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THE IMPACT OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING ON ALASKA'S PRISON POPULATION

NCJRS ACOVIENTONS

Mark Torgerson House Research Agency Alaska State Legislature May 1986

House Research Agency Report 86-D

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INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Alaska implemented a new criminal sentencing law. Between 1980 and 1985, the State's prison population tripled. The legislature responded to the need for new prison space by appropriating \$127.2 million for prison construction. In addition, annual operating costs for corrections more than tripled, from \$21.6 million in FY 80 to \$77.7 million in FY 86.

Due to concern that Alaska's prison population and corrections costs would continue to increase, the Alaska House of Representatives asked the House Research Agency to assess the impact of the new sentencing law on prison population. This report responds to that request. Chapter One discusses the development of Alaska's sentencing law and includes a brief history of American and Alaska sentencing practices. It also includes explanations of sentencing terminology. Chapter Two assesses the impact of the new sentencing law on Alaska's prison population and discusses the many factors which can affect prison populations. Chapter Three describes alternatives for dealing with prison crowding. Where available, cost impacts of these alternatives are provided.

SUMMARY

OVERVIEW OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN AMERICA

- During the 1800s, state legislatures generally prescribed sentence ranges for criminals and gave judges the discretion to select the specific sentence for each offender. Prison crowding eventually occurred, largely because of relatively lengthy sentences, improved law enforcement, population growth and inadequate prison construction. To relieve crowding, corrections agencies used good time credit, probation and parole to release prisoners before they served their entire sentence. These policies influenced the advent of the flexible indeterminate sentencing laws which were predominant by 1930 (p. 1).
- Reformers called for an end to the sentencing disparity which they argued was caused by flexible sentencing. They advocated the enactment of sentencing laws which provide more fairness, justice and certainty (p. 2).
- In response, 15 state legislatures and Congress have replaced their flexible sentencing systems with determinate sentencing laws. These laws give judges discretion to select a specific sentence from a legislatively prescribed range of sentence lengths. However, there is wide variation among these states in the scope of discretion given judges. While some states allow judges full sentencing discretion, others restrict discretion with presumptive sentencing laws, an offshoot of determinate sentencing. Under presumptive sentencing, judges must sentence the offender to a preset term of imprisonment; variation from this term is allowed only if the judge finds aggravating or mitigating factors present (p. 2).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING IN ALASKA

- In 1975, a Governor's Task Force on Corrections recommended changes in the State's corrections system, including a revised sentencing law (p. 3).
- In 1976, the Alaska Legislature created the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission to draft a new criminal code. A major goal of the subcommission was to recommend a system that would eliminate unjustified disparity and uncertainty in sentencing (pp. 4-6).

- In 1978, the legislature enacted a criminal code which revised sentencing and early release provisions. Effective January 1, 1980, the new law was similar to that favored by the subcommission; indeterminate sentencing applied to most first-time felony convictions while presumptive sentencing applied to subsequent convictions (pp. 6 7).
- The new sentencing law limited the prior effect of both discretionary parole release and good time credit on offenders' actual time served (p. 8).

Amendments to the Revised Code, 1980-1986

- The legislature has amended the sentencing code frequently since its implementation in 1980. The amendments have generally resulted in "tougher" sentencing than that enacted in 1980. Under the current law, there is generally more chance of imprisonment, and for a longer term, than under the 1980 law or the old code (pp. 9 12).
- Major differences between the old law and current law include using good time instead of discretionary parole as a major release mechanism, and diminishing judges' and the parole board's discretion, thereby leaving prosecutors with the majority of influence on offenders' time served (pp. 11 - 12).
- After Alaska's sentencing law was revised in 1980, the prison population rose at a much faster rate than the general population (pp. 13 - 15).

General Effect of Sentencing Laws on Prison Population

- Any sentencing structure--whether it is indeterminate, determinate or a combination of the two--affects prison populations in two general ways:
 - the percentage of crimes which require incarceration, or the mandatory imprisonment rate; and
 - the amount of time the law requires an offender to serve in prison, or simply <u>time served</u> (p. 16).

- In order to determine changes in total time served, sentencing data for crimes subject to presumptive sentencing must be compared to data for comparable crimes under the pre-1980 law. Although the data necessary for a comprehensive assessment of Alaska's revised law are not currently available, some conclusions can be drawn:
 - When the good time credit enacted under Committee Substitute for House Bill (CSHB) 104 is applied to sentence averages in 1984 and 1985, total prisoner time decreases by 8.2 percent (p. 20).
 - When the major early release mechanism under prior law-parole--is substituted for the current mechanism--good time credit--for crimes subject to presumptive and mandatory sentencing, total prisoner time drops by over 40 percent. The elimination of discretionary parole for crimes now subject to presumptive and mandatory sentencing had a large impact on total prisoner years (p. 20).
 - When 1976-1979 sentence averages are substituted for comparable offenses in 1984 and 1985, the change in total prisoner years is insignificant; total prisoner years are slightly higher for 1984 and slightly lower for 1985. These data suggest that—at least for the crimes substituted—sentence lengths have generally not changed significantly under the new law. Therefore, we can conclude that the provisions regarding sentence length did not generate the huge increase in prison population experienced after the law was revised (p. 22).
 - Other criminal justice factors that can affect growth include crime and arrest rates, prosecution practices, demographic changes and the economic situation (pp. 22 26).

Effect of the Revised Law on Future Prison Needs

• Theory indicates that the rate of growth in prison population should slow in the near future. However, because prisons are currently at full capacity, new facilities (in addition to the Seward prison) will probably have to be built by 1990 unless the State takes steps to reduce the prison population (pp. 26 - 29).

ALTERNATIVES TO REDUCE PRISON CROWDING

- · There are two basic ways to reduce prison crowding:
 - accommodate the population increase by building more prisons; and
 - implement alternatives which reverse the sentencing law's effect on prison crowding; i.e., amend the law to require less time served or fewer incarcerations (p. 31).
- The legislature chose the construction option during the first half of the 1980s. The resulting prison construction tripled the State's prison capacity to roughly keep pace with the sharp rise in the prison population. However, the cost to operate this new capacity has resulted in a fourfold increase in the corrections operating budget since 1980 (p. 31).

REDUCING TIME SERVED

- There are two ways to reduce an offender's time served: 1) reduce the sentence imposed by the court; and 2) reduce the sentence after incarceration by applying an early release mechanism (pp. 31 38).
- The three general early release mechanisms which can be utilized include the following:
 - emergency early release by executive order;
 - · good time credit; and
 - parole release (pp. 32 38).
 - Emergency early release provisions are utilized in a number of states. These provisions grant the executive branch the power to release prisoners before they have served the full sentence imposed by the court. In Alaska, Governor Sheffield implemented an emergency release system in 1983. Titled the "Emergency Conditional Commutation Release" plan (ECCR), the order permits early release of "nonviolent" prisoners when deemed necessary to reduce prison crowding (pp. 33 34).
 - There are two general types of good time credit allowed in the states: 1) statutory good time; and 2) meritorious good time. Alaska law currently provides for a statutory good time deduction only (pp. 34 35).

 Another potential method to reduce average time served is by expansion of the State's discretionary parole release system to prisoners subject to presumptive sentencing. Like those prisoners currently subject to mandatory minimum sentencing, presumptively sentenced prisoners could be required to serve a minimum amount of time before becoming eligible for discretionary parole (pp. 36 - 38).

Reducing Prison Entries

- Reduction of time served is the way to reduce prison crowding once prisoners have been incarcerated. The other method reduces prison crowding by decreasing the number of convicts who are required to go to prison. There are a number of possible alternatives to incarceration. Generally, the less restrictive the alternative, the less expensive its cost to the State (p. 38).
- In Alaska, community residential centers (CRC)--so-called half-way houses--are minimum security facilities operated by private providers in cooperation with the Alaska Department of Corrections. Eligible inmates include those near the end of their sentence, and those who are working, receiving counseling or participating in education and training pursuits. Data from the Department of Corrections demonstrate the increase in use of this alternative in Alaska since it was initially tried in 1979 (pp. 38 40).
- The most widely used form of nonincarcerative punishment, utilized in all states, is the <u>probation/parole</u> system. These services generally consist of <u>monitoring</u> convicted offenders' progress for a specified period following their release from prison (p. 42).
- Although community residential centers and probation/parole are currently utilized in Alaska, their use as alternatives to imprisonment of low-risk offenders could be increased. Department of Corrections operating costs would theoretically be reduced by increased utilization of these alternatives; an increased number of offenders could be punished at a lower cost (p. 40).
- Recently, some states have experimented with new forms of CRCs and probation/parole to reduce existing prison crowding and cut costs. Some have implemented house arrest programs. In effect, convicts are incarcerated in their homes for a required period. Fifteen states have added <u>electronic monitoring</u> to their house arrest alternative. In some house arrest cases, felons are monitored by a telephone robot (pp. 40 41).

- At least eight states have implemented some form of intensive probation, diverting up to one fifth of their convicted felons from prison. Under Georgia's program, probationers are subject to mandatory curfews, a minimum of five unannounced visits a week at home or work, 132 hours of community service, and spot urinalyses or breath tests to detect drugs or alcohol (p. 42).
- Georgia also utilizes "shock" incarceration, where participating inmates are incarcerated in one of the state's prisons and are segregated from long-term convicts. The program's routine is similar to marine corps boot camp; inmates receive military-style haircuts, perform hard labor, and end each day with intensive calisthenics (p. 42).
- Under a Nevada alternative, prisoners are diverted from state prisons to less costly facilities such as conservation camps (pp. 43 - 44).

Feasibility of the Alternatives in Alaska

• Any of the alternatives described would generally be feasible to implement in Alaska. Moreover, each alternative costs the State less per inmate than the cost of imprisonment. Some--such as the emergency overcrowding act and community residential centers--have been utilized in the past. Their use as ways to reduce institutional crowding could be expanded without significant additional cost to the State. In addition, their expansion would not require changes to current law (pp. 44 - 46).

CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALASKA'S SENTENCING LAW

OVERVIEW OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN AMERICA

American sentencing practices have changed considerably since colonial times, when criminal sanctions were so severe that few would dare break the law. With few jails in existence at that time, penalties consisted of physical punishment, fines, banishment or (frequently) death. 1 In the 1800s, reformers' demands for more humane punishment led to increased use of the imprisonment sanction.

Initially, states utilized fixed sentencing. Under these schemes, legislatures prescribed sentence ranges for crimes and gave judges discretion to select the specific sentence for each offender. In addition, criminal offenders served their entire sentence in prison, with no chance for early release. Although sentences were long compared to those currently imposed, they were viewed as a humane alternative to death.²

Eventually, prison crowding occurred, largely because of relatively lengthy sentences, improved law enforcement, population growth, and inadequate prison construction. To relieve crowding, corrections officials increased the use of pardons and implemented good time, probation and parole schemes, which allowed release of prisoners before they served their entire sentence. These factors influenced the advent of indeterminate sentencing laws, which transferred discretionary sentencing power from judges to corrections officials and parole boards. Under these laws, judges sentenced offenders to prison for a range of

Alfred Blumstein et. al., Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform, Vol. 1, p. 58, (1983) [Cited hereafter as Blumstein]. Indeed, capital punishment may have been the most common type of punishment: more than 350 offenses were punishable by the death penalty. See Frank E. Hartung, "Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, p. 284 (November 1952).

²For example, burglars were often given ten year sentences, more than triple the average time served in most jurisdictions today. See David J. Rothman, "Perspectives on the History of Sentencing," paper presented at National Research Council Conference on Sentencing Research, Woods Hole, MA, July 1981, cited in Blumstein.

years (such as one to 99). Corrections and parole board officials determined specific release dates by assessing the prisoners' behavior and progress toward reform.

Based upon the theory that imprisonment was for <u>rehabilitation</u> rather than punishment, the flexible indeterminate sentencing system became the predominant method of criminal incarceration in America by 1930. Widely supported by participants in the criminal justice system, it became entrenched in state, federal and model criminal codes.

In the 1960s, however, many began to question whether indeterminate sentencing was an effective system of punishment or rehabilitation. Some studies revealed that recidivism rates (the rate at which offenders return to prison for conviction of subsequent crimes) were high. Stories about released convicts who subsequently committed serious crimes caught the public's attention, and rising crime rates elevated public demands for tougher criminal sanctions. Furthermore, modern-day reformers called for an end to unjustified sentencing disparity, which they argued was caused by indeterminate sentencing. They advocated the enactment of sentencing laws which provide more fairness, justice and certainty.

In response, 15 state legislatures and Congress have replaced their indeterminate sentencing structures with determinate sentencing laws. Like the fixed sentencing used in the 1800s, these laws give judges discretion to select a specific sentence from a legislatively prescribed range of sentence lengths. However, there is wide variation among these states in the scope of discretion given judges. While some states allow judges full sentencing discretion, others restrict discretion with presumptive sentencing laws, an offshoot of determinate sentencing. Under presumptive sentencing, judges must sentence the offender to a preset term of imprisonment; variation from this term is allowed only if the judge finds aggravating or mitigating factors present.

Unlike the old fixed sentencing laws, presumptive and determinate sentencing schemes contain early release mechanisms like those included under indeterminate sentencing laws. Although most states using determinate sentencing systems have abolished discretionary parole, they have retained other early release mechanisms such as probation, pardons

and good time.³ The use of these mechanisms varies widely in the states. For example, some states allow twice the amount of good time as do others. Because of these mechanisms, prisoners subject to determinate or presumptive sentencing rarely serve their full term in prison.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING IN ALASKA

Like other states, Alaska traditionally utilized a system of indeterminate sentencing with early release mechanisms such as parole and good time. From Statehood until the mid-1970s, few questioned the system's effectiveness. In 1975, a Governor's Task Force on Corrections recommended changes in the State's corrections system, including a revised sentencing law. In its report, the task force implied that the rehabilitation concept was unworkable:

"The people who reach corrections are for the most part those who have demonstrated their inability to live within society's rules. Society asks of Corrections not only protection from these people but that they rehabilitate the criminals so when they are released they will not be a further threat to society. This is an impossible task."

The task force recommended the repeal of the State's indeterminate sentencing law and enactment of a combined indeterminate/determinate system. Based on the Fogel Plan (a sentencing concept devised by Professor David Fogel from the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle),

³Good time is time credited for good behavior while in prison. To get good time, the inmate is not required to do anything "good;" he or she gets good time by staying out of trouble. Accumulated good time is subtracted from the sentence imposed on the defendant, thereby allow ing early release. For example, if the law allows one day of good time credit for every two days served, a prisoner could reduce his or her time served by 33 percent. Good time deductions are virtually automatic.

the proposal would give judges complete discretion in sentencing first-time felony offenders, included mandatory minimum sentencing for second and subsequent offenses, and favored discretionary parole only for first offenders.⁴

The Criminal Code Revision Subcommission's Sentencing Proposal

The Alaska Legislature also sought changes in the State's sentencing structure. In 1976, it created the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission to draft a new criminal code, including a revised sentencing law. A major goal of the subcommission was to recommend a system that would eliminate unjustified disparity and uncertainty in sentencing.

In its recommendations published in February 1977, the subcommission noted that a study by the Alaska Judicial Council revealed significant and apparently unjustified sentencing disparities in Alaska's courts between 1974 and 1976. In that report, the Judicial Council suggested that judges' personal sentencing philosophies had a lot to do with these disparities (i.e., whether the judge was lenient, moderate or harsh in his or her approach to the type of offense and the particular offender).

In its report, the subcommission contended that the State's indeterminate sentencing law was neither "coherent nor rational." In support, the subcommission cited examples of sentencing inconsistencies in the code, the wide range of available sentences, and capricious judicial sentencing. Moreover, the subcommission noted that, although the law provided for enhanced punishments for habitual offenders, the provision was rarely utilized.

⁴Mandatory minimum sentencing is similar to determinate sentencing structures in which the judge selects a prison term from a broad range (e.g., 20-99 years). Under both schemes, incarceration is normally mandatory, and prisoners receive credit for good time. However, prisoners subject to mandatory minimum laws cannot be sentenced to less than the minimum term prescribed in the code. Nevertheless, prisoners subject to mandatory sentencing may be eligible for discretionary parole after serving a mandatory minimum term. As noted, discretionary parole is usually eliminated under presumptive sentencing.

⁵Tentative Draft, Alaska Revised Criminal Code, Alaska Criminal Code Revision Subcommission, February 1977, Chapter 36, pages three et. seq. See "Alaska Felony Sentercing Patterns: A Multivariate Statistical Analysis (1974-1976)," The Alaska Judicial Council, April 1977.

The subcommission proposed a presumptive sentencing system similar to that recommended by the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing. This national task force, composed of representatives from all facets of criminal justice, analyzed various forms of sentencing and ultimately advocated presumptive sentencing, a system they believed provided more justice and certainty in sentencing than the existing indeterminate system. In addition, they asserted that to achieve certainty and justice, a sentencing system must avoid the "evils" of "untrammeled discretion on the one hand and of total inflexibility on the other." The group summed up this proposed system as follows:

The task force proposes a system under which the legislature would retain the power to make those broad policy decisions that can be wisely and justly made about crime and do not involve the particulars of specific crimes and criminals. The sentencing judge would have some degree of guided discretion to consider and weigh those pertinent factors that cannot be wisely evaluated in the absence of the particular crime and criminal. And the parole board would have some degree of guided discretion to consider and weigh factors that were unavailable at the time of sentencing so that it could tailor its decision regarding release to the needs of the prisoner and society.

The Alaska subcommission's proposal contained a mix of indeterminate and presumptive sentencing. It provided for indeterminate sentencing (i.e., full judicial discretion) on all first-time felony convictions, and presumptive sentencing on second and subsequent felony convictions. The presumptive sentence was to be imposed in the "average" case, and the judge could vary from this sentence only if aggravating or mitigating factors were deemed present.

Subcommission Proposals on Early Release

In addition to the sentencing proposal, the subcommission recommended continued use of suspended sentences and probation, and wider use of restitution and community work service. However, the subcommission supported changes in the existing parole system and in the good time credit allowance, factors which can significantly reduce an offender's actual time served in prison.

⁶Alan M. Dershowitz, "Fair and Certain Punishment," The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing (1976).

^{7&}lt;sub>Id.</sub>, p. 19.

Under the indeterminate sentencing system, the Alaska Parole Board determined the actual time served by prison inmates. Upon conviction, the defendant was incarcerated for a term set by the sentencing judge within the range of terms established by the legislature. After serving one-third of the sentence, the defendant was eligible for discretionary release by the parole board.

The subcommission favored a continuation of discretionary parole only for first-time felons, with good time the only available early release mechanism after the first conviction. In addition, the subcommission favored a ten percent limit on good time. Under the indeterminate system in effect at the time, prisoners could get good time credit which would reduce their actual time served by up to 49 percent.

The 1978 Revised Code

In 1978, the legislature enacted a criminal code which revised sentencing and early release provisions. Effective January 1, 1980, the new law generally reflected the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission's proposals but included some major changes by the legislature.

Definition and Scope of Presumptive Sentencing. In its commentary to the Revised Criminal Code, the legislature defined presumptive sentencing and outlined its application and scope. A presumptive sentence is defined as a "legislative determination of the term of imprisonment the average defendant convicted of an offense should be sentenced to, absent the presence of legislatively prescribed factors in aggravation or mitigation or extraordinary circumstances." In addition, presumptive sentences were to be applied if a minimum seven-year period had not

³The subcommission proposed the elimination of discretionary parole on presumptively sentenced cases only. Because it proposed indeterminate sentencing for all murder and kidnapping convictions, discretionary parole would have been available in all of these cases.

