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COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE 1980'S:
RECENT ADVANCES IN POLICE PROGRAMS

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INTRODUCTION

The idea for a conference to explore emerging issues in Community Policing was conceived and developed in the Research and Program Development Branch of the Canadian Police College and the Research Branch of the Ministry of the Solicitor General. Personnel in each unit who were in touch with research and experimentation considered that the current state of knowledge and developments undertaken in particular communities merited such an event. After some preliminary discussion, the R.C.M.P., through the Canadian Police College, and the Ministry of the Solicitor General agreed to jointly sponsor the conference. Much further discussion and negotiation ensued, an agenda was produced, speakers were invited and decisions were made about whom to invite. This volume is an edited version, to greater or lesser degree, of the papers presented.

We had several objectives in mind in organizing the conference, and in publishing these proceedings. First, we wanted to stimulate thought and discussion about major aspects of community policing in the Canadian police community. To this end, we decided to invite knowledgeable and experienced speakers from the United States, Canada and Great Britain. Each was asked to address the particular dimension with which he was most familiar and to be prepared for questions and discussion. In addressing broad issues, and the policy implication, we invited as participants a select group of police chiefs, federal and provincial officials and police researchers. The stimulation we sought was evident in the discussion both during the conference and in its aftermath.

A second objective was to encourage change, initiative and innovative developments in the Canadian police community. This included projects and initiatives currently being implemented in various communities as well as possible new developments. As subsequent events have shown, the conference has had an undoubted impact either as a direct stimulus to change or as reinforcement for changes already in progress.

A third goal, really implicit in the first two, was to provide a forum wherein police executives, government officials and researchers could exchange ideas and discuss common concerns. This is something which is, unfortunately, all too infrequent but which in this case was highly successful. It is interesting to note that there has already been one equally successful follow-up workshop at the Canadian Police College with another planned for late 1987. The Research Branch of the Ministry of the Solicitor General is similarly engaged in follow-up activities. The publication and dissemination of this volume will ensure that the ideas generated at the conference will be widely available in Canada and available for use in a variety of settings.

The papers have been organized into four broad topic areas although, given the realities of policing, the overlap between them is certainly evident and expected. These are: General Issues in Community Policing; Management of Community Policing; Operational Issues; and the Role of Research.

Don Loree and Chris Murphy

PART I
GENERAL ISSUES IN COMMUNITY POLICING

Taken together, the three papers in this section address the past, present and future of policing and come to grips with some of the key changes that have been and will be instrumental in shaping the role of police. If community policing is to be more than just a term trotted out when politically expedient, there must be some fairly clear philosophical orientation and direction guiding the process; there must be structural change that will allow the innovations to have a chance to prove themselves; and there must be perceptual changes on the part of police management and street cops alike about the nature of their work and the reality of policing a changed and changing society. These are the themes that run through the three papers and the hard questions they pose.

Henry Jensen, drawing upon decades of operational and administrative experience with the RCMP, challenges the traditional views of police managers. The manager of the future must be innovative and flexible, not bound to tradition. The police organization itself will have to adapt to changing circumstances, making use of all available knowledge. The community must become a real part of community policing, with input that will challenge many with traditionalist views. The community and policing are changing and police executives must become students of both.

George Kelling, a student of policing for many years examines the processes of change in policing in the U.S., the current situation and some possible future directions. The police must become closer partners with the community in combating crime and fear of crime. However, the police responsibility is much broader and this needs to be recognized by managers to a much greater extent than at present. To this end, managers should move toward greater latitude of patrol, and enhance the status of this primary police function. The "professional" model of policing, and the isolation from community that it engenders, needs to be replaced by a less bureaucratic, decentralized and more service oriented perspective that deals with the reality of the community and its needs.

In the third paper, Chris Braiden argues for what is essentially a humanizing of police management and of policing in general. Describing himself as an "average street cop" he draws on his many years on the street in Edmonton. Policing is too numbers oriented as managers look for measures of what they do. This merely stultifies policing and inhibits the initiative of street officers. Police need to re-evaluate what they do and why or else face becoming redundant to most of the community. The crime-fighting model, and ideology, is long out-dated and unrealistic, promoting a perception by and of the police that is, in the long term, harmful. The future demands police leaders who inspire rather than restrain their departments and who know, understand and work with the communities they serve.

1. OPENING ADDRESS

Deputy Commissioner H. Jensen
Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to our nation's capital, to those of you who have come from other parts of Canada or other countries. On behalf of Commissioner Simmonds and all members of the RCMP, I am pleased to welcome you to this conference which I think is important and certainly timely. We will be addressing the topic Community Policing in the 1980's: Recent Advances in Police Programs. Although the Commissioner is unable to be here, he sends his greetings and best wishes to all of you for an informative and successful conference.

The RCMP as an organization, through the Canadian Police College, is pleased to be able to sponsor this event in collaboration with the Research Division of the Ministry of the Solicitor General. It is gratifying to see the response and the interest from police forces across Canada, from provincial governments and others with strong interests in the policing endeavour. I am especially pleased to welcome the international body of speakers, both from police and academic circles, from Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Hopefully in the process of sharing ideas and experiences we can shed a little more light on our mutual policing problems and look collectively and individually into the future perhaps with a greater degree of assurance. I'm somewhat humbled to be addressing a group such as this.

This conference has been in preparation for just about a year. The idea for it stemmed from a number of sources: interest by people in the Research Division and by people in the Canadian Police College in recent developments and directions in police research externally; the police literature on the topic; growing awareness of the numerous changes and experiments that are being undertaken by various police forces in many cities of Canada and abroad; and also from concerns that are being expressed by senior police officials, civilian researchers, and political personages about the changing role and function of police in a modern, urban society. Accordingly, we have brought together here police leaders and researchers, government officials and private individuals who are actively involved and deeply interested in the subject. This assemblage, of course, represents but a small part of the total Canadian police community but we know that ideas which are generated here will be communicated on a much broader basis. To this end, our conference proceedings will be published and they will be distributed as soon as possible.

Shortly, as the presentations and discussions begin, we will see the fruition of the many months of planning. I should caution you that in my view there are no easy answers that will be forthcoming; even the task of identifying and defining the problems is

a most difficult one. Over the course of the next two-and-a-half days, we hope to point to possible directions for change and innovation in the policing environment; perhaps a change in mandate; perhaps changes in approaches and functions. We hope that we can pose questions that will involve a reconsideration and a reconceptualization of policing and to examine the role and function of the police by considering what we are doing now, why we are doing it and perhaps what we should do or might have to do.

We in Canada, as elsewhere, are acutely aware that the nature of police work has changed considerably in recent years, as has the nature of the society that we live in and the communities that we serve as police officers. New demands for policing services continue to grow; often they grow more rapidly than the resources that our communities are able to commit to the policing problem. New types of crime have come to the fore: changes in technology and communications, a computer-based society, etc., have all served to assist those with a criminal mind to develop new forms of theft, fraud and other forms of crime. Police forces in this country are caught up, at this time, in a tightening fiscal squeeze. We are continually asked to do more and more, with what seems to be less and less. This is stretching our managerial skills to the limit. Our problems are internal as well. We must come to grips with an aging police force, or police forces, in an era where there is little or no growth in police establishments. All this is coupled with changes that will flow from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. And finally, we also face a growing and changing involvement in policing functions from the private security industry. As senior police executives, we must always be students of policing. We know that we must be aware of these changes and the implications of external change if we are to maintain viable, effective and efficient services to the communities that we serve.

In recent years, we have seen a great deal of information documenting perceived problems and issues facing us and many suggestions for improvement and change in the way in which we fulfill our function. Policing research, searching for understanding of the police role and for ways to better deliver services, has questioned many of the underlying assumptions about police work and police functions. For example, questions have been raised concerning the efficacy of rapid response to calls for service in some circumstances, and about the role of detectives in solving crime in others. Traditional measures of police activity may no longer be appropriate or adequate. This research, conducted with the active collaboration or many police forces in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere has shown us alternate ways of looking at policing issues and police functions. Discussions about the merits of a problem-oriented approach to crime rather than an incident-specific approach is a case in point, and one which we are all familiar with as we move to more comprehensive crime analysis systems in our given forces. Finally, we are increasingly aware of alternate ways of doing things that arise out of the research and experimentation con-

ducted by and within police forces. Of course, some of these
alternatives are found to be effective and some certainly have no
utility at all. However, it is in the exploratory process that
policing has developed and will continue to develop.

As a result of this research activity in many countries and
many police forces, including the work sponsored and conducted by
research branches at the Canadian Police College and the Ministry
of the Solicitor General, our collective knowledge about policing
has expanded in recent years. As a result of dissemination of the
results in reports and journals, including the Canadian Police
College Journal, an increasing number of police managers, academ-
ics and other people are aware of what is transpiring. This
dynamic process of questioning and searching for answers assists
the police in continuing to accomplish their mission better. The
more we know about ourselves and the environments in which
we labour, the more relevant and effective we can be and should
be. But as practitioners, we the police must also be students of
our profession. We must recognize that, like everything else,
policing is subject to pressure for change, both internal and
external, and that we indeed will have to change; much more than
we have in the past. The leadership that we can offer is criti-
cal.

I would like to touch now on but three aspects of change and
then return to the important leadership issue. The first concerns
the changes that have occurred in the socio-economic, demographic
and political dimensions of Canada, particularly in urban
society. Cities have been under considerable stress as a result
of a combination of population growth, multi-racial mixes, and
fiscal restraint. The city of the 1980s is not the city that we
all knew when we began our careers as police officers. The city
of the 1990s will also, likely, be significantly more different.
There are pressures on all institutions, including the police,
that make it necessary for us to examine what we do, why we do it
and to assess the consequences of our actions or inactions. The
best example of this pressure, I suppose, may be seen in increas-
ing demands for accountability of police management, of fiscal and
financial management and of our policies. This is a fact of life
of which we are all becoming increasingly aware on a daily basis.
Are we meeting the needs of our constituencies now? Will we be
prepared to meet them in the future?

The second point that I would like to make involves the rela-
tionship between the police and this very heterogeneous, more
knowledgeable and articulate community; a community which we can
expect to be more demanding and more questioning. How well do our
approaches reflect the concerns of these communities? The recog-
nition by police of the limitations of a reactive, primarily law
enforcement mode, and their movement towards a pro-active commun-
ity involvement seems to auger quite well in this respect. How-
ever, we as police executives must continue to look to the future
of this relationship in our heterogeneous society. Changes in
legislation in areas such as civil rights and police powers are

redefining our relationship with the community in important ways. We look at cities in which fear of crime remains high in spite of the fact that in some areas there are declining crime rates. Where victimization studies show there still remains a very large volume of unreported crime we must ask ourselves, "Why?"

