TERRORISM IN ITALY:
AN UPDATE REPORT, 1983–1985

REPORT
OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

OCTOBER 1985

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1985
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,

Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Chairman: In July of 1984, I forwarded to you a report entitled "Terrorism and Security: The Italian Experience." This report contained a thorough examination of the terrorist phenomenon in Italy and the security measures developed in response at both the government and private levels from 1968 through 1982. The author of this superb, well-received work was Dr. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, an internationally recognized authority in the field of terrorism.

Because of the growing importance of the area of terrorism and counterterrorism, I asked Dr. Daniel J. Boorstin, the Librarian of the Library of Congress, to agree to fund the study, and I also asked Dr. Pisano to prepare an update of his report. Both were kind enough to agree. It is with great pleasure that I transmit to you the results entitled "Terrorism in Italy: An Update Report, 1983-1985."

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.
FOREWORD

Since the beginning of 1983, domestic and transnational groups have continued to engage in serious acts of terrorism and subversion in Italy. Such acts include direct attacks against the United States and NATO.

U.S. diplomat Leamon R. Hunt, Director-General of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), was murdered in Rome by the Red Brigades, possibly in cooperation with Middle Eastern extremists. The Italian editor of NATO News, Mr. Leonetto de Leon, suffered the bombing of his Rome residence by the Communists Struggling Against Imperialism and Armaments. The Italian Government has evidence that the domestic pacifist movement, whose slant is strongly anti-Western, has been infiltrated by terrorist elements. Remnants of Front Line, another Italian Terrorist group of Communist inspiration, entertains logistical/operational links with Direct Action and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, two Paris-based terrorist formations known for their anti-American violent activism. All Red Brigades tracts and communiques of these years contain anti-NATO and anti-U.S. exhortations. The U.S. Embassy in Rome was the objective of a projected car-bomb attack by Lebanese terrorists. In addition, during the recent wave of anti-NATO "Euroterrorist" attacks throughout Western Europe, the language of the Red Brigades was adopted in the responsibility claims of non-Italian formations.

In the light of the specifically anti-American nature of ongoing terrorist activity in Italy and in consideration of the continuing influence of the Italian terrorist model, Senator Denton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, has asked that the Committee print this update to an earlier report, "Terrorism and Security: The Italian Experience," which covered the period 1968-1982. The original report and this update have been prepared by Dr. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, an internationally recognized expert on Italian terrorism. I believe this update report will be a useful resource in the Committee's efforts to study the problems of international terrorism as it impacts on our Nation.

STROM THURMOND,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary.
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TERRORISM IN ITALY: AN UPDATE REPORT, 1983–85

INTRODUCTION

The emergence, growth, and incipient decline of the Italian terrorist phenomenon between 1968 and 1982 were discussed in detail in an earlier report titled Terrorism and Security: The Italian Experience.¹ This supplementary report is intended to serve as an update and to provide an analysis of subsequent developments.

Reduced terrorist activity in 1983, 1984, and the first semester of 1985 confirms certain trends already discernible in the later stages of the period addressed in the previous study. There has in fact been a steady decline in the aggregate number of annual terrorist attacks and, to a degree, in the overall quality of terrorist operations.

Official statistics indicate that 421 terrorist incidents—including 2 murders and 16 woundings—were recorded in 1983, 339—including 6 murders and 11 woundings—in 1984, and 32—including 4 murders and 2 woundings—in January–April of 1985. Not included in these statistics are a few additional incidents of apparent terrorist nature but still under investigation. Among the latter, particularly serious was a train bombing perpetrated on December 23, 1984, which caused 15 deaths and 131 injuries.

Other trends of this period reflect continued dissidence within the terrorist fold as well as repeated failure on the part of all terrorist formations to operate as a force capable of uprooting or simply paralyzing democratic institutions. Moreover, these groups did not even fully recover from the unprecedented setbacks suffered throughout 1982 because of systematic law enforcement operations, timely intelligence collection, and the confessions of repentant or disassociated terrorists.

On the other hand, several indicators attest to the fact that terrorism continues to serve as a tool in the hands of organizations and groups—domestic and foreign—entertaining broader subversive designs. Despite the proven inadequacy of the "armed struggle" to bring about the collapse of the present system of government or to alter the country's international political alignment, terrorist warfare is attracting a new generation of recruits. Likewise, seasoned veterans at large and in the prisons continue to believe in the validity of their battle. According to the Government, there are at large 295 identified terrorists of the left and 68 of the

right. At the same time, the prison population includes approximately 1,250 terrorists of the left and 350 of the right. Other terrorists and extremists are combining political objectives with common crimes, including drug and arms trafficking. And, limitedly to elements of the leftist milieu, there has been a return to sophisticated situational analyses in terrorist resolutions and tracts.

Potentially more worrisome are still other developments. There is evidence of ongoing efforts to establish or reconstitute a broad support base through the exploitation of economic and social tensions and through the infiltration of ideological groups. While this applies primarily to the terrorist left, similar efforts are being made by elements of the terrorist right as well. A noteworthy target of this strategy is the pacifist movement. There is also evidence of an increasing process of internationalization, particularly with respect to leftist objectives and operations. Finally, the presence in Italy of transnational formations with specific anti-Western designs raises additional disquieting questions.

RED BRIGADES (BRIGATE ROSSE—BR)

Within the Communist or Marxist-Leninist ideological component of the Italian terrorist spectrum, the BR are the oldest surviving organization. Despite their reduced operational rhythm during the last 3 years, the BR still constitute the foremost terrorist menace. Before addressing their current operational/logistical structure and estimated personnel strength, it is worth focusing upon their recent actions.

The BR can be credited with three major operations, all of which were carried out in Rome at the rate of one per year.

THE GIUGNI CASE

On May 3, 1983, as he was heading for his office building at approximately 7:30 p.m., Gino Giugni, professor of labor law at the University of Rome, was called by name by a young couple on a motor-scooter. Giugni instinctively turned and was fired upon by the girl on the rear seat of the scooter. Three out of seven 9mm-long pistol rounds hit and wounded the victim. The couple on the scooter immediately fled.

Shortly after the shooting, a caller announced to the Roman daily II Messaggero: “We have executed the pig Gino Giugni, a representative of the capitalist bourgeoisie. War on the social pact!” The caller concluded his message by identifying himself as a spokesman of the Communist Combatant Party, that is, the “militarist” faction of the BR. Giugni, who is hailed as the principal drafter of pro-labor legislation enacted in 1970 and referred to as the “Workers’ Statute,” had also contributed to the drafting of the recent economic agreement of January 22, 1983, on the cost of labor, which the BR consider exploitative of the proletariat.

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The BR telephone message is indicative of their intention to kill rather than wound. It has therefore been deduced that the young age, inexperience, and apparent nervousness of the assailants luckily turned this action into an abortive murder attempt. The following day Bruno Seghetti, one of the “unbent” BR members then on trial in Turin for other indictments, read a “proclamation” in court confirming the responsibility of the BR. He branded Giugni as “a man for all seasons” and defined the cost-of-labor agreement as “the most serious attack against the Workers’ Statute, which Giugni himself had assisted in enacting.” A written communique, which traditionally constitutes the formal and final BR responsibility claim, was subsequently issued in Rome. Also in keeping with standard BR procedure, it included a “resume” of the victim’s career and reiterated the “reasons” behind the attack.

In addition to the BR’s clear intent to enter the arena of capital-labor relations and affix thereto their typical revolutionary mark, the attack on Professor Giugni was planned to coincide with the electoral campaign leading to the parliamentary elections of June 1983.

THE HUNT CASE

On February 15, 1984, at approximately 6:30 p.m., a FIAT 128 with two males aboard blocked the chauffer-driven armored sedan in which U.S. diplomat Leamon R. Hunt was returning to his Rome residence. One of the men got out of the vehicle and fired two or more bursts from a Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle against the rear window of Hunt’s sedan. One sole bullet hit and mortally wounded Hunt, whereas his driver was unhurt. The attackers fled the scene in a back-up vehicle driven by a third member of the commando group.

Hunt’s demise took place in the hospital 2 hours later. He had been posted in Rome at the beginning of 1983 as Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)—generally referred to as the Sinai peacekeeping force—with administrative headquarters in the Italian capital, pursuant to an agreement signed by Italy on June 12, 1982.

One hour after the incident, a caller telephoned a Milan private radio station, “Radio Popolare,” claiming responsibility on behalf of the same BR faction that had wounded Professor Giugni. The telephone message stated: “The imperialist forces out of Lebanon! No to the missiles in Comiso! Italy out of NATO!” A second verbal claim was made the following morning in a Genoa court room, where other die-hard red brigadists were standing trial. The written paternity claim was produced 1 day later in Rome. This communique accused the Italian Government of spending on defense to the detriment of socioeconomic needs.

All too clearly, in this case the BR were addressing both domestic and international issues. Significantly, preparations were underway at the Sicilian installation of Comiso to host 112 Cruise missiles as part of NATO’s modernized European theater nuclear force.
THE TARANTELLI CASE

On March 27, 1985, shortly before noon, Ezio Tarantelli, economist and professor at the University of Rome, was about to drive away from the University when two men approached his sedan on foot and one of them opened fire with a Scorpion submachinegun. Fifteen rounds hit the intended victim, who died instantly. Before fleeing, the killers attached to the windshield of Tarantelli's car BR Pamphlet No. 20, which is currently still subject to investigative secrecy in accordance with the rules of criminal procedure, as is the subsequent written responsibility claim. However, press accounts report that both documents attack the Government, the Employers Association (Confindustria), and the Italian Confederation of Free Labor Unions (CISL), because of their role in limiting the cost-of-living index clause over which a popular referendum was pending at the time of the assassination. Tarantelli himself was an economic advisor of CISL. Just as in the previous two cases, Tarantelli was targeted by the Combatant Communist Party or militarist faction of the BR.

The overall sophistication of these terrorist actions, which reflect an operational crescendo, is comparable to that repeatedly demonstrated by the BR in the course of analogous operations during the period 1977–1981.

The attacks on Giugni, Hunt, and Tarantelli were accompanied by secondary actions at violent and nonviolent levels. In some cases, however, conclusive evidence of BR paternity is limited. The following is a selective survey of what might be termed complementary BR activity during the same period.

BEHAVIOR IN COURT

On March 16, 1983, which marked the fifth anniversary of the BR abduction of the late Christian Democratic President and former Premier Aldo Moro, red brigadist Lauro Azzolini, on trial in Milan for other crimes, addressed the chief judge of the court and shouted: “Your Honor, we wish to remind you that today is March 16th and for us it is a great feast!” During the same hearing, red brigadist Flavio Amico yelled at the court: “I will be offended if I am not sentenced to life imprisonment just like the comrades in Genoa and in Rome.” Still another defendant, Biancamelia Sivieri, defiantly told the chief judge: “Your Honor, I cannot look at you in the face, because you make me vomit.” The following day, in a lighter vein, Azzolini attempted to recite before the same court a poem titled “Samson” and composed on a role of toilet paper. During another trial in Turin on May 16, 1983, the prosecutor requested the chief judge to order the separation of male and female BR defendants in consideration of the fact that two of them were committing “obscene acts” in court.