 $^{^9 \}rm Under\ ten\ percent\ good\ time,\ a\ prisoner\ could\ be\ given\ credit\ for\ one\ extra\ day\ of\ incarceration\ for\ each\ ten\ days\ actively\ served. In effect, it can reduce time\ served\ by\ ten\ percent.$

¹⁰Commentary to the Alaska Revised Code, page 153 (1978). Alaska Code Section 12.55.165 addresses "extraordinary circumstances." It provides that a sentencing judge can forward a case to a three-judge panel if the judge finds that "manifest injustice" would result from either failure to consider nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating factors, or from imposition of the presumptive term. This section has apparently had a negligible effect on sentence length.

elapsed between the defendant's unconditional discharge for a previous felony and the commission of a subsequent offense. 11 "Unconditional discharge" means that the defendant has been released from all "disability" for the previous offense, including probation and parole. The seven-year period has since been extended to ten years.

Sentencing Structure. Table 1 illustrates the sentencing structure implemented in 1980. The revised scheme was similar to that favored by the subcommission; indeterminate sentencing applied to most first-time felony convictions while presumptive sentencing applied to subsequent convictions. However, presumptive sentencing also applied to most first-time Class A felonies in which the defendant possessed a firearm or caused serious physical injury. In addition, the legislature established mandatory minimum sentencing for all murder and kidnapping convictions; that is, these felons must be incarcerated for a minimum term. (In these cases, the subcommission had favored a zero to 99-year indeterminate sentence.)

The legislature enacted presumptive sentencing ranges which generally exceeded those recommended by the subcommission. For instance, although the subcommission supported a sentence ranging between three and 16 years for second-time Class A offenders, the legislature chose a range of five to 20 years.

¹¹Alaska Code Section 12.55.145 (1978).

TABLE 1
REVISED SENTENCING LAW EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1980*

	Sentence Range in Years					
Type of	First Felony	Second Felony	Subsequent			
Offense	Conviction	Conviction	Conviction			
Murder I	<u>20</u> - 99	<u>20</u> - 99	<u> 20</u> – 99			
Murder II	<u>5</u> - 99	<u>5</u> - 99	<u>5</u> - 99			
Kidnapping	<u>5</u> - 99	<u>5</u> - 99	<u>5</u> - 99			
Class AFirearm, etc. Class AOther	3 - 20 [6] 0 - 20	5 - 20 [10] 5 - 20 [10]	7.5 - 20 [15] 7.5 - 20 [20]			
Class B	0 - 10	0 - 10 [4]	3 - 10 [6]			
Class C	0 - 5	0 - 5 [2]	0 - 5 [3]			

^{*}For offenses subject to presumptive sentencing, the presumptive term is shown in brackets. For offenses subject to mandatory minimum sentencing, the minimum sentence is underlined. Note that the minimum sentence is not the minimum time served. As shown in the next section, an offender who gets a five-year sentence could be released after 3.75 years if he or she is awarded all possible good time.

* * * *

Early Release. Table 2 compares the discretionary parole and good time allowances under the old code, the subcommission's proposal, and the new code. The new sentencing law limited the prior effect of both discretionary parole release and good time credit on offenders' actual time served.

While the law gave the parole board continued release discretion on first-time Class A, B and C convictions (convicts are eligible for parole after serving at least one-third of the prison term), it eliminated the board's discretion for those convicted of subsequent felonies. In addition, the new code allowed good time credit up to 25 percent of the prison term, an apparent compromise between the subcommission's recommendation (10 percent) and that available under the old code (49 percent).

As Table 2 suggests, the subcommission favored more liberal parole board discretion and less good time credit than that adopted by the legislature. While the old code allowed parole release eligibility in all felonies after an inmate served one-third of the sentence, the

new code eliminated parole eligibility in presumptive sentencings and limited its use in mandatory minimum sentencing cases. 12

TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF EARLY RELEASE PROVISIONS

Provision	Original Code	Subcommission Proposal	Adopted Code
Parole Eligibility	After 1/3 of term served	After 1/2 of term served	Indeterminate1/3 Mandatory1/3 but not less than man- datory minimum minus good time PresumptiveNone
Statutory Good Time Credit Up to 49 per-		10 percent of term	25 percent of term
Meritorious Good Time	cent of the sentence*	None	None

^{*}The original code allowed statutory, meritorious and extra-meritorous good time. The amount that an inmate could accummulate depended upon the length of the original sentence.

AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED CODE, 1980 - 1985

Table 3 illustrates the sentencing law and early release provisions as of April 1986. The legislature has amended the sentencing code frequently since its implementation in 1980. The amendments have generally resulted in "tougher" sentencing than that enacted in 1980. Under the current law, there is generally more chance of imprisonment, and for a longer term, than under the 1980 law or the old code. 13

¹²Under the old law, convicts given a "life" sentence were required to serve 15 years before becoming eligible for parole release. Note that good time credit and parole eligibility are not cumulative; i.e., inmates' prison terms are reduced by one or the other, but not both.

 $^{^{13}}$ The exception to this generalization is the recent amendment of the good time provisions which can reduce time served from 75 percent of the sentence to 67 percent of the sentence.

TABLE 3
FELONY SENTENCING AND EARLY RELEASE STRUCTURE IN ALASKA
APRIL 1986
Sentence Length (Years)

Sentence Length (Years)						
Oftense	First Felony Conviction	Second Felony Conviction	Subsequent Conviction	Good	Discretionary Parole Eligibility	
Murder I	<u>20</u> - 99	<u>20</u> - 99	20 - 99	.33	Greater of 13.3 yrs. served or 1/3 of term	
Murder II, Kid- napping, Miscon- duct Involving C trolled Substanc	on-	<u>5</u> - 99	<u>5</u> - 99	.33	Greater of 3.3 yrs. served or 1/3 of term	
Sex. Assault I, Sex. Abuse of a Minor I (S.A.M.		7.5 - 30 [15]	12.5 - 30 [[25] .33	None	
Sex. Assault I, S.A.M. I	4 - 30 [8]	7.5 - 30 [15]	12.5 - 30 [[25] .33	None	
Class Aa,b Class A	3.5 - 20 [7] 2.5 - 20 [5]	5 - 20 [10] 5 - 20 [10]	7.5 - 20 [7.5 - 20 [
Class B ^b Class B	0 - 10 [2] 0 - 10	0 - 10 [4] 0 - 10 [4]	3 - 10 [3 - 10 [
Class C ^b Class C	0 - 5 [1] 0 - 5	0 - 5 [2] 0 - 5 [2]	0 - 5 [3 0 - 5 [3		None lst offense onlyafter 1/4 of term	

Note: Mandatory minimum terms are underlined and presumptive terms are in brackets. Indeterminate terms have no underline or bracket.

aApplies when a defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument or caused serious physical injury, except for manslaughter.

bApplies when a defendant knowingly directed the conduct (crime) at a peace officer, correctional officer, emergency medical technician, or other emergency medical responder who was engaged in the performance of official duties at time of offense.

A 1982 amendment made all first-time class A offenses subject to presumptive sentencing. Previously, most first-time Class A offenders received 20-year indeterminate sentences. In addition, the 1982 legislature made all first degree sexual assaults an unclassified crime subject to an eight-year presumptive sentence. Before 1982, sexual assault was a Class A offense. Moreover, first degree misconduct involving a controlled substance (M.I.C.S. I) became an unclassified offense carrying a maximum ninety-nine year term with a five-year mandatory minimum sentence.

The 1983 legislature added sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree (an unclassified offense) to the list of crimes which are presumptively sentenced on the first conviction. Another 1983 amendment made any Class A, B or C conviction subject to presumptive sentencing when the defendant "knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer, fire fighter, correctional officer, emergency medical technician, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder who was engaged in the performance or official duties at the time of the offense..."14 [emphasis added]. Since this amendment, Class B and C felonies committed in circumstances other than the above scenario remain as the only convictions not subject to either mandatory minimum or presumptive sentencing rules.

In 1985, the legislature effectively reduced time served for some felons by amending certain parole release provisions. Effective January 1, 1986, discretionary parole eligibility for inmates subject to indeterminate sentencing changed from one-third to one-fourth of their sentence. However, those subject to mandatory minimum sentences must still serve one-third of their term before becoming eligible for discretionary parole. Another amendment gives the sentencing judge discretion to restrict any offender's discretionary parole eligibility date. 16

In 1986, the legislature increased the amount of good time credit which prisoners can accumulate. The maximum credit increased from 25 percent to 33 percent of the term. This amendment became effective in April 1986 and was applied retroactively. 17

 $^{^{14}}$ Alaska Code Sections 12.55.125(c)(2), (d)(3), and (e)(3) [1985].

¹⁵Id., Sections 33.16.090 and 33.16.100 (1985).

¹⁶Id., Section 12.55.115 (1985).

¹⁷Committee Substitute for House Bill 104.

Two other notable changes occurred in the sentencing scheme since 1980. First, the legislature has frequently amended the number of aggravating and mitigating factors which the court may consider when sentencing a defendant. Currently, there are 26 aggravators and 15 mitigators.

The second change altered the way in which the court at a sentencing determines whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentencing. The 1980 Criminal Code [AS 12.55.025(e)] provided: "If the defendant is convicted of two or more crimes before judgment on either has been entered, any sentences of imprisonment may run concurrently or consecutively, as the court provides. If the court does not specify, the sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently." As originally enacted, this statute arguably created a presumption in favor of concurrent sentencing. In 1982, this section was amended to provide that except in limited circumstances, sentences of imprisonment run consecutively when a defendant is convicted of two or more crimes. In a recent sexual assault case, the Alaska Court of Appeals intrepreted this limitation broadly. 19

In summary, the current felony sentencing and release structure is considerably different from the pre-1980 law. Clearly, it has diminished judges' and the parole board's discretion, thereby leaving prosecutors with the majority of influence on offenders' time served. Moreover, the new law has given the legislature more control over the sentencing process by restricting decisions on incarceration, sentence length and time served. Furthermore, the probability of incarceration is more certain under the new scheme.

Since the new law was enacted, the prison population has tripled. In Chapter 2, we will address the impact of the new sentencing law on this increase, including the law's effect on incarceration rates and sentence lengths.

¹⁸See discussion of this issue in <u>Griffith v. State</u>, 675 P. 2d 662, 664-665 (1984).

 $^{^{19}}$ The Alaska Court of Appeals recently wrote a lengthy analysis of this statute in <u>State v. Andrews</u>, 707 P. 2d 900 (1985). In its decision, the court apparently gave trial judges additional discretion in determining prison terms for defendants subject to consecutive sentencing.

CHAPTER 2

THE IMPACT OF ALASKA'S REVISED SENTENCING LAW ON PRISON POPULATION

Alaska's prison population has tripled since the revised sentencing law was implemented in 1980. In order to accommodate convicts, the State has spent \$127.2 million for prison construction since 1980. Moreover, the corrections operating budget has increased almost fourfold, to \$77.7 million in FY 86. The clear link between the number of prisoners and expenditures required to incarcerate them is a cause of concern; will the prison population expansion continue? Is the trend due to presumptive sentencing? This chapter addresses these questions and discusses future prison capacity requirements.

Table 4 and Figure 1 show two measures of Alaska's prison population each year since 1971. The total population includes inmates sentenced under State law and housed in State prisons, community residential centers (CRC) and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP). The number of incarcerated prisoners per 100,000 general population is also shown. As the table indicates, the inmate population more than doubled between 1971 and 1980, and then tripled during the next five years, resulting in a January 1986 population of 2,428.

The prison population rose at a much faster rate than the general population from 1981 through 1985. This suggests that factors other than general population growth have triggered the rise in the number of prisoners. Because the revised sentencing law was implemented in 1980-just prior to this sharp rise--it is believed to have generated the increase. However, the data suggest that other factors have caused some increase in the prison population.

The following sections analyze the effect of the revised sentencing law on the prison population. In addition, various other factors that may have contributed to this increase are addressed.

TABLE 4
ALASKA PRISON POPULATION 1971 - 1986


					COMMUNITY	TOTAL		PRISONERS	
4	GENERAL	ANNUAL	ALASKA	FEDERAL	RESIDENTIAL	INHATE	ANNUAL	PER 100000	ANNUAL
YEAR	POPULATION	CHANGE	PRISONS	PRISONS	CENTERS	POPULATION	CHANGE	POPULATION	CHANGE
1971	319,600					482		151	
1972	329,800	3.2%				413	-14.3%	125	-17.0%
1973	336,400	2.0%				413	0.0%	123	-2.0%
1974	348,100	3.5%				488	18.2%	140	14.2%
1975	384,100	10.3%				495	1.4%	129	-8.1%
1976	409,800	6.7%				529	6.9%	129	0.2%
1977	418,000	2.0%				600	13.4%	144	11.2%
1978	411,600	-1.5%	614	120		734	22.3%	178	24.2%
1979	413,700	0.5%	557	165	16	738	0.5%	178	0.0%
1980	419,700	1.5%	585	163	22	770	4.3%	183	2.8%
1981	435,200	3.7%	640	200	36	876	13.8%	201	9.7%
1982	460,837	5.9%	821	187	61	1,069	22.0%	535	15.2%
1983	495,290	7.5%	1119	191	78	1,388	29.8%	280	20.8%
1984	523,048	5.6%	1431	198	103	1,732	24.8%	331	18.2%
1985	533,000	1.9%	1794	182	97	2,073	19.7%	389	17.5%
1986	na		1992	188	248	2,428	17.1%		

NOTES GENERAL POPULATIONS REPRESENT ESTIMATES FOR JULY OF EACH YEAR SHOWN.
TOTAL INNATE POPULATIONS REPRESENT JANUARY AVERAGES.

INMATE POPULATIONS WERE PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. THE INMATE POPULATION INCLUDES FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR OFFENDERS.

ALASKA PRISONERS CURRENTLY HOUSED IN FEDERAL PRISONS MUST BE RETURNED TO STATE INSTITUTIONS BY DECEMBER 31, 1987 IF SPACE IS AVAILABLE.

PREPARED BY THE HOUSE RESEARCH AGENCY MAY 1986.



NUMBER OF PRISONERS (Thousands)

GENERAL EFFECT OF SENTENCING LAWS ON PRISON POPULATIONS

Any sentencing structure--whether it is indeterminate, determinate or a combination of the two--affects prison populations in two general ways:

- the percentage of crimes which require incarceration, or the mandatory imprisonment rate; and
- the amount of time the law requires an offender to serve in prison, or simply time served.

An increase in either time served or mandatory incarceration results in a proportionate increase in the prison population. If both factors increase, the effects on prison population are combined. Therefore, the key to assessing the impact of Alaska's revised sentencing law on the prison population is to determine the changes generated by the law in time served and mandatory imprisonment. The product of these factors—total prisoner time served—could then be compared to the total prisoner time imposed for the same crimes under the old law.

Unfortunately, the data necessary for a comprehensive assessment of Alaska's revised law are not currently available. In order to determine changes in total time served, sentencing data for crimes subject to presumptive sentencing must be compared to data for comparable crimes under the pre-1980 law. Although presumptive sentencing data have been compiled by the Department of Corrections since October 1983, there is little previous information with which to make a useful comparison. 20

In addition, the revised law's specific impact on mandatory incarceration cannot be determined. There are many factors which affect the number of offenders sentenced to prison, including the crime rate, law enforcement efforts, prosecutions, the sentencing law and noncriminal justice factors. There is no method to accurately separate the effect each of these factors has on the number of offenders jailed each year. Moreover, this task is further complicated by annual amendments to the State's sentencing law since the initial revisions were implemented in 1980. Nevertheless, available data allow some conclusions to be drawn. The following sections address the effects of mandatory incarceration, time served and other factors on prison population.

²⁰ Judicial Council studies contain some useful data, but the reports on pre-1980 sentences classify offenses differently than the revised law's classifications. Although a conversion table was used to compare crime definitions under the old and revised law, it did not contain all the information necessary to convert all crimes in the Judicial Council reports to current classifications. Only the case files would contain this information.

Effect of Mandatory Incarceration on Prison Population

Since the revised sentencing law's implementation, incarceration is required for crimes subject to presumptive and mandatory sentencing. 21 Under prior law, judges had discretion to impose a nonjail penalty for all crimes except Murder I. Under the new law, there is virtually no discretion. Although presumptive terms can be mitigated to lesser sentences, these terms still usually result in imprisonment.

The judicial discretion allowed under the pre-1980 law resulted in probationary (nonjail) sentences for some felons whose crimes would now be subject to presumptive sentencing. For example, a Judicial Council study showed that between 1976 and 1979, 23 percent of the defendants convicted of robbery were given a probationary term. Under current law, the first conviction for Robbery I is subject to a five-year presumptive term.

The general impact of the new law's mandatory imprisonment provisions on the prison population is obvious: a larger percentage of criminals are punished by incarceration under the new law. By assuming that the same number of convictions for each crime occur under the revised law as occurred under prior law, we could estimate the effect of presumptive sentences on prison population.

The premise, however, does not appear to be valid. Convictions for some crimes have risen substantially since the law was revised. This is especially notable for "violent" offenses. For example, there were only 30 convictions for Sexual Assault I between 1976 and 1979; in 1984 and 1985, there were 139 incarcerations for this crime. Data limitations prevent us from separating the effects of increased incidence of crime, crime reporting, prosecutors' efforts and the law itself.

²¹There are 15 unclassified and Class A offenses under the revised code; all are subject to presumptive or mandatory sentencing on the first conviction. Although small in number, these crimes comprise 49 percent of all time to be served by offenders jailed in 1984, and 65 percent of all presumptively sentenced time. Presumptive sentencing also applies to Class B and C offenders convicted of their second or subsequent felony in the ten years prior to the current offense. The Judicial Council study of convictions between 1976 and 1979 indicates that courts imposed probation on 27 percent of the urban "property" offenders who had a prior felony record. Under current law, all of these offenders would normally go to jail.

Effect of Time Served on Prison Population

Time served is determined by subtracting applicable early release credit from the sentence imposed by the court. There are two types of early release which reduce time served: good time credit and discretionary parole. Only one of these mechanisms applies in determining each prisoner's release, i.e., their effect is not cumulative.

Generally, the type of sentencing law determines which mechanism applies. Good time usually applies under presumptive sentencing while parole applies under indeterminate laws. The end result--time served-directly affects the size of the prison population; the population will increase when average time served increases (assuming other factors are constant).

Alaska's revised sentencing law changed the early release provisions significantly from those under prior law. Under the pre-1980 mechanism, most felons were eligible for discretionary parole release after serving one third of their sentence. ²² Current law provides for three different early release mechanisms. The type of sentence imposed in each case-presumptive, nonpresumptive or mandatory--dictates the mechanism applied.

When presumptive sentences are imposed, good time applies. Good time credit can reduce time served by up to 33 percent under current law. 23 If a convicted felon is nonpresumptively sentenced, he or she is eligible for parole release. Prisoners so sentenced before January 1, 1986 are parole eligible after serving one third of their sentence. After this date, those sentenced nonpresumptively are eligible for parole release after serving one-fourth of their sentence. As noted in Chapter One, nonpresumptive sentences are applied only to Class B and C offenders convicted of their first felony.

²²All felony offenders were eligible for discretionary parole except those sentenced to "life" terms for Murder I; they served a 15-year minimum term before becoming parole eligible. There are no "life" sentences under the new law. Note that offenders who become eligible for discretionary parole are not necessarily released. The parole board determines who is released. If the parole board denies a prisoner's application for release, the prisoner is still released under the good time provisions—after serving at least two-thirds of the sentence.

²³Prior to April 1986, prisoners could accumulate good time credit up to 25 percent of the sentence. However, the 1986 legislature increased allowable good time to 33 percent (one-third of the sentence). This increase became effective immediately, thereby reducing time served by current prisoners by roughly eight percent.

