPTS APPLYING ONLY TO INDIVIDUALS MUST BE ANALYZED SEPARATELY, AND (2) CONCEPTS APPLYING TO THE ORGANIZATION ONLY MUST BE IDENTIFIED. REFERENCES ARE INCLUDED. (JLF)
Index Term(s): Corruption of public officials; Police agencies; Police corruption; Regulatory agencies; Social control theory; United States of America
Note: PAPER PRESENTED TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY, DALLAS (TX), NOVEMBER 1978
To cite this abstract, use the following link:
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=68211

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