As I mentioned, and as the changes that many of you have implemented in your forces effectively demonstrate, some old traditional modes of policing that stress control and enforcement ar no longer sufficient. Too much distance is sometimes put between the police and the public. This distance is not effective in this day and age.

Broader, community-oriented and community-based approaches, which are being introduced in some quarters, certainly are not panaceas but nonetheless, in moving the direction that greater experience, research and common sense tend to dictate, there are many positives. However, there are important correlates of this that cannot be disregarded, primarily involving community input into the decision-making and goal-setting processes through collaborative efforts that are mutually satisfactory to the police and the community. This poses challenges for us as police managers, certainly now and in years to come.

The third area of change that I would like to touch upon involves the police institution itself. Successful movement in a community-oriented policing direction requires a readiness to examine and change, both in philosophical orientation and in organizational structure. That police forces are willing and able to change is illustrated by efforts that are being made in a number of Canadian and foreign police forces in the immediate past and certainly today. We look forward to hearing from some of these who will probably account for their experiences first hand. The clear message that seems to emerge is that the traditional add-on programs are no longer adequate to meet current policing needs, at least in some of our communities.

This now brings me to the critical issue of police leadership. This role of police executives is critical in identifying problem areas and collaborating with the community, with other agencies and interest groups in efforts to define and ultimately achieve mutually acceptable ends. In this process, there will be times when we must be prepared to reassess and revise our goals if we find that some of our more traditional policing goals are not the community goals or are not given the same priority. This obviously is a process fraught with difficulties but one which offers great potential benefit for police and the community alike. It demands leaders who are alert and who are questioning; who are willing to accept challenges, to experiment, to innovate and to take risks. I doubt that an overall blueprint for success will emerge from your discussions over the next two-and-a-half days. There are no manuals or directives articulating the stages to follow and I doubt that any will be written here. Each police force, while learning from what others have done, will have to

chart its own course to meet the particular circumstances and needs that are unique to its community.

Some police executives here are responsible for policing several communities, many of which are different and have different needs. All sectors of a given single city may not necessarily be the same and may have different requirements. You'll appreciate that this is a challenge; more difficult for the Ontario Provincial Police, the Sureté du Québec and the RCMP. My force polices over 200 municipalities under contract, as well as 8 provinces and 2 territories. That requires significant flexibility, from the central headquarters as well as the division headquarters, to permit the various detachments and units to deliver something that is tailor-made for those given communities.

In addition, we will always face the issue of internal leadership and the management of change within our respective organizations. The problem of ensuring that policy directions and changes are implemented in an effective manner at the operational or street level is a very difficult one. Appropriate leadership is necessary to inspire all members of a police force and give them the commitment that is necessary if change is to be successful. As we are all well aware, changes are coming and an "I'm alright Jack" attitude must be a thing of the past. The question here is, "will we, the police, be followers in the process or will we take the initiative and lead?" In large measure then, this is what the conference is all about: the process of change and the role of police and police leadership in it.

The term 'Community Policing' is a key phrase in the conference title. It has come to be regarded by many as symbolic of the current or proximate stage in the process: recognizing of course that there is no one ultimate definitive end state in social and institutional evolution. It will go on forever. The term 'Community Policing' has been given many meanings, just as there are numerous interpretations of how to implement it via police programs. Various perspectives on both terms will be proferred during the conference. I trust that we will move towards a greater understanding of both of these concepts and their implications.

However, as a starting point, let me advance the following definition from an article that was written by Phillip Stenning. "Community policing ... refers to some arrangement for policing which seeks to give some significant role to "the community," however defined in the definition and performance of the policing function itself." Some such definition, if acceptable, involves the necessity of a much broader and reconceptualized view of policing and police functions than has traditionally existed. It is encouraging and indeed instructive that so many of you are taking your forces in this direction; that so many have made a conscious choice to throw open the windows, to let in the fresh air of new ideas and new directions. This is not without risk; no innovation is, but the potential gains are great, as your presence

here attests. I would not want to suggest that all that we have
done in the past or all that we are doing today is necessarily
inappropriate. Obviously, the police service in this country has
met with considerable success in the past but we must maintain the
vigor and vitality to continue to drive it in a responsive direc-
tion.

My own organization has also been active in this respect.
The most recent result being the report by Corporal Muir and Dr.
Murphy. Dr. Murphy is with the Ministry of the Solicitor General;
Corporal Muir was attached to our Contract Policing Branch and is
now at the Canadian Police College. You are no doubt familiar
with part of their publication at least. In this we have sought
to see what has been done in terms of community policing, what is
known about it, and more importantly, we wanted to initiate dis-
cussion and consideration of what is possible and sensible. In
his address to the International Conference on Police Accountabil-
ity in 1981, Commissioner Simmonds argued for policing that is
closer to the community and the people being policed. The Muir-
Murphy report, and many other initiatives, attest to our concern
and commitment.

In concluding, I believe we all look forward to the next two-
and-a-half days as a time to learn; a time to explore new ideas; a
time to challenge; and a time to debate where we are and where we
might or should be going.

This is a unique opportunity where we have the ability to
examine and discuss the most current views on various facets of
community policing with researchers and practitioners who are all
in the forefront of these developments. It is an opportunity for
each of us, to hear first hand what is being done elsewhere in
Canada and abroad. We will not be told what to do, but rather
told of what has been done and what we might be able to do. It is
up to each of us to listen, to discuss, to weigh the arguments, to
question, to assess the ideas put forward and ultimately ferret
out what is useful or appropriate to our country and to the
communities that we serve in particular.

I would like to stress two ideas that I mentioned earlier.
First, whatever the future holds for community policing and how-
ever the relationship between the police and the community will
develop, it will only reach fruition through active experimenta-
tion by police forces themselves. This is essential and is predi-
cated upon dedicated police leaders with a clear vision of where
they wish their forces to go, of where their forces should go.
And lastly, as I mentioned earlier, there are no easy or simple
answers. There are only ideas, examples that others have tried --
that may or may not have been successful -- and new approaches
that we hope you will try. I feel very humbled by the quality of
speakers that we have available to us and the calibre of police
leadership and others who are involved with the regulation of
police forces or involved in police research in this country or
other countries. And I am satisfied that I, more than anyone, can
learn a great deal from this exchange. Thank you and welcome.

2.   THE CHANGING FUNCTION OF URBAN POLICE:
THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY POLICING

Professor George Kelling
University of Wisconsin

I want to talk with you about American policing from the
point of view of one who has been looking at American policing for
approximately 20 years. Some of you will recognize without having
to be told, that in an earlier incarnation I was a seminary
reject, because I will not be talking with you dispassionately.
I will not be talking to you as a researcher about American polic-
ing, but rather as an advocate.

My relationship with policing over the years has been quite
checkered. I know that after the Kansas City study was published,
there was a motion on the floor of the IACP to ban researchers
from police departments in the United States. For a long time
police executives were more than happy to acknowledge that indeed
I was an outsider and a civilian. I was quick to claim that as
well.

Something funny happened in about 1982. Suddenly police
started to talk to me and say "we". I will reflect on the dra-
matic change in policing that took place in 1981 and 1982. It was
so dramatic that even those of us that were working very closely
with policing didn't realize it. As researchers, some of us view
ourselves as holding up mirrors to the policing occupation and
letting the policing occupation look at itself. What happened was
that suddenly things didn't make much sense and we couldn't figure
it out. What does this business of the Kansas City Study mean?
What does this business about response time mean? Where are we
going in policing? Nobody had any idea really. And we could only
talk in bits and parts. Around 1982, suddenly some things fell
together. When we went back out and looked at policing again
there were things going on that were profoundly different than in
the 1970s. I'd like to talk about what policing looked like prior
to the 1970s, how it got that way, and the extent to which it has
dramatically reshaped itself.

Now, I think there are some police leaders in the United
States that would reject some of my portrayal of American polic-
ing, but I don't think many of the elites in policing would. Many
would go farther than I and say that the changes are even more
dramatic than I portray them. I would add that in terms of
research in the United States, I think we are also approaching a
critical new point. Research up to now has focused on aggregate
police activities: preventive patrol, rapid response and investi-
gative activities. I think we're going into a new stage of police
research that focuses on a much different subject and my presenta-
tion will finish on this point. Let me begin with the conclusion,
and that is that more and more, we're going to be focussing on
what the individual police officer is doing, rather than aggregate

activities. I think in a sense we know where American policing has to go, we know where it can't stay, and we have a pretty good idea of what impact we can get from certain kinds of aggregate police activities. But, we still have not developed the wisdom of the patrol officer or the investigator, and we have still have not learned about the wisdom of the patrol officer and the investigator.

The American model of policing that dominated from the turn of the century until the 1960s was very impressive. It grew out of unique American circumstances. It grew out of tremendous problems with corruption in American cities, not only in policing but in government generally, and not just in cities but in the federal government. For the most part, corruption and inefficiency were the most serious problems that police reformers tried to deal with around the turn of the century. It was not only corruption but an idea of inefficient clowns. The Keystone Cops were just not a Hollywood artifact but represented a deeply held American view of policing. In the 50 to 60 years before 1960 policing was pulled up by its bootstraps by leaders such as Volmer, O.W. Wilson and J. Edgar Hoover. They developed a model and a vision of policing around which a profession developed. That vision gave to policing a sense of its own identity. It developed a coherent organizational strategy.

Up to that time, policing had been conceived of as a broadly based social service agency in American cities. Police ran the first soup kitchens and bread lines. Police stations were built so that immigrant workers could spend nights there. One of the first things the reformers did, especially O.W. Wilson, was to narrow the focus of American policing. Policing became synonymous with law enforcement and fighting crime. Police developed the idea that by concentrating on serious crime, and by attacking crime directly, they could have a great impact on the level of crime in American cities.

Secondly, policing changed its source of authority. Up to that time American policing found its support and its authority in local politics the extent that authors such as Fogelson talked about American police as being adjuncts to political machines. J. Edgar Hoover, O.W. Wilson and other police reformers, pulled police away from local communities, primarily by putting police in cars. This tactic was less for strategic purposes but was much more oriented toward breaking the link between communities and the police. The idea developed that police would be professionals relating impersonally to communities, without emotional investment or close ties to them. The source of their authority was not to be in the political will of the community but would be found instead in criminal law and in police professionalism. So for a generation, if you asked American police why they did what they did, they would say "we did it because of the law," or "because of police professional wisdom." To say otherwise was tantamount to admitting to corruption. Political or community or neighbourhood

influences on the police were considered to be corrupting and out
of line.

