
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## **ARSON IN NEW YORK: 1985**



## CITY OF NEW YORK

Edward I. Koch, Mayor



Prepared by The Arson Strike Force

September 1986

103200



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ARSON IN NEW YORK CITY: 1985

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ACQUISITIONS

September 1986

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the Arson Strike Force member agencies and the efforts and support of the following A.S.F. personnel who participated in the production of this annual report:

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


A.S.F. staff members Dolores Mack and Tom Langtry.

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#### Mission Statement

Established by Local Law No. 23 of 1978 to foster greater cooperation between various city agencies in the battle to control the incidence of arson, the Mayor appoints an Arson Strike Force which is chaired by the Criminal Justice Coordinator and consists of representatives of the Fire Department, Police Department, Human Resources Administration, Department of Housing Preservation and Development, Finance Department and such supportive staff as is necessary. The Office coordinates the anti-arson activities of city agencies; manages the city's Arson Information Management System; acts as a clearinghouse for arson related data and complaints; analyzes such data with a view toward policy recommendations and legislative initiatives to the Arson Strike Force Board and the Mayor; and interacts with community groups involved in anti-arson programs.



Mayor Edward Kocn flanked by (right) Fire Commissioner Joseph Spinnato and Chief Fire Marshal John Regan and (left) Deputy Chief Fire Marshall Thomas Sweetman, with members of one of the Red Cap task forces.

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#### MESSAGE FROM THE MAYOR

Over the past eight years this Administration has committed its full resources to the war against arson. On the law enforcement front, we have expanded the number of fire marshals three-fold; we have established clear lines of jurisdictional responsibility between Police and Fire Department investigators; we have improved intelligence gathering techniques; and we have amended the state's penal and insurance laws to close loopholes and ensure cooperation between the insurance industry and the public sector.

In the housing field, we have expended millions of dollars to seal and demolish fire-prone vacant structures; we have rehabilitated thousands of low income dwellings; created alternative mangement programs to break the cycle of disinvestment which creates abandoned buildings; and we have supported and funded the work of community groups engaged in the front line battle to stem housing decay and enlist citizens in arson prevention activities.

As a result, arson in buildings has now been reduced to its lowest level in 20 years. This annual report of the Arson Strike Force, which has coordinated the City's anti-arson efforts since 1978, highlights the accomplishments of 1985, the fifth consecutive year in which structural arson declined, and identifies some of the problem areas which still remain. Refinement of existing programs and development of new initiatives undertaken during the past year should increase the momentum we have established. The war is not over, but the tide has been turned. Arsonists, beware!

Ed Kich

Edward I. Koch MAYOR

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After 15 consecutive quarterly declines, structural arson showed an increase in the Fall of 1984, a rise which carried over into the first two quarters of 1985. There was also an increase in accidental fire activity over the same period. This upswing, city-wide in nature, aroused the immediate concern of the Arson Strike Force Board and, even after a dramatic fall-off in arson and fire levels during the second half of 1985, much of the activity of the ASF Coordinator's Office and its member agencies centered around initiatives undertaken earlier in the year:

> -Computer-generated lists of properties which had experienced multiple arsons were distributed to member agencies for inspectional/demolition/seal-up targetting and for general intelligence purposes. The five county district attorney offices were also later included in the distribution. This new tool was made possible by creation of a new arson database through inputting/research by the ASF Intelligence Unit of every fire marshal's investigation report, which commenced in January of 1985.

> -Recognizing the importance of increasing the efficiency and utility of the Arson Incident Computer file, a grant proposal was submitted in June to the New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control to fund the creation of an Arson Information Management System (AIMS). Late in the year, the ASF was awarded a half million dollar grant by the State to implement AIMS, which should become operational in early 1987.

-The Fire Department was also awarded a grant from the NY Department of State's local anti-arson prevention and assistance program to set up a pilot pre-arrest diversion project for selected juveniles who might profit more from professional counseling than traditional family court processing.

-Because vacant building fires are the most susceptible to control through seal-up/demolition/patrol programs, mechanisms for quickly identifying and referring such fire-prone properties were improved.

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-Five community groups in Brooklyn and Manhattan were funded with \$200,000 of City tax levy monies funnelled by the borough presidents during the budget adoption process through the Criminal Justice Coordinator's Office. The groups contracted to perform a variety of arson/fire prevention services in their target areas, with the ASF monitoring their program objectives.

-Serious violations of the City's smoke detector law were monitored with a view toward criminal prosecution of culpable property owners and the method of referring such violations from the Fire Department to HPD was analyzed for possible improvements.

-The Bureau of Fire Investigation began planning a reorganization of its staff deployment to become effective with the addition of a fourth Red Cap unit in 1986.

-The ASF set up a subcommittee of influential industry leaders, State legislative staffers and City managers to develop legislation aimed at piercing the corporate veil surrounding arson profiteers and to quickly identify insurance carriers for properties suffering major fires. The resultant bill was passed by the State Legislature in July of 1986.

-The Department of Finance improved its data collection activities and undertook new legal strategies to enhance enforcement of the Fire Insurance Proceeds law.

-The Fire Department, working with the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition, Assemblyman George Friedman, and the NYS Office of Fire Prevention and Control, drafted a burn reporting bill which was passed by the legislature and signed into law by Governor Cuomo. The bill, which became effective November 1, 1985, serves as an aid to investigators in tracking down arsonists burned by their own fires.

-The Police Department's Arson Major Case Squad, in its first full year of operation, penetrated a new organized crime faction which used arson to eliminate competition in the "numbers" racket. Working closely with arson prosecutors in three counties, the Squad obtained the arrests of 13 individuals, clearing 20 arsons and 8 arson homicides.

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#### STATISTICAL SUMMARY

New York City's structural arson level remained virtually unchanged in 1985, due to a 9.1 percent decline in arson fires from July to December, which offset an 8.1 percent increase during the first six months of the year. Overall, there were 5,075 arsons in buildings during 1985, down from 5,104 in 1984. This slight decline of less than 1.0 percent nonetheless dropped the structural arson total to its lowest level since 1966, when 4,421 arson cases in buildings were recorded, and marked the fifth consecutive annual decrease in this category in the city. Arson incidence increased markedly during the first three months of the year, compared to the prior year's level (+11.9 percent), then increased less substantially in the Spring (+4.9 percent) and subsided thereafter (-2.4 percent for the Summer and -15.3 percent for the Fall).

Arson in occupied buildings increased slightly (+2.1 percent) during the year, from 3,520 in 1984 to 3,595 in 1985, and arson in vacant structures declined 7.0 percent, from 1,584 in 1984 to 1,480 in 1985. During the past eight years, arson in occupied buildings has been reduced from 4,727 in 1978 to 3,595 in 1985 (-24 percent) while more significant gains were achieved in the vacant building category, which declined from 5,575 to 1,480 arsons (-73 percent) during the same time period.

Structural arson declined in Brooklyn (-5.8 percent, or 107 less arsons) and the Bronx (-1.8 percent, or 24 less arsons). The two boroughs accounted for 60 percent of the city's arson total last year. Small increases were registered in Manhattan (+2.7 percent, or 29 more arsons) and Staten Island (+1.3 percent, or 3 more arsons). Queens experienced the greatest increase in total structural arson, from 586 cases in 1984 to 656 last year (+11.9 percent, or 70 more cases), with most of this increase concentrated in the Rockaways and Corona. The Bureau of Fire Investigation deployed a task force of 43 fire marshals (Red Caps) in Queens last Spring and they are continuing to patrol areas of high fire incidence in that borough.

Arson fires involving motor vehicles rose sharply during 1985, with 1,287 such cases recorded during the year, compared with 737 during 1984, an increase of 75.0 percent. Most of these fires occurred in abandoned automobiles, with vandalism and insurance fraud cited as the two leading motives by investigators. A large portion of this increase is attributable to better reporting methods instituted early last year to bring abandoned burned-out vehicles to the attention of fire investigators. Thus, there was a 72.0 percent increase in motor vehicle fire investigations undertaken by the Bureau of Fire Investigation, with 1,933 cases investigated in 1985, compared to 1,011 in 1984. Motor vehicle arson now constitutes 20 percent of all arson fires in the city,

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which is closer to the national and state averages for this arson classification. The Bureau of Fire Investigation has established liaison with the NYPD's Auto Crime Unit to focus added investigative attention on this problem.

#### MAJOR FINDINGS

-New York City ranked fourth out of the five largest American cities in per capita arson rate during 1985 (see p. 22).

-The Department of Housing Preservation and Development's demolition and masonry seal-up of abandoned structures effectively addressed 40% of the city's vacant building fire problem. Masonry seals resulted in an 85% reduction in fire incidence in buildings treated over a six-month period following seal-up (see p. 19-20).

-Forty-nine percent of all incendiary fires in occupied structures were investigated by fire marshals within two hours of the occurrence during 1985 (see p. 21).

-Vehicular arson outnumbered structural arson incidents in Staten Island during 1985, the first time non-structural arson has predominated in any of the boroughs (see p. 33).

-Only 12% of the city's 34,000 structural fires resulted in a Property Insurance Loss Register filing during 1985 and only 10% of PILR filings were associated with arson fires (see p. 43).

-There was a 13% increase in the number of females arrested for arson during 1985, with females now comprising 17% of all arson arrests in New York City (see p. 47).

-The arrest clearance rate for arson improved slightly, from 6.5% in 1984 to 6.9% in 1985 (see p. 51).


-Arson caused 12% of all fire-related fatalities in 1985, a decrease from 1984's 13% fatal fire rate (see p. 57).

-The ten community districts with the highest arson rates are located in contiguous areas of the southwestern Bronx (4 CD's), northeastern Manhattan (2 CD's) and northern Brooklyn (4 CD's) and they account for 40% of the city's structural arson (see p. 66).

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# CITY-WIDE ARSON TRENDS






Structural arson steadily increased from 1966 to its peak in 1976, then declined during eight of the next nine years.

Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

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


Since the mid-1970's, occupied building arson levels have remained relatively stable, while vacant building arsons experienced an enormous decline.

Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.


#### STRUCTURAL ARSON by DECADE

More arsons were registered during the first five years of the 1970's than occurred in the entire preceding decade. If the present pace continues, the 1980's will record a little more than half of the arson total of the 1970's.




#### STRUCTURAL ARSONS per STRUCTURAL FIRES 1971 to 1985


The number of total structural fires and the number of arson fires both peaked in 1976. In 1977, 26.2% of all structural fires that occurred in the City were incendiary. In 1985, the percentage of incendiary fires was 14.8%, virtually unchanged from 1984. Since 1976, the peak year for all structural fires, arson has declined 63.1%, while structural fires have declined 40%.



Source: NYC Fire Department.



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OCCUPIED-ACCIDENTAL


OCCUPIED-ARSON

VACANT-ARSON

VACANT-ACCIDENTAL

78

148




Structural arson returned to its traditional pattern in 1985, peaking in the spring (II) and ebbing in the fall (IV). Nineteen eighty-four was only year in this decade which saw arson peak in the last quarter.

Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.


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#### 1984 vs. 1985

The incidence of all structural fires in the City is generally correlated with seasonal conditions. As the heating season begins in the fall (4th quarter), the number of fires rise, peaking in December and January and then gradually subsiding during the spring and summer months.



Source: FDNY, Bureau of Information and Computer Services.




Commencing November, 1984, after 13 consecutive year-to-year monthly declines, structural arson increased for six consecutive months, decreased in May, increased in June and then decreased significantly in every month thereafter, a decline which continued well into 1986.

Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

STRUCTURAL ARSON by MONTH

1984 vs. 1985





Over the past two years structural arson levels fluctuated on parallel courses during the winter and summer months and showed a pronounced deviation in the spring and fall.


Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

### NUMBER OF OFFENSES KNOWN to POLICE 1981-1985


For the past 5 years, the following FBI Crime Index felonies experienced steady decreases. However, arson was the only one of those listed categories to increase from 1984 to 1985.







(in thousands)




Source: U.S. Dept. of Justice, FBI, <u>Uniform Crime Reports</u>. (Arson totals are provided by the FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.)

ROBBERY

#### 1980 - 1985


In 1985, despite a slight decrease in structural arson, the total number of arsons in NYC increased 9%. The tremendous rise (+75%) in the identification of auto arsons caused this increase, leading to the first rise in the total arson level since 1980. Nationwide, the FBI's <u>Uniform Crime Reports</u> registered a 3% increase in arson complaints in 1985. NYC's vehicular arson level now approximates the national share, about 20% of all arsons. There has been a steady increase in the share of arson complaints accounted for by motor vehicles since this category was added to the arson statutes of the state penal law in 1980.\*



\*Prior to the 1979 amendment of the NYS Penal Law, the intentional burning of a motor vehicle was not classified as arson. \*\*Includes incendiary fires in sheds, dumpsters, mailboxes, etc.

Source: N.Y.C. Fire Department.

#### ARSON BY BUILDING TYPE



Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

#### Arson by Property Classification

The latest national figures indicate that the greatest share of structural arson involves one and two family houses. However, more than 50% of all structural arson in New York City traditionally occurs in multiple dwellings, even though only 18% of the tax lots in NYC consist of this building type.

Propert	ty Classification Multiple Dwellings	Number of Offenses 3,240	NYC % Distribution 50.6%	National % Distribution 12.1%
	One & Two Family Houses	416	6.5%	29.4%
	Storage	109	1.7%	7.3%
	Industria1/Manufacturing	19	0.3%	1.1%
	Other Commercial	832	13.0%	9.1%
	Public Buildings	308	4.8%	7.5%
	Other Structures	175	2.7%	3.9%
Total	Structural	5,099	79.6%	70.4%
Total	Motor Vehicle	1,304	20.4%	29.6%
City-wide Total		6,403*	100%	100%**

\*There are 33 cases for which no property classification was available. \*\*National percent distribution computed from 1984 figures, the latest available at time of publication. Nationally, 17.7% of arson is directed against non-structural/non-vehicular property, such as crops, timber, fences, signs, etc. which would not be defined as arson under NYS Penal Law. This category was therefore deleted in computing national percentages in order to allow for a more appropriate comparison.

Source: NYC Fire Department, Bureau of Fire Investigation; FBI, Uniform Crime Report.

	Demolition		Seal-Up		Total	
	(Fires:)		(Fires:)		(Fires:)	
# of Fires	Building (I/A)		Building (I/A)		Building (I/A)	
1	146	(84/62)	177	(102/75)		(186/137)
2	50	( 55/ 45)	63	( 74/ 52)	113	(129/ 97)
3	31	( 43/ 50)	33	( 51/ 48)	64	(94/98)
4	10	( 21/ 19)	10	( 23/ 17)	20	( 44/ 36)
5	5	( 15/ 10)	13	( 36/ 29)	18	( 51/ 39)
6	6	( 26/ 10)	7	( 19/ 23)	13	( 45/ 33)
7	1	( 3/ 4)	4	( 14/ 14)	5	( 17/ 18)
8	2	( 9/ 7)	3	(15/9)	5	( 24/ 16)
9	0	( 0/ 0)	3	( 16/ 11)	3	( 16/ 11)
10 or more	2	( 18/ 11)	5	( 35/ 29)	.7	( 53/ 40)
Total # of Bldgs. w/ Fires	253		318		571	
Total # of Fires		274 (I) 218 (A) 492		385 (I) <u>307</u> (A) 692	Ī	659 (I) 525 (A) 1,184

### Incidence of Fire in Buildings Prior to Demolition/Seal-Up BY H.P.D. During 1985\*

# of Buildings (Incendiary Fires/Accidental Fires)

\*Each building demolished was researched for Incendiary (I) or Accidental (A) fire history in the year prior to demolition


Source: Division of Demolition (HPD); Structural Fire History Computer File and Arson Incident Computer File (Arson Strike Force).

#### IMPACT of DEMOLITION & MASONRY SEALS ON ARSON/FIRE RATES

During 1985, the Department of Housing Preservation and Development demolished 997 buildings and masonry sealed another 1,451 properties. These 2,448 structures had suffered a total of 659 arsons and 525 accidental fires in the 12 month period immediately preceding the date of HPD's treatment. Since New York City's annual total vacant building fire rate has averaged 2,743 over the last two years, HPD's seal-ups and demolitions alone address over 40 percent of the vacant building fire problem.

In order to assess the effectiveness of masonry seals in preventing fires, each building sealed by HPD during the first half of 1985 was researched for fire histories during the six month period immediately preceding and following the date of seal-up. Comparing these equivalent pre/post periods, there was found to be an 83% decrease in incendiary fires (from 139 to 24) and a 90% decrease in accidental fires (from 94 to 9).


In addition to demonstrating the importance of removing or severely reducing the opportunity to commit arson in vacant buildings, this research also underscored another important point: of the 659 arsons which had occurred in the 2,448 structures prior to treatment, 344 or 52% of these arsons were concentrated in buildings that suffered three or more arsons. The value of targetting buildings that suffer multiple arsons for city intervention -- a program instituted by the Arson Strike Force during 1985 -- is thus further highlighted.



#### 1985 DEMOLITION ACTIVITY CHART

Source: Arson Strike Force, R & A Unit; H.P.D., Division of Demolition.

FIRE MARSHALS' RESPONSE TIME to ARSON SCENE (OCCUPIED BUILDINGS ONLY)




As with most criminal investigations and particularly with arson, the speed with which investigators respond to the crime scene has a marked impact on the successful resolution of the case. During 1985, fire marshals arrived at the scene of the most serious arson fires (i.e., those occurring in occupied buildings) less than one hour after being summoned in 24.8% of the cases analyzed. In almost half of the arson cases in occupied buildings (48.5%) during 1985, the marshals arrived within two hours. Fire marshals also respond to other fire scenes (i.e., fires in vacant buildings, auto fires, accidental multiple alarm fires and accidental fires resulting in serious injuries/ fatalities), and also conduct follow-up criminal investigations on fires previously determined to be arson. These responsiblities tend to lengthen the average response time.

\*There were 558 cases for which response data was lacking.

#### ARSON RATE in CITIES

#### with 1,000,000+ POPULATION

Despite having the largest population and the greatest number of arsons, NYC ranked fourth in the country in per capita arsons, at 107 arsons per 100,000 people. Los Angeles, with the second highest population, had a 61% higher per capita arson rate. Nationally, Cleveland (pop: 546,543) had the highest arson/population ratio: 186.0787 arsons per 100,000 people.



\* The <u>Uniform Crime Report</u> 1985 arson figure is based on complaint data recorded by the NYPD. The NYC Fire Department recorded 6,436 complaints. Many complaints never reach the Fire Department because there was no fire company response (e.g., small fires which self-extinguished, attempted arson, etc.).

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau (1984); FBI Uniform Crime Report.

# SURVEY OF ARSON/FIRE PREVENTION LITERATURE



#### FIRE AND ARSON HIGHLIGHTS OF 1985

A survey of 1985 arson and fire prevention literature shows evidence of significant fire control achievements and provides incentives for continued efforts to create, implement, and upgrade fire safety and anti-arson programs. A thorough review of these highlights clearly demonstrates the merits of concerted efforts and shared results. Illustrative recaps follow:

#### Creating an Arson Strike Force: How to Do It

Early in 1985, Fire Prevention Specialist Thomas E. Minnich of the U.S. Fire Administration in Emmitsburg, Maryland, praised the accomplishments of the NYC Arson Strike Force in a letter to then-Coordinator Angelo Pisani. He said that the National Emergency Training Center (NETC) had noted similarities in its approach to initiating an arson strike force and in the concept actualized in the design and development of the NYC Arson Strike Force.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) drafted a guide for establishing an arson strike force in December, 1984. Earlier anti-arson efforts were already being made across the nation, for example, the establishment of strike forces in such places as Ventura County, California which fought a series of arson fires at citrus processing plants; Detroit, Michigan, where arson fires had regularly occurred at Holloween time; and in Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee, where a strip-and-burn auto theft ring had been responsible for 99 arson fires.

FEMA stressed that the concept of an arson strike force can be exported to any place and time where arson fires occur, but the design must be conceived and implemented to fit each unique situation. Accordingly, FEMA outlined a point-by-point methodology for setting up an arson strike force and insuring its successful operation until such time as arson fires decrease sufficiently to warrant termination of the project as a separate entity.

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#### Do Arson Reporting-Immunity Laws Work?

Arson Reporting-Immunity Laws exist today in all fifty states. <u>Target Arson: Update</u>, published by the Insurance Committee on Arson Control (ICAC), stated that these laws "are intended to allay insurers' fears of legal action for providing information to public arson investigative agencies and thereby facilitate the timely information exchange so critical to effective arson investigation and handling of potentially fraudulent insurance claims." An autumn 1985 survey of claims supervisors, arson investigation unit chiefs, and others evaluated the effectiveness of Arson Reporting-Immunity Laws in six states: Virginia, New Jersey, California, Texas, Ohio, and Illinois.

The survey's primary concern was the "reciprocity" provision that requires public arson investigative agencies to share information with insurers. In some cases (e.g., Virginia and New Jersey) insurers had a stated "right to receive" information from public agencies. In others (e.g., California), only a "right to request" it. Several large states, such as Texas, have no reciprocity provision in their laws. Nine-five percent of those solicited responded to the survey and 75 percent estimated that more than half the arson cases their offices had handled in the past year were situations in which insurers and public agencies exchanged information. Eighty-nine percent found the sharing of information between insurers and public agencies useful, including data on potential arsons and points from the Property Insurance Loss Register (PILR). Inconsistencies and contradictions, respondents noted, could be found more easily when material such as loss reports, sworn statements, depositions of the insured and other parties, as well as law enforcement documentation could be shared. "Reciprocity" is the most vital key to making the system work. It encourages insurers and public investigative units to keep open communication lines with one another.

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#### Juvenile Arson: Impact and Treatment

Each year approximately 8,000 juvenile arson arrests take place. Child-arson is a leading cause of property loss to United States schools and the major reason for child admissions to burn hospitals.

Communities throughout the nation have been grappling with problems of juvenile arson. Attempts to solve the dilemma of kids who start fires emphasize educational programs that link schools, parents, public officials, and fire prevention experts. A Senate Subcommittee in April, 1985, initiated a series of hearings on juvenile firesetting to develop a psychological profile of the issue. California Governor George Deukmejian signed into law the child arson task force bill which mandated a study of the extent, impact, and treatment of juvenile arsonists in that state. The task force includes the State Fire Marshall, the National Firehawk Foundation, the U.S. Attorney General's Office, members of the insurance industry, and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. California has became a model currently being duplicated by other states.

The National Committee on Property Insurance (NCPI), a non-profit advisory organization for property and casualty insurance companies, prepared a report on the effectiveness of six juvenile arson-control programs. The report, entitled "Juvenile Firesetters Programs: A Summary of Available Resources," stated that the recidivism rate for juvenile firefighters dropped drastically -- as much as 90 to 100 percent -- in communities using one of the programs (e.g., St. Paul, Minnesota). The NCPI report maintains that the key to lower recidivism rates is education not criminal prosecution of youthful offenders. Baltimore, Maryland and Kansas City, Missouri were among other cities that have developed effective juvenile arson control programs.

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#### New York State Burn Reporting Law

The Burn Reporting Law, which became effective November 1, 1985, requires that "every case of burn injury or wound where the victim sustained second or third degree burns to five percent or more of the body; any burns to the upper respiratory tract or largyneal edema due to the inhalation of super-heated air; and every case of a burn injury or wound likely to or which may result in death, shall be reported at once to the Office of Fire Prevention and Control." Failure to comply on the part of physicians, hospitals, or other medical facilities responsible for treatment of burn victims, constitutes a class A misdemeanor, punishable by six months incarceration and/or fine of up to \$1,000. A toll-free Burn Reporting Hotline is available 24-hours a day. A report must be submitted within 72 hours of the injury. Appropriate local investigative agencies will then be notified.

Similar in its make-up to the "gunshot wound law," the Burn Reporting Law is an effective weapon against arson since arsonists frequently suffer burns "on the job." Speedier identification and apprehension of suspected arsonists should necessarily follow. Fire safety education is a further valuable effect of the law.

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#### Sharing Fire Service Information: An International Venture

Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of South Korea received American fire service delegates last May as part of an international effort to update and improve worldwide fire safety through fire information and technology sharing.

Some interesting facts emerged. For example, in China, the fire service is nationalized: firefighters are drawn from Army recruits and spend four years as Armed Police -- on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to battle fire. Tokyo's 11.4 million citizens are served by a modern fire force of 18,000 members. Its management is decentralized, comparable to the NYC borough system, with individual areas given responsibility and authority for all fire service activity. Full-time firefighters in South Korea work a 56-hour week providing protection in major cities. As in China, on-site fire brigades are required by law in major industrial and commercial complexes. Both Japanese and Korean fire services provide ambulance and emergency medical care.

In each of the Asian countries visited, water is not nearly as readily available as it is in the United States. Furthermore, storage facilities and distribution networks are extremely limited. The result is added emphasis on fire prevention education and activities. Wide-spread evidence of chemical fire extinguishers can be seen in all major buildings and public areas.

According to the Fire Control Digest (December 1985), the three countries visited -- Japan, China, Korea -- keep fire safety statistics with superior expertise compared to the United States. It is evident, the Digest stated, that "their fire prevention activities have been more successful than ours." Exported American ideas that aroused great interest abroad included new sprinkler technology, high-rise fire safety, fire defense master planning, and emergency management.

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#### Anti-Arson Grants Awarded by USFA

Seventeen community organizations in eight states received anti-arson grants from the United States Fire Administration in 1985. Grants ranging from \$5,000 to \$25,000 covered a variety of anti-arson programs, such as arson prevention and investigation and the establishment of an early warning system for arson-prone buildings. Recipients of USFA grants sharing the \$300,000 fund included localities in Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas.

Clyde Bragdon, USFA Administrator, explained that these grants represent federal efforts to assist state and local governments in fighting arson, one of the nation's most severe problems, responsible for millions of dollars in damages every year throughout the country.

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#### 1985 Federal Arson Seminar

Increased anti-arson legislation by Congress has strengthened the federal role in arson incident investigations as increased attention is being focused on this crime. Glynco, Georgia was the site of the 1985 federal arson seminar which drew state and local attorneys from thirty states last November. The purpose of this gathering was to discuss issues facing prosecutors in arson cases. Sponsored by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), in conjunction with the Department of Justice's National Institute of Justice and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's Office of state and local training, the seminar scrutinized issues related to the compilation of circumstantial evidence in establishing financial motives for arson. It considered methods of improving the use of grand jury and expert witnesses, and of coordinating multi-jurisdictional arson investigations. Attention was also focused on arson-related statutes and recent legislation in case developments of arson prosecution.

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#### Wildland Arson

ICAC's Target Arson: Update noted that rural arson is a growing problem (March, 1985). Vast acres of forest and wildlands, as well as structures and machinery fall victim to arson in localities where water, fire-fighting equipment, and adequately trained personnel are greatly limited. Widespread economic repercussions follow.

ICAC findings were corroborated in the <u>Fire Control Digest</u> (October, 1985) which re-emphasized growing national concern over arson-caused wildfires. The California-Nevada-Hawaii-Kiwanis District and the California Inter-agency Wildland Arson Prevention Committee have banded together against these atrocities to strengthen and encourage cooperative activities such as the development of compatible information systems, improved resource sharing and the building of closer ties between fire agencies and the criminal justice system. Public information, education, and fund-raising -- the expertise of Kiwanis associates -- will focus on reducing wildland arson fires. States with large rural areas were urged to enact tougher laws and impose heavier penalties in arson convictions.

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#### Firefighter Deaths

One hundred twenty-two American fire fighters died last year. Nearly half (51) these deaths were caused by heart attacks, according to the <u>Washington Scene</u>. Twenty-four fire fighters died as a result of incendiary or suspicious fires in 1985, a sizeable increase over the 12 deaths attributed to the same cause in 1984. Other fire fighter fatalities resulted from apparatus and motor vehicle accidents which took place while fire fighters were responding to or returning from alarms. According to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 58 fire-fighter fatalities were career personnel who died in the line of duty.

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#### Re-examining RICO

The 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is a formidable weapon against organized crime, striking a powerful blow through litigation involving securities, antitrust, commodities, labor, fraud, and contract actions.

RICO's force lies in its far-reaching remedial provisions which effect both civil and criminal prosecution, as, for example, those which enable a private plaintiff or municipality to collect triple damages, plus attorney's fees, forfeiture, and pretrial seizure of assets. RICO law deems illegal any participation in "enterprises" that operate through a "pattern of racketeering activity" (two such acts within a ten-year period). A long list of federal and state crimes, including mail fraud and wire fraud, fall within the scope of RICO provisions. Effectively used in both federal and state courts, RICO implementation has been seriously debated. "Unbridled use of RICO" was the challenge. Fifteen years after its passage, it was argued that the original intent was to use RICO law against grand scale racketeering groups such as the Mafia, not against small businesses which have come under RICO attack in a "veritable litigation explosion." In May, 1985, the Appellate Division, First Department, ruled that State courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over private civil actions seeking treble damages under RICO; while a subsequent 5-4 Supreme Court decision refused to restrict RICO's scope. Nevertheless, it remains for Congress to prescribe any necessary reforms for the future.

The Insurance Committee for Arson Control (ICAC) reported that prior to 1980, only nine percent of RICO decisions involved allegations associated with arson and bribery (so called 'professional crimes''). RICO's impact on arson prosecution and the recovery of damages resulting from arson-for-profit racketeering makes it a potentially valuable weapon in the war against arson. 28

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#### Arson Ring Conviction and RICO at Work

In the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Mo, surrounded by high double rows of chain link fence and watchtowers where guards stand with guns poised, arson ring mastermind Bernard Gold, nicknamed "Father Dollar," is spending the next ten years, incarcerated for his role in arson-for-profit maneuvers that destroyed hundreds of NYC tenement apartments. The prosecutions were brought by the office of United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani, under the supervision of Assistant United States Attorney Ruth Wedgwood, following an investigation by the FBI with the cooperation of the New York Fire Department.

Although no tenants were injured in the 17 multistory Harlem and South Bronx apartment blazes, scores of innocent victims were left homeless and forty-five fire fighters were injured. Criminal landlords and their co-conspirators collected \$1.2 million from insurance companies as a result of these 1976-1979 arson schemes.

Sentenced in January of 1985, Gold, 82, suffers from heart disease and diabetes, but that did not deter him from "serving the arson-for-profit ring from all quarters," according to Ruth Wedgwood. More than 50 fires were deliberately set with homemade gasoline bombs in 17 occupied apartment buildings. Gold arranged for insurance policies to be written on those apartment buildings; he loaned money to landlords to buy the policies; and he and others hired professional arsonists to torch the dwellings in the dead of night and early morning. The arson ring later paid an insurance company executive \$25,000 to backdate a policy so that it could collect on the fire-struck property.

When U.S. District Judge Thomas P. Griesa sentenced Bernard Gold, he said: "The court cannot under any circumstances allow this serious kind of behavior to go unchallenged. If this court sends out a message to the community that you can burn down buildings to defraud insurance companies, and nothing happens to you, nothing could be worse for our community. And there is a community out there to protect....If he (Gold) were a younger man and a healthier man, I would impose a much larger sentence."

Griesa sentenced Gold to 10 years. In addition, Gold was fined \$25,000, plus another \$25,000 in illegal profits which he agreed to forfeit. Four landlords also convicted in the plot drew sentences ranging up to 14 years in prison.

In June of 1985 the City of New York filed a \$13,000,000 federal lawsuit under the RICO statute which attempted to recover from 9 of the convicted conspirators the cost of intentional endangerment of fire fighters, waste and diversion of fire fighting resources and the destruction of City housing stock.

NYC Corporation Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., said, "This RICO suit demonstrates the intent of the City to make aggressive use of all remedies available to defend and protect the interests of the City and its citizens. When, as here, criminals engage in unconscionable acts for personal profit regardless of the human and social costs, we will pursue RICO actions and other avenues of relief to protect the citizens of this City to make the City whole and to deter other offenders." The civil RICO suit was the first case of its kind in New York City brought against arson profiteers.

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#### ICAC Urges Caution

Though arson statistics are an invaluable weapon in the war on crime, the real battle is not in the arena of data, but in the fight against loss of life and property. The Insurance Committee for Arson Control (ICAC) views the recent national arson decline with prudent reservation. The FBI warns, according to ICAC, that "Caution is recommended when viewing arson trend information. The percent change figures may have been influenced by improved arson reporting procedures during the collection's relatively limited time It is expected that year to year statistical comparability will improve span. as collection continues." ICAC stands with "cautious optimism" coupled with "commitment and tenacity." Their goals remain: assistance to member companies in the development, implementation and evaluation of internal anti-arson initiatives, encouragement of arson data collection and use, strengthening and support of anti-arson legislation, increased public awareness, and promotion of cooperation between all groups working for arson control.

ICAC continues to call for teamwork among insurers, legislators, enforcement personnel, prosecutors, the judiciary and government officials. A bold broad-based initiative was begun in 1985 by ICAC's effective program participation in national conventions held by these groups, as well as by strenuous writing in their national publications. In a 1985 address to the Internal Association of Arson Investigators (IAAI), Rick Hammond, Executive Director of ICAC, called for a militant national forum of all organizations that fight against arson, lest public attention be diverted from this horrendous crime.

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
## **BOROUGH-WIDE ARSON TRENDS**






Number and Percent Change of Structural Arson, By Borough 1981 vs. 1985

Since 1981, arson has declined in each borough, with the greatest decreases in Brooklyn (-39.8%) and the Bronx (-43.5%), although arson continued to predominate in these boroughs. Manhattan, Queens and Staten Island accounted for 39.4% of the City total, as compared to 31.8% in 1981.



CHANGE in ARSON, by BOROUGH

#### 1984 vs. 1985




Despite having suffered the most incendiary fires in the City, Brooklyn was the only borough that experienced a decline in occupied and vacant building arsons during 1985. Queens was the only borough to suffer an increase in occupied and vacant building arsons, with a combined increase of +11.9% from 1984.

Vehicular arson rose for the fifth consecutive year, partially attributable to improved detection procedures. In Staten Island, vehicular arsons (289) outnumbered structural arsons (226) by 28%, marking the first time in New York City that any borough suffered more arsons in mobile property than in structures.

Source: New York City Fire Department.

#### ARSON RATE per 100,000 POPULATION

Staten Island, with the least inhabitants and lowest population density, has overtaken the Bronx in terms of arson rate per population size. This is due mainly to the increase in auto arson, which outnumbers structural arson in this borough. All of the boroughs experienced rate increases from 1984, due largely to the increase in vehicular arson.




Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1984); FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

#### STRUCTURAL ARSON by QUARTER


#### 1984 vs. 1985

Contrary to 1984, arson increased in every borough during the winter of 1985. Brooklyn was the first borough to experience a decline, during the spring. The largest decline was in Staten Island during the summer, 29.3%, a great contrast to 1984 when there was an increase of 11.5%. Despite the arson increases in the first two quarters, structural arson eventually experienced a decline, which became especially pronounced during the last quarter.





Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

### BRONX STRUCTURAL ARSON



36





7%

On a borough-wide basis, the Bronx had the highest occurence rate of arson in multiple dwellings (78%). The borough of Queens ranked highest in the most arson of commercial-industrial buildings (21%). Staten Island accounted for the most arson in public buildings, with 12% of the arson in this borough occurring in these buildings.


Compared to 1984 figures, the percentage of distribution, within each borough and the city as a whole, remained unchanged except for Manhattan and Queens. Manhattan showed an 8% decrease in multiple dwellings; in Queens, the arson rate in commercialindustrial properties decreased by 17%.

Source: N.Y.C. Fire Department.

#### STRUCTURAL ARSONS per STRUCTURAL FIRES


#### 1984 vs. 1985

The percentage of all structural fires caused by arson remained virtually unchanged from 1984. Staten Island continued to account for the smallest percentage (4.5%) of NYC's structural fires while having the highest ratio of structural fires caused by arson (24.1%). Queens and Manhattan experienced slight increases, with Queens surpassing Manhattan in rank (as compared to 1984).



Source: N.Y.C. Fire Department.

#### FIRE and ARSON RATES in VACANT BUILDINGS by BOROUGH



The majority of the vacant building fires in NYC continued to be caused by arson, although in 1985, the rate of incendiarism in abandoned structures fell slightly from 56.6% to 55.1%. Fire officials believe that the second leading cause of such fires is the use of open flames for cooking and heating by squatters. Drug-related activities in clusters of vacant buildings in some neighborhoods is also thought to be another contributory factor.


Manhattan had the lowest rate of incendiarism in vacant structures (41.1%), while Queens had the highest ratio (88.1%). Overall, empty buildings in the Bronx continued to pose the greatest fire hazard in NYC, with 37.4% of its identified vacant structures suffering some fire activity in 1985.

Source: NYC Dept. of City Planning (Sanborn Vacant Building File); FDNY.

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#### ARSON per VACANT BUILDING RATIO


Although the Bronx ranked third in the number of vacant buildings Citywide, approximately 23 out of every 100 vacant buildings located in this borough suffered arson fires in 1985, the highest ratio in the five boroughs and more than twice the Citywide rate (9.4%).



Source: NYC Fire Department; NYC Department of City Planning (Sanborn Vacant Building File).

#### VACANT BUILDINGS and H.P.D. TREATMENT, by BOROUGH

Approximately 17% of all the vacant buildings in the City (as recorded by the Sandborn Map Co.) suffered fires during 1985, compared to 16% in 1984. The Department of Housing Preservation and Development masonry sealed or demolished 15.6% of all vacant buildings in the five boroughs during 1985, compared to an 18.0% treatment rate in 1984. Brooklyn and the Bronx, accounting for 67.9% of the City's vacant building fires, were the location of 70.2% of HPD's demolition/seal-up activities. Analysis of the buildings demolished and sealed by HPD revealed that a total of 1,184 fires (659 of which were arson) had occurred in these structures in the 12 month period preceding their seal-up or demolition.




Source: NYC Department of City Planning (Sanborn Vacant Building File); and NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development (Division of Demolition).

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#### COMBINED ACCIDENTAL and ARSON FIRE INSURANCE CLAIMS by BOROUGH


Of the 34,237 structural fires which occured in NYC during 1985, the Property Insurance Loss Register recorded 4,258 (12.4%) which resulted in fire loss claims exceeding \$1,000. Approximately 20% of all structural fires in Queens and Staten Island resulted in PILR filings, while only 7% of the fires in the Bronx are represented. Approximately 10% of all PILR claims were associated with arson fires. Since the incendiarism rate for NYC structural fires is approximately 14%, there appears to be a number of arson fire loss claims which are not being reported to PILR.



Source: Property Insurance Loss Register (created by the insurance industry in 1980, PILR is a national computerized database of fire loss claims exceeding \$1,000 filed by insurance adjusters).

#### ESTIMATED LOSS to BUILDING/CONTENTS for CLAIMS CONTAINING SUCH DATA

The dollar losses reported to the Property Insurance Loss Register must be viewed with caution. Fully 20% of all PILR filings contain no estimation of the dollar loss. The remaining claims indicate an average estimated loss of \$28,830 per incident.




Source: Property Insurance Loss Register (created by the insurance industry in 1980, PILR is a national computerized database of fire loss claims exceeding \$1,000 filed by insurance adjusters).

# **ARSON ARRESTS**



ARSON ARRESTS




Brooklyn continues to lead the boroughs in arson arrests, with 31.6% of all arrests. While the arrest rate remains constant for three boroughs, there was a sharp increase (+31.8%) in Queens and a sharp decline (-37.0%) in Staten Island. The increase in Queens is attributable to the presence of Red Cap fire marshals in the borough during the last three quarters of the year (there were no Red Caps assigned to Queens in 1984).

Source: NYPD, Crime Analysis Section, On Line Booking System.


#### ARSON ARRESTS by SEX and AGE

Males between the ages of 21 and 29 continued to account for the largest number of arson arrests in 1985, representing 32% of those arrested. There was a 13.1% increase in the total number of females arrested for arson; in 1985 females accounted for 17% of all arson arrests in NYC (112 out of 671 arrests).



8

Source: NYPD, Crime Analysis Section, On Line Booking System.





Arrest for arson in residential property continues to account for the majority of all arson arrests in 1985 (56.8%). The most significant increase in arson arrests (+32.0%) involved commercial properties as the location of the fire.

Source: NYPD, Crime Analysis Section, On Line Booking System.


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#### MOST FREQUENT COMPANION FELONY CHARGES

for ARRESTED ARSONISTS

1984 vs. 1985



(Each category includes attempted crimes as well.)

The most frequent companion charge for arrested arsonists continues to be Reckless Endangerment, accounting for 31% of all companion felony charges. There was a 68% increase in murder as a companion charge in 1985, with 20 more arrests for arson homicide. Most of this increase was attributable to the Arson Major Case Squad's succesful investigation of feuding policy operators who used fire to eliminate competing criminal enterprises.

Source: NYPD, Crime Analysis Section, On Line Booking System.

#### The Arson Major Case Squad

During its first full calendar year of operation, the Police Department's Arson Major Case Squad accepted 43 cases for investigation and cleared 4 cases by arrest. One of the Squad's active cases resulted in the arrest of thirteen individuals in October for arson and murder. Those arrested were linked to a gambling ring run by a Cuban emigre origanized crime group known as "The Corporation." This case, involving 20 arsons at 14 policy ("numbers") locations where eight persons were killed, is a current long term investigation in which additional arrests are anticipated. To date, the Squad has concentrated on commercial properties for investigation.

	Arson Major Case Squad
	Activity Chart, 1/1/85 - 12/31/85
Total cases accepted	43
Number cleared by arrest	4
Other results obtained*	3
Referred to other units	0
Number closed without results	27
Number still active (as of 12/3)	/85 9
	bes of Locations for Cases Accepted
Supermarkets/groceries	9
Other commercial properties	18
Government buildings/properties	2
Houses of Worship	4
Policy Locations	3
Residential	7
Total	43

\*Two fires initially suspected to be incendiary were later found to be accidental; a third case was cleared by extraordinary means when the suspected perpetrator died.

#### Arson Clearance Rates by Borough, 1984 vs. 1985

The number of total arsons and the number of those cleared by arrest both increased during 1985, but the clearance rate, i.e., the percentage of all arson cases recorded by the Bureau of Fire Investigation which resulted in at least one arrest for either an arson or arson-related charge, remained relatively stable: in both 1984 and 1985, less than 7 out of every 100 arson cases in the City led to an arrest.

On a borough-wide level, Brooklyn showed the most significant improvement, while the other boroughs remained remarkably consistent from year to year.

	Total No. Arsons			No. Cleared by Arrest*			Clearance Rate	
	1984	1985	% Change	1984		% Change	1984	1985
Brooklyn	2,131	2,361	+10.8%	99	147	+48.5%	4.6%	6.2%
Bronx	1,495	1,521	+ 1.7%	104	107	+ 2.9%	7.0%	7.0%
Manhattan	1,148	1,186	+ 3.3%	106	107	+ 0.9%	9.2%	9.0%
Queens	722	845	+17.0%	59	69	+17.0%	8.2%	8.2%
Staten Is.	389	523	+34.5%	13	15	+15.4%	3.3%	2.9%
Tota1	5,885	6,436	+ 9.4%	381	445**	+16.8%	6.5%	6.9%

\*Does not include arrests for arson/attempted arson cases which did not result in a firefighting response.

\*\*Includes two cases for which borough not identified.

#### Time Elapsed, Crime to Arrest

During 1984 and 1985, two-thirds to three-quarters of all arson arrests occurred within 24 hours of the fire. Put another way, once an arson is more than a day old, an arrest is two to three times as unlikely to occur.

	198	4	1985		
m: va 1	<b>N 1 1</b>	Cumulative		Cumulative	
Time Elapsed	Number*	Percentage	Number*	Percentage	
-Within 24 hours	464	74.8%	442	67,5%	
-24 to 48 hours	24	78.7%	26	71.5%	
-48 to 72 hours	8	80.0%	13	73.4%	
-Over 72 hours	124	100.0%	174	100.0%	
Total	620		655		

\*Includes all arson and attempted arson arrests by all commands for which times of crime/arrest were available.

NOTE: Many arrests are made for arson and attempted arson which are associated with small self-extinguished fires not reported to the FD.

Source: NYPD, Crime Analysis Section, On Line Booking System.


Source: NYPD, On Line Booking System (arson arrests for all commands) and FDNY, Arrest Desk (arson-related arrests by fire marshals and federal arrests).


### **ARSON FATALITIES**



N.Y.C. ARSON FATALITIES


1981 - 1985





Arson fatalities have declined appreciably over the past five years, as have homicides in general. In any given year, arson accounts for approximately 2% of all homicides.

#### ARSON FATALITIES by BOROUGH




The distribution of arson fatalities by borough is generally correlated with the relative frequency of occupied building arsons. Fatalities in Brooklyn increased greatly, accounting for more than half of the NYC fatalities in 1985.

#### ARSON HOMICIDES by MONTH

#### 1983 - 1985

Over the past three years, arson homicides have been most prevalent during the winter. Fatalities resulting from accidental fires also peak in the winter, which traditionally experiences the greatest amount of occupied building fire activity.

Only the months of May, September and November were devoid of at least one multiple homicide incident during the past three years.




--- Homicides

#### ARSONS RESULTING in MULTIPLE HOMICIDES 1983 -1985

The majority of incendiary fires which claim lives result in only one fatality; however; arson occasionally results in multiple homicides. The origin of such fires is usually public areas-- apartment house hallways, social clubs, etc., and revenge is frequently the motive.


In 1976 a jealous boyfriend torched a Bronx social club and killed 25 people. In 1985 a debt-related revenge fire claimed five lives in a Brooklyn social club. The accessibility of public hallways makes them a prime area for revenge fires; from 1983 - 1985, 43% of all fatal arson fires originated in these areas.



Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation, Fatal Fire Desk.

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
#### ARSON FATALITIES VS. ACCIDENTAL FIRE FATALITIES by AGE



Arson caused 12.2% of 1985's 213 fire-related fatalities, a decrease from 13.1% in 1984. Teenagers consistently comprised the lowest proportion (4%) of arson and accidental fire victims during the past three years, while people age 50-plus represented the highest proportion of victims. The average age for arson victims declined from 46 in 1984 to 35 in 1985. Over the past three years, arson has claimed slightly more males (44) than females (36).

### **COMMUNITY GROUPS**







#### 1985 COMMUNITY GROUP RECAP

By their very nature, community groups are rooted in local issues that have a direct impact on decaying neighborhood stability, eroding safety, and debilitating potential for growth and revitalization. The forces of disinvestment, displacement, building deterioration and abandonment, as well as arson-for-profit, are central issues upon which community groups focus. With the phase-out of federal community development funds, money was appropriated by borough presidents' offices in Fiscal 1986 to fund neighborhood-based anti-arson programs which are monitored by the Arson Strike Force.

Nineteen eighty-five witnessed the fifth consecutive annual decrease in structural arson occurrences, a trend attributable in part to the research, direct intervention, neighborhood outreach, public education, technical assistance, housing management, tenant organization, and development strategies put forth by community groups at the grass roots level. It is important to note the singular significance of <u>local</u> organizations in arson control. These groups lead the fight against arson by mobilizing community resources in the very locations where arson is most likely to occur. Thus, their achievements in the struggle against arson and the overall work of fire prevention, represent the efforts of neighborhood people to protect their homes, families, neighbors, and merchants from the catastrophic cumulative effect of housing destruction; they manifest the best results of government at work with the governed.

The Arson Strike Force monitored five community groups in 1985: the People's Firehouse, the Southside United Housing Development Fund Corporation, the St. Nicholas Neighborhood Preservation Corporation, the Ridgewood/Bushwick Senior Citizens Council, Inc., and the New York Neighborhood Anti-Arson Center.

Some highlights of these programs follow:

People's Firehouse (PF) began in 1978 with a full-time staff of one CETA employee. Today it employs 44 full time and 2 part-time personnel. A pioneer member of the North Brooklyn Anti-Arson Program, PF's many success stories have appeared frequently in the media as its work continues to expand. In 1985, the high percentage of fires located in commercial and industrial buildings along the Williamsburgh waterfront formed a major focus of PF's activities. Together with the Waterfront Committee of the Community Board, People's Firehouse involved many neighborhood residents and business personnel working together to deal with waterfront issues of which fire -- and specifically arson -- is a major concern. Fires along the waterfront are recognized as long-term re-development issues, insofar as incendiary ones are sometimes related to the land-clearance aspirations of landlords whose sights are focused on the lucrative possibilities of gentrification. (Other arson motives include vandalism, insurance fraud, pyromania, etc.) By identifying the factors which contribute to fires along the waterfront, and by developing research, education, and anti-arson/ anti-fire outreach projects, People's Firehouse is effectively committed to protecting and rehabilitating the area.

In 1985, more attention was paid to gentrification issues which often give rise to harassment, illegal lock-outs, rent increases and other methods of "emptying" buildings. In August, Bruce Dillenbeck of People's Firehouse completed a lengthy "Survey of At Risk Properties," which traces arson proneness throughout the area.

St. Nicholas Neighborhood Preservation Corporation (St. Nick's) set up a neighborhood network in 1985 which enabled tenants and property owners to work together on larger community needs. Assisted by St. Nick's organizers, tenants themselves chaired meetings concerned with fighting crime and drug abuse in the neighborhood. Through a grant from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, a voluntary crime patrol was organized to cover the St. Nick's service area. In 1985 the formation of twenty-one new tenant associations brought the total to 35. Since the majority of arson continues to occur in deteriorating multiple dwellings, tenant associations are often the most effective tool in preventing further abandonment and the vicious cycle of fire activity which disinvestment breeds. A dramatic demonstration of the effectiveness of St. Nick's organizing occurred in February, and forced the resolution of housing problems in several Greenpoint buildings where Polish and Hispanic immigrants had been harassed by threats of arson from an angry new landlord who demanded exorbitant rent hikes. A street march from these buildings to the landlord's headquarters and thence to the New York City Corporation Counsel enabled tenants to obtain a temporary restraining order against the landlord which stopped overt harassment and held rents to the stabilization rate. Senior citizens in another building, who had been without heat or hot water for 13 years, were threatened with the final blow -eviction -- as their building went up for private auction. Through St. Nick's efforts, the tenants' homes were dramatically rescued as community group organizers rushed to the scene of the auction, carrying documentation of housing code violations and rent overcharges against the landlord. The worst devastation in Williamsburg can be found South of Grand Street, an area targeted in 1985 for special anti-arson work by St. Nick's. A thorough data base was developed to be used in planning strategic anti-arson operations in the area. Other efforts resulted in the successful ousting of drug dealers, a growing menace in the neighborhood.

The Southside of Williamsburg, located in Brooklyn's Community Board #1, experienced all the symptoms of urban blight, worsened by a high incidence of fire and arson brought about by vandalism and ruthless attempts by property owners to drain the last bit of value from a building. The Southside United Housing Development Fund Corporation (Los Sures) has battled against neighborhood deterioration and devastation for the past twelve years. Los Sures has put together an intense anti-arson program through tenant associations working to halt the loss of affordable apartments and thereby re-establish neighborhood stability. Forty-six such associations have been organized by Los Sures within the past two years. It has conducted an education campaign for tenants through meetings, person-to-person contact, and a bi-lingual newsletter which addressed the critical issues facing all residents. Arson-prone buildings were targetted. Workers visited each building and contacted residents to educate them in arson prevention. Los Sures worked successfully with People's Firehouse and St. Nick's to form the Community Coalition for Red Cap, and helped to make the Red Cap mission effective in the Southside by close cooperation with the Fire Department.

Workshops and meetings with other groups, including the Neighborhood Anti-Arson Center (NAC), brought in technical assistance and support for arson control. Los Sures maintained close contact with the local Community Board for the delivery of city services. It reported broken hydrants, buildings to be sealed, lots to be cleaned, abandoned cars to be towed away, and other problems requiring city assistance. It effectively involved youth in the struggle against arson by organizing a youth group, "Southside Smoke Busters," which continues to grow.

Ridgewood/Bushwick Senior Citizens Council is located in Brooklyn Community District #4. Throughout 1985, it developed successful methods of getting major repairs done on many buildings (new plumbing, installation of heating systems, new fire escapes, etc.). In addition to housing repairs, Ridgewood/Bushwick provides a wide range of social services for neighborhood residents. Although its approach to problems often originates in "clients" simply walking into the storefront office to express a particular need, there has also been a building-by-building survey with landlords and tenants, aimed at determining specific problems and code violations that should be addressed. Neighborhood stabilization is the major goal of Ridgewood/Bushwick's multi-faceted community outreach. It has worked extensively with the Northern Bushwick Residents Association (NBRA), a volunteer organization comprised of over 300 active residents and community leaders concerned with anti-arson activities, fire prevention, curtailment of crime, unemployment, health and safety hazards, noise levels, pollution, and other symptoms of neighborhood decay. In conjunction with the local Police Precinct, Fire Battalions, the District sanitation Office, the Community Planning Board and other City agencies, the Council maintains liaison with the NBRA, which in turn has established positive working relationships with all local elected officials while continuing to develop and maintain grass roots involvement in all neighborhood issues. Fire prevention seminars are held regularly, and fire statistics along with arson proneness reports are published.

The Neighborhood Anti-Arson Center (NAC), currently located at the Community Services Society, composed and distributed a handbook for tenants of fire-affected buildings. The handbook, published in November, advises tenants of their legal rights. Mary Breen, Director of NAC, said: "The handbook is a central resource of information for New York City residents who have been burned out of their apartments. It describes both legal and social service entitlements available to fire victims, urging them to work together to achieve needed building repairs." She went on to explain, "Sometimes it's hard to know what your rights are -- a fire is so devastating -- but it's important to know that you do have rights. Perhaps the booklet's most significant emphasis is that fire does not necessarily sever the tenant/landlord relationship." NAC sees the handbook as a very important neighborhood anti-displacement tool. It is also available in Spanish.

NAC also undertook a study of arson incidence in four neighborhoods in Manhattan (East Harlem, Washington Heights, Clinton, Lower East Side), utilizing data provided by member agencies of the Arson Strike Force. The research which is nearing completion, will attempt to examine the effect of gentrification on firesetting patterns. Other groups active in the battle against arson are the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC), consisting of ten neighborhood associations servicing Community Boards # 5, 6, 7 and 8 in the Bronx; the Clinton Community Coalition, and the Harlem Fire Safety Council in Manhattan; and the Flatbush Development Corporation in Brooklyn. These groups, like those described above, operate highly successful anti-arson programs which focus concerted community action on areas of particular vulnerability.


"Arson Alert", for example, was developed by the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC). It targets specific multiple dwellings that have had recent fires, excessive housing code violations, increased vacancies and vandalism, the early warning signs of arson. NWBCCC makes an arson-awareness presentation to tenants in the targeted buildings to help them understand that "the landlord is not necessarily the only one at fault." Barbara Schulman, Project Director of NWBCCC's Fire and Arson Prevention Project, reported that three buildings targeted for "Arson Alert" during 1985 did not have a single fire since the program became operational.

NWBCCC also played a significant role in the passage of 1985's Burn Reporting Bill. This legislation, sponsored by Bronx Assemblyman George Friedman, was drafted by members of the NWBCCC's Committee (Thomas Wooding, Grace Ferry, and Elizabeth Keller) in cooperation with Chief Fire Marshal John Regan and Fire Marshal Jim McSwigin. "It was the combination of many people working together which was responsible for the passage of the Burn Reporting Bill," Ms. Schulman says. "If we really didn't work together on this, it would have died." What she's talking about is the <u>community</u> -- people at the grass roots level -- the Fire Service and the State Government all working together to get things done.

The achievements of community groups cannot be adequately described in these few pages, but the emphasis can be made that government, enlisting the active participation of concerned citizens, is the most effective way to improve the quality of life by overcoming the forces of destruction. The Arson Strike Force salutes the year-long -- many years! -- struggle of community groups to deliver comprehensive services to neighborhood people, to educate them for protecting their own rights and property, and to fight against the forces of decay and destruction which blight many parts of the City.

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### COMMUNITY DISTRICT ARSON TRENDS



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Highbridge Morrisania			
Sedgewick/Parkchester			
East New York			
Williamsburg/Greenpoint			
Bushwick			
Central Harlem			
East Harlem			
Astoria			
Far Rockaway			
Jamaica			
Springfield			

01/05-06/01
06/01-12/31
06/01-12/31
01/01-06/15
08/10-12/31
08/10-12/31
01/11-04/07
04/08-07/10
04/08-07/10
07/10-09/16
07/10-12/31
07/10-12/31

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The Red Cap Program enables force units to investigate fires During the length of a task force's deployment more arson is uncovered, as the Red Caps investigate nearly all fires? not just those the Battalion Chiefs referred. The Red Caps target vacant buildings for <sup>7</sup> BROOKLYN particular attention as these structures are more 10 vulnerable to arson. The 11 addition of Task Force #3 (50 Fire Marshals) in December 1984 expanded Red Cap coverage to another six community districts. (The actual target districts vary from year to year.)

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
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
RED CAP SHARE of ARSON DETERMINATIONS



During 1985, Red Caps made 840 structural arson determinations, an increase of 41.4% over 1984. Red Caps made 17% of the structural arson determinations in the city last year, up from 12% in 1984.


Source: FDNY, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

STRUCTURAL ARSON -THE TOP TEN COMMUNITY DISTRICTS



COMMUNITY DISTRICT STRUCTURAL ARSON TREND

1984 vs. 1985




#### COMMUNITY DISTRICTS with MOST SIGNIFICANT

INCREASES/DECREASES in STRUCTURAL ARSON

<u> 1984 - 1985</u>

Morrisania Morris Park/Pelham East Harlem West Harlem Corona Morris Hts. Bushwick DECREASES	(Bx #3) (Bx #11) (Man #11) (Man #9) (Qns #4) (Bx #5) (Bklyn #4)	+22
Brownsville Mott Haven Central Harlem Fordham/Bedford Pk E. Tremont Canarsie/Flatlands Highbridge	(Bklyn #16) (Bx #1) (Man #10) (Bx #7) (Bx #6) (Bklyn #18) (Bx #4)	-55 -54 -41 -38




## COMMUNITY DISTRICTS with

# MOST STRUCTURAL FIRES, 1985


<ol> <li>Central Harlem</li> <li>Bedford Stuyvesant</li> <li>East Harlem</li> <li>Highbridge</li> <li>Morris Heights</li> <li>East New York</li> <li>West Harlem</li> <li>Washington Heights</li> <li>East Village/L.E. Side</li> <li>Brownsville</li> </ol>	(Man #10) (Bklyn #3) (Man #11) (Bx #4) (Bx #5) (Bklyn #5) (Man #9) (Man #12) (Man #3) (Bklyn #16)	1,293 1,263 1,188 1,175 1,158 1,035 952 951 939 892	
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	* BR(	OOKLYN	4 QUEENS 6 8 9 12 10 10
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COMMUNITY DISTRICT STRUCTURAL FIRE TREND

1984 vs. 1985




#### COMMUNITY DISTRICTS with MOST SIGNIFICANT INCREASES/DECREASES in STRUCTURAL FIRES, 1984 to 1985



Of the City's 59 community districts, 36 experienced decreases in structural fires during 1985, while 22 had increases and one remained unchanged.

#### COMMUNITY DISTRICT with HIGHEST PROPORTION of STRUCTURAL FIRES ATTRIBUTABLE to ARSON



#### ARSON-PRONE COMMUNITY DISTRICTS SURVEY

The Arson Strike Force conducted a survey during 1985 to determine the perceptions of community board members relating to arson in their districts. We solicited responses from the 12 community districts in New York City with the highest number of total arson complaints.

Although the response rate was low, all respondents cited vacant buildings as a major factor contributing to arson in their area, ranking it as the most important of the 14 factors listed. Those surveyed also cited vandalism/juvenile fire setters, insurance fraud and poorly maintained sub-standard buildings as significant factors behind the arson problem in their neighborhoods. Revenge fire-setting, pyromania and gentrification were all ranked among the least important factors overall by the respondents.

Rank Order	Number Value*	Most Important Factor in Arson Causation
1	587	Vacant Buildings
2	486	Vandalism
3	466	Insurance Fraud
4	465	Poor Maintenance
5	405	Drug/Alcohol Abuse
6	364	Poor Economic Conditions
7	336	Abandoned Automobiles
8	326	Welfare Relocation
9	319	Declining Neighborhood Conditions
10	314	Fires to Conceal Crimes
11	310	Personal Quarrels
12	295	Pyromaniacs
13	293	Illegal or Legal Business Enterprises Eliminating Competition
14	271	Gentrification

\*Points were assigned to each factor based on each respondent's choice of rank order, i.e., 14 points for the first choice, 13 points for the second choice, and so forth.

Source: Arson Strike Force, "Arson-Prone Neighborhoods Survey," December, 1985.

# **REFERENCE DATA**



## Structural Arson Fires in N.Y.C. <u>1960 - 1985</u>

<u> 0 C</u>	CUPI		<u>v</u>	ACAN	Г		
Numbor	• • • • • •	-	Mumbor*		-	Tatal	8 Changa
799	$\frac{10001}{(24.5)}$	+ 3.2	2,462	$\frac{10021}{(75.5)}$	+27.6	$\frac{10021}{3,621}$	<u>Change</u> +20.6
786	(26.5)	- 1.6	2,183	(73.5)	-11.3	2,969	- 9.0
876	(30.4)	+11.5	2,005	(69.6)	- 8.2	2,881	- 3.0
1,007	(35.7)	+15.0	1,810	(64.3)	- 9.7	2,817	- 2.2
950	(32.1)	- 5.7	2,012	(67.9)	+11.2	2,962	+ 5.1
1,184	(32.4)	+24.6	2,467	(67.6)	+22.6	3,651	+10.5
1,414	(32.0)	+19.4	3,007	(68.0)	+21.9	4,421	+17.4
1,670	(32.8)	+18.1	3,421	(67.2)	+13.8	5,091	+15.2
1,997	(25.9)	+19.6	5,711	(74.1)	+40.1	7,708	+51.4
2,585	(30.1)	+29.4	5,992	(69.9)	+11.3	8,577	+11.3
2,419	(27.7)	- 6.4	6,322	(72.3)	+ 5.5	8,741	+ 1.9
1,888	(23.1)	-22.0	6,302	(76.9)	3	8,190	- 6.3
2,691	(32.1)	+42.5	5,686	(67.9)	- 9.8	8,377	+ 2.3
3,093	(34.3)	+14.9	5,920	(65.7)	+ 4.1	9,013	+ 7.6
3,501	(33.5)	+13.2	6,940	(66.5)	+17.2	10,441	+15.8
2,592	(22.5)	-26.0	8,931	(77.5)	+28.7	11,523	+10.4
3,255	(23.7)	+25.6	10,497	(76.3)	+17.5	13,752	+19.3
4,573	(34.3)	+40.5	8,775	(65.7)	-16.4	13,348	- 2.9
4,727	(45.9)	+ 3.4	5,575	(54.1)	-36.5	10,302	-22.8
4,653	(60.0)	- 2.9	3,101	(40.0)	-43.7	7,754	-24.7
4,863	(58.5)	+ 4.5	3,449	(41.5)	+11.2	8,312	+ 7.2
4,484	(58.1)	- 7.8	3,223	(41.9)	- 6.5	7,707	- 7.3
3,993	(58.7)	-11.0	2,813	(41.3)	-12.7	6,806	-11.7
3,686	(66.3)	- 7.7	1,871	(33.7)	-33.5	5,557	-18.4
3,520	(69.0)	- 4.5	1,584	(31.0)	-15.3	5,104	-8.2
3,595	(70.8)	+ 2.1	1,480	(29.2)	- 6.6	5,075	-0.6
	Number 799 786 876 1,007 950 1,184 1,414 1,670 1,997 2,585 2,419 1,888 2,691 3,093 3,501 2,592 3,255 4,573 4,727 4,653 4,727 4,653 4,863 4,484 3,993 3,686 3,520	% of           Number         Total           799         (24.5)           786         (26.5)           876         (30.4)           1,007         (35.7)           950         (32.1)           1,184         (32.4)           1,414         (32.0)           1,670         (32.8)           1,997         (25.9)           2,585         (30.1)           2,419         (27.7)           1,888         (23.1)           2,691         (32.1)           3,093         (34.3)           3,501         (33.5)           2,592         (22.5)           3,255         (23.7)           4,573         (34.3)           4,727         (45.9)           4,653         (60.0)           4,863         (58.5)           4,484         (58.1)           3,993         (58.7)           3,686         (66.3)           3,520         (69.0)	NumberTotal (24.5)Change $+ 3.2$ 786(26.5) $- 1.6$ 876(30.4) $+11.5$ 1,007(35.7) $+15.0$ 950(32.1) $- 5.7$ 1,184(32.4) $+24.6$ 1,414(32.0) $+19.4$ 1,670(32.8) $+18.1$ 1,997(25.9) $+19.6$ 2,585(30.1) $+29.4$ 2,419(27.7) $- 6.4$ 1,888(23.1) $-22.0$ 2,691(32.1) $+42.5$ 3,093(34.3) $+14.9$ 3,501(33.5) $+13.2$ 2,592(22.5) $-26.0$ 3,255(23.7) $+25.6$ 4,573(34.3) $+40.5$ 4,727(45.9) $+ 3.4$ 4,653(60.0) $- 2.9$ 4,863(58.5) $+ 4.5$ 4,484(58.1) $- 7.8$ 3,993(58.7) $-11.0$ 3,686(66.3) $- 7.7$ 3,520(69.0) $- 4.5$	\$ of $$$ NumberTotal (24.5)Change $+ 3.2$ Number* 2,462786(26.5) $- 1.6$ 2,183876(30.4) $+11.5$ 2,0051,007(35.7) $+15.0$ 1,810950(32.1) $- 5.7$ 2,0121,184(32.4) $+24.6$ 2,4671,414(32.0) $+19.4$ 3,0071,670(32.8) $+18.1$ 3,4211,997(25.9) $+19.6$ 5,7112,585(30.1) $+29.4$ 5,9922,419(27.7) $- 6.4$ 6,3221,888(23.1) $-22.0$ 6,3022,691(32.1) $+42.5$ 5,6863,093(34.3) $+14.9$ 5,9203,501(33.5) $+13.2$ 6,9402,592(22.5) $-26.0$ 8,9313,255(23.7) $+25.6$ 10,4974,573(34.3) $+40.5$ 8,7754,653(60.0) $- 2.9$ 3,1014,863(58.5) $+ 4.5$ 3,4494,484(58.1) $- 7.8$ 3,2233,993(58.7) $-11.0$ 2,8133,686(66.3) $- 7.7$ 1,8713,520(69.0) $- 4.5$ 1,584	\$ of Total (24.5) $$$ of tal (24.5) $$$ of tal 	Number 799Total (24.5)Change $+ 3.2$ Number* $2,462$ Total (75.5)Change $+27.6$ 786(26.5) $- 1.6$ $2,183$ (73.5) $-11.3$ 876(30.4) $+11.5$ $2,005$ (69.6) $- 8.2$ 1,007(35.7) $+15.0$ $1,810$ (64.3) $- 9.7$ 950(32.1) $- 5.7$ $2,012$ (67.9) $+11.2$ 1,184(32.4) $+24.6$ $2,467$ (67.6) $+22.6$ 1,414(32.0) $+19.4$ $3,007$ (68.0) $+21.9$ 1,670(32.8) $+18.1$ $3,421$ (67.2) $+13.8$ 1,997(25.9) $+19.6$ $5,711$ (74.1) $+40.1$ 2,585(30.1) $+29.4$ $5,992$ (69.9) $+11.3$ 2,419(27.7) $- 6.4$ $6,322$ (72.3) $+ 5.5$ 1,888(23.1) $-22.0$ $6,302$ (76.9) $3$ 2,691(32.1) $+42.5$ $5,686$ (67.9) $98$ 3,093(34.3) $+14.9$ $5,920$ (65.7) $+ 4.1$ 3,501(33.5) $+13.2$ $6,940$ (66.5) $+17.2$ 2,592(22.5) $-26.0$ $8,931$ (77.5) $+28.7$ 3,255(23.7) $+25.6$ $10,497$ (76.3) $+17.5$ 4,573(34.3) $+40.5$ $8,775$ (65.7) $-16.4$ 4,727(45.9) $+ 3.4$ $5,575$ $(54.1)$ $-36.5$ 4,653(60.0) $- 2.9$ $3,101$	\$ of $$$ of $$$ of $$$ NumberTotalChangeNumber*TotalChangeTotal786(26.5)-1.62,183(73.5)-11.32,969876(30.4)+11.52,005(69.6)-8.22,8811,007(35.7)+15.01,810(64.3)-9.72,817950(32.1)-5.72,012(67.9)+11.22,9621,184(32.4)+24.62,467(67.6)+22.63,6511,414(32.0)+19.43,007(68.0)+21.94,4211,670(32.8)+18.13,421(67.2)+13.85,0911,997(25.9)+19.65,711(74.1)+40.17,7082,585(30.1)+29.45,992(69.9)+11.38,5772,419(27.7)- 6.46,322(72.3)+ 5.58,7411,888(23.1)-22.06,302(76.9)38,1902,691(32.1)+42.55,686(67.9)- 9.88,3773,093(34.3)+14.95,920(65.7)+ 4.19,0133,501(33.5)+13.26,940(66.5)+17.210,4412,592(22.5)-26.08,931(77.5)+28.711,5233,255(23.7)+25.610,497(76.3)+17.513,7524,573(34.3)+40.58,775(55.7)-16.413,3484,72

\*Prior to March of 1979 the Bureau of Fire Investigation estimated vacant building arson totals by arbitrarily classifying 90% of all fires that originated in vacant buildings as incendiary.

			UPIED			VACA	NT		ТО	TAL
Year	Number of Fires	% of Total	Number Incendiary	% Incendiary	Number of Fires	% of Total	Number Incendiary*	Indenciary*	Number	% Incendiary
1971	41,902	(85.7)	1,888	( 4.5)	7,002	(14.3)	6,302	(90)	48,904	(16.7)
1972	41,427	(86.8)	2,691	( 6.5)	6,318	(13.2)	5,686	(90)	47,745	(17.5)
1973	42,955	(86.7)	3,093	(7.2)	6,578	(13.3)	5,920	(90)	49,533	(18.2)
1974	44,457	(84.7)	3,501	(7.9)	8,016	(15.3)	6,940	(90)	52,473	(19.9)
1975	45,033	(82.0)	2,592	( 5.8)	9,924	(18.0)	8,931	(90)	54,957	(21.0)
1976	45,147	(79.5)	3,255	( 7.2)	11,663	(20.5)	10,497	(90)	56,810	(24.2)
1977	41,191	(80.9)	4,573	(11.1)	9,750	(19.1)	8,775	(90)	50,941	(26.2)
1978	38,476	(86.1)	4,727	(12.3)	6,194	(13.9)	5,575	(90)	44,670	(23.1)
1979	37,374	(86.8)	4,653	(12.4)	5,698	(13.2)	3,101	(54.4)	43,072	(18.0)
1980	38,339	(86.8)	4,863	(12.7)	5,812	(13.2)	3,449	(59.3)	44,151	(18.8)
1981	37,018	(87.3)	4,484	(12.1)	5,370	(12.7)	3,223	(60.0)	42,388	(18.2)
1982	34,593	(88.1)	3,993	(11.5)	4,658	(11.9)	2,813	(60.4)	39,251	(17.3)
1983	33,001	(90.4)	3,686	(11.2)	3,504	( 9.6)	1,871	(53.4)	36,525	(15.2)
1984	31,875	(91.9)	3,520	(11.0)	2,798	( 8.1)	1,584	(56.6)	34,673	(14.7)
1985	31,550	(92.2)	3,595	(11.4)	2,687	( 7.8)	1,480	(55.1)	34,237	(14.8)

## Percentage of Structural Fires (Occupied/Vacant) Classified as Incendiary, 1971 - 1985

\*Prior to March of 1979, the Bureau of Fire Investigation estimated vacant building arson incidence by arbitrarily classifying 90% of all fires that originated in vacant buildings as incendiary.

## Arson Categories 1966 to 1985

Year	Structural Arsons	Motor Vehicle Arsons*	• Other Arsons**	Total	% Change
1966	4,421		-	4,421	+ 21.1
1967	5,091	-	-	5,091	+ 15.2
1968	7,708	-	-	7,708	+ 51.4
1969	8,577		-	8,577	+ 11.3
1970	8,741	-	-	8,741	+ 1.9
1971	8,190	-	-	8,190	- 6.3
1972	8,377	-	-	8,377	+ 2.3
1973	9,013	-	-	9,013	+ 7.6
1974	10,441	-		10,441	+ 15.8
1975	11,523	<b>-</b>	-	11.523	+ 10.4
1976	13,752	-	-	13,752	+ 19.3
1977	13,348	-	-	13,348	- 2.9
1978	10,302	-	-	10,302	- 22.8
1979	7,754	-	-	7,754	- 24.7
1980	8,312	347	-	8,659	+ 14.0
1981	7,707	398	-	8,105	- 6.3
1982	6,806	443	-	7,249	- 10.5
1983	5,557	490	47	6,094	- 15.9
1984	5,104	737	44	5,885	- 3.4
1985	5,075	1,287	74	6,436	+ 9.4

\*Prior to the 1979 amendment of the NYS Penal Law, the intentional burning of a motor vehicle was not classified as arson.

\*\*"Other" arsons include incendiary fires in sheds, dumpsters, mailboxes, etc.

#### Structural Arson by Month & Quarter, 1981 to 1985\*

January February March Ist Quarter	<u>1981</u> 641 580 697 1,918	<u>1982</u> 520 582 612 1,714	<u>1983</u> 497 403 466 1,366	<u>1984</u> 414 336 447 1,197	<u>1985</u> 456 389 492 1,337
% Change(Yr.to yr.)	- 5.3%	-10.6%	-20.3%	-12.4%	+11.7%
April	679	657	490	420	484
May	735	656	491	514	469
June	666	539	479	406	444
2nd Quarter	2,080	1,852	1,460	1,340	1,397
% Change(Yr. to yr.	-11.6%	-11.0%	-21.2%	- 8.2%	+ 4.3%
July	685	600	464	426	410
August	641	537	476	373	369
September	584	502	515	422	407
3rd Quarter	1,910	1,639	1,455	1,221	1,186
% Change(Yr. to yr.	- 4.0%	-14.2%	-11.2%	-16.1%	- 2.9%
October	641	560	462	446	420
November	569	531	454	470	390
December	591	509	396	460	345
4th Quarter	1,801	1,600	1,312	1,376	1,155
% Change(Yr. to yr.	-10.2%	-11.2%	-18.0%	+ 4.9%	-16.1%

\*These figures include a small number of incendiary fires in small structures (less than 1% of any total for any month in any year) which would not technically be classified as arson under N.Y.C. Penal Law, unless the fire extended to a building or automobile.

# <u>New York City</u> <u>Crime Trends 1981-1985</u> Number of Offenses Known to Police

						% Change	% Change
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	<u> 1984 - 1985</u>	<u> 1981 - 1985</u>
Murder/Non-negligent Manslaughter	1,826	1,668	1,622	1,450	1,384	- 4.6%	- 24.2%
Forcible Rape	3,862	3,547	3,662	3,829	3,880	+ 1.3%	+ 0.5%
Robbery	107,475	95,944	84,043	79,541	79,532	0.0%	- 26.0%
Aggravated Assault	43,783	42,784	43,326	47,472	50,356	+ 6.1%	+ 15.0%
Burglary	205,825	172,794	143,698	128,687	124,838	- 3.0%	- 39.3%
Larceny/Theft	258,369	264,400	253,801	250,759	262,051	+ 4.5%	+ 1.4%
Motor Vehicle Theft	104,706	107,430	92,725	88,478	79,426	-10.2%	- 24.1%
Arson	8,105	7,249	6,094	5,885	6,436	+ 9.4%	- 20.6%
Total	733,951	695,816	628,971	606,101	607,903	+ 0.3%	- 17.2%

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, <u>Uniform Crime Reports</u>. (Arson totals are provided by NYC Fire Department, Bureau of Fire Investigation.)

#### Arson Rate in Cities with 1,000,000+ Population

City	Population	Nationwide Population Rank	# of Arsons	Nationwide Total Arson Rank	Arson Rate per 100,000
Los Angeles	3,096,721	2	5,338	2	172.3758
Houston	1,705,697	4	2,001	4	117.3127
Detroit	1,088,973	6	1,253	5	115.0625
New York City	7,160,800	1	7,679*	1	107.2366
Chicago	2,992,472	3	2,026	3	67.7032

\* The <u>Uniform Crime Report</u> 1985 arson figure is based upon complaint data recorded by the NYPD. The NYC Fire Department recorded 6,436 arsons.

NOTE: Many arson complaints never reached the Fire Department because there was no fire company response (e.g. small fires that self-extinguished, attempted arson, etc.).

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau (1984); FBI Uniform Crime Report.

Number and Percent Change of Structural Arson, by Borough 1981 vs. 1985							
	1	981	1	985	СНА	NGE	
Borough	Number	% of City 	Number	% of City Total	Number	8	
Brooklyn	2,887	37.4%	1,737	34.2%	-1,150	(-39.8%)	
Bronx	2,369	30.7%	1,339	26.4%	-1,030	(-43.5%)	
Manhattan	1,329	17.2%	1,117	22.0%	- 212	(-16.0%)	
Queens	845	11.0%	656	12.9%	- 189	(-22.4%)	
Staten Is.	279	3.6%	226	4.5%	<u>- 53</u>	(-19.0%)	
Total	7,709*	100.0%	5,075	100.0%	-2,634	(-34.2%)	

\*NYCFD officially recorded 7,707 structural arsons for 1981.

	Ars	on by Bor	ough		
		Brooklyn	L		
Property Affected Occupied Buildings Vacant Buildings Total Structural	<u>1984</u> 1,299 545 1,844	% of Total 60.9 25.6 86.5	$   \begin{array}{r} 1985 \\   \hline     1,232 \\     505 \\     1,737 \\   \end{array} $	% of Total 52.2 21.4 73.6	'84 to '85 <u>% Change</u> - 5.2 - 7.3 - 5.8
Motor Vehicle Other Total Arson	277 <u>10</u> 2,131	13.0 <u>.5</u> 100%	608 <u>16</u> 2,361	25.7 <u>0.7</u> 100%	+119.5 + 10.8
		Bronx			
Occupied Buildings Vacant Buildings Total Structural	780 <u>583</u> 1,363	52.2 <u>39.0</u> 91.2	838 <u>501</u> 1,339	55.1 <u>32.9</u> 88.0	+ 7.4 - 14.1 - 1.8
Motor Vehicles Other Total Arson	123 <u>9</u> 1,495	8.2 <u>.6</u> 100%	162 <u>20</u> 1,521	$   \begin{array}{r}     10.7 \\     \underline{1.3} \\     100\%   \end{array} $	+ 31.7 + 1.7

		Manhatta	<u>n</u>			
Occupied Buildings	834	72.7	869	73.7	+	4.2
Vacant Buildings	254	22.1	248	20.9	-	2.4
Total Structural	1,088	94.8	1,117	94.2	+	2.7
Motor Vehicles	55	4.8	56	4.7	+	1.8
Other	5	.4	13	1.1		
Total Arson	1,148	100%	1,186	100%	+	3.3

		Queens			
Property Affected Occupied Buildings	<u>1984</u> 471	% of <u>Tota1</u> 65.2	<u>1985</u> 523	% of <u>Total</u> 61.9	'84 to '85 <u>% Change</u> + 11.0
Vacant Buildings	115	15.9	133	15.7	+ 15.7
Total Structural	586	81.2	656	77.6	+ 11.9
Motor Vehicles Other	122 14	16.9 <u>1.9</u>	172 <u>17</u>	20.4 2.0	+ 41.0
Total Arson	722	100%	845	100%	+ 17.0

# Staten Island

Occupied Buildings	136	34.9	133	25.4	- 2.2
Vacant Buildings	87	22.4	93	17.8	+ 6.9
Total Structural	223	57.3	226	43.2	+ 1.3
No. 4	1(0	44 4	200	<b>66</b> 7	00.0
Motor Vehicles	160	41.1	289	55.3	+ 80.6
Other	6	1.5	8	1.5	
Total Arson	389	100%	523	100%	+ 34.5

Source: NYC Fire Department, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

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Structural An	son by	Month	æ	Quarter,	1984*	vs.	1985

	<u>Brooklyn</u>	Bronx	Manhattan	Queens	<u>s.i.</u>	1985 Totals	% Change 1984 - 1985
January February March	180 117 165	107 94 129	104 91 112	48 64 60	17 23 26	456 389 492	+ 10.1% + 15.8% + 10.1%
1st Qtr. % Change (84-85)	462 +6.5%	330 +10.7%	307 +14.1%	172 +19.4%	66 +26.9%	1,337	+ 11.7%
April May June	161 151 146	130 118 133	117 113 83	57 58 61	19 29 21	484 469 444	+ 15.2% - 8.8% + 9.4%
2nd Qtr. % Change (84-85)	458 - 3.8%	381 + 7.3%	313 +11、0%	176 + 3.5%	69 +21.1%	1,397	+ 4.3%
July August September	133 134 125	115 93 122	92 72 99	51 55 54	19 15 7	410 369 407	- 3.8% - 1.1% - 3.6%
3rd Qtr. % Change (84-85)	392 -13.5%	330 - 1.2%	263 +10.5%	160 +15.9%	41 -29.3%	1,186	- 2.9%
October November December	139 139 <u>147</u>	117 109 72	82 85 <u>67</u>	64 39 45	18 18 14	420 390 345	- 5.8% - 17.0% - 25.0%
4th Qtr. % Change (84-85)	425 -11.8%	298 -22.0%	234 -23.0%	148 0.0%	50 -16.7%	1,155	- 16.1%
Total % Change (84-85)	1,737 - 5.9%	1,339 - 2.2%	1,117 + 2.2%	65) + 9.:		226 5,075 0.4%	- 1.1%

\* These figures include 42 incendiary fires in small structures (less than 1% of any total for any month in any borough) which would not be technically classified as arson under NYS Penal Law, unless the fire extended to a building or automobile. There were also 14 miscoded arsons not included in totals.

Source: NYC Fire Department, Bureau of Fire Investigation.

## Structural Fires by Quarter, by Borough

## 1984 vs. 1985

lst. Qtr.	8X Change 2,050 +14.8	BK Change 3,130 + 7.4	$\frac{MN}{2,534} \stackrel{\text{\theta}}{\rightarrow} 0.9$	QN Change 1,390 + 5.6	S.I. <u>Change</u> 277 +27.1	Total <u>(% Change</u> )* 9,381
(% of Boro. Total)	(26.5%)	(27.9%)	(27.2%)	(27.6%)	(29.6%)	(+ 7.3%)
2nd Qtr.	2,027 + 9.2	2,752 - 7.3	2,462 + 9.2	1,253 +1.9	248 - 5.7	8,742
(% of Boro Total)	(26.2%)	(24.5%)	(26.4%)	(24.9%) (26.5%)		(+ 1.4%)
3rd Qtr. (% of Boro	1,829 - 8.7	2,609 - 7.6	2,061 - 2.6	1,191 - 1.8	202 - 8.2	7,892
(% of bold Total)	(23.7%)	(23.3%)	(22.1%)	(23.7%)	(21.6%)	(- 5.8%)
4th Qtr. (% of Boro	1,817 - 8.7	2,722 - 7.9	2,275 - 8.2	1,199 - 6.3	209 - 8.7	8,222
(7 of Boro Total)	(23.5%)	(24.3%)	(24.4%)	(23.8%)	(22.3%	(- 7.9%)
Total (% of	7,723 + 1.1	11,213 - 3.9	9,332 - 0.3	5,033 - 1.0	936 + .7	34,237
Total)	(22.6%)	(32.8%)	(27.3%)	(14.7%)	(2.7%)	(- 1.3%)

\*Percent change figures for the each quarter were computed by comparing 1984 data.

Source: NYC Fire Department, Bureau of Information and Computer Services.

#### Vacant Buildings and H.P.D. Treatment by Borough

Borough Brooklyn	Vacant Bldg. Fires 996	% of <u>Total</u> 37.1%	Vacant <u>Buildings</u> 7,611	<pre>% of Tota1 48.4%</pre>	Bldgs.Demolished & Masonry Sealed 1,022	<pre>% of Total 41.7%</pre>
Bronx	827	30.8%	2,212	14.1%	722	29.5%
Manhattan	604	22.5%	3,353	21.3%	527	21.5%
Queens	151	5.6%	1,972	12.5%	149	6.1%
Staten Island	109	4.18	581	3.7%	28	1.1%
1985 City-wide	2,687	100%	15,729	100%	2,448	100%
1984 City-wide	2,798		17,151		3,093	
<pre>% Change 1984-1985</pre>	- 4.0%		- 8.3%		-20.8%	

#### Source: NYC Department of City Planning (Sanborn Vacant Building File); and NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development (Division of Demolition).

#### 1985 Demolition Activity Chart

#### Demolition Category

Borough Brooklyn	Bmergency (Private) 10	Emergency (City-Owned) 3	Urban <u>Renewal</u> 67	Unsafe <u>(Private)</u> 139	Unsafe (City- Owned) 228	Total <u>(1985)</u> 447	TOTAL (1984) 821	<pre>% CHANGE '84-'85 -45.5</pre>	
Bronx	13	6	15	94	184	312	473	-34.0	
Manhattan	8	10	28	20	53	119	124	- 4.0	
Queens	1	0	Q	64	43	108	166	-35.0	
Staten Island	0	0	0	7	4	11	35	-68.6	
Total	32	19	110	324	512	997	1,619	-38.4	

Source: NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development, Division of Demolition.

## Incidence of Fire in Buildings Six Months After Masonry Seal by H.P.D. During 1985\*

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# of Buildings (Incendiary Fires/Accidental Fires)

# of Fires	(Fires:) Bronx (I/A)	(Fires:) Bklyn (I/A)	(Fires:) Manh. (I/A)	(Fires:) Queens (I/A)	(Fires:) S.I. (I/A)	(Fires:) Total (I/A)
1	$\frac{1}{6}$ (4/2)	12 (11/1)	6 (4/2)	$\frac{\sqrt{000000}}{0}$	0 (0/0)	24 ( 19/ 5)
2	0 ( 0/ 0)	1 (2/0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	1 ( 2/ 0)
3	0 ( 0/ 0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	1 (3/0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	1 ( 3/ 0)
4	1 ( 0/ 4)	0 ( 0/ 0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	0 ( 0/ 0)	1 ( 0/ 4)
Total # of Bldgs. w/fires	7	13	7	0	0	27
Total # of Fires	4 (I) <u>6 (</u> A) 10	13 (I) _1 (A) _14	7 (I) 2 (A) 9	(I) 0 (A) 0 0	(I) 0 (A) <u>0</u>	$\begin{array}{c} 24 (1) \\ \underline{9} (A) \\ \overline{33} \end{array}$
Total # of Bldgs. w/No Fires	403	562	401	41	17 1	,424

\* Each building sealed was researched for Incendiary (I) or Accidental (A) fire history in the six months after seal-up.

Source: Division of Demolition (HPD); Structural Fire History Computer File, and Arson Incident Computer File (Arson Strike Force).

## Combined Accidental and Arson Fire Insurance Claims by Borough\*

<u>Borough</u> Manhattan	Total # o: Loss Cla Repor 1,106	aims	% of <u>City Total</u> 26.0%	Total # of Claims Containing Estimated Loss Data 874	Estimated Loss to Building and/or Contents \$30,608,933	% of <u>City Total</u> 31.5%	Average Value of Claim with Estimated Loss \$35,021
Brooklyn	1,414	12.6%	33.2%	1,090	\$34,258,840	35.3%	\$31,430
Bronx	557	7.2%	13.1%	435	\$10,277,175	10.6%	\$23,625
Queens	995	19.7%	23.4%	819	\$18,613,506	19.2%	\$22,727
Staten Island	186	19.9%	4.4%	151	\$ 3,370,304	3.4%	\$22,319
City-Wide	4,258	12.4%	100%	3,369	\$97,128,758	100%	\$28,830**

\* These are claims filed for property losses caused by fires; information on the cause of the fires which resulted in these claims is not provided.

\*\*This figure represents the average dollar loss for the 3,369 claims containing estimations of dollar losses.

Source: Property Insurance Loss Register (created by the insurance industry in 1980, PILR is a national computerized database of fire loss claims exceeding \$1,000 filed by insurance adjusters).

## Arson Arrests By Sex and Age

	<u>MAL</u> 1984	<u>E</u> 1985	% Change	<u>FEM</u> 1984	ALE 1985	% Change
12 & Under	$\frac{1364}{16}$	$\frac{1303}{14}$	4 caldrige	6	3	o unange
13 & 14	25	31		2		
15	16	24		ō	4 3	
Subtotal (15 & Under)	57	69	(+21.05%)	8	10	(+25.00%)
16	19	26		0	1	
17	31	15		4	3	
Subtotal (17 & Under)	107	110	(+ 2.80%)	12	14	(+16.67%)
18	17	24		2	4	
19	16	22		2 2	1	
20	17	24		9	6	,
Subtotal (20 & Under)	157	180	(+14.65%)	25	25	(+ 0.00%)
21 to 24	79	83		22	14	
25 to 29	101	97		18	21	
Subtotal (29 & Under)	337	360	(+ 6.82%)	65	60	(- 7.69%)
30 to 34	65	70		12	24	
35 to 39	51	53		6	9	
Subtotal (39 & Under)	453	483	(+ 6.62%)	83	93	(+12.05%)
40 to 44	40	26		4	6	
45 to 49	23	13		5	3	
50 to 54	12	15		3	3 5	
55 to 59	7	14		3	Ō	
60 to 64	3	5		0	4	
65 & Over	4	3		1	1	
Total	542	559	(+ 3.14%)	99	112	(+13.13%)

Source: NYC Police Department, Crime Analysis Section, On Line Booking System.

Charge	1984 Number	1985 Number	1984 Attempts	1985 <u>Attempts</u>	1984 <u>Total</u>	1985 <u>Total</u>
Reckless Endangerment	161	159	2	2	163	161
Criminal Mischief	81	91	3	0	84	91
Assualt	32	43	2	0	47	43
Burglary	64	42	5	6	69	48
Crim. Poss. of Weapon	34	31	0	0	34	31
Murder	9	29	16	13	25	42
Crim. Poss. of Stolen Property	7	24	0	0	7	24
Grand Larceny	21	20	3	6	24	26
Robbery	14	11	11	0	25	11
Ins. Fraud	4	11	1	0	5	11
Conspiracy	6	11	0	0	6	11
Crim. Poss. of Drugs	8	6	0	0	14	6
Kidnapping	0	4	0	0	0	4
Escape	2	1	0	0	2	1
Criminal Solicitation	0	1	0	0	0	1
Falsifying Business Records	0	1	0	0	0	1
Bribery	0	1	0	0	0	1
Hindering Prosecution	0	1	0	0	0	1
Sexual Abuse	2	0	0	0	2	0
Rape	1	0	0	0	1	0
Totals	446	487	43	27	508	514
1984 to 1985 % Change:		(+ 9.19%)		(-37.21%)	(	(+1.2%)

## Most Frequent Companion Felony Charges for Arrested Arsonists

Source: NYC Police Department, Crime Analysis Section, On Line Booking System.

\*

Arson	Fataliti	es by	Borough

	1984		1	985	1983 - 1985		
Borough	Fatalities	% of Total	Fatalities	<u>% of Total</u>	Fatalities	<u>% of Total</u>	
Brooklyn	6	22.2%	15	57.7%	33	41.3%	
Manhattan	10	37.0%	4	15.4%	21	26.3%	
Bronx	7	25.9%	4	15.4%	13	16.3%	
Queens	3	11.1%	2	7.7%	10	12.5%	
Staten Island	1	3.7%	1	3.8%	3	3.8%	
Citywide	27	100.0%	26	100.0%	80	100.0%	

Source: NYC Fire Department.

# Arson Fatalities vs. Accidental Fire Fatalities by Age

	the second s		talities	the second s		re Fatalities			ated Fatalities	
Age	1984	1985	1983 - 1985	1984	1985	1983 - 1985	1984	1985	1983 - 1985	
Under 13	1	3	11	41	34	119	42	37	130	
13-19	1	2	6	0	12	20	1	14	26	
20-29	5	6	14	19	16	51	24	22	65	
30-49	8	8	22	35	35	106	43	43	128	
50-plus	9	7	24	79	89	260	88	96	284	
Unknown	3	0	3	5			8		14	
Total	27	26	80	179	187	567	206	213	647	
(%)*	(13.1%)	(12.2%)	(12.4%)	(86.9%)	(87.8%)	(87.6%)	(100%)	)(100%)	(100%)	
*Indicate	es percei	*Indicates percentage of all fire fatalities.								

Source: NYC Fire Department, Bureau of Fire Investigation, Fatal Fire Desk.

Fire Origin	<u>1984</u> Ti	<u>1985</u> ncidents	1983-1985	<u>1</u>	9 <u>84</u> F	<u>1985</u> ataliti	<u>1983-1985</u> es
					····		
Basement	0	2	2		0	2	2
Bedroom	6	1	9		7	2	11
Kitchen	0	1	1		0	1	1
Living Room	1	0	4		1	0	4
Porch	1	0	2		1	0	2
Public Hallway	7	6	19		8	12	34
Sales Showroom	4	1	7		8	2	12
Stairway	0	0	1		0	0	1
Storage Room	2	0	3		2	0	3
Victim	0	2	2		0	2	2
Work Area	0	1	3		0	1	4
Unidentified Area	0	4	4		0	4	4
Total	21	18	57		27	26	80

# Arson Fatalities by Origin of Fires

# Arson Fatalities by Type of Building

	<u>1984</u> 1	1985 ncident	<u>1983-1985</u> s	<u>1984 1985 1983-1985</u> Fatalities
Multiple Dwelling	11	9	32	15 11 46
Private House	5	5	13	5 6 14
Store	3	3	8	5 4 11
Loft Building	2	0	3	2 0 4
Other	0	1	1	0 5 5
Total	21	18	57	27 26 80

## Ranking of Community Districts by Number of Structural Arsons

Ra	nk				1984	1985	<u>9</u>
<u>184</u> 3	$\frac{185}{1}$	Name Fast New York	<u>Borough</u> Brooklyn	$\frac{\text{CD No.}}{(\text{CD}\# 5)}$	Structural 243	Structural 257	<u>Change</u> + 5.8%
2	2	Highbridge <sup>1</sup>	Bronx	(CD# 4)	270	242	- 10.4%
1	3	Central Harlem <sup>1</sup>	Manhattan	(CD#10)	287	233	- 18.8%
7	4	East Harlem <sup>2</sup>	Manhattan	(CD#11)	178	219	+ 23.0%
11	5	Morrisania <sup>2</sup>	Bronx	(CD# 3)	141	216	+ 53.2%
8	6	Morris Heights	Bronx	(CD# 5)	174	196	+ 12.6%
5	7	Williamsburg/Greenpoint <sup>1</sup>	Brooklyn	(CD# 1)	194	191	- 1.5%
10	8	Bedford Stuyvesant	Brooklyn	(CD# 3)	164	184	+ 12.2%
4	9	Mott Haven	Bronx	(CD#1)	206	151	- 26.7%
12	10	Bushwick <sup>2</sup>	Brooklyn	(CD# 4)	128	149	+ 16.4%
9	11	E. Tremont/West Farms	Bronx	(CD# 6)	169	131	- 22.5%
б	12	Brownsville	Brooklyn	(CD#16)	192	129	- 32.8%
17	13	Crown Heights (North)	Brooklyn	(CD# 8)	107	115	+ 7.5%
13	14	North Shore	Staten Is.	(CD# 1)	125	111	- 11.2%
27	15	West Harlem	Manhattan	(CD# 9)	70	110	+ 57.1%
18	16	E. Village/Lower E. Side	Manhattan	(CD# 3)	106	108	+ 1.9%
19	Ħ	Jamaica/St. Albans <sup>2</sup>	Queens	(CD#12)	104	108	+ 3.8%
21	18	The Rockaways <sup>2</sup>	Queens	(CD#14)	86	104	+ 20.9%
=15	19	Coney Island	Brook1yn	(CD#13)	114	98	- 14.0%
≈55	20	Morris Pk/Pelham	Bronx	(CD#11)	23	87	+278.3%
=23	21	Fort Greene	Brooklyn	(CD# 2)	81	85	+ 4.9%
=30	22	Midtown	Manhattan	(CD# 5)	67	83	+ 23.9%
14	23	West Side	Manhattan	(CD# 7)	117	81	- 30.8%
20	24	Hunts Point	Bronx	(CD# 2)	97	78	- 19.6%
=30	25	East Flatbush	Brook1yn	(CD#17)	67	72	+ 7.5%
38	26	Central Area	Staten Is.	(CD# 2)	55	70	+ 27.3%
22	27	Washington Hgts/Inwood	Manhattan	(CD#12)	85	69	- 18.8%
=23	28	Park Slope/Red Hook	Brooklyn	(CD# 6)	81	64	- 21.0%
=15	29	Fordham/Bedford Park <sup>3</sup>	Bronx	(CD# 7)	114	63	- 44.7%
34	30	Borough Park	Brooklyn	(CD#12)	60	60	0.0%
28	31	Bensonhurst	Brooklyn	(CD#11)	69	59	- 14.5%
26	=	Sedgewick/Parkchester <sup>2</sup>	Bronx	(CD# 9)	73	59	- 19.2%
47	33	Corona/Elmhurst	Queens	(CD# 4)	29	56	+ 93.1%
29	34	Chelsea/Clinton	Manhattan	(CD# 4)	68	54	- 20.6%
36	35	Sunset Park	Brooklyn	(CD# 7)	58	53	- 8.6%

.

Ra: ' 84	nk 185	Name	Borough	CD No.	1984 Structural	1985 Structural	% Change
$\frac{-84}{35}$	36	Crown Heights (South)	Brooklyn	$\frac{\text{(CD H0.}}{\text{(CD# 9)}}$	<u>59</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>Change</u> - 13.6%
25	37	Flatbush	Brooklyn	(CD#14)	77	50	- 35.1%
33	38	Astoria/Long Island City <sup>2</sup>	Queens	(CD# 1)	63	47	- 25.4%
=48	=	Lower Manhattan	Manhattan	(CD# 1)	28	47	+ 67.9%
54	40	Throgs Neck/CoC/City Is.	Bronx	(CD#10)	24	46	+ 91.7%
=52	=	Yorkville/E. Side	Manhattan	(CD# 8)	27	46	+ 70.4%
32	42	Sheepshead Bay	Brooklyn	(CD#15)	64	45	- 29.7%
39	43	Glen Oaks/Laurelton <sup>2</sup>	Queens	(CD#13)	46	44	- 4.3%
41	=	Flushing/Whitestone	Queens	(CD# 7)	39	44	+ 12.8%
45	45	Howard Beach/Ozone Park	Queens	(CD#10)	33	43	+ 30.3%
=42	46	South Shore	Staten Is.	(CD# 3)	38	39	+ 2.6%
=48	47	Murray Hill	Manhattan	(CD# 6)	28	38	+ 35.7%
44	48	Jamaica Estates/Fresh Mead.	Queens	(CD# 8)	35	36	+ 2.9%
46	49	Jackson Hgts./E. Elmhurst	Queens	(CD# 3)	31	34	+ 9.7%
=48	50	Ridgewood/Glendale	Queens	(CD# 5)	28	32	+ 14.3%
=52	51	Greenwich Village	Manhattan	(CD# 2)	27	29	+ 7.4%
=48	52	Marble Hill/Riverdale <sup>3</sup>	Bronx	(CD# 8)	28	28	0.0%
=55	53	Bay Ridge	Brooklyn	(CD#10)	23	27	+ 17.4%
59	=	Forest Hills/Rego Park	Queens	(CD# 6)	13	27	+107.7%
37	55	Canarsie/Flatlands	Brooklyn	(CD#18)	57	25	- 56.1%
40	=	Kew Gardens/Richmond Hill	Queens	(CD# 9)	44	25	- 43.2%
=42	=	Williamsbridge/Wakefield	Bronx	(CD#12)	38	25	- 34.2%
58	58	Bayside/Douglaston	Queens	(CD#11)	15	24	+ 60.0%
57	59	Woodside	Queens	(CD# 2)	21	21	0.0%
		Other*			4		-
		C.D. Designation Unavailable	e		12	57	
		Total			5,104	5,075	- 0.6%
<sup>2</sup> C.D	. wh	ere Red Caps were assigned for ere Red Caps were assigned for ere Red Caps were assigned for	or part of 1	1985.	1985.	<b>1</b> 2 <b>4 5 4</b>	

\*Includes major parks and airports which serve more than one community district. Source: Arson Strike Force, Arson Incident File.

	by Percentage of Structural Fires Caused by Arson								
	Str.	Arson per Struct.		<u></u>	No. of Struct.	No. of Struct.	<pre>% of Struct. Fires Caused</pre>		
	Rank	Fire Rank	Name	Borough	Fires	Arsons	By Arson		
49	20	1	Morris Park/Pelham	Bronx	286	87	30.4		
18	5	2	Morrisania <sup>2</sup>	Bronx	758	216	28.5		
53	26	3	Central Area	Staten Is.	250	70	28.0		
59	46	4	South Shore	Staten Is.	156	39	25.0		
6	1	5	East New York <sup>1</sup>	Brooklyn	1,035	257	24.8		
43	24	б	Hunts Point	Bronx	329	78	23.7		
22	10	7	Bushwick <sup>2</sup>	Brooklyn	636	149	23.4		
14	7	8	Williamsburg/Greenpoint <sup>1</sup>	Brook1yn	824	191	23.2		
50	=31	9	Bensonhurst	Brooklyn	264	59	22.3		
25	11	10	E. Tremont/West Farms	Bronx	616	131	21.3		
31	14	=	North Shore	Staten Is.	522	111	21.3		
4	2	12	Highbridge <sup>1</sup>	Bronx	1,175	242	20.6		
55	45	13	Howard Beach/Ozone Park	Queens	214	43	20.1		
3	4	14	East Harlem <sup>2</sup>	Manhattan	1,188	219	18.4		
13	9	15	Mott Haven	Bronx	826	151	18.3		
1	3	16	Central Harlem <sup>1</sup>	Manhattan	1,293	233	18.0		
46	35	17	Sunset Park	Brooklyn	301	53	17.6		
28	19	18	Coney Island	Brooklyn	569	98	17.2		
5	6	19	Morris Heights	Bronx	1,158	196	16.9		
26	18	=	The Rockaways <sup>2</sup>	Queens	614	104	16.9		
40	33	21	Corona/Elmhurst	Queens	354	56	15.8		
·57	=53	22	Forest Hills/Rego Park	Queens	172	27	15.7		
37	30	23	Borough Park	Brooklyn	397	60	15.1		
2	8	24	Bedford-Stuyvesant	Brooklyn	1,263	184	14.6		
10	12	25	Brownsville	Brooklyn	892	129	14.5		
58	58	26	Bayside/Douglaston	Queens	168	24	14.3		
17	=16	27	Jamaica/St. Albans <sup>2</sup>	Queens	762	108	14.2		
54	50	28	Ridgewood/Glendale	Queens	228	32	14.0		
11	13	29	Crown Heights (North)	Brooklyn	840	115	13.7		
42	=38	30	Lower Manhattan	Manhattan	348	47	13.5		
41	=43	31	Glen Oaks/Laurelton <sup>2</sup>	Queens	353	44	12.5		
32	28	=	Park Slope/Red Hook	Brooklyn	511	64	12.5		
48	48	33	Jam. Estates/Fresh Med	Queens	293	36	12.3		

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## Ranking of Community Districts by Percentage of Structural Fires

Str.	Str.	Arson per			No. of	No. of	% of Struct.	
Fire	Arson	Struct.			Struct.	Struct.	Fires Caused	
Rank	Rank	Fire Rank	Name	Borough	<u>Fires</u>	Arsons	By Arson	
39	42	34	Sheepshead Bay	Brooklyn	375	45	12.0	
56	=55	35	Kew Gardens/Richmond Hill	Queens	211	25	11.8	
7	15	36	West Harlem	Manhattan	952	110	11.6	
9	=16	37	E. Village/Lower E. Side	Manhattan	939	108	11.5	
19	22	38	Midtown	Manhattan	735	83	11.3	
44	49	39	Jackson Hts./E.Elmhurst	Queens	308	34	11.0	
34	=40	40	Throgs Neck/COC/City Is	Bronx	430	46	10.7	
35	=43	41	Flushing/Whitestone	Queens	422	44	10.4	
15	21	42	Fort Greene	Brooklyn	817	85	10.4	
30	34	43	Chelsea/Clinton	Manhattan	524	54	10.3	
33	=38	44	Astoria/Long Island City	Queens	466	47	10.1	
20	25	=	East Flatbush	Brooklyn	716	72	10.1	
23	29	n	Fordham/Bedford Park <sup>3</sup>	Bronx	625	63	10.1	
16	23	47	West Side	Manhattan	807	81	10.0	
52	=55	48	Canarsie/Flatlands	Brooklyn	252	25	9.9	
45	52	49	Marble Hill/Riverdale <sup>3</sup>	Bronx	302	28	9.3	
36	47	=	Murray Hill	Manhattan	414	38	9.2	
47	=53	51	Bay Ridge	Brooklyn	296	27	9.1	
27	36	52	Crown Heights (South)	Brooklyn	578	51	8.8	
51	59	53	Woodside	Queens	259	21	8.1	
21	37	54	Flatbush	Brooklyn	638	50	7.8	
24	=40	55	E. Side/Yorkville	Manhattan	623	46	7.4	
8	27	56	Washington Hgts/Inwood	Manhattan	951	69	7.3	
12	=31	57	Sedgewick/Parkchester <sup>2</sup>	Bronx	835	59	7.1	
38	=55	58	Williamsbridge/Wakefield	Bronx	388	25	6.4	
29	51	59	Greenwich Village	Manhattan	529	29	5.5	
			Other*		250			
			C.D. Designation Unavailab	le		57	and for	
			Total		34,237	5,075		
*Inc	ludes r	najor parks	and airports which serve mo	ore than one	community	district.		
1 C.	$\frac{1}{2}$ C.D. where Red Caps assigned for part of 1984 and 1985.							

<sup>2</sup> C.D. where Red Caps assigned for part of 1984 and 1 <sup>2</sup> C.D. where Red Caps assigned for part of 1985. <sup>3</sup> C.D. where Red Caps assigned for part of 1984.

		by Number of St	ructural Fire	<u>es</u>		
Struct. Arson <u>Rank</u> 3	Struct. Fire <u>Rank</u> 1	Name <u>1</u> Central Harlem	<u>Borough</u> Manhattan	<u>C.D. No.</u> 10	No. Struct. Fires 1,293	<pre>% Change 1984 to 1985 + .94</pre>
8	2	Bedford Stuyvesant	Brooklyn	3	1,263	- 2.09
4	3	East Harlem <sup>2</sup>	Manhattan	11	1,188	67
2	4	Highbridge <sup>1</sup>	Bronx	4	1,175	- 1.92
6	5	Morris Heights	Bronx	5	1,158	+11.24
1	6	East New York <sup>1</sup>	Brooklyn	5	1,035	- 7.42
15	7	West Harlem	Manhattan	9	952	+ 8.42
27	8	Washington Heights	Manhattan	12	951	+ 1.28
=16	9	East Village/L.E.Side	Manhattan	3	939	- 2.39
12	10	Brownsville	Brooklyn	16	892	- 7.37
13	11	Crown Heights (North)	Brooklyn	8	840	+ 2.19
=31	12	Soundview/Parkchester <sup>2</sup>	Bronx	9	835	- 0.0
9	13	Mott Haven	Bronx	1	826	-14.14
7	14	Williamsburg/Greenpoint <sup>1</sup>	Brooklyn	1	824	- 8.44
21	15	Fort Greene	Brooklyn	2	817	-16.29
23	16	West Side	Manhattan	7	807	-15.32
=16	17	Jamaica/St.Albans <sup>2</sup>	Queens	12	762	- 5.00
5	18	Morrisania <sup>2</sup>	Bronx	3	758	+ 7.67
22	19	Midtown	Manhattan	5	735	- 6.61
25	20	East Flatbush	Brooklyn	17	716	55
37	21	Flatbush	Brooklyn	14	638	- 6.31
10	22	Bushwick <sup>2</sup>	Brooklyn	4	636	+19.77
29	23	Fordham/Bedford Park <sup>3</sup>	Bronx	7	625	- 1.73
=40	24	Yorkville/East Side	Manhattan	8	623	+ 5.06
11	25	E. Tremont/W. Farms	Bronx	6	616	+13.86
18	26	The Rockaways <sup>2</sup>	Queens	14	614	+16.07
36	27	Crown Heights (South)	Brooklyn	9	578	+ 1.40
19	28	Coney Island	Brooklyn	13	569	- 5.00
51	29	Greenwich Village	Manhattan	2	529	+17.55
34	30	Chelsea/Clinton	Manhattan	4	524	- 3.50
14	31	North Shore	Staten Is.	1	522	- 1.32
28	32	Park Slope/Red Hook	Brooklyn	6	511	+ 5.14

## Ranking of Community Districts by Number of Structural Fires

Struct. Arson	Struct. Fire				No. Struct.	% Change
Rank	Rank	Name 2	Borough	C.D. No.	Fires	1984 to 1985
=38	33	Astoria/Long Is.City <sup>2</sup>	Queens	1	466	-11.24
=40	34	Throgs Nk/C-O-C/City Is.	Bronx	10	430	+21.81
=43	35	Flushing/Whitestone	Queens	7	422	-11.53
47	36	Murray Hill	Manhattan	6	414	-10.97
30	37	Borough Park	Brooklyn	12	397	- 3.87
=55	38	Williamsbridge/Wakfield	Bronx	12	388	+ 1.30
42	39	Sheepshead Bay	Brooklyn	15	375	+ 4.16
33	40	Corona/Elmhurst	Queens	4	354	+15.69
=43	41	Glen Oaks/Laurelton <sup>2</sup>	Queens	13	353	+ 2.91
=38	42	Lower Manhattan	Manhattan	1	348	+17.57
24	43	Hunts Point	Bronx	2	329	- 9.11
49	44	Jackson Hgts/E.Elmhurst	Queens	3	308	+ .33
52	45	Marble Hill/Riverdale <sup>3</sup>	Bronx	8	302	- 6.21
35	46	Sunset Park	Brooklyn	7	301	- 7.10
=53	47	Bay Ridge	Brooklyn	10	296	- 7.79
48	48	Jam. Estates/Fresh Med.	Queens	8	293	- 4.25
20	49	Morris Pk./Pelham	Bronx	11	286	- 4.35
=31	5บ	Bensonhurst	Brooklyn	11	264	- 1.86
59	51	Woodside	Queens	2	259	-11.90
=55	52	Canarsie/Flatlands	Brooklyn	18	252	-20.75
26	53	Central Area	Staten Is.	2	250	+12.61
50	54	Ridgewood/Glendale	Queens	5	228	- 3.39
45	55	Howard Beach/Ozone Pk.	Queens	10	214	+22.28
=55	56	Kew Gardens/Rich. Hill	Queens	9	211	- 3.21
=53	57	Forest Hills/Rego Pk.	Queens	6	172	- 5.00
58	58	Bayside/Douglaston	Queens	11	168	-13.40
46	59	South Shore	Staten Is.	3	156	- 3.70
		Other **			250	-17.20
		Total			34,237	- 1.26
1						

1 Indicates CD's where Red Caps assigned for part of 1984 and 1985. 2 Indicates CD's where Red Caps assigned during 1985. 3 Indicates CD's where Red Caps assigned during 1984. \*\* Includes major parks and airports which serve more than one community district.

Source: NYC Fire Department, Bureau of Information and Computer Services.

#### ARSON DEFINITIONS UNDER ARTICLE 150 OF THE NEW YORK STATE PENAL LAW

Arson in the First Degree (Class A-1 Felony). Section 150.20. 1. A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by causing an explosion or a fire and when (a) such explosion or fire is caused by an incendiary device propelled, thrown or placed inside or near such building or motor vehicle; or when such explosion or fire is caused by an explosive; or when such explosion or fire either (i) causes serious physical injury to another person other than a participant, or (ii) the explosion or fire was caused with the expectation or receipt of financial advantage or pecuniary profit by the actor; and when (b) another person who is not a participant in the crime is present in such building or motor vehicle at the time; and (c) the defendant knows that fact or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such person therein a reasonable possibility.

2. As used in this section, "incendiary device" means a breakable container designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion upon impact, containing flammable liquid and having a wick or a similar device capable of being ignited.

Arson in the Second Degree (Class B Felony). Section 150.15. A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire, and when (a) another person who is not a participant in the crime is present in such building or motor vehicle at the time, and (b) the defendant knows that fact or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a reasonable possibility.

 $\frac{\text{Arson in the Third Degree (Class C Felony). Section 150.10.}{\text{A person is guilty of arson in the third degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing an explosion.}$ 

Arson in the Fourth Degree (Class E Felony). Section 150.05. A person is guilty of arson in the fourth degree when he recklessly damages a building or motor vehicle by intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion.