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
Law Enforcement Bulletin

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A Special Report

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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The Cover:
With the Police Foundation vertical logo, the cover symbolizes the foundation "Crime File" video project.



Law Enforcement Bulletin

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William H. Webster, Director

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Patrick V. Murphy (left) presents award from the Police Foundation for law enforcement leadership to FBI Director William J. Webster.

The Police Foundation

A Special Report

The dramatic opening moments of the Police Foundation's series of "Crime File" videos are reminiscent of the popular "Hill Street Blues" television series: Scenes of officers at role call, on patrol, in raids, ending with a courtroom scene. More realistic than commercial television, these videos, produced by the Police Foundation under a grant from the National Institute of Justice, contain thoughtful, balanced analyses of issues affecting police work today.

These half-hour programs, a new medium for dissemination of research results and debate in criminal justice,

are important to the public, the public's elected policymakers, and to the police themselves. The newly appointed President of the Police Foundation, Hubert Williams, wants to increase the foundation's support of law enforcement agencies seeking to adopt more-effective means to accomplish their missions. Generating public and policymaker support of innovation, a purpose of these "Crime File" television productions, is one way of helping law enforcement to achieve this goal.

By
THOMAS J. DEAKIN
Special Agent/Editor,
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Special Agent Deakin

The Police Foundation was initially best known for its year-long Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, conducted with the cooperation of Clarence M. Kelley, then Chief of the Kansas City, MO, Police Department. Completed in 1973, this study showed that the level of preventive police patrol did not affect the crime rate or citizens' fear of crime.

This conclusion caused a re-examination of one of policing's basic tenets, that crime is prevented by random police patrol. Perhaps as important, the study opened policing's door to experimentation by showing that experiments could be conducted while a police department carried out its responsibilities to life and property. This was one of the goals of the Police Foundation: To overcome natural police objections to experimentation, objections based on fear the process would interfere with normal operations and obligations.

What is the Police Foundation and what is it trying to accomplish? What has been its impact on policing? How will the foundation's work affect the future of policing?

"The mission of the Police Foundation is to foster improvement and innovation in American policing and, thus, to help the police in their mission of reducing crime and disorder in America's cities."¹

Beyond this basic mission statement, underlying assumptions about police work guide the foundation; over the last 16 years, these assumptions have become guiding standards for much of American policing. The foundation believes that the control of crime and the maintenance of order depend on the cooperation of citizens,

thus police must be close to the citizens they serve. This belief is now a tenet of police practice that has helped to foster today's neighborhood policing programs and a variety of other programs designed to bring police and the citizenry closer together.

Other Police Foundation operating assumptions include:

"That the police must be willing to examine their practices and question and experiment with the ways they use their resources; That the police must be prudent and civil in the ways they use their discretion, especially in the use of force; That to be effective in controlling crime and maintaining order in the diverse communities of the nation's cities, police departments should actively hire and promote members of minorities and women; That, because of cutbacks in local funding for many police departments the police must do more with less."²

In many ways, especially the last, these assumptions are today governing the ways police do their job. Experiments with ways of using resources, prudence in the use of force (also as mandated recently by the Supreme Court), and hiring and promoting minorities (the number of black chiefs of police has greatly increased in recent years) are ways in which the police are seeking to do more with less, as evidenced in the pages of this Bulletin.

Ford Foundation Origins

On July 1, 1970, McGeorge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation, met with then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and outlined the Ford Foundation's plan to begin a Police Development Fund, which would have \$30 million to spend over the next 5 years. Three weeks later, on July 22,

“The mission of the Police Foundation is to foster improvement and innovation in American policing....”

Bundy held a press conference in New York City to announce the fund, which would make grants to police departments to bring about major reforms.

At the press conference, Bundy introduced Ivan Allen, Jr., former Mayor of Atlanta, GA, who would be the chairman of the board of the new organization. The board would include members of the legal, academic, and police communities, including Quinn Tamm, Executive Director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and a former FBI executive. Executive Director of the fund would be Charles H. Rogovin, former head of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and previously an Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts.

Other members of the board with police backgrounds included Michael Canlis, then President of the National Sheriff's Association; Hubert Locke, former Deputy Police Commissioner of Detroit and a professor at Wayne State University; David McCandless, Director of the Southern Police Institute in Louisville, KY; Lawrence Pierce, a former Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Police Department; and Stanley Schrotel, former Chief of Police in Cincinnati.³

A report on the newly established police development fund was issued at the press conference. In the foreword by McGeorge Bundy, the social changes of the 1960's were outlined as reasons for this new Ford Foundation effort:

“The need for reinforcement and change in police work has become more urgent than ever in the last decade because of rising rates of crime, increased resort to violence, and rising tension, in many communities, between disaffected or angry groups and the police.”⁴

The report noted that America had realized in recent years that there was a “seriously high incidence of crime” and the “system of criminal justice is inadequate for its prevention or the apprehension of criminals.” The 1965 Presidential Commission report, “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,” recommended far-reaching improvements, and later reports from the Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) and the Commission of the Causes and Prevention of Violence (the Eisenhower Commission) added significant observations on the need for more effective policing.

These commission reports observed that a fundamental attack on crime would require a national effort to lessen poverty, slums, ill health, and illiteracy, but the Ford Foundation said remedies to the criminal justice system “cannot wait for action on the full range of our social ills.” Noting that Federal funds would be available in the 1970's to assist local police for the first time (the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration), the foundation expressed concern whether our society would end up with more of the same system or with “something new and significantly different” in policing, because:

“We leave to the police many of society's problems, whether or not they are equipped to handle them. We have neither articulated a precise role for them in combatting crime, nor structured their broader role in the community. Nevertheless, whenever the lid blows, we call the police.”⁵

The Ford Foundation established a \$30 million fund to “assist a limited number of police departments in ex-

periments and demonstrations aimed at improving operations, and to support special education and training projects.” The fund would join with Federal, State, and local agencies in order to increase its impact.