Finally, those sentenced under mandatory sentencing provisions—(murder, kidnapping and misconduct involving a controlled substance I)—are subject to either good time or parole release, depending upon the length of sentence imposed. 24

Time Served Under Various Sentencing Scenarios

In this section, four scenarios are presented to illustrate the effect of sentencing and release provisions on prison population. Total prisoner time—average time served times the number of convictions for each crime—under 1985 law, pre-1980 law, and current law are shown in Table 5. Table 5 also shows total prisoner time under the assumption that crimes committed in 1984 and 1985 resulted in sentences equal to

²⁴The release condition is the mandatory minimum sentence minus good time or one-third of the sentence, whichever is longer. Under mandatory sentencing, the convict must serve at least the mandatory minimum term minus accumulated good time credit. For example, those convicted of Murder I must be sentenced to a minimum twenty-year sentence. If such a sentence is imposed, the convict is eligible for good time credit but cannot be released until he or she has served 13.3 years. However, if the sentence were 60 years, the convict would have to serve at least 20 years (one-third of the sentence) before he or she could be released on parole.

the average sentence given for those crimes during the years 1976 to 1979.25 [More comprehensive comparisons are contained in Appendix A.] 26

When the good time credit enacted under Committee Substitute for House Bill (CSHB) 104 is applied to sentence averages in 1984 and 1985, total prisoner time decreases by 8.2 percent. 27

When the major early release mechanism under prior law-parole-is substituted for the current mechanism-good time credit-for crimes subject to presumptive and mandatory sentencing, total prisoner time drops by over 40 percent. 28 The elimination of discretionary parole for crimes now subject to presumptive and mandatory sentencing had a major effect on total prisoner years.

²⁵Each scenario assumes that other factors which may generate changes in the prison population (such as crime rate) remain constant. Furthermore, each case assumes that all prisoners are released at the earliest eligible date. In practice, this does not always occur.

 $^{^{26}}$ The 1984 and 1985 data were provided by the Department of Corrections. Average sentences under prior law were determined by using data from a Judicial Council study for sentences imposed between 1976 and 1979. Crimes under prior law were converted to comparable crimes under the revised law. Conversions were done using a conversion chart written by Barry Stern, one of the drafters of the revised sentencing law. Conversion of other crimes to current classifications was deemed unfeasible based on available information. Adjustments were made to some of the data provided by the Department of Corrections. example, the department's data listed presumptive sentences for misdemeanor crimes. Since no misdemeanors are subject to presumptive sentencing, the crimes so listed are shown as miscellaneous Class A, B and C felonies. Conversely, the data listed nonpresumptive sentences for some crimes which require presumptive sentencing (Murder I, for example). Averages for these crimes are listed entirely as presumptive sentences. In addition, 1984's data listed all classes of Sexual Abuse of a Minor under one category. The 1984 tables in Appendix A list presumptive sentences for these crimes under Sexual Abuse of a Minor I, and nonpresumptive sentences under Sexual Abuse of a Minor II.

²⁷This bill increases good time from the prior 25 percent of sentence to 33 percent of the term. It was implemented in April 1986 and applied retroactively.

 $^{^{28}}$ To determine total prisoner years under this assumption, sentence averages are multiplied by .33, the earliest that these felons could be released on parole under the old law.

PRISON POPULATION

TABLE 5

TOTAL PRISONER YEARS--ALASKA

		CURRENT LAW		PRE-	1980 LAW	1976 - 1979 SENTENCES		
	1985 LAW	YEARS	REDUCTION	YEARS	REDUCTION	YEARS	REDUCTION	
1984 Sentences	3,234	2,970	8.2%	1,916	40.8%	3,251	5%	
1985 Sentences	3,427	3,147	8.2	2,026	40.9	3,357	2.1	

NOTE: Reductions refer to changes from the 1985 law.

"1985 law" reflects good time of 25 percent (75 percent of sentence averages).

"Current law" represents good time of 33 percent (67 percent of sentence averages).

"Pre-1980 law" represents 33 percent of sentence averages.

Mandatory minimum sentencing rules are applied where necessary.

When 1976-1979 sentence averages are substituted for comparable offenses in 1984 and 1985, the change in total prisoner years is insignificant; total prisoner years are slightly higher for 1984 and slightly lower for 1985. 29 These data suggest that—at least for the crimes substituted—sentence lengths have generally not changed significantly under the new law. Therefore, we can conclude that the provisions regarding sentence length did not generate the huge increase in prison population experienced after the law was revised.

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE PRISON POPULATION

The revised sentencing law is only one of many factors which may have affected growth in Alaska's prison population. Other criminal justice factors that can affect growth include crime and arrest rates, prosecution practices, demographic changes and the economic situation. Although these factors change regardless of the type of sentencing law in effect, there is some evidence of an indirect relationship between the factors and prison population.

Crime Rate

One study suggests that mandatory sentencing laws may reduce crime rates because prisoners are unable to commit crimes by the very fact of their incarceration. The analysis also indicated that the higher the probability of incarceration for some offenses, the lower the rate of crime for those offenses. However, the study asserted that laws that mandate imprisonment only for convicts with prior felony records are not as efficient in reducing the crime rate. As noted, presumptive and mandatory sentencing does not apply to first convictions of Class B and C crimes under Alaska's current law. 30

²⁹The 1976-79 crimes used in this comparison are subject to presumptive or mandatory sentencing on the first conviction. Although the number of crimes substituted is small, the total prisoner time they represent is significant; the total prisoner years imposed for these crimes in 1984 comprised 45 percent of all prisoner time and 62.6 percent of time served for presumptive sentences. The offenses include all crimes which would have been unclassified and Class A offenses between 1976 and 1979. Presumptive sentencing also applies to Class B and C offenders convicted of their second or subsequent felony in a 10-year period. As noted, conversion of these offenses to current crime classifications was deemed problematic with data currently available.

³⁰ Joan Petersilia and Peter W. Greenwood, "Mandatory Prison Sentences: Their Projected Effects on Crime and Prison Population," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, (V. 69) 604, 605 (1978).

Crime rates are popularly believed to directly affect prison populations. However, as Figure 2 shows, Alaska's crime rate did not track with the prison population during recent years. ³¹ The crime rate rose between 1978 and 1981, then fell in 1982-83. (The rate in 1984 roughly equaled that in 1983.) During this period, the prison population rose steadily until 1981, when it began to soar for the next four years. Even if a 12 to 18-month lag between crime and incarceration is assumed, there is little similarity between changes in the crime rate and the prison population during this time. ³²

Similarly, the arrest rate did not track with the increase in prisoners. Although arrests increased 14 percent in 1981, increases in 1982 and 1983 were modest. Moreover, total arrests declined 12 percent in 1984, when the prison population increased by 17 percent. 33


³¹Part I crimes and Part I arrests include seven offense categories: criminal homocide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny/theft and motor vehicle theft. Although some of these crimes are not felonies, they serve as an index for observing changes in the amount and rate of reported crime. They were selected for this use by the National Committee on Uniform Crime Records.

³²An increase in the crime rate causes an increase in the prison population only if a proportionate number of the crimes result in arrest, prosecution and incarceration. The lack of relationship between the crime rate and prison populations was exemplified by the national trend during the 1960s. While the crime rate soared, prison populations generally declined.

³³The 17 percent increase in prison growth occurred during 1985. That year's population was used because of the time lag between arrest and incarceration. Note that the arrests represented here include a small percentage of cases which were closed for any number of reasons, including death of the defendant. In addition, these arrests do not represent all felonies, and some misdemeanors are included. According to Paul Edscorn of the Department of Public Safety, they are representative of trends in arrest rates generally.

Figure 2

CRINE IN ALASKA



Data from the Alaska Court System indicate that felony filings increased at a rapid rate between 1978 and 1984.34 While all categories of felonies (violent, property, etc.) increased during this period, violent crime filings increased most dramatically, from 231 in 1978 to 751 in 1984. Between 1980 and 1981 alone, violent crime filings increased by 60 percent.

Assuming a constant conviction rate for these filings, these data suggest that prosecutions also affected the rise in the prison population. The noted increase in violent felony filings would most clearly increase prison population because those convicted of violent crimes are likely to get a prison sentence, and their sentences are generally longer than those convicted of other crimes. Therefore, the increase in felony filings affects both the number of offenders incarcerated and the average length of incarceration. Furthermore, some argue that prosecutors' efforts may increase under presumptive and mandatory sentencing because of the certainty of imprisonment provided in these laws. If this occurs, the increased efforts would affect prison population.

Demographic and Economic Factors

The 20 to 34-year-old population is often cited as the age group which commits a disproportionate percentage of crimes relative to the group's size in the general population. In 1984, this group comprised 66 percent of Alaska's prison population, but only 34 percent of the state's general population. The proportion of 20 to 34-year-old individuals is significantly larger in Alaska than in the United States population generally. While this age group comprised 34 percent of the state population between 1980 and 1984, it constituted only 25 percent of the general U.S. population. This may explain in part why Alaska's crime rate has been higher than that in the general population during this period. However, the percentage of this high crime-rate group in

³⁴Because the Department of Law was unable to provide conviction data, felony filings in the Alaska Court System were used to reflect trends in prosecutions. According to Richard Delaplain, Manager of Technical Operations for the court system, roughly 70 percent of felony filings end in convictions.

Alaska's general population did not change between 1980 and 1984. Therefore, the "high crime group" does not appear to be an important factor in the rise in Alaska's prison population.³⁵

Economic factors such as the unemployment rate are also viewed as affecting crime rates, and therefore prison populations. However, while the unemployment rate fluctuated between seven and twelve percent on a seasonal basis during this period, the crime rate declined. Therefore, the unemployment rate does not appear to have been a significant factor in the State's prison population growth.

As indicated by this section, there are many factors <u>besides</u> the State's sentencing law which could have generated increases in the prison population. Regardless of the specific factors which led to the larger population, the result to the State has been spiraling corrections costs.

EFFECT OF THE REVISED LAW ON FUTURE PRISON NEEDS

Based upon available data, the revised sentencing law has probably contributed to the increase in the State's prison population. Time served for crimes comprising the bulk of prisoner time has increased, and the percentage of crimes subject to mandatory imprisonment has increased as well.

However, the specific numerical effect of the new sentencing law on prison population growth is unknown because of the noted lack of data. Furthermore, the data necessary to isolate the effects of the revised law from the effects of other factors affecting prison population (such as conviction rates) are not available. Without these data, accurate projections of prison population cannot be made. Nevertheless, a general projection of growth resulting from the law can be made.


³⁵This conclusion assumes that the propensity for crime within the target age groups remains constant during the period. One study asserts that crime patterns are changing, and that males between 24 and 34 years of age are showing an increasing propensity for crime, especially sex crimes. See J. O'Connell, Inmate Forcasting: A Planning Tool for Policymakers, the Washington State Office of Financial Management, April 1985. As the propensity for crime changes among various age groups, the prison population may be affected.

Figure 3 shows the growth in prison population since 1980. Note that there is no significant increase in the rate of growth until 1981. The initial lag is due to the time span between arrest and incarceration. The early effects of the new law reflect the law's mandatory imprisonment provisions. Later, the effects of modifying the release provisions were felt and the average inflow of prisoners began to exceed the outflow at an accelerating pace.

As the slope of the line shows, there is a steep rise in population beginning in 1981 and continuing into 1985. Theory indicates that the line will return to its original slope, but at a higher level. This will occur when the law's effect on prison entries and departures is in balance.

Knowing when the slope will level off and the new level of prison population are vital to corrections planning. With this knowledge, corrections planners could avoid unnecessary prison construction and operation. There are too many factors and too many unknowns to allow an accurate assessment of the shape the curve will take in the future. Based on the tables in Appendix A, the line should begin leveling out in 1986 and stabilize by 1989. 36

 $^{^{36}}$ This is a "seat-of-the-pants" estimate and is not suitable for planning purposes.




Cost Impacts of Rising Prison Populations

Figure 4 compares annual changes in Alaska's instate prison population and instate prison capacity since 1980. The populations do not include prisoners incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. These prisoners must be returned to in-state institutions by December 31, 1987, if space is available. Capacity has generally kept pace with the rise in population. When the prison population soared from 1982 until 1985, prison capacity also increased sharply and even exceeded population during part of 1984. As of April 1986, prison population and capacity are roughly in balance.

The cost impact of rising prison populations is the initial cost to build new prisons plus the long-term costs to operate them. As prison population rises, the State must appropriate funds for additional prison construction. Moreover, after new prisons are built, their operating costs become a permanent financial burden to the State. However, new prisons must be built for a rising prison population in order to avoid prison crowding and costly lawsuits and court orders. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, prison construction and operation is expensive. It consumes funds that would otherwise be available for other State programs. If the Legislature decides that increasing prison capacity is no longer a cost effective way of dealing with the rising population, there are a number of alternatives to consider. Chapter Three addresses these measures.

Figure 4
INSTATE PRISON POPULATION AND CAPACITY



CHAPTER 3

ALTERNATIVES TO REDUCE PRISON CROWDING

As Chapter Two noted, there are a number of factors, including the revised sentencing law, which caused the sharp rise in Alaska's prison population during the first half of the 1980s. There are two basic ways to reduce prison crowding caused by these factors:

- · accommodate the population increase by building more prisons; and
- implement alternatives which reverse the sentencing law's effect on prison crowding; i.e., amend the law to require less time served or fewer incarcerations.

The legislature chose the construction option during the first half of the 1980s. The resulting prison construction tripled the State's prison capacity to roughly keep pace with the sharp rise in the prison population. However, the cost to operate this new capacity has resulted in a fourfold increase in the corrections operating budget since 1980.

The combined effect of declining State revenues and the high cost of prison construction and operation makes this alternative difficult to maintain. The State spent \$127 million on prison construction in the early 1980s. In addition, the average daily cost of supervision per institutionalized offender in FY 85 was \$82.49. This translates to a minimum annual financial commitment by the State of roughly \$30,100 per bed. Moreover, this cost should be considered a conservative figure because it is based on the adult confinement portion of the department's operating budget and therefore excludes capital costs, debt service (if any) and that portion of the administration and support budget that could be attributed to adult confinement.

Less expensive alternatives to prison construction and operation are available. As noted, these methods reduce overcrowding by essentially reversing the effects of the revised sentencing law. This can be done by: 1) reducing average time served; and 2) reducing prison entries. Generally, the less restrictive the alternative, the lower the cost. The following sections describe various ways to implement these alternatives.

REDUCING TIME SERVED

There are two ways to reduce an offender's time served: 1) reduction of the sentence imposed by the court; and 2) reduction of the sentence after incarceration by applying an early release mechanism.

Sentence Lengths

The most obvious way to reduce time served is by decreasing sentence lengths. Under this option, presumptive, nonpresumptive and/or mandatory terms could be reduced.

If sentence lengths are decreased, the number of prisoners who can be incarcerated increases in a prison system with constant capacity. On average, the number of possible annual punishments doubles when average sentence lengths are reduced by 50 percent.³⁷ This assumes that the early release mechanisms remain unchanged.

A recent survey indicated that the public still believes that sentences for prisoners are too lenient. In fact, between 1972 and 1982, the percentage of people surveyed who believe courts are not harsh enough increased from 66 to 86 percent. 38 Because of this sentiment, decreasing sentence lengths is probably the least popular of available alternatives. 39

Amendment of Early Release Provisions

A second method of reducing time served is by amendment of early release provisions. In effect, these provisions reduce the sentence length imposed by the court. The three general early release mechanisms which can be utilized include the following:

- emergency early release by executive order;
- · good time credit; and
- · parole release.

³⁷The timing of prisoner entry and release has a crucial effect on prison capacity. Excessive entries at any given time can create an over-crowding problem.

³⁸Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1984, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (1985), pp. 226-27.

³⁹On the other hand, this alternative would not conflict with the revised criminal code's objectives of sentencing-uniformity and certainty of punishment. Any alternative that treats offenders of the same crimes differently with respect to the incarceration decision or time served would conflict with this philosophy.

Emergency Release. Emergency early release provisions are utilized in a number of states. These provisions grant the executive branch the power to release prisoners before they have served the full sentence imposed by the court. Emergencies are declared when state prisons exceed a predetermined capacity level. Only those prisoners deemed good security risks are considered for emergency release. State parole boards decide which inmates meet this criterion.

This alternative is applied in various ways in the states. In Michigan, the governor must declare an emergency when the state's prisons exceed rated capacities for 30 consecutive days. When an emergency is declared, parole eligibility dates for prisoners are advanced by 90 days. If this action does not reduce populations to 95 percent of capacity within 90 days, the process is repeated. Between January 1981 and May 1984, this early release process was invoked by the state eight times. 40

In Iowa, the 1981 legislature placed a cap of 2,645 on the prison population. Under current provisions, an emergency is declared if the average daily inmate count exceeds the cap for 60 consecutive days. The Iowa Parole Board has 45 days to get the population under the cap; otherwise, all prisoners' sentences are reduced by 90 days. The across-the-board sentence reduction has not been necessary despite the fact that the cap has been exceeded a number of times since its implementation in 1981. Before the 60-day deadline is reached, the state's parole board releases eligible prisoners. The board's decisions are based upon a unique risk assessment system which attempts to determine each convict's risk to society if released.⁴¹

In Alaska, Governor Sheffield implemented an emergency release system in 1983. Titled the "Emergency Conditional Commutation Release" plan (ECCR), the order permits early release of "nonviolent" prisoners when deemed necessary to reduce prison crowding.

⁴⁰M. Kay Harris, Reducing Prison Crowding and Nonprison Penalties, 478 ANNALS 150, 157 (March 1985).

⁴¹The Iowa legislature initiated the population cap due largely to assertions by the state's Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) that the use of risk assessment could increase the number of paroles without further risk to public protection. Additional discussion of the risk assessment system is found on page 37 of this report.

The act describes situations in which early release of prisoners may be granted. 42 Under the act, the governor "shall" declare an emergency if the average prison population exceeds 25 prisoners over capacity for any 30-day period.

When this occurs, the parole board selects eligible inmates from a list provided by corrections personnel. Eligible inmates must have served one-half of their sentence and be within 120 days of their release. The list can include felons or misdemeanants convicted of nonviolent crimes. In addition, the order states that the Department of Corrections shall consider the use of half-way houses for prisoners who are released under the order.

Since the act's implementation in late 1983, 194 prisoners have been granted early release. Overcrowding emergencies have largely been avoided because prison capacity has roughly kept pace with the sharp rise in Alaska's prison population since 1980. However, declarations of overcrowding could increase under present capacity unless inmate releases "catch up" with inmate entries.

Because overcrowding emergencies have rarely been declared, the administrative costs to the State have been minimal. In fact, the State saves money under this alternative because prisoners are removed from a high cost facility to a lower cost means of supervision—either parole, probation or a community residential center (CRC).

Increasing good time credits. Another method to reduce actual time served—without changing statutory sentence lengths—is by increasing the good time credit allowance. There are two general types of good time credits allowed in the states: 1) statutory good time; and 2) meritorious good time.

⁴²This order implements the powers of pardon, commutation and reprieve already granted the governor by Article III, Section 21 of the Alaska Constitution, and Alaska Code Section 33.20.070.

⁴³At present, 46 states allow good time accumulation. In response to overcrowding, some states have recently increased available allowances or have provided special good time. For example, California increased the amount of possible good time that could be earned on a maximum sentence from 33 percent to 50 percent as a reward for participation in work or study programs. Until recently, Illinois law permitted the Director of Corrections to grant as many 90-day additional good time awards as were necessary to limit prison crowding. However, since this mechanism's recent elimination, prison crowding has become critical.

Under statutory good time, prisoners are rewarded for their good behavior while incarcerated. Their time served is reduced by the amount of accumulated good time credit. To receive this type of good time, prisoners need not do anything special but stay out of trouble.

Alaska law currently provides for a statutory good time deduction only. Under this provision, prisoners' sentences may be reduced by up to 33 percent for good time behavior. A bill enacted during the 1986 legislative session, Committee Substitute for House Bill 104 (CSHB 104) increased statutory good time credit to 33 percent. As discussed in Chapter Two, application of 33 percent good time to sentences of those incarcerated in 1984 and 1985 reduced total time served by 8.2 percent.

Unlike statutory good time, meritorious good time requires the inmate to do something. Many states provide for meritorious good time credit, usually for performing work, improving education or successfully completing counseling.