After the police were in cars, authors such as O.W. Wilson
started to develop a rationale about, tactical approaches to
crime, that had to do with the idea of the car moving quickly
through city streets creating the feeling of police omnipresence.
When radios and later on computers became standard equipment, they
developed the idea of rapid response to calls for service.
Strategy developed around an existing reality, the police in
cars. At first cars were viewed as a means of getting police
farther away from citizens and as a means of police going from
beat to beat. They could go to a beat, get out of their car,
patrol the beat, and then get back in the car and go on to another
beat. Later on, O.W. Wilson developed the theories of preventive
patrol and rapid response to calls for service.

The style of policing that developed was impersonal. A cari-
cature of that, was Sgt. Friday, "just the facts mam, just the
facts." A woman would have been raped, assaulted, was upset, emo-
tionally troubled, and Sgt. Friday would respond, "just the facts
mam, just the facts." The feelings and the welfare of the victim
were less of concern than solving the crime on an impersonal
basis. Organizationally, police seized upon an idea of central-
ized command and control. Rather than have district stations
where there would be more influence from neighbourhoods and commu-
nities, American policing moved to centralized command and con-
trol, so that all decisions would be made from the top in a homog-
enized form of policing. Preventive patrol and rapid response to
calls for service, would be distributed across a community based
on the idea of calls for service and reported crimes. Working
closely with communities, was tantamount to corruption.

By the 1960s, that model had reached its fruition. Police
were in relatively good shape. They were in good shape in
American cities, when the 1967 President's Commission was
created. It said there were some problems with minorities not
liking preventive patrol because of its aggressiveness, but that
preventive patrol was so important that it had to be continued.
Rapid response to calls for service was viewed as central to
policing. Investigators weren't even talked about in the
President's Commission report. It was just assumed that every-
thing was alright in American policing. Police executives would
go to City Councils in the 1960s and they were able to get more
and more police. Policing was riding high.

During the 1960s in the United States, however, certain so-
cial changes took place that were quite dramatic. First of all
crime started to increase and it was just beginning. We declared
war on crime in the mid-1960s and we didn't know that by 1980 it
would still be getting worse and worse. Secondly, police ran into
the whole issue of civil rights, civil unrest and the movement of
minorities in the United States. Cities changed, the people that
formerly lived in cities had moved out and cities became increas-

ingly populated by new urban dwellers. Suddenly, policing began
to fail on its own terms. Now, what do I mean by that? All
studies aside, it didn't matter what the police did they couldn't
improve their record dealing with crime. Despite police depart-
ments doubling in size, despite almost every city getting
increased money for police, crime simply did not respond. Later
on, research into preventive patrol, research into response time,
started to provide more evidence of that apart from just the over-
all statistics. Despite the vigor of the model and despite its
importance in rallying police, the changing serial circumstances
of American cities rendered police tactics obsolete. Police tac-
tics also failed to reduce citizens' fear. Fear went up even in
areas of low crime and continues to escalate to this day. Some of
it quite realistic, others of it extraordinarily unrealistic. But
it was fear that jeopardized American cities. People took drastic
action; they moved out of cities, they baracaded themselves in
homes, they stopped using neighbourhood shopping centres. As a
result, the impact on American cities was very dramatic.

Third, despite the fact that police allocation plans on the
surface were equitable, that is depending on how many calls for
service, and upon crime levels, minorities continued to complain
about police. They complained less about outrageous abuses of au-
thority, but more about uncivil treatment, inadequate service and
not enough police. Police were never, during this era, able to
satisfy the demands of minorities.

The fourth thing that occurred was that police began to lose
their broad-based citizen support. They lost their political sup-
port. It was no longer possible to convince citizens to increase
the size of police departments. For the most part, citizens and
political leaders simply gave up, on the possibility that increas-
ing the number of police would have a dramatic impact on crime and
fear. Budgets began to be cut for American police departments.
New York was cut a third, Newark was cut a third. In city after
city, police departments were drastically reduced in size. Some
of the responses of academics, I think unwise, gave clue to just
how serious an issue this was. Academics would say, look in New
York City we have reduced the police by a third, arrests have not
gone down, crime is increasing no faster, therefore it was obvious
that we had too many police. Now, for those of us that would walk
in Times Square, and walk around Washington Park, the idea that
there were too many police in New York City seemed crazy. Go into
the New York City subway system if you want to feel fear. I don't
care how sophisticated you are, you know that you're safer in the
subway than you are on the street. People again were starting to
trivialize the importance of police in American cities. I think
that was a disaster, and I think we lost control of many areas as
a result of that. The impact of police was being trivialized.
Policing started to lose to the competition. If it was in the
private sector, managers would be extremely concerned. Because
police started to lose out to private security, they started to
lose to community crime control, they started to lose to hardware,
and they started to lose to creating fortress kinds of cities and

houses. There were those who were suggesting that if, indeed, public policing was a private organization, it would consider going bankrupt.

Next, a serious problem that continues to plague us to the present day. Police created a demand for their services via "911", that they couldn't meet. Police had advertised full service would come to all calls within 3 minutes. Call the police and we'll come immediately; and that demand grew, and continued to grow. Police increased their capacity to handle it; they added computer-aided dispatch, and it grew more and consequently, it's out of control in many areas. "911" is used to call the police for all kinds of problems, including what time department stores open and all kinds of minor issues for which it was never devised. The "911" demand got out of control.

Finally, as a result of these changes in the community and the problems that police were having, the model of policing around which police had rallied, lost the vision and zeal of police officers. In American city after American city one could and talk to police officers and find that so many of them were a grumpy lot. No longer did they have a clear vision of themselves, about what they were doing, where they were going. It was as if their self-belief system had been undercut, especially at patrol levels. And they turned grumpy. For those of us that came and watched, and are interested in what happens in organizations, it was fascinating to us that in the private sector you could see managers create zeal about selling plastic containers and McDonald's hamburgers, but you couldn't create zeal in officers about maintaining justice in communities.

Now, what happened to turn all of this around, because I think it largely has.

First, experiments in foot patrol suggested that citizens liked a different kind of policing. And please understand that when I talk about foot patrol, I'm not just talking about a police officer walking around a beat, like for example this market area just to the side of the hotel. In a market area like that, foot patrol might be quite wise. You go to areas of Los Angeles or Houston or Toronto, and I suppose areas of Ottawa as well, you put an officer on foot and he wouldn't see anyone for three days, there's just so much open territory. I use foot patrol as a metaphor for more contacts between police and citizens, increased quantity and improved quality of police/citizen contact. What happened when we had foot patrol? These are findings from the Newark foot patrol study, and these findings have been replicated in Flint, and they've been replicated in Ostorp, in Amsterdam. The findings are always very consistent. First of all, if you increase or decrease the number of foot patrol officers, citizens recognize it immediately. If you increase or decrease the level of motor patrol, citizens generally don't have much sense of that police presence.

Secondly, it reduces fear. Citizens, for some reason, feel that when there's a foot officer around, things are safer. Not only does it reduce fear, it increases citizen satisfaction with the police, and it doesn't matter what the race of the officer or the race of the citizen or the sex of the officer. Where there's foot patrol, citizens like the police more. Interestingly, one of the other findings was that when you use foot patrol, police officers come to like the citizens more. A lot of police in a lot of neighbourhoods divide the world into assholes and the police, and there's nothing in between. What police found when they got out of their cars was that most of the people out there were good people. They were looking for help from police. They liked the police and were law-abiding, respectable people. It didn't matter if you went to the Robert Taylor homes in Chicago. Those of you who that have not been there need that experience to see what social planners and policy makers have done for us. You go down State Street for three miles and it's one twenty-storey building after another and almost 100% black citizens, primarily black females with their children. It doesn't matter, if you go to an area like that, as most of the people want part of the American dream, as we would call it. They want to live a good life, they're respectable citizens and they're preyed on and victimized and they're looking for continuing police presence. Anyway, the police came to appreciate citizen views, and in every study, police morale improves as soon as they go on foot patrol.

Don't make the mistake of thinking that police like getting out of their cars. For the most part, they don't. They don't look forward to it, but once they do it, it turns out that they find it's really quite satisfying and they enjoy it. In fact, use of sick time generally went down in areas of Newark and areas of New Jersey where they used foot patrol.

I think the second thing that happened was that we began to understand around 1980 that fear was more closely linked to disorder than it was to serious crime. When you went out and talked to police about this, police would immediately say, I know that's the case. I go out to talk to citizens groups and I come with my computer printouts about the level or number of burglaries and the number of armed robberies. I'd put them on the table with community crime control groups and they say yes that's very interesting but now let's get to our problems--our problems are prostitutes out on the street, drunks and emotionally disturbed people wandering around. It turned out that that kind of disorder citizens found is much more threatening than serious crime. They tended to take serious crime rather matter-of-factly. If you ask American citizens generally, do you like police, yes, would you like more police, yes, do you think police can do much about crime, no. It turns out that the citizen's expectations of police are somewhat different than what police have thought citizens wanted. Police commanders I talk to in New York and wherever say, that goes on at every community crime control meeting that we have. They're concerned about problems of disorder more than serious crime.

The next thing that happened was that I think citizens in-
creasingly became intolerant with public disorder, and by intoler-
ant I don't refer to vigilantism. There's increasingly a sense in
the United States that 'enough is enough'. The radical indivi-
dualism of the 1960s and 1970s has gotten out of hand. The insti-
tutionalisation of the emotionally disturbed, of juvenile delin-
quents, decriminalization of drunkenness and prostitution and low-
-level drug dealing has turned the city streets into places in
which anything goes, short of somebody hitting me. I mean they
can walk up to me and play those radios in front of me and destroy
my ears, they can use any kind of language, they can behave in any
kind of outrageous way and that's considered an expression of
political freedom. I think increasingly there was a sense that it
had gone too far and that something had to be done about that.

The next thing that I think occurred was the police started
to sense that the response of minorities to them had substantially
changed. I think in the United States largely the issue of sym-
bolic representation of minorities in police departments has been
grappled with. Although there are still some problems, citizens
recognize that there are minorities on police departments and
there are minorities now managing police departments in the five
largest cities of the United States, three have chiefs who are
black. Minority citizens started more and more to say, we can't
let things get out of control the way they did in the past. and if
you rode with the police in areas of Chicago, areas of L.A., the
police would say, we can't let things get out of control. The
citizens and the police were saying the same thing. As the police
and citizens started to work more closely together, police sensed
the growing intolerance in the minority community for the kinds of
craziness that they most often were victimized by and they started
to sense the support they had in the minority community, that con-
tinues to develop.

Next, the police started to sense a political demand for a
different kind of policing. It was not accidental that in New
Jersey, foot patrol was foisted on police executives by a governor
who had gone to Europe, saw what he considered to be safe streets
because he saw police officers walking around, came back and said
let's have foot patrol. Police executives responded that foot pa-
trol was out-moded, it was a place to put people when you didn't
have cars, you couldn't control police officers when they're on
foot patrol. He said I understand your position completely, so
here's money and you can only have foot patrol officers with the
use of this money. Suddenly 30 cities in New Jersey had foot
patrols. Every time the mayor of Boston ran for political office,
low and behold, foot patrol would be started throughout the city.
Why, because of its political popularity. It turns out that
Flint, Michigan, which had the highest level of unemployment in
the United States, some 24%, twice voted to increase its taxes for
police, not for police across the board, but for one thing--foot
patrol. Foot patrol became for citizens a popular form of polic-
ing, a different form of policing that they wanted and were will-
ing to pay for, even in seriously economically depressed areas.

Now, it turned out that this was one more expression of another political demand for policing. As a result, police started to develop a new conventional wisdom about policing, and I would like to talk to you a little about that conventional wisdom.

Heretofore, police have been saying, policing, keeping a community safe, is police business. Stay out of it, don't get involved. When you call the police you've met your obligations, leave it to the professionals. Suddenly, police began saying that social control, crime control, is a function of the basic institutions of society—family, neighbourhood, church, and the most that police can do in any community is to support those basic institutions of control. To the extent that police alienate themselves from those institutions or create distance between themselves and those institutions, their job becomes hopeless. This will be accomplished then by turning to communities and creating new linkages to the community; first, for the moral authority to act. That's what Wilson and I talked about in <u>Broken Windows</u>. Understand, this is a radical departure from the past in American policing. It says that politics, neighbourhood politics is not corrupting and that police have to link themselves to the moral will of the community, to gain the moral authority to act. Without the moral authority to act, without citizens saying we can't let things get out of control again in the relationship between the police and citizens, they can't act to maintain control. Because when push comes to shove, citizens will not support the police unless the police are getting their moral authority to act from the community.

The second element in this is to assist the community to solve its problems and defend itself. Every community has problems, some of those problems have to do with serious crime, others have to do with disorder, others have to do with conflict. The task of the police officer is to assist a neighbourhood or a community, to manage its problems and defend itself. But the police task at the same time is always to protect strangers in communities. It is easy to turn to the community for the moral authority to act, as American policing has done in the past, and they have not interfered with lynchings. They have helped keep minorities out of communities. One has to look at both sides of those coins simultaneously, that one gets the moral authority to act from the community but at the same time one always takes the stance that the task of the police as well is to defend minorities from majority populations in any neighbourhood.

All of this implies, a broadening of police function. Fear reduction becomes an end in itself in such a model. This is very important for the life of communities. If we know that fear is gutting cities, strategies, tactics that are oriented to reduce fear become important to the livelihood of cities. I've walked with foot patrol officers and gone into small stores and the storekeepers say, "take away this foot patrol officer and I pull up stakes. I can't survive here without that foot patrol officer." That's the kind of fear, realistic or unrealistic.

Citizens seeing police officers in areas feel comforted and will tend to use those areas. Order maintenance becomes an end in itself and as Jim (James Q. Wilson) and I argue, a means to reduce crime. And as you know, Jim and I have developed an hypothesis, the metaphor is broken windows. If you get broken windows in a building and don't do something about it, pretty soon the whole building is going to go; similarly, if you have disorder in a community and don't do something about it, the disorder is going to get more serious, and ultimately result in serious crime.

That suggests additionally, that crime control is an important part of police activities, but it's not necessarily the central task of police. Let me talk about this just a minute. The old strategy of policing said that if the police targeted on crime, used their resources to fight crime, it would be likely that they could reduce crime, prevent crime and solve crime. This strategy says something different. This strategy says to the extent that police do other things well, that is to the extent that they work closely with communities, assist communities to defend themselves, get information from citizens, they will have an indirect impact rather than a direct impact. It doesn't mean the police are not concerned about crime, it means that police understand that they have to work through other institutions to be successful in dealing with crime. Now, a lot of police find that very difficult to deal with. I think in the United States, more and more police are simply throwing up their hands and saying, "yes we have gotten beaten up so badly out there on this issue of crime, that it's quite clear that we have to try a new approach." That new approach is to work indirectly with citizens--indirectly through citizens. If you look through all of the research about improving the effectiveness about crime, dealing with crime, one feature stands out. To the extent that patrol officers get information and use it or give it to investigators to use, police can increase their success in dealing with crime. Information is the key. How do you get that information and how do you understand that information? You work with and through citizens. Once again it's an indirect approach to crime, one works closely with citizens to get information, that information in turn becomes productive in dealing with crime. It's a slight shift in orientation. But I think there's some empirical support for that general approach.

Now, what does this mean organizationally? First of all, if we're going to talk seriously about dealing on a neighbourhood and community level, we have to get those patrol officers out there to work independently as entrepreneurs. That's generally not recognized in the management plan. The organizational charts suggest, centralized command and control with direct supervision at all times. We know that that's largely a farce. We know that police officers work 90%, or more than 90% of the time alone. They work unsupervised and police executives are very nervous about that. I know when I talk to police executives in some large American cities, their response is, "George, you know, I take your point, but do you know how many drunks I have out there. Do you

know how many guys I have out there that I'm afraid when they're carrying guns." It's a vision of the troops at a management level that I think essentially manages at the least common denominator and that's because we're afraid of corruption and because we're afraid of abuse. What we do is try and manage in ways that eliminates discretion; that restrains the police officer as much as possible, rather than trying to teach the officers how to fly. Historically the assumption then is how can we keep them under control, how can we keep them out of trouble, how can we keep them from becoming corrupt. The primary task of police departments is not to keep officers out of trouble. You want to, but that's not what the organizations are for. The organizations are there to provide services, deal with crime, deal with conflicts. We know that if you run organizations in ways that say to officers, "don't do this and don't do that" and don't create opportunities for officers, that you start running the organizations where the goal is to have a clean organization. While his is nice, we wind up in some cities, where because of fear of corruption, they won't let individual officers do any low-level drug enforcement. Citizens then watching police closing their eyes to low-level drug enforcement, say that they must be on the take, because they're not enforcing these laws.

You see the important thing is to recognize that if we mean it about patrol being the guts and heart of an organization, we have to mean it on a managerial level. We have to respect the fact, the reality of their freedom out there and their tremendous potential. We must get their vision and zeal and manage them properly, and stop using a management style that assumes that given the slightest freedom, they're going to become corrupt or get out of control. There's risk in that. If you work in that direction you're going to have more troubles with corruption. You deal more with drugs, you're going to have more trouble with corruption. You get into some of the dirty business, and you know you're going to have troubles with corruption. That's the way it is. But to organize your institutions in ways just to prevent corruption, changes the goal of the organization. If you're going to mix it up and relate to communities, you're going to have more problems with that, because officers are going to be more inventive and more creative, and some of the things they're going to do you're going to wince a little bit about. But it seems to me that you have to mean it when you talk about patrol being the guts of the organization. There probably isn't a department in the United States where at one point or another somebody doesn't say to a detective, "if you don't shape up, I'm shipping you back to patrol." I've never heard anyone say to a patrol officer, "if you don't shape up we're going to ship you over to the detectives." You see, we haven't meant it, we really haven't meant it when we've talked about the importance of patrol officers. We haven't put our money and our marbles there.

So managerially it implies decentralization. If you look at American police departments, right now they look like this. They are very steep pyramids. What the military called the tail-to-

teeth ratio is very bad. Current management theory suggests that
most police organizations could cooperate quite satisfactorily
with four levels of personnel and I suspect that we're going to
see that kind of reduction in the number of layers of personnel.
Also involved in that organizational decentralization is that
planning is going to have to be done on a local level, based on
the nature of local problems.

What we have to think about carefully is: What do we want
the police to stay out of? What is it that we really don't want
them to do? A lot of police in the United States are doing commu-
nity organization, that is they're organizing communities.   I
think it's fair to ask, do we want the police out there as commu-
nity organizers? Are there inherent political dangers in that?
Are there inherent organizational dangers when the police officer
goes with citizens to demonstrate against City Hall. Some of
those things have happened in the United States, and I think we
have to ask the question, what do we want the police to stay out
of.

In conclusion, there's a new strategy new model and new para-
digm being formulated in the United States. The Ben Wards, the
Lee Browns, the Al Andrews, the elite chiefs in the United States
are rapidly moving in the direction of community policing. Prob-
lem solving, problem identification, is a central part of their
activity. The new strategy must maintain some strengths of the
past. We do have a professional level of management now, skilled
managers. We're going to have to deal with corruption and take it
very seriously. We're going to have to see cities and neighbour-
hoods differently. We're going to have to see cities and neigh-
bourhoods as important sources of character building in the United
States, and that essentially they're a primary source of social
control and the police are there to support that and to help
develop it. All of this has to be framed in ways that recaptures
the zeal and vision of American police. When you deal with police
chiefs like Lee Brown and the Ben Ward; when you deal with people
that have developed some of the experiments in Houston and Newark,
Newport News, one senses that the zeal and the vision about
American policing again. What they're doing is very, very import-
ant, it matters, and that when they do it well citizens appreciate
it, and respond to it.   It gives the job meaning and purpose.
Because unless we again develop this zeal and vision in the line
troops we're never going to be able to police well. People need
meaning in their work. They just don't go out there for money.
We all need meaning in our work and patrol officers need that
meaning. We have to find ways, as organizations get older, to
recognize the contributions of patrol officers, to help them to
fly and to give them a vision of what they're doing. In research
and in our development it seems to me now we have to focus on what
individual police officers do rather than how they're organized.