James Q. Wilson, today's Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Police Foundation and a Professor of Government at Harvard University, told the Bulletin that the Police Foundation took its present name immediately after the Ford Foundation announcement of the formation of a Police Development Fund, to avoid any connotation that the “fund” was to improve policing in the manner of improving underdeveloped countries.

Wilson, an original member of the board of directors, said that a difference in policy priorities between the board and the Police Foundation's first President, Charles H. Rogovin, led to the selection of Patrick Murphy as the new chief executive officer of the foundation in 1973. The board wanted a research focus for the foundation while Rogovin, the board felt, was more interested in an emphasis on police leadership development and training.⁶

Another member of the Police Foundation's Board of Directors noted that the board is self-perpetuating; members elect new members as vacancies occur, and there is now a 6-year term of office for members of the board. The board, in the main, depends on the Police Foundation staff to present potential research topics which the board considers.⁷

Preventive Patrol Experiment

The first study to impact police operational practices was the landmark Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. Conducted from October 1,

“whenever the lid blows, we call the police.”

1972, to September 30, 1973, this study showed that increasing or decreasing the level of routine preventive patrol had no appreciable effect on crime, fear of crime, or citizen satisfaction with police services.

As Murphy's foreword to this report noted:

“It is not easy for police departments to conduct operational experiments. For one thing, maintaining experimental conditions cannot be permitted to interfere with police responsibility for life and property.”⁸

Murphy had just become President of the Police Foundation after beginning his law enforcement career as a New York City patrolman and working his way up to commissioner of the country's largest police department. Along the way he served as the top police executive in three other large cities. His willingness to experiment, advocacy of new ideas, and police experience, along with his unique service as the top police executive in four of the country's largest cities, made him the best known and most respected police innovator since August Vollmer, many police executives have noted. Murphy retired from the Police Foundation in 1985; his long-range impact on American policing nationally probably will be judged by students of police history as significant as that of August Vollmer or J. Edgar Hoover.

The Kansas City Police Department and the Police Foundation began the experiment under Chief of Police Kelley, who was appointed Director of the FBI before the study's completion. His successor, Joseph D. McNamara, said the experiment repudiated “a tradition prevailing in police work for almost 150 years.” Routine preventive patrol is the widely practiced patrol

strategy which assumes that the impression of police omnipresence on the streets through cruising patrol cars will deter potential offenders.

The principal spokesman for this widely accepted theory of preventive patrol had been O. W. Wilson, a veteran of the Berkeley Police Department, Chief of Police in Wichita, KS, and a prominent academic theorist on police issues. Later, he was the Superintendent of Police in Chicago. As Murphy noted:

“<this project> ranks among the very few major social experiments ever to be completed . . . never before had there been an attempt to determine through such scientific examination the value of visible police patrol.”⁹

This was only the first in a series of social experiments to test the tenets of policing. The concluding chapter of Murphy's 1977 book, *Commissioner*, speaks of the work of the Police Foundation: its philosophy “rests not on the proposition that American policing, with minor modifications, is in good shape but on precisely the opposite.”¹⁰

The Police Foundation initiated experimental studies using proven scientific technique. For example, the Kansas City preventive patrol evaluation divided one patrol division's 15 beats into an experimental area of 3 groups of 5 beats, using computer-based techniques, with similar crime figures, population characteristics, and calls for police service. One group of beats was designated “reactive,” where preventive patrol was eliminated and patrol cars entered only in response to calls for service. A second set of beats was the “control,” where the usual level of preventive patrol was maintained. A third “proactive” group of beats, with two or three times the usual level of preventive patrol, was established.

Victimization surveys before and after the experiment, reaching a total of 1,200 households, also determined the fear of crime and attitudes of citizens and businessmen toward police. The three sets of experimental patrol conditions—reactive, proactive, and control—appeared not to affect crime, delivery of police services, or the fear of crime in the way police often assume they do. Even one fear of the experimenters, that traffic accidents would increase in the reactive group of beats, did not occur.

This experiment was conducted by the Kansas City Police Department and evaluated by the Police Foundation. One police officer was one of four authors of the subsequent report, and another officer acted as one of the observers of the experiments. Three other officers and seven administrators of the department contributed directly to the project. Numerous academic consultants and the Midwest Research Institute helped design the surveys used and analyzed the data produced.¹¹

Other Studies

The decade of the 1970's brought numerous experiment reports and other studies of law enforcement issues to this country's police community. These experiments were carefully designed by social scientists using the latest methods of statistical analysis and verification, in cooperation with the various police departments that were helping conduct the tests. And the various experiments and reports were on subjects that the law enforcement community recognized as important issues for policing. This was a successful effort to prove the validity of Police

Foundation experimental methods that produced valid conclusions. The few earlier analyses of policing had not been accepted by the law enforcement community because the research methods or the data had been found lacking in some aspects.

Some of the issues addressed in 1974, the year of the Kansas City patrol experiment, included the subject of policewomen on patrol in Washington, DC. The Police Foundation report concluded that gender is not a legitimate occupational qualification for patrol work. This year also saw publication of *Guidelines and Papers from the National Symposium on Police Labor Relations*, jointly sponsored by the IACP and the Police Foundation. The next year, 1975, brought a study of officer height and its relationship to selected aspects of performance; a study of the cost and impact of police corruption; and an experiment in San Diego, CA, that showed the value of field interrogation in deterring certain crimes, particularly those committed by youths in groups.