Work time is probably the most common form of meritorious good time allowed. In Nevada, the Department of Corrections recently opened two conservation camps of 150 beds each to increase the availability of work time facilities for prisoners. In addition, a major reason for creation of the camps was reduction of crowding in Nevada's state prisons. 45

As noted, Alaska law does not currently allow time off for meritorious good time. If such a law were enacted, it could provide for sentence credit when convicts participate successfully in work release, study release or counseling for drugs or alcohol.

The success of a meritorious good time provision in reducing crowding depends upon the amount of good time allowed, and how much use prisoners make of it. Iowa, for example, allows an additional five days per month for meritorious good time credit. If a prisoner earns this extra time, his or her sentence is reduced by two months for each year of accumulated credit. If a significant number of inmates earn this credit, the provision could substantially reduce the prison population.

⁴⁴Prior to April 1986, prisoners received good time up to 25 percent of their sentence. The law passed in 1986 was made retroactive.

^{45&}quot;Nevada, Adapting to Rapid Growth," <u>Corrections Today</u>, December 1985, page 86. The camps were also opened because they are less expensive to operate than state prisons.

Expansion of the Parole System. Another potential method to reduce average time served is by expansion of the State's discretionary parole release system to prisoners subject to presumptive sentencing. Like those prisoners currently subject to mandatory minimum sentencing, presumptively sentenced prisoners could be required to serve a minimum amount of time before becoming eligible for parole.

In order to implement this alternative, the State could establish a structure similar to that proposed by the Alaska Code Revision Subcommission. They proposed parole eligibility for all felons after 50 percent of the sentence was served. Good time under that proposal was limited to 10 percent of the term. Under this alternative, time served for presumptively sentenced prisoners would be reduced from the current 67 percent of the sentence to 50 percent of the term. Moreover, release would not be automatic under the parole system as it currently is when good time is earned.

Arizona is the only state which currently combines a presumptive sentencing law with discretionary parole release. There, felony offenders must serve minimum terms before becoming eligible for parole release. The required time served is based upon the seriousness of the crime committed. 46 "Dangerous" offenders must serve two-thirds of their term before becoming parole eligible; others serve one-half of their term. 47

Iowa's sentencing law combines mandatory and indeterminate sentencing with a unique variation of the traditional parole release system. There, the parole board determines each inmate's release date based upon guidelines developed by Iowa's Statistical Analysis Center (SAC). 48

 $^{^{46}}$ The good time credit allowance is also based upon the seriousness of the convict's offense.

⁴⁷Note that prisoners would only be <u>eligible</u> for release after serving 50 percent of their sentence. The parole board would determine actual releases based upon prison behavior, criminal record and other information available at the hearing for parole release.

⁴⁸See "Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Law and Justice Statistics," U.S. Department of Justice, 1983, page 53. According to Fred Scaletta of the Iowa Department of Corrections, the risk assessment guidelines are also used by the department to assess the risk each offender poses if placed in communities for work or other release.

These guidelines utilize an offender "risk assessment" scoring system which attempts to determine each offender's potential risk upon release—risk to public protection and risk of committing another crime. The system was developed by the Iowa Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) which constructed the model from data collected on convicts released from the state's prisons between 1974 and 1976.⁴⁹ The risk score is determined by assessing a number of factors including the following:

- · substance abuse history;
- · current offense classification;
- · age at conviction;
- · total volume of past record;
- · violent/nonviolent offender, and whether first offender;
- · prior felony history, and history of violence; and
- · street time since prior offenses.

In addition to their application for parole eligibility, the guidelines are also used to reduce the prison population when prison crowding occurs in the state. However, the parole board has avoided the declaration of any emergencies by releasing convicts determined low risks before the 60-day limit.

A report to the Iowa General Assembly in 1983 documents that the guidelines, along with the legislatively imposed prison population ceiling, resulted in a 52 percent increase in paroles during 1981-82 over the previous two years. In addition, the rate of violent crime among parolees was reduced by 35 percent, and the "general threat posed by a typical parolee" was reduced by 17 percent. The report concluded that public protection had not been compromised in the process. 50

⁴⁹The Iowa SAC validated its model by testing data on 9,387 former state convicts released between 1977 and 1979.

⁵⁰The Iowa Statistical Analysis Center estimates that if all jurisdictions utilized the Iowa model, prison populations nationwide could be reduced by 20 percent with no increase in threat to the general public.

Recent data indicate that although the crime rate for convicts released under this system has increased, it has not increased nearly as rapidly as the rate of parole releases by the Department of Corrections. In 1981, 21 percent of the prison population was released on parole during the year, and 19 percent of those released were eventually rearrested for committing a crime. In 1985, 50 percent of the prisoners were released on parole during the year, but only 26 percent were rearrested.

REDUCING PRISON ENTRIES

Reduction of time served is the way to reduce prison crowding once prisoners have been incarcerated. The other method reduces prison crowding by decreasing the number of convicts who are required to go to prison. There are a number of possible alternatives to incarceration; each is essentially a form of punishment, but each method reduces prison entries and is less expensive than incarceration in a state institution. 51 Generally, the less restrictive the alternative, the less expensive its cost to the state.

Many states are implementing alternatives to institutional incarceration in an effort to avoid further prison crowding and to cut operating costs. These alternatives are geared to so-called low-risk offenders-convicts who the particular corrections agencies deem to be the least likely to commit an offense during their punishment period. As indicated, the alternatives consist of punishment outside the traditional prison atmosphere. Any such punishment is normally a component of a state's community corrections system. The traditional components of this system include the community residential center (CRC) and the parole/probation system.

Community Residential Centers

In Alaska, <u>community residential</u> <u>centers</u> (CRC)--so-called half-way houses--are <u>minimum</u> security facilities operated by private providers in cooperation with the Alaska Department of Corrections. Eligible inmates include those near the end of their sentence, and those who are working, receiving counseling or participating in education and training

⁵¹The decision whether to imprison offenders or impose other forms of punishment has been debated since ancient times. Some of the current suggested alternatives feed the ongoing debate; they range from imposing electrical shock treatment for all criminals—in lieu of imprisonment—to the virtual elimination of prisons with minimal alternative punishments.

pursuits. In addition, the centers may include offenders who require more support than is available with traditional probation/parole services. Inmates can travel outside the CRC during the day, but are confined to the center in the evenings.

The following data from the Department of Corrections demonstrate the increase in use of this alternative in Alaska since it was initially tried in 1979. These figures reflect the average number of CRC beds used in January of the years shown.

COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL BEDS IN ALASKA

<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	1982	1983	<u>1984</u>	1985	1986
16	22	36	61	78	103	97	248
		*	*	*	*		

Probation/Parole

The most widely used form of nonincarcerative punishment, utilized in all states, is the <u>probation/parole</u> system. These services generally consist of monitoring convicted offenders' progress for a specified period following their release from prison. Parole and probation officers enforce conditions of release, make service referrals as needed, and provide sentencing recommendations to the Alaska Court System.

Although community residential centers and probation/parole are currently utilized in Alaska, their use as alternatives to imprisonment of low-risk offenders could be increased. This increased utilization could reduce prison crowding by diverting convicts from prison to CRCs or probation/parole. A risk assessment system such as Iowa's could be established to determine eligible low risk offenders for these alternatives. Moreover, Department of Corrections operating costs would theoretically be reduced by increased utilization of these alternatives; an increased number of offenders could be punished at a lower cost.

Table 6 compares the number of annual punishments that can be imposed under various alternatives for each \$1 million of Alaska's operating budget. The alternative punishments include probation/parole, community residential centers, and State prisons. The estimated costs per convict year were those incurred by the Department of Corrections in FY 85. As the table demonstrates, a substantially larger number of punishments can be imposed using CRCs or probation/parole than those requiring incarceration in a State prison.

TABLE 6

ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT EXPERIENCES FOR EACH \$1 MILLION OPERATING BUDGET ALASKA, FISCAL YEAR 1985 DOLLARS

Type of Punishment	Costs per Inmate Year	Average Time Served (Years)	Annual Punishments
Probation/ Parole	\$1,796	.5 1 2 3	1,114 557 279
Community	\$16,848	3 •5	186 120
Residential Centers	·	1 2 3	60 30 20
State Prison	\$30,109	.5 1 2 3	66 33 17 11

SOURCE: House Research Agency, May 1986. See also Gail S. Funke, The Economics of Prison Crowding, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 478, page 96 (March 1985).

* * * *

Recently, some states have experimented with new forms of CRCs and probation/parole to reduce existing prison crowding and cut costs. These new methods include house arrest, intensive probation, and alternative incarceration. The following sections discuss these measures.

House Arrest

Recently, many states have implemented house arrest programs. In effect, convicts are incarcerated in their homes for a required period.

In Florida, the Department of Corrections started a house arrest (also called community control) program in October 1983 in an attempt to relieve prison and jail crowding. Under the program, selected felony offenders are confined to their residences except for gainful employment and public service work. Teams composed of a surveillance officer

and supervising officer visit the convict on a daily basis. In addition, program participants are normally required to pay restitution to their victims and a \$20 monthly fee to the state for supervision costs. The state's daily cost per convict for this program is roughly \$3 compared with over \$28 to incarcerate a prisoner in one of Florida's prisons. 52

Recently, 15 states have added <u>electronic monitoring</u> to their house arrest alternative. Some convicts <u>subject</u> to house arrest receive a transmitter which is attached to their ankle during the required monitoring period. Under Florida's program, a computer reports when the convict moves more than 150 feet from his or her residence. Convicts subject to the monitoring can leave their residence only for approved purposes, such as work or community service. According to Leonard Flynn, Director of Florida's Community Control program, this form of monitoring is currently used for misdemeanants only. However, the Department of Corrections is evaluating its use for felons.

In some house arrest cases, felons are monitored by a <u>telephone robot</u>. The robot can safely store 350 names and telephone numbers. It calls these numbers at various times during the day and night to solicit responses from offenders. Offenders respond by passing an electronic bracelet over the telephone to confirm that they answered the phone. The device sends electronic signals through the convict's telephone to a computer at the area's probation office. The department rents the robots for \$350 per month; the bracelets are currently free.

Mr. Flynn stated that Florida's house arrest program has exceeded expectations. Only six percent of the house arrestees are imprisoned for crime violations while under the department's supervision. Moreover, Mr. Flynn stated that the main purposes of the program--reduction of prison crowding and avoidance of prison construction--have been accomplished. Since the program began in 1983, more than 5,000 felons have been successfully diverted from the state's prisons.

^{52&}quot;State Innovations Range From Prisons to Babies," <u>State Government News</u>, November 1985, page 8.

Intensive Probation

This variant of traditional probation involves more frequent contacts and demands than normal probation. It differs from house arrest in that there is more freedom of movement under intensive probation. At least eight states have implemented some form of intensive probation, diverting up to one fifth of their convicted felons from prison. 53

Under Georgia's program, probationers are subject to mandatory curfews, a minimum of five unannounced visits a week at home or work, 132 hours of community service, and spot urinalyses or breath tests to detect drugs or alcohol.

According to Larry Anderson, coordinator of Georgia's alternative sentencing programs, the intensive probation program's results have exceeded initial goals. Of the 2,500 convicts who have participated in the program since it began in July 1982, only 4.7 percent (119) have committed new crimes; only one of these crimes was a major felony (armed robbery). In addition, participating probationers pay the entire cost of the program. As part of their sentence, the judge requires them to pay a monthly fee for the program. Mr. Anderson stated that the program cost for FY 86 should be \$2.7 million, and program receipts are projected to total \$3.5 million, a "profit" of \$800,000.

Special Alternative Incarceration

Also entitled "shock" incarceration, this alternative was implemented in Georgia in November 1983. Program participants are usually between the ages of 17 and 25 years who have not previously served time in a state prison. Participants are selected by judges at sentencing and must not have been convicted of a crime requiring mandatory imprisonment (i.e., murder, armed robbery, etc.).

According to Larry Anderson, participating inmates are incarcerated in one of the state's prisons and are segregated from long-term convicts. Mr. Anderson stated that the program's routine is similar to marine corps boot camp; inmates receive military-style haircuts, perform hard labor, and end each day with intensive calisthenics. Instead of serving a one-to-five-year incarceration (which they would have faced), participants stay for 90 days and are then placed on varying levels of probation for an extended period. 54

^{53&}quot;The Alternative to Prison," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, September 2, 1985, Page 6.

⁵⁴Note that this alternative reduces time served. Although convicts are still incarcerated, their prison stay is drastically reduced.

Operating costs for shock incarceration are at least as expensive as regular imprisonment because of the high level of supervision required. Nevertheless, substantial savings are realized because offenders are diverted from long prison terms and the related costs.

Mr. Anderson maintains that this program is one of the most effective alternatives currently utilized in Georgia. Preliminary figures show that 93.5 percent of the program's participants were offense-free for six months following their release. Long-term statistics are not yet available.

Conservation Camps

Under this alternative, prisoners are diverted from state prisons to less costly facilities. This method of reducing prisons entries has been successfully implemented in Nevada.

The Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) probably grew faster than any other state corrections agency during the past eight years--16 percent annually. During 1985, the NDC opened two conservation camps of 150 beds each to reduce crowding in the prisons, and to cut corrections costs.

Inmates are selected for the camps using an objective classification system based on a model by the National Institute of Corrections (NIC). Selection to the camps is restricted to low-risk inmates who meet a number of criteria, including the following:

- no sex offender history;
- · no history of repetitive violence;
- · no history of psychological or emotional problems;
- · no violent crimes within the past year; and
- · no past prison escapes.

According to Peter Demosthenes of the Nevada Department of Corrections, the camps have a number of advantages to the inmates <u>and</u> the state. Inmates get the opportunity to work, which means additional good time credit and a nominal wage. The added good time credit results in an earlier release than is possible in the state prison. Moreover, prisoners have the opportunity to be productive during their imprisonment period.

The advantages to the state include cheap labor for local and state projects, and reduced corrections costs. Camp inmates work on conservation and fire suppression projects supervised by the state's forestry division. In addition, inmate crews have worked within communities on projects which the towns could not otherwise afford. Recent projects include gathering firewood for senior citizens, clearing sidewalks of snow, and improvement of parks and rodeo grounds.

Moreover, the State has saved money because of the lower cost of supervising camp inmates. Mr. Demosthenes stated that the current average supervision of a camp inmate is \$6,700 per year compared to \$12,000 per year for prison inmates.

Furthermore, the camp program has helped Nevada to reduce its prison crowding and postpone construction of new prisons. The NDC plans to expand one camp and construct three more during the next 14 months to increase camp bed space to 1,115 beds. The NDP has kept construction costs for the camps down by using inmate labor, NDC equipment, and surplus modular units from the Alaska Pipeline Project. 56

FEASIBILITY OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN ALASKA

Any of the alternatives described in this chapter would generally be feasible to implement in Alaska. Moreover, each alternative costs the State less per inmate than the cost of imprisonment. Some—such as the emergency overcrowding act and community residential centers—have been utilized in the past. Their use as ways to reduce institutional crowding could be expanded without significant additional cost to the State. In addition, their expansion would not require changes in the current law.

⁵⁵Those living in the camps get at least ten more days per month good time than the maximum allowed in the state's prisons. In addition, prisoners are paid extra when on fire fighting status.

⁵⁶According to Mr. Demosthenes, there have been few escapes from the camps despite the mere eight-foot chain link fence which surrounds the camps. Mr. Demosthenes asserts that the escape from these camps has been lower than that of all other institutions in the western states.

Expansion of discretionary parole would require changes to the current law. In addition, expanded use of this alternative would require additional personnel to handle the larger caseload. However, substantial savings are realized under this alternative because its use may prevent or postpone additional prison construction which would otherwise be required. As noted, the cost to supervise a convict on parole is significantly less than the cost of incarceration.

The intensive probation and house arrest programs could be implemented without any change in current law. These alternatives could be applied to eligible Class B and C felons who would otherwise have been jailed for their offenses.

If any alternative in this chapter is implemented, careful screening and evaluation of eligible convicts is vital to program success. Each alternative would place an offender in a lower level of security, increasing the potential for escape. However, some risk cannot be avoided unless the legislature decides to build more prisons in lieu of other choices.

The University of Alaska Anchorage (UAA) recently published a forecast of the State's prison population over the next twenty years or so. The forecast projects a prison population exceeding 4,000 by 1990. If accurate, this means that the population would roughly double during the next five years.

It no additional prisons are built after the Spring Creek facility opens in 1987, the State's prison capacity would theoretically be 1,500 beds short of the projected inmate population by 1990. Nevertheless, crowding probably would not occur under present law. Under the current Emergency Conditional Commutation Release act (ECCR), the governor is required to release prisoners when prison populations exceed a specified level for a specified period of time. If this act is carried out in its present form, prisoners would be released on a consistent basis under the UAA forecast.

Release under the ECCR would effectively result in the expansion of the State's discretionary parole system. Under discretionary parole, inmates are released if they have served a statutorily required period of time and are determined to be reasonable security risks upon release. The same general principles apply under the ECCR; eligible inmates must have served at least one-half of their sentence and be within 120 days of release. Moreover, they cannot be released if deemed a bad risk based on a number of criteria.

However, using the ECCR in its present form as the means to reduce crowding does little to provide long-term relief or control of the crowding situation. Because so few prisoners are released under the ECCR relative to the number currently entering the State's prisons, the

prison population may exceed the ECCR's capacity limits soon after ECCR releases are made, thereby invoking the act again. Then, the time-consuming inmate selection process must start all over.

If implemented, one or more of the alternatives described in this chapter could reduce the prison population to a level sufficient to avoid invocation of the ECCR. Implementation of any of the described alternatives could provide a measure of relief from constant prison crowding. Moreover, selected alternatives could enable corrections personnel to get the crowding problem under control. Although there are security risks involved with any of the alternatives, each has been successfully implemented in other states.

APPENDIX

Parele after 1/8 of Sentence for Mon-pressaptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Good Time of 25% for Pressaptively Sentenced Convicts

			þ	IONPRESUNPTI	VE SENTENCES			PF	RESUMPTIVE SEN	TERCES			TIME SERVED UNDER PRESUMPTIVE
CRIHE	CRIME CLASS	TOTAL CONVICTIONS	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TINE SERVED	% OF GRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE I	AVERAGE HCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	% OF GRAND TOTAL	SENTENCES AS A % OF TOTAL TIME SERVED
Harder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.001	17	27.0	20.9	344.9	14.171	100.00%
Horder II	Ų	. 5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	26.0	8.7	43.9	1.78	100.00
Henslaughter	A	10	_		0.0	0.0	0.60	10	7.0	5.3	32.5	2.16	100.00
Cr Heg Honocide Assault I	C	7 20	7	4.0	1.8 0.0	9.8 0.0	1.16	20	8.0	0.0 6.0	0.0 120.0	0.00 4.94	0.00 100.00
Assault II	8	20	15	8.0	1.0	15.0	1.87	13	6.0	4.5	58.5	2.41	79.59
Assault III	Č	76	~ 52	3.0	1.0	52.0	6.47	24	4.0	3.0	72.0	2.96	58.06
Kidnapping	Ü	2			0.0	0.0	0.00	2	20.0	6.7	13.3	0.55	100.00
Cust. Interference I	E	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Sor Assault I	U	77			0.0	0.0	0.00	77	10.0	7.5	577.5	23.76	100.00
Sox Assault II	B	22	20	4.0	1.8	26.7	8.82	2	5.0	9.B	7.5	0.81 0.00	21.95 0.00
5ox Assault III 5ex Abuse of Hinor I	C	0 14	8	0.5	0.5	4.0 0.0	0.50 0.00	14	6.0	0.0 4.5	0.0 0.6	2.59	100.00
Sex Abase of Misor II	B	52	52	4.0	1.3	89.3	0.62	47	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sox Abase of Minor III	Č	0	***	***	0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Incost	C	4	4	2.0	0.7	2.7	0.33			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Explait minor	B	5	2	15.0	5.0	10.0	1.24			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Robbery I	A	38			0.0	0.0	0.00	98	9.0	6.0	228.0	9.98	100.00
Robbery II	D	11	В	4.0	1.8	10.7	1.39	3	6.0	4.5	13.5	0.56	55.86
Extortion	В	0			0.0 0.5	0.0 0.5	0.00			0.0 0.0	0.0	0.00 0.00	0.00
Coercion Theft I	C B	1 4	1 4	1.5 5.0	1.7	6.7	80.0 E8.0			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Thaft II	C	60	92	3.0	1.0	32.0	3.78	29	4.0	3.0	84.0	8.46	72.41
Theft by receiving	Č	5	5	1.0	0.3	0.7	0.08			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft of Sorvices	В	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	6.0	4.5	22.5	0.93	100.00
Issuing Bad Check	В	9	4	8.0	2.7	10.7	1.33	5	7.0	5.3	26.3	1.08	71.11
Fraud Use of Cr Card	C		0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	2	3.0	2.3	4.5	0.19	100.00
Burglary I	В	57	29	3.0	1.0	29.0	3,61	28	5.0	9.8	105.0 120.0	4,32 4,94	78.96 01.08
Durglary II	C	92 5	42	2.0	0.7 0.0	28.0 0.0	9.49 0.00	40 5	4.0 15.0	3.0 11.3	56.9	2.31	100.00
Arson I Arson II	A B	3	3	8.0	1.0	9.0	0.97		14,0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Cris Hischief I	8	1	•	0,0	0.0	0.0	0.00	1	3.0	2.3	2.3	0.09	100.00
Cris Hischief II	C	12	6	1.5	0.5	3.0	0.87	6	3.0	2.3	19.5	0.56	81.82
Forgory I	B	4	5	7.0	8.9	4.7	0.58	2	1.5	1.1	2.9	0.09	32.53
Forgary II	C		6	5.0	1.7	10.0	1.24	8	10.0	7.5	0.0	2.47	85.71
School to defraud	В	4	4	1.0	0.3	1.8	0.17			0.0 0.0	0.0	0.00	0,00 0.00
False Business Record Endanger Hinor	0		1	0.1 0.3	0.1 0.3	0.1 0.9	0.01 0.03			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Dribery	В		i	3.0	1.0	1.0	0.12			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Perjurg	8		2	4.0	1.8	2.7	0.38			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Escape I	٨	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			. 0.0	0.0	0.00	
Escape II	В		1	4.0	1,3	1.8	0.17	9	7.0	5.3	15.8	0.65	92.20
Promote Contraband I	3		1	8.0	1.0	1.0	0.12	1	5.0	3.8	9.0	0.15	78.95
Tamper with witness	C				0.0	0.0	0.00 0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00 0.00	
Tamper with evidence Interfere Off Proceed	C B		1	5.0	0.0 1.7	0.0 1.7	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hindering Prosecution	C		•		0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Terroristic Threat	Č		5	2.0	0.7	1.3	0.17			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Riot	C	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.08			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hisconduct Veapons I	C		5	11.0	3.7	7.3	0.91	5	12.0	9.0	45.0	1.85	85.99
Control Substance I	U				0.0	0.0	0.00	- 8	4.0	3.0 4.9	24.0 43.9	0.99 1.81	100.00 100.40
Control Substance II Control Substance III	A B		54	3.0	0.0 1.0	0.0 54.0	0.00 6.71	9 19	6.5 5.0	3.8	71.9	2.93	56.89
Control Substance IV	C		17	2.0	0.7	• 11.3	1.41	4	5.0	9.0	15.0	0.62	56.96
Attoupt consit folday	A			5.0	1.7	5.0	0.62	4	5.0	9.0	15.0	98.0	75.00
Solicit commit crime	В			3.0	1.0	1.0	0.12			0.6	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscollancous A folony	A				0.0	0.0	0.00	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	
Hiscellaneous D felong	3		1	6.0	2.0	2.0	0.23	.0		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscollaneous C felony	13			0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	60	2.4	1.9 0.0	106.5	4.38 0.00	100.00 0.00
Hisdoneanors			6,062	0.1	0.1	384.6 804.9	47.82 100.003	468		V.0	2,430.1	100.00%	75.13%
MARL		6,922	0,707			047.0	444,449	-100			~! .~		

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 3,234.3 Years TIME SERVED UNDER 1985 LAW: 3,234.3 Years

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 73 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT HURDER I AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF GHE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANDATORY HINTHUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 1985 LAW:

10.01Years

CHANGE FROM 1905 LAW:

20.0

CRIMES, CONVICTIONS, SENTENCE LENGTH, AND LENGTH OF INCARCERATION--ALASKA 1984 (TIME IN YEARS)

RELEASE CONDITIONS:

Parole after 1/8 of Sentence for Non-pressaptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Good Time of 931 for Pressaptively Sentenced Convicts

			H	ONPRESUMPTIVE	SENTENCES			PR	ESUMPTIVE SEN	TEHCES			TIME SERVED UNDER
CRIHE	CRIHE CLASS CON	TOTAL VICTIONS CON	IVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE IN	AVERAGE CARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	I OF GRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE 1	AVERAGE NCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	3 OF GRAND TOTAL	PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES AS A % OF TOTAL TIME SERVED
Hurder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.001	17	27.0	18.0	806.0	14.131	100.00
Hurdar II	U	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	26.0	8.7	49.9	2.00	100.00
Nanslaughter	A	10			0.0	0.0	0.00	10	7.0	4.7	46.7	2.15	100.00
Cr Neg Hosecide Assault I	C A	7 20	7	4.0	1.3 0.0	9.B 0.0	1.16	20		0.0	0.0 106.7	0.00	0.00 100.00
Assault II	B	28	15	3.0	1.0	15.0	1.87	19	8.0 6.0	5.8 4.0	52.0	4.92 2.40	77.61
Assault III	Č	76	52	3.0	1.0	52.0	6.47	24	4.0	2.7	64.0	2.95	55.17
Kidanpping	Ü	2	JL	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	5	20.0	6.7	13.3	0.62	100.00
Cust. Interference I	Č	ō			0.0	0.0	0.00	. •	44.4	0.0	0.0	9.00	100.00
Sex Assault I	Ū	77			0.0	0.0	0.00	77	10.0	6.7	519.3	23.70	100.00
Sex Aspault II	B	22	20	4.0	1.8	26.7	9.82	2	5.0	3,3	6.7	0.91	20.00
Sox Assault III	C	8	8	0.5	0.5	4.0	0.50	_	***	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Hinor I	U	14	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	14	6.0	4.0	56.0	2,58	100.00
Sex Abuse of Hinor II	В	52	52	4.0	1.3	69.3	8.42			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Hinor III	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Incost	Ċ	4	4	2.0	0.7	2.7	0.98			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Exploit minor	B	2	2	13.0	5.0	10.0	1.24			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Rubbery I	A	30			0.0	0.0	0.00	38	8.0	5.8	505.9	9.86	100.00
Nobbary II	B	ii	0	4.0	1.3	10.7	1.23	9	6.0	4.0	12.0	0.55	52.94
Extortion	В	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Coercion	C	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.06			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft I	9	4	4	5.0	1.7	6.7	0.83			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft II	C	60	92	3.0	1.0	0.56	9.90	28	4.0	2.7	74.7	3.45	70.00
Theft by recoiving	C	5	2	1.0	0.3	0.7	0.08			0.0	0.0	0.00	0:00
Theft of Services	B	5			0.0	0.0	0.05	5	4.0	4.0	20.0	0.92	100.00
Issuing Bad Check	B	9	4	8.0	2.7	10.7	1.93	5	7.0	4.7	23.9	1.08	68.63
Fraud Use of Cr Card	C	2	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	2	3.0	2.0	4.0	0.18	100.00
Burglary I	В	57	29	3.0	1.0	29.0	3.61	28	5.0	3.3	93.3	4.31	76.29
Durglary II	C	85	42	2.0	0.7	28.0	3.48	40	4.0	2.7 10.0	106.7	4.92	79.21
Arson I Aroon II	A B	5 9	3		0.0	0.0	0.00	5	15.0	0.0	50.0 0.0	2.81	100.C0 0.00
Cris Hischief I	B	1	ð	9.0	1.0 0.0	9.0 0.0	0.97 0.00	1	3.0	2.0	2.0	0.00 0.09	100.00
Grin Hischief II	C	12	6	1.5	0.5	3.0	0.57	6	9.0	2.0	12.0	0.55	80.00
Forgery I	8	4	2	7.0	8.5	4.7	0.58	5	1.5	1.0	2.0	0.09	30.00
Forgery II	Č	14	4	5.0	1.7	10.0	1.24	8	10.0	6.7	53.9	2.46	84.21
School to defraud	В	4	4	1.0	0.3	1.3	0.17	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
False Business Record	C	1	1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0,01			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Endanger Hinor	C	1	1	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.03			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Driberg	В	i	1	8.0	1.0	1.0	0.12			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Perjurg	В	2	2	4.0	1.8	2.7	0.83			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Escape I	A	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Escape II	В	4	1	4.0	1,8	1.3	0.17	3	7.0	4.7	14.0	0.65	91.80
Promote Contraband I	C	2	1	9.0	1.0	1.0	0.12	1	5.0	3.3	9.3	0.15	76.92
Tamper with witness	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Tapper with evidence	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Interfere Off Proceed	В	1	1	3.0	1.7	1.7	9.21			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hindering Prosecution	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Terroristic Threat	C	5	5	2.0	0.7	1.3	0.17			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Riot	Ċ	1	i	0,5	0.5	0.5	0.06	_	48.4	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Misconduct Beapons I	Ç	7	5	11.0	3.7	7.8	0.91	5	12.0	9.0	40.0	1.85	84.51
Control Substance I Control Substance II	U A	8 9			0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.00	8 9	4.0 6.5	2.7 4.3	21.9 39.0	0.98 1.80	100.00 100.00
Control Substance III	B	73	54	3.0	1.0	54.0	4.71	19	5.0	3.3	63.3	2.92	\$3.97
Control Substance IV	C	81 23	17	2.0	0.7	11.8	1.41	4	5.0	3.3	13.3	0.62	54.05
Attempt connit felong	À	7	3	5.0	1.7	5.0	0.62	4	3.0	8.3	13.3	0.62	72.73
Solicit count crise	8	1	1	3.0	1.0	1,0	0.12	7	2,0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscollaneous A felosy	Ä	0	•	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscellagoous D felong	8	1	1	6.0	2.0	2.0	0.25	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscellangous C felony	Č	60	Ĉ	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	60	2.4	1.6	94.7	4.37	100.00
Misdeognors	Ħ	6,062	6,062	0.1	0.1	384.6	47.02	•	,	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
TOTAL		6,922	6,454		- 	804.3	100.00%	468			2 144 1	100.003	72.92

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 2,970.4 Years
TIME SERVED UNDER
1905 LAW: 3,234.3 Years

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT MURDER I AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF ONE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANOATORY MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME
UNDER 1985 LAW: 269.9 Years
CHANGE FROM
1985 LAW: 6.2%

Parale after 1/8 of Sentence for Hon-presumptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Parole after 1/3 of Sestance for Presumptively Sestanced Convicts

				OHPRESUMPT1	IVE SENTENCES			PR	ESUMPTIVE SEN	TENCES			TINE SERVED UNDER
CRIME	CRIME CLASS	TOTAL CONVICTIONS	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE IHCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	S OF GRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE I	AVERACE HCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	1 OF GRAND TOTAL	PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES AS A S OF TOTAL TIME SERVED
Hurder I	U	17			8.0	0.0	0.00%	17	27.0	9.0	159.9	13.771	100.00
Hurder II	U	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	26.0	8.7	49.9	3.90	100.00
Hanslaughter	A	10			0.0	0.0	0.00	10	7.0	2.9	28.9	2.10	100.00
Cr Heg Homocide	C	7	7	4.0	1.8	9.3	1.16			0.0	0.0	0.40	0.00
Assault I Ausault II	A	20	48		0.0	0.0	0.50	20	8.0	2.7	53.3	4.80	100.00
Assault III	B	28 76	15 52	3.0	1.0 1.0	15.0 52.0	1.87	19 24	6.0	2.0	26.0 92.0	2.34	63.41
Kidnapping	U	2	JE	8.0	0.0	0.0	6.47 0.80	5	4.0 20.0	1.3 6.7	13.3	2.88 1.20	38.10 100.00
Cust. Interference I	Č	0			0.0	0.0	0.00	•	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	,,,,,,
Ser Assault I	Ü	77			0.0	0.0	0.00	77	10.0	3.3	256.7	23.09	100.00
Sex Assault II	B	22	20	4.0	1.9	26.7	9.92	5	5.0	1.7	3.3	0.30	11.11
Sex Assault III	C	8	0	0.5	0.5	4.0	0.50			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Minor I	U	14	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	14	6.0	2.0	28.0	2.32	100.00
Sex Abuse of Hinor II	B	52	52	4.0	1.0	E. 93	8.42			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Hisor III	C	0			0.0	0.0	0,00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Incest	C	4	4	2.0	0.7	2.7	0.33			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Exploit minor	Đ	2	2	15.0	5.0	10.0	1.24			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Robberg I	A	38			0.0	0.0	0.00	38	8.0	2.7	101.9	9.12	100.00
Robbery II	В	11	8	4.0	1.5	10.7	1.99	3	6.0	2.0	4.0	0.54	36.00
Extortion	B	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0,0	0.0	0.00	
Coercian	C	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.06			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft I Theft II	C C	4 60	4 92	5.0	1.7 1.0	6.7	0.83	20		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft by receiving	C	2	92	8.0 1.0	0.3	82.0 0.7	8.98 0.08	28	4.0	1.3	87.9 0.0	9.96	59.85 0:00
Theft of Services	8	5	-	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	5	6.0	2.0	10.0	0.90	100.00
Issuing Bad Check	B	9	4	0.0	2.7	10.7	1.83	5	7.0	2.3	11.7	1.05	52.24
Fraud Use of Cr Card	Č	é	ò	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	2	8.0	1.0	2.0	0.18	100.00
Dorglary I	D	57	29	3.0	1.0	29.0	3.41	28	5.0	1.7	46.7	4.20	61.67
Burglary II	C	82	42	2.0	0.7	28.0	8,48	40	4.0	1.3	53,3	4.80	65.57
Arson I	A	5	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	5	15.0	5.0	25.0	2.23	100.60
Arson II	₿	9	8	9.0	1.0	3.0	0.97			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Crim Hischief I	В	1			0.0	0.0	0.00	1	3.0	1.0	1.0	0.09	100.00
Crim Mischief II	C	12	6	1.5	0.5	9.0	0.97	6	8.0	1.0	6.0	0.54	66.67
Forgerg 1	8	4	5	7.0	2.8	4.7	0.50	2	1.5	0.5	1.0	0.09	17.65
Forgary II	C	14	6	5.0	1.7	10.0	1,24	8	10.0	3.3	26.7	2.40	72.79
Scheme to defraud	В	4	4	1.0	8.0	1.9	0.17			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
False Business Record	C	1	1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.01			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Endanger Misor	C B	1	1	0.9	0.3	8.9	0.03			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Briberg	9	5	1 2	3.0 4.0	1.0 1.3	1.0 2.7	0.12 0.93			0.0	0.0	0.00 0.00	0.00
Perjury Escape I	A	0	£	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Escape II	8	4	1	4.0	1.9	1.3	0.17	3	7.0	2.3	7.0	0.00	84.00
Promote Contraband I	C	2	1	3.0	1.0	1.0	0.12	ĭ	5.0	1.7	1.7	0.15	62.50
Tasper with witness	Č	ō	•		0.0	0.0	0.00	-		0.0	0.0	0.00	
Tamper with evidence	Č	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	***
Interfere Off Proceed	В	1	1	5.0	1.7	1.7	0.21			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hindering Prosecution	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	***
Terroristic Threat	C	5	5	2.0	0.7	1.9	0.17			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Riot	C	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.04			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hisconduct Weapons I	C	7	5	11.0	3.7	7.3	0.91	5	12.0	4.0	20.0	1.80	73.17
Control Substance I	U				0.0	0.0	0.00	8	4.0	1.3	10.7	0.98	100.00
Control Substance II	A	9			0.0	0.0	0.00	9	6.5	2.2	19.5	1.75	100.00
Control Substance III	8	78	54	9.0	1.0	54.0	6.71	19	3.0	1.7	91.7	2.85	96.96
Control Substance IV Attempt condit felony	C	21 7	17 3	2.0	0.7	11.9	1.41	4	5.0 5.0	1.7 1.7	6.7 6.7	0.60 08.0	97.04 57.14
Solicit commit crime	A B	í	3 1	5.0 3.0	1.7 1.0	5.0 1.0	0.62 0.12	4	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Miscellaneous A felony	A	0		3.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscellaneous B felony	9	1	1	6.0	2.0	2.0	0,25	ő		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Miscellaneous C feleng	Č	60	ō	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	60	2.4	0.8	47.3	4,26	190.00
Hisdesenbors	H		6,062	0.1	0.1	384.6	47.82			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
TOTAL		6,922	6,454			804.3	100,001	468		.,	1,111.5	100.001	\$8.02

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 1,915.8 Years

TIME SERVED UNDER

1985 LAW: 8,234.3 Years

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT HUNDER I AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF ONE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME

UNDER 1985 LAW: 1,818.5 Years

CHANGE FROM

1985 LAW:

49 85

Parole after 1/8 of Sentence for Mon-prescaptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Good Time of 25% for Presumptively Sentenced Convicts

			H	ONPRESUMPTI	VE SENTENCES			PŘ	ESUMPTIVE SE	NTENCES			TIHE SERVED UNDER PRESUMPTIVE
CRIKE	CRIME CLASS (TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	S OF GRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	% OF GRAND TOTAL	SENTENCES AS A % OF TOTAL TINZ SERVED
Harder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.00%	17	8.88	28.9	491.9	20.101	100.00%
Harder II	U	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	22.8	7.6	30.0	1.55	100.00
Hanalaughter	4	10			0.0	0.0	0.00	10	6.9	5.2	51.0	2.12	100.00
Cr Heg Homocide	C	7	7	4.0	1.8	9.8	1.16		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Assault I	A	50			0.0	0.0	0.00	20	2,9	2.1	42.0	1.72	100.00
Assault II	В	58	15	8.0	1.0	15.0	1.87	13	6.0	4.5	58.5	2.39	79.59
Asseult III	Ç	76	52	3.0	1.0	32.0	6.47	24	4.0	9.0	72.0	2.94	58.06
Kidnapping	U	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	8	24.5	8.8	17.7	0.72	100.00
Cust. Interference I	C U	0 77			0.0	0.0	0.00	**	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	100.00
Sex Assault I Sex Assault II	u 8	22	20	4.0	0.0 1.8	0. 0 26.7	0.00 3.82	77 2	11.6 5.0	8.9 3.B	691.5 7.5	27.85 0.91	21.95
Sor Assault III	C	0	20 0	0.5	0.5	4.0	0.50	6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Hipor I	ti	14	Û	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.00	14	6.0	4,5	0.0	2.57	100.00
Sex Abuse of Minor II	В	52	52	4.0	1.3	69.9	8,62	17	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Minor III	C	0	5 2	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Incest	Č	4	4	2.0	0.7	2.7	0.93		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Exploit ainor	D	5	2	15.0	5.0	10.0	1.84		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Robberg I	Ā	90	-		0.0	0.0	0.00	38	4.1	3.1	116.9	4.78	100.00
Robbery II	В	11	8	4.0	1.3	10.7	1.93	9	6.6	4.5	19.5	0.55	35.86
Extortion	В	0			0.0	0.0	9.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Coercion	C	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Thaft I	В	4	4	5.0	1.7	6.7	0.03		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
That II	C	60	92	3.0	1.0	82.0	3.98	28	4.0	3.0	84.0	3,43	72.41
Theft by receiving	C	2	2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.08		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Thaft of Sarvicas	9	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	6.0	4.5	22.5	0.92	100.00
Issuing Bad Check	B	9	4	8.0	2.7	10.7	1.33	5	7.0	5.9	26.3	1.07	71.11
Fraud Use of Cr Card	C	5	0	0.0	0.0	€.0	0.00	2	9.0	2.9	4.5	0.18	100.00
Burglary I	B	57	29	3.0	1.0	29.0	3.61	20	5.0	9.8	105.0	4.29	78.36
Durglary II	C	02	42	2.0	0.7	28.0	9.48	40	4.0	3.0	120.0	4.90	01.08
Arson 1	A	5			0.0	0.0	0,00	5	5.5	4.1	50.6	0.84	100.00
Araon II	B	3	3	3.0	1.0	3.0	0.97		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Crim Hischiaf I	8	1			0.0	0.0	0.00	1	3.0	2.3	2.3	0.09	100.00
Cris Hischief II	C	12	6	1.5	0.5	9.0	0.97	6	3.0	2.3	18.5	0.55	81.02
Forgery I	B	4	2	7.0	2.3	4.7	0.58	5	1.5	1.1	2,3	0.09	92.59
Forgery II	C	14	6	5.0	1.7	10.0	1.24	8	10.0	7.5	60.0	2.45	85.71
School to defraud	Ð	4	4	1.0	0.8	1.8	0.17		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
False Duminess Record	C	1	1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.01		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Endanger Minor	C	1	1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.03		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00 0.00
Bribery	B	1	1	3.0	1.0	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Perjurg	В	1	2	4.0	1.3	2.7	0.33		0.0	Q.Q 0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Excape 1	A D	0 4			0.0	0.0 1.3	0.00 0.17	3	7.0	0.0 5.3	0.0 15.8	0.00 0.64	92.20
Escape II Promote Contraband I	D	2	1	4.0 9.0	1.9 1.0	1.0	0.17	1	5.0	8.8	3.0	0.15	70.95
Tamper with witness	0	0	•	3.V	0.0	0.0	0.00	•	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	19.70
Tamper with evidence	Č	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Interfere Off Proceed	В	i	1	5.0	1.7	1.7	0.21		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hindering Prosecution	Č	Ō	•	•••	0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Torroristic Threat	Č	ž	2	2,0	0.7	1.3	0.17		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Riot	Č	1	ì	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hisconduct Usapons I	C	7	2	11.0	3.7	7.3	0.91	5	12.0	9.0	45.0	1.84	05.99
Control Substance I	U	8			0.0	0.0	0.00	8	2.6	2.0	15.6	0.64	100.00
Control Substance II	A	9			0.0	0.0	0.00	9	6.5	4.9	49.9	1.79	100.00
Control Substance III	В	73	54	8.0	1.0	34.0	6.71	19	5.0	8.8	71.8	2.91	56.09
Control Substance IV	C	21	17	2.0	0.7	11.3	1.41	4	5.0	3.0	15.0	0.61	56.96
Attempt commit follows	A	7	9	5.0		5.0	0.62	4	5.0	9.8	15.0	0.61	75.00
Solicit commit crimu	В	1	i	8.0	1.0	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscellansons A felony	A	0			0.0	0.0	0.00	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Miscullaneous D folony	В	1	1	6.0	2.0	2.0	0.25	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Miscellencous C followy	C	60	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	60	2.4	1.8	106.5	4.85	100.00
Hisdencanors		6,062	6,062	0.1	0.1	384.6	47.02		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
TOTAL		6,922	6,454			804.3	100.001	448			2,446.7	100.00%	75.261

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 3,251.0 Years TIME SERVED UNDER

1985 LAW: 8,234.3 Years

MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 73 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT NURBER 1 AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FGR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF ONE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MAMOATORY

ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 1985 LAW.

li6.71Years

CHANGE FROM 1985 LAW: -0.51 THIS TABLE CONTAINS SENTENCE AVERAGES FOR 1974-79 CRIMES WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT TO PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING, FOR THOSE CRIMES WHERE DATA ARE AVAILABLE.

Parale after 1/8 of Sentence for Mon-presumptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Good Time of 30% for Presumptively Sentenced Convicts

			N	OMPRESUMPTI	VE SENTENCES			PR	ESUMPTIVE SE	NTENCES			TIME SERVED UNDER
CRIME	CRIME CLASS	TOTAL CONVICTIONS	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	1 OF CRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	% OF CRAND TOTAL	PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES AS A % OF TOTAL TIME SERVED
Hurder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.001	17	86.6	20.9	491.9	22.001	100.00
Herder II	IJ	. 3			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	22.6	7.6	98.0	1.70	100.00
Munslaughter	A	10			0.0	0.0	0.00	10	6.9	4.6	46.0	2.06	100.00
Cr Heg Homocide	C	7	7	4.0	1.3	9.8	1.16		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Assault I	A	20			0.0	0.0	0.00	20	8.8	1.9	97.9	1.67	100.60
Assault II	B	58	15	8.0	1.0	15.0	1.87	19	6.0	4.0	52.0	2.93	77.61
Assault III	C	76	52	9.0	1.0	52.0	6.47	24	4.0	2.7	64.0	2.86	55.17
Kidnapping	U	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	2	26.5	8.8	17,7	0.79	100.00
Cust. Interference I	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	***
Sex Assault I	U	77			0.0	0.0	0.00	77	11.9	7.9	605.7	27.09	100.00
Sex Assault II	9	55	20	4.0	1.8	26.7	8.82	2	3.0	3.3	6.7	0.90	20.00
Sex Assault III	C	8	8	0.5	0.5	4.0	0.50		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Minor I	U	14	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	14	6.0	4.0	56.0	2.50	100.00
Sex Abuse of Minor II	B	52	52	4.0	1.8	69.9	8.42		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Minor III	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
lacost	C 8	4 2	4	2.0	0.7	2.7	0.33		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Exploit binor	-	80	5	15.0	5.0	10.0	1.24		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Robbers I	A B	11	В	4.0	0.0 1.8	0.0 10.7	0.00	28 9	4.1	2.7	103.9	4.65	100.00
Robbery II Extortion	B	0	U	4.0	0.0	0.0	1.83	3	6.0 0.0	4.0 0.0	12.0 0.0	0.54 0.00	52.94
Coercion	Č	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft I	В	4	4	5.0	1.7	6.7	0.83		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft II	C	60	82	9.0	1.0	92.0	9.65 9.78	28	4.0	2.7	74.7	3.84	70.0¥
Theft by receiving	C	2	2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.08	50	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft of Services	8	5	•	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	3	6.0	4.0	20.0	0.89	100.00
Issuing Bad Check	8	9	4	0.0	2.7	10.7	1.93	5	7.0	4.7	23.3	1.04	68.68
Fraud Use of Cr Card	Č	ė	ò	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	2	3.0	2.0	4.0	0.18	100.00
Durglary I	8	57	29	3.0	1.0	29.0	3.61	20	5.0	3,9	93.3	4.17	76.29
Burglary 11	Č	85	42	2.0	0.7	28.0	8.48	40	4.0	2.7	106.7	4.77	79.21
Arnon I	A	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	5.5	3,7	10.3	0.82	100.00
Arson II	8	3	8	9.0	1.0	8.0	0.97		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Cris Hischief I	Ð	1			0.0	0.0	0.00	1	3.0	2.0	2,0	0.09	100.00
Cris Mischief II	C	12	6	1.5	0.5	3.0	0.37	6	9.0	2.0	12.0	0.54	80.00
Forgery I	B	4	2	7.0	2.8	4.7	0.5B	2	1.5	1.0	2.0	0.09	30.00
Forgery II	C	14	6	5.0	1.7	10.0	1.24	8	10.0	6.7	59.9	2.39	84.21
Scheme to defraud	B	4	4	1.0	0.9	1.8	0.17		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
False Business Record	C	1	1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.01		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Endanger Hinor	C	1	1	0.8	6.0	0.3	0.03		9.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Bribery	В	1	1	9.0	1.0	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Perjurg	8	5	2	4.0	1.9	2.7	0.83		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Escape I	٨	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Escape II	8	4	1	4.0	1.3	1.3	0.17	9	7.0	4.7	34.0	0.63	91.90
Procose Constabled I	C	5	ı	3.6	1.0	1.0	0.12	1	5.0	9.9	3.8	0.15	76.92
Temper with witness	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Tamper with evidence	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	***
Interfere Off Proceed	В	1	1	5.0	1.7	1.7	0.21		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hindering Presecution	C	0	_		0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Terroristic Threat	C	5	5	2.0	0.7	1.8	0.17		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Riot	C	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Miscanduct Weapons I	•	7	2	11.0	3.7	7.8	0.91	•	12.0	9.0	40.0	1.79	84.51
Control Substance I	U	8			0.0	0.6	0.00	8	2.6	1.7	13.9	93.0	100.00
Control Substance II	A	9			0.0	0.0	0.00	9	6.5	4.3	39.0	1.74	100.00
Control Substance III Control Substance IV	В	73	54	9.0	1.0	54.0	6.71	19	5.0	3.3	68.8	2.83	59.97
	C	21 7	17	2.0	0.7	11.3	1.41	4	5.0	9.3	13.3	0.60	54.05
Attempt commit felony Solicit commit crime	A B	1	8	5.0	1.7	5.0	0.62	4	5.0	9.9	19.9	0.60	72.78
Miscellaneous A felony		1	1	3.0	1.0	1.0	0.12	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscollaneous B folony	A B	1	1	6.0	0.0 2.0	0.0 2.0	0.00	0	0.0 \$.0	0.0	0.0 0.0	0.00	0.00
Miscellaneous C felong	C	60		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.25 0.00	60	2.4	1.6	94.7	4.23	100.00
Hisdemennors	Ň	4,062	6,062	0.1	0.1	384.6	47.82	••	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
TOTAL		6,922	6,454			804.3	100.001	468		# 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	2,235.5	100.001	73.548

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 3,039.8 Years TIME SERVED UNDER 1905 LAW: 3,234.3 Years INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT MURDER 1 AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF ONE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME
UNDER 1905 LAM: 194.5 Years
CHANGE FROM
1905 LAW: 6.01

THIS TABLE CONTAINS SENTENCE AVERAGES FOR 1976-79 CRIMES WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT TO PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING, FOR THOSE CRIMES WHERE DATA ARE AVAILABLE.

Parole after 1/8 of Sentence for Mon-prosumptive Sentences Exceeding 100 Days Parole after 1/8 of Sentence for Presumptively Sentenced Canvicts

			H	DNPRESUKPTI	VE SENTENCES			PR	SS BYTTYKUZB	NTENCES		n 26 ats an orenz en be be	TIHE SERVED UNDER PRESUMPTIVE
CUINE	CRINE CLASS (TOTAL CONVICTIONS (CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERACE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	S OF GRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	Y OF GRAND TOTAL	SENTENCES AS A % OF TOTAL TIME SERVED
Nurder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.00%	17	84.8	20.9	491.9	35.931	100.003
Hurder II	U	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	. 5	85.6	7.6	88.0	2.73	100.00
Hanslaughter	A	10			0.0	0.0	0.00	10	6.9 0.0	2.9 0.0	23.0 0.0	1.65	100.00
Cr Hog Hosseide Assault I	C	7 20	7	4.0	1.9 0.0	9.9 0.0	1.16	20	2.0	0.9	18.7	1.94	100.00
Assault II	" B	20	15	3.0	1.0	15.0	1.87	19	6.0	2.0	26.0	1.87	69.41
Assault III	Č	76	52	8.0	1.0	52.0	6.47	24	4.0	1.8	92.0	2.80	38.10
Kidnapping	บ	2			0.0	0.0	0.00	\$	26.5	0.8	17.7	1.27	100.00
Cust. Interference I	t	0			0.0	0.0	0.00	***	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	100.00
Sex Assault I	U	77	**		0.0	0.0	0.00	77 2	11.B 3.0	3.9 1.7	302.9 3.8	21.76 0.24	11.11
Sox Asseult II	B C	22 0	20 0	4.0 0.5	1.8 0.5	26.7 4.0	9.02 ¢đ.0	c c	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Assault III Sex Abuse of Hinor 1	1)	14	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	14	6.0	2.0	20.0	2.01	100.00
Sox Abuse of Hinor II	8	52	52	4.0	1.8	69.8	83.8	**	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Hisor III	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	**
Incest	C	4	4	2.0	0.7	2.7	0.93		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Exploit minor	В	5	Ę	15.0	5.0	10.0	1.24		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Robbery I	A	38			0.0	0.0	0.00	38	4.1	1.4 2.0	51.9 6.0	3.73 0.43	100.00 36.00
Robberg II	8	11	ŧ	4.0	1.8	10.7 0.0	1.83	8	6.0 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	30.00
Extortion Coarcion	B	0	1	1,5	0.5	0.5	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft I	В	4	4	5.0	1.7	6.7	0.83		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft II	Č	60	82	9.0	1.0	92.0	9.98	20	4.0	1.3	37.3	2.60	53.85
Theft by receiving	5	2	2	1.0	8.6	0.7	0.03		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft of Services	9	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	6.0	2.0	10.0	0.72	100.00
Issuing Bad Chock	b	9	4	8.0	2.7	10.7	1.83	5	7.0	2.3	11.7	0.04	52.24 100.00
Fraud Use of Cr Card	C	5	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	28 28	3.0 5.0	1.0 1.7	2.0 46.7	0.14 3,35	61.67
Durglary I	B	57 82	29 42	3.0 2.0	1.0 0.7	29.0 28.0	8.61 9.43	40	4.0	1.3	59.9	3.03	65.57
Dorglary II Arson I	A	ນຂ 5	45	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	5	5.5	1.0	9.2	0.46	100.00
Arson II	В	9	3	3.0	1.0	8.0	0.37	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0 00	0.00
Cris Hischief I	В	1	·		0.0	0.0	0.00	1	9.0	1.0	1.0	0.07	100.00
Cris Hischief II	C	12	6	1.5	d.5	9.0	0.87	6	9.0	1.0	6.0	0.43	66.67
Forgery I	D	4	5	7.0	2.8	4.7	0.58	5	1.5	0.5	1.0	0.07	17.65
Forgory II	C	14	6	5.0	1.7	10.0	1.24	8	10.0	9.3 0.0	26.7 0.0	1.92 0.00	72.79 0.00
School to defraud	B C	4	4	1.0	0.8 0.1	1.8	0.01		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
False Business Record Endanger Minor	C	1	i	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.03		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Bribors	В	1	ī	3.0		1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Perjurg	D	5	B	4.0	1.8	2.7	0.33		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Escaps I	Α	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0		0.0	0.00	
Escapo II	В	4	1	4.0	1.8	1.3	0.17	3 1	7.0 5.0		7.0 1.7	0.50 0.12	84.00 62.50
Promote Contraband I	C	8	1	3.0	1.0	1.0	0.12 0.00	1	0.0		0.0	0.00	44.40
Tamper with uttness Tamper with ovidence	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0		0.0	0.00	N=
Interfere Off Proceed	В	1	1	5.0		1.7	0.21		0.0		0.0	0.00	0.00
Hindering Prosecution	Č		_		0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	-
Terroristic Threat	Ċ	5	8	2.0		1.8	0.17		0.0		0.0	0.00	0.00
Ript	C	1	1	0.5		0.5	0.06		0.0		0.0	0.00	0.00
Misconduct Beapons I	C	7	5	11.0		7.8	0.71	5	12.0		20.0 6.9	1.44	73.17 100.00
Control Substance I	U	8			0.0	0.0	0.0b 0.00	8 9	2.6 6.5		19.5	1.40	100.00
Control Substance II	A B	9 78	54	3.0	0.0 1.0	0.0 54.0	6.71	19	5.0		31.7	2.20	96.96
Control Substance III Control Substance IV	C	21	17	2.0		11.8	1.41	4	5.0		6.7	0.48	27.04
Attempt commit felony	A	7		5.0		5.0	0.62	4	5.6	1.7	6.7	0.48	57.14
Solicit count crise	9	1	1	3.0		1.0	0.12		0.0		0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscellaneous A folony	A	0			0.0	0.0	0.00	0	0.0		0.0	0.00	
Hiscellanaous D felony	В	1	1	6.0		2.0	0.25	0	0.0		0.0 47.3	0.00 3.40	0.00 100.00
Miscellaneous C felony	C	60		0.0 0.1		0.0 834.6	0.00 47.82	60	2.4 0.0		0.0	0.00	0.00
Hisdoscanors TOTAL	H	6,062 6,922			V.1	B04.8	100.00%	468			1,391.6		63.87

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 2,195.9 Years
YIME SERVED UNDER
1905 LAW: 8,294.9 Years

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT MURDER I AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF ONE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE NAMBATORY NIMIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME
UMBER 1985 LAW: 1,038.4 Years
CHARSE FROM
1985 LAW: 92.1%

THIS TABLE CONTAINS SENTENCE AVERAGES FOR 1974-79 CRIMES UNION ARE NOW SURJECT TO PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING, FOR THOSE CRIMES WHERE DATA ARE AVAILABLE.

Parole after 1/9 of Sentence for Mon-presumptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Gund Time of 251 for Presumptively Sentenced Convicts

				NONPRESUMPTI	VE SENTENCES			PR	ESUMPTIVE SE	NTENCES			TIME SERVED UNDER PRESUMPTIVE
CRIKE	CRIHE CLASS	TOTAL CONVICTIONS	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERACE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	S OF GRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	1 OF GRAND TOTAL	SENTENCES AS A \$ OF TOTAL TIME SERVED
Horder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.00\$	17	28.0	21.0	357.0	18.451	100.00
Hurdar II	U	7			0.0	0.0	0.00	7	18.0	6.0	42.0	1.61	100.00
Hanslaughter	A	9	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	9	7.0	5.9	47.8	1.81	100.00
Cr Neg Hasocide	C	9	9	2.0	0.7	5.8	0.66	1	8.5	8.6	2.6	0.10	92.98
Assault II	A	18			0,0	0.0	0.00	18	8.6	6.5	116.1	4.44	100.00
Assault III	B C	21 72	11 55	8.0 2.0	1.0 0.7	11.0 96.7	1.85 4.52	10	6.0	4.5	45.0	1.72	80.84
Kidnapping	U	6	33	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	17 6	4.0 14.0	3.0 4.7	51.0 28.0	1.95 1.07	58.17 100.00
Cust. Interference I	C	2	2	2.0	0.7	1.8	0.16	•	17.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Assault I	ū	62	•		0.0	0.0	0.00	28	11.0	0.0	511.5	19.56	100.00
Sex Assault II	B	23	19	8.0	1.0	19.0	2.84	4	7.0	5.3	21.0	0.80	52.50
Sex Assault III	C	9	3	0.5	0.5	1.5	0.18	•		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Minor I	υ	20			0.0	0.0	0.00	20	10.0	7.5	150.0	5.74	100.00
Sex Abuse of Minor II	В	99	83	3.0	1.0	89.0	4.06	6	7.0	5.3	91.5	1.20	40.84
Sex Abuse of Minor III	C	8	8	1.0	0.0	2.7	0.83			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Incost	C	1	1	9.0	1.0	1.0	0.12			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Exploit minor	D	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Robberg I	A	86			0.0	0.0	0.00	26	8.8	6.6	287.6	9.09	100.00
Nobberg II	В	5	2	7.0	2.0	4.7	0.57	9	4.5	9.4	10.1	0.89	68.45
Extortion	8	1	1	4.0	2.0	2.0	0.25			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.60
Coercion	C	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	9.04			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Thats I Thofs II	9	11 65	10	8.5	1,2	11.7	1.44	1	5.0	9.0	8.8	0.14	24.92
Theft by receiving	C	5	93 2	2.5	0.0 0.0	27.5	8.89	92	8.0	2.3	72.0	2.75	72.36
Theft of Services	B	0	E	1.0	0.0	0.7	0.08			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Issuing Dad Chock	B	9	6	8.0	1.0	8.0	0.00	3	5.5	4.1	12.4	0.00 0.47	67.35
Fraud Use of Cr Card	Č	í	4	1.5	0.5	2.0	0.25	2	8.0	2.9	4.5	0.17	69.23
Burglary I	В	77	42	3.0	1,0	42.0	5.17	35	5.5	4.1	144.4	5.52	77.46
Burglary II	Č	78	41	2.0	0.7	27.9	3.97	92	4.0	9.0	96.0	8.67	77.84
Arson I	Á	5	,-		0.0	0.0	0.00	5	5.6	4.2	21.0	0.80	100,00
Arson II	В	5	2	5.0	1.7	8.9	0.41	8	8.5	2.6	7.9	0.30	70.26
Cris Mischief I	D	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	ш
Cris Hischief II	C	. 16	11	1.0	0.8	3.7	0.45	5	9.0	2.3	11.9	0.43	75.42
Forgery I	В	i	1	4.5	1.5	1.5	0.18			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Forgery II	C	10	6	4.0	1,9	8.0	0.99	12	8.0	6.0	72.0	2.75	90.00
Scheme to defraud	B	9	9	1.0	0,8	3.0	0.37			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Falso Dusiness Rocord	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Endanger Minor	C	1	1	0.8	0.8	8.0	0.03			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Briberg	В	1	1 4	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.06			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Perjurg Easter 7	В	4	4	4.0	1.8	3.3	0.66		49 A	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Escape I Escape II	A B	1 9	1	7.0	0.0 2.3	0.0 2.9	0.00 0.29	1 2	12.0 9.0	9.0 6.8	9.0 13.5	0.84 0.52	100,00 85,26
Prosote Contraband I	C	2	1	10.0	3.8	3.8	0.41	1	6.5	4.9	4.9	0.19	39.89
Tamper with uitness	Č	i	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06	•	0,0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Tamper with evidence	Č	i	i	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Interfore Off Proceed	9	ō	•	-,•	0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	trus.
Hindering Prosecution	C	2	2	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.12			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Terroristic Threat	Ç	1	Ō		0.0	0.0	0.00	1	a.0	2.3	2.3	0.09	100.00
Rios	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Hisconduct Wespons I	C	15	6	4.0	1.3	8.0	0.99	Ÿ	0.0	6.0	54.0	2.07	87.10
Control Substance I	υ	6	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	6	12.0	4.0	24.0	0.92	100.00
Control Substance II	A	15	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	15	6.0	4.5	67.5	2.59	100.00
Control Substance III	В	60	85	2.0	0.7	23.8	2.87	25	4.0	3.0	75.0	2.87	76.27
Control Substance IV	C	24	21	2.0	0.7	14.0	1.72	3	2.0	1.5	4.5	0.17	24.92
Attempt commit folias	A	5		3.0	1.7	1.7	0.21	1	5.5	4.1	4.1	0.16	71.22
Solicit commit crime	В	2	2	10.0	8.9	6.7	0.82	**		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscollaneous A felong	A	26		5.0	1.7	70.0	0.62	20	9.0	8.8	195.0	5.16	65.05
Miscellaneous D felony Miscellaneous C felony	0	24 24	0		0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.00 0.00	24 24	4.5 2.4	3.4 1.8	81.0 43.5	3.19 1.66	100.00 100.00
Misdaseacors	H	4,892	6,382	0.1	0.1	419.3	31.64	£4	6.4	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
TOTAL		7,240	6,762			812.1	100.60%	470		********	2,614.8	100.001	76.80

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 3,426.9 Years TIME SERVED UXDER INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT MURDER 1 AND II, KIONAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF ONE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE JR THE MANDATORY HIMIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 1905 LAW:

(0.0)Years

CHANGE FROM 1905 LAN:

0.05

1905 LAN: 3,426.9 Years

Parole after 1/8 of Sentence for Hen-presumptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Soud Time of 39% for Presumptively Sestenced Convicts

Description Column Colum)	IONPRESURPTI	IVE SENTENCES			PA!	ESUMPTIVE SI	ENTERCES			TIME SERVED UNDER PRESUMPTIVE
Marche II	CRIKE			CONVICTIONS			TIME	GRAND	CONVICTIONS			TIME	GRAND	SENTENCES AS A S OF TOTAL TIME SERVED
Translaughter A	Forder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.00%		28.0	10.7	817.8	18.591	100.001
Characterist C	Hurder II	U				Q.0		0.00			4.0		1.86	100.00
Assessit I A 10														100.00
Assert III				-	2.0									80.49
Massault III														100.00
Ministrate Min		_												78.43
Cent Listerferances C				35	2.0									55.20
Sear Assendit 1									0	14.0				100.00
Sort Assentition					2.0				40	44. A				0.00 100.00
Sex Absend I III					9.0									49.56
Sea Nobes of Histor I		-							4	7.0				0.00
Sear Advance of Histor: II					V. a				bn	10.0				100.00
Set Abuse of History III C S O 1.0 O.8 E.7 O.80 C O.0 O.					9 1									45.90
Exploit stant S		-							•	1,0				0.90
Exploit cinor				_										0.00
Control Cont				_	2									
Comborn Time T		-							84	0.8				100.00
Electrium B		2		2	7.0	2.3				4.5	D.0	9.0	0.37	65.85
Theft		В	1	1	6.0	2.0	2.0	0.25			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Thort by receiving C	Coercios	C	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.08			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Thoist by recessing C	Theft I	В	11	10	8.5	1.2	11.7	1.44	1	5.0	3.3	3.8	0.14	22.22
The Fire Services	Thait II	C	65	. 89	2.5	0.0	27.5	8.89	92	8.0	2.0	64.0	2.74	69.94
Tenuing Dad Chock	Theft by receiving	C	5	2	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.08			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Fraud Use of CF Card C	Thatt of Services	D	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0		***
Borglary I	Insuing Dad Check		9											64.70
Durglary II		_												66.66
Arson II		-												75.84
Argon II		_			2.0									75.74
Crie Hischief I														100.00
Propose Contraband I		_			5.0				y	8.5				67.74
Forgory I														73.17
Forgary II									J	8.0				0.00
School to Coffaud 0 9 9 1.0 0.8 3.0 0.37 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00									15	пΛ				99.07
False Businoss Rocord C O 0.0 0.0 0.00		-							*-	0.0				0.00
Endanger Hiner C		-	-		••									***
Bribary B		-			0.8									0.00
Paryung D	-													0.00
Escape I	•	-	-								0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Except II D S I 7.0 P.S P.S		A	1	0		0.0	0.0		i	12.0	0.0	8.0	0.34	100.00
Promote Contraband I C P 1 10.0 8.8 3.8 0.41 1 6.5 4.9 4.3 0.19	•				7.0	2.9	2.0			9.0	6.0	12.0	0.51	03.72
Tamper with evidence		C			10.0	9.3	3.8			6.5	4.9	4.3	0.19	56.52
Interfere Off Proceed B O O O O O O O O O	Tapper with witness		1		0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06						0.00
Ilindering Presecution C 2 2 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Terroristic Threat C 1 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 1 3.0 2.0 2.0 0.09 Riot C 0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Hisconduct Reapons I C 15 6 4.0 1.3 8.0 0.99 9 8.0 5.3 44.0 2.06 Control Substance I U 6 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 12.0 4.0 24.0 1.03 Control Substance II A 15 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15 4.0 4.0 24.0 1.03 Control Substance III 8 60 35 8.0 0.7 28.8 2.07 23 4.0 2.7 66.7 2.06 Control Substance IV C 24 21 2.0 0.7 14.0 1.72 9 2.0 1.3 4.0 0.17 Attempt count folions A 2 1 5.0 1.7 1.7 0.21 1 5.3 3.7 3.7 0.16 Solicit count crime 8 2 2 10.0 3.8 6.7 0.02 0.0 0.0 6.0 120.0 5.14 Hiscollancous A felions A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 120.0 5.14	Tamper with evidence	C	. 1	. 1	0.5	0.5		0.06						0.00
Terroristic Threat C 1 0 0.0 0.0 0.00 1 3.0 2.0 2.0 0.09	nterfere Off Proceed	_	-			*								
Riot C 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.					0.5									0.00
Hisconduct Mapons I C 15 6 4.0 1.3 8.0 0.99 9 8.0 5.3 40.0 2.06 Control Substance I U 6 0 0.0 0.0 0.00 6 12.0 4.0 24.0 1.03 Control Substance III A 15 0 0.0 0.0 0.00 15 6.0 40 60.0 2.57 Control Substance III B 60 35 8.0 0.7 88.8 8.07 25 4.0 2.7 66.7 2.86 Control Substance IV C 24 81 2.0 0.7 14.0 1.72 9 8.0 1.3 4.0 0.17 Stolictic count foliog A 2 1 5.0 1.7 1.7 0.21 1 5.5 3.7 3.7 0.16 Solicit count crime B 2 2 10.0 3.8 6.7 0.82 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Miscellaneous A feliang A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 180.0 5.14		-	-	•					1	8.0				100.00
Control Substance I U 6 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 12.0 4.0 24.0 1.03 Control Substance II A 15 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15 6.0 4.0 60.0 2.57 Control Substance III B 60 35 8.0 0.7 28.8 2.07 25 4.0 2.7 66.7 2.06 Control Substance IV C 24 21 2.0 0.7 14.0 1.72 9 8.0 1.3 4.0 0.17 Attempt count foling A 2 1 5.0 1.7 1.7 021 1 5.5 3.7 3.7 0.16 Solicit count crime B 2 2 10.0 3.8 6.7 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 Miscellaneous A felding A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 180.0 5.14									_					
Control Substance II A 15 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15 6.0 4 0 60.0 2.57 Control Substance III B 60 35 8.0 0.7 28.9 2.07 23 4.0 2.7 66.7 2.06 Control Substance IV C 24 21 2.0 0.7 14.0 1.72 9 2.0 1.3 4.0 0.17 Attempt count: foling A 2 1 5.0 1.7 1.7 0.21 1 5.5 3.7 3.7 0.16 Solicit count: count crime B 2 2 10.0 3.8 6.7 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Miscellaneous A felong A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 120.0 5.14					4.0									85.71
Control Substance III B 60 35 2.0 0.7 28.9 2.07 25 4.0 2.7 66.7 2.06 Control Substance IV C 24 21 2.0 0.7 14.0 1.72 9 2.0 1.3 4.0 0.17 Attempt coeff falong A 2 1 5.0 1.7 1.7 0.21 1 5.5 3.7 9.7 0.16 Solicit coeff crime B 2 2 10.0 3.9 6.7 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Hiscollancous A felong A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 120.0 5.14														100.00
Control Substance IV C 24 21 2.0 0.7 14.0 1.72 9 2.0 1.3 4.0 0.17 Attempt consit folions A 2 1 5.0 1.7 1.7 0.21 1 5.5 3.7 3.7 0.16 Solicit connect crime B 2 2 10.0 3.8 6.7 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.00 Miscellaneous A felang A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 180.0 5.14														100.00
Attempt commit folding A 2 1 5.0 1.7 1.7 0.21 1 5.5 3.7 9.7 0.16 Solicit commit crime B 2 2 10.0 3.8 6.7 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.00 Miscellaneous A folding A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 180.0 5.14														74.07 22.22
Solicit consit crise B 2 2 10.0 3.8 6.7 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.00 Miscellançous A felanç A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 120.0 5.14														68.75
Hiscollancous A felong A 62 42 5.0 1.7 70.0 0.62 20 9.0 6.0 120.0 5.14									1	5,6				
									20	D A				0.00 69.16
Miscellageous B folong B 84 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24 4.5 3.0 72.7 3.11					2.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	24 24	4.5	3.0	72.7	9.11	100.00
Miscellaneous B folong B 24 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24 4.5 3.0 72.7 3.11 Miscellaneous C folong C 24 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24 2.4 1.6 30.7 1.66														100.00
Misdoneanors H 6,892 6,892 0.1 0.1 419.8 51.64 0.0 0.0 0.00					0.1				4.7	h. 7				0.00
TOTAL 7,240 6,762 812.1 100.001 470 2,894.5 100.001	***************	.,	*******	****			*	***	######################################				MAGDEV - 4444	74,191

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 3,145.6 Years TIME SERVED UNDER

1935 LAN: 3,426.9 Yours ****

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT NURDER I AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 1. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF OME THIOD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 1905 LAN: 230.9 Years CHANGE FROM

1985 LAV 8.21

(TIME IN YEARS) RELEASE CONDITIONS:

Parole after i/8 of Sentence for Mea-pressaptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Parole after i/8 of Sentence for Pressaptively Sentenced Convicts

				URPRESURY !	IVE SENTENCES			PK	ESUMPTIVE SEP	I LACES			UNDI
CRINE	CRIME CLASS	TOTAL CONVICTIONS	COMULCTIONS	AVERACE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	1 OF GRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE 1	AVERAGE NCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	S OF GRAND TOTAL	PRESUMPTION SENTENCES A A N OF TOTAL TIME SERVE
Norder I	u	17			0.0	0.0	0.00%	17	20.0	9.8	158.7	19.07%	100.
Harder II	U	7			0.0	0.0	0.00	7	18.0	6.0	42.0	3.46	100.0
Hanslaughter	A	9			0.0	0.0	0.00	9	7.0	2.8	21.0	1.78	100.
Cr Heg Hasocide	C	9	8	2.0	0.7	5.8	0.66	1	3.5	1.2	1.2	0.10	17.9
Assault 1	A	19			0.0	0.0	0.00	18	8.6	2.9	51.6	4.25	100.0
Assault II	₿	21	11	9.0	1.0	11.0	1.35	10	6.0	2.0	20.0	1.65	64.
Assault III	C	72	55	2.0	0.7	96.7	4.52	17	4,0	1.3	22.7	1.07	88.
Kidnapping	U	6			0.0	0.0	0.00	6	14.0	4.7	28.0	2.31	100.0
Cust. Interference I Sex Assault I	C	2 62	5	2.0	0.7	1.3	0.16			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Sex Assault II	8	83 23	19	9.0	0.0 1.0	0.0 19.0	0.00 2.84	62 4	11.0 7.0	3.7	227.9 9.9	10.72	100.0
Sex Assault III	C	3	8	0.3	0.3	1.5	0.18	4	7.0	8.8 0.0	0.0	0.77 0.00	92. 0.
Sex Abuse of Hinor I	Ü	20	٠	0,0	0.0	0.0	0.00	20	10.0	8.8	86.7	5.49	100.
or Abuse of Hinor II	В	39	33	9.0	1.0	99.0	4.06	6	7.0	2.8	14.0	1.15	29.
ex Abuse of Minor III	Č	8	8	1.0	0.8	2.7	0.83		1.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Incost	Č	1	i	8.0	1.0	1.0	0.12			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Exploit aigor	B	ō	•		0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	•••
Robberg I	Ā	86			0.0	0.0	0.00	36	8.0	2.9	105.6	8.70	100.
Nobberg II	В	5	· E	7.0	2.9	4.7	0.57	9	4.5	1.5	4.5	0.87	49.
Extertion	В	i	1	6.0	2.0	2.0	0.25			0.0	0.0	0.00	9.
Coercion	C	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.06			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Thaft I	8	11	10	3.5	1.2	11.7	1.44	1	5.0	1.7	1.7	0.14	12.
Thefs II	C	65	33	2.5	0.8	27.5	3.89	32	9.0	1.0	82.0	2.64	53.
Their by receiving	C	5	5	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.08			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Theft of Services	8	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0 0	0.0	0.00	
Issuing Dad Check	В	9	6	9.0	1.0	6.0	0.74	а	3.5	1.9	5.5	0.45	47,
Fraud Uge of Cr Card	C	6	4	1.5	0.5	2.0	0.25	2	3.0	1.0	2.0	0.16	50.
Durglary I	В	77	42	3.0	1.0	42.0	5.17	85	5.5	1.B	64.2	5.20	60.
Durglary II	C	73	41	2.0	0.7	27.8	8.97	92	4.0	1.3	42.7	9.51	60.
Areon I	٨	5	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	5	5.6	1.9	9.3	0.77	100.
Arson II	Đ	5	2	5.0	1.7	8.8	0.41	3	8.5	1.2	9.5	0.29	51.
Crim Hischief I	D C	0 16	11		0.0	0.0 8.7	0.00		2.4	0.0	0.0 5.0	0.00	57.
Cris Hischief II	В	1	1	1.0 4.5	0.8 1.5	1.5	0.45 0.18	5	. 3.0	1.0 0.0	0.0	0.41 0.00	0.
Forgery I Forgery II	C	18	6	4.0	1.3	8.0	0.59	12	8.0	2.7	32.0	2.64	80.
School to defraud	B	9	9	1.0	0.8	3.0	0.97	16	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
also Susinoss Record	Č	é	•	***	0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	٧.
Endanger Minor	Č	1	1	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.03			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Oribers	В	ī	i	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Parjury	8	4	4	4.0	1.3	5.8	0.66			0.0	0.0	0.00	Ŏ.
Escape I	A	i	i		0.0	0.0	0.00	1	12.0	g4.0	4.0	0.33	100.
Escape II	B	3	i	7.0	2.3	2.3	0.29	ž	9.0	3.0	6.0	0.49	72.
Promose Contraband I	3	2	ī	10.0	9.9	3.3	0.41	1	4.5	2.2	2.2	0.18	39.
Teaper with witness	C	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06	-		0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Tasper with evidence	3	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
nterfere Off Proceed	В	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.90	
lindering Prosecution	C	2	2	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.12			0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Terroristic Throat	C	1	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	1	9.0	1.0	1.0	0.03	100.
Riot	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00			0.0	0.0	0.00	
Hisconduct Beapons I	C	15	. 6	4.0	1.3	0.0	0.99	9	8.0	2.7	24.0	1.98	75.
Control Substance I	U	6	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	6	12.0	4.0	24.0	1.93	100,
Control Substance II	A	15	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	15	6.0	2.0	33.0	2.47	100.
ontrol Substance III	8	60	85	2.0	0.7	23.8	2.87	25	4.0	1.8	83.9	2.74	50
Control Substance IV	C	24	21	2.0	0.7	14.0	1.72	9	2.0	0.7	2.0	0.16	12.
tteapt consit felong	A	5	1	5.0	1.7	1.7	9.21	1	5.5	1.8	1.8	0.15	52
Solicit commit crime	8		5	10.0	9.9	6.7	6.85			0.0	0.0	0.00	0
iscellaneous A folony	A	95	42	5.0	1.7	70.0	8.62	20	9.0	3.0	60.0	4.94	45
iscullaneous B felony	B	24	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	24	4.5	1.5	8.38	2.99	100.
iscollangous C felong Misdescanors	C H	24 6,832	0 558,8	0.1	0.0 0.1	0.0 419.8	0.00 51.64	24	2.4	0.8 0.0	19.3 0.0	1.59 0.00	100. 0.
iitanganggorg	n 	0,032	0,034	V.1	V · A	747.5	P0,15			V.V	4.V	v.vv	V.