Over the last fifty years we've been primarily concerned
about how police are organized. Now we have to start concentrat-
ing on what individual police officers do, and to recognize some

of genius activities that go on out there, encourage police offi-
cers to write them up. We ought to be writing up their experi-
ences, they ought to be writing up their experiences on their own
to distribute, rather than having people like me coming and col-
lecting war stories.   The police officers start viewing him or
herself almost in the handling of a particular type of case; this
is what I did, this is what the outcome was, this is what we could
learn from that.   This kind of case analysis begins to turn
policing at the line into the kind of intellectual activity that
it genuinely is.

     I thank you for your attention and courtesy. I enjoyed talk-
ing with you.   If I became a missionary, it wasn't for the United
States it was for a vision of policing and you'll have to forgive
that. Thank you for your time.

3. "COMMUNITY POLICING" - A PERSONAL VIEW

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The thoughts that I share with you today will sound like déjà vu in many cases, because I'm going to come at it from the position of an average police officer's experience over twenty-one years. Community policing is a relatively new discovery for me, at least the writings are a new discovery for me. But as I cast my thoughts back, I find that the ideas are not really that original or radical. They simply make sense. Some of the other things I want to talk about, I'm sure, you'll take strong objection to. I think that is as it should be because we shouldn't sound like clones of each other.

When we entered policing, we brought unique personalities, and unique views, with us and I want to make the point that many of those views did not die as we made our way through our years in policing. But certain things did happen in policing and some of them have troubled me although for many years I didn't have answers to them. I saw things that I didn't understand and I would ask myself the question, how come? One of the benefits of working alone in a patrol car is you have time to think at four o'clock in the morning with no one to talk to but the rabbits. Many times I used to wonder, why do we do these things and why do we do them the way we do? Family fights were an example. I could never figure out why we wouldn't charge the husband for punching the wife when if he punched me, it was a simple case of assault.

As I look back I think of many people who've had an influence on me in policing, there are three people that come to my mind more often than not. They all came in like the rest of us, as constables. And they all left as constables. None of them seemed to make much of a mark while they were in policing, but as I think of them I see perhaps three of the finest human beings I ever encountered in life. They weren't strong at the traditional things in policing--they weren't tough, they weren't aggressive, they weren't macho, they weren't good at the, 'measurable' things of policing. But they were very, very good at the human touch, the 'unmeasurable' dimensions of policing. And I wonder, did we lose something in policing? We couldn't seem to find a place for the human talents of these people.

Most things in life have rank structures. The civil service has a very real rank structure to it. They don't wear a uniform, and so although the rank structure is there, it isn't as visible in the everyday goings on in the office. In policing, we are a walking advertisement of our sucess and failure. Sometimes I find myself looking at shoulders and arms when I'm looking for help or looking for inspiration from somebody that I think might help me

with a problem, rather than looking into the heads and into the hearts of people. So I wonder if the rank structure has served us or maybe it has done us a disservice.

In policing there is tremendous human talent. Now we haven't always gotten the best out of that talent in the last twenty or thirty years. But the best example of that talent is sitting right in front of me today, in police chiefs and executives who for one reason or another were given the opportunity to 'strut their stuff' so to speak. Somebody, sometime, looked into our hearts and our heads, to look for a bit of talent. Remember, at one time we were all constables. We were given the opportunity to show what we could do and we were fortunate to climb up through the ranks. I wonder if there isn't a fundamental lesson in all of this for us. If community policing is to become more than documents, reports, and conference topics, if it is ever to move from the library shelf and become a living body on the street, I'm convinced that it will have to come through and from the people of policing and not from the things of policing. In policing, we claim we're very busy, our whole society busy. But in fact, often we're not busy, things are busy. You walk into an average office and you'll find telephones and typewriters and word processors banging away. But our minds are not busy, our native intelligence is not busy. In policing, we try to solve problems by throwing money at them instead of looking to human talent to solve them. In my opinion, if we are to ever have community policing, it will be people that will carry us and it will not be technology, machines and things. It is through an over-dependence upon these things that we have painted ourselved into the crime-fighting corner we're in.

For as long as I've been involved in policing, the word 'professionalism' has always been there. It's been in the reports, it's been talked about, and I never fully understood what it meant. I still don't fully understand what 'professionalism' means. I'm not sure whether it means that if I go into a particular job I become a professional the minute I enter or whether that job becomes a profession by my bringing certain talents to it.

My belief is that policing is a calling. Wherever that fits between a profession and an occupation, I don't know, but when I think of the good cops that I know, they're first and foremost fundamentally first class human beings. If you look into their families, if you look into their backgrounds, if you look into their private lives, they're givers. They end up as hockey coaches or soccer coaches, but they end up as givers, doing things for other people. Now if you or I were to suggest to them that they are akin to a priest or minister they would laugh at us because they're so busy giving to others and looking outside of themselves that they sit down and pat themselves on the back. I wonder if maybe that's the sort of thing we in management should be doing a little more of. Words that I heard this morning and over the last couple of years which I strongly dislike, are 'stroking' and 'massaging', so as to motivate people. I know what

they mean but they're condescending and they're wrong. We shouldn't stroke people. We shouldn't massage people. Because if those people ever find out why we're stroking or massaging them, we're in trouble.

Common wisdom is that managers need to motivate others. This is nonsense. People bring their own motivation. That door is locked from the inside. What we need to do is liberate that talent and motivation. Our past record in police management shows that we have suppressed and stultified it.

We've striven so hard in policing to become a profession and to find a nitch for ourselves equal to the other professions that I think at times we pass over a narrow little line that becomes elitism. Elitism seems to bring with it self-praise, arrogance, aloofness and isolation. It's a very indefinite line. But I think we can strive so hard to become professional and take on all of the trappings of professionalism that perhaps we have passed over that line and become a profession of form rather than substance; we have become process oriented rather than task oriented and we have lost touch with the people who produce the product, the constables, and the people who consume it, the citizens.

Policing was a very undefined job to start with but we cleaned the edges so as to make it measurable and in the process, squeezed many of the juices out of it. Everthing was measured by a criminal or civil, police or family stick. Only the former were considered police work. I can always remember as I walked the street as a constable when I went to complaints, the first things that I banged into my head, is this a criminal matter or is this a civil matter? If I could convince myself it was a civil matter, which often meant I didn't know, a little thing would turn off in my head and I would decide, this is just a very basic little report--fill in two or three lines, name, address, telephone number--and get the hell out of there. I really wasn't interested in what went on because only criminal matters concerned me.

Another measuring stick that I used subconsciously was, is it a police issue or is it a family issue? If it was a family issue, then I wasn't that terribly interested in it. The reason that I share these things with you is not because I read them in some report, because I didn't. I lived them in my first ten or twelve of my policing. I didn't see anything wrong with them, although there'd be some little niggly questions at the back of my head all the time. What purpose am I serving, am I achieving here? Consequently I found myself looking for easy answer.

I always think back to a little situation I had in 1968, when I was a constable. I got a call to a shoplifter in one of the large department stores in Edmonton. And it was a clear-cut shoplifting case, no question. It was around Christmas time and a woman with two little kids, single parent, had stolen a bunch of stuff. She was in the manager's office. It should have been a perfunctory thing--open and shut. And I didn't know at the time

why I handled it the way I did. I know now, I think, but I didn't know then. I asked a few questions and I found out, of course, she's a single parent, on welfare, didn't have much money, the kids are watching television, see these toys on television, she's in the store shopping for other things, the kids see these toys in the store and they want the toys. The mother hasn't got the money to give them the toys and so she looks around and swipes them and was caught. However, what was very important to me was she didn't steal for herself, she stole for the kids. She had no other criminal record. I spent an hour with the manager of the store, who had his own problems, a huge problem of shoplifting. I spent an hour talking him out of charging her with shoplifting, and I wasn't even sure of what in the hell I was doing. Maybe it was to get out of the paperwork because if I charged her I'd have to write more reports, if I didn't I'd have to write a short report. I remember agonizing after because I thought, what happens if this fellow phones in to complain. This is the frontline entrepreneurship that George Kelling talked about but often it must be exercised covertly and one must buck the system to do it. The constables of today experience that same fear, because the policy manual emphasises the process and not the end product. So these are the agonizing things that I went through that I presume many of the constables that are working the streets today are going through as well. We haven't given them much fundamental guidance on these things, that it is alright not to charge somebody with a crime where a de facto crime exists, so long as you're doing it for the right reasons. Our management style has been one of restraint rather than inspiration. It has rewarded conformity rather than creativity. The manual is the bible. And you innovate at your peril.

There is apathy at the front level of policing today. The work of the front end has become dull, boring, unimaginative. I wonder why policing has become a law enforcement trade/craft journeyman function. We do it because it has to be done, get it over with as quickly as possible, and get ready for the next call and hope we don't get the next call. When Sir Robert Peel was responsible for starting the first police, policing by consent as we know it today, that's not, what he had in mind. He had more of a community catalyst role in mind for the police. To get involved in a much broader spectrum of things for a much deeper reason. There was not a mention of crime fighting and he emphatically militated against any court work. I believe that quite apart from what the community might need in terms of its policing, I think we in policing need community policing. To revitalize us and our work. To put the juices back in that were squeezed out in our quest for a professional crime fighting role. The fact is we have never, in reality, been able to control our product because so long as we are only a telephone call away from people who need our help, and we don't charge user fees, and we're available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, we never will control our product. The customer on the other end of the telephone will. They will decide what our work is and they will decide how good we are at it. Quality is in the eye of the beholder. This is what I

refer to as Perceptions Policing as opposed to Figures Policing. Policing is what people perceive it to be, not what we the cops want it to be. The biggest change we have to make is to admit that we provide a service to customers who must be satisfied with that service. And the people that do phone us, which is a very easy, cheap act today, four out of the five times they call us it has absolutely nothing to do with crime.

If we look back at policing over the last hundred or hundred and fifty years, and for me there's about six or seven distinct periods of change. Never once did we control the changes, they were controlled by things outside of our sphere of control. But let's just think back to the last few years. Let's think back to Britain, and the coal miners' strike, which the police had no control over, had no input, but think of the impact that strike had on policing in Britain. The police had to react to it and do the best that they could and in the meantime try and introduce community policing while cast in a confrontation role. In Western Canada today, think of the drop in the price of oil. Think of the impact that that will have on policing and of course it's got nothing to do with policing, supposedly. Not only the impact it will have on police budgets but what about when people begin to lose their houses and their businesses and the social problems this that will create. They'll pick up the telephone and call the police with their problems and we will have to try and do something about them. But these particular types of problems are not reflected in Figures Policing, the report card we use today to measure police success or failure.

