IN 1976, THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATUTES OF GEORGIA, FLORIDA, AND TEXAS, REPRESENTING THE FIRST TIME SINCE FURMAN V. GEORGIA THAT IT AFFORDED THE STATES THE RIGHT TO UTILIZE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. THOSE STATES' STATUTES SATISFIED THE MAJOR OBJECTIONS IN FURMAN, IN THAT THEY PROVIDED PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE ARBITRARY IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. HOWEVER, IN 1977, THE COURT DECIDED THAT IT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR GEORGIA TO IMPOSE A DEATH SENTENCE FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE AND FOR LOUISIANA TO MANDATE A SENTENCE OF DEATH FOR THE MURDER OF A POLICE OFFICER. IT DID REITERATE ITS VIEW THAT THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDER IS NOT IN ITSELF A VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BAN ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. THE COURT CONSIDERED ONLY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER PARTICULAR STATUTES IMPOSED DEATH ON A PRISONER IN THE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS FASHION WHICH FURMAN V. GEORGIA SOUGHT TO PROHIBIT. THE EMPHASIS OF THE COURT IN ITS 1977 TERM HAS BEEN ON SEVERELY RESTRICTING THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY, SO THAT STATES WILL USE IT ONLY IN A VERY PARTICULAR FASHION AND ONLY FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF OFFENSES. CERTAIN ISSUES HAVE BEEN LEFT UNSOLVED, HOWEVER. THE COURT HAS MADE CLEAR ITS DESIRE TO LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF MANDATORY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR SOMEONE SERVING A LIFE SENTENCE WHO COMMITS MURDER. IN ADDITION, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NUMEROUS STATUTES PRESCRIBING DEATH FOR CRIMES NOT INVOLVING THE DEATH OF ITS VICTIMS, SUCH AS HIJACKING, TERRORISM, AND TREASON, HAS BEEN LEFT IN DOUBT. (VDA)