ABORTIVE OPERATIONS AND BARGAINING

On May 18, 1983, at approximately 4 p.m., a State Police patrol foiled an armed robbery directed against a Rome post office. One

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8 Statements reported in La Repubblica, Mar. 17, 1983, p. 11 (Rome).
red brigadist was immediately apprehended, another one fled, and
the third barricaded himself in the postal facility with hostages. He
finally surrendered more than 4 hours later, after being allowed to
speak to an imprisoned fellow militant. The following day, the fugi-
tive member of the commando—a young woman—turned herself in
with the assistance of an attorney specialized in terrorist cases.
The fact that the commando was part of the less organized “move-
mentist”—as opposed to the militarist—faction of the BR may have
had some bearing on the general outcome of this operation.

PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY RECORD

On June 30, 1983, during the trial of the Turin BR “column,” de-
fendant Francesco Piccioni of the militarist faction denied all re-
ponsibility for the trial-unrelated June murder of State Attorney
Bruno Caccia, which had been followed by telephone claims in
Turin and in Rome by self-styled BR spokesmen. Piccioni coldly
told the Turin Court:

As militants of the BR and communist combatants we
have amply demonstrated on very many occasions that we
have no problems in claiming responsibility for actions
carried out by our organization or in expressing our sup-
port for the practices of the revolutionary movement . . .
Regrettably, we had nothing to do with the murder of the
Chief Prosecutor of Turin.

Standard BR practices in fact corroborate Piccioni’s all·
avation.

DISENGAGEMENT AND RETALIATION

On the evening of December 14, 1984, the militarist faction at-
tempted to rob a Metro Security Express armored van that was
transporting the cash collected by two Roman supermarkets. In the
ensuing fire engagement with private security guards, red brigadist
Antonio Gustini was killed and his companion Cecilia Massaro was
wounded together with two security guards and a bystander. The
other members of the BR commando, one of whom had opened fire
with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, retreated from the scene. The fol-
lowing month, on January 9, 1985, Ottavio Conte, a young police-
man assigned to a SWAT-type unit of the State Police, was mur-
dered in a telephone booth in Torvaianica, a beach resort near
Rome. According to a telephone call allegedly issuing from the BR,
this action was in retaliation for the death of Gustini. His demise
had already been commemorated by “unbent” red brigadists on
trial in Rome for other crimes and BR “punitive” actions had also
been announced in Court. Yet conclusive evidence of BR responsi-
bility is still lacking, since the modalities of Conte’s murder do not
fully coincide with BR patterns.

The same consideration applies to a number of armed robberies
that took place in the January 1983-June 1985 timeframe. If they
are in fact the work of the BR, their perpetration was aimed at
self-financing. It is also possible that some of these robberies are
the joint work of disbanded red brigadists and common criminals.
On the other hand, there is no knowledge whatsoever of BR-orga-
nized abductions during this period for either demonstrative or self-financing purposes.

A number of tentative conclusions may be drawn from the BR record of these years. Notwithstanding the cleavage between the "militarists," who consider themselves a revolutionary vanguard in the strictest Leninist sense of the term, and the "movementists," who favor greater revolutionary spontaneity and aim at immediate mass participation, BR tactics have not substantially changed. What suffered, instead, is the overall effectiveness of BR strategies.

At the same time, it is clear that the BR have attempted to cure—at least with partial success—the less than adequate compartmentalization of the past, which made it possible for repentant red brigadists to furnish to the police and to the judiciary information of capital importance thus crippling the BR organization at various hierarchical and geographical echelons. Indeed, between 1980 and 1983, these confessions, coupled with other law enforcement operations, had brought about the dismantling of broad strata of the BR structure.

The BR now appear to have achieved strict compartmentalization between the operational and logistical elements of their organization. In fact, post-1983 apprehensions of members of the support structure have not led to a substantive breach of the operational structure, which, in its turn, is now characterized by stricter internal compartmentalization. Moreover, new recruits increasingly tend to be part-time "irregulars" rather than full-time "regulars" as in the past and generally have a clean police record. While those observations more readily apply to the militarist faction, it should be noted that regardless of approach—militarist or movementist—the BR are fighting the same battle aimed at achieving the same Communist objectives.

Personnel estimates drawn up in Italian judicial circles—prosecutors and investigating judges—indicate that current BR strength includes at least 100 "regulars" and no less than 300 "irregulars." The former, as in the past, live in full clandestinity, while the latter combine the "armed struggle" with propaganda and other nonviolent revolutionary functions.

The strongest and most efficient unit remains the Rome "column," whose overall numerical composition is believed to include 120 elements. Significantly, a peripheral section of Rome, comprising several south-side neighborhoods, is generally referred to in the media as "BR-City." More difficult to assess in detail is the BR presence elsewhere in Italy and its organizational posture. Units of "column" or smaller size are reportedly located in Milan, Turin, Genoa, Naples, and the region of Tuscany. Moreover, considering the large number of red brigadists still at large and the proven acquisition of new recruits, the references in recent BR documents regarding the continuing existence of the "strategic direc-

6 Interviews granted to the media by key police officials, prosecutors, and investigating judges reflect a consensus regarding the restructured organization of the BR. See, for example, Il Giornale Nuovo, June 26, 1983 (Milan), La Repubblica, Feb. 8, 1984 (Rome), L'Espresso, Apr. 15, 1984 (Rome).
7 See L'Espresso, Apr. 7, 1985, p. 9 (Rome).
8 Id.
9 See, for example, L'Espresso, Apr. 14, 1985, pp. 24–26 (Rome).
torate” are theoretically credible. Evidence regarding an “external column” in France will be discussed under a subsequent heading.

Moreover, the record reflects that operational bases, logistical depots, and hideouts are available to the BR, together with suitable weaponry for urban guerrilla warfare, such as 88 cal. revolvers, 9 mm-long semiautomatic pistols, Scorpion submachine guns, and Kalashnikov assault rifles. To these material assets should be added the rather fertile, albeit misguided, minds who are capable of drafting detailed sociopolitical analyses such as Pamphlets No. 19 and 20 of March 1984 and March 1985, respectively, and other leaflets and communiques whose style is becoming more readable and always less delirious. As it will be seen below, these documents also unprecedentedly attempt to strike a balance between domestic and international issues.

FRONT LINE (PRIMA LINEA—PL) AND ORGANIZED COMRADES FOR PROLETARIAN LIBERATION (COMPAGNI ORGANIZZATI PER LA LIBERAZIONE PROLETARIA—COLP)

PL used to serve as an umbrella organization for a plurality of minor groups whose aims and dynamics were roughly comparable to those of the movementist faction of the BR. By 1981, PL had practically ceased to exist as a viable terrorist organization, even though some members of its affiliate formations were still at large and part of its apprehended militants remained politically active in the prisons and in the courtrooms. PL’s loose structure and the insufficient Leninist revolutionary indoctrination of its members contributed to the organization’s comparatively rapid downfall. In April of 1988, during the Bologna trial of high-ranking members of its leadership, PL officially announced its self-dissolution. Subsequently, during judicial proceedings in Turin, former PL leaders stated that their present problem was “how to participate in new movements and how to become the interlocutors of the classist left and of the Italian Communist Party.” In essence they were expressing continuing commitment to old ideals through nonviolent means. To be sure, the number of repentant or disassociated PL members is considerable. During the last 2 years, many of them turned to religious and family values and—to the public’s surprise—often managed to procreate despite their status as prison inmates.

Of the few surviving PL affiliations or offshoots, the COLP are the only ones that has attracted repeated attention. Although the circumstances leading to their emergency are not altogether clear, the COLP were reportedly formed at the start of this decade, possibly under a different name, by PL members Sergio Segio and Susanna Ronconi. Their initial objective was to free prison inmates still committed to the “armed struggle.” By late 1983, additional COLP objectives included the reorganization of PL and the development of new models of “social guerrilla.” Known COLP presence in Italy is circumscribed to the north of the country, but, together

10 For background information, see II Messaggero, Feb. 9, 1984, p. 17 (Rome), and La Repubblica, Oct. 15, 1983, p. 15 (Rome).
with other former PL militants, they constitute a principal element of the Italo-French terrorist connection.

**MINOR COMMUNIST FORMATIONS**

Minor formations active during this period—be they satellites of the BR, former affiliations of PL, or groups connected to the extremist and violence-prone extraparliamentary Autonomy—have generally limited themselves to the perpetration of negligible damage to property. The following are notable exceptions.

In the early afternoon hours of January 29, 1983, a terrorist commando group that subsequently claimed responsibility under the name of Armed Proletarian Power (Potere Proletario Armato) overpowered assistant warden Germana Stefanini in the lobby of her building and forced her into her apartment, where she was "tried" and "sentenced" under an impromptu red banner. She was then led to an isolated area, forced into the trunk of a stolen car, and "executed" with a pistol. Stefanini's task at Rome's Rebibbia Prison was to check packages addressed to the inmates. Police investigators later determined that the murderers were also after a colleague of the victim who lived in the same building. While being held captive in her apartment, Stefanini had been coerced to call her colleague from the window and invite her for a visit, but the latter excused herself because her son was feverish. Some members of the same commando group, who were in contact with the movementist faction of the BR at the time of Stefanini's murder, later joined the BR and participated in the abortive post office robbery and hostage situation reported above.

On January 2, 1984, bystander Stanislao Ceresio, an employee of the State Railroad Administration, was killed in Portici (Naples), when the automobile of prison guard Giuseppe Monteleone exploded. Responsibility for the car bombing was claimed by the Proletarians for Communism (Proletari per il Comunismo), a formation believed to be connected to the BR. Significantly, a training center for prison guards is located in the Municipality of Portici.

A potentially disastrous incident took place in the Rome subway on February 9, 1985. A bag containing incendiary bottles exploded at approximately 11:20 a.m. in an empty car of Line A and seriously damaged it. Had the explosion taken place a few minutes earlier or later, passengers would have been aboard the same subway train. A responsibility claim was issued by the Workers Brigades (Brigate Operaie). News agency ANSA first received a telephone call and then a leaflet was delivered to the Roman daily *La Repubblica*. The leaflet stated:

> This is not an act of violence, but an act of love against the daily exploitation of the labor force from the hinterland to the material places of its exploitation. This is not a protest, but a precise act of war.

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11 This group was heretofore unheard of in Rome, but a few terrorist actions had been perpetrated in Como in 1981 under that name.
A number of robberies that occurred during this period are also believed to be the work of minor terrorist formations in need of funds and equipment for their revolutionary purposes. One such example is the abortive armed robbery of a jewelry store in Bologna on December 14, 1984. A suspected female terrorist lost her life in this action.

**Workers' Autonomy (Autonomia Operaia—AUTOP) and the Substrata of Communist Terrorism**

As opposed to its record of previous years, comparatively low-keyed has also been the role of AUTOP, whole communism-orientated activists are estimated by the Government to number "tens of thousands" and are concentrated in the key regions of Latium, Veneto, Lombardy, and Campania. In keeping with its tradition, AUTOP continues to serve as a reservoir for terrorist recruitment and support and still espouses subversive causes or attempts to subvert ideological groups.

In recent years, AUTOP has been particularly active in demonstrating in favor of an amnesty and other clemency measures vis-a-vis terrorist militants in prison and at large. Its contribution to "pacificist" activism will be addressed below.

The most resounding developments of this period include the escape to France of Professor Antonio (Toni) Negri, AUTOP's foremost ideologue, and the conclusion of the Rome trial against key as well as less important AUTOP militants for crimes committed before 1979.

The Radical Party (Partito Radicale—PR)—a libertarian and left-leaning political party with limited representation in Parliament—decided to run Professor Negri on its slate for the June 1983 parliamentary elections. Negri, who at the time was being tried by the Court of Assizes of Rome, was nevertheless elected in all three districts in which he was a candidate and opted to represent his Milan constituents. While a certain percentage of the ballots cast in his favor is traceable to the PR's own electorate, Negri's election primarily constitutes a manifestation of AUTOP's political following as well as an indication of the numerical strength of circles close to the terrorist and/or extremist milieu. Negri obtained 13,521 votes in Milan, 26,389 in Rome, and 11,480 in Naples. The total clearly exceeds 50,000 votes. Negri's election to the Chamber of Deputies—the lower house of Italy's bicameral Parliament—made his release from prison mandatory. Before the Chamber of Deputies could strip him of parliamentary immunity (as it ultimately did) in order to return him to prison, Toni Negri fled to bordering France.

The Rome trial of the 71 AUTOP members indicted for various crimes ranging from armed insurrection to subversion, from abduction to murder, and from armed robbery to violations of the gun

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12 Supra note 3, p. 23.
13 Under Italian electoral law, a candidate may be included on a party slate in as many as three districts, but, if elected in more than one, the candidate must choose the district he/she wishes to represent.
laws continued without Negri's presence on the defendants' bench. The verdict was finally handed down on June 12, 1984: 57 defendants were convicted and 14 were acquitted. The only charge that the court did not uphold was armed insurrection. Negri himself was sentenced in absentia to a 30-year prison term. In its verdict, the court defined Negri as—

An individual who for a decade propagandized everywhere messages of hatred and violence and advocated the necessity to constitute an organization having a twofold program of aggression against the State: the incitement of the masses to [commit unlawful] appropriations, on one hand, and [the launching] of a vanguard attack, on the other.

The verdict also reads:

He was the instigator, the principal, the organizers of those choices that characterized a long season of violence. 15

Despite the prosecution and conviction of its "historic" cadres, AUTOP remains a pole of aggregation for sundry leftist extremists, usually referred to as "autonomists," who would otherwise operate in groups of negligible strength and face virtual isolation.

VESTIGES OF ANARCHISM

At the end of April of 1983, the Italian Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Italiana—FAI) held its 16th National Congress in Reggio Emilia. It was attended by over 200 delegates from various Italian cities and by several observers primarily from Spain, France, West Germany, and Japan. The principal items on the agenda were "anti-militarism," "the nuclear issue," and "the struggle against repression." As it will be seen below, militant anarchists are an active and occasionally violent component of the pacifist movement. In September of 1984, an "international anarchist convention" was held in Venice to discuss "authoritarian trends and libertarian tensions in contemporary societies." But the most significant development at the symbolic level occurred in March of 1985 when the Municipal Council of Carrara authorized, by a bare majority vote, the erection of a monument to the memory of anarchist Gaetano Bresci, the assassin of King Umberto I at the beginning of the century. This anarchist project had previously been vetoed by the Municipal Council.

A definitive court decision is still pending with respect to a major terrorist action believed to have been perpetrated in unison by anarchist and rightist elements. The retrial—ordered by the supreme court—of anarchist Pietro Valpreda together with rightist extremists for a 1969 bank bombing in Milan, which caused 16 deaths and 90 injuries, began on December 12, 1984, before a Bari court. However, a recent incident is indicative of persistent tactics entailing anarchist presence in rightist circles. On May 8, 1985, a group of young anarchists posing as sympathizers of the Italian

15 La Repubblica, June 13, 1984, p. 6, and Apr. 17, 1985, p. 12 (Rome).
Social Movement (MSI)—a legal rightist party—worked their way directly under the MSI speakers' stand in Milan’s principal square. When approached by alert policemen, who noticed that the anarchists were not applauding, five or six of them attempted to flee and accidentally dropped a concealed “Molotov cocktail.” One was arrested and identified by the police as a notorious anarchist activist.

**SEPARATISM AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE**

Separatism continues to be an issue that occasionally leads to terrorist violence in the island of Sardinia as well as in the South Tyrolean portion of the Trentino-Alto Adige region, which borders with Austria.

**SARDINIA**

The intertwined elements of banditry, separatist aspirations, and leftist ideology are still present in Sardinian criminal and politically extremist circles. A noteworthy and somewhat emblematic development of the period January 1983–June 1985 is the emergence of the Sardinian Armed Movement (Movimento Armato Sardo—MAS).

MAS first appeared on the Sardinian scene in June of 1983 under the reputed leadership of former shepherd and common criminal Annino Mele, who underwent a process of politicization while on the run from justice and mastered leftist terrorist phraseology to the point of declaring himself a supporter of the “armed struggle.” The announced MAS platform is indicative of three objectives: Sardinian independence, sale of military installations on the island to the highest bidder, and an insular economy based principally on tourism. At the same time, MAS called for the punishment of those who destroy or undermine “the morality, proper way of living, and noble traditions” of Sardinian society and warned that it would “restore justice” where abuses are not cured.

By the end of 1983, MAS had claimed responsibility for six murders—some of which preceded the emergence of MAS under that name—and one abduction for ransom. However, the murder victims were witnesses, or relatives of witnesses, who testified in court against common criminals. The proceeds from the abduction, on the other hand, were to be used “to purchase arms.” Two additional kidnappings for ransom are believed to be the work of elements connected to MAS. Moreover, in July of 1984, MAS leader Mele abducted journalist Michele Tatti of the daily *Unione Sarda* for a few hours in order to “grant an interview,” which turned out to be a monologue on the objectives of the organization and on Sardinian society.

Although the ultimate aims of MAS are viewed by both the judiciary and the police forces as predominantly criminal, MAS or other criminal bands that may adopt the MAS model are in fact influenced by a subversive and terrorism-oriented environment.16

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The potential menace of the MAS syndrome is attested to in the semiannual intelligence report submitted to the Parliament by the Prime Minister in February 1984.17

Other separatist developments in Sardinia reflect a more pronounced political matrix. On the morning of January 20, 1984, the Carabinieri arrested Salvatore Meloni, who runs a transportation business in Torralba (Orestano). Meloni is also a leading figure of the Sardinian Independentist Party (Partidu Indipendentista Sardu—PARIS). The PARIS acronym means “All Together” in the Sardinian language. PARIS came to light in the early days of January and immediately drew public attention because of its fund-raising campaign. PARIS circular letters delivered to Sardinian residents and nonresidents stated: “We ask one thousand lire [roughly 50 cents in U.S. currency] to support our battle. If we do not receive a reply, it will be o.k. just the same: We will know who our enemies are.” PARIS' militants are reportedly former members of the most extreme wing of the Sardinian Action Party (Partito Sardo d’Azione Psd’Az).18

In a recent interview, Michele Columbu, the best known spokesman of Psd’Az, which is represented in both the Italian Parliament and the European Parliament, indicated that his party’s intention is eventually to seek independence from Italy, but through legal means.19 In the last parliamentary elections—June 1983—the Psd’Az obtained 91,809 ballots and locally took fourth place among the 13 parties that ran candidates out of Sardinia.20

Most recently, on May 18, 1985, a Cagliari court handed down a decision to the effect that between 1979 and 1981 a group of Sardinian extremists had plotted to wage guerrilla warfare on the island in order to bring about the separation of Sardinia from Italy. In addition to Meloni, whose separatist activities predate PARIS, and 15 other conspirators, the court sentenced to prison Bainzu Piliu, professor of chemistry at the University of Cagliari and president of the Sardinian Independentist Front (Fronte Indipendentista Sardo—FIS).

SOUTH TYROL

On September 9, 1984, Northern and Southern Tyroleans dressed in their ethnic costumes marched together in Innsbruck, Austria, to commemorate Tyrolean patriot and historical figure Andreas Hofer. The march/rally/ceremony included slogans and posters calling for the independence of South Tyrol from Italy. While such manifestations are mostly indicative of ethnic/nationalistic aspirations, three groups continue to be regarded as an actual or potential source of separatist violence in Trentino-Alto Adige:

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20 Supra note 14, p. 296.
(1) South Tyrolean terrorists of the 1960's who escaped to Austria;
(2) Austrian and German neo-Nazis who finance, organize, and coordinate propaganda and other forms of activism; and
(3) extremist members of the paramilitary Schuetzen (sharpshooters).  

Less than 4 months before the Innsbruck manifestation, South Tyrolean separatists Walter Gruber and Peter Paris had blown themselves up in Lena (Bolzano) on May 24, 1984, while handling explosives meant for a terrorist attack. Successful dynamite attacks were conducted in November of the same year against power lines and oil pipelines. Ensuing police investigations led to the issuance of 10 arrest warrants against South Tyroleans holding Italian citizenship and against Austrian citizens. Less violent episodes occurred in early 1985, including the hurling of red paint cans against an Italian World War I memorial in Bolzano.

For the time being, the most visible reaction of local Italian ethnics (some of whom resorted in the past to anti-Germanic retaliatory violence) has been the unusually large number of ballots cast in favor of the rightist and highly nationalistic Italian Social Movement (MSI) in the May 1985 municipal elections. In Bolzano, the MSI became the relative majority party with 22.58 percent of the vote.

TERRORISM OF THE RIGHT

This period has been characterized by court-room related developments pertaining to neo-Fascist or neo-Nazi terrorist crimes committed before 1983 by militants belonging to New Order (Ordine Nuovo), Black Order (Ordine Nero), the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Revolucionari—NAR), and less notorious formations. While various proceedings at the trial and appellate levels of jurisdiction resulted in the conviction of extremists responsible for individual murders and other selective acts of aggression, judicial efforts have shed no further light on the indiscriminate massacres of December 1969, May and August 1974, and August 1980, caused by the detonation of explosive devices and attributed to the terrorist right, but whose material perpetrators have yet to be identified.

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22 According to media reports, both men belonged to the Schuetzen. See La Repubblica, Nov. 11, 1984, p. 14 (Rome). Reportedly there are 5,000 Schuetzen organized into 138 companies.

23 As mentioned in the discussion of anarchist-rightist ties, the retrial for the Milan massacre of December 1989 is now pending before an appellate court in Bari. A Venice court of appeals acquitted four neo-Fascists who had been convicted for the Brescia massacre of May 1974. Also acquitted by a Bologna appellate court were the rightist extremists previously convicted for the August 1974 massacre on the "Italicus" express train. The only development of relevance at the judicial level with respect to the Bologna massacre of August 1980 is the indictment of Gen. Pietro Musumeci, former deputy head of military intelligence (SISMI), and his assistant Pietro Belmonte. They are accused of fabricating false evidence in order to deviate ongoing investigations. The trial is currently being held in Rome. Accusations regarding connivance between the intelligence services and subversive or terrorist elements, particularly of the right, have contin-
Another massacre nearly occurred on August 10, 1983, at 11:43 p.m., when the detonation of an explosive device failed to blow up the railroad tracks in the vicinity of Vernio. The intended target was the Milan-Palermo train with 1,000 passengers aboard. Only two machinists were slightly wounded by flying glass. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by telephone callers in the name of Black Order.

Operationally, NAR remains the most menacing rightist formation, though in no way comparable to the Red Brigades at the other end of the Italian terrorist spectrum. Following a period of apparently limited activity, NAR reacquired visibility in early 1985. NAR could be responsible for the arson of a Rome movie theater on January 12, where a meeting of the rightist but lawful Italian Social Movement (MSI) was planned for the following day. The MSI-NAR relationship is one of hostility. However, besides NAR, the leftist Anti-Fascist Territorial Groups (Gruppi Antifascisti Territoriali) also claimed responsibility for this action. Less equivocally, two NAR militants were killed in Alessandria on March 25, when their Turin-licensed car was stopped for a routine document check and the four occupants opened fire on the police. They were transporting weapons, identification cards, documents, police-type equipment, and an air force uniform. On May 1, two presumable NAR members feigned a car breakdown on the Rome-L'Aquila highway. As a patrol car pulled over to offer assistance, the two terrorists fired on the patrolmen killing one—Giovanni Di Leonardo—and disabling the other—Pierluigi Turgioni. The terrorists then fled with the submachineguns and service pistols of the policemen. Investigators are also taking into consideration the possibility that NAR may be responsible for the above-reported attack on State Police SWAT-team member Ottavio Conte, whose murder was claimed by the Red Brigades as well as NAR.

Other rightist terrorists, having no precise organizational affiliation, also made the headlines during the period covered by this update report. On July 3, 1984, Rodolfo Crovace, whose curriculum includes violent rightist extremism and drug trafficking, was killed by the Carabinieri as he resisted arrest with two handguns. In December 1984/January 1985, a cluster of nighttime incendiary attacks took place in Roman secondary schools. The attackers left behind wall inscriptions extolling New Order and NAR. The early months of 1985 have likewise been marred by the emergence of so-called Fasces-bars frequented by motorcycle-riding vandals. Their language and symbols are borrowed from Nordic mythology and Nazi heraldry and their behavior reflects racial intolerance.

Nordic themes and Nazism accompanied by misguided moral fervor constitute the presumable motivation behind a series of bizarre murders whose disquieting implications came to light only in 1983. By February of that year, 8 to 10 murders perpetrated since August of 1972 had been attributed to, or claimed by, a group that operates under the name of Ludwig. The victims were stabbed, burned, or assaulted with a hammer and a hatchet. All of them

ually been made in the press and political circles since the late 1960's; however, those allegations have not been corroborated to date by judicial findings. For statistical details on the aforementioned four massacres see supra note 1, p. 88.
were either social deviants—gypsies, drug addicts, homosexuals, and prostitutes—or "unworthy" clergymen. These targetings took place in the Veneto region or in the municipality of Trento.

In May of 1983, Ludwig extended its sphere of action. It claimed responsibility for the burning of Milan movie theater "Eros" and consequential death of six spectators. Responsibility claims were also issued by Ludwig for the arson of two porno centers in Amsterdam and Munich in December 1983 and January 1984, respectively. The responsibility claims for individual actions or clusters of actions have consistently been written in runes, a Gothic script, and bear a Nazi eagle. In each instance, the message provided details regarding the material perpetration of the crime and ended with the salutation "Gott mit Uns."

On March 4, 1984, the Carabinieri arrested two young Verona residents and former classmates with a rightist background: Italian national Marco Furlan and German national Wolfgang Abel. They were immediately charged with the attempted arson of a Mantova disco and are currently under investigation for the other Ludwig-related crimes. A book found in Abel's Munich apartment narrates the preachings of Brother Ludwig, a fanatic follower of St. Francis of Assisi. Certain underlined passages could be the clue behind the Ludwig denomination. Although no further attacks have followed these arrests, written messages ostensibly issued by the Ludwig sect announced future actions. The investigators are reportedly searching for accomplices of the two suspects.

The most recent trends of rightist terrorism are schematically described in the last semiannual intelligence report of the Prime Minister, which is a "sanitized" version of broader findings by the Italian intelligence and security services. It points to continuing linkages between rightist extremists and common criminals. It attests to the ideological influence of the dissolved Black Order and National Vanguard (Avanguardia Nazionale) on more recent formations. It specifically notes the "cross-over" of militants from one formation to another or even their simultaneous presence in various rightist formations with discordant platforms. It detects reorganizational efforts on the part of NAR, particularly in Rome and in the Veneto region. It voices concern over the interest that rightist elements are displaying for Islamic extremism and views this development as a potential source of linkage between rightist and leftist groups. An earlier semiannual intelligence report indicated unprecedented availability on the part of the terrorist left to cooperate with the terrorist right.

INFILTRATION OF THE PACIFIST MOVEMENT

The Italian pacifist movement, whose origins are traceable to the "Cold War" years, resurfaced en masse after the Government decided to support NATO's resolution of December 12, 1979, to modernize the European theater nuclear force (TNF) in response to the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles. Subsequent Italian decisions pertaining to defense and foreign policy have likewise met or-

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24 Supra note 3, pp. 26-29.
25 Supra note 17, p. 29.
ganized pacifist opposition. The exploitability of the pacifist issue for subversive and violent purposes gradually attracted the attention of extremist and terrorist organizations whose long-range political aims are Marxist-Leninist, anarchist, or separatist. In fact, the nature, composition, and dynamics of the Italian pacifist movement facilitate exploitation and infiltration.

Italy's peace movement is made up of two principal components. One is inspired by Marxist/radical ideologies. The other is inspired by Christian/liberal ones. However, within each of these components there are marked differences not only in political platforms, but also in the pacifist approach itself. Each component draws additional support from unaffiliated elements—groups as well as individuals—who believe in the pacifist cause and express their pacifist commitment through the structures and activities organized by the parties and/or entities that are part of those components. Supportive nonaffiliated elements include conscientious objectors, ecologists, antinuclear energy activists, intellectuals, and idealists.

On the Marxist/radical side of the pacifist spectrum, the principal actors are the Italian Communist Party (PCI), remnants of the self-dissolved Democratic Party of Proletarian Unity (PDUP), Proletarian Democracy (DP), the Radical Party (RP), the League for Unilateral Disarmament, and Struggle for Peace. On the Christian/liberal side, the principal actors are the Christian Associations of Italian Workers (ACLI), Pax Christi, the Reconciliation Movement, Christians for Socialism, and Christians for Dissent.

The most significant role in the overall deployment of the pacifist forces is played by the PCI, Italy's second largest party, whose organizational capability and capillary structures constitute the backbone of the pacifist movement. As opposed to PDUP, DP, and PR, all of which advocate unilateral disarmament, the PCI favors East-West negotiations for the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear armaments, but simultaneously opposes the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, despite current Soviet nuclear superiority in the European theater.

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26 TNF modernization entails, inter alia, the deployment of 112 Cruise missiles in Italy. The selection of the Sicilian town of Comiso as the pertinent missile site was made by the Italian Government on Aug. 7, 1981. Initial missile deployment in Comiso began in 1984. Sixteen missiles are reportedly in place at this writing: In accordance with other innovative governmental decisions of this period, Italian military contingents have taken part in the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since July 28, 1979; in the multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon from Aug. 26 to Sept. 12, 1982, and from Sept. 26, 1982, to Feb. 26, 1984; in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)—whose administrative headquarters are Rome-based—since Apr. 26, 1982; and in the multinational minesweeping operations in the Red Sea from Aug. 22 to Oct. 7, 1984.

27 The following statement, widely circulated by the PCI during the June 1983 parliamentary elections campaign, reflects its nuanced stance which is ultimately nonsupportive of NATO:

"Do you prefer the rearmament race, with its attendant and ever-increasing danger of war, or the gradual reduction of armaments and the resumption of détente? It is a well known fact that Italian policy has opted for rearmament. Our government, chaired by the Christian Democratic Party and supported by a five-party coalition, was the first one in Europe to say yes to the Euro-missiles and, in 1983, it appropriated 12 thousand billion lire for armaments. But do you really want Italy to become an atomic target? Or are you in agreement with us in wanting: First, the interruption of the works at the Comiso base. Second, even if an agreement is not reached in Geneva within 1983, the continuation of negotiations without installing the missiles. Third, simultaneously with an adequate reduction of the missiles in the USSR, the non-installation of the American missiles in Western Europe. Fourth, the dynamic commitment, with a genuine will toward a freeze of all nuclear armaments in the world, to commence a real reduction. This is because there are neither good bombs nor bad bombs; they are all terrible. On June 26, you can vote for a rearmament policy or for a peacetime policy. If you want peace, vote PCI. And remember: he who does not vote is silent. And he who is silent consents to rearmament."
essence, the PCI calls for negotiations with the U.S.S.R. from a position of Western weakness.\textsuperscript{28}

Noteworthy because of its unequivocal pro-Soviet alignment is the aforelisted Struggle for Peace (Lotta per la Pace). It was founded by retired Air Force General and former PCI Senator Nino Pasti. This organization is an affiliate of the Soviet-run World Peace Council. According to Pasti, Soviet armaments are merely defensive, whereas the objective of NATO is the military elimination of world communism.\textsuperscript{29}

The organizations and groups that make up the Christian/liberal component of the pacifist movement are frequently motivated by spiritual values intermingled with leftist earthy objectives. Their policies generally favor cooperation with Marxist or Marxist-oriented parties and formations in the interest of humanitarian goals.

Clearly, Italian pacifist activism constitutes a movement rather than a tight organization. Since its structures are loose, the movement must rely upon cooperation among groups whose ultimate aims are not homogeneous. While each organization or group preserves at least formal autonomy, it individually lacks, with the exception of the PCI, the potential for mass mobilization.

To counterbalance its organizational weakness, the pacifist movement has adopted a pyramidal structure consisting of a “national coordination” committee, “regional coordination” committees in each of Italy’s 20 regions, and hundreds of local committees at the municipal level. Nevertheless, while this loose structure enables the movement to plan and conduct a variety of pacifist demonstrations through joint efforts, it falls short of providing sufficient facilities and funds. This problem is largely solved by relying on the capillary structures of the PCI, its youth organization (FGCI), its affiliated labor union (CGIL), PCI-run and PCI relative-majority municipalities,\textsuperscript{30} and the Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI). ARCI’s president and the majority of its 1,300,000 members are also PCI members or sympathizers. Moreover, ARCI, which has 14,000 clubs throughout the country and a 20,000-member affiliation known as the Environmental League, is endowed with a suitable budget largely derivable from its multifaceted role in the entertainment field.

Pacifist manifestations in Italy take on various forms of expression, the majority of which are adopted from the experience of the German “Greens” and adroitly adapted to the Italian scene.

The basic and intrinsically dynamic form of pacifist expression is the march (or converging marches) followed by a rally. Alternative techniques include “human chains” to symbolize solidarity and

\textsuperscript{28} Since the mid-1970’s the PCI has officially discarded its preclusions against NATO, albeit in equivocal language. Yet, it generally continues to side with USSR over foreign policy issues. Worthy of note is the position of the rank-and-file vis-


\textsuperscript{30} In 1983, out of approximately 8,000 municipalities, 384 were PCI run and 1,579 had a PCI relative majority.
"die-ins," to dramatize the effects of war. Marches and rallies make extensive use of changed political slogans.

These slogans are a recurrent indicator of the anti-American and anti-Western feelings of many participants. The following example lose their rhyme effect in the English translation, but are nevertheless to the point: "Reagan, mind your business; go back to the movie screen to play cowboy!"; "Reagan, stick a missile up your rear: a flower will sprout from your mouth!"; "Reagan, you moron, withdraw the neutron bomb!"; "Reagan, pistol and bomb wielder, you will be the only one to shoot!"; "The only nuclear head we like is Reagan’s head against the wall!"; "It’s enough to chase away the servants of CIA: peace is not Utopia!"; "Red Italy! Reagan in a ditch!"; "From Sicily to Lombardy, one shout: Americans go away!"; and "Italy out of NATO!"

In concomitance with the march rally techniques, pacifist activists frequently organize unofficial referendums as a form of moral suasion. Some of these address armaments in general. Others are concerned with specific local issues such as nuclear energy plants or firing ranges.

The pacifist movement can also count on "de-nuclearized municipalities," including Bologna (Emilia-Romagna), Leghorn (Tuscany), and Vittoria (near Comiso, Sicily). These are nothing other than PCI-run or PCI-relative majority townships, where the local municipal council has the numerical strength to pass resolutions—obviously not binding on the central government in Rome—to the effect that nuclear armaments and munitions are unwanted in the municipality. In addition to the statement of principle inherent in such resolutions and their propaganda value, these municipal governments provide support and logistical structures for pacifist activities, for example, headquarters for the various coordination committees, mailing addresses having an ostensible character of officiality and premises for conferences, exhibits, films, and the like.

Out-door and in-door manifestations are supplemented by writings directly published by the activist groups themselves or elsewhere in the press. The most elaborate effort of this nature is a book put out in 1983 by the Radical Party through its Research Institute for Disarmament, Development, and Peace (IRDISP). Polemically titled "What the Russians Already Know and the Italians Must Not Know," this publication lists—by region, province, and municipality—NATO, U.S., and Italian installations on the peninsula and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. The argument of its authors is that these military forces and facilities serve only the purpose of rendering Italy a target for multiple devastation, while, on account of their cost, they foreclose the possibility of developing needed civilian structures and services.\(^\text{31}\)

Although the pacifist protest is primarily directed against nuclear armaments in Italy—the so called Euromissiles—a number of other issues have been and/or still are the target of pacifist activism. They include Italian participation in the multinational peace-keeping forces in Lebanon (1982–1984) and in the minesweeping operation in the Red Sea (1984), the presence of U.S. military forces.

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31 IRDSP, Quello che i Russi già Sanno è gli Italiani non Devono Sapere, Rome, 1983.
in Italy, Italian arms sales on the world market, military-service related accidents, the safety of commercial air travel vis-a-vis military aircraft, conscientious objection, the alleged disproportion of the defense budget, and even the yearly military parade in the center of Rome to celebrate the anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic.

The plurality of issues pacifism addresses, the variety of social groups pacifist issues attract, the latent anti-Western state of mind of the pacifist activists, and the aggregative looseness of the pacifist structure unquestionably make the pacifist movement a fertile ground for extremist and even terrorist infiltration and agitation.

The Prime Minister, on the basis of information provided by the intelligence and security services, first expressed this concern in the semiannual intelligence report submitted to the Parliament on July 5, 1983. In the subsequent report, submitted on February 2, 1984, the Prime Minister referred to “increasing pseudo-pacifist and anti-militarist activities with clear anti-NATO connotations.” The next report, submitted on August 9, 1984, addressed the “ferment [within] pacifist, anti-militarist, and anti-nuclear movements ... by extremist groups in connection with mass demonstrations.” Moreover, that report attests to the presence of “provocateurs.” The most recent one, submitted on February 11, 1985, reiterates the same dangers and, in the context of the anti-NATO and anti-Western wave of terrorist attacks perpetrated in Europe during the pertinent semester, the report recalls related Red Brigades goals.

The schematic information presented in the semiannual intelligence reports is corroborated by other open-source data relative to the degenerative phenomena that occur in the course of pacifist militancy. Such phenomena are most frequently detectable in Comiso, the very fulcrum of pacifist agitation in Italy. Demonstrations in front of the gates of the missile site regularly entail “sit-ins” aimed at blocking military and military-related transit in order to disrupt military operations. This form of “passive resistance” and “civil disobedience” has from time to time given way to threats and violence. For example, in August of 1983, a group of “pacifists” paint-sprayed on the security police vehicles the words: “We will kill you all.” In November of the same year, a policeman who attempted to prevent the recurrence of such conduct was physically attacked. On other occasions, police car tires were slashed.

Moreover, the pacifist militants have purchased through an alleged public subscription three tracts of land, two of which border with the Comiso missile installation. They are called “The Green Vineyard,” “International Meeting Against Cruise—(IMAC),” and “Cobweb” and were reportedly bought for Lit. 37 million, 12 million, and 35 million, respectively. IMAC’s “staff” includes anar-

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23 Supra note 17, p. 42.
24 Supra note 21, p. 32.
25 Supra note 3, p. 21.
chist elements. The twofold purpose of these “camps” is to serve as pacifist centers and living quarters for permanent or rotating groups and as staging areas for clandestine penetrations into the missile site. These raids are conducted for sketching purposes—as demonstrated by repeated arrests followed by charges of espionage—or for demonstrative slogan-writing within the installation. The most representative raid occurred during the night between Good Friday and Holy Saturday of 1984, when two women from the “The Cobweb” camp negotiated the protective fence and subsequently spray-painted slogans on the installation’s water tower and 23 military vehicles. Another significant incident was reported on January 15, 1985. According to the press, a detailed map of the installation was found in a Comiso post office together with a letter addressed to London’s New Statesman.

A substantive portion of the agitation in Comiso is coordinated by the Unitary Committee for Disarmament and Peace (CUDIP), headed by Giacomo Cagnes, formerly the Communist mayor of Comiso. The presence in CUDIP of members of Workers’ Autonomy (AUTOP), whose preferential relationship with the leftist terrorist fold was discussed above, has been confirmed by Cagnes himself. Unlawful tactics in conjunction with pacifist activities are not limited to Comiso. One such tactic is called “fiscal objection” and is practiced in various areas of the country. It is nothing other than the refusal to pay a percentage of the personal income tax equal to the defense-spending percentage of the national budget. This practice falls right in line with AUTOP’s rent and utility bills “proletarian reduction.” As of November 1983, there were 1,649 cases of “fiscal objection” on record, as opposed to 419 during the previous year. Reportedly, fiscal objectors include three Members of Parliament—Gianluigi Melega and Roberto Cicciomessere of PR and Mario Capanna of DP—as well as Bishop Luigi Bettazzi, president of Pax Christi. Another initiative in support of conscientious objection is aimed at organizing disobedience and sabotage in the armed forces by draftees. Although conceptualized by Catholic pacifists, it parallels the activities of the Proletarians in Uniform (PID) of the early 1970’s, that is, groups of Marxist-Leninist agitators within the military establishment.

Moreover, during pacifist marches and demonstrations, AUTOP participants resort to tactics generally ranging from disturbance of the peace to acts of vandalism. However, AUTOP elements have also set off, within the timeframe of planned pacifist manifestations, detonations of explosive against more or less representative targets. Two incidents of this nature are particularly serious. On September 10, 1983, a group called New Armed Partisans for Communism damaged with five explosive charges a national television transmitter in Trent and caused a blackout. A responsibility leaflet dropped off at the site of the incident states in part:

Against the disinformation of national radio-televisio
race . . . against dismissals and unemployment; for the mobilization of the masses, for the proletarian cause, from Trent to Sicily, resistance now and forever.

The second one took place Rome on July 27, 1984, when a group that claimed responsibility under the name of Communists Struggling Against Imperialism and Armaments bombed the residence of Leonetto De Leon, Italian editor of NATO News. His wife and son were injured. This heretofore unheard of terrorist formation is believed to be an offshoot of AUTOP.

During the period January 1983–June 1985, there has also been an increased and more dynamic interest in the pacifist issue on the part of the Red Brigades (BR). In Politics and Revolution (Politica e Rivoluzione), a book authored by imprisoned and unbent red brigadists Prospero Gallinari, Bruno Seghetti, Francesco Piccioni, and Andrea Coi, "the movements against war, the deployment of the missiles and nuclear [energy], and even the ecology [movements]" are defined as "an ensemble of proletarian antagonism." The authors propose "liaison between combatant initiative and these mass movements." Moreover, virtually all BR writings of this period include, as a minimum, anti-NATO and anti-"Euromissiles" statements, as most dramatically exemplified by the communique issued after Mr. Hunt's assassination.

Finally, pacifist ferment in Sardinia has had a contagious effect on the island's separatist extremists. In January 1984, the above discussed Sardinian Independentist Party (PARIS) demanded from the U.S. Government a payment of $5 billion as rear rent for the submarine base at La Maddalena. It remains to be seen whether this demand will be followed by terrorist attacks. As it is, the independentist platform excludes the NATO presence.

Most difficult to assess is the numerical strength of full-time infiltrators within the pacifist movement, as opposed to the thousands of AUTOP extremists and the hundreds of anarchists available for the exploitation of pacifist initiatives. An official indication of the number of full timers dates back to September 1984. At that time, the Prime Minister reported to the parliamentary intelligence oversight committee that 70 suspected terrorists and supporting elements were active in the anti-nuclear, anti-militarist, and pacifist organizations. The presence of foreign activists and/or agents of foreign governments in the Italian pacifist movement will be addressed under the next heading.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ITALIAN TERRORISM AND THE FRENCH CONNECTION

The period January 1983–June 1985 has been marked by increased concern over the internationalization of Italian terrorism, one of whose principal aspects is the so-called French connection. However, the matter of international linkages or even patron state support is not an altogether new development. In fact, pre-1983

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41 Quoted in L'Espresso, Sept. 16, 1984, p. 8 (Rome).
42 See La Repubblica, Sept. 11, 1984, p. 7 (Rome).
43 Supra note 1, particularly pp. 28-35, 38, and 40-41.
circumstantial and testimonial evidence relative thereto has been corroborated and/or expanded upon in a confidential report prepared by the Executive Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CESIS) on March 31, 1983, under the title of "International Implications of Terrorism." 

That report deserves careful examination for a better understanding of significant precedents and their bearing upon the timeframe covered by this update. The following is a summary of the salient portions of the declassified intelligence report.

**THE PALESTINIAN CONNECTION**

Immediately after Moro's abduction, Mario Moretti of the Red Brigades (BR) was contacted by representatives of Hyperion, "a Paris structure under the cover of a language school which was to coordinate—apparently under the direction of the Soviet KGB, as stated by several repentant terrorists—the operations of various subversive groups in Europe: IRA, ETA, NAPAP, RAF." Moretti accepted Hyperion's proposal to lend international scope to the BR and was then introduced to a Paris-based representative of the PLO's Marxist minority faction.

As a result of this and subsequent meetings, the BR acquired from the PLO two shipments of weapons. The first was introduced into Italy through a French-Italian mountain pass toward the end of 1978, while the second was made available to the BR in Cyprus and brought to Italy in the summer of 1979. As opposed to the first, which included both East and West European weapons, the second shipment consisted exclusively of West European ones. Some of these weapons were distributed among the various BR "columns" and at least one—a Kalashnikov rifle—was given to, and used by, the Sardinian separatist and BR-connected Red Barbagia (Barbagia Rossa).

Other aspects of the PLO–BR agreements encompassed assistance to the BR abroad, including Paris and Angola, and access to training camps in Lebanon. In return, the BR would store in Italy part of the furnished weapons for future PLO use and would conduct or coordinate, upon request, attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Italy on behalf of the PLO. The intelligence report notes that at the beginning of 1982, Soviet-made weapons wrapped in Arabic-language newspapers were discovered in a BR storage facility in Montello near Treviso. Moreover, when red brigadist Bruno Seghetti was captured in May 1980, he was in possession of an English-language note with the Rome address of the Israeli Ambassador and military attaché. Interestingly enough, Seghetti was not familiar with the English language.

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45 Id., p. 379.
Leftist terrorist formations, other than the BR, also entertained Palestinian contacts through former “autonomist” Maurizio Folini, who, in July–August 1978, brought from Lebanon to Italy a boat-cargo of East-European weapons. Though not originally intended for the Italian terrorist left, these weapons were ceded with Soviet consent. Folini, who was accompanied by a militant of the Communist Revolutionary Committees (Comitati Comunisti Rivoluzionari—CO.CO.RI), enjoyed freedom of movement in Lebanon and Syria because of his Palestinian contacts. Moreover, a number of repentant terrorists believed that he was a KGB agent.

THE EAST EUROPEAN CONNECTION

In addition to the Hyperion-KGB connection referred to above, the report briefly addresses or corroborates more direct linkages between Italian extremists/terrorists and Eastern Europe. These include, inter alia, the contacts of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli—the leftist revolutionary ideologue and publisher who accidentally blew himself up in 1972—with the intelligence services of the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia; the presence in Czechoslovakia from 1973 to 1974 of BR fugitives Peili and Franceschini; a list of Italians who underwent political and terrorism training in the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and Albania up to 1978; and a contribution of Lit. 70 million to Workers’ Autonomy (AUTOP) in 1979 from Czechoslovakia through the automobile manufacturing firm SKODA.

Still, according to the intelligence report, the testimony of repentant terrorists—Savasta, Cianfanelli, Peci, Rossana Mangiameli, Pietro Mutti, and Gino Aldi—refers to close relations, particularly with respect to the supply of weapons, between the Soviet and Bulgarian intelligence services, on one hand, and minor Italian terrorist formations, on the other, long before 1981—the year that the BR made contact with the Bulgarian intelligence services through a cousin of red brigadist Loris Scricciolo. However, the BR-Bulgarian connection is deemed to have been of short duration because of the public disclosure of revelations concerning the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II and the abduction of General James L. Dozier.

The report concludes this heading by referring to a document authored by Giovanni Senzani—the reputed leader of the movementist faction of the BR—and seized at the time of his arrest in January 1982. It reflects Senzani’s belief that the KGB was “in a position to pilot the activity of the major European and Palestinian terrorist organizations for anti-Western purposes.” Moreover, in Senzani’s view, the KGB could “manipulate simultaneously groups of the extreme right and of the extreme left” and “had planted its agents in the militarist faction of the BR.” The intelligence report comments that apart from any assessment of Senzani’s conclusions, the fact remains that he held a “privileged” position in the clandestine terrorist milieu.

46 Supra note 44, pp. 385-386.
THE FRENCH CONNECTION

The report once again refers to the aforementioned Hyperion. It lists two of its principal representatives—Swiss-born Francoise Tusher and Italian-born Corrado Simioni (the latter "recruited by the KGB in Paris")—as promoters of the International Center for Popular Culture with offices at 14 Rue de Nanteuil, Paris, which remained through 1982 the principal point of contact between European and Palestinian terrorist groups and Italian militants of the BR, Front Line (PL), the Communist Combat Units (Unità Combattevole Comunisti—UCC), and AUTOP. Thereafter, it served as a meeting point for Armenian, Palestinian, Irish, and Italian extremists. Another Paris-based support network for Italian terrorist fugitives was the Unitary Collective for the Liberation of Political Prisoners.

According to the report, Gloria Cesari Grunbaum, a Roman-born French citizen by marriage, a former member of the Italian extremist organization Ongoing Struggle (Lotta Continua), a resident of France since 1975, and an active participant in said Unitary Collective, is suspected of providing liaison for Italian terrorists in Italy and France. Grunbaum's presence was also noted in the International Center for Expanded Space for Freedom (CINEL), a satellite of the Soviet-run World Peace Council and of the Henri Curiel network of Paris. At the time of his arrest, PL member Marco Donat Cattin was in the company of Grunbaum.

The report finally lists the front organizations and clandestine groups with which AUTOP ideologue Toni Negri has been associated in France: CINEL, Hyperion, Autonomous Coordination, NAPAP, and the former Center for Socio-Economic Research and Investigations (CRISE).

Although these precedents covered by the intelligence report are by no means negligible, they are not comparable to the systematic rhythm of domestic activity carried out by Italian terrorist formations of the left from 1968 through 1982. To be sure, the BR in particular had repeatedly addressed international issues in their writings and, with the abduction of General Dozier in 1981, had dynamically stepped into the international arena. Yet, the internationalization of Italian terrorism—or its substantive beginning—appears to be a more recent development.

In discussing the Italian pacifist movement, it was already noted that the themes addressed violently and nonviolently by the BR, AUTOP, the anarchists, and other extremist formations are clearly international in their anti-NATO and anti-Western connotations. Moreover, all major documents—pamphlets and communiques—issued by the BR since 1983 make at least some reference to international matters even when they essentially deal with domestic affairs. A macroscopic example of this tendency is provided by Pamphlet No. 19 of March 1984, which covers in 60 pages Italian economic, social, and political affairs, but ends with the exhortation:

Against warmongering foreign policy: Withdrawal of all troops from the Middle East! No to the missiles in Comiso!

47 Supra note 44, p. 387.
Italy out of NATO! Get rid of the Craxi [Italy's Prime Minister] government, servant of the bosses and of imperialism!

In Pamphlet No. 20 of the following year, the BR attribute to themselves a leading role in the European "anti-imperialist struggle."48

Likewise, international references appear in all three communique issued by the BR as responsibility claims after the attacks on Giugni, Hunt, and Tarantelli. But the action against Hunt is the most indicative of the internationalization process at various levels. The victim was substantially unrelated to either Italy or NATO. Moreover, the communique addressed a broad range of foreign issues, including Western "imperialism" in the Third World. Finally, the murder was accompanied by a second responsibility claim in Beirut, issuing from the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Brigades. Whether a "solidarity" claim or a "principal's" claim, it reflects unity of intent.

The absence of Italian participation in so-called "Euroterrorist" actions during the wave of ostensibly coordinated anti-NATO and anti-Western attacks recorded in key West European countries from October 1984 to March 198549 is not per se an indication that international objectives have been discarded by the Italian terrorist left. According to qualified observers, BR attention was largely taken up during that period by an internal debate encompassing the militarist/movementist issue and other policy matters.50 Other considerations are equally pertinent. In their responsibility claims for "Euroterrorist" attacks, the Belgian Communist Combat Cells (CCC) quoted BR writings. One day before the opening of the trial of members of the BR Veneto "column" that started on March 6, 1985, a significant "delivery" took place in Venice: the original French-German text and its Italian translation of the Direct Action and Red Army Faction joint communique of January 15, 1985, a passage of which reads: "Today it is possible and even necessary to set up the International Proletarian Warfare Organization and its politico-military arm: West European Guerrilla." Also in March 1985, BF, Pamphlet No. 20 extolled the "anti-imperialist struggle" in the terms noted above. And, not least, already in late 1984, Italian terrorists of the left had joined their Basque, Corsican, Irish, German, French, and Belgian comrades in the Basque country to study "a unified offensive against imperialism and militarism."51

In the context of the internationalization of the Italian terrorist phenomenon, the French connection is particularly meaningful as it reflects not only subversive/terrorist international solidarity, but also the pooling of forces and/or resources. Involved in the French

48 As mentioned earlier on in the text, pamphlet No. 20 of March 1985 is still subject to investigative secrecy; however, at least some passages have been acquired by the press. See, for example, La Repubblica, Mar. 28, 1985, p. 4 (Rome).
49 For an overview and analysis of these incidents, see Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "Euroterrorism and NATO," Update Report, Clandestine Tactics and Technology, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, Md., vol. 11, 1985.
connection are the Organized Comrades for Proletarian Liberation (COLP), PL-related elements, the BR, and AUTOP.

COLP/PL

Initial evidence of operational cooperation between Direct Action (Action Directe—AD) and PL emerged in March of 1980 when PL members Enrico Bianco, Oriana Marchionni, Franco Pinna, and Pierluigi Amadori were arrested near Toulon on charges of participation in an armed “proletarian expropriation” organized by AD. Joint operations of this nature grew in intensity since 1983. Gloria Argano of COLP has been indicted for her role in the murder of two policemen in Paris on May 31, 1983, during their shoot-out with AD militants. Argano is further suspected of involvement in two robberies perpetrated by AD in Paris in July of the same year. Also involved in one of these two robberies was COLP member Vincenzo Spanò. On October 14, 1983, still another COLP member, Ciro Rizzato, was killed in Paris during a robbery conducted under the AD banner. AD subsequently named one of its “combat units” after Rizzato. On February 22, 1984, Spanò was arrested in a Parisian AD hideout, where the police seized 22 firearms and 32 kilograms of explosives.

BR

A document confiscated in a BR safe house in January 1982 refers for the first time to an “external column, whose task is to protect fugitives and recruit new militants.” The document further states that successful counterterrorist operations in Italy paradoxically reinforced the “external column.” This information was provided by a Roman investigating judge in response to a question regarding the French connection. The magistrate also pointed out that red brigadist Giorgio Frau, who kept a list of public figures, including BR victim Ezio Tarantelli, was arrested in Paris. According to another Roman investigating judge, a BR “liaison office” operated in Paris since the days of Moretti’s initial travels to France in 1978 through Senzani’s capture in 1982. In order of succession, the BR representatives to Paris were Moretti, Anna Laura Braghetti, Riccardo Dura, Maurizio Jannelli, Alvaro Lojacono, Fulvia Miglietta, and Senzani.

On November 7, 1983, French journalist Jean-Louis Baudet was arrested in Paris and subsequently convicted in July 1984 for possession of weapons and classified documents. According to repentant red brigadists, Baudet had furnished to Senzani several weapons, including rocket launchers, and had traveled to Rome to provide instruction on their employment. His girl friend, Catherine Legagneur, told the Italian investigating judges that she had also supplied to Palestinians and to BR members false documents. On his part, Baudet claims that he was working for the French Government and his task was to keep leftist groups from carrying out terrorist attacks against the Socialist Government headed by Mitterrand.

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52 Interview with Judge Ferdinanda Imposimato in Panorama, Apr. 7, 1985, pp. 36-38 (Milan).
53 Supra note 50.
Several BR documents seized by the Italian police in 1984 attest to continued BR planning in France and even to internal organizational debates held in that country. Moreover, the apprehension of Barbara Balzarani, an "historic" leader of the BR convicted of several murders, and her clean-police-record companion Gianni Pelosi performed by the Carabinieri in Ostia (Rome) on June 19, 1985, has reportedly been made possible by investigations conducted in France. This counterterrorist development, which is obviously most recent, may possibly shed additional light on the French connection. What appears to be certain at this point is that the BR fugitives whose traces are lost in France resurface in Italy for operational purposes.

It was reported in the Introduction that 117 identified terrorist fugitives are located in France. These are official statistics. Press accounts, on the other hand, concur on a larger figure: 200. Presumably, a notable percentage of these are "autonomists" who committed terrorism-related crimes. Major AUTOP members enjoying asylum in Paris are Toni Negri, Oreste Scalzone, and Gian Franco Pacino, all three convicted in Italy to prison sentences ranging from 28 to 36 years. Negri and Scalzone in particular enjoy access to a number of academic and cultural circles in which and through which they continue to propagandize views that are, to say the least, unconventional.

In the context of international links, some observations are in order with respect to the pacifist movement as well. "The Cobweb," one of the above-discussed pacifist camps set up in Comiso, is made up exclusively of women and the majority of them is of English or German nationality. Expulsions from Italy of foreigners responsible for blocking the entrances of the missile site and conducting clandestine penetrations therein have been frequent. More disquietingly, a number of German pacifist militants in the area was found in possession of suspiciously recent visas to East European countries. Worst yet, Libyan leader Qaddafi has made it clear, through his Sicilian agent of influence Michele Papa, that funding is available for pacifist demonstrations worth patronizing. The pro-Western mayor of Comiso, an unwilling recipient of the Libyan offer, angrily disclosed this practice in the course of an interview. Other sources report that Libyan funding has been channelled to select pacifist groups through certain firms that do business with Libya. Significantly, Giacomo Cagnes, head of the above-referred Unitary Committee for Peace and Disarmament of Comiso (CUDIP), has alleged that the Comiso-based missiles are pointed at Libya, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Cagnes proposes closer relations with the "liberation movements" of the entire southern Mediterranean as "the new central commitment of Italian pacifism."

Rather limited, by comparison, are the international links and objectives of the rightist terrorist formations. As in the past, Ital-

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55 Supra note 37, p. 8.
ian rightist extremists enjoy safehaven and other points of contact in Latin America, France, and England.

**TRANSITIONAL TERRORISM IN ITALY**

Several transnational terrorist actions recorded during this period reflect that Italian territory continues to serve as an alternate battle ground for foreign feuds. Terrorist attacks of this nature were conducted primarily against citizens or property of Libya, Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. While these actions are generally related to the internal affairs of those countries, to regional disputes involving those countries, or to the Palestinian issue, still other transnational terrorist operations—consummated or planned—are an unequivocal indication of anti-Western designs. Even more disconcerting from an Italian security standpoint are the repeated threats made against Italy by Third World elements, whose record includes political violence in their countries and abroad.

**LIBYA**

As opposed to the pre-1983 timeframe, which was characterized by terrorist actions against expatriates who refused to return to Libya or to cooperate with Qaddafi's regime, analogous actions have since been carried out against representatives of the Libyan Government in Rome. On January 21, 1984, shortly after 3 p.m., Libyan Ambassador Ammar El Taggazy was attacked from behind by two masked men as he approached the garage of the condominium in which he resided. He was beaten and fired upon with two pistols. The following day a caller telephoned the London office of Associated Press to claim responsibility on behalf of the Libyan opposition group Al Forkan (Vulcan). The Ambassador did not recover and died in a Rome hospital on February 10, 1984. Almost 1 year later, in the early morning hours of January 13, 1985, Libyan press attaché Magkjun Farg was murdered near his residence by a lone gunman, who discarded his silencer-equipped Walther 7.65 mm semiautomatic pistol. Before dying, Farg returned the assailant's fire with a 38 cal. revolver and wounded him, presumably, slightly. Al Forkan once again claimed responsibility in accordance with the previous modalities.

Conversely, two more terrorist attacks perpetrated during the same period have been attributed to emissaries of the Libyan regime. On September 20, 1984, Libyan political refugee Mohammed Khomsi was found strangled in a Rome hotel. A telephone responsibility claim received by the news agency ANSA from the Organization of Mauritanian Nationalists (ONAM) is not deemed credible by the investigators. On March 1, 1985, Mordechai Fadlum, a Libyan Jew and expatriate, was murdered in his Rome jewelry store shortly before closing time with a silencer-equipped Beretta 7.65 mm semiautomatic pistol, which the attacker discarded before fleeing. Although the store safe was open, nothing was removed. Witnesses described the last store visitor as Arabic-looking and provided an identikit.
On October 26, 1983, at approximately 1:40 p.m., as Jordanian Ambassador Taysir Alaeddin Toukan was being driven by his chauffeur from the Embassy to his Rome residence, a gunman posted behind a billboard took advantage of the rush-hour traffic that temporarily halted the Ambassador's car and opened fire with a Polish WZ-63 submachinegun. Both the Ambassador and his driver were seriously wounded. The gunman was backed up by two accomplices who fired upon the Ambassador's bodyguard after they dismounted from the escort vehicle to chase the attacker. The assault weapon was abandoned in a nearby street. Among less credible responsibility claims, one was issued by the Abu Nidal group, a renegade faction of Al Fatah.

Responsibility for another anti-Jordanian attack in Rome was claimed by Black September on March 22, 1985. A three-man commando group broke into the local office of the Jordanian Airlines, hurled three grenades, wounded two employees, and fled. Two weeks later, on April 3, 1985, at approximately 9:40 a.m., a Black September militant aimed a disposable anti-tank weapon against the offices of the Jordanian Embassy in Rome from the underlying square (Piazza Verdi). He missed the intended target by one floor and hit the apartment below. Fortunately, no injuries resulted from this incident. The terrorist, Palestinian Ahamed Mimour, was captured by a courageous doorman. Mimour was also carrying a pistol, but it jammed when tried to shoot the doorman, Illuminato Tavella. In addition to Mimour's admission, there was also a telephone responsibility claim from a Black September spokesman.

Serious damage was caused to a Syrian Airlines Boeing 727 on July 13, 1983, when an incendiary device was smuggled aboard by unknown terrorists. The fire took place before takeoff and consequently there were no injuries. Only a few days thereafter, another device of the same type was found in a toilet of Rome's International Airport "Leonardo Da Vinci." Investigators believe it was meant for the same plane. In the evening of April 1, 1985, a bomb intended for the Rome office of the Syrian Airlines slightly wounded three bystanders on the other side of the street.

The Arab Revolutionary Brigades, a group believed close to Abu Nidal, claimed responsibility in Paris for the attack against Mohamed Al Sowaidi, Vice Consul of the United Arab Emirates in Rome. This action was perpetrated by Jordanian national Mohammad Othman on October 26, 1984. He seriously wounded the diplomat and killed his Iranian girl friend Noushine Montassari, a student at the University of Rome. The gunman took advantage of a traffic light that caused the vehicle they were riding in to stop. He was immediately apprehended. The responsibility claim warned the "United Arab Emirates and other states of the Gulf against pursuing their policy linked to the Americans and to the Zionist movement and hostile to Arabs and Palestinians."
OTHER TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITY

During the same period various individuals from Third World countries traveling on false passports and in possession of explosives were arrested at Rome's International Airport. These extremists were mostly traveling on Italian territory to reach other destinations. Moreover, press accounts report that a network of politically-religious fanatics has been organized in Rome under the Iranian Ayatollah Hadi Khosraw-Shahi to carry out anti-Western subversive and possibly terrorist activity. This network reportedly includes various foreign nationals, to wit, Pakistanis, Tunisians, and Turks, and appears to be modeled after the ones already operating in France. Furthermore, an attack of still dubious paternity occurred in Rome on December 14, 1984. Two persons on a scooter approached PLO representative Ismail Darwish, fired several pistol shots, and left him dead on the sidewalk.

A potentially devastating attack, reminiscent of the bloodiest terrorist actions perpetrated in the Middle East, was foiled by Swiss-Italian cooperation in late 1984. The intended target was the U.S. Embassy in Rome. On November 18, the Swiss police arrested Lebanese national Hussein Atat, who had arrived at the Zurich airport from Beirut and was waiting for a connecting flight to Rome. Atat was in possession of explosives. The Swiss police authorities alerted their Italian counterparts, who, in turn, apprehended in the Roman beach resort of Ladispoli seven Lebanese nationals enrolled as students either at the University of Rome or in other professional institutes. All seven were in contact with the Palestinian arrested in Switzerland. Two were subsequently released, while the other five—Mahmoud Gebara, Mahmoud Hani Bayoun, Fahs Mohamed Neemtalla, Hussein Abdul Hassan El Sefaqi, and Melhem Khadr Issa—have been charged with the crimes of armed band and attempted massacre.

In the Ladispoli residence of the arrestees the Italian police found a map of the U.S. Embassy in Rome with compromising annotations in the margins. This led the investigators and the state attorney to the conclusion that an explosive-truck attack against the U.S. Embassy was in the offing. The arrestees rejected all charges, but admitted to be members of Islamic Jihad. At this writing, a trial date has not yet been set. Procedurally, it is up to the investigating judge to determine whether trial is warranted on the basis of the findings of the state attorney.

It might be noted that the aforementioned Atat, believed to be a courier of explosives, was released by the Swiss authorities in close concomitance with the release of Swiss diplomat Erich Wehrli, who had been abducted in Beirut. This development forecloses the possibility of Atat’s extradition to Italy in connection with the proceedings against the five Lebanese charged in Rome. Because of the potentially damaging consequences at the judicial level, the Italian Minister of Justice has expressed some bitterness vis-a-vis the Swiss decision.

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67 See Vittorfranco S. Pisano, France as a Setting for Domestic and International Terrorism, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, Md., 1985.
68 Corriere della Sera, supra note 2.
In the early months of 1985, threats were leveled against Italy by Libya's Qaddafi, on one hand, and the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) and Islamic Jihad, on the other. In March, Libyan news agency JANA quoted Qaddafi to the effect that he would support Italian terrorist groups if Italy backs anti-Libyan regime elements and does not release "hundreds of Libyans in prison," a highly inflated reference to the few Libyans arrested in Italy because of their attacks on Libyan expatriates. From February through May, threats of direct attacks against Italian targets were made by the LARF and Islamic Jihad in a fruitless effort to obtain the release of their members arrested in Italy on account of their involvement in transnational terrorist activity.

For the sake of completeness, a few comments are in order limitedly to the judicial and propaganda developments regarding the abortive assassination attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II perpetrated by Turkish national Mehmet Ali Agca in St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981. In July of the same year, Agca was convicted by the Court of Assizes of Rome, pursuant to the longstanding 1929 agreements between Italy and the state of the Vatican City that vest the Italian courts with jurisdiction over crimes committed on Vatican territory. Supplementary investigations subsequent to Agca's conviction led to a new trial for conspiracy, which began on May 27, 1985, and is consequentially still in progress. In addition to Agca, the defendants are Bulgarian nationals Sergei Antonov, Todor Ayvazov, and Jelio Vassilev and Turkish nationals Bekir Celenk, Musa Serdar Celebi, Omer Bagci, and Oral Celenk.

These indictments were made possible by Agca's testimony months after his initial conviction. Although there are some contradictions and inaccuracies in Agca's statements, the Italian judicial authorities, after having investigated all aspects of Agca's belated revelations, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to bring the case to trial. During the hearings held to date, Agca's courtroom behavior has repeatedly been bizarre, for example, he proclaimed himself to be Jesus Christ. This could ultimately impeach his credibility before the court. However, after a lot of "rhetoric," he did confirm in court the "Bulgarian connection." Moreover, a formal psychiatric expertise performed in Turkey and expert opinion offered in Italy lead one to believe that he is not insane. Under the circumstances, Agca's odd behavior could be an attempt to communicate and/or bargain with former principals or associates. Besides, there is no certainty that Agca told the prosecution all he knows.

