

OPPORTUNITY HOUSE

*An experiment in social treatment
for
chronic public drunkenness offenders*

PROGRESS REPORT

LEAA GRANT ~~71-DF-612~~ *DF-009*

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CITY OF HOUSTON HEALTH DEPARTMENT

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CITY OF HOUSTON HEALTH DEPARTMENT
OPPORTUNITY HOUSE - PROJECT SUMMARY

Houston Opportunity House was a pioneer effort conducted through discretionary grant funding from November 8, 1969 through October 31, 1970, to attack the serious law enforcement problem of public drunkenness arrests. It was based on eight years of uncentered experience by leadership of Alcoholics Anonymous and numerous other public and private organizations in the community.

The prior experience of AA and other groups was accompanied by a steady decrease in arrests for public drunkenness, with the annual average going from 32,448 in 1961 to 26,007 in 1968. However, inasmuch as arrests for this offense continued in 1968 to account for approximately one-half of all local arrests, the leadership of the community groups sought establishment of a receiving and counseling residence to provide material necessities during the time the victims of alcoholism were receiving the services of specialists in fields ranging from vocational guidance to medicine.

The concept which these private citizens had developed and which was to be tested by the grant-supported effort is based on a cycle followed by public drunkenness offenders. As observed by the AA leadership, thousands of individuals each year are arrested in "skid row" areas of the city, found guilty of public drunkenness, incarcerated at the City Prison Farm when found unable to pay fines, only to make their way back to the original arrest area upon being released. Early efforts to help these men break the cycle determined that the most effective point is immediately after release from the Prison Farm. At that stage, the alcoholic has completed a period of enforced sobriety, cleanliness and good diet, free from the social atmosphere in which alcohol is the simple escape. Consequently the preceding efforts from 1961 to 1968 had taken selected men and concentrated on solving their problems. This experience had shown a clear need for continuance of the diets, cleanliness, and a responsive social environment, combined with the dignity of freedom and the counseling and assistance of innumerable available agencies -- and to this purpose the Opportunity House was dedicated.

The selection of the post-Prison Farm stage also meets the problems of the unique legal situation involved. In Houston, the City Charter does not allow its judges to mete out jail terms, but provides only the power to fine; thus, sentences to the Prison Farm are regarded not as court-ordered terms, but remanding the indigent to a city facility to "work off" the debt they cannot pay.* The difficulty in this is that there is therefore no legal mechanism for a parole to a treatment center, and the post-Farm period thus is the most logical.

The problem of the repeat public drunkenness offender is more than a dilemma of human misery and individual social adjustment. It also is of such scope that it places a heavy strain on the manpower and finances of municipal police, courts and prison systems. In Houston, which is not exceptional in the nation in regard to this problem, these offenders have for

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many years accounted for one-half of all non-traffic arrests made by City police officers.

In Houston, through 1968 the toll of public drunkenness offenders produced a heavy drain on the resources of police and courts, which already were functioning with barely half the manpower minimums established by such organizations as the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Each arrest in a case of public drunkenness at that time involved a minimum of six officers, from the dispatchers, beat patrolmen, jail officers and desk men to the officers in charge. On an annual basis, it is estimated that the cost of this "minor crime" was approaching 100,000 man-hours of police time and a total cost to the city of nearly \$5 million, when the pro-rated costs of courts and prison farms were interpolated (a prior study, conducted by then Police Inspector Larry Fultz, with allowances for increases in costs, showed that in 1969, each arrest of a public drunkenness offender cost the City government \$160.83).

On November 8, 1969, Houston Opportunity House opened at 1111 Rosalie Street. From then until the project completion date of October 31, 1970, the House was an operational project, providing support, treatment and guidance for 367 individuals.

Because of preliminary indications of success, the project was re-funded through a separate grant category for an additional 15-month period, to commence upon completion of the pilot phase under the original grant.

In the conduct of operations, the operational philosophy called for the regular, paid personnel of the House to provide primary care and supervision for residents while appropriate consultative agents met with them to determine their individual physical, environmental and medical needs.

Very early in the conduct of the project it was realized that the most fundamental need for these alcoholics was the development of an acceptable method of self-support. Consequently, the Texas Rehabilitation Commission became an extremely vital component of the operation. Through most of the project, Texas Rehabilitation Commission maintained a full-time counselor at the House. In all, they provided special support for 255 of the 367 men who were residents of the House, with services ranging from a minimum of testing and interviewing to actual retraining and placement in productive jobs.

Another agency of considerable significance in the operation of the House was the Veterans Administration Hospital, whose intensive special treatment for severe cases of alcoholism was provided for 38 of the 367 men.

Alcoholics Anonymous, through its Intergroup Association, Inc., conducted functions of vital importance at two phases of the operation. Members of Intergroup first served as the prime screening agents for potential applicants, meeting several times weekly with men serving fines out both at the City Prison Farm and as trustees in the City Jail Division, and with officials of the farm and jail. Secondly, AA members conducted regular meetings at the House and, after functions became smooth, outside the House for its "alumni". AA further provided counselors for individuals with special problems, made its office available for referrals and provided AA sponsors for scores of men.

Although these and other agencies dealing with alcoholics existed in Houston at the inception of this project, it was found early in the operations that many personal needs of residents could not be met through them or through the facilities of the City. Consequently, leaders of the original uncentered movement to help the victims of alcoholism formed a new-non-profit corporation --Houston Opportunity House, Inc. to provide special advice and support not otherwise available. Its membership provided funds for incidental purchases, such as razors, combs, cigarettes, clothing, and also assisted in direct labor functions to keep the building in order.

The location at 1111 Rosalie, utilized for the Opportunity House, was a former hospital annex. It was chosen both due to its physical attributes and to its location--near enough to the center of the City and the Medical Center to make services convenient, and yet far enough away from "skid row" type areas to make them (or the distance to them) unattractive. The structure, a three-level building, provided adequate space for offices for staff and consultants, for dining and relaxation areas, and to house at a maximum some 70 men. However, it was quickly discovered that the skeletal staff of five full-time personnel was most effective with a resident load of less than 45, and this level of occupancy was early designated the optimum. It was further regarded as most effective for the purposes of the project, on the advice of psychological counselors, inasmuch as an increase in residency would have created too similar an atmosphere to the crowded penal atmosphere the House was designed to overcome.

The normal process for a House resident began with observations and interviews by AA personnel at the Prison Farm and City Jail. In close cooperation with the Farm captain and jail officials, the AA personnel then determined as far as was possible the sincerity and potential of the individual for rehabilitation. Upon the joint referral of these personnel, the Project Manager accepted the candidate.

Upon arrival at the House, the new resident would be assigned to a room and given an explanation in detail of the operation.

The initial interview at the House placed special emphasis on the self-help aspects of the program, leaning heavily on the proven philosophy of the AA program, and stressing that the House could not make a new world for the man but could only help him achieve his own goals. After this admission indoctrination, each new resident received fresh linen, soap, tobacco and other personal items.

The second interview for new residents took place in the in-House office of the Vocational Rehabilitation counselor, who then arranged for a complete physical examination for each man. Without these examinations, no further work could be conducted with other agencies and the next few days were a continuation of the "controlled environment", without bars, that preceded entry to the House. Throughout, it was stressed to the men that their participation was voluntary.

The following are broad observations from manual methods:

Race: Of the 367 men admitted to the House, 328 were Caucasian, 10 Negro, 22 Mexican-American and 7 American-Indian.

Marital Status: Of the 367 men, 67 were single, 70 married, 209 divorced, and 21 widowed.

Age: The average age of the residents was 46 years: the youngest resident, 22; the oldest, 68.

Occupational data: A total of 258, or 70 percent of the residents, were veterans of military service. A total of 169, or 46 percent, at one time or another had belonged to a unit of organized labor.

Community financial impact: Professional studies have shown that in a community such as Houston, wages lost by persons arrested and incarcerated average out to \$21.23 per day. With the average incarceration for a public drunkenness offense being 14 days, this means that each such arrest distresses the economy by a total of \$297.22. Applying this figure to the 1,310 arrests not made of men in the Opportunity House project suggests, then, a return to the economy of \$389,358.20. Applying it to the actual, total decrease in arrests for the effective eight months of the project suggests a return to the economy of \$883,635.06.

Agency involvement: The key to success of this project was the cooperation of public and private agencies in the Houston community. As indicated elsewhere in this report, the agency most involved was the Texas Rehabilitation Commission operation, a factor which directly relates to the employability of the residents and, thereby, to the feasibility of measuring community financial impact as was done in the paragraph above. In all, of the 303 men who remained more than one week at the House, 255 were accepted by Texas Rehabilitation Commission and provided with direct re-access to the labor market. In addition, from the total group of 367 men (in actuality, 24 of the men who remained fewer than eight days were referred), 38 entered the Veterans Administration Hospital alcoholism program, 9 were provided employment through resources of Alcoholics Anonymous, 9 were admitted to the County Hospital for extended treatment, 5 were accepted by the Harris County Welfare Department, 4 received help from the American Red Cross, 2 were referred to the YMCA, 2 to the Tuberculosis Sanitarium for treatment, 2 to the Harris County Optometric Society for free eyeglasses, and one to REACT.

Re-Admissions to the House: Of the 367 residents of the House, a total of 103 were readmitted for times varying from one day to several weeks. No statistical breakdown on these cases has been attempted, but the majority probably were men who had made one "slip" and afterwards had convinced Alcoholics Anonymous and other specialists of the sincerity of the individual during his initial stay. Of the 103 men readmitted, one-half remained clear of alcohol and the law.

Project Costs: The original grant amount for a 12-month project, including planning and acquisition costs and time, estimated that a total of \$99,815 would be required. At the close of the Project, which was conducted for 51 weeks in full-scale operation and which also involved three months of preliminary work, the total cost to LEAA was \$77,951.25. Major savings were effected through support work of local agencies, locating and equipping the facility at costs far below original estimates, and in operating efficiencies. A total of 12,080 man-days were spent by residents in Opportunity House, which meant an average daily residency of 33.5 men and an average cost per man per day of \$6.80.

Average length of stay: Although estimates by City Courts personnel at the outset of the project indicated all agency help could be completed in an average of ten days, it was quickly discovered that such was only the ideal. Due to the time necessary for evaluation of Vocational Rehabilitation testing results (an average of four days), as well as normal delays in non-emergency medical treatment (such as eyeglasses, dental, etc.), many cases went far beyond the ten day estimate. This became an obvious necessity in view of the fact that the work of many agencies required completion of the work of other agencies before it could be begun--a factor not anticipated in the original planning. Final analysis showed, also that the re-entry of 103 of the 367 men for further assistance, plus the extended treatment required for the majority, extended the average stay to 25.8 days.

The impact of this project has been in most ways more effective than was anticipated in the original grant application. In particular, the primary objective of the Opportunity House was to break the cycle which makes arrests for public drunkenness the single most significant statistic of all urban arrests. It has done this directly by providing the guidance with which 303 men were not arrested a total of 1,310 times which under their otherwise normal circumstances would have occurred, or in other terms has produced a direct reduction in arrests of 62.2 percent for this group. It has further demonstrated beyond anticipation that the so-called "hard core" of these offenders is more within reach of such treatment than most other groups, by diminishing arrests for the 44 men normally apprehended 20 or more times a year by 75.3 percent. Thirdly, the handling of these men under the Opportunity House concept has been shown clearly to be one with long-range impact, with the records of the earliest residents showing a continued reduction even below the reduction produced in their first few months of exposure to the House. Fourth, the broad percentage figures on the reduction actually are conservative measurements, inasmuch as the records show conclusively that even higher percentages of the resident remain below their levels of statistical probability, while the overall statistics on reduction are impacted negatively by only a few men in each group.

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FOREWORD

On September 25, 1970, the administration of Opportunity House was assumed by the City of Houston Department of Public Health.

Despite critical financial problems, relocation of the residents, and a severe shortage in the house staff, Christmas of 1970 found the project moving towards its original purpose.

INTRODUCTION

The real meaning of this word, "Opportunity"*

Every city has its "revolving door" drunks--the typical "wino", the homeless, skid row derelict--or, in politer terms, the repeat public drunkenness offender, who is in jail sleeping or working off a drunk almost as soon as he got out from his last term.

Many programs by many agencies have tried to stop this cycle, but with the exception of Missions and the Salvation Army, which are located in the middle of the skid rows, most of these agencies and their programs are unknown to the revolving door men. Still, most of these programs recognize that sooner or later--if it isn't too late--every one of those men will reach the point where he wants desperately to get out of that cycle...most often, probably, on a day when he has walked out of the barred rooms for the twentieth time in a year and in something like a panic starts to search for a road to somewhere besides the bar rooms.

On that day, he stands there...wearing the same wrinkled, dirty and probably befouled and stinking clothes he wore when he was arrested, ten or twelve days ago. He stands there, faced with immediate and pressing needs and problems. How to provide for the simple needs of food and lodging, clean clothes, toilet articles--the simple things so necessary to make a presentable appearance--the simple things everyone else so often takes for granted.

There are only two ways he can get them, or the money to obtain them--legally. He can go to the blood bank or the labor pool. In one, he can

*Observations of a recovering alcoholic, February 8, 1970.

get a little cash right away: in the other, a day's work throwing advertising circulars on someone's lawn. In both, he's right back with the same people, the same environment that he wants to escape.

If he wants to try for something better, he must find a way to live, to obtain decent clothing, while he arranges for interviews. There isn't enough blood in him to finance that, because he also has that special problem--the extra time it will take, even if he looks respectable, to convince a potential employer he really will stay that way.

If he wants, instead, to seek out some agency to help him, he has no information on what they are, where they are, or what they do. And he still needs to look good, to have lodging and food while he waits for agency aid.

What he wants...what he needs...is not a handout or a lecture. He wants...and needs...an opportunity.

SECTION A

PROJECT HISTORY - A SUMMARY

Houston Opportunity House was a pioneer effort conducted through discretionary grant funding from November 8, 1969 through October 31, 1970, to attack the serious law enforcement problem of public drunkenness arrests. It was based on eight years of uncentered experience by leadership of Alcoholics Anonymous and numerous other public and private organizations in the community.

The prior experience of AA and other groups was accompanied by a steady decrease in arrests for public drunkenness, with the annual average going from 32,448 in 1961 to 26,007 in 1968. However, inasmuch as arrests for this offense continued in 1968 to account for approximately one-half of all local arrests, the leadership of the community groups sought establishment of a receiving and counseling residence to provide material necessities during the time the victims of alcoholism were receiving the services of specialists in fields ranging from vocational guidance to medicine.

The concept which these private citizens had developed and which was to be tested by the grant-supported effort is based on a cycle followed by public drunkenness offenders. As observed by the AA leadership, thousands of individuals each year are arrested in "skid row" areas of the city, found guilty of public drunkenness, incarcerated at the City Prison Farm when found unable to pay fines, only to make their way back to the original arrest area upon being released. Early efforts to help these men break the cycle determined that the most effective point is immediately after release from the Prison Farm. At that stage, the alcoholic has completed a period of enforced sobriety, cleanliness and good diet, free from the social atmosphere in which alcohol is the simple escape. Consequently the preceding efforts from 1961 to 1968 had taken selected men and concentrated on

solving their problems. This experience had shown a clear need for continuance of the diet, cleanliness and atmosphere of the prison farm, combined with the dignity of freedom and the counseling and assistance of innumerable available agencies -- and to this purpose the Opportunity House was dedicated.

The selection of the post-Prison Farm stage also meets the problems of the unique legal situation involved. In Houston, the City Charter does not allow its judges to mete out jail terms, but provides only the power to fine: thus, sentences to the Prison Farm are regarded not as court-ordered terms, but as remanding the indigent to a city facility to "work off" the debt they cannot pay.* The difficulty in this is that there is therefore no legal mechanism for a parole to a treatment center, and the post-Farm period thus is the most logical time.

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SECTION A-1

EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of the repeat public drunkenness offender is more than a dilemma of human misery and individual social adjustment. It also is of such scope that it places a heavy strain on the manpower and finances of municipal police, courts and prison systems. In Houston, which is not exceptional in the nation in regard to this problem, these offenders have for many years accounted for one-half of all non-traffic arrests made by City police officers.

Detailed analysis of this situation over the past decade shows a cyclical pattern which traps both the offender and the system of justice, with constant repetition of an almost unbreakable chain of events, from skid-row arrest to court to prison farm to skid-row and re-arrest. Until recently, the only pathway out of this cycle for most individuals has been delirium tremens and death.

The impact of alcoholism, of course, goes beyond these factors, and the impress of any alleviation consequently would be even greater. Alcoholism, according to a Washington Post editorial of February 8, 1970, is the nation's most ignored and most costly illness, currently afflicting as many as 10 million Americans. The only recent public programs to combat it, as exemplified in the 1970 Maryland Comprehensive Intoxication and Alcoholic Control Act, are the commonly called "DeTox" operations, which are medically oriented and require great expenditures of both time and money, and are limited in the services they provide.

Because of the breadth of the problem, no single program can realistically be expected to eliminate it, no final or total treatment can intelligently be expected to solve it. But just as certainly, any significant

improvement can be of measurable and immeasurable benefit. In Houston, for example, through 1968 the toll of public drunkenness offenders produced a heavy drain on the resources of police and courts, which already were functioning with barely half the manpower minimums established by such organizations as the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Each arrest in a case of public drunkenness at that time involved a minimum of six officers, from the dispatchers, beat patrolmen, jail officers and desk men to the officers in charge. On an annual basis, it is estimated that the cost of this "minor crime" was approaching 100,000 man-hours of police time and a total cost to the city of nearly \$5 million, when the pro-rated costs of courts and prison farms were interpolated (a prior study, conducted by then Police Inspector Larry Fultz, with allowances for increases in costs, showed that in 1969, each arrest of a public drunkenness offender cost the City government \$160.83).

On May 14, 1969, the Mayor of the City of Houston was informed that a grant was available from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for the purpose of exploring new avenues to fight crime. Since it was apparent that further and more substantial reductions in public drunkenness arrests would free police for other anti-crime duties, the Mayor proposed an Opportunity House program to LEAA on May 16, 1969. On June 3, 1969, the City was requested to prepare a formal grant application for the project, for consideration by June 10, 1969, and the application was forthwith compiled and submitted.

Approval of the grant request, as part of \$1,048,935 in discretionary fund allocations to the nation's 11 largest cities, was announced in Washington, D. C., on July 1, 1969, and the Mayor was formally notified of the approval on July 15, 1969. Precise planning began three days later

and on November 8, 1969, Houston Opportunity House opened at 1111 Rosalie Street. From then until the project completion date of October 31, 1970, the House was an operational project, providing support, treatment and guidance for 367 individuals.

Because of preliminary indications of success, the project was re-funded through a separate grant category for an additional 15-month period, to commence upon completion of the pilot phase under the original grant.

Management and operation of the House was conducted by a staff of only five personnel, headed by Project Manager L. B. Davis, Jr., and maintaining a functional level of operations on a 24-hour, seven-day basis.

Where original concepts of the project presumed that it would be most effective in dealing with alcoholics in a type of middle status--that is, in which they were deeply enough involved in the cycle to have a serious problem, but not so deeply involved as to be chronic offenders--it was quickly discovered that it was most effective in dealing with the most serious offenders, men with an average of 20 or more arrests per year. In all, 44 of the men who remained in the program long enough for it to become effective with them, were in this category. Men in this group were exposed to the impact of Opportunity House for an average of 192 days, which under normal circumstances--being almost exactly one-half year--should have meant a minimum number of average arrests of 10. In final analysis, these supposedly "hopeless" cases had recorded the most impressive results of all categories by showing a 75.3 percent decrease in arrests from what normally would have been expected among them. Equally significant is the fact that of the 44, an even dozen--more than 25 percent--remained totally sober, and eight additional men "slipped" only once after their Opportunity House experience.

With the exception of first-time offenders, the impact of the House was similarly impressive although no group reached the 75.3 percent reduction of the most serious group. In brief, men with previous records of from two-to-five arrests per year showed a 43.5 percent decrease; men with previous records of from six-to-ten arrests per year showed a 68.5 percent decrease; and men with previous records of from 11 to 20 arrests per year showed a 51.5 percent decrease.

Overall, of the 367 men who entered the project, 64 dropped out or were asked to leave before they had spent more than seven days, the general minimum time discovered necessary to begin serious work with them. Of the 303 who were residents for longer periods, men ranging from first-time offenders to the serious cases, the overall decrease in arrests was computed at 62.2 percent. Among this group, 124 remained totally clean, remaining sober and free from re-arrest after entering Opportunity House, and a substantial percentage of those who did suffer re-arrests were far below their anticipated average without the intercession of this project.

One of the pleasant surprises in the Project came from a continuing analysis of early residents, to probe the question of whether the impact of the House would be short-term or long-range. The records show clearly that the impact extends over a considerable period of time--certainly through the life of the project and anticipatedly far beyond it. In particular, men in the "20 plus" previous category, at the midway point of the project showed a 66 percent decrease in their arrests--certainly encouraging, but nonetheless measurably below the year-long average for the entire group (75.3 percent). However, a final review of these individuals at the end of a year showed their record had improved, rather than deteriorated, so that as a subgroup they had a slightly better

record (a 75.7 percent reduction) than their entire main group (all "20 plus" offenders in the project). Similar continuing sobriety was shown for all other groups in the project.

Impact of the program on the City government indicates that as much as the time of eight police officers was freed from this onerous duty for the fight against more serious crime. In dollars and cents, the direct, measurable savings to City government was somewhere between \$185,000 and \$478,000—a range far beyond the cost of the entire project, in tax funds.

The success of the project actually depended most significantly on the endeavors of private and public agencies in Houston aside from the many divisions of City government which became involved. Specifically, major support was provided by Texas Rehabilitation Commission, the Veterans Administration Hospital and Alcoholics Anonymous through its Intergroup Association, Inc.

Continuing assistance, guidance and support also were provided by St. Joseph's Hospital, which made welcome House residents at its psychological group sessions and provided volunteer and interviewer personnel for specialized occasions; the Texas Commission on Alcoholism, which provided the special, consultative service and guidance of its field representative and its state program coordinator, both of whom were essential in the opening phases of the project as well as most useful through its life; the Houston Council on Alcoholism, a United Fund agency, whose executive director provided special insight and regular assistance of a guidance nature; the Texas House, which provided the services of therapeutic counselors; the Harris County Hospital District, which provided direct, emergency medical care for many men, as well as hospitalization for 9 men; the Texas State

Hospital, which provided medical care and guidance: the Texas Employment Commission, which provided the regular testing services of its operations throughout the project duration: the Houston Legal Foundation, which provided special legal counsel for men in need of advice in that area: the Harris County Optometric Society, whose members provided eye care when needed: the San Jose Clinic, which made available dental care: the Harris County Mental Health Screening Center and the Harris County Psychiatric Diagnostic Clinic, both of which provided guidance.

SECTION B

METHODOLOGY

Personnel:

Inasmuch as the project was intended to deal with a statistically high crime problem, it was considered essential for its initial activities to be under the general guidance of an advisory group of City officials whose normal functions provided them with insight and contacts relative to public drunkenness. At the same time, it was recognized that the day-to-day operation of the House would require a staff with both expertise and the instant authority required for dealing with alcoholics, and that the key to successful treatment of the men would depend on the cooperation of agencies independent of the City. Accordingly, a unique, three-level system of personnel was established.

At the top was the Advisory Group, composed of the judge in whose court all public drunkenness cases are handled; the police inspector in charge of the jail division where such cases appear; the presiding judge of the City Courts Department, inasmuch as the first-listed judge is under his supervision; a third member of the City judiciary chosen to insure representation of minority group views; and an administrative assistant to the Mayor with training and experience in both criminology and social problems.

Because the judge who hears all public drunkenness cases had initially brought to the attention of the Mayor the work of Alcoholics Anonymous and other groups, as well as their idea of an Opportunity House, he was designated Project Director. Under his urging, it was recognized that the city judiciary is not the proper agency for supervision of rehabilitative operations and the Advisory Group thus

was specifically not made a board of directors, but instead was designed more to be a launching group, intended to begin the project and later to evaluate its performance. Specifically, as approved in the LEAA grant, this unique body was created to:

- (1) Complete all necessary, detailed arrangements with various consultative agencies.
- (2) Meet as necessary with members of the various agencies to solve any developing problems and to obtain data for final assessments.
- (3) Meet twice monthly with the Project Manager and representatives of agencies to maintain liaison with the project.
- (4) Assist resident personnel of the House in obtaining vehicles and other equipment and services provided by the City government.
- (5) Locate and select the initial staff for actual operation of the House.
- (6) Develop specific evaluative procedures.
- (7) Establish procedures to maintain contact with former House residents.
- (8) Utilize both city and private facilities for computer studies of the project.
- (9) Evaluate the project at the end of six months and initiate plans either to disband it if it appeared unsuccessful or to obtain permanent funding if it appeared successful.
- (10) Maintain general review over spending, personnel functions and general operations.

Because of policy decisions in the City Courts Department and due to the abilities and energies of resident personnel of the House, however, most of the above duties instantly fell upon the project manager. In particular, the Advisory Group during the year of House operation never met with agency representatives and, until June 8, 1970, conducted meetings only for the purpose of passing on the qualifications of secondary echelon employees of the House. Specifically, the Advisory Group conducted a get-acquainted meeting

with spokesmen from several local agencies on August 1, 1969, prior to the opening of the House, and then met on six subsequent occasions to discuss personnel matters, with the Presiding Judge commencing participation only after the meeting of June 8, 1970.

The second division of personnel was composed of the only paid employees of the Project, the operating level of personnel officed and housed physically in the House. These personnel consisted of the Project Manager, a secretary, a house manager, an assistant manager and a cook. As operations of the House developed, the project manager became responsible for all arrangements with various agencies for the services they could provide for the House residents, generally served as overseer of financial and operational operations, served as primary screening source for resident applicants, as prime liaison with City departments, as locator and supervisor of all other House employees, as contact with former residents, as well as initial work in locating a suitable building and having it properly equipped. The secretary performed routine secretarial duties for the project manager as well as assistance in resident initial interviews for the first nine months of the project, and thereafter was primarily designated to serve the project director. The house manager and assistant manager rotated to provide round-the-clock, seven-days weekly resident supervision of the daily conduct of residents, managed the physical facilities and exact lodging arrangements of individuals. The cook, in addition to obtaining and preparing three meals daily, maintained a constantly operational coffee bar and provided on-call help to other House staff members.

The third division of personnel was composed of the agents of various private and public groups dealing with the problems of alcoholics.

In the conduct of operations, the operational philosophy called for the regular, paid personnel of the House to provide primary care and supervision for residents while appropriate consultative agents met with them to determine their individual physical, environmental and medical needs.

Very early in the conduct of the project it was realized that the most fundamental need for these alcoholics was the development of an acceptable method of self-support. Consequently, the Texas Rehabilitation Commission became an extremely vital component of the operation. Through most of the project, Texas Rehabilitation Commission maintained a full-time counselor at the House. In all, they provided special support for 255 of the 367 men who were residents of the House, with services ranging from a minimum of testing and interviewing to actual retraining and placement in productive jobs.

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Although these and other agencies dealing with alcoholics existed in Houston at the inception of this project, it was found early in the operations that many personal needs of residents could not be met through them or through the facilities of the City. Consequently, leaders of the original uncentered movement to help the victims of alcoholism formed a new, non-profit corporation--Houston Opportunity House, Inc., to provide special advice and support not otherwise available. Its membership provided funds for incidental purchases, such as razors, comb, cigarettes, clothing, and also assisted in direct labor functions to keep the building in order.

Facilities:

The location at 1111 Rosalie, utilized for the Opportunity House, was a former hospital annex. It was chosen both due to its physical attributes and to its location--near enough to the center of the City and the medical center to make services convenient, and yet far enough away from "skid row" type areas to make them (or the distance to them) unattractive. The structure, a three-level building, provided adequate space for offices for staff and consultants, for dining and relaxation areas, and to house at a maximum some 70 men. However, it was quickly discovered that the skeletal staff of five full-time personnel was most effective with a resident load of less than 45, and this level of occupancy was early designated the optimum. It was further regarded as most effective for the purposes of the project, on the advice of psychological counselors, inasmuch as an increase in residency would have created too similar an atmosphere to the crowded penal atmosphere the House was designed to overcome.