We've never been able to quantify true policing. We've tried to quantify it. We've tried to write descriptions but we have never succeeded. The last effort I came across had so many descriptives, the only person I know who could qualify was crucified 2,000 years ago. I don't think we should even try to quantify policing. Because it seems to me that true policing defies separation from all of the other social illnesses of our society. Crime is a symptom of something else. True policing cannot be divorced from poverty and family break-up. The flight to the suburbs has left most cities with core slums. Money still talks, and the poor are the overwhelming favourite to become either criminals or victims of violent crime. Not all poor people are street criminals, but all street criminals are poor. One third of Canadian children live with one parent, usually the mother. Teenage suicide has increased a staggering 800% in the past 30 years; a period when we have never been wealthier, healthier or better educated. We end up dealing with the realities of these things. And I'm not so sure we're getting the help from the rest of society that we should. The Bar and the Bench have much soul searching to do. I suspect there's a little dumping. But the police, traditionally, have been one of the quietest bodies, the most obedient bodies in Canadian society. We don't speak our minds, we don't make our feelings known, we're certainly not political. There are so many things about our system that only we know, and if we don't make them known the people in the community will never know about

those things. Bureaucracies on the public dollar rarely change
themselves, they only react to outside stimulation. The criminal
justice system is shamelessly expensive and inefficient. The pub-
lic have a right to know these things. The main problem with the
entire system is that it has a monopoly. Where do people go if
they are unhappy with the service? Imagine what kind of cars we
would be driving today if only Ford made them?

     I think that policing in Canada is at a crossroads. And I
mean a significant crossroads. Not for the reasons that it's at a
crossroads in Britain or Ireland or the U.S. I think we're at a
crossroads for different reasons. Because essentially our commu-
nities are still quite peaceful. We don't have the upheaval that
some of our peers in other countries are having to deal with. And
secondly, police leadership in this country is very stable. A
police chief certainly stays on the job more than the three-year
average of the U.S. Our chiefs have the job for life unless they
commit murder. So we have a chance to try things that perhaps in
other jurisdictions they couldn't try. We have the stability and
we have the peace in our communities that we could try things in
community policing and risk the fact that they may not work and
we're not likely to get fired for it.

     One reason for the crossroads, I believe, is the growth of
private security. There are 100,000 fewer public police in the
U.S. today than there were a decade ago. Private policing has
grown by 11% each year during the same period. Much of the work
that is 'load-shed' by us today is snapped up by those entrepre-
neurs. We might just be load-shedding ourselves out of work. How
long will the same customer pay for two police services? But
there's something odd about what's happening because 150 years
ago, public policing took over policing from the private sector.
And we are now bit by bit handing it back. And I'm not so sure
that we're handing it back in a planned way or that we even
realise we're handing it back. This is certainly something for
the police unions to cogitate over a pint.

     Let us stop and think about the average city, whether it be
Ottawa, Edmonton, Vancouver, Victoria, think of the downtown and
think of shopping malls. Especially think of the winters that we
have. Winters are very cold so people don't stay outside much.
They go inside where it's warm to do their shopping. So most of
these people are gathering in places that are essentially private
property. If the owners of those shopping malls, wanted to say to
the police "you're persona non grata," they could prevent us from
entering unless we had a specific legal reason for entering. So
the character of the public places that we used to police, and we
still police, are changing very dramatically. This is another
fact of our society we have to be aware of, and adjust to.
Private security today is a lot more than a few security guards
walking around. Private security has gotten into areas of our
society that are having a huge effect on crime. Think of big cor-
porations and companies. Many of them have their own private
security which handles their internal crime. If it doesn't suit

them, they will not release the knowledge of that crime to the public police. They will judge that crime on its commercial rather than social merits. They will keep it inside, deal with it in whatever way they want and really not concern themselves with the public good, if that suits their cause. Think of shoplifting in all of the big malls. They will deal with that if they want, in their own way. If it's a good customer and if it's the son or daughter of some well-to-do person they may not call us because they don't want to lose that customer. If it's some old tramp then they will call us. In the final analysis, public policing might be left on the outside picking up the pieces thrown to them by capitalists and their private police, all of which will render our known crime figures meaningless. So in many ways private security is beginning to manipulate us, and beginning to dictate the public product that has been paid for by the public. Security systems is another area. Alarms are a huge problem for police, 98% of which are false. The private sector gets paid to install them, at our urging, but then the public police literally services them.

What are the realities of policing today? What do we do during a regular shift when we work the street? The Police Service Study which was conducted in 1978 looked at twenty-four police departments. It looked at sixty districts in those twenty-four police departments, fifteen shifts each, so that we're looking at 900 shifts. They found on average in an 8-hour shift, that 97 minutes was assigned work. Thirty-one minutes was self-generated work. So that the average total committed time was 128 minutes, a little over two hours out of an eight-hour shift. The average number of encounters was six and they lasted about 20 minutes each. But here's the most important figure. In low-income areas the average time spent was 153 minutes. In middle-class and upper-income areas, the average time spent on assigned work was only 34 minutes. That tells us that three-quarters of our cities probably don't need a lot of policing; except for service to help them to keep their communities healthy because to a great extent their communities are already healthy. This could be referred to as Maintenance Policing. But a quarter of our cities need a lot of policing, a lot of help, a lot of stimulation. I call this Construction Policing. These are the things we're talking about when we talk about community policing. They're the parts of our cities that have no lobby groups, they're unorganized, they're the silent neighbourhood, nobody speaks for them and they don't know how to speak for themselves. These are the people who can't afford the flight to the suburbs. They just stay in the core slums, live their way of life and hope that they don't become victimized and hope that nothing happens to them. Many of them live in perpetual fear.

We can't leave them alone, they are our reason for being. They are the ones that need us the most. But we have to search them out because they don't know how to turn to us for help. Coincidentally, these are often the breeding grounds for our next generation of criminals. This is the difficult policing that's

ahead of us. Neighbourhood Watch and Block Parents are noticeable
by their absence in these areas. Wealth must have no say in the
quality of policing that we give out. But if we really analyze
policing today, for instance foot patrol, wealth does have a lot
to do with it. Not intentionally, not consciously, but the loud-
est lobby group gets alot of attention. I call it Law by Lobby.
The loudest and the latest. Foot patrol is usually in the busi-
ness area, during the day, because the Chamber of Commerce kicked
up a fuss to get it there. Some of you will say we haven't got
time to organize these neighbourhoods. Well, the PSS Study I
referred to showed that we spend 67% of our time doing nothing,
waiting for the big catch. Sure there are times when we're run
ragged, but there are 168 hours in a week! There are long periods
of inactivity.

We have come to the stage where "in-service" is so important
for us in policing. In-service is good. It means that we are
reachable, we're close to the radio or we're close to the computer
terminal. Remember, this is how our people at the front end think
and how they do their policing because they think this is what
will get them things on their arms and shoulders. This is the
mentality that management has created and rewarded. "Out-of-ser-
vice" is bad because we don't know where they are. Especially if
they're not on work that we have given them to do. If they're on
self-generated work with a bunch of snotty-nosed kids, that is not
capturable or measurable then they may end up like the three peo-
ple I started out talking about--nice people but eccentric and not
to be taken seriously. And, for sure, they're really not going
anywhere.

So, we've come to a puzzling situation, for instance, if a
kid phones up and says his bike has been stolen, we won't re-
spond. We'll take a report over the telephone, but we won't re-
spond to do whatever it is you could do about a stolen bike. But
at the same time, we will give our constables hockey cards and
football cards and we will tell them, "go find some kids and give
them these cards so you get a chance to meet them". So there's a
bit of a puzzle there for me anyway. We loadshed genuine reasons
for meeting kids and we replace them with artificial reasons. I'm
sure some constables ponder these conundrums just as I did years
ago.

There's one little flaw in the whole crime fighting model and
once again we really don't control it. It's the people factor;
it's the Achilles tendon of the whole thing. We know that rapid
response doesn't work, not because we don't get there fast enough
and not because we don't put enough effort into it, we do. It
doesn't work because people don't call us fast enough. The lapse
time is what's critical. I've seen three studies on response
times. One had six minutes the average lapse time, one had fif-
teen minutes and one had fifty minutes. I mean, let's take the
smallest--six minutes. We know that if it's a crime in progress,
six minutes is a lifetime. Especially in the city. If somebody
is mobile, the chances of catching that person are slim. We also

know that forensic science solves only 1% of the problem. So we come down to the basic fact that people solve the vast majority of whatever crime we solve. Ninety-three percent of all our work comes from people.

Preventive patrol doesn't find it like we thought it would. We're dependent on people calling us. We know that the best single source of solving crime is information from complainants or witnesses. So all the time we're coming back to people. If a crime is not solved by an on-scene arrest or being provided with an identification, chances are slim it will ever be solved.

We also know that in over fifty percent of the calls that we get, the same people have called us ten or more times in the previous year. So that we respond to recurring problems and treat them as individual incidents in band-aid fashion. This is because we have fashioned our constables into <u>responders</u> to incidents rather than <u>investigators</u> of problems.

What do other people think of us? We sell ourselves as pro-fessional crime fighters but is that how others perceive us? There was very good research done in England where the police were asked what they believed people thought of them and why they thought it. The people were asked, "what do you think of the police? and why you think it?" Well, the police thought that the people liked us because of our ability to solve crime, our clearance rates, our technology and mobility. When the public were asked, we found that they liked us far more than we believed. They had a tremendous faith in us, but they cared little about our crime fighting abilities. They knew a tremendous amount about the human qualities of the police officers that they'd met. They seemed to know we couldn't do much about crime and they didn't expect us to. They were not impressed by the trappings of policing but were looking at the human being inside the uniform.

Which leads me to the present. Why should we have community policing? What is community policing? Is it different from what we've had in the past, and if it is different, how is it different? It seems to me that the best piece of advice that's ever come down the pipe, not just in policing but in life generally, is to do unto others as you would have others do unto you. In policing, let us police others as we would have others police us. But this need for trustworthiness, or this need that people seem to want to be our friends and to know who is policing their neighbourhood shouldn't surprise us. Let's stop and consider for a minute our own lives. If we get sick and we need a doctor, we don't pick up the yellow pages and look through it to find a doctor. We go to our family doctor, who knows us well, and knows our body well. We're looking for trustworthiness and we're looking for somebody we're familiar with. If our car breaks down, we don't take it to any service station. The first thing we want to do is take it to a mechanic who's familiar with the car and knows us and doesn't give us a bunch of parts for the car that we don't need. If we go for a drink, we don't go to a strange bar with

strangers, we go with a few friends and we go to a bar where we're known and we get fair measure in our drinks. So in our own lives we strive for the same things that people are telling us they want from us in policing.

