Civilian Police and Multinational Peacekeeping—A Workshop Series
A Role for Democratic Policing
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A Role for Democratic Policing

James Burack
William Lewis
Edward Marks
Workshop Directors

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The Professional Conference Series of the National Institute of Justice supports a variety of live, researcher-practitioner exchanges, such as conferences, workshops, planning and development meetings, and similar support to the criminal justice field. The Research Forum publication series was designed to share information from these forums with a larger audience.

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The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a national, nonprofit research institute and membership organization of police executives, is dedicated to improving the delivery of police services and crime control and to encouraging discussion of police and criminal justice issues.

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Foreword

Few of us who came of age during the Cold War expected to witness the end of the bipolarity that for so long was the central organizing principle of world politics. We have seen a relaxation of that superpower rivalry, which formed the subtext of so many conflicts, but we have not seen it replaced by a long hoped-for era of global harmony. On the contrary, what has taken its place is a multipolarity generated by several new and unfamiliar variables, among them the centrifugal forces unleashed by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the abrupt shift to an unregulated market economy (accelerated by globalization), the abandonment of former client states to their own devices, and the struggle within those states to rebuild governmental and other institutions on the basis of democracy and the rule of law.

The many and widely scattered crises ensuing in the wake of these developments have created unprecedented opportunities for third-party intervention. The good news is that intervention no longer entails the prospect of a clash between superpower patrons of the parties in conflict. The downside is that the major paradigm shift to the new world order has forced the international organizations that deal with regional and intrastate conflict to proceed with outdated “roadmaps.”

Increasingly, civilian police have been introduced into international peacekeeping operations as a deterrent or stabilizing factor, joining the traditionally deployed civilian and military participants. In this context, the roadmap problem translates as a lack of systematic, indepth analysis of the role of civilian police. In response, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), with support from the National Institute of Justice, joined forces to tap the experience and expertise of specialists in the government, nongovernmental organizations, the military, academia, and private-sector organizations in identifying specific problem areas and possible remedial actions.

A series of workshops begun in 1997 under CSIS and PERF sponsorship is addressing the roles of civilian police in “complex emergencies,” the juridical mandate of civil policing in multinational operations, and how the relationship of the civilian police to other participants (such as the military) in these operations should be defined. Professor David H. Bayley, Dean and Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at SUNY-Albany and a specialist in international criminal justice with a particular interest in policing, presented the keynote address at the second workshop in the series. His paper on the distinguishing features of democratic policing, as well as other major addresses from the workshop, are reproduced here.

The National Institute of Justice sponsors studies of all aspects of policing—enforcement, prevention, management, and organizational issues—under its broad mandate to conduct criminal justice research. NIJ supported the workshop and is disseminating the results because advancing the understanding of policing issues has always been a major priority and, more recently, the Institute has recognized international justice reform as a topic meriting increased attention by researchers and practitioners alike.
For law enforcement officials in countries either struggling with complex emergencies or making the transition to democracy, Professor Bayley’s analysis of responsiveness and accountability as the distinguishing features of democratic policing has much value. It also provides pertinent information for their counterparts in the United States.

The number of situations in which the police are called on to assume responsibility in the context of international peacekeeping is likely to increase, making it all the more important to clearly define their peacekeeping role. Our three organizations are confident that the workshop papers and the exchange of ideas will generate knowledge that can make a useful contribution toward that end.

Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice

Joe Montville
Director, Preventive Diplomacy Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Chuck Wexler
Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum
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Overview

William Lewis and Edward Marks

The number of states experiencing internal unrest has multiplied since the end of the Cold War. Not uncommonly, the unrest has been accompanied by the breakdown of internal order, the failure of governing institutions, and the emergence of displaced and refugee populations—numbering some 45 million people according to United Nations estimates. In these circumstances, a growing need for an effective civilian police force has become evident if reasonably stable internal order is to be maintained.

The burgeoning roles of international civilian police in monitoring and helping to direct the formation of public safety forces present a unique challenge to the international community. To address the issues arising out of complex humanitarian emergencies and the roles of international civilian police, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in collaboration with the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and with the support of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), brought together public safety specialists with experience in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Central America. Also participating in the workshop were Federal Government officials and researchers who are concerned with building public safety institutions in conflict areas of the world. Held on October 6, 1997, the workshop was the second in a series on civilian policing and international peacekeeping.

Democratic policing principles elaborated

Professor David H. Bayley, Dean of the School of Criminal Justice in the State University of New York at Albany and a leading comparative police scholar with extensive experience in international affairs, presented the keynote address. The theme was rebuilding and reforming police institutions on the basis of democratic policing principles. The central question Professor Bayley addressed was how to define the term “democratic policing.” In doing so, he focused on identifying elements common to all democratic police forces around the world and found two: responsiveness and accountability.

Responsiveness requires that the police take their cue about what they do from the disaggregate public—not from the state and not from the government. What problems the public brings to the police to resolve and how the police respond are clear indications of the extent to which democratic policing practices have been adopted.

Similarly, accountability to oversight institutions, independent of ruling regimes, is an important underpinning of democratic policing. These institutions may include courts, legislatures, the media, and complaint review boards or independent ombudspersons. Democratic police can be distinguished, ultimately, by their submission to and acceptance of outside supervision and examination.

In seeking to encourage the establishment of police forces abroad dedicated to responsiveness and accountability, there are four guiding principles. First, focus on elements critical to democratic policing, and avoid the temptation to replicate in whole or in part other existing systems or procedures simply because they come from police forces in democratic countries.

Second, recognize that substantive, lasting reform requires sensitivity to and understanding of local policing traditions and, more important, the host country’s basic cultural values. Reform that disregards cultural norms is hazardous and very likely destined to fail. Similarly, superficial reforms, such as transfers of advanced technologies to embryonic police forces, are unlikely to make a significant impact on the ability of the indigenous force to engage in democratic policing.

Third, recognize that police play a central role in the political life of any society. As a result, successful reform of the police will require either the active
support or, at the very least, passive acquiescence of the political forces in the host nation. Police reform cannot occur if the host nation’s political powers are opposed.

Fourth, understand that pressures from competing constituencies and interests can subvert reform. These pressures come from various sources, including the imperative for police to provide internal security to the government, the international law enforcement community’s conflicting aims, the personal interests of the individual members of the indigenous police force, and the diverse interests of the local population.

Opportunities for improvement identified

The workshop addressed a range of issues related to the weaknesses of the United Nations (U.N.) CIVPOL (civilian police) unit, particularly its inability to provide effective oversight and logistical support for field operations. Comparable shortfalls in U.S. support for international policing were identified and evaluated. The need for effective integration of military and civilian policing planning was accorded special attention by workshop participants. They also made several recommendations for remedial action on the part of the U.N., as well as the United States and other member states. These recommendations merit serious consideration by governments involved in past and current civilian police operations called in response to complex humanitarian emergencies.
The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View

David H. Bayley

The purpose of this workshop is to examine what countries such as ours can do to reconstruct and reform foreign police forces, when the need arises, so that they can provide security for their populations in a humane and democratic way. This is a new mission for the international community, one that has grown enormously since the end of the Cold War. Efforts to construct an effective but democratic police come after peacemaking; that is, after fundamental conditions of security have been achieved but before responsibility for maintaining it is returned to the indigenous forces. This rebuilding and reform is sometimes referred to as institution building. It constitutes a separate agenda of activities for the international community after military intervention and the forceful stabilization of domestic security.

In this paper, I will address the issue of rebuilding and reforming police institutions abroad by examining three topics:

- The varieties of world policing.
- The distinguishing features of democratic policing.
- The process of managing democratic change abroad.

Varieties of world policing

When I was approached to address this workshop, I was asked to summarize the varieties of police experience around the world, evidently in the hope that this tour d’horizon would help policymakers understand what models of policing they might select from and also might need to replace. Frankly, the more I thought about this idea, the less I liked it. Classifying police systems globally is an intellectual game that I think is better left to the academics. I say this not because police systems cannot be classified globally, but because such schemes will not inform the work of this workshop in a useful way.

For example, police systems have been classified as “democratic” as opposed to “colonial,” depending on whether they were established to serve indigenous populations or to maintain control by foreign powers. Curiously, Great Britain created the model for both, which shows the complexity of police history. Another common classification distinguishes Anglo-Saxon policing (decentralized, accountable to law, limited in functions, democratically controlled) from Continental policing (centralized rule-making power, multiple functions, democratic or authoritarian control) and from communist policing (centralized, political rather than legal control, omnibus regulatory functions, authoritarian polity).