When obtained, the Rosalie Street building was in only partial use by an engineering firm, and was made available at a rental rate far below the

original anticipation of the City. Major remodeling of its interior was necessary, performed by City Public Works employees, volunteers, and early residents.

It had originally been expected that within 60 days of receiving the grant, the City could have begun the project. However, efforts to obtain such a site were delayed by the Project Director until the hiring of the Project Manager in late August; it became his task both to locate, contract for and equip the building, which was done by November 8.

Procedures:

The normal process for a House resident began with observations and interviews by AA personnel at the Prison Farm and City Jail. In close cooperation with the Farm captain and jail officials, the AA personnel then determined as far as was possible the sincerity and potential of the individual for rehabilitation. Upon the joint referral of these personnel, the Project Manager accepted the candidate.

The initial planning for the project had called for the City to provide a mini-bus for the House to use in transporting ex-prisoners to the House and residents to and from various treatment and testing appointments. However, due to lack of availability of the desired vehicle, two standard automobiles were provided. These were used in conjunction with return-trips by police wagons which had taken new inmates to the prison farm.

Upon arrival at the House, the new resident would be assigned to a room and given an explanation in detail of the operation. Then, utilizing a form designed by the Project Manager with the aid of private industry data processing experts, an in-depth interview was conducted. The information on these forms was designed both for better understanding by House and agency

personnel, and for eventual use in computer studies of the statistical significance of the project. (A sample is appended to this report, p. 8).

Although estimates by City Courts personnel at the outset of the project indicated all agency help could be completed in an average of ten days, it was quickly discovered that such was only the ideal. Due to the time necessary for evaluation of Vocational Rehabilitation testing results (an average of four days), as well as normal delays in non-emergency medical treatment (such as eyeglasses, dental, etc.), many cases went far beyond the ten day estimate. This became an obvious necessity in view of the fact that the work of many agencies required completion of the work of other agencies before it could be begun--a factor not anticipated in the original planning. Final analysis showed, also, that the re-entry of 103 of the 367 men for further assistance, plus the extended treatment required for the majority, extended the average stay to 25.8 days.

The initial interview at the House placed special emphasis on the self-help aspects of the program, leaning heavily on the proven philosophy of the AA program, and stressing that the House could not make a new world for the man but could only help him achieve his own goals. After this admission indoctrination, each new resident received fresh linen, soap, tobacco and other personal items.

The second interview for new residents took place in the in-House office of the Vocational Rehabilitation counselor, who then arranged for a complete physical examination for each man. Without these examinations, no further work could be conducted with other agencies and the next few days were a continuation of the "controlled environment", without bars, that preceded entry to the House. Throughout, it was stressed to the men that their participation was voluntary.

OPPORTUNITY HOUSE

CODE NO: _____

1.		Name	S.S. No.	Sex M F	Race		DESCRIPTIVE	DATA		
		Birth Date	Age	EDUCATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 - 1 2 3 4			JOB SKILL			
		Marital Status M S W D Sep.	No. Dependants	Name of Spouse			UNION MEMBER			
		Total No. Previous Arrests	Total Days	Cost to City			WHITE COLLAR			
		Previous Work Experience			Wage or Salary Range			OTHER		
		Union Member Yes No	Name of Union	Local No.	Location			EX. G.I.		
		Office Worker	Name of Company		Location					
		Remarks								
		Interview Date					Interviewed By			
		Date In - Op. Hse	Date Out	Length Stay	Cost					
		Agency Referred to	Date	Follow Up Date						
		Action Taken by Agency								
		Personal & Job Experience Since								
		Total New Arrests					Days Lost	Cost to City	Lost Wages Earnable	
		Remarks								
		Interview Date					Interviewed By			
		Date In - Op. Hse	Date Out	Length Stay	Cost					
		Agency Referred to	Date	Follow Up Date						
		Action Taken by Agency								
		Personal & Job Experience Since								
		Prev. Treatment					V.A.	M.H.	G.H.	Other
		Status at End of Period								
		Final Disposition								
								PREVIOUS TOTAL ARRESTS		
								TOTAL DAYS		
								COST TO CITY		
								LOST WAGES EARNABLE		
								DAYS IN OP. HOUSE		
								COST SAVINGS TO CITY		
								PREVIOUS TOTAL ARRESTS		
								TOTAL DAYS		
								COST TO CITY		
								LOST WAGES EARNABLE		
								DAYS IN OP. HOUSE		
								COST SAVINGS TO CITY		
								SUMMARY	+	
								A 1 - C 1 =	-	
								A 2 - C 2 =	-	
								A 3 - C 3 =	-	
								A 4 - C 4 =	-	
								A 3 + C 3 =	Total Cost To City	
								B 2 + D 2 =	Total Op. Hse Cost	
								A3 + C3 - B2 - D2 =	Net Savings Community	
								+ Now Earning & Productive		

Following physical examination, if medical treatment was indicated, House personnel arranged for it. If no treatment was needed, the resident then was given the name and telephone number of a personal counselor at the downtown office of Texas Rehabilitation Commission. Placing this responsibility on the resident was an early, clear step to insist that it was a self-help program, although transportation was arranged by the House for appointments made.

Because of the recognized occupational needs of these men, throughout the Project, Texas Rehabilitation Commission remained the first point of call and had the first determination on each individual. They provided, for acceptable clients, vocational training, rehabilitative services and therapy, including providing outside housing for the men upon their departure from Opportunity House, through payments to facilities such as Texas House. In addition, Texas Rehabilitation Commission provided direct, remedial medical treatment where it was deemed necessary.

As indicated previously, of the 367 House residents, 38 went to the Veterans Administration Hospital. This group was only a small fraction of the veterans in the group (258 of the 367 had served in the Armed Services). The 38 participated in a 70-day special program at the Hospital, an in-patient alcoholism project: upon completion, they returned to the Opportunity House for further aid, if needed.

The activities for each individual resident varied, since the basic concept of the program is that individual treatment and concern is needed. The Community Mental Health Center at St. Joseph's Hospital, offering both group therapy on a regular, bi-weekly basis, and individual help on call, was utilized by a majority of the inmates. Similarly, a high percentage availed themselves of the counseling and therapeutic support of Alcoholics Anonymous, whose members conducted four meetings weekly at the House. All residents

were required to participate in one form or another of self-examining assistance, through these programs or through out-patient sessions at the Texas House or the V.A.

Because the men involved were selected due to serious drinking problems, it was expected at the outset that many would not be seriously ready for assistance when they entered Opportunity House. Several dozen incidents of drinking either at the House or while a resident did occur, and in each instance the offender was requested to leave. However, this did not affect their eligibility to re-enter, and awareness of this prompted many re-entries.

For the great bulk of the men, the end of the formal phase of the project arrived when they had found employment and other more permanent living quarters. Through July, 1970, the Project Manager maintained personal contact with most such "alumni", but such efforts were terminated at that stage of the project.

Concentration:

At its inception, the Opportunity House deliberately limited to concentration on one particular segment of the repeat offenders. This segment, or level, was based on the numbers of average arrests per year for each individual, and was chosen due to two factors: the potential impact on the police/courts workload of even a small improvement, and the presumption that the men most likely to be reached by such a program were those somewhere between the first offenders and the so-called, confirmed drunks. The five basic segments of offenders, as analyzed by the City Courts Department, showed this breakdown:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Number/arrests</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
A	1	2167	4710
B	2-5	1442	1806
C	6-10	298	378
D	11-20	159	173
E	20+	34	19

So, the original concept of the judiciary of the City was that men in Groups A and B probably were not deeply enough into the cycle of public drunkenness to be impacted by such a program, whereas those in Groups D and E were probably too far gone to be reached. Further, the thinking was that those in Group C, if reached in any appreciable number, would have a substantial effect in reducing total arrests.

In actual operation of the House, it soon was learned that the transitory nature of many public drunkenness offenders did not produce an accurate picture of their past records. Consequently, after the first two months of operation a more careful interrogation was made of each new resident to obtain a more accurate record: this, combined with interviews on early residents, showed that large numbers were coming to the program from all four of the categories, B through E. Since at that stage of the project, preliminary examinations showed substantial impact on all groups, less attention was paid than was originally planned to those in Group C as the only ones reachable. Although nothing indicated a change in impact after this state, new policy was imposed by the Advisory Board in July, 1970, limiting the House stay for more serious offenders (the impact of this change will be examined in the following section).

SECTION C
FINDINGS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
ANALYSIS

Ricidivism:

Since the fundamental objective of this project as an LEAA supported study is to endeavor to reduce arrests for public drunkenness, primary statistical collection and examination has concentrated on this factor.

The attached tables (C-1 through C-6, pages 6 through 19, Section C of this report) reflect the overall impact of the project on the five categories of offenders and further provide a comparative base through examination of those residents whose stay in Opportunity House (seven or fewer days) was too brief for the project to have had measurable impact.

In examining these tables, it will be noted that two, sometimes different figures are listed for each resident under the general heading of "Previous Arrests". As indicated in the preceding section of this report, this is due to the transitory nature of these men: in each table, the first figure under this heading is the man's own admission in regard to the number of arrests in the preceding year: the second figure is the reflection of computerized records of the Houston Police Department. Further, since Opportunity House functioned strictly as a voluntary project and all residents were totally free to come and go, the date of their admission to the House is regarded as the significant nexus for comparison of past and subsequent arrests.

The following are primary observations from these tables:

(1) The arrests reflected in Table C-1 are of men in Category A, those who had been arrested only one time in the preceding year. The 15 men in this category were under the influence of Opportunity House for an average

of 226 days, which statistically suggests that under circumstances normal for them they would have been expected to be arrested .62 times as often as a group, or a total of nine times in the 226 days. As the records reflect, the men in this group were arrested 10 times during that period, an increase beyond normal expectations of 11 percent.