If we can't accept the basic principle that we provide a service to customers, I personally can't perceive how we can ever have community policing. It seems to me that we have gone through a litany of adjective policing, which has totally confused me and I presume it has confused at least most of the people at the front end. George Bernard Shaw once said, "there's only one religion, though there be a hundred versions of it." Now just think for a minute. We've had team policing, we've had zone policing, we've had preventive policing, we've had pro-active, reactive, hard policing, soft policing and on and on it goes. I don't know if these are all different models, or variations of a central theme or what. And I can assure you that the front end is just as confused as I am. I would submit that these 'innovations' never get beyond the slogan stage. There is only policing as it is and as it should be. I would love it if we could get rid of all of these adjectives. I would love if we didn't even have to use the term 'community policing.' I would love if we could simply use the term policing. I would say that most of us still admit that Peel's principles are the reason for being inpolicing today. We police with the consent of the people. I know that Sir Kenneth Newman believes that because in the policing principles of the London Metropolitan Police that were produced just last year, in the introduction, Sir Kenneth Newman himself said, "Like all police officers, I've served contentedly under the wise counsel of the primary objects of the police. The ringing tones created by Sir Richard Main, Commissioner of the Police in 1829, these words set as fine a standard for professionalism today as they did when they were first written." Because it's important to understand why Peel made the choice to go with consent policing. Remember, Peel was a politician. Peel was not an anthropologist. Peel knew the mood of the people, he knew what would fly in his day and what wouldn't fly. For fifty years before Peel, he and his predecessors had been trying to bring civil policing to London and it didn't work. The people didn't want it. The people were very suspicious of policing. The London of that day is very different from the London of today. It was an unruly city. It was in the middle of its industrial revolution. Eighty percent of the people were illiterate. The cities were mushrooming, they were becoming huge. Riots were common place and the only thing that they had to put them down with was the army. There was no civil police force to look after it. Peel had four models he could follow. He knew that the people would not accept three of them. One was the Royal Irish Constabulary, which had been formed in 1780. The specific purpose of that police force was not to police with the consent of the people, it was to police apart from the community. Although it was made up of Irishmen, they would take people from one town or city and station them in another town or city. The intention was to have people who were not a part of the community. They were there simply to impose the Queen's peace upon a people who

did not accept it. So Peel knew that type of policing wouldn't
work in London. Peel also knew that the Continental Model
wouldn't work, which was a covert, corrupt kind of policing that
infiltrated the community and bought information and turned citi-
zens against each other and was actually instrumental in causing
the French Revolution. That wouldn't work either. And of course
you had the Bow Street Runners, which was a force of private
detectives hired to catch thieves and were paid out of private
funds. They worked under cover and they were corrupt, and they
bought their information as well. It was a purely commercial
arrangement. None of those would fly in England in 1829 because
the people were beginning to recognize and to enjoy the few human
rights they had.

What he did emulate was the Thames River Police which had
been set up in 1780 by private industry. At that time, London was
the largest entry port in the world. Three-quarters of all of the
merchandise that came into England came in through London. The
thievery and the pilferage that went on was huge, it would make
our shoplifting problem pale in comparison. They had to do some-
thing about it so the shipowners, the merchants and the insurance
companies got together and they formed a private force of 1,200
people, and put them in uniform to watch. They were highly visi-
ble, and they were open. There was nothing hidden about them and
within 18 years they had done away with 80% of all of the pilfer-
age and thievery. They were so successful that in 1798 the city
of London made them a public police force and 30 or so years later
that was the model that Sir Robert Peel based his police force
on. Central to Peel's intention was that while the Bobbies
watched, the people could watch their behaviour.

For me it is very important to try to understand from whence
we came so as to understand why our policing today has drifted
considerably from its starting point. If we look at our police
acts today, which is really the job description that we have to
follow in Canada, we will find that the message there is very dif-
ferent from what Peel had in mind. Peel seems to be asking for an
order maintenance, prevention oriented model that performs its
tasks with the blessings of the community and based on the needs
of the community. He talks about public approval, public respect,
cooperation of the public, public favour, individual service and
friendship to all members of the public and community welfare.
When we look at a police act today, the message to be gleaned is
quite different. I'll just quote part of one of them. "The mem-
bers of police forces are charged with the duty of preserving the
peace, preventing robberies and other crimes and offences and
apprehending offenders and commencing proceedings before the pro-
per tribunal and prosecuting and aiding in the prosecuting of
offenders and on and on and on." Its message has become very nar-
row. It speaks only of catching and prosecuting criminals. There
is not a mention of public consent or approval. But it didn't
need to become narrow. I'm not so sure whether we in policing
followed the police acts or whether they followed us. But suffice
to say, we need to take a hard look at those things because if

there's anything we've learned it is that while we may not have much effect on crime and the things that cause crime, we know that we can have a huge effect on people's perceptions of crime and the ways that people see crime. We know in Canada, for instance, that people think there's five times as much crime as there actually is. We know that people think that fifty-four percent of all crime is violent while the actual figure is less than eight percent. While we judge our success on the U.C.R. reports, which measures, at best, 25% of our work, people judge us on their perception of crime. A five or ten percent change in U.C.R. reports has very little effect on how people see us. We need to move from Figures Policing to Perceptions Policing. In the final analysis, quality is in the eye of the beholder.

How can we bring community policing into our operations today? Well there's a number of things that have to happen. We have learned that we cannot police in isolation, and my comments now are directed to the people here who are from the provincial ministries, and from the police commissions, neither can police bring in community policing by themselves. The changes that will have to take place are profound. The community and its organizations will have to change with it. Police acts will have to be re-written. But police commissions will have to change their expectations of the police because if we have become very measurable, part of the reason is that police chiefs have to answer to police commissions who demand measurable things at budget time. We can't change ourselves while your demands remain the same. Your demands are going to have to change with us. We are going to have to find a way to reward the unknown and unknowable figures that form such a large part of the realities of policing. I don't know how you can measure them, and I don't care. Maybe we should simply get away from the mentality of measuring, to a certain extent. Because remember until 1962 in Canada we didn't have Uniform Crime Reports and police departments survived before that and cities survived. As a matter of fact our crime rates skyrocketed since then. The fact is that U.C.R. may not be serving us, it may be a hinderance to us. We must give more freedom to the front line and trust them to deal with some matters informally. How do we measure the hour I spent with the shoplifter. We must realise that much of the reality of policing defies measurement. We must reward the work rather than the process.

We also have a significant teaching job ahead of ourselves. In policing, we have to teach our people. We have to teach them a mentality that will change things dramatically. We need to retool our heads before we retool what we do. A strategic vision must precede the planning, otherwise it is planning for planning sake. We have to teach our communities as well. But more than anything else, community policing will mean that we have to get out of cars, get away from technology, at least some of us, some of the time.

More than anything else, we have to start meeting normal people under normal circumstances on a regular basis. Today we're

dealing with the losers in society, those in crisis or who can't care for themselves, for whatever reason. Some people seek us out willingly, because they need us. Others, criminals, are very happy if they never see us. Between us, we're having a debilitating effect on each other. We're meeting unpleasant people most of our time and we're not seeing a lot of happiness, we're not seeing the things that stimulate us to do other things. Like everyone else, we are molded by our environment. Certainly we have to make the best of what we know about managing calls for service, managing patrol operations and managing criminal investigations. This is fundamental because we cannot get away from our crime fighting component. It is central to our mandate, but it's not the whole biscuit. We must simply get better at that while we spring some people and some resources free to do the other things.

We must become students of the communities we live in as well. Just as we became very good at gathering intelligence on crime, we must become very good at gathering knowledge on the ordinary, non-criminal community around us. It goes without saying that we need to become more generalist than specialist. Because if we were to compare the average organizational chart of a police department of 1985, vis-a-vis 1965, I would say that the number of boxes would have tripled or quadrupled. Yet the fundamental work hasn't changed. We've created new boxes, we've put a few people in each one and considered the problem solved. I think that we should generalize where we possibly can and specialize only where we need to. Specialization leads to empire building which places personal motives above corporate ones. More than anything else, I would say we could put a moratorium on technology acquisition, except where it's absolutely essential. Technology acquisition for the sake of technology acquisition is doing us a disservice. It's becoming our security blanket. The time and money that we save on that we should begin to funnel back to our people.

Now I'm not naive. I'm not saying that every one of the fifty-four thousand police officers we have in Canada is a shining light, an entrepreneur, ready to burst out with talent. We know that many will remain journeymen. But I do know that there are many, many people out there with talent who will surface if we give them the opportunity. I think that that's where our future lies. Because policing is still essentially about people. While robots might be able to build cars, they are little use to a family in turmoil or an old wino bent on suicide.

Computers are fantastic machines if we know their limitations. Computers can't create, and for sure they haven't diminished the paper flow. And one of the problems is that we gather so much information today, but we're not really sure what to do with it. We are one of the most efficient information gathering organizations, but we haven't learned how to put this mass of information to us.

What does this mean for us who are in a leadership role in policing? Well here's what I think it means for us. Marx once said, and that's Groucho Marx by the way, if you don't know where you're going how the hell do you know whether you've arrived or not? George Kelling today talked about a vision. And that's very true. Because police leaders are paid to lead, they are not paid to get stuck into the paperwork with the rest of us. The paperwork can be delegated, leadership cannot. The chief must have a vision and then make it compelling to others. That vision is no use unless it can be articulated and unless that leader can put into words, "here's what it is I want you to do." But the chief must have missionaries to carry the vision. The inspiration has to come too. As much as possible, we must give ownership of a piece of the action to those who will accept the challenge. Individual squads and officers must own neighbourhoods and the people must own their cops. Who paints a rented house? The story is different, however, if they own it.

The quality of policing in a democracy has a direct effect on the standard of life in that community. I think that there's a leadership void in our society today. I think that for whatever reason, the average person is losing faith in a judicial system that they don't understand, they don't respect and that is hugely expensive and inefficient. They're losing faith in organizations or institutions that should be leading and for whatever reason are not. Contemplate the fate of the family, church and school in the past 30 years. I think that after a generation, probably two, of experimenting with freedoms, there's a longing for stability. There's a unique opportunity for us in policing to step into that leadership role.