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 2,026.4 Years
TIME SERVED UNDER
1905 LAN: 3,426.9 Years

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SUNTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT MURDER I AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 1. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF DIE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 1905 LAM: 1,400.5 Years

CHANGE FROM

1985 LAW:

F

RELEASE CONDITIONS:

Parole after 1/3 of Sentence for Man-presumptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days

Good Time of 25% for Presumptively Sentenced Convicts

			, N	ONPRESUMPTI	VE SENTENCES			PR	ESUMPTIVE SENT	TENCES			TIME SERVED UNDER
CRIME	CRIME CLASS	TOTAL CONVICTIONS	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TINE SERVED	% OF CRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE II	AVERAGE CARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	% OF GRAND TOTAL	PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES AS A % OF TOTAL TIME SERVED
Hurdar I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.00%	17	86.B	28.9	491.9	19.93%	100.00
Hurdar II	U	7			0.0	0.0	0.00	7	85.0	7.6	53.2	2.09	100.00
Manalaughter	A	9			0.0	0.0	0.00	9	6.9	5.2	46.6	1.83	100.00
Cr Heg Honocide	C	9	8	2.0	0.7	5.8	0.66	1	9.5	6.5	9.5	0.10	92.98
Assault I	A	18			0.0	0.0	0.00	18	2.8	2.1	97.0	1.49	100.00
Assault II	В	21	11	3.0	1.0	11.0	1.95	10	4.0	4.5	45.0	1.77	80.36
Assault III	C	72	55	2.0	0.7	34.7	4.52	17	4.0	9.0	31.0	2.00	59.17
Kidnapping	U	6	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	6	26.5	8.8	53.0	2.08	100.00
Cost. Interference I	C	5	2	2.0	0.7	1.9	0.16		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sax Assault I	U	52			0.0	0.0	0.00	45	11.8	9.9	548.7	21.36	100.00
Ser Assault II	D	23	19	9.0	1.0	19.0	2.94	4	7.0	5.9	21.0	0.09	52.50
Sex Ausault III	C	8	3	0.5	0.5	1.5	0.10		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Minor I	U	20			0.0	0.0	0.09	20	6.0	4.5	90.0	9.54	100.00
Sex Abuse of Minor II	8	89	83	3.0	1.0	93.0	4.06	6	7.0	5.3	31.5	1.24	48.84
Sex Abuse of Minor III	C	0	8	1.0	0.9	2.7	0.93		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Incost	C	1	i	3.0	1.0	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Exploit ainor	0	0			0.0	0.0	0.00	~4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Robbery I	A	36	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	35	4.1	9.1	110.7	4,95	100.00
Robberg II	8	5	5	7.0	8.5	4.7	0.57	3	4.5	9.4	10.1	0.40	6B.45
Extortion	B	1	1	6.0	2.0	8.0	0.25		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Correten	C	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.04		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft I	В	11	10	8.5	1.2	11.7	1.44	1	3.0	3.8	3.8	0.15	24.92
Theft II	C	65	33	2.5	8.0	27.5	8.39	35	9.0	2,3	72.0	2.89	72.36
Theft by receiving	C	2	5	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.08		0,0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft of Services	B	0			0.0	0.0	0,00	_	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Issuing Dad Chock	B	9	6	8.0	1.0	6.0	0.74	9	2.5	4.1	12.4	0.49	67.35
Fraud Use of Cr Card	C	6	.4	1.5	0.5	8.0	0.25	2	3.0	2.8	4.5	0.18	69.23
Durglary I	В	77	42	8.0	1.0	42.0	5.17	95	5.5	4.1	144.4	5.67	77.46
Burglary II	C	73	41	2.0	0.7	27.9	9.37	32	4.0	9.0	96.0	9.77	77.84
Arson 1	A	5	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	5	5.5	4.1	20.6	18.0	100.00
Arson II	В	5	2	5.0	1.7	9.8	0.41	3	8.5	2.6	7.9	0.91	70,26
Cris Hischief I	В	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Crin Hischief II	C	16	11	1.0	0.8	9.7	0.45	5	3.0	2.3	11.9	0.44	, 75.42
Forgery I	8	1	1	4.5	1.5	1.5	0.1B		0.0	9.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Forgery II	C	18	6	4.0	1.8	8.0	0.99	12	8.0	6.6	72.0	2.09	90.00
Scheno to defraud	8	9	9	1.0	0.8	3.0	0.37		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
False Dusiness Record	Ċ	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Endanger Hinnr	C	1	1	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.03		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Bribery	8	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0	0.0	0,00	0.00
Parjurg	В	4	4	4.0	1.8	5.8	68.0		0,0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Escape I	A	1	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	1	12.0	9.0	9.0	0.35	100.00
Escape II	8	9	1	7.0	2.9	2.9	0.29	5	9.0	6.8	13.5	0.53	85.26
Propote Contraband I	C	5	1	10.0	8.8	3.9	0.41	1	6.5	4.9	4.9	0.19	59.39
Tamper with witness	C	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Tamper with evidence	C	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Interfere Off Proceed	В	0	_		0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Hindering Prosecution	C	2	5	0,5	0.5	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Terroristic Threat	C	1	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	1	9.0	2.3	2.3	0.09	100.00
Riot	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Hisconduct Meapons I	C	15	6	4.0	1.3	0.0	0.99	. 9	8.0	6.0	54.0	2.12	87.10
Control Substance I	U	6	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	.6	2.6	2.0	11.7	0.46	100.00
Control Substance II	A	15	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	15	6.0	4.5	67.5	2.65	100.00
Control Substance III	8	60	85	2.0	0.7	23.3	2.87	25	4.0	8.0	75.0	2.95	76.27
Control Substance IV	C	24	21	2.0	0.7	14.0	1.72	9	2.0	1.5	4.5	0.18	24.32
Attempt commit felong	A	2	1	5.0	1.7	1.7	0.21	1	5.5	4.1	4.1	0.16	71.22
Solicit commit crime	8	8	2	10.0	9.8	6.7	0.82		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Hiscallaneous A felony	A	36	42	5.0	1.7	70.0	26.8	20	9.0	8.8	185.0	5.91	65.85
Hiscellaneous 8 felony	8	24	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	24	4.5	8.4	81.8	3.21	100.00
Hiscellaneous C folony	C	24	. 202		0.0	0.0	0.00	24	2.4	1.8	43.5	1.71	100.00
Mindensanors	H	6,332	6,892	0.1	0,1	419.8	51.64		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 3,356.6 Years TIME SERVED UNDER

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT HURDER I AND II, KIDHAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 1. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF ONE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANOATORY

1985 LAM: 3,426.9 Years

MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 1985 LAW: 70.9 Years CHANGE FROM 1985 LAW: 2.11

THIS TABLE CONTAINS SENTENCE AVERAGES FOR 1976-79 CRINES WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT TO PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING, FOR THOSE CRINES WHERE DATA ARE AVAILABLE.

Parole after 1/S of Sentence for Mon-presumptive Sentences Exceeding 180 Days Cond Time of 23% for Presumptively Sentenced Convicts

				OMPRESUMPTI	VE SENTENCES		******	PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES					TIME SERVED UNDER PRESUMPTIVE
CRIME	CRIME CLASS	RIME TOTAL LASS CONVICTIONS	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	I OF GRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	% OF GRAND TOTAL	SENTENCES A A 1 OF TOTA TIME SERVE
Hurder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	200,0	17	84.8	28.9	491.9	21.131	100.
Hurder II	U	. 7			0.0	0.0	0.00	7	22.0	7.6	53.2	2.29	100.0
Manulaughter	A	9	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	9	6.9	4.6	41.4	1.78	100.0
Cr Reg Hosocide	C	9	8	2.0	0.7	5.8	0.66	1	8,5	2.9	2.3	0.10	30.4
Assauly I	A	18			0.0	0.0	0.00	18	2.8	1.9	93.6	1.44	100.0
Assault II Assault III	C	21 72	11 55	9.0 2.0	1.0 0.7	11.0 84.7	1.35	10 17	6.0	4.0	40.0	1.72	78.4
Kidnapping	Ü	6	33	E.V	0.0	0.0	4.52 0.00	6	4.0 26.5	2.7 9.8	45.9 53.0	1.95 2.28	35.1 100.1
Cost. Interference I	Č	2	2	2.0	0.7	1.3	9.16	·	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.1
Sex Auszult I	Ū	42	-		0.0	0.0	0.00	62	11.0	7.9	497.7	20.95	100,0
Sex Assault II	B	29	19	8.0	1.0	19.0	2.94	4	7.0	4.7	18.7	0.80	49.
Sor Assault III	C	3	9	0.5	0.5	1.5	0.18		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0
Sox Abuse of Kisor I	U	20			9.0	0.0	0.00	20	6.0	4.0	B0.0	3.44	100.1
Sex Abuse of Hinor II	В	99	89	3.0	1.0	93.0	4.06	6	7.0	4.7	28.0	1.20	45.5
Sex Abose of Misor III	C	0	8	1.0	0.8	2.7	0.23		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Incest	C	1	1	9.0	1.0	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0
Exploit minor	B	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	•
Robberg I	A	36			0.0	0.0	0.00	36	4.1	2.7	98.4	4.23	100.
Robbery II	B	5	2	7.0	2.8	4.7	0.57	3	4.5	9.0	9.0	0.89	65.
Extertion	В	1	1	6.0	2.0	2.0	0.25		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Coercion	C B	1 11	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.04		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Thoft I Thoft II	C	65	10 99	9.5	1.2 0.9	11.7 27.5	1.44	1 32	5.0 3.0	3.3	3.3	0.14	22. 69.
Theft by receiving	Č	93 2	2	2.5 1.0	0.8	0.7	9.99 0.08	32	0.0	2.0 0.0	64.0 0.0	2.75 0.00	07.
Theft of Services	8	0	•	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	٧.
Issuing Bad Check	8	9	6	3.0	1.0	6.0	0.74	3	3,5	3.7	11.0	0.47	64.
Fraud Use of Cr Card	Č		4	1.5	0.5	2.0	0.25	5	3.0	2.0	4.0	0.17	66.
Burglary I	В	17	42	9.0	1.0	42.0	5.17	35	5.5	3.7	128.3	5.51	75.
Burglary II	C	73	41	2.0	0.7	27.9	9.97	82	4.0	2.7	85.3	3.66	75.
Arson I	A	5			0.0	0.0	0.00	5	5.5	3.7	18.3	0.79	100.
Arson II	В	5	2	5.0	1.7	3.9	0.41	а	8.5	2.8	7.0	0.80	67.
Cris Hischief I	В	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Crim Hischief II	C	16	11	1.0	0.9	3.7	0.45	5	a.0	2.0	10.0	0.43	73.
Forgery I	В		1	4.5	1.5	1.5	0.18		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Forgery II	C	18	6	4.0	1.3	8.0	0.99	12	8.0	5.9	64.0	2.75	88.
Schome to defraud	В	9	9	1.0	0.8	3.0	0.87		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.4
False Business Record	C	Q 1		* *	0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Endanger Hinor Briberg	8	1	1 1	0.8 0.5	0.5 0.5	0.5	60.0 80.0		0.0 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Perjarg	B	. 4	4	4.0	1.3	3.8	0.46		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Escape I	A	1	õ	7,0	0.0	0.0	0.00	1	12.0	8.0	8.0	0.84	100.
Escape II	8	8	i	7.0	2.8	2.9	0.29	į	9.0	6.0	12.0	0,52	83.
Propose Contraband I	ì	2	1	10.0	8.8	9.8	0.41	ī	6.5	4.9	4.3	0.19	56.
Tamper with witness	Č	ī	i	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Tamper With evidence	C	1	i	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Interfere Off Proceed	8	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Hindering Prosecution	C	5	2	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
Terroristic Threat	C	1	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	1	9.0	2.0	2.0	0.09	100.
Riot	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Hisconduct Veapons I	C	15	6	4.0	1.8	8.0	0.99	9	8.0	5.3	40.0	2.06	B5.
Control Substance I	U	6	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	6	2.6	1.7	10.4	0.45	100.
Control Substance II	A	15	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	15	6.0	4.0	60.0	2.58	100.
Control Substance III	В	60	35 91	2.0	0.7	29.9	2.87	25	4.0	2.7	66.7	2.86	74.
Control Substance IV	C	24	21	2.6	0.7	14.0	1.78	3 1	2.0 5.5	1.3 3.7	4.0 3.7	0.17 0.16	22. 68.
Attempt commit felony Solicit commit crime	A B	5	1 2	5.0 10.0	1.7 9.3	1.7	0.21	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.10	0.
Hiscollangous A folony	A	95	42	5.0	3.3 1.7	6.7 70.0	98.0 94.8	20	9.0	6.0	120.0	5.15	63.
Miscellaneous B felony	B	24	0	. , u	0.0	0.0	0.00	24	4.5	3.0	72.7	3.12	100.
Miscellaneous C felony	C	24	ō		0.0	0.0	0.00	24	2.4	1.6	38.7	1,66	100.
Hisdeseanors	ĸ		6,832	0.1	0.1	419.3	31.64		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.
						-				········			

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 3,140.2 Years
TIME SERVED UNDER
1985 LAW: 8,426.9 Years

INCARCERATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT HURGER I AND II, KIDMAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF ONE THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 1985 LAW: 284.7 Years

THIS TABLE CONTAINS SENTENCE AVERAGES FOR 1976-79 CRIMES WHICH ARE MON SUBJECT TO PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING, FOR THOSE CRIMES WHERE DATA ARE AVAILABLE.

CHANGE FACH 1985 LAW:

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Parole after 1/8 of Septence for Non-presumptive Sentences Exceeding 100 Days Parole after 1/8 of Sentence for Presumptively Sentenced Convicts

	MOMPRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES							PN	TIME SERVED UNDER PRESUMPTIVE				
CRIHE	CRIME CLASS COM	TOTAL IVICTIONS COM	VICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERACE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TIME SERVED	% OF CRAND TOTAL	CONVICTIONS	AVERAGE SENTENCE	AVERAGE INCARCERATION	TOTAL TINE SERVED	% OF GRAND TOTAL	SENYENCES AS A & OF YOTA TIME SERVE
Hurder I	U	17			0.0	0.0	0.001	17	84.8	20.7	491.9	126.68	100.00
Hurder II	U	7			0.0	0.0	0.00	7	85 · G	7.6	53.2	9.64	100.00
Hanslaughter	A	9	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	9	6.9	2.3	20.7	1.41	100.00
Or Hog Hosecide	C	9	0	2.0	0.7	5.8	0.66	1	9.5 2.6	1.2	1.2 8.81	0.08 1.15	17.95 100.00
Assault I	A B	10 21	11	a.o	0.0 1.0	0.0 11.0	0.00 1.35	18 10	6.0	0.9 2.0	20.0	1.13	64.52
Assault III Assault III	C	21 72	33	2.0	0.7	36.7	4.52	17	4.0	1,3	22.7	1.55	38.20
Kidnapping	U	6	44	F.10	0.0	0.0	0.00	- 6	26.3	0.8	53.0	3.62	100.00
Cust. Interforence I	Č	5	2	2.0	0.7	1.8	0.16	•	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sor Assault I	Ü	62	_		0.0	0.0	0.00	62	11.8	9.9	243.9	16.67	100.00
Sor Aspault II	B	23	19	9.0	1.0	19.0	2.84	4	7.0	2.3	9.9	0.64	32.94
Sur Assault III	C	3	3	0.5	0.5	1.5	0.18		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Sex Abuse of Himor I	U	20			0.0	0.0	0.00	50	0.0	2.0	40.0	2.73	100.00
Sex Abuse of Hinor II	B	39	89	0.6	1.0	93.0	4.06	6	7.0	2.3	14.5	2.96	29.79
Sex Abuse of Minor III	C	8	8	1.0	0.3	2.7	0.89		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
incast	C	1	1	8.0	1.0	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Exploit minor	В	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Robberg I	A	36			0.0	0.0	0.00	36	4.1	1.4	49.2	3.36	100.00
Robbary II	В	5	5	7.0	8.8	4.7	0.57	9	4.5	1.5	4.5	0.81	49.09
Extortion	В	1	1	6.0	2.0	2.0	0.25		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Coercion	C	1	1	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0 1.7	0.0 1.7	0.00	0.00 12.50
Thait I	В	11	10	9.5	1.2	11.7	1.44	1 92	5.0 3.0	1.0	32.0	0.11 2.19	53.76
Theft II	C	65	89	2.5	0.8	27.5 0.7	9.37 0.09	32	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft by receiving	C	5	5	1.0	0.3	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Theft of Services	C B	9	6	3.0	1.0	6.0	0.74	3	5.5	1.9	5.5	0,38	47,83
Issuing Bad Check Fraud Use of Cr Card	C	6	4	1.5	0.5	2.0	0.25	2	3.0	1.0	2.0	0.14	50.0
Burglary I	В	77	42	8.0	1.0	42.0	5.17	85	5.5	1.8	64.2	4.39	60.4
Burglary II	C	73	41	2.0	0.7	27.8	3.37	92	4.0	1.8	42.7	2.92	60.9
Arson I	A	5	-14		0.0	0.0	0.00	5	5.5	1.0	9.2	63.0	100.00
Armon II		5	ź	5.0	1,7	3.3	0.41	3	3,5	1.2	3.5	0.24	51.23
Cris Hischief I	8	õ	_		0.0	8.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Cris Hischief II	C	16	11	1.0	0.9	8.7	0.45	5	3.0	1.0	5.0	0.94	57.69
Forgary I	В	1	1	4.5	1.5	1,5	0.18		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
Forgery II	C	18	6	4.0	1.8	8.0	0.99	12	8.0	2.7	32.0	2.19	80.0
School to defraud	8	9	9	1.0	0.9	3.0	0.87		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00
False Businoss Record	C	0			0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	
Endanger Kiner	C	1	1	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.03		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0
Dribory	В	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00 0.00	0.0
Porjurg	8	4	4	4.0	1.9	5.8	5.66		0.0 12.0	0.0 4.0	4.0	0.00	100.0
Escape I	A	1	0		0.0	0.0	6.00	i 2	9.0	3.0	8.0	0.41	72.0
Escape II	B C	3 2	1 1	7.0 10.0	2,3 3.8	2.3 3.3	0.29 0.41	i	6.5	2.2	2.2	0.15	39.3
Propote Contraband I	C C	1	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.06	•	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0
Tanpar with witness Tanpor with evidence	C	i	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	60.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0
Interfere Off Proceed	8	0	•	0,3	0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	-
Hindering Prosecution	C	2	2	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.12		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0
Terroristic Threat	č	i	0	٠.٠	0.0	0.0	0.00	1	3.0	1.0	1.0	0.07	100.0
Riot	Č	0	-		0.0	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	-
Misconduct Coapons I	C	15	å	4.0	1.3	8.0	0.99	9	8.0	2.7	24.0	1.64	75.0
Control Substance I	U	6	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	6	8.5		5.2	0.36	100.0
Control Substance II	A	15	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	15	4.0	2.0	90.0	2.05	100.0
Control Substance III	8	60	95	2.0	0.7	28.8	2.8.	25	4.0	1.9	93.3	2.28	58.0
Control Substance IV	C	24	21	2.0	0.7	14.0	1.72	9	2.0	0.7	2.0	0.14	12.5
Attempt commit felong	A	5	1	5.0		1.7	6.21	1	5.5		1.6	0.13	52.9
Solicit commit crime	B	ā	5	10.0	9.9	6.7	0.82		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0
Miscellanoous A folong	A	62	42	5.0		70.0	8.62	20	9.0	3.0	60.0	4.10	46.1
Hiscollancous B felong	B	24	0		0.0	0.0	0.00	24	4.5	1.5 0.8	96.9 19.8	2.48 1.82	100.0 100.0
Miscallaneous C felony	C	24	0	۸.	0.0	0.0	0.00	24	2.4 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0
Histoponnors		6,832	6,932	0.1	0.1	419.3	51.64		V.V			-, + +	••••
TOTAL		7,240	6,762			012.1	100.001	478			1,463.2	100.001	64.3

TOTAL TIME SERVED: 2,275.2 Years TIME SERVED UNDER

1985 LAW: 3,426.9 Years

INCARCENATION FOR PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES EQUALS 75 PERCENT OF THE SENTENCE EXCEPT HURDER I AND II, KIDNAPPING AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I. THE SENTENCE FOR THESE CRIMES IS THE GREATER OF OME THIRD OF THE SENTENCE OR THE MANDATORY MINIMUM TERM LESS GOOD TIME.

ADDITIONAL TIME
UNDER 1905 LAN: 1,151.7 Years
CHANGE FROM
1905 LAN: 33.61

THIS TABLE CONTAINS SENTENCE AVERAGES FOR 1974-79 CRIMES WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT TO PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING, FOR THOSE CRIMES WHERE DATA ARE AVAILABLE.