However, it should be noted that the size of this group makes it a questionable subject for proper analysis, and the closeness of the actual arrests to projected arrests suggests only that the original concept--that one-time offenders are not deep enough into the cycle to be affected--is correct.

(2) Table C-2 lists the comparative records of men in Category B, those with from two to five arrests in the year preceding their admission to Opportunity House.

These 79 subjects were under the influence of the House for an average of 216 days, which produces a probability of arrest in that period equal to .59 of a year's arrests, or an expected total of arrests for the group of 159. In fact, however, the 79 members of the group accounted for only 89 arrests--a total which is 43.5 percent lower than would normally have been expected.

It should further be noted that within this group, 39 men had no arrests subsequent to their admission to Opportunity House and that 18 were arrested only one time, both figures reflecting a substantial impact of the project. It is especially significant that of those men, 12 had gone considerably beyond the average of 216 days (men entering the House prior to January 1, 1970, were free and sober at least 307 days each).

(3) Table C-3 lists the records of men in Category C, those with from six to ten arrests in the year prior to Opportunity House entry.

These 92 men, the largest individual group among these groupings, also were under House impact for a 216 day average and thus had the same .59 probability of equaling the total arrests for an entire year. In fact, however, where this meant they should have been arrested a total of 434 times in those 216 days under "normal" conditions, they were arrested only 136 times--a total of 68.5 percent below anticipation.

Of the 92 men, 45 remained free of arrest following admission to the Opportunity House--an average freedom of 216 days and obviously a major impact of the program on this significant group. In addition, 14 of the remaining 47 men experienced only one arrest and 11 more were arrested only twice, both categories being below the normal expectations.

(4) Table C-4 reflects the records of Category D, men with from 11 to 20 arrests in the preceding year.

For these 73 men, the average time under influence of the House was 242 days, which meant a probability of .66 of the arrests the same had experienced in the year preceding entry. As the records show, the total arrests for the group totalled 345, whereas the probability in 242 days was 710 arrests. The group, thus reflects a 51.5 decrease in arrests.

Of these men, 18 remained clear of the law, with the longest individual record being Case No. 75, who entered the House on December 13, 1969, and thus remained sober for the entire 324 days remaining in the project period. Equally significantly, 10 of the group of 73 experienced only one arrest, 3 were arrested only twice, 6 were arrested three times, 5 were arrested four times and 4 were arrested five times, all records far below the normal expectations for men who normally would have been expected to be in jail from 11 to 20 times in a single year.

(5) Table C-5 reflects the records of men arrested 20 or more times prior to entering Opportunity House, in a year-long period.

For the 44 men in this group, the average time under the impact of Opportunity House was 192 days, which produces a probability factor for arrests of .53. Applying this against the 1062 total of arrests reported and/or recorded for these men in a prior year would point toward an expected total arrest record of 563. In actuality, the total of arrests subsequent to House admission was 139, a reduction of 75.3 percent for this group.

Further, of the 44 men, 12 went without an additional arrest on their records, 8 were arrested a single time only, and 20 were apprehended fewer than nine times--all below the normal statistical expectations.

(6) In general for all five categories, it should be noted that small percentages of men in each group exceeded by far the normal expectations for arrests. Thus, in Category A, 4 of the 15 men accounted for 9 of the ten arrests made after their exposure to Opportunity House; in Category B, 13 of the 79 men accounted for 54 of the 89 arrests; in Category C, 10 of the 92 men accounted for 66 of the 136 arrests; in Category D, 13 of the 73 men accounted for 175 of the 345 arrests; and in Category E, 7 of the 44 men accounted for 86 of the 139 arrests.

(7) Table C-6 depicts the records of men who remained in Opportunity House for seven or fewer days. Inasmuch as this is not true grouping from the point of previous records, a direct comparison with the individual results of other group analysis is invalid. If this Group F is subgrouped, however, it produces points of some validity. In particular, where this group as a whole shows considerably more arrests after exposure to the House than do Groups B, C, D and E, within it, those with a full seven days in Opportunity House (a total of 10 men) compare favorably. This subgroup, of

seven-day men, would normally have expected a total of 60 arrests in its 222 days average period, but in fact experienced only 30 arrests. Similarly, men with six days of exposure (a subgroup of 13 individuals) normally could have anticipated 78 arrests but actually experienced 50; and men with five days exposure (a subgroup of 7 men) experienced a total of 39 arrests, which was only three fewer than normally would have been anticipated.

(8) The combination effect of men who remained in Opportunity House more than seven days shows a total of 303 men, who together accounted for 3152 public drunkenness arrests in the 12 months prior to entering Opportunity House. For an average 219 day period after entry, the 303 men were arrested a total of 719 times, whereas at a probability level of .6 they would have normally been apprehended a total of 1892 times. The overall reduction in arrests, therefore, was 62.2 percent.

Among the group of 303 men, a total of 124 suffered no re-arrests at all following their introduction to Opportunity House.

TABLE C-1

ARREST COMPARISONS

Group A
(1 or no previous
arrests in 12 mos.)

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House entry</u>
5	11/8/69	23	357	1	1	1
21	11/14/69	26	351	0	1	2
78	12/15/69	20	322	1	0	2
84	12/22/69	75	315	1	1	0
94	12/26/69	22	311	1	1	2
96	12/29/69	95	308	0	1	0
128	1/16/70	65	290	1	1	0
141	2/2/70	36	273	1	1	0
159	2/20/70	22	256	1	1	0
196	4/2/70	8	216	1	1	0
301	7/11/70	26	113	1	1	0
320	7/31/70	47	93	1	1	0
321	7/31/70	11	93	1	1	3
340	8/24/70	36	69	1	1	0
367	11/1/70	12	12	1	1	0
			3379	(15)		10

TABLE C-2

Group B
(2-5 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House entry</u>
7	11/10/69	11	355	2	2	0
15	11/12/69	12	353	3	3	2
24	11/15/69	10	350	0	5	2
25	11/15/69	9	350	2	1	1
27	11/15/69	53	350	1	5	0
31	11/17/69	18	348	2	2	4
33	11/18/69	54	347	3	5	1
35	11/19/69	12	346	2	1	0
39	11/21/69	21	344	5	1	0
50	11/27/69	26	338	1	2	3
51	11/28/69	19	337	2	3	6
62	12/6/69	10	329	2	1	1
70	12/12/69	18	325	2	1	0
73	12/13/69	17	324	3	2	6
76	12/15/69	50	322	2	2	1
79	12/15/69	8	322	2	1	1
82	12/19/69	23	318	2	1	0
83	12/19/69	10	318	2	1	0
99	1/2/70	23	305	4	1	0
101	1/3/70	36	303	2	2	0
105	1/5/70	20	301	4	2	3
111	1/8/70	15	298	3	2	2
112	1/10/70	15	296	3	3	1
113	1/10/70	45	296	2	4	2
126	1/16/70	95	290	2	2	0
129	1/17/70	52	289	5	2	2
138	1/30/70	15	276	5	1	1
144	3/25/70	67	223	5	3	3
150	2/13/70	25	264	2	1	0
158	2/18/70	17	258	4	1	0
162	2/28/70	24	248	2	1	0
163	2/28/70	17	248	5	2	2
165	3/3/70	20	245	4	5	1
169	3/7/70	27	241	3	3	0

TABLE C-2 (Cont'd.)

Group B
(2-5 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
171	3/10/70	14	238	3	1	0
172	3/10/70	34	238	4	5	4
173	3/14/70	10	234	2	1	3
186	3/24/70	10	224	3	1	1
189	3/25/70	10	223	2	3	0
191	3/27/70	8	221	4	1	0
193	3/28/70	33	220	5	1	0
198	4/4/70	10	214	2	2	1
203	4/6/70	32	212	4	5	4
205	4/9/70	18	209	2	2	1
210	4/11/70	34	207	3	2	3
215	4/24/70	14	195	5	0	1
229	4/24/70	41	195	5	1	9
231	5/2/70	9	187	2	1	0
232	4/29/70	36	190	2	3	0
236	5/8/70	29	181	3	1	0
238	5/14/70	65	175	2	1	0
239	5/9/70	39	180	4	5	0
240	5/16/70	22	173	1	5	0
241	5/15/70	26	174	4	3	2
245	5/18/70	15	171	2	2	3
253	5/23/70	20	166	2	2	0
263	5/30/70	13	157	5	4	0
269	6/3/70	88	153	3	1	0
272	6/11/70	27	145	4	2	1
275	6/12/70	21	144	4	3	0
286	6/27/70	15	127	5	1	1
292	7/4/70	23	121	3	3	0
295	7/6/70	10	119	3	3	0
302	7/13/70	17	111	0	3	0
309	7/21/70	20	103	4	1	0
311	7/24/70	50	100	2	4	1
313	7/24/70	30	100	2	1	1
319	7/31/70	60	93	0	3	0

TABLE C-2 (Cont'd.)