As a matter of fact, research was done very recently in England in 1982, which was the year after Brixton. After the British police had gone through very difficult times. And it was to do with the confidence that people had in organizations in their community. And I'll just read some of the figures for you, to show the deep faith that the people have in us and the confidence that they have in the police. Trade unions came out at 18%, Parliament came out at 19%, civil service came out at 26%, law courts came out at 42%, the police came out at 71%. Now that faith that they have in us will lie dormant unless we pick it up and run with it. And that's what I mean when I say, we must become more political with a small 'p'. We must become more vociferous. We must say the things that we know about the system and we must say the things that the vast majority of the people don't know, but have a right to know. We must play a much more integrated rather than isolated role in our society. Some of us must take the time to read and to write and to think about ourselves and the things that we do. We must play a much more intelligent game than in the past. We must add to the body of knowledge that's growing up around policing. The time of researchers researching on police from the outside should be gone. We should be now talking about researching with the police. I don't think for a minute that there's any shortage of knowledge and intelli-

gence and the ability to write, in policing. I know that it exists there because I've had the opportunity in the last year and a half to travel around the country and see it. But I think what we need is people who have the ability to research and police who have a vision for where it is that policing should be going, and we should cement the two with a bit of humility. It's not a time for cop-bashing--we've had enough of that. That's not helpful to us at all. I would make the point that in Canada, the interest from academia is noticeable by its absence in helping the police produce a better product; certainly in comparison to the U.S. or the U.K.

I have found since I came to Ottawa, that I have learned a tremendous amount from an RCMP corporal. And it didn't matter to me that he was either. I've learned a tremendous amount from an academic, from Antogonish, Nova Scotia; and it didn't matter that he was either. And I hope that I've been able to pass something on to them as well. I know that when I go back to Edmonton I just feel that I'll be a better man, I'll be better at what it is that I do. I think I'll be more useful to the people in Edmonton. I see a fantastic, bright future for policing. I see a tremendous challenge ahead of us and a chance to really bring a vitality back in policing. The only constant that we've ever had in life is change, and we either accept it or become its victim. We don't have the right to resist, and to remain comfortable. We don't have the option. It will take place whether we want it to or not. Our society has never stopped changing around us and it will either change with us or it will change without us. The only option we have is how we will manage this change. It's not a time for finger-pointing. It's a time for us to get together with honesty and humility. I think it's a time for imagination and I think it's a time for us to be a bit naive and maybe a little less conservative. It's a time for us to try things because research- ers are useless unless we the practitioners try out the solutions they suggest to us. Until we try them out, they don't know whether they work or not. It's a time for dreamers and creators in policing, not conformists and conservatives. Their time is past. It is a time for us to shed the old duties of cultism and to knock those trendy academics and bureaucrats on their asses with our intelligence and verve. No more feeling sorry for our- selves and begging a few spent politicians to change a piece of legislation on our behalf. More than anything else, it is a time to retool our heads and our product and to lead ourselves into change instead of being shamed into it. We are limited only by our perception of ourselves. As George Patton said, "A good plan violently executed today is better than a perfect plan next week."

Thank you.

PART II MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY POLICING

The previous section discussed some of the reasons for
changes now underway in many police departments. The authors con-
sidered some of the internal and external causal factors as well
as the philosophical orientations that are involved in determining
the type and direction of change in general and the trend toward
what is generally referred to as community policing in partic-
ular. In this section, we will look at the processes of imple-
menting community policing in police departments, once the decis-
ion is taken that some such change is necessary and desirable.
The pressures may come from the community, from inside the police
force, or both as both speakers note and the initiatives taken
will vary from community to community. Nonetheless, several com-
mon threads are seen; a philosophical base and commitment, organi-
zational revision and so on.

The two speakers, Deputy Chief Peter Scott of Metropolitan
Toronto and Deputy Assistant Commissioner Robert Hunt of the
Metropolitan Police are well placed to talk about the implementa-
tion of such change, having been intimately involved with it in
two large departments. Although the scale may be different, for-
ces of all sizes may benefit from their experiences as most of the
problems are common to all departments. Both officers stress the
need for leadership at the top of the organization and involvement
of all levels, especially the street officers, in the implementa-
tion. Both warn of the reality of resistance to change in some
quarters as well as not to expect change to occur too quickly.
Ideas and attitudes that are a product of generations cannot
easily be altered overnight. Both point to a well planned system-
atic process of implementation and some form of constant monitor-
ing and evaluation.

What occurred, or rather is in the process of occurring, in
both departments was, as Robert Hunt expresses it, more than mere
change. It was a "revolution in our policing management." He
points to the necessity of formally involving the community at all
stages of development and implementation. While this may be
costly in time perhaps, the community support necessary cannot
otherwise be engendered. Both officers stress the philosophical
foundations of change. Hunt points to the base established by Sir
Kenneth Newman in this respect and his leadership role throughout
the process. In a similar search for such a commitment, Scott
proposes eight principles of policing which address the police
role and function in contemporary society.

There is much for police leaders to learn here; about the
dynamics of change and about its changes and pitfalls. It is a
slow process much of the time and those involved must be prepared
for challenges from within and without their organization. How-
ever, of much more importance is the demonstration that change is
necessary and, with will and commitment, possible.

4. THE CURRENT CLIMATE OF CANADIAN POLICING: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Deputy Chief Peter Scott
Metropolitan Toronto Police

When I was asked to address this conference, I was honoured, apprehensive and confused: honoured because somebody out there believed I had something of value to communicate; apprehensive because you, my peers are the toughest audience in the world; and confused as to what I could discuss that would be of value. After some soul searching, I arrived at the conclusion that if I were sitting in the audience I would like a speaker to be interesting and to be challenging; to make me think. Also, I would like to take away with me something that is useful, something that would allow me to do my job better at home. Considering these criteria, I believe that some of the experiences in the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force over the past four years in implementing major change, would be of interest and value to you: our successes, our failures and our methods.

First, for those who are not in the police environment, let me set the stage. Metropolitan Toronto covers 241 square miles and has a population of 2.2 million people. Our total strength in the police force is slightly over 7,000 with 5,400 sworn police officers and 1,614 civilian members.

In 1981, we hired a management consultant firm to conduct a complete management audit review of our force. Fifteen consultants came into our force and 18 months later their work was complete at a cost of nearly half a million dollars. The result was a 6 volume report containing a total of 142 recommendations which touched nearly every facet of police work in my force.

I wish to talk in a frank, open manner to you about my experiences in implementing these recommendations. This was, and still is, my responsibility. I will give a brief comment on some of the key elements; a summary of how they were handled; some personal views on what we as senior police executives should be aware of and beware of; and conclude with a reconceptualization of the policing function. If you are interested in any particular area, I'm willing to expand upon it during the question period or I will talk to you personally at a later date.

First, a word about consultants. A major question facing us is, "should we let them into our force?" The major concern with them is simply that you may not agree with the results. Accept the fact that once you hire consultants and they come into your police force you, the chief and the executives of that force are placed in a position of having to agree with the majority of their recommendations. Of the 142 recommendations, we rejected 3, 4 were kept for study and planning, and the rest were accepted.

What will they do, these consultants, when they come into
your force? They will ask for and take your internal recommenda-
tions. They will take your ideas, some of which you have been
struggling to implement for years, regurgitate them in official
consultant language and then they will charge you a princely sum
at the end. I mention this because the process generates a lot of
resistance that you have to deal with in the implementation
stage. In fact, the 142 recommendations started a standard joke
in our force. The men said the consultants knew 142 ways to make
love but didn't have a woman.

The final consultant's report is typically vague, with pro-
lific use of words such as policing philosophy, strategic vision,
snapshot view, and policing mentality. Recommendations such as
"the Metropolitan Toronto Police should have closer cooperation
with the public" are common. Motherhood words abound. Why?
Because it's safe. Nobody can argue with motherhood statements.
And the consultant naturally does not want to take risks because
his reputation is on the line. Let me give you an example. Our
version of community based policing is called 'zone policing.'
Recommendation, number 23, in book 5 was that "the Metropolitan
Toronto Police Force adopt a policy of having constables assigned
to specific zones for between 12 to 18 months." From that we
developed the zone policing concepts used in Metropolitan Toronto.

Where does that leave you, the police executive? You are
left with the responsibility of translating these recommendations
into policing efforts, into programs and methods. These are tan-
gible and obvious and, as such, are immediately open to criticism,
both internally and externally.

Well, why hire them if, as I say, they are expensive, they
give you back your own ideas and even then are vague about it.
Accept the fact that consultants are viewed as credible, objec-
tive, well-qualified people who have examined your force at arms
length. Their recommendations have a strength and authority that
internal recommendations do not have. The result is support and
money from your police commission and your city council which, in
turn, makes change possible. My comment to you therefore is, if
you're serious about major change in your force, support the hir-
ing of a consultant. We have implemented changes within our force
in the last four years that were only talked about for ten to fif-
teen years previously. Do not be too concerned about vague recom-
mendations. In their very vagueness you have the freedom to
implement the recommendation in the manner and form most benefic-
ial to your force.

I have a list of suggestions about implementing major
change. These are directed mainly at police executives but are
applicable in any organization. These are not the mechanics of
implementing major change which are well documented. They are
some personal comments and observations which I have made, some of
them learned the hard way.

First of all, prior to hiring a consultant or implementing any major change in your department, even in the planning stage, nominate a middle ranking senior officer to be in charge of the process. There are several reasons for this. He will work with the consultants and if there are any surprises coming up, you will know about them. He's the liaison officer between the consultants and the force. As a chief of police, you are the final arbitrator; the court of last resort. You have a position to uphold, and the respect of the men to maintain. Therefore this senior officer acts as a lightening rod for any criticisms that may emerge. Give that man a resource team, ideally a cross-section of ranks within your force. The most important person in that resource team is the police constable, and I will get into this in some depth a little later.

Another thing I found in dealing with my chiefs and deputies, as I was a superintendent at the time, is that they really did not expect discord. They give an order, and it's usually obeyed. But in the process of major change, expect discord. It's normal and often comes from the senior officers. The old adage that age makes change difficult is very true. Prepare your board or police commission for this discord. For example, half way through the implementation process in our force, a group of senior officers went to our police commission. However, the police commission had been prepared because when we had talked with them about the process and had listed the manifestations of change and it was something that they expected.

Make sure you commit resources to communications, and then communicate. We had many problems in this area. We started off by training 60 sergeants to go out and train the officers in community based policing and other changes. The result was that we got 60 different versions of the same thing. Each one applied his own interpretation to it. Not