Then, in 1976, there were reports on experiments that addressed the peer review approach to modifying the behavior of police officers (*Kansas City Peer Review Panel*, 1976); the effectiveness of patrol officers and detectives working in teams in Rochester, NY (*Managing Investigations*, 1976); a study of three intervention approaches—authority, negotiation, and counseling—which led a majority of officers in the experiment to decide that negotiation was the most important approach for recruits to learn (*The Police and Interpersonal Conflict*, 1976). Police personnel exchanges, the experi-

ence of six California cities; *Police Response Time* not strongly affecting citizen satisfaction with police service in Kansas City, MO (1976); and different approaches to criminal apprehension in Kansas City were published in 1976, along with *Police Chief Selection: A Handbook for Local Government*.

The next year brought a report on *Patrol Staffing in San Diego* (1977), a most important study of the comparative effectiveness and safety of one- or two-officer units which concluded that one-officer units are more efficient and safer. This year saw the results of studies in Detroit and Kansas City showing the importance of threats as predictors of domestic violence (*Domestic Violence and the Police*, 1977), a critical area to police patrol officers. The hard-to-maintain, but useful, team policing concept as an alternative to traditional patrol methods was detailed (*Cincinnati Team Policing Experiment*, 1977).

Performance Appraisal in Police Departments, Police Personnel Management Information Systems, and Selection through Assessment Centers: A Tool for Police Departments were all the subjects of 1977 reports. The next year brought a general administrative survey, *Police Practices*, 1978, which was a continuation of a study begun in 1951 by the Kansas City Police Department, and the history of a failed attempt to bring about radical change in a major American police department (*The Dallas Experience*, 1978).

The quality and quantity of these experiments and reports brought credit to the Police Foundation and to the social scientists who designed and implemented these pioneering studies. In a single decade, the Police Foundation had become a force for change and improvement in American policing.

Deadly Force

Consistency in his views on police use of deadly force is one mark of Patrick Murphy's innovative philosophy. When he was Police Commissioner of New York City, he changed the department's policies in this area, modeling them after the long-established FBI policy of using firearms only when necessary to protect the lives of officers or citizens, not to shoot those fleeing from a crime. In his testimony before the House District Committee, Murphy noted that restrictions on the use of deadly force can ease police-citizen tensions that lead to urban unrest. As he put it:

"The most distinctive characteristic of policing is the authority to use force. But with this authority comes the responsibility never to misuse it. This responsibility translates into an imperative on the part of police management to control police discretion so that officers employ only that degree of force necessary to do their job fairly and humanely.

"The use of force at its most extreme is the use of deadly force which can be described as the decision of a police officer to point a service revolver at another human being and fire it. This is the most momentous decision a human being can make—to take another life.

"Limiting the frequency of such decisions is one of the most important goals for the police chief and for the police agency."¹³

Six years later, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed Murphy's, and the FBI's, views on law enforcement's use of deadly force for all the Nation's police.

This concern with police use of deadly force was also seen in the Police Foundation's review of the litera-

“[Murphy’s] long-range impact on American policing nationally probably will be judged by students of police history as significant as that of August Vollmer or J. Edgar Hoover.”

ture on the subject and a survey of seven cities’ use of it in a 1977 report, *Police Use of Deadly Force*, followed in 1981 by *Readings on Police Use of Deadly Force*, edited by American University professor James J. Fyfe. Fyfe is a former lieutenant with the New York City Police Department, where he served for 16 years, and today is recognized as one of the foremost authorities in this field. Fyfe’s anthology of major articles from authorities on police use of deadly force includes two that originally appeared in the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* written by an FBI Agent in the Legal Counsel Division.

This valuable collection of articles was in response to the many requests of the Police Foundation for information on deadly force. As Fyfe noted:

“Often these requests come from small and medium sized jurisdictions in which single shootings have made deadly force a major concern. In some cases, that concern has also expressed itself in disorder, protests, and tensions which have led to the downfall of city administrations and police chiefs, and in enormous burdens to taxpayers.”¹⁴

Fyfe currently is directing an experiment, funded by the Metro Dade County, FL, Police Department, that is designed to identify techniques useful in defusing potentially violent police encounters with citizens.

Foot Patrol

In 1968, James Q. Wilson wrote of the three major styles of policing in America in *Varieties of Police Behavior*. These are the “watchman” style (police who are mainly concerned with the physical security of the community and its people), the “stranger” style (police as virtual outsiders brought in

to impose order in a community), and the “community service” mode, where police recognize their dual roles of crime prevention and order maintenance, plus miscellaneous service duties. While some suburban departments have long had this last style of policing and some big city departments are moving in this direction, more needs to be done, according to Wilson.

People want a “visible police presence” to improve the quality of life in their communities, recent studies have shown, according to Wilson, and this requires at least some police foot patrol. The Kansas City preventive patrol experiment early on showed that random motor patrol did not materially affect the crime rate or the community’s fear of crime. The most promising developments for actually having an impact on the crime rate are the programs targeted at removing high-rate repeat offenders from the streets.

As a young patrolman in New York City after World War II, Patrick Murphy learned the value of contact with the citizens he served on foot patrol. In New Jersey, passage of the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program in 1973 made State funds available for foot patrol in selected cities (28 in 1975, rising to 32 in 1980) in compliance with State criteria. Two-thirds of the \$12 million allocated was available for the “safe” part of the program. As a result of inquiries from State officials to the Police Foundation as to the cost-effectiveness of this program, the foundation undertook a multi-faceted study of the question of foot patrol.

In Newark, NJ, the foundation worked with the police department and the State to design an experiment with foot patrol to test a number of hypotheses: That (1) foot patrol would improve citizen attitudes toward police, (2) foot patrol would reduce crime, ei-

ther reported crime or crime victimization, (3) foot patrol would increase the number of arrests, and (4) foot patrol would increase job satisfaction of officers assigned it.

The complexities of conducting the overall New Jersey survey, and especially the Newark experiment, fill a 130-page report (*The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment*, 1981), which affords a perception of the difficulties faced by the researchers in such a project. But the findings developed shed new light on foot patrol: (1) Residents were aware of foot patrol to a much greater extent than motorized patrol and viewed police more favorably as a result, (2) crime rates, measured by reported crime or by victimization surveys, were *not* affected, (3) residents *perceived* diminishment of crime and disorder problems, and (4) officer job satisfaction did increase.

As Murphy’s preface to this report notes:

“One of the questions citizens most asked of mayors, council members, and police chiefs is, ‘Why don’t we have foot patrol, like in the good old days?’ The good old days were a time of tightly knit urban neighborhoods . . . and few patrol cars in which officers could be encapsulated and made remote from the citizens they served. . . . Citizens associate the officer on the foot beat with a time when crime rates were low and they felt secure in their neighborhoods.

“<This> study concludes that, although foot patrol (like routine motor patrol . . .) does not appreciably reduce or prevent crime, it does measurably and significantly affect citizens’ feeling of safety and mobility in their neighborhoods.”¹⁵

Domestic Violence

Perception of citizen safety, on the part of women especially, entered into the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, which took place over a year and a half in 1981 and 1982. Under a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a cooperative effort on the part of the Minneapolis Police Department and the Police Foundation tested police responses to domestic violence, which is "the staple and bane of every patrol officer's work life," according to former police officer James K. Stewart, now NIJ Director.

As the Police Foundation summary report on this project noted, this "was the first scientifically controlled test of the effects of arrest for any crime." And the experiment showed that of the three standard methods police use in responding to domestic violence—arrest, counseling both parties, or sending assailants away from home for several hours—arrest was the most effective response as it resulted in considerably less recidivism.¹⁶

The purpose of this experiment was to test the validity and effectiveness of 1) the traditional police response of doing as little as possible in domestic violence cases because the offenders would not be punished by the courts, 2) the psychologists' view that police mediate these disputes, but not make arrests, or 3) the approach recommended by the Police Executive Research Forum and by many women's groups that police treat domestic violence as a criminal offense subject to arrest.

Previous research in this area suggested that arrests take place in less than 10 percent of the cases, in spite of violence in one- to two-thirds of the incidents. Recently liberalized legislation in Minnesota, allowing police to make arrests for misdemeanor

assault without having witnessed the assault, allowed design of a classic lottery-type experiment. The three different responses being tested—arrest, counseling, and separation—were governed by a color-coded set of report forms for officers' use, alternating colors dictated the response the officers were to follow in each case.

Followup interviews by a female staff, plus criminal justice reports on the alleged assailants, were collected for 6 months after the experiment in the 314 cases studied. Only 3 of the 136 suspects arrested received formal sanction from a judge, but all spent the night in jail. The Police Foundation Report on this experiment carefully notes all the variables that might have affected the results, but the clear conclusion is that arrest has the best potential of reducing repeat violence in these types of cases. This could have tremendous impact on legislative action in other States that would effect police actions in domestic violence cases.

"Crime File" Videos

Domestic violence, like the police use of deadly force, is also the subject of a "Crime File" video, a new medium for the Police Foundation. Funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), part of the U.S. Department of Justice, the "Crime File" is a series of 22 half-hour video presentations that the NIJ calls a "quick course in criminal justice." Four-page study guides have been developed for each program to supplement the visual information with necessary historical background and additional sources.

Covering a broad range of topics—deadly force, domestic vio-



James Q. Wilson, Chairman of the Board of the Police Foundation, is the moderator of the Crime File videos.

lence, foot patrol, gun control, prison crowding, jail, search and seizure, victims, etc.—these tapes can be used before community gatherings to broaden perspectives for citizens and their community leaders, according to NIJ. The FBI is also using the tapes as part of its nationwide police training effort, as the programs present authorities in each area who address all sides of sometimes controversial issues. Professionally taped at a public television station in Washington DC, the whole series of programs, with study guides, is available for under \$400 from the NIJ.

Moderator of these programs is James Q. Wilson, Chairman of the Police Foundation's Board of Directors,

To obtain tapes of the Crime File series, write National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Box 6000 BCD, Rockville, MD 20850, or call 800-851-3420.

“[The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment] ranks among the very few major social experiments ever to be completed....”

who selected the topics and questions for these videos. Wilson's even-handed appearance as moderator adds credence to the authority and balance of the programs. Some of the videos include presentations by veteran police officers who participated in Police Foundation experiments, which add a great deal of weight, particularly in the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment for example.

Change in Leadership

Patrick Murphy's retirement in 1985 requires an examination of future developments that can be expected under the law-trained Newark police executive who succeeded Murphy as the new President of the Foundation. Murphy and the new President, Hubert Williams, had been chiefs of police because the board, as Chairman Wilson explained, wanted to preserve the "strong roots" of the Police Foundation in the law enforcement community by choosing presidents with practical experience. Wilson sees this policy continuing for the foreseeable future.¹⁸

Hubert Williams, for 12 years a Newark, NJ, police officer who specialized in undercover narcotics work, and since 1974, the Police Director in Newark, was selected as President of the Police Foundation in 1985. Williams' undergraduate degree is from John Jay College of Criminal Justice and he holds a law degree from Rutgers University School of Law.

Williams told the Bulletin that the overall mission of the Police Foundation will continue to be to improve American policing and the principal tool to realize this mission will continue to be experimental research in the field. But Williams said the foundation seeks to do more through technical assistance to help police departments in

implementing the results of research. In addition, Williams said the foundation seeks to develop centers of expertise to assist police agencies in dealing with problems as diverse as the threat of domestic terrorism, the growing incidence of liability suits, and the challenge of developing and using reliable, practical measures of police effectiveness.

"In all of our efforts, we will continue to anchor our work in our constituency, the police departments of America," said Williams.

He noted that the Ford Foundation originally funded the Police Foundation for a 5-year period. But because of the organization's contributions to policing and society, the Ford Foundation has seen fit to continue its support of the Police Foundation, helping to transform it into the permanent entity it is today.

The Police Foundation currently is exploring endowment possibilities from the private sector and has taken on projects, on a selective basis, from the Federal Government to help accomplish its mission. For example, the "Crime File" video series, the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, and a project on reducing fear of Crime in Houston and Newark were all undertaken with grants from the Justice Department's National Institute of Justice.

The current President of the foundation observed that a long-standing need of police executives was a means, or combination of means, of objectively evaluating the effectiveness of their agencies. This has to be coupled with means of measuring the effectiveness of their personnel; arrest statistics are only a small part of the answer to this need. Since the Police Foundation has developed methodology to measure the effectiveness of some law enforcement programs on


specific issues, the next area to be addressed should be the overall effectiveness of police departments and their personnel.

Williams called drug problems the most pressing domestic concern of the whole society. He noted its close ties to the overall crime problem; that narcotics addicts are usually unemployable and have to support their habit through street crime, often in poorer neighborhoods. He sees the unemployed of America, often uneducated, becoming "soldiers in the drug armies" that are growing across this country.¹⁹

Current Projects

Brian Forst, Director of Research for the Police Foundation, told the Bulletin that recently completed foundation projects includes the Houston and Newark Fear Reduction Experiment. A summary report was published this year by the Police Foundation (*Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report*, 1986). Since the 1980 Figgie report on the fear of crime, the existence of this fear has been targeted by a number of strategies. The foundation and NIJ designed a testing program for many of these strategies and found that opening neighborhood police stations and stimulating formation of neighborhood organizations works best for combating fears of white, middle-class homeowners, but is less effective in rental neighborhoods. The most successful programs, such as neighborhood police centers, door-to-door contacts, community organizing by police, and the coordination of several such approaches, had two characteristics in common:

—They provided time for police to have frequent discussions with citi-



Director William H. Webster meets with Patrick V. Murphy (left), former President of the Police Foundation, and Hubert Williams (right), the new President of the Foundation.

zens who were encouraged to express their concerns about their neighborhoods, and

—They relied upon the initiative and innovativeness of individual officers to develop and implement programs responsive to the concerns of the public.

Police officers may resist these neighborhood assignments (see "The Detroit Ministration Experience" in the February 1985, issue of the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*), but initial resistance gives way when officers learn how receptive citizens are to this strategy. This type of program involves a "proactive" strategy—a positive outreach—and careful recruitment of personnel, plus a commitment to the experimental method, are needed.

A summary report on the Washington, DC, repeat offender study was published in July 1986 (*Catching Career Criminals: The Washington, DC Repeat Offender Project*), and this approach is being replicated in San Antonio and other cities. In a program developed by the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police Department recognizing that a small proportion of criminals commit a disproportionate number of crimes, the foundation study found that the operation of a special police unit that focused on repeat offenders increased the likelihood of arrest, prosecution, and conviction of these offenders.

In the near future, the results of an experiment testing the results of arrest or warning strategies on recidivism among shoplifters will be published.

Forst said that a recent survey of police strategies to deal with the drug

problem is the beginning of a new Police Foundation focus on law enforcement and the narcotics problem, which will be the subject of a future article in the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*.²⁰

The Future

FBI Director William H. Webster, speaking last May 17 at Patrick Murphy's retirement as President of the Police Foundation, said that the "foundation has responded well to the challenge of the hard question." In accepting the first Patrick V. Murphy Award in law enforcement leadership, established by the foundation's directors, Webster praised Murphy's "aspirations for effective, Constitutional law enforcement."

Clarence M. Kelley, the former Chief of Police in Kansas City who worked closely with the Police Foundation on its earliest projects, became a member of the Police Foundation Board when he retired as Director of the FBI in 1978. Kelley told the *Bulletin* that since the report by the Police Foundation on preventive patrol in Kansas City, which addressed the effectiveness of patrol and has since been replicated by other police departments, the solid research work done by the foundation has led to a greater acceptance over the years of the foundation's reports and studies by police executives. Kelley said the foundation has contributed "a great many studies of great value," citing the recent report on the handling of domestic violence, that go to the heart of policing today.

"FBI Director William H. Webster... said that the 'foundation has responded well to the challenge of the hard question.'"

Mentioning the pioneering work the Police Foundation did in 1973 in executive training for FBI executives, Kelley believes, as a result of Police Foundation work and the FBI's National Executive Institute for police officials, that police departments are today in "good hands." Police executives are willing to experiment, to learn from the experimental process, and are willing and able to institute needed changes. The Police Foundation is achieving its goal of learning how police can be more effective and police managers are now more capable of transforming their departments.²¹

The now former President of the Foundation, Patrick Murphy, said that increased education of police is at least part of the reason that police executives are willing to experiment and institute needed changes. Federal money available in the 1970's through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which Murphy headed in 1968, "created the model" for the college-educated policeman. Now some States or departments offer pay incentives to police officers with college education. And the FBI National Academy, in cooperation with the University of Virginia, now offers some college credits in connection with its training. Today, Murphy sees at least those officers interested in police management as continuing on their own to get college educations, even without availability of Federal funds.