Group B
(2-5 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests</u>		<u>Arrests after House entry</u>
				<u>Admitted</u>	<u>Recorded</u>	
322	8/3/70	82	89	0	4	0
325	8/10/70	13	83	0	3	1
331	8/14/70	12	79	0	3	3
337	8/22/70	36	71	4	1	0
338	8/22/70	12	71	5	1	0
345	8/31/70	39	62	4	5	1
347	9/5/70	33	57	4	2	1
351	9/24/70	36	38	0	2	0
355	10/5/70	25	26	3	4	0
358	10/17/70	13	14	4	1	0
281	6/18/70	34	149	1	2	2
				17,098	(266)	89

TABLE C-3

Group C
(6-10 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
1	11/8/69	9	357	0	10	11
11	11/11/69	14	354	0	9	2
14	11/12/69	141	353	0	9	3
19	11/14/69	38	351	8	5	0
20	11/14/69	127	351	3	7	6
40	11/21/69	22	344	7	3	2
43	11/22/69	12	343	0	10	2
44	11/22/69	16	343	10	3	12
45	11/22/69	25	343	0	9	3
48	1/3/70	23	303	0	9	8
49	11/27/69	26	338	0	8	0
51	3/21/70	10	227	0	6	3
52	11/28/69	12	337	0	8	2
55	11/28/69	10	337	0	6	0
57	11/29/69	30	336	6	4	0
58	11/29/69	19	336	7	7	4
61	12/4/69	20	331	0	7	1
72	12/15/69	36	322	0	9	4
81	12/17/69	32	320	8	3	2
95	12/29/69	23	308	0	6	0
100	1/3/70	35	303	0	9	0
102	1/5/70	62	301	0	10	0
115	1/12/70	23	294	8	1	2
117	1/12/70	17	294	0	6	3
118	1/12/70	16	294	7	1	0
119	1/14/70	25	292	7	1	0
125	1/16/70	13	290	6	2	1
127	1/16/70	35	290	0	9	3
132	1/23/70	23	283	0	6	2
135	1/26/70	11	280	8	2	0
139	1/30/70	8	276	8	8	7
147	2/11/70	19	266	0	10	0
148	2/13/70	48	264	0	9	0
149	2/13/70	21	264	10	4	1

TABLE C-3
(Cont'd)

Group C
(6-10 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
152	2/13/70	13	264	10	2	0
153	2/13/70	14	264	7	1	1
154	2/14/70	11	263	0	10	0
155	2/16/70	56	261	7	3	0
160	2/20/70	30	257	6	1	0
164	3/2/70	76	246	8	2	0
166	3/3/70	77	245	9	2	0
168	3/6/70	15	242	0	10	5
175	3/14/70	20	234	8	3	5
176	3/16/70	11	232	0	8	4
181	3/19/70	26	229	7	3	0
183	3/21/70	24	227	0	10	3
184	3/21/70	16	227	8	1	0
185	3/23/70	15	225	0	8	3
188	3/24/70	15	224	0	10	2
192	3/27/70	34	221	6	4	0
194	3/28/70	28	220	0	6	3
199	4/4/70	21	214	10	2	1
201	4/4/70	9	214	10	9	1
204	4/8/70	81	210	10	9	3
206	4/10/70	88	208	6	5	1
207	4/10/70	13	208	10	5	1
209	4/11/70	57	207	10	9	0
220	4/24/70	67	195	0	10	1
222	4/25/70	18	194	10	5	0
227	4/23/70	72	196	10	8	0
230	4/29/70	115	190	5	10	0
234	5/5/70	16	184	8	5	2
242	5/18/70	25	171	10	4	0
243	5/19/70	41	170	4	6	0
246	5/21/70	33	168	7	5	2
255	5/26/70	44	163	6	3	0
261	5/30/70	28	157	4	6	1

TABLE C-3
(Cont'd)

Group C
(6-10 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
271	6/5/70	48	151	4	7	0
273	6/9/70	36	147	8	4	0
280	6/8/70	15	148	6	2	0
289	7/2/70	38	123	6	3	1
291	7/4/70	29	121	7	6	0
297	7/7/70	20	118	8	6	0
308	7/18/70	13	106	6	2	0
312	7/24/70	70	100	4	7	1
314	7/25/70	10	99	3	6	0
324	8/8/70	17	85	8	6	3
330	8/14/70	31	79	0	6	3
335	8/15/70	31	78	0	7	0
336	8/22/70	36	71	10	6	0
339	8/24/70	24	69	6	1	0
341	8/25/70	16	68	7	8	2
344	8/31/70	35	62	5	10	1
346	9/1/70	33	61	6	2	0
348	9/5/70	33	57	4	8	1
349	9/4/70	10	58	8	0	1
350	9/18/70	42	44	3	9	0
352	9/26/70	34	36	6	6	0
353	10/2/70	21	29	2	7	0
356	10/8/70	22	23	7	10	0
361	10/19/70	11	12	9	9	0
363	10/21/70	9	10	6	1	0
			19,864	(736)		136

TABLE C-4

Group D
(11-20 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
8	11/10/69	12	355	0	13	13
9	11/10/69	118	355	0	15	11
29	11/16/69	20	349	16	8	11
30	2/9/70	33	268	0	16	16
32	11/17/69	17	348	0	16	1
34	11/18/69	18	347	15	1	2
36	11/19/69	23	346	15	8	9
37	11/19/69	23	346	0	19	16
38	11/21/69	18	344	14	2	3
42	11/21/69	22	344	0	16	14
47	11/24/69	11	341	0	19	12
59	12/3/69	33	332	20	13	1
64	12/6/69	20	329	0	19	11
65	12/6/69	20	329	0	16	6
66	12/6/69	12	329	0	17	10
68	12/11/69	16	324	0	13	1
69	12/11/69	18	324	17	1	4
71	12/12/69	18	325	0	18	14
74	12/13/69	17	324	0	16	21
75	12/13/69	16	324	0	18	0
85	12/20/69	34	317	0	15	3
86	12/22/69	75	315	14	7	0
89	12/25/69	45	312	12	2	0
92	12/26/69	17	311	15	4	5
103	1/3/70	37	303	0	15	14
104	1/3/70	36	303	0	11	6
106	1/5/70	9	301	12	3	6
107	1/5/70	79	301	15	20	9
109	1/6/70	18	300	0	13	7
114	1/10/70	17	296	12	7	12
120	1/13/70	24	293	0	13	1
121	1/14/70	12	292	18	11	6
122	1/15/70	31	291	10	18	10
123	1/15/70	23	291	0	16	6
124	1/15/70	23	291	0	16	5

TABLE C-4
(Cont'd.)

Group D
(11-20 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
				<u>Admitted-</u>	<u>Recorded</u>	
130	1/23/70	15	283	0	14	4
133	1/23/70	45	283	18	11	0
140	1/31/70	24	275	0	13	1
142	2/10/70	76	267	0	18	8
157	2/17/70	73	260	0	14	5
161	2/27/70	23	249	0	12	4
170	3/9/70	51	239	15	3	0
174	3/14/70	26	234	15	4	3
182	3/20/70	40	228	0	17	3
187	3/24/70	24	224	0	14	6
195	4/1/70	30	218	12	3	3
200	4/4/70	9	214	15	4	6
214	4/24/70	8	195	12	1	0
216	4/24/70	38	195	16	5	4
217	4/24/70	15	195	12	6	1
224	4/20/70	74	197	12	5	0
226	4/24/70	17	195	0	13	1
228	4/16/70	33	203	15	1	1
229	4/11/70	40	208	12	16	9
237	5/8/70	18	181	12	16	3
248	5/21/70	15	168	12	1	0
259	5/28/70	60	161	15	7	0
264	6/1/70	29	155	5	14	5
265	6/2/70	70	156	12	4	0
270	6/5/70	39	153	14	1	0
278	6/12/70	74	146	10	14	1
290	7/3/70	13	122	10	19	0
299	7/8/70	49	117	12	14	2
307	7/18/70	57	107	15	6	1
283	6/23/70	27	131	6	17	2
287	6/30/70	54	124	12	9	4
288	7/1/70	15	123	12	3	0
326	8/12/70	23	81	12	5	2
327	8/12/70	75	81	0	11	0

TABLE C-4
(Cont'd.)

Group D
(11-20 arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
329	8/14/70	10	79	0	16	0
357	10/9/70	21	22	12	1	0
359	10/17/70	13	14	15	12	0
360	10/19/70	11	12	2	12	0
			17,695	(1,073)		345

TABLE C-5

Group E
(20+ arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
				<u>Admitted</u>	<u>-Recorded</u>	
3	11/8/69	17	357	40	1	2
6	11/10/69	26	355	25	2	0
16	11/12/69	19	353	0	21	11
18	11/13/69	40	352	0	26	1
22	11/14/69	24	351	25	11	10
41	11/19/69	11	346	20	3	4
53	11/28/69	8	337	20	1	15
60	12/4/69	12	331	0	24	6
63	12/8/69	18	327	0	20	4
87	12/24/69	12	313	25	5	15
97	1/1/70	22	306	25	1	0
98	1/2/70	30	305	30	2	6
134	3/26/70	42	222	0	21	1
143	2/10/70	41	267	0	21	2
151	2/13/70	22	264	20	1	1
167	3/6/70	53	242	0	25	8
211	4/11/70	113	207	8	21	0
213	4/28/70	62	191	15	22	0
233	5/5/70	53	184	25	14	4
244	5/16/70	11	173	20	12	9
249	5/22/70	10	167	20	4	0
267	6/4/70	9	154	20	6	4
268	6/3/70	62	155	35	7	2
274	6/8/70	40	150	30	1	1
279	6/12/70	18	146	25	2	1
282	6/18/70	20	140	25	7	2
284	6/13/70	15	145	20	22	5
285	6/27/70	14	131	20	25	4
293	7/4/70	50	123	25	2	0
296	7/6/70	56	121	20	2	1
298	7/8/70	49	119	15	23	2
300	7/9/70	36	118	20	7	4
303	7/14/70	9	113	20	22	6
304	7/15/70	12	112	24	24	2
305	7/15/70	74	112	25	14	0

TABLE C-5
(Cont'd.)