I tried my own hand at this several years ago, coming up with “Anglo-Saxon,” “Authoritarian,” and “Oriental,” the latter category distinguished by the sharing of responsibility for security between government and populace in social systems founded on communitarian as opposed to individualist principles.

In my judgment, all these schemes are unsatisfactory for informing policy, not because they are wrong, but because they are arbitrary. The police is a complex institution; it can be classified in terms of a very large number of elements. Any method for classifying police systems depends entirely on the elements chosen. For example, one arrives at different classification schemes depending on whether one focuses on the national structure of policing, involvement of the military, range of functions, accountability, forcefulness, operational strategies, recruitment requirements, rank structure, training, pay and benefits, social composition, equipment, organizational specialization, and so forth. In the computer world we are familiar with the expression “garbage in, garbage out.” The analog here would be “criteria in, classification out.” To be useful for
The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View

policymaking, the classification exercise needs to be tied to a particular set of interests. Because reform of the police needs to involve so many different facets of organization and practice, any classification scheme is bound to be limited, superficial, arbitrary, and problematic.

Furthermore, all the classification schemes I know miss what may be the most important trend in world policing, namely, the rise of private policing. They do so because they focus on state policing—on police created by governments. All over the world, however, in developed and underdeveloped countries alike, the state is rapidly losing its monopoly on policing; that is, on the task of providing security. After centuries of increasing state control of policing, it is now being denationalized. Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the authority to provide security within countries is being refeudalized among businesses, industrial establishments, gated communities, neighborhood crime-prevention organizations, and for-profit security services.

This seems to be occurring for three main reasons. First, fear of crime has increased, sometimes reflecting genuine crime and disorder crises consequent on rapid social change, at other times reflecting the exploitation of crime by commercial media in democratic, market-centered economies. Second, “mass private property” has increased as a result of the expansion of free-enterprise worldwide. (“Mass private property” refers to space used by the public that is privately owned, such as shopping malls, banks, office buildings, sports stadiums, and condominiums.) Although all mass private property is subject to policing by the state, security is being provided increasingly in all of it under private auspices. Third, states themselves, paradoxically, are encouraging communities to participate in policing through a variety of neighborhood-based crime prevention programs such as Neighborhood Watch, civilian patrols, police reserves, crime prevention councils, and police-citizen problem solving. This sort of public-state partnership is the hallmark of policing in Japan, Korea, China, and Singapore, and has been rediscovered in the West under the banner of community-oriented policing.

If our purpose in this workshop is to explore how to create democratic police forces more successfully abroad, I believe our time is better spent not in reviewing various classifications of world police experience but in examining, first, what democratic policing looks like substantively and, second, what problems are involved in creating its specific features abroad.

Distinguishing features of democratic policing

What makes a police force democratic? I think there are two features—responsiveness and accountability. Everything else is unimportant in the sense that it may be compatible with both democratic and undemocratic forms of policing.

A police force is democratic when it responds to the needs of individuals and private groups as well as the needs of government. Most police forces in the world are what I call “regime police,” concerned primarily with doing what the government requires. Democratic police, on the other hand, orient their activities primarily to the needs of the disaggregate public. The clearest sign of this orientation is the emergency telephone numbers that citizens may use to call for police assistance. Through this device, individuals command the services of government in the form of a uniformed and often armed police officer who will attend to their immediate problems, whatever they may be. This is a remarkable development in the evolution of government. It constitutes, I believe, an advance in civilization.

A democratic police force is organized to be responsive downward; an undemocratic police force is organized to be responsive upward. I suggest, therefore, two tests for the “democraticness” of any police force. First, what proportion of its work is generated by requests from the disaggregate public? Second, do people call the police only at times of desperate need or whenever they feel the need for authoritative intervention or effective assistance, regardless of whether laws have been violated? Although police in the developed democratic countries frequently complain about the burden of responding to trivial calls from the public, I submit that those calls are a vital indicator of the contribution the police are making to the political health of the country.
The second distinguishing feature of democratic police forces is that they are accountable to multiple audiences through multiple mechanisms. Police in developed democratic countries are watched and supervised by elected politicians; by civil, criminal, and administrative courts; by the media; and increasingly by independent ombudspersons and civilian complaint-review boards. All of these are supported by accountability to written, democratically enacted law. In other words, democratic police forces are open to monitoring by outsiders. They may not always like being watched and second-guessed, but they recognize that this is inevitable in a democracy. Indeed, reflective police officers understand that their effectiveness in providing security depends almost entirely on their willing acceptance of outside supervision.

In this connection, I would suggest that a solid indicator of the democraticness of the police is whether a country gives visas to foreigners to study its police operations, because this suggests openness to outside examination.

In summary, then, our efforts to reform foreign police forces to make them humane and democratic should concentrate on making them responsive to the needs of individuals and private groups and accountable to multiple external audiences.

**Process of managing democratic change abroad**

As foreign reformers try to implement these changes abroad, they should keep four principles in mind.

1. **Isolate the substance of democratic policing.** First, reformers must separate what is essential substantively to democratic policing from what is not. There is a strong tendency for foreign advisers to advocate the practices they are familiar with at home. The logic seems to be that since they come from democratic countries, whatever their police forces do must be in the interests of democracy. This is what the Allied Powers did in Germany and Japan after World War II. Indeed, the United States, Britain, France, and Russia set up replicas of their own police systems in each of their zones of occupation. As soon as they left, however, both Germans and Japanese went back to their historical pattern of organization. The favorite reforms that American advisers urge upon foreign police are decentralizing policing to local control; combining uniformed patrol and criminal investigation functions within a single organization; establishing a nonstratified rank structure, with recruitment only at the bottom rank; adopting technological modernization; and, most recently, incorporating community-oriented policing. Close examination of contemporary and historical experience will show, however, that democratic policing is compatible with the absence of all of these. None of these necessarily leads to enhanced responsiveness or accountability. Indeed, technological enhancement and community-oriented policing may in various circumstances be inimical to the development of democratic policing. Technology may simply make more efficient a police force whose primary purpose is serving a repressive regime. It empowers the repressors, not the forces of democratic evolution. Community policing, too, rather than empowering local communities vis-à-vis the police, may become a device for instructing the populace rather than for listening to it. It becomes an instrument whereby authoritarian regimes mobilize and monitor populations, as in Cuba, China, and the former Soviet Union. In short, American police advisers must understand what is democratic in what they do at home. Unfortunately, very few bring this sort of perspective to their customary activities.

Another feature that American advisers frequently insist on is the separation of the police from the military. This is correct and exceedingly important, in my view. When I recently reviewed the extent to which the military participated in policing in more than 120 countries, I found that policing was more heavily penetrated by the military in Latin America than in any other region of the world. Only Africa south of the Sahara came close. Police in the Western democracies, as well as in communist countries, carefully excluded the military from internal policing. It would appear, therefore, that the separation of the military from the police is necessary but not sufficient for enhancing responsiveness and accountability. So reformers must understand that while penetration of policing by the military inhibits democratic development, separation is not an end in itself. It is only the beginning of democratic reform.
2. **Balance the democratic with the achievable.** Foreign reformers must frame their agenda carefully. They must avoid doing what is easy but inconsequential, such as pursuing technological modernization. And they should avoid what is impossible because of local traditions. Probably the most resistant feature of policing, but one that Americans have insisted on trying to change abroad, is the national structure of the police. It is an article of faith among Americans that a decentralized system based on autonomous local police forces is the hallmark of democracy. This is what we tried to bring about in Japan and Germany immediately after World War II, and it is what we tried again in Bosnia under the Dayton Accords. I predict that in the latter case, as in the former, we will fail.

For institutional reform to succeed abroad, we must study, therefore, what is democratic in our own policing and what is achievable given local traditions abroad. Both of these require careful comparative analysis. The implication for reform operations is that the reform agenda must be carefully planned before intervening abroad. A successful CIVPOL operation requires the same sort of advanced planning that the military requires in foreign operations. Curiously, the American government has a much greater capacity to anticipate problems of military involvement where, arguably, it has overwhelming power, than in civilian involvement, where it has hardly any power.

3. **Keep in mind the link of policing to politics.** Reformers must never forget that policing cannot be separated from politics. Reform will go only as far as the local political situation will allow. If the indigenous government is hostile to the democratic reform of policing, go home. Democratic reform of the police cannot take place in the face of undemocratic governments. The police are not the tail that wags the governmental dog.

At the same time, police can become downwardly responsible and more widely accountable through their own actions if governments are either ambivalent or indifferent to police affairs. Reform requires permission from political regimes, not active direction. Police officials frequently argue that they cannot undertake reform unless the political establishment is engaged. This is an avoidance of responsibility. Indifference by the political establishment can be an opportunity. It provides space for courageous leaders in the police to work. Hostility on the part of government, however, is hopeless. In that case, instituting reform is like beating a dead horse.

4. **Recognize the pressures under which the police operate.** Reformers must recognize the pressures on any foreign police force, regardless of local histories, that will inhibit democratic reform. Police are susceptible to pressure from the following four constituencies, all of them legitimate and all of them potentially able to impede democratic reform:

- **Governments.** Governments always put their own security interests ahead of the public's. It is naive to expect governments that are under violent attack, or the threat of violent attack, not to require the police to protect them first. One sees this in Sri Lanka, the Punjab, Israel, Northern Ireland, and apartheid South Africa. This is not cynical selfishness on the part of political leaders. Reform of governmental institutions cannot take place unless there is a stable political center. Unstable governments rarely create democratic police forces.

- **The international community.** The members of this community have law enforcement interests that vie with democratic reform for precedence. The government of the United States, for example, wants to enlist foreign nations in combating terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and illegal immigration. Its specialized agencies, such as the FBI, DEA, and INS, are more interested in maintaining or establishing close working relations abroad than in pressing for uncomfortable reforms. The enhancement of law enforcement capability takes precedence over democratic reform. Their advocacy is not wrong; they are being true to their mission. But it means that the international community, including the United States, often sends conflicting signals to foreign police about what is important at any given moment. So, too, do international human rights groups. Their pressure for the investigation of human rights violations and the prosecution of war criminals supports the effectiveness agenda and, paradoxically, may deflect local attention, from longer range reforms involving responsiveness and accountability.
The police themselves. The police themselves have both corporate and personal interests that must be served, among them levels of remuneration, immunity from legal harassment, stability of livelihood, and professional standing within the community. Policing is an occupation, and its practitioners cannot realistically be expected to be more selfless than others.

The public. The agenda of the public rarely coincides altogether with the agendas of any of the previously described constituencies. It overlaps but is distinct in emphasis, tending to focus on personal crimes, disorderly events that are inconvenient and threatening but not necessarily criminal, and services that are urgently required but beyond their own ability to provide. Unfortunately, this agenda, which constitutes the heart of democratic police reform, tends to come last.

The key to democratic reform, therefore, is to move rapidly from the agendas of the regime, the international community, and the police themselves to the agenda of the disaggregate public. All are legitimate, all are important. The last, however, may be the surest way to achieve the others, although it takes unusual courage on the part of local police officials to act on this insight.

Conclusion—being smart

To be successful in achieving democratic police reform abroad, foreign CIVPOL agents must, above all things, be smart. The reform enterprise is highly demanding intellectually. Reformers need to be smart about:

- What is essential to democratic policing.
- What is democratic in our own police experience.
- What is unchangeable in local police traditions.
- The connection between politics and policing.
- Our own conflicting pressures on foreign policing.

Democratic police reform abroad is difficult and demanding. It cannot be successful if its practitioners are intellectually lazy. Although the United States has the intellectual capacity to succeed in this enterprise, it will do so only if the issue is given the attention it deserves.

Notes


Managing U.S. Participation in International Police Operations

Robert M. Perito

More than 3,000 international police officers from 53 countries are currently engaged in United Nations peace operations in 8 countries. The largest operation is in Bosnia, with 2,027 officers; the smallest and oldest operation is in Cyprus, with 35 officers. These operations, in which police from around the world are engaged in monitoring, mentoring, training, and generally assisting their local counterparts, provide a useful perspective from which to view the issues raised in Professor Bayley’s presentation. While a scholarly analysis is beyond the scope of these brief remarks, I would like to make a few observations on how the actual experience in these operations appears to either support or raise questions concerning Professor Bayley’s conclusions. This approach is fair, as Professor Bayley was an active participant in crafting the U.N. International Police Task Force’s (IPTF’s) program for police reform in Bosnia.

Defining democratic policing

In a recent address to a United Nations (U.N.) seminar on the role of police in peacekeeping, former IPTF Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald recalled his experience when he informed the Bosnian police they would have to adopt international police standards. When the Bosnians asked for a copy of the standards, Fitzgerald and his fellow IPTF officers, who came from different cultures, traditions, and policing philosophies, discovered that standards varied widely and determined that there must be something else they had in common. That something was a set of democratic principles that were reflected in the “Commissioner’s Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina” in May 1996. Professor Bayley aided in drafting the “Guidance,” which includes model codes of conduct and guidelines on how policing should be carried out in a democratic society. These principles formed the basis of subsequent training programs for the Bosnian police and are among the most important contributions the United Nations has made to the peace implementation process in Bosnia. Now when someone asks, “What is democratic policing?” there is an answer.

Managing democratic policing

Professor Bayley is both right and wrong about the approach taken toward managing democratic police reform in Bosnia. He believes Americans have a “knee jerk” reaction in favor of decentralization. In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, public security was the responsibility of 10 cantons with ethnically segregated police forces. IPTF, with strong U.S. support, used a common police certification process. U.S. advisers pressed the cantons to adopt common procedures, standards, and codes of conduct. With U.S. backing, IPTF promoted common institutions such as a civil disorder management unit made up of police officers from all cantons and the Federation. All this was done in an effort to ensure as much commonality as possible in a situation in which central control would be anathema.

Before the conflict, the Yugoslavian police force contained paramilitary units. Consistent with Professor Bayley’s belief in the importance of separating the police from the military, the IPTF program in Bosnia stressed the importance of creating a completely civilian police force. This involved rigorous vetting and testing to remove former fighters; providing new, Western-style civilian police uniforms; and training in respect for human dignity and basic police skills for every police officer. It also included visits to Germany and the United States to introduce the new Bosnian police leadership to community policing. After observing U.S. police officers operating community centers and providing other community-related services, some
of the Bosnians have introduced similar programs in their own police agencies.

Finally, the international police assistance effort in Bosnia has been anything but high-tech. U.S. equipment donations have been limited primarily to training materials and replacements of basic equipment and furniture destroyed during the war. One U.S. police adviser created a sensation by introducing a preprinted, standard incident report form at Sarajevo’s Centar Station. The new form replaced the form previously in use—a blank sheet of paper. U.N. appeals for international equipment donations for the police program have gone unheeded. Of necessity, the emphasis has been on low-technology, labor-intensive efforts such as Community Watch to deal with a growing crime problem.

Planning police operations

While civilian police in emerging democracies should be separated from the military, Professor Bayley was correct in pointing out that international police operations require a degree of planning equal to if not greater than international military operations, and that the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is ill equipped to perform this function. As many speakers noted during the U.N. seminar referred to earlier, the CIVPOL office in DPKO is extremely understaffed (there is only one U.N.-funded position) and overwhelmed by its “mission impossible” of managing eight police operations. Seminar speakers noted that DPKO has no police planners and police officers have been excluded from assessment missions. This is a problem that should be solved now by member states requiring that the United Nations create and fund positions for the CIVPOL office in DPKO. The first task of these new police officers would be to develop a generic plan for police operations. The plan would serve as a template for future operations, providing an overall framework that could be modified in response to local conditions.

It is also time to address our own shortcomings in managing U.S. participation in international police operations. With some 18,000 independent police departments, the United States has no national police force to provide expertise and personnel. Instead, responsibility for policy formulation, organization, implementation, funding, and training for international police operations—including the raising of U.S. contingents—is divided among the National Security Council, three Federal Government departments, a large number of bureaus and offices, and several civilian contractors. This situation is awkward at best and costly and confusing at worst. In my view, there is a need to identify one Federal department in which a single office would be fully responsible for managing and funding all aspects of U.S. participation in international police operations. This unit would be staffed by law enforcement professionals and diplomats with experience in handling international police operations. With our own house in order, the United States would be better able to work with Sweden, Canada, and other countries concerned with improving CIVPOL operations.

Training for roles and missions

In my judgment, among the areas that require attention is training for potential CIVPOL officers, particularly training in how to perform their roles and missions. The common experience of CIVPOL personnel is that they arrive in country, are sent to their stations, and then spend a good deal of time trying to figure out what to do. The 5-day orientation that the United Nations provides for IPTF in Bosnia is a start, but this needs to be supplemented by training in the tasks CIVPOL personnel are expected to perform. Such training would require prior agreement among donor countries on doctrine, standards, and procedures for operating CIVPOL stations and performing basic tasks. This would take time to work out, but it is absolutely essential. In peace operations, CIVPOL normally takes months to deploy and even longer to become operational. By the time it is functioning effectively, the initial period of the operation is over, and the best chance for effecting change is lost.

These recommendations for improving CIVPOL performance are not expensive nor are they beyond the capacity of the international community. It would, however, take political will on the part of concerned states to effect change. Attendees at the U.N. seminar on the role of police in peacekeeping indicated a strong interest in improving CIVPOL performance. We should take advantage of the current environment to see what can be done.
Practical Issues in Providing Policing Assistance Abroad

Michael Berkow

This workshop on civilian policing and international peacekeeping was proposed as a way to bring to the table some of the various stakeholders in international policing ventures and examine what the United States can and should be doing in the international context. I have been asked to speak to the practical: What are the issues in the delivery of police development assistance abroad, and how can we begin to address them?

I offer my comments in the context of a “growth industry”: the United States’ role in international police assistance. That role has grown tremendously since 1986, and it continues to expand. Expansion covers all aspects of our assistance and includes State Department aid funneled through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), State Department grants to various NGOs in support of specific projects in selected countries, and training and assistance provided by the operational agencies overseas (i.e., the DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs Service). In all areas, the U.S. Government is increasing its assistance to law enforcement agencies in foreign countries.

Although the U.S. role is a growth industry, we are operating without either a vision or a business plan. We are committing increased amounts of money from myriad agencies and providers—and we are doing it without agreement on the scope, the intent, or the desired result, let alone any coordination or any discussion about what it is that the United States has to offer other countries in the way of policing. Moreover, many of the key U.S. players do not agree on the fundamental aspects of policing assistance or the ways to deliver it.

Situations calling for policing assistance

Because of the lack of agreement, I want to start with the basics—some definitions and specifics of the different types of policing missions. Why is it we commit ourselves to policing assistance overseas, and what is it that we strive to do once there?

Broadly speaking, there are two types of situations in which the U.S. is providing police assistance: transitional situations and what experts call “complex humanitarian emergencies,” or failed-states situations. While both have separate and distinct characteristics, they are not totally unconnected. Rather, they can occupy different points on a continuum of policing. This is especially true for complex humanitarian emergencies: If the rescue mission is successful, at some point the emergency will downgrade to a transitional situation.

Transitional situations. Briefly, transitional efforts involve aid and assistance to a country’s internal security forces (read “police”) as they move from one political system—communist, socialist, whatever—to a democratic system based on the rule of law. Professor Bayley suggests that the two key features of democratic policing are responsiveness and accountability. I would agree: Democratic policing means the police are responsive to the laws of the country and the public—not a specific regime or government—and they are held accountable for their actions as measured against the laws of the state.

Our efforts to assist police agencies in transitional situations are going on around the world but have recently been most prominent in Latin America and in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the
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former Soviet Union, as well as in Eastern European countries emerging from totalitarian rule.

The common elements of a state where transitional assistance is being offered are:

- An existing, functioning government.
- An existing, functioning police force of some type. This police force does not have to be great or even very effective. It only has to be one in which people put on uniforms and go to work charged with the mission of internal or public security.
- The U.S. efforts generally aim to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the other government’s police force. Examples include provision of training in Honduras to control auto theft or in the Newly Independent States to control money laundering. There may be a security gap in these countries but there is not an absence of security. We are not serving as the police nor are we assuming responsibility for law enforcement. Rather, we are strengthening the local capacity that is already providing police safety.

As I mentioned, this is both a growing arena and a confused one. The money is being spread among a variety of providers but the essential coordination—is not as clear. For example, in 1997, the State Department in its State and Local Law Enforcement Programs provided more than $7 million for initiatives ranging from Project Harmony (law enforcement exchanges between Russia/Ukraine and police departments in New England), to Florida State University’s exchange program and annual seminar with the Czech Republic, to Connect/US-Russia (a program focused on domestic violence, with exchanges and conferences in Moscow and Minnesota). These projects were in addition to the ICITAP programs (also funded by the State Department) and the work being done by the operational agencies in various countries (for example, $10,000 in crime scene photography training provided by the FBI to Antigua or $20,000 in training provided by the ATF in Bolivia).

Thus, the U.S. Government is throwing millions of dollars into transitional policing efforts through a variety of sources but without an overall game plan or desired end state. What is lacking is an analysis of the process of managing democratic change abroad similar to the one Professor Bayley conducted. This is especially true in regard to consideration of what we ought to be helping to create overseas or, as Professor Bayley put it, “What is the substance of democratic policing that we ought to be exporting?”

Complex humanitarian emergencies. But that is not the primary topic here. We are focused on the more critical and larger complex humanitarian emergencies—the situations in which a true crisis or disaster has occurred. These situations, while not occurring frequently, tend to be much more costly and require a more extensive U.S. commitment than do the situations calling for transitional assistance. And they tend to have a much higher profile.

We have to agree on what a “complex humanitarian emergency” is. I would suggest that the best definition is the one provided by Andrew Natsios, who identified five characteristics that each of these situations possesses with varying degrees of intensity:2

- The most visible characteristic is civil conflict, which is rooted in traditional ethnic, tribal, or religious animosities.
- The authority of the national government deteriorates to such an extent that public services disappear and political control over the country passes elsewhere; for example, to regional centers of power or warlords.
- Mass population movements occur because internally displaced people and refugees want to escape conflict or search for food.
- The economic system suffers massive dislocation.
- Food security declines, a situation to which the first four characteristics contribute.

I cannot say it better than Natsios, who wrote, “Communal violence is not only the most common of the five characteristics, but frequently the earliest sequentially.”

Thus, in these complex humanitarian emergencies, the key common element is the absence of a safe and secure environment. This creates an immediate
problem in the attempt to create a democratic police force. As Professor Bayley pointed out in his paper, “Reform of governmental institutions cannot take place unless there is a stable political center. Unstable governments rarely create democratic police forces.”

Policing and other assistance in complex emergencies

The number of complex humanitarian emergencies is growing, and the U.S. response now includes police assistance almost as a matter of course. The past 10 years have seen a number of these major assistance efforts, starting with Panama in 1989 and continuing with El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, and Liberia—and then Bosnia, which bears elements of both a failed state and a transitional effort.

Defining the role. In each crisis, we must consider the nature of the policing role that the international community is playing. Are we entering the country to assume the law enforcement function (true operational responsibility) or are we expected to provide assistance to other entities—local entities—that will then undertake the policing chores. In each of the recent large-scale complex humanitarian emergencies that has included a U.S. policing response, our role has been different.

In Somalia, the international community program (and especially the U.S. Government program) consisted strictly of training, assistance, and infrastructure. There was no operational staff, and the U.N. CIVPOL contingent was neither equipped nor staffed for law enforcement operations. In contrast, in the early stages of the Haiti intervention, there was significant assumption of responsibility for delivery of law enforcement services by the international community, including certain aspects of the U.S. assistance. With Bosnia, CIVPOL has returned to the training/assistance role rather than the provision of law enforcement services.

There are substantial differences between the two roles—provider of law enforcement services and provider of training and other transitional assistance. We need to be explicit at the outset about what role the international police are to assume, and we need to avoid having our assistance efforts play roles in which they cannot succeed.

Progression to the transitional stage. I would suggest that in a perfect world, a complex emergency should serve merely as the starting point on a continuum that leads to the transitional side of the equation. If done well, any response to a complex emergency should result, ultimately, in transitional assistance as the host country moves out of the crisis stage.

El Salvador and Panama are key examples of this progression. Initially, both countries had no functioning police/internal security force; both had experienced a major change in political system and direction; and in both there were major U.S. interests at stake and hence U.S. commitments. In both countries, our initial efforts were aimed at establishing an interim security force and then moving to fill the security gap long-term. Finally, in both countries, over time, our effort has shifted from the creation and support of a new internal police force to efforts that enhance, strengthen, and realign the force.

Perspective of the military

My key point in addressing these various roles is that at the outset of any response to a complex emergency, the end result must be kept in mind. We cannot simply focus on the short-term issue of the security gap at the onset of the problem or, alternatively, at the onset of U.S. entry into the problem area.

A number of “fundamental truths” (or “hard truths”) derive from considering the onset of our involvement:

- The military drives these major interventions at the outset. The Department of Defense is the major player here and the Department of Justice has tended to be a bit player in the planning and initial execution.

- That first fundamental, or hard truth, has proven very problematic for my second hard truth: the military views civilian policing as an exit strategy and hence does everything in its power to accelerate effective civilian policing’s arrival/operation.
Within that second truth several key points are hidden:

- The military does not “do” civilian policing or internal security. There may well be a security gap on the ground, but traditionally the U.S. military does not want to fill it, even in the short run. This causes a variety of problems depending on the specific situation. For example, in Haiti it was a problem until the interim force had been trained.

Indeed, the primary reason for the creation of an interim public security force was to fill this initial “security gap.” Part of the former Haitian military was recycled into this force because there was no one else to fill the void. The U.S. military, although ultimately providing significant assistance to the interim force, wanted to avoid the public safety mission. In Somalia, day-to-day public safety was a constant problem because of the extreme level of violence coupled with the type of weapons and their numbers throughout the country.

- Civilian policing is not the same as creating a military force. This fact tends to be ignored. Civilian policing takes longer. It requires key agreements with political elements of the host government, the civilians, and others. If they are developed well, these agreements provide the foundation for enduring change. The need for speed, however, can prevent them from developing as needed.

From the outset, a public security force is engaged in its primary mission. As the members of the force graduate from training and are deployed, they are “in action.” In contrast, when a military operation is set up in a foreign country, rarely is the new military pressed into immediate operation. Generally, it is standing by, ready to go to work as needed. Thus, the new policing organization has no time for rigorous training, testing, “shakeouts,” practice missions, and the like. It goes to work and the mistakes it makes during early development are seen as failures. To be convinced of this, one only has to read the early reports of the newly created Haitian police force.

Vastly divergent views. Let me share a short story that illustrates these different perspectives. ³ It involves a writing assignment in which university students were asked to pair off and work cooperatively to construct a short story. The purpose was to teach the students something about the importance of consistent plot and characterization. A woman and a man paired up, with the following result:

Woman: Eleanor sat with her legs curled under her. As she watched her teabag steeping, her mind drifted to thoughts of Peter. Could relationships really be this difficult? Was it really as arduous a task to know the soul and heart of another as it now seemed?

Man: Meanwhile, out in the cosmos, unknown to Eleanor, on the planet of Zorgan, the evil Zorgonians were planning an assault on the earth that would render Eleanor’s interpersonal difficulties insignificant. For, in a few moments, Eleanor, Peter, and all the other luckless inhabitants of their fair city would be vaporized along with the other hapless earthlings.

Woman: Fortunately, in Eleanor’s travels as an astronaut, she had befriended the Zorgonians and, using her special satellite hookup to Zorgan, she brokered a peace treaty just moments before the earth was to be obliterated. The Zorgonian space crafts returned to their planet, happy and content that they now could live peacefully with their sisters and brothers on earth.

Man: Unfortunately, the Zorgonians were not to be trusted. After making a loop around the earth’s moon, they hid on the dark side, planning their merciless surprise attack.

Woman: I can’t continue this. It is a mockery of literature . . . and you are an insensitive, macho jerk.

Man: And you are a neurotic, self-absorbed, narcissistic navel gazer.

Woman: Jerk!

Man: Idiot!
And so forth. The nature of the communication between civilian police and the military often resembles this scenario. We do not speak each other’s language; nor have we created the necessary interface between our senior military command and our policing institutions. The creation of police forces in certain foreign cultures is new, and we are struggling to get a handle on it. We are just beginning to establish the requisite studies and baseline requirements. More importantly, we are wrestling with the questions that Professor Bayley has focused on: What are the distinguishing features of democratic policing and how can we “export” them? The civilian policing side of the equation is working to establish its protocol and, as it does so, it must convince the military of the legitimacy of its operating style.

This dichotomy of focus takes us back to my story: the woman wanted to write about relationships; the man, about action and war. The two do not fit together. The civilian police development experts are thinking about what will happen down the road and envisioning the transitional phase; the military is thinking, “When do we get out of this peacekeeping role and get back to our primary mission?”

**No ready forces for deployment**

Another hard truth about these missions is that on the civilian police side, two key elements are required: personnel and logistics. Civilian police have neither ready for immediate deployment; we lack a surge capacity. A fundamental difference with the military is that the police are actively engaged in their primary mission. The military, in contrast, is training, preparing, and standing ready for their primary mission—war (national defense). Every police officer removed from the street of any city or town is removed from active engagement. In the military, this would be the equivalent of taking soldiers from the battlefield in the midst of an engagement and sending them elsewhere. Our towns and cities are our battlefields, and police officers are our soldiers. We simply do not have personnel who are not engaged. The transfer of any personnel to foreign duty is a diminution of effort at a time when the Federal Government, among others, has tried to increase the numbers of “cops/soldiers” in the battle. Just consider the billions of dollars provided by the Federal Government to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services for hiring 100,000 police officers. The goal was to get more officers in the field in the United States, not to provide them for overseas missions.

We do not even have a single pool of police to draw from—we have no national police force and thus no trained cadre ready for deployment. Rather, we have to implore the chiefs of more than 17,000 agencies to give us personnel on “loan,” or we hire retired officers.

These are critical issues that have not been resolved. In Haiti, for the first time, the United States committed to provide personnel for the CIVPOL force tasked with actual operational law enforcement responsibilities. Yet there was (and is) no system to obtain the appropriate staffing for these positions. This situation was repeated in Bosnia: We obtained officers from a variety of locales across the country on short-term assignments.

**Police lack support systems.** Civilian policing also lacks the logistical support to respond to these situations. The police do not have the field kitchens, and the water systems, and the portable buildings that the military have. The police do not have transport capacity for movement to remote, hostile locations around the world. Yet most of the major policing missions have been in exactly these types of locales. In the absence of developing an independent logistical support system, the police need the help and support of the military. They need to be viewed as a critical element of the force package, not an add on or a burden.

**Criminal justice operations**

Finally, both the police and the military tend to forget another hard truth: The police are merely one part of a criminal justice system. You need prosecutors, judges, and prisons to complete the system. In every mission we have been involved in we forgot, ignored, or did not deal with this problem at the outset. It is only after we start policing operations—start arresting people—that we stop and say, “Oops! We need some judges, some prosecutors, and some jails.” Our failure to think of the operations as requiring a criminal justice “system”
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creates serious problems in executing the support activities.

Part of this is extremely unfair to the military. In the worst situations, it is the military that is first on the ground. It is the military that must deal with people who are imprisoned, many times unjustly, in horrific conditions. In Haiti, it was courageous and thoughtful military officers who dealt with the people imprisoned there. The same was true in Somalia.

Implications for future operations

In thinking about and improving future civilian policing operations, we might consider the following:

- Encouraging the police and the military to better understand each other’s systems and capabilities. The military needs to learn something about civilian policing and vice versa.

- Developing a better sense of who we need and when we need them in an operation, based on a hard assessment of the on-the-ground reality. Do we need regular civilian police? Do we need paramilitary civilian police like the Carabinière? Do we have the logistical support we need?

- Determining at the outset the specific role of the international police—support, training and assistance, or actual law enforcement operations—and providing appropriate staff and equipment.

- Developing the capacity to bring the systems into play—prisons at the outset and prosecutors/judges/courts shortly after the police are operational.

- Ensuring that the political will is there—both in the United States and in the host country—to carry out the ultimate mission.

As I noted, civilian policing in this context is a growth industry. Just as the military has truly “gone to school” on peacekeeping missions amid a recognition that they will be increasingly frequent, so too will the police need to work on their response to international peacekeeping missions as an integral, timely, effective part of the force package. Civilian policing has a large and growing role in these endeavors, one that we must “get right.”

Notes

1. This last point is addressed very effectively by Professor Bayley in his paper.


3. I would like to thank Dr. Steven Vicchio for “lending” me this story.
Participants’ Comments—A Summary

Problems in the makeup of the international civilian police force

Workshop participants believe the experience in Bosnia has underscored the need for a more effective international civilian police infrastructure to organize, direct, and maintain standards for international civilian police deployments. As the Bosnia operation has demonstrated, the 30-plus participating countries that contributed police “monitors” did not universally subscribe to a common recruitment standard, and as a result it was not uncommon for unqualified personnel to be deployed to the operation. This necessitated the establishment of a time-consuming vetting process. In addition to language difficulties (English was the official language of the mission), some recruits could not meet minimum standards for policing, such as the ability to drive a car. Further complicating factors, according to the workshop participants, include the differing political agendas of some contributing nations, the limited material and financial resources available to some contingents, and time constraints that affected the ability to fully train personnel.

Military and civilian police functions

Panama and Haiti presented different challenges, according to workshop participants. In both instances, at the time of intervention, primary police functions were carried out by corrupt, poorly supervised police agencies, which has sometimes been the case in parts of Latin America and Africa. In many cases, policing institutions, frequently in collaboration with the military, were directly protecting and sustaining the undemocratic ruling elites.

Privatization of the police

In growing proportions both in the United States and elsewhere, private security agencies and other nontraditional policing institutions are promoting public safety in societies threatened by crime. In South Africa, Liberia, and a number of other countries, some staff in these private organizations originally were trained by public police agencies. Defections from public police agencies for higher pay in the private sector may weaken the performance of public police. The proliferation of private police may also fragment spans of control and weaken the perceived legitimacy of regular civilian police. Participants felt that while private police may contribute to a higher level of law and order, at least in some areas, they may also contribute to diminished authority of the public police and, by extension, already fragile governing institutions.

Technology

In many complex emergency situations, police needs are frequently at the low end of the technology spectrum. Haiti in the period 1994 to 1996 was cited by participants as a classic example. With the removal of the military establishment and creation of a national civilian police force, the basic support requirement was for uniforms; vehicles; radios (the police have few telephones); and riot control gear such as shields, batons, and other basic equipment.

Advanced technology could not be used effectively in the emergent police force, and when it was, it was frequently not cost-effective. For rural police, for example, horses and bicycles were preferable to motor vehicles. Because of the difficulty of maintaining vehicles in less developed areas of the world, and because of the poor state of the roads in many rural areas in those countries, motor vehicles are frequently not the best way to provide local police with reliable transport to reach the bulk of the population.
**Postoperation diagnosis**

Several participants voiced concern about the absence of a centralized U.S. authority to monitor performance and measure outcomes to create effective and responsive local police abroad. The U.S. military’s “lessons learned” process is exceptionally valuable in capturing useful knowledge from past U.S. military operations. However, these participants say there is no system that can provide comparable information for nonmilitary operations. They cited legislative constraints as part of the reason, and the absence of central oversight authority within the executive branch of the U.S. Government as another part. They felt serious consideration should be given to corrective legislation, but pending that development, some additional analysis and evaluation capability could be introduced.

**The justice triad**

Participants noted that a one-dimensional approach relying primarily or exclusively on postcrisis development of the police will invariably fail if two other institutional requirements—development of an independent judiciary and development of an effective penal system—are not met. Frequently, priority is given by the intervening international community to civilian police reform, with penal and judicial matters treated as marginal issues. For example, the failure of the Somali police, despite their best intentions, is partially attributable to the absence of the penal and judicial “legs” in the justice triad. According to workshop participants, there were comparable shortcomings in contemporary Haiti and Bosnia. Contributing to this absence of a balanced triad are the personnel and institutional gaps in the international agencies and governments responsible for the intervention.

**Strategic and operational integration**

In many complex emergency and humanitarian assistance situations, the United States and various international agencies must likely deal with a mix of failed governments and collapsed institutions. Security for the intervening forces, or “force protection,” will compete for resources needed to provide extensive and abundant humanitarian relief. It can be expected in the initial phase of operations that military peacekeeping forces will be present, along with civilian U.N. assets, nongovernmental and international organizations and, perhaps, indigenous resources and personnel. This collection of assets, capabilities, interests, agendas, and programs must be coordinated and priorities established. This in turn requires some measure of strategic planning to determine the roles and missions of participants, including those of international civilian police. Concomitantly, the establishment of an effective multinational police force requires that agreement on standardized street-level and patrol procedures be reached by all contributing national police forces. Establishing this coordination at both the strategic and the tactical level will prove to be the challenge.
“Police skills are fundamentally different from those that we train our soldiers in.”

Robert E. Houdek

“Police can undermine democracy and they can reinforce it, but they cannot create it.”

David H. Bayley

“One of the things we need in Washington is what I refer to as the ‘center of gravity’ in terms of centralizing and coordinating our [international policing] activities.”

William Lewis

“This business of ‘feudalization’ of private law enforcement is an amazing phenomenon. And it’s really making life a lot more difficult for us.”

Robert Perito

“The only tradition that exists in policing in many countries is the military one. . . . But you have got to tell them that policing is not a war. Policing is something else.”

Rachel Neild

“The police in Bosnia are not going to change until the entire criminal justice system has moved in the right direction.”

Bob Edwards

“I think we need to be careful about simply assuming that, for example, community policing works well in Prince George’s County [in the United States]; therefore, we will send it to Bosnia and do it over there.”

Chuck Wexler
Appendix A: Workshop Agenda

9 a.m.  Welcome and Introduction
Mark Sakaley, Acting Director
National Institute of Justice International Center
Joe Montville, Director, Preventive Diplomacy Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dr. Chuck Wexler, Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum

9:15 a.m. Opening Remarks: “Cops and Crises”
Ambassador Robert E. Houdek, Adviser to USAID Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and former Ambassador to Eritrea and Uganda

Dr. David H. Bayley, Dean, School of Criminal Justice
State University of New York at Albany

10:30 a.m. Responses to Keynote and Group Discussion
Moderator: Dr. William Lewis
Professor Emeritus, George Washington University
Donna Hansen, Former Chief, Fort Myers [Florida] Police Department
Former Chief, Support Unit, International Police Task Force, United Nations, Zagreb, Croatia
Robert Perito, Deputy Director
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
U.S. Department of Justice
Rachel Neild, Senior Associate
Washington Office on Latin America

12 noon Lunch and Presentation: “Is There International Police Power? The Legal Basis for International Intervention”
Introduction: James Burack, Counsel, Police Executive Research Forum
Colonel F.M. Lorenz, U.S. Marine Corps, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University
Appendix A: Workshop Agenda

1 p.m.  **Discussion: “Civilian Policing—Across the Spectrum of Crisis”**

Moderator: Ambassador Edward Marks (ret.)

Michael Berkow, Chief, South Pasadena [California] Police Department
Former Police Project Manager in Somalia and Haiti for ICITAP, U.S. Department of Justice

Colonel Larry Forster, U.S. Army
Director, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute

Colonel Michael J. Dziedzic, U.S. Air Force
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

2:15 p.m.  Adjournment
Appendix B: Biographies of Presenters

David Bayley is dean and professor in the School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany. A specialist in international criminal justice with a particular interest in policing, he has conducted extensive research in India, Japan, Australia, Canada, Britain, Singapore, and the United States. Professor Bayley’s research on policing has focused on strategies of policing, the evolution of police organizations, organizational reform, accountability, and the tactics of patrol officers in discretionary law enforcement situations. Recently he served as a consultant to the U.S. Government and the United Nations on police reform in Bosnia. His most recent book, *Police for the Future*, is based on field research in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. Professor Bayley holds a B.A. degree from Denison University, an M.A. degree from Oxford University, and a Ph.D. from Princeton.

Michael Berkow is the police chief of Coachella, California. He served previously as Police Project Manager in Somalia and Haiti for the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program of the U.S. Department of Justice. In the missions to both countries he was responsible for creating police academies, providing technical assistance, and helping to establish local civilian police forces. He spent 13 years with the Rochester [New York] Police Department, leaving with the rank of lieutenant. He was an adjunct professor at the State University of New York-Brockport and taught at a number of police academies and other institutions, including the Connecticut State Police Academy, the Orlando [Florida] Police Academy, and Northwestern University. Chief Berkow received a bachelor’s degree from Kalamazoo College in arts, sociology, and public policy; and a J.D. from Syracuse University. He also is a graduate of the FBI National Academy.

James Burack is Counsel with the Police Executive Research Forum. He participated in two U.S. State Department projects related to the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia, including working on recruitment and selection issues for the U.S. contingent, managing technical assistance provided to the IPTF, and serving briefly with the IPTF planning staff in Sarajevo. Before assuming a position with PERF, he was a Marine Corps judge advocate and served as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney. He is currently serving as a civil affairs officer in the Marine Corps Reserve. Mr. Burack was a patrol officer with the Westminster [Colorado] Police Department for 4 years and graduated from the Senior Management Institute for Police. He received an A.B. degree in government and history from Dartmouth College and a J.D. degree from the University of Colorado.

Michael Dziedzic is currently a senior military fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, where his principal issue areas are peace operations and security affairs in the Western Hemisphere. Previously, he was a member of the faculty at the National War College. He also served as air attaché in El Salvador from 1992 to 1994, during the implementation of the peace accords. Before that posting, he was a political-military planner in the Western Hemisphere Division of the Air Staff (1992), a tenured professor in the Department of Political Science of the U.S. Air Force Academy (1988 to 1991), and a visiting fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (1987 to 88). His writings include *Mexico: Converging Challenges* and a number of articles on Mexican defense policy, the transnational drug trade, hemispheric security matters, and current U.S. peace operations.

Larry Forster is director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. Colonel Forster has been commander of the Military Coordination Center in Zakho, Iraq; Provost Marshal/Force Protection Officer in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, Rwanda; and a U.N. military observer in the Sinai and Lebanon. As a Military Police (MP) officer, he was chief of MP operations for U.S. Army Europe; Commander of the 701 MP Battalion; Director of Law Enforcement/Commander of the 291 MP Company, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Provost Marshal of the Yakima Firing Center; and Provost Marshal, Pleiku Province, Vietnam. From 1995 to 1996 he was a fellow at the Harvard Center of International Affairs and taught history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Colonel Forster earned an M.A. degree.
in criminal justice from John Jay College of Criminal Justice and an M.A. degree in history from the University of California, Davis. He also is a 1988 graduate of the FBI National Academy.

**Donna Hansen**, a consultant in criminal justice, recently returned from a 1-year assignment in the former Yugoslavia, where she served as chief of the U.N. Support Unit. In that capacity she was responsible for the training and rotation of more than 2,000 international civilian police who monitored the activities of local police in three U.N. missions. Ms. Hansen’s law enforcement career includes 4 years as the chief of police for the City of Fort Myers, Florida, and 21 years with the Metro-Dade Police Department, Miami, Florida. Ms. Hansen holds an M.A. degree from Florida International University and is a graduate of the Southern Police Institute Senior Management Program.

**Robert E. Houdek** is an adviser to the USAID Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and former U.S. ambassador to Eritrea and Uganda. Ambassador Houdek returned to the United States in 1996 to assume his current position after having served 3 years as the first U.S. ambassador to Eritrea. Before his posting there, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Ambassador Houdek has served in Belgium, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Jamaica, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. In 1991, he was awarded the President’s Exceptional Service medal for his role in evacuating Ethiopian Jews to Israel in the last days of the Ethiopian civil war. In 1997 Ambassador Houdek was on special assignment in Eastern Zaire, where he served as a negotiator and liaison officer for an AID Disaster Assistance Response Team that was assisting in the evacuation of Rwandan refugees and the resettlement of Congolese people internally displaced by the civil war.

**William Lewis** is professor emeritus in political science and international relations at George Washington University, where he taught from 1978 to 1994. He was the founder and director of the Security Studies Program and was a visiting professor at the University of Michigan and Georgetown University. In addition to having served as Deputy Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, U.S. Department of State, he was assigned to the policy planning staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Presidential Task Force on Foreign Aid, and the State-Defense Departments strategy planning group. He currently provides consulting services to several government and research institutions, including the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Science Applications, Inc., and CSIS. He is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University and received a doctorate from The American University.

**Frederick M. Lorenz** is a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps. He currently occupies the Marine Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. He served as the senior legal adviser in Somalia for Operation Restore Hope from 1992 to 1993 and for United Shield in 1995, and was on the legal staff of Operation Joint Endeavor in Sarajevo in early 1996. Colonel Lorenz has lectured and written widely on operational law issues such as the rules of engagement and the use of force in peacekeeping operations. As a Marine judge advocate, he has held a wide variety of positions, including prosecutor, defense counsel, military judge, and rifle company commander. Additional assignments, focusing on environmental law issues, led to his current research on international environmental security. Colonel Lorenz received his undergraduate and law degrees from Marquette University and a Master of Law degree from George Washington University.

**Edward Marks** retired in 1995 from the U.S. Foreign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor in the Senior Foreign Service. His most recent assignments were as Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, Deputy Chief of Mission in Sri Lanka and the Republic of Maldives, Senior Visiting Fellow at CSIS, Deputy Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism and Emergency Planning, and Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Ambassador Marks continues to provide consulting services to INSS; CSIS; Booz, Allen and Hamilton; Cubic International; and the U.N. Development Fund. He received his bachelor’s degree from the University of Michigan and his master’s degree from the University of Oklahoma. He is also a graduate of the Foreign Service Institute and the
National War College. Ambassador Marks has taught at New York University and served in the U.S. Army.

Joe Montville is the Director of CSIS’s Preventive Diplomacy Program, which specializes in community-building and support of peacemaking in countries affected by serious ethnic conflict. Mr. Montville was a career diplomat, serving in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Morocco. He spent a year in Egypt as a Fulbright Scholar. At the State Department, Mr. Montville was regional policy adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and was Near East Division Chief and Director, Office of Global Issues, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He also was research director at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Montville has been a consultant to the Department of Defense and currently cochairs a State Department open forum working group on conflict resolution, civil society, and democracy. During the past 15 years, Mr. Montville has been developing expertise in and writing about cultural diversity and ethnic conflict resolution theory and practice. His field work has included South Africa, Slovakia, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Northern Ireland, Russia, the Baltic countries, Romania, Hungary, Cyprus, and the Middle East. A founding member of the International Society of Political Psychology, Mr. Montville is also author and editor of Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies and coeditor of The Psychodynamics of International Relationships. He holds faculty appointments at the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction at the University of Virginia Medical School and, as a lecturer on psychiatry, at the Harvard Medical School. Mr. Montville graduated from Lehigh University and did graduate work at Harvard and Columbia University.

Rachel M. Neild is a Senior Associate with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a nonprofit organization that promotes international and national policies to advance human rights, democracy, and social and economic justice in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ms. Neild is responsible for WOLA’s work on comparative issues in police reform in Haiti and edits Enlace, a quarterly Spanish-language bulletin. She has published numerous papers and two major reports on police reform in Haiti and edited “Demilitarizing Public Order; the International Community, Police Reform and Human Rights in Central America and Haiti.” She also has written reports on human rights training programs of the U.S. military and on human rights and democratization issues in Chile and Paraguay. Ms. Neild has a master’s degree in international affairs from the University of Colombia, and a bachelor’s degree in philosophy and literature from the University of Manchester. She previously worked with the Comision Andina de Juristas in Lima, Peru; the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica; and Americas Watch [now Human Rights Watch/Americas] in Washington, D.C., and New York.

Robert Perito is Deputy Director of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice. He is retired from the State Department, where he served in numerous diplomatic posts around the world.

Chuck Wexler is the Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum. He previously worked for the Boston Police Department, where he helped develop and manage the community disorders unit, which earned a national reputation as a model for the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crime. He also headed the professional development division for the International Association of Chiefs of Police. In addition, he served as special assistant to the Nation’s first “drug czar,” managed a national project for the President’s Drug Advisory Council, and worked for the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, where he collaborated with major corporations on the drug-free workplace initiative. Dr. Wexler earned a bachelor’s degree from Boston University, a master’s degree in criminology from Florida State University, and a doctorate in urban studies and planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Appendix C: Workshop Attendees

Professor David Bayley  
Dean, School of Criminal Justice  
State University of New York at Albany  
135 Western Avenue  
Albany, NY 12222  
518–442–5214  
518–442–5212 (Fax)

Chief Michael Berkow  
South Pasadena Police Department  
1422 Mission Street  
South Pasadena, CA 91030  
818–799–1121  
818–441–3985 (Fax)  
mjberkow@earthlink.net

Mr. Anne Willem Bijleveld  
Representative, United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees  
1775 K Street N.W., Suite 300  
Washington, DC 20006  
202–296–5191  
202–296–5660 (Fax)  
usa.wa@unhr.ch

Mr. Jim Burack  
Counsel  
Police Executive Research Forum  
1120 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 930  
Washington, DC 20036  
202–466–7820  
202–466–7826 (Fax)  
jburack@PoliceForum.org

Mr. Ray Dalland  
International Security and Peacekeeping Bureau of Political and Military Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  
2201 C Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20520  
202–736–7747  
202–647–4055 (Fax)

Colonel Michael Dziedic  
Institute for National Strategic Studies  
National Defense University  
Fort McNair S.W.  
Washington, DC 20319–6000  
202–685–2220

Ms. Wendy Eaton  
Defense Forecasting, Inc.  
21 Dupont Circle N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036  
202–785–9041

Mr. Bob Edwards  
Incline Village, NV 89451  
702–832–7181  
702–832–7191 (Fax)

Mr. Steven Edwards  
Program Manager  
Office of Research and Evaluation  
National Institute of Justice  
U.S. Department of Justice  
810 Seventh Street N.W.  
Washington DC 20005  
202–307–0500  
202–307–6394 (Fax)

Colonel Larry Forster  
Director  
U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute  
Army War College  
Carlisle, PA 17013–5050  
717–245–3740  
717–245–3279 (Fax)  
forsterl@csl-emh1.army.mil

Mr. Eliot M. Goldberg  
National Defense University  
Fort McNair, Bldg. 62 S.W.  
300 Fifth Avenue  
Washington, DC 20319–5066  
202–685–2375  
202–685–3972 (Fax)  
goldberge@ndu.edu
Appendix C: Workshop Attendees

Ms. Donna Hansen  
P.O. Box 247  
Ft. Myers, FL 33902  
hansup@worldnet.att.net

Mr. Glenn Hodes  
Research Analyst  
Overseas Development Council  
1875 Connecticut Avenue N.W.  
Washington, DC 20009  
202–234–8701  
202–245–0067 (Fax)  
hodes@odc.org

Ambassador Robert E. Houdek  
2030 Rhode Island Avenue  
McLean, VA 22101  
703–534–4761  
703–534–9170 (Fax)

Ms. Ruby Kahn  
Center for Strategic and International Studies  
1800 K Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036  
202–775–3179  
202–775–3199 (Fax)  
rdk@csis.org

Mr. Robert J. Kaminski  
Social Science Analyst  
National Institute of Justice  
U.S. Department of Justice  
810 Seventh Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20531  
202–616–9135  
202–307–0200  
rkaminski@aol.com

Ms. Lorelei E. Kelly  
Research Fellow  
Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiations  
Stanford University  
Stanford, CA 94305–8610  
650–723–2574  
650–723–9421

Dr. William Lewis  
Professor Emeritus  
1101 S. Arlington Ridge Road, #307  
Arlington, VA 22202  
703–521–0881

Colonel Fred Lorenz, USMC  
Industrial College of the Armed Forces  
Fort McNair S.W.  
Washington, DC 20319  
202–685–4202  
202–685–4175 (Fax)  
lorenzf@ndu.edu

Ambassador Edward Marks (ret.)  
2737 Devonshire Place N.W.  
Washington, DC 20008  
202–588–1632  
edwardmarks@msn.com

Mr. Bill Maudlin  
Administrator, International Programs  
International Association of Chiefs of Police  
515 Washington Street  
Alexandria, VA 22314  
703–836–6767, ext. 325  
703–836–4543 (Fax)

Mr. Sam McQuade  
Social Science Program Manager  
National Institute of Justice  
U.S. Department of Justice  
810 Seventh Street N.W.  
Washington DC 20531  
202–307–0200  
202–307–6394 (Fax)

Ms. Johanna Mendelson  
USAID/BHR/OTI  
Room 5314A NS  
U.S. Department of State  
2201 C Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20523–0059  
202–647–3990  
202–647–0218 (Fax)

Mr. David C. Mitchell  
Policy and Missions Office  
Secretary of Defense  
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict  
2500 Defense Pentagon, Room 2B525  
Washington, DC 20301–2500  
703–693–2897  
703–693–0615 (Fax)  
mitchellda@osd.pentagon.mil
Mr. Joe Montville  
Director  
Preventive Diplomacy Program  
Center for Strategic and International Studies  
1800 K Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006  
202–775–3277  
202–775–3199 (Fax)  
jvm@csis.org

Ms. Rachel Neild  
Senior Associate  
Washington Office on Latin America  
400 C Street N.E.  
Washington, DC 20002  
202–544–8045

Ms. Diane Paul  
Human Rights Watch  
321 St. Dunstans Road  
Baltimore, MD 21212  
410–323–1055  
410–435–8003 (Fax)  
pauls@charm.net

Mr. Robert Perito  
Deputy Director  
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program  
U.S. Department of Justice  
1331 F Street N.W., 5th Floor  
Washington, DC 20004  
202–305–4234  
202–616–8429 (Fax)

Mr. Richard Rankin  
Program Manager  
BETAC International Corporation  
2001 N. Beauregard Street  
Suite 1100  
Alexandria, VA 22311  
703–824–3207  
703–825–3130 (Fax)

Mr. Mark Sakaley  
Acting Director  
International Center  
National Institute of Justice  
U.S. Department of Justice  
810 Seventh Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20531  
202–305–2698  
202–307–6394 (Fax)  
sakaleym@usdoj.gov

Mr. Thomas Schiller  
International Networking Liaison  
National Criminal Justice Reference Service  
Aspen Systems Corporation  
2277 Research Boulevard  
Rockville, MD 20850  
202–305–1294  
301–519–5932  
301–519–5313 (Fax)  
tschiller@ncjrs.org  
schiller@ojp.usdoj.gov

Mr. Frank Severs  
Assistant to Head of Delegation  
International Committee of the Red Cross  
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Suite 545  
Washington DC 20037  
202–293–9430  
303–293–9431 (Fax)

Lieutenant Colonel Louis Thompson  
Senior Fellow  
Atlantic Council  
910 17th Street N.W., 10th Floor  
Washington, DC 20006  
202–778–4980  
202–463–7240 (Fax)  
lthompson@acgate.acus.org

Mr. J. Matthew Vaccaro  
OAS S&R PK-HA  
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs  
U.S. Department of Defense  
2900 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301–2900  
703–614–0446  
703–614–0442 (Fax)  
jmvaccaro@aol.com
### Appendix C: Workshop Attendees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Fax</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Heather Ward</td>
<td>Vera Institute of Justice</td>
<td>377 Broadway, New York, NY 10013</td>
<td>212–334–1300</td>
<td>212–941–9407 (Fax)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hward@vera.org">hward@vera.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Kim Ward</td>
<td>Baltimore County Police Department</td>
<td>700 East Joppa Road, Towson, MD 21286</td>
<td>410–887–2206</td>
<td>410–887–4581 (Fax)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kmward@bellatlantic.net">kmward@bellatlantic.net</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Chuck Wexler</td>
<td>Police Executive Research Forum</td>
<td>1120 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 930, Washington, DC 20036</td>
<td>202–66–7820</td>
<td>202–466–4826 (Fax)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:cwexler@policeforum.org">cwexler@policeforum.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Susan Woodward</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Studies</td>
<td>1771 Massachusetts Avenue N.W., Washington, DC 20036</td>
<td>202–797–6092</td>
<td>202–797–6003 (Fax)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:swoodward@brook.edu">swoodward@brook.edu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Donald Zoufal</td>
<td>General Counsel</td>
<td>Chicago Police Department, 111 South State Street, Suite 400, Chicago, IL 60605</td>
<td>312–747–7972</td>
<td>312–747–2430 (Fax)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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About the National Institute of Justice

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a component of the Office of Justice Programs, is the research agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. Created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, NIJ is authorized to support research, evaluation, and demonstration programs, development of technology, and both national and international information dissemination. Specific mandates of the Act direct NIJ to:

- Sponsor special projects and research and development programs that will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime.
- Conduct national demonstration projects that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving criminal justice.
- Develop new technologies to fight crime and improve criminal justice.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs and identify programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated.
- Recommend actions that can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments as well as by private organizations to improve criminal justice.
- Carry out research on criminal behavior.
- Develop new methods of crime prevention and reduction of crime and delinquency.

In recent years, NIJ has greatly expanded its initiatives, the result of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the Crime Act), partnerships with other Federal agencies and private foundations, advances in technology, and a new international focus. Some examples of these new initiatives:

- Exploring key issues in community policing, violence against women, violence within the family, sentencing reforms, and specialized courts such as drug courts.
- Developing dual-use technologies to support national defense and local law enforcement needs.
- Establishing four regional National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Centers and a Border Research and Technology Center.
- Strengthening NIJ’s links with the international community through participation in the United Nations network of criminological institutes, the U.N. Criminal Justice Information Network, UNOJUST (United Nations Online Justice Clearinghouse), and the NIJ International Center.
- Improving the online capability of NIJ’s criminal justice information clearinghouse.
- Establishing the ADAM (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) program—formerly the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program—to increase the number of drug-testing sites and study drug-related crime.

The Institute Director establishes the Institute’s objectives, guided by the priorities of the Office of Justice Programs, the Department of Justice, and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals and researchers in the continuing search for answers that inform public policymaking in crime and justice.

To find out more information about the National Institute of Justice, please contact:

National Criminal Justice Reference Service,
Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849–6000
800–851–3420
e-mail: askncjrs@ncjrs.org

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