Murphy's view of policing in the near future notes that the art is improving, "but there is still an enormous amount of work to be done." He summarized to this writer five areas of con-

centration that need to be addressed in the remainder of this century and the next:

1) Neighborhood policing programs of all kinds need to be developed, improved, and expanded.

2) More police officers need college and graduate-level education.

3) There should be more civilianization of police departments. Civilian specialists can add to department operations and release sworn officers for police duties.

4) Departments must continue to become more representative of the communities they serve by recruiting women and minorities.

5) Restraint in the use of force, especially deadly force, must be increased.²²

In a soon to be published chapter of a new book, the current President of the Police Foundation, Hubert Williams, echoes these needs for the future in policing.

For 12 years, the Police Foundation was led by a man of innovative and strong ideas about the directions that policing should take. Experimental testing proved many of Patrick Murphy's ideas correct. Now Hubert Williams, another innovator with his own philosophy, has taken the helm, but both men base their philosophy on that originally developed by Robert Peel, the founder of modern policing in England. Peel's view was that policing in a democratic society must be deeply rooted in the consent of those policed. Williams' thoughtful essay, "Retrenchment, the Constitution, and Policing," in the American Bar Association's recently published collection of articles by leaders in the law enforcement community comments on the English roots of modern policing, ending with the comment that "the preservation of peace in our society cannot and

should not be achieved at the expense of hard-won freedoms."²³

We already have seen some police departments acting on conclusions that the Police Foundation has offered after rigorous experimentation over the last 15 years. And more are to come.

FBI

Footnotes

- ¹Police Foundation brochure, 1986, p. 1.
- ²Id., pp. 2-3.
- ³M.A. Jones to Mr. Bishop FBI memo 7/23/70, "Concerning Police Development Fund to be sponsored by the Ford Foundation."
- ⁴Ford Foundation, *A More Effective Arm*, August 1970.
- ⁵Id., pp. 4-5.
- ⁶James Q. Wilson, telephonic interview with author, July 7, 1986.
- ⁷Patrick V. Murphy, interview with author, June 26, 1986, at Council of Mayors office, Washington, DC.
- ⁸George L. Kelling, et al, *The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment* (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 1974), p. iii.
- ⁹Id.
- ¹⁰Patrick V. Murphy and Thomas Plate, *Commissioner: A View from the Top of American Law Enforcement* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), p. 256.
- ¹¹Supra note 8, pp. xi-xii, 1-10.
- ¹²Police Foundation, Testimony of Patrick V. Murphy, President, before Committee on the District of Columbia, U.S. House of Representatives, June 27, 1980, typescript, p. 1.
- ¹³Id., p. 4.
- ¹⁴Police Foundation news release, August 9, 1982, p. 2.
- ¹⁵Police Foundation, 1981, *The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment*, Washington, DC, p. iii.
- ¹⁶Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard A. Berk, *Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment*, Police Foundation Reports #1, April 1984, p. 1.
- ¹⁷Police Foundation & National Institute of Justice, "Crime File" brochure, undated.
- ¹⁸James Q. Wilson, telephonic interview with author, July 7, 1986.
- ¹⁹Hubert Williams, interview with author at Police Foundation office, Washington, DC July 8, 1986.
- ²⁰Brian Forst, interview with author at Police Foundation office, Washington DC, June 23, 1986.
- ²¹Clarence M. Kelley, telephonic interview with author, July 3, 1986.
- ²²Patrick Murphy interview with author, as above.
- ²³William A. Geller, ed, *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity* (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 347.

To obtain Police Foundation publications, write to the Foundation's Communications Department, 1001 22nd Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20037, or call (202) 833-1460.

NIJ Study— “When the Victim is a Child”

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has published a study of new methods for easing the trauma faced by child victims and witnesses who have to go through criminal proceedings. The report is designed for prosecutors, judges, police officers, and other professionals interested in improving the way the criminal justice system treats child abuse victims.

The study, “When the Victim is a Child,” responds to an urgent need expressed by the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence, which called for research into the court treatment of child victims. It discusses the competency of child witnesses, child victim advocates, videotaping statements, and testimony, as well as recommended changes in hearsay statutes. Included is a comparative survey of each State’s legislation to protect child witnesses in sexual abuse.

After discussing in detail the various problems both the system and the child victim face, the report makes a number of recommendations for improvements. For example, it called for an end to State laws requiring that witnesses be at least a certain age. Many States bar or greatly curtail testimony from young witnesses, whereas Federal rules permit testimony from any competent witness irrespective of age.

In addition, the report recommends the adoption of State legislation to permit special exceptions to the hearsay rule for children. Such laws

would admit certain out-of-court statements to counselors or prosecutors that might otherwise be ruled out because they are not available from the young witnesses during direct

Other legal provisions examined in the report include proposals for:

- Permitting a child witness to have a support person during testimony;
- Offering services to explain the court procedures to the child and his or her family;
- Directing law enforcement officers social service agencies, and prosecutors to conduct joint investigations in each child sexual abuse case using a single trained interviewer; and
- Scheduling trials to give priority to those involving young victims and discouraging postponements.

The study, which was conducted by a private research firm, also contains appendixes on interviewing child victims and videotaping a child’s statement or testimony.

The publication is for sale from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC (stock number 027-000-01248-5). The price is \$3.25. Microfiche copies are available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850, telephone (301) 251-5500. The toll-free number is 800-851-3420.

Fighting Fear in Baltimore County **The COPE Project**

"... a new role for police might very well be that they identify all problems [in the community] that might cause fear and disruption and address them as part of their duties."

By

CORNELIUS J. BEHAN

Chief of Police

Baltimore County, MD

Criminal justice costs the American taxpayer \$30 billion annually. Of this amount, the Federal Government spends about one-seventh; State governments, a third; and local governments, the remainder. Yet, our local police departments operate *without* a clearly defined, agreed-upon mission. Nowhere in the laws, rules, or regulations is a specific mission stated.