Group E
(20+ arrests in
prior 12 mos.)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
315	7/20/70	30	106	27	12	2
318	7/28/70	52	97	20	3	0
323	8/8/70	82	85	0	37	1
328	8/14/70	26	79	0	20	2
332	8/14/70	51	79	0	22	1
334	8/15/70	75	78	6	31	0
343	8/29/70	62	64	24	13	0
354	10/2/70	28	29	0	24	0
362	10/19/70	11	12	20	2	0
			8,418	(1,062		139

TABLE C-6

Group F
(Seven or fewer
Days in House)

ARREST COMPARISONS

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>House Days</u>	<u>Days Influenced</u>	<u>Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded</u>		<u>Arrests after House Entry</u>
2	11/8/69	4	357	0	5	9
4	11/8/69	7	357	10	3	3
10	11/12/69	5	353	0	7	3
12	11/11/69	1	354	0	2	3
13	11/12/69	3	353	0	5	6
17	11/12/69	3	353	0	3	0
23	1/17/70	7	289	0	7	1
26	11/15/69	6	350	0	14	10
28	11/15/69	7	350	0	24	12
46	11/22/69	3	343	0	7	13
56	11/28/69	4	337	0	4	2
67	12/6/69	5	329	0	11	10
77	12/16/69	2	321	0	2	2
80	12/17/69	1	320	0	7	3
88	12/24/69	7	313	3	1	0
90	12/26/69	5	311	0	6	4
91	12/26/69	7	311	0	6	4
93	12/26/69	4	311	0	2	7
108	1/6/70	6	300	0	23	6
110	1/6/70	6	300	0	18	7
116	1/12/70	3	294	0	1	1
131	1/23/70	4	283	0	5	9
136	1/28/70	1	278	0	7	4
145	2/9/70	2	268	0	17	12
146	2/10/70	6	267	0	23	4
156	2/17/70	7	260	0	6	1
177	3/16/70	5	232	0	3	13
178	3/18/70	4	230	0	3	5
180	3/18/70	6	230	0	13	4
190	3/25/70	7	223	15	5	2
197	4/3/70	3	215	0	2	1
202	4/4/70	6	214	30	3	10
208	4/10/70	5	208	6	2	2
212	4/13/70	6	206	3	2	1
218	4/27/70	4	190	10	23	4

TABLE C-6
(Cont'd.)

Group F
(Seven or fewer
Days in House)

Case No.	Entry Date	House Days	ARREST COMPARISONS		Arrests after House Entry
			Days Influenced	Previous Arrests Admitted-Recorded	
221	4/24/70	6	193	6 2	1
223	4/21/70	2	190	10 1	0
225	4/23/70	7	192	25 1	2
235	5/8/70	4	181	15 38	11
247	5/21/70	6	168	30 3	1
250	5/22/70	2	167	0 5	0
251	5/23/70	3	166	0 4	6
252	5/23/70	3	166	0 7	4
254	5/26/70	3	163	6 1	3
256	5/27/70	1	162	0 1	1
257	5/27/70	2	162	0 1	0
258	5/29/70	3	160	4 0	0
137	1/29/70	1	277	0 15	13
179	3/18/70	2	230	3 5	3
260	5/30/70	5	157	20 12	6
262	5/30/70	6	157	3 13	3
266	6/4/70	6	154	4 5	0
276	6/12/70	6	144	10 7	0
277	6/12/70	5	144	0 11	1
294	7/4/70	3	121	12 1	0
306	7/16/70	7	108	2 12	3
310	7/23/70	4	101	35 33	3
316	7/22/70	7	102	15 24	2
317	7/28/70	6	96	8 14	3
333	8/15/70	6	78	0 1	0
342	8/28/70	7	65	25 6	2
364	10/23/70	7	8	0 4	0
365	10/24/70	6	7	0 1	0
366	10/27/70	3	4	10 2	0

14,233

(662)

246

The duration of impact of Opportunity House is of special importance. In this connection, it is pertinent to compare a study conducted after April 30, 1970, into the records of the first 200 residents of the House, with the record upon the completion of the project. The following table reflects the findings of the study covering arrests through April 30, 1970:

Category	Number of Men	Average Days Exposure	Arrests		
			Prior	Post	Anticipated
A	9	109	8	4	2.4
B	45	107	145	27	42.5
C	60	105	483	55	139
D	46	113	674	106	209
E	17	123	410	47	138
F	23	---	---	---	-----

As in the final analysis, men in Category A are too few in number for meaningful interpretation, but the individuals in the other four primary categories provide a clear parallel. In particular, at the end of April, roughly the half-way point in the project, men in Category B reflected 37 percent fewer arrests than would normally have been anticipated and at the end of the program on October 31, reflected a comparable 43.5 percent decrease; men in Category C at the mid-way point measured a 69.5 percent decrease compared to a project end figure of 68.5 percent; men in Category D at mid-way, 49 percent, as compared to 51.5 percent at conclusion; and men in Category E, 66 percent at mid-point compared to a final figure of 75.3 percent.

The following table is even more specifically to the point, for it compares the statistical records of those first 200 men at the end of the first six months of the project with their own records at the end of the year, and to the expectations for their own special groups.

<u>Category</u>	<u>No. Men</u>	<u>Prior Arrests</u>	<u>4/30 Arrests</u>	<u>4/30 Anticipated</u>	<u>4/30 Variation</u>	<u>10/31 Arrests</u>	<u>10/31 Anticipated</u>	<u>10/31 Variation</u>	<u>Total Project Variations</u>
A	9	8	4	2.4	+60.0%	7	6.4	+10.0%	-11.0%
B	45	145	27	42.5	-37.0%	59	115.0	-48.6%	-43.5%
C	60	483	55	139.0	-69.5%	111	382.0	-71.0%	-68.5%
D	46	674	106	209.0	-49.0%	309	547.0	-43.5%	-51.5%
E	17	410	47	138.0	-66.0%	86	344.0	-75.0%	-75.7%

In all categories except Category D, men with prior arrests in the 11 to 20 range, these Opportunity House residents maintained better than average records than the entire project enrollment averages, over far longer periods of time. Since the Category D group is the segment selected for policy changes by the Advisory Board in June, it is quite probable that the exceptional record there is a result of said policy changes.

Whereas no total and direct correlation can be made between the services of Opportunity House and the total public drunkenness arrests made by the Houston Police Department, a measurable change in the arrest records did occur simultaneously with the operation of the facility. Allowing seven weeks, from November 8, 1969 through December 31, 1969, as a shakedown period during which the project was too young to draw comparisons, the following table illustrates the arrests for the 10 months of effective operation--from January, 1970, through October, 1970, and shows how the monthly totals compare with those of parallel months in the preceding year.

<u>Month</u>	<u>1969 Arrests</u>	<u>1970 Arrests</u>
January	2,421	1,743
February	2,148	1,760
March	2,298	1,884
April	2,355	1,946
May	2,246	1,782
June	1,899	1,677
July	1,930	1,653
August	1,954	1,833
September	1,874	1,988
October	2,029	2,098
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>21,154</u>	<u>18,364</u>

As can be seen, in this ten-month period, arrests decreased by 2,790, or 13 percent, despite a re-surge of arrests in the final two months of the Project period. A special examination was made of the records of past

Opportunity House residents for those two months, and to the credit of the project there is no evidence that men who went through the program were in any way responsible for the sudden increase. However, it is significant to note that the surge in September and October coincided with Court-directed changes in the admission of new residents. Under orders of the Project Director, who assumed direction of the Project as a direct personal function only during those two months, a deliberate, measurable decrease was made in admissions of those types of offenders with whom the project previously had been most successful.

Consequently, it appears logical to make a separate examination of the arrests records for the eight months prior to that major policy change. Such an examination shows a total of arrests of 14,278, as compared to a total during the same eight months of 1969 of 17,251. The decrease was 2,973, or more than 17 percent.

The financial impact of the Opportunity House project, both directly on City of Houston operating costs and indirectly on society, is a measurable factor of considerable significance.

Several years prior to the Opportunity House experiment, then Inspector Larry Fultz of the Police Department conducted a special study of the costs of public drunkenness arrests. This study, which prorated the costs of police, courts and prison farm, conservatively brought up to date to reflect minimum increases in costs, reveals that in 1969 the average cost for each public drunkenness arrest, to the City Government, was \$160.83.

That figure applied to the latest figures listed in this report, those of total arrests, reflects an actual saving by the City of Houston of \$478,125.59 over just the eight key months of this project. Applied to the earlier tables, which show that the decrease in arrests for the men of the

Opportunity House program was 1310, it shows a direct, measurable savings for the City of \$185,597.82.

Additionally, since the statistics on the actual residents show a lasting, residual impact of the House, continued savings by the City can be anticipated as a result of the project, and its handling of the problems of the 303 affected residents.

In the application for the grant which funded this project, a side study had shown that each arrest involves 3.5 man hours of police time. With previous levels of arrests for public drunkenness, this amounted to the equivalent of nearly three officers for other duties; at a maximum, utilizing the actual decrease in total arrests during the effective eight months of the project, it shows that more than eight officers' time was devoted to other duties (officers work a 40 hour week over a 49 week year, or a total per individual of 1960 hours. This, related to a total of 1310 arrests, reflects time saved of 4585 hours over a ten-month period. Related to the actual full decrease of 2,973 over the effective eight months, it reflects time saved of 10,906 hours. During an eight-month period, the average 1960 hours of a police officer becomes 1307).

An analysis of resident data shows further financial impact of the Project. Although computer forms were devised and full data acquired during the project for a full, data-processing examination of information of significance, the Project Director determined that electronic equipment was not to be utilized. Consequently, the data reviewed at this point in the report was viewed by human eyes and is thus subject to possible error not otherwise to be expected. This portion of the report also is lacking, as a result of this procedural decision, in full tables to reflect many desirable categorical breakdowns (tables previously listed also were compiled primarily in a manual

system, but because of their direct significance to the project were deemed essential to the report).

The following are broad observations from manual methods:

Race: Of the 367 men admitted to the House, 328 were Caucasian, 10 Negro, 22 Mexican-American and 7 American Indian.

Marital Status: Of the 367 men, 67 were single, 70 married, 209 divorced, and 21 widowed.

Age: The average age of the residents was 46 years: the youngest resident, 22; the oldest, 68.

Occupational data: A total of 258, or 70 percent of the residents, were veterans of military service. A total of 169, or 46 percent, at one time or another had belonged to a unit of organized labor.

Community financial impact: Professional studies have shown that in a community such as Houston, wages lost by persons arrested and incarcerated average out to \$21.23 per day. With the average incarceration for a public drunkenness offense being 14 days, this means that each such arrest distresses the economy by a total of \$297.22. Applying this figure to the 1,310 arrests not made of men in the Opportunity House project suggests, then, a return to the economy of \$389,358.20. Applying it to the actual, total decrease in arrests for the effective eight months of the project suggests a return to the economy of \$883,635.06.

Agency involvement: The key to success of this project was the cooperation of public and private agencies in the Houston community. As indicated elsewhere in this report, the agency most involved was the Texas Rehabilitation Commission operation, a factor which directly relates to the employability of the residents and, thereby, to the feasibility of measuring community financial impact as was done in the paragraph above. In all, of the 303 men who

remained more than one week at the House, 255 were accepted by Texas Rehabilitation Commission and provided with direct re-access to the labor market. In addition, from the total group of 367 men (in actuality, 24 of the men who remained fewer than eight days were referred), 38 entered the Veterans Administration Hospital alcoholism program, 9 were provided employment through resources of Alcoholics Anonymous, 9 were admitted to the County Hospital for extended treatment, 5 were accepted by the Harris County Welfare Department, 4 received help from the American Red Cross, 2 were referred to the YMCA, 2 to the Tuberculosis Sanitarium for treatment, 2 to the Harris County Optometric Society for free eyeglasses, and one to REACT.

Re-Admissions to the House: Of the 367 residents of the House, a total of 103 were readmitted for times varying from one day to several weeks. No statistical breakdown on these cases has been attempted, but the majority probably were men who had made one "slip" and afterwards had convinced Alcoholics Anonymous and other specialists of the sincerity of their interest in reform. A criterion for readmission also was the record of the individual during his initial stay. Of the 103 men readmitted, one-half remained clear of alcohol and the law.

Project Costs: The original grant amount for a 12-month project, including planning and acquisition costs and time, estimated that a total of \$99,815 would be required. At the close of the Project, which was conducted for 51 weeks in full-scale operation and which also involved three months of preliminary work, the total cost to LEAA was \$77,951.25. Major savings were effected through support work of local agencies, locating and equipping the facility at costs far below original estimates, and in operating efficiencies. A total of 12,080 man-days were spent by residents in Opportunity House, which meant an average daily residency of 33.5 men and an average cost per man per day of \$6.80.

Although in planning stages it had been estimated that the City of Houston government would make major, in-kind contributions to support the project, as it evolved the great bulk of in-kind support was provided instead by private and public agencies of the community. City government support is valued at \$7,024.42 (this does not include in-kind support provided through services of the City Courts or Police Departments, neither of which has as yet provided data; however, inasmuch as the Courts Department, intended to be a major contributor, in fact withdrew from major project participation until the final three months of the project, the dollar value of its support is not expected to have been significant).

In-kind contributions of other agencies are calculated at \$319,300 for the 12 effective months of project operation. This included:

Texas Rehabilitation Commission, Vocational Rehabilitation-----	\$ 26,400
Veterans Administration Hospital-----	127,200
Intergroup Association, Inc. (Alcoholics Anonymous)-----	48,000
Texas State Hospital-----	36,000
Houston Opportunity House, Inc.-----	32,000
Harris County Hospital District-----	20,000
Texas Employment Commission-----	8,000
St. Joseph's Hospital-----	7,200
Houston Council on Alcoholism-----	4,000
The Texas House-----	2,000
Houston Legal Foundation-----	1,000
Harris County Optometric Society-----	1,000
San Jose Clinic (Dental care)-----	1,000
Harris County Mental Health Screening Center-----	800
Harris County Psychiatric Diagnostic Clinic-----	400

SECTION D

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The impact of this project has been in most ways more effective than was anticipated in the original grant application. In particular, the primary objective of the Opportunity House was to break the cycle which makes arrests for public drunkenness the single most significant statistic of all urban arrests. It has done this directly by providing the guidance with which 303 men were not arrested a total of 1,310 times which under their otherwise normal circumstances would have occurred, or in other terms has produced a direct reduction in arrests of 62.2 percent for this group. It has further demonstrated beyond anticipation that the so-called "hard core" of these offenders is more within reach of such treatment than most other groups, by diminishing arrests for the 44 men normally apprehended 20 or more times a year by 75.3 percent. Thirdly, the handling of these men under the Opportunity House concept has been shown clearly to be one with long-range impact, with the records of the earliest residents showing a continued reduction even below the reduction produced in their first few months of exposure to the House. Fourth, the broad percentage figures on the reduction actually are conservative measurements, inasmuch as the records show conclusively that even higher percentages of the residents remain below their levels of statistical probability, while the overall statistics on reduction are impacted negatively by only a few men in each group.

Inasmuch as all other goals set for the project are outgrowths of the fundamental object of breaking the cycle, the same measure of effectiveness applies. In particular, sub-purposes included returning so-called "hopeless" cases to useful roles in society, reducing City governmental expenses and freeing police officers for duties in higher crime categories, reducing court and prison farm burdens, and marshalling available public and private resources.

Since every metropolitan area in the nation faces problems almost identical to those of Houston in regard to the repeater public drunkenness offender, it is apparent that the techniques and concept of the Opportunity House project should be of great value elsewhere, with proper adjustments for intrinsic differences in socio-economic situations, geographical peculiarities, agency availabilities and lessons learned in the pilot application.

In striving towards the primary goal, the staff of Opportunity House experienced no unusual problems. The occasional secondary problems which did arise virtually all are due to shortcomings in the planning stage for this project, which themselves were produced by the extremely brief time allowed for planning. Through cooperation and understanding of the LEAA, these problems proved far from insurmountable, most of them being solved quickly through approval of amendments to the grant application.

Central to the problems growing out of hasty planning was one specific factor--a lack of a clear table of organization and responsibility. Of paramount significance is the fact that within the legal structure permitted by the Charter of the City of Houston, it was necessary to place this operation under the technical direction of an existing department. Haste in consideration placed this in the domain of the City Courts on the mistaken assumption that this was required by the LEAA since the grant is a law enforcement matter. This placement was not in keeping with the spirit or intent of the philosophy of the House, which was clearly expressed two years prior to this project by the judge who was to be named Project Director, in an article in the Texas Bar Journal, Vol. 30, No. 5, May, 1967, pages 341-345, in which he stated:

"Obviously the police and the courts, including the municipal (corporation) courts, cannot be converted into social agencies, nor can the state statutes be ignored. While the court, as an

institution, cannot become involved in the actual treatment and rehabilitation programs, the Judge, by individual leadership, persuasion, and cooperation can interest various social agencies in establishing rehabilitation programs for the alcoholic offender outside the confines of the courtroom."

With this philosophy in mind, then, the program as originally planned called for the judge in whose court public drunkenness cases appear, to serve as Project Director, with the primary purpose being to, as his article stated, exercise individual leadership, persuasion and cooperation to work with other outside agencies, and to leave the operation of the House to qualified, ex-offenders under general supervision. Due, as mentioned, to haste in application preparation, the philosophy as such was not directly expressed in the grant application and confusion afterwards arose on occasion in regard to exact lines of authority.

Regardless, however, in various portions of the application the duties of the Advisory Group and Director were delineated and--in the inceptual stages of such a project--such functions still appear to be valid. In particular, the requirements of the grant required the Project Director as chairman of the Advisory Group, to give general supervision to the following ten primary functions:

1. Complete all necessary, detailed arrangements with various consultative agencies.
2. Meet as necessary with members of agencies to solve developing problems and to obtain data for final assessments.
3. Conduct meetings twice monthly with regular attendance of agency representatives and the Project Manager.
4. Assist House personnel in obtaining vehicles and other equipment, as well as the assistance of other City departments.
5. Locate and select staff members.
6. Develop specific procedures for evaluating the project.

7. Maintain contact with former residents.
8. Explore the possibilities of computerizing data, utilizing both City and possible voluntary facilities.
9. At the end of six months make a major assessment of progress and, if indications warranted, begin planning for a permanent operation.
10. Prepare final reports.

For any City contemplating institution of a similar project, it is recommended that an advisory group be utilized in the initial stages, turning over full authority for actual operation of the project (including contact with outside agencies) to a qualified staff executive, but otherwise restricting its activities to such functions as are outlined above.

It is further recommended that any similar projects more properly, for general administration, belong under Public Health operations, but require within them the full cooperation of police and courts departments.

Operation of such a project also should clearly detail the individual responsible for establishing, maintaining and evaluating records, as well as for preparing necessary studies and reports. As mentioned in the preceding section, in the Houston project this responsibility was left to the Project Director and the Advisory Board, rather than to an individual. In summary then, clearly defined responsibilities and duties should eliminate most of the problems which were experienced in this Pilot Program.