The trial has been preceded and is being accompanied by various forms of propaganda against the findings of the prosecution as they relate to the "Bulgarian connection." Books and press accounts allege or hypothesize fabrication of evidence and coaching of Mehmet Ali Agca by Western intelligence services, particularly those of Italy and the United States of America.59 On his part, An-

59 Two significant examples out of many: (1) In May 1985, Italian Communist publisher Napoleon put out a book titled "La Pista" (The Trail). Its author, French attorney Christian Roulet, argues that American intelligence has built up the accusations against Bulgaria. (2) An article in the May 19, 1985, issue of the Roman weekly "L'Espresso" insinuates that Agca, who alleges to have visited Antonov's Rome apartment for conspiratorial purposes, actually de-
tonov's defense counsel, Giuseppe Consolo, made an appeal on NBC television to the American public regarding the alleged innocence of his client.60

Recent developments also include ostensible efforts to improve strained Italian-Bulgarian relations. In December of 1982, following the arrest of Sergei Antonov, one of the above-listed defendants, diplomatic relations between Rome and Sofia were temporarily downgraded. Only in the spring of 1984 were they restored to the full ambassadorial level. Moreover, the Italian Government seems to have overlooked that the new Bulgarian Ambassador to Rome, Raiko Marinov Nikolov, had been expelled from France earlier on in his career and had subsequently been denied reentry in that NATO country.61 Likewise Bulgarian air and naval attaché Ivan Jueorguev Kotchovski, who should have been expelled from Italy on espionage grounds in November of 1983, was apparently allowed to leave the country because of the "normal expiration of his posting" as claimed by the Bulgarian Embassy. On her part, Bulgaria released from prison and repatriated to Italy in 1984 Gabriella Trevisin and Paolo Farsetti. The couple had been arrested and convicted in Bulgaria on questionable espionage charges in 1982, just as the ramifications of the "Bulgarian connection" were beginning to emerge.

This apparent political accommodation has not affected to date the Italian judicial process, much to the credit of the Italian judiciary. Whatever the outcome of the trial, it should be remembered that said trial is governed by the rules of criminal procedure and evidence—democratic rules not easily applicable to the murky sphere of international clandestine operations.

COUNTERMEASURES AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Legislative enactments of this period are not directly related to terrorism. However, Law No. 398 of July 28, 1984, on the reduction of pretrial confinement and provisional release62 could have restored to freedom, as early as February 2, 1985, "1300 suspected terrorists, mafiosi, murderers, kidnappers, and drug traffickers." 63 Wisely, in January 1985, the Italian Parliament extended to November 30 of the same year pretrial confinement for individuals charged with the commission of intrinsically violent crimes.

Official statistics reflect that counterterrorist operations have continued to bear fruits. In 1983, the State Police (Polizia di Stato) arrested 132 terrorists/extremists of the left and 111 of the right and seized 9 safe houses of the terrorist left. During the same year, the Carabinieri arrested 140 terrorists/extremists of the left and 33 of the right and seized 8 safe houses of the terrorist left and 1 of the terrorist right. In 1984, the State Police arrested 50 terrorists/

60 In commenting on NBC's interview of June 13, 1985, with Consolo, an Italian news agency defined "incomprehensible" Consolo's "appeal to the American people." See Agenzia Italiana Stampa—AIS, No. 180, June 29, 1985, p. 2 (Rome).
61 See, for example, L'Espresso, May 13, 1984, p. 11 (Rome).
63La Repubblica, Jan. 18, 1985, p. 1 (Rome).
extremists of the left and 37 of the right and seized 1 safe house of
the terrorist left. On their part, the Carabinieri arrested 87 terror-
ists/extremists of the left and 14 of the right and seized 9 safe
houses of the terrorist left and 1 of the terrorist right. Official sta-
tistics for 1985—up to May 20—reflect that the carabinieri arrested
33 terrorists/extremists of the left and 3 of the right and seized 2
safe houses of the terrorist left. Statistics regarding 1985 State
Police counterterrorist operations are not available at this writing.

Conversely, these statistics constitute an indicator of the residual
numerical strength of the politically violent milieu at a time when
the overall domestic terrorist menace in Italy has subsided.

Unchanged are the methods developed by the police forces in
combating terrorism prior to 1983.64 However, the tightening of
compartmentalization, particularly in the structure of the Red Bri-
gades (BR), has reduced the potential contribution of new terrorist
recruits who did or might repent after capture and has necessitat-
ed greater reliance upon documents confiscated in captured safe
houses and propaganda material openly issued by the pertinent
terrorist formations.

With respect to past counterterrorist operations, two develop-
ments at the judicial level deserve attention. After the successful
liberation of General Dozier from a BR “people’s prison” in Janu-
ary 1982 by members of the State Police Central Operative Nucleus
for Security (NOCS), five policemen, including officials and NOCS
members, were indicted on charges of torture allegedly committed
on red brigadists to force them to reveal information. One of the
five, Salvatore Genova, was not brought to trial, since in the inter-
im he had been elected to Parliament. On July 15, 1983, the Tribu-
nal of Padoa held that mistreatment rather than torture had taken
place. An appellate decision of March 20, 1984, reduced the essen-
tially symbolic suspended sentence inflicted by the lower court.65
On April 30, 1984, the Court of Assizes of Pavia inflicted another
suspended sentence on police official Ettore Filippi, who had “cov-
ered” crimes against property perpetrated by a police-controlled po-
litical extremist so that he could acquire credibility with the BR. In
fact, this infiltrator had led to the capture of high-ranking red bri-
gadists Mario Moretti and Enrico Fenzi in 1981. Both court deci-
sions have caused some bitterness in counterterrorist circles, but
they reflect, nevertheless, the application of the rule of law.

Beyond the contents of the above-summarized CESIS report,
which addresses international linkages, little progress has officially
been made in acquiring details on backstage elements of the Italian
terrorist phenomenon. Rather disappointing in this respect is the
outcome of the appellate trial regarding the Moro affair. The trial
ended on March 14, 1985. Despite the revelations of Valerio Mor-
ucci, a key disassociated red brigadist and a participant in the
Moro abduction, it was not even possible to establish where the

64 See supra note 1, pp. 51-56.
65 Notwithstanding these court decisions, there are those who still attribute to the police tort-
includes several interviews with the terrorists themselves relative to the period 1968-1982. A
direct account of the Dozier affair and its aftermath is provided by Salvatore (“Rino”) Genova.
late Christian Democratic party president was hidden during his captivity.

A noteworthy departure from past practices is the attitude displayed by the executive branch of government on the occasion of the December 23, 1984, train bombing in the Apennines gallery near San Benedetto Val di Sambro that killed 15 passengers and wounded 181. In the past, indiscriminate or "blind" attacks of this nature had immediately been blamed on the extreme right in the belief, assumption, or "political" determination that this modus operandi can only be rightist. In reporting to the Parliament, on December 27, 1985, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi stated that "the trials to be investigated . . . are multiple" and warned against the dangers of "one-way" investigations.66

On the other hand, this despicable massacre brought once again to the forum a favorite allegation of the Communist left and its fellow travelers: the involvement of the Italian intelligence services in antidemocratic plots and their "subordination" to the United States, directly or through NATO. This time the proponent of said thesis was Socialist Member of Parliament Rino Formica.67 Interestingly enough, Formica cited a book authored by one Giuseppe De Lutiis, published by Editori Riuniti, the publishing house of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and titled "Storia dei Servizi Segreti in Italia" (History of the Secret Services in Italy).68 The central theme of the book is that subversive armed bands have consistently constituted a parallel structure of the Italian intelligence services, whose operations are conditioned by agreements with the United States. The book, which is characterized by the repeated and systematic use of the words "perhaps" and "probably" cites almost exclusively Communist or left-oriented sources. Both the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister categorically denied such "subordination," past or present.69

Other polemics resulted from the unprecedented pardon of a convicted terrorist, Flora Pirri Ardzzone, in late May of 1985, after she had served 7 years and 2 months in prison. There are those who fear that it constitutes a prelude toward a generalized amnesty at a time when new legislation is being considered to reinsert disassociated terrorists. The societal recovery of terrorists is a sensitive problem for which a suitable solution could more readily be found at this time in consideration of the reduced momentum of the Italian terrorist onslaught.

Though not specifically related to the terrorist problem, Law No. 354 of July 26, 1975, which constitutes the basis for the reform of the Italian prison system, calls for the rehabilitation of prisoners as well as former prisoners. Contemplated measures include the identification of specific rehabilitation needs of individual prisoners and rehabilitation programs encompassing education, work, religion, cultural activities, recreation, sports, family relations, and appropriate out-of-prison contacts. This law also provides for the es-

67 See, in particular, interview with La Repubblica, Dec. 29, 1984, p. 3 (Roma).
establishment of social service centers connected to the offices of the judiciary having a supervisory role over prison institutions. Likewise, it calls for the utilization of qualified volunteers interested in the rehabilitation of social deviants.

The scope of the law includes social service assistance to release prisoners during the immediate postimprisonment stage. According to the law, this can also be accomplished with the participation of specialized public and private entities. Of the private ones, many are religious (nearly always Catholic) institutions. Another important provision of the law requires that former prisoners subject to the security measure of "freedom under surveillance" be entrusted to the care of the social service in addition to the obligation of complying with police controls.

Regrettably, the implementation of Law No. 354 of 1975 has been slow and generally unsystematic. Nevertheless, it could provide a working frame of reference not only for the rehabilitation of common criminals, but also of former terrorists.

At present, the institution that appears to have had the greatest success in "bridging the gap" between Italian repentant or disassociated terrorists and society is the Catholic Church, as evidenced by the frequent requests of former terrorists for religious services on the occasion of their marriage and the birth of their children, on one hand, and by instances of whole arsenals being turned over by former terrorists to the ecclesiastical authorities, on the other. In this connection it is important to emphasize that the Catholic Church has maintained a stable presence both in the prisons and in the organizations whose aim is the rehabilitation of social deviants. Significantly, former terrorists have stressed the attractiveness of the Church's social ministry rather than her underlying religious mission.

In the long term, it may also be possible to hypothesize a contributory role in the rehabilitation of terrorists by police officials responsible for supervising former terrorist prisoners subject to "freedom under surveillance," provided that specific training be made available if this additional task is assigned. Moreover, political organizations particularly active in social and humanitarian issues could in certain cases serve as a secondary conduit for the rehabilitation of former terrorists convicts or even terrorists sympathizers who have never been indicted. Nevertheless, this sort of political "cooption" is open to dangers.

The political defeat of Italian terrorism does not foreclose the recurrence of terrorist crimes. In fact, the period January 1983–June 1985 has been marked by terrorists actions perpetrated after the revolutionary battle against democratic institutions had already been lost. Violence-oriented subversive forces still in the field—and their new recruits—do continue to display commitment to their cause.

On the purely domestic side of the spectrum, the most worrisome scenario entails a potential accommodation between the militarist and movementist factions of the BR. Parallel operations by these two groups would ensure, in the long term, the continuation of selective, even if occasional, terrorist attacks, accompanied by active and passive recruitment of various strata of Italian society in concomitance with the exploitation of socioeconomic tensions and/or
ideological initiatives. Moreover, the leftist terrorist ranks could draw at least occasional reinforcement from rightist extremist circles, if the trends detected by the intelligence and security services prove to be viable.

On the international side of the spectrum, it is now clear that the terrorist left in particular is combining domestic goals with international ones, as manifested by its writings and actions. This development could enhance linkages with transnational formations. The Italian Prime Minister, as recently as January 29, 1985, stated that during the last 12 months the major danger signs come from "international terrorism" to which Italy "... is particularly exposed because of her geographical position and her extremely liberal legislation and policy ... regarding access and sojourn in the territory of the Republic."70

While revolutionary fervor and obstinacy cannot be easily stamped out, equally evident is the fact that after nearly 20 years of counterterrorist experience, the Italian security forces and the judiciary have acquired the necessary expertise to cope with changing situations.

70 Atti Parlamentari, id., p. 14.