skip navigation


Register for Latest Research

Stay Informed
Register with NCJRS to receive NCJRS's biweekly e-newsletter JUSTINFO and additional periodic emails from NCJRS and the NCJRS federal sponsors that highlight the latest research published or sponsored by the Office of Justice Programs.

NCJRS Abstract

The document referenced below is part of the NCJRS Virtual Library collection. To conduct further searches of the collection, visit the Virtual Library. See the Obtain Documents page for direction on how to access resources online, via mail, through interlibrary loans, or in a local library.


NCJ Number: 98018 Find in a Library
Title: Environmental Negotiation - Its Potential and Its Economic Efficiency
Author(s): R C Porter
Corporate Author: University of Michigan
Institute of Public Policy Studies
United States of America
Date Published: 1982
Page Count: 69
Sponsoring Agency: University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Format: Document
Language: English
Country: United States of America
Annotation: This paper examines the conditions under which there is scope for a negotiated compromise and the conditions under which such a compromise is economically efficient.
Abstract: This paper shows three potential sources of failure from the viewpoint of economic efficiency: (1) environmental negotiation may lead to the wrong amount (either excessive or inadequate) of environmental safeguarding, (2) environmental negotiation may fail to produce agreement for desirable projects, and (3) it may produce agreements for undesirable ones. Industrial/environmental disputes can be categorized in terms of four features. First, the dispute may involve a new development with external environmental costs or an attempt to prevent an already operative project from continuing to generate its traditional environmental impacts. Second, the negotiation may involve transfer payments (the establishment of environmental safeguards) between the parties. Third, the environmental damage that the development project will generate may be related to the extent of the environmental safeguarding in convex fashion (drastic initial damage reduction but decreasing returns). Finally, the amount of safeguarding and side payments a court would impose on the industrialist may vary. The paper examines a situation in which (1) a new industrial project is proposed, (2) no side payments can enter the negotiation, (3) the environmental damage/safeguards relation is convex, and (4) if the dispute goes to court, the industrialist will either proceed without safeguards or the project will be stopped. These attributes are varied, revealing how the change affects the potential for and efficiency of a negotiated solution. Results suggest that environmental negotiation conducted under the threat of a court battle will not produce a socially desirable outcome. Three case studies are presented, two of which are analyzed using mathematical relationships developed within the text. Twenty references, 67 footnotes, and 10 figures are included.
Index Term(s): Alternative dispute settlement; Conflict resolution; Cost analysis; Environmental quality; Negotiation
Note: Institute of Public Policy Studies Discussion Paper, number 177.
To cite this abstract, use the following link:

*A link to the full-text document is provided whenever possible. For documents not available online, a link to the publisher's website is provided. Tell us how you use the NCJRS Library and Abstracts Database - send us your feedback.