One reason for this is the way law enforcement developed in America. Police officers were not meant to have too much power; Americans cherish individual liberty and freedom.

At first, citizens policed themselves. Each family knew the rules of the community and the sanctions imposed for breaking the rules. Police were not needed, nor were they wanted. Many came to this country from Europe to escape political, religious, or economic oppression. Determined not to create regulators here to oppress them, they believed they could take care of their own problems. Law violators were "run to the ground" by the "hue and cry" and often punished right on the spot.

Private justice prevailed. Each individual took care of himself. When wronged, he made it right. The fault in that position is that the weak in the community were not strong enough to exercise private justice. They did not have either the wherewithal or the strength to bring it about.

Most police departments evolved as did the one in Baltimore County, MD. Prior to the Civil War, there was no police department. A night burglary from the county courthouse vault in Towson 118 years ago caused a demand, not for a policeman, but for a watchman, who was hired for the specific purpose of watching during the night. Later, when Baltimore County hired a police force, it was limited to 30 men—just 30—to ensure they wouldn't intrude on anyone's personal freedom.

Private justice was being replaced by public justice, which allows that everyone is equal under the law and equal in its protection. Victims without the physical or mental capabilities to capture their assailants now had the State to do it for them. Obviously, this makes more sense and has more equity than private justice.

In this process, however, citizens never gave up their right to protect

themselves. They kept the power of arrest and the power to use force to protect themselves from bodily harm.

Today, this country's 16,000 or more local police departments are decentralized—accountable to the people in their own jurisdictions and limited in their power. The police mission is what the public wants, and that changes constantly. Citizens want more than crime fighting. At least 70 percent of our efforts in Baltimore County have nothing to do with crime but apply to service. It's the same in other communities. This shows how vague the police mission is—that people mainly decide what police do. We help stranded motorists. When a storm breaks a power line or a water main bursts in the street, the police are called. When a woman goes into labor, or a boat overturns, or a child is missing, people turn to the police. At one time, the police in New York City picked up the garbage. Public health was considered an appropriate police objective.



Chief Behan

Through this unstable environment, the police forces in this country have tried to improve. We have always asked ourselves, "What should we do about crime; how do we improve our service or use technology?" Improvement comes by diligently trying to answer these questions. We now study constitutional law. We have substituted constraint for confrontation and modified our use of force. We study and deal with human and civil rights. And, we're trying to adapt to mini- and micro-computers.

Twenty years ago, these matters were not even discussed. Now, they are part of all basic and inservice police academy training and are very important to the way police departments operate.

Attacking Fear

We recently asked ourselves two new questions: "What is being done about the fear of crime?" and "Whose role is it to reduce fear in a community, if fear is, in fact, worse than the crime itself?"

At a seminar held at the University of Maryland's College Park Campus, Dr. Charles Wellford, Director of the university's Institute of Criminal Justice, delivered a thoughtful paper on fear of crime. It held:

- The fear of crime is not directly related to crime levels.
- The older people become, the less likely they are to be a victim; but, they become more fearful.
- Most fear of crime comes from vicarious experiences rather than from being the actual victim of crime.

That's when we ask ourselves whose job is it to attack fear and who is actually doing it. The answers are that it was *our* job and it wasn't being done.

Since we have no definable mission, and as we have in the past met crises head on because no one else was around to do it, we took it upon ourselves in Baltimore County to assume that fear is a problem to be addressed, and perhaps, the police should address it. Not knowing much about where this was going to take us, we went to work.

We created a new unit—Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE). Its mission was to identify and reduce citizens' fear.

The term "fear of crime" is nebulous, but after interviewing hundreds of people, we learned that they were:

- Afraid to go out at night,
- Afraid to open the door when someone knocked.
- Afraid to walk past a stranger,
- Afraid to come out of the bank,
- Afraid in the grocery store parking lot,
- Afraid to leave their curtains open, and
- Afraid to call the police or to sign a complaint if they saw a crime or had a specific problem.

COPE police officers had to be carefully selected and retrained. The traditional ways had to be replaced by new, innovative approaches to problem solving.

We equipped our COPE officers with motorcycles and compact cars. These vehicles brought them closer to the people. Motorcycles and cars were to be driven slowly, stopped frequently, so officers could greet neighbors and allow youngsters to become acquainted with officers and their equipment.

“COPE is becoming more active in identifying community problems that might not ordinarily come to police attention....”

Dr. Herman Goldstein, University of Wisconsin School of Law, had written a paper entitled “The Problem-Oriented Approach to Improving Police Service.” He suggested that “police examine all facets of a problem and do whatever is required to restore peace to a neighborhood.” Dr. Goldstein joined our retraining effort. Going beyond crime, he taught COPE to identify the causes of citizen fear and to do something about them. He believed that a new role for police might very well be that they identify all problems (in the community) that might cause fear and disruption and address them as part of their duties.

COPE began operation in July 1982. Each of 3 units is staffed with 13 police officers and 2 supervisors, for a total of 45 law officials. Placed under the jurisdiction of an area commander, they are deployed as needed. COPE officers have a great deal to say about how they are assigned. The police officers and the supervisors are required to frequently discuss what they have learned about a problem, what additional data must be developed, and what to do about it. It is new for a police officer to be at the problem identification and planning stages and then be involved in the solution. As a result of this involvement, the COPE teams have developed an esprit de corps that enhances their job performance.

Garden Village Project

On June 7, 1983, a gunfight occurred at Garden Village, a low-income, predominantly black-occupied apartment complex adjacent to the City of Baltimore. On June 18, a rape took place. Neither crime was reported to police, although one person was wounded in the shooting. Two factions

had developed in the community, and they were struggling for dominance. Crime in the area was above normal, with robbery heading the list. The people in Garden Village were living in terror, and their relationship with the government had so deteriorated that they had stopped reporting crimes.

A COPE officer was assigned as project coordinator. His team conducted house-to-house problem identification surveys, which revealed:

- 91 percent black residency,
- Low income,
- On the average, 3-5 years of residency,
- 59 percent of residents under age 29,
- 65 percent of respondents calling juvenile crime a main concern,
- Area lacking in recreational facilities,
- Lighting and alley deterioration in evidence, and
- No community leadership.

Seeing no government commitment to the area, people had a high degree of apathy toward law enforcement. The project team decided on a two-pronged approach: 1) *Community interaction*—to open lines of communication and attempt to alleviate community problems, and 2) *criminal intervention*—to gather intelligence information on all criminal activities and to coordinate this information with the patrol and detective forces in the department.

Through community interaction, data were gathered showing a need to upgrade street lighting. The COPE officer arranged meetings with the county lighting supervisor and the local utility company. Using data to show crime patterns related to lack of lighting, the COPE officer was able to convince utility officials to repair and upgrade 31

existing lights and to add 3 new mercury vapor lights.

Although the alleys were private property, COPE got the county roads department to repair the roads and alleys. COPE officers learned that the county could not afford to construct a new park facility, so they assisted the community in applying for a Federal grant through the community development coordinator's office. When the area did not meet Federal guidelines for funding, \$70,000 for construction of a multipurpose (volleyball, basketball, tennis) court and tot lot was included in the 1986 county capital improvements budget. Present playground apparatus was repaired and painted, and dilapidated equipment was removed. The overall general maintenance of the park has been improved. In the meantime, COPE is helping to organize a youth group in the area.

Since crime prevention in Garden Village was nonexistent, the management of the complex willingly responded to suggestions by COPE officers. Shrubbery was trimmed, locks upgraded, vacant apartments secured, and a crime reporting system established.

The interaction group secured a meeting place for the community to meet and organize. With their guidance, the citizens have filed for a charter.

The criminal investigation officers had similar success. Gaining the confidence of the youngsters, they developed information on the burglaries and several arrests were made. High visibility patrols were established and

maintained. When an arrest was made in the original shooting, friction between the two groups ceased. One community member was particularly disruptive. Learning that he was on parole, COPE officers had him returned to the penitentiary. Burglaries were reduced 80 percent; auto larceny, 100 percent.

COPE involved 11 agencies in this project. This is a far cry from the traditional police response. A forgotten neighborhood was shown that government cares, and fear was reduced accordingly.

Pioneering a New Idea

COPE is a new idea in law enforcement. It is pioneering. We had to rethink and retrain in regard to traditional police responses. Never before has fear reduction been a unit's mission. Sometimes it was a secondary accomplishment due to crime fighting or a patrol strategy. It requires identifying what people are afraid of, rather than making assumptions based on crime statistics or police know-how. Our experience shows that people are frightened for reasons the police never imagined. Also, if fear is not present in an area, COPE does not become operable.

In its first 3 years, COPE's mission—to reduce fear—has not changed. Its strategy has undergone significant refinement, however, and has achieved a uniqueness among today's policing concepts. This transition has been stimulated by COPE's training and acceptance of Dr. Goldstein's problem-oriented approach to policing. COPE has shown strong evidence of becoming more skillful in problem identification and analysis and more creative in approaching solutions to community problems.

It is devoting more time to the individual community, i.e., committing itself to fewer communities for *longer* periods of time:

- 121 communities in 1983 (average of 3 weeks each),
- 63 communities in 1984 (8 weeks each), and
- 34 communities in 1985 (18 weeks each).

The average total hours committed to each community have tripled since the first year.

COPE is now more selective and learning to verify alleged problems and is more proficient at recognizing community problems needing its services. COPE has improved significantly in its efforts to identify underlying conditions contributing to fear/disorder and pays less attention to police perspective and more to citizen perceptions. For example, a fear elderly persons had of purse-snatching was identified and greatly reduced through education, including a 7-minute police/citizen home-made video.

COPE is becoming more active in identifying community problems that might not ordinarily come to police attention, hoping to avert disorder before it occurs. For example, in the case of a citizen threatening to shoot or kill juveniles who were harassing him, the police met with the citizen, ensuring police attention, interacted with the juveniles, changing gathering patterns, and became involved with the police public information office, to obtain media support and coverage of efforts.

To deal with panhandling, alcoholic vagrants who were causing fear among shoppers and merchants, the chamber of commerce helped with fliers asking citizens not to contribute to panhandlers in order to discourage the lifestyle. COPE helped develop and supported local ordinances to better

control panhandling and obtained support of the health department and social services for a detoxification facility. The assistance of local liquor stores in controlling sales was obtained, and COPE established a dialogue with vagrants to compile personal histories, developing profiles of hard-core vagrants for court and police use.

A Final Fact

One underlying discovery, or truth, comes clear in this endeavor. If any government system, including criminal justice, is to work, support and leadership from the highest elected officials are essential. The police cannot get roads paved, shrubbery cut, panhandlers convicted, or parks cleaned without the help of other agencies. Only "the people's choice," their elected officials, have the position and power to force cooperation and coordination.

Unfortunately, not all political leaders understand this role. Therefore, the public must demand it of them. As a condition of office, this kind of leadership must become a main priority. If the police, who are on the cutting edge of community fear and discontent, discover the causes, then a mechanism—like COPE—is needed to provide the solution. This, the elected officials must realize, is the most important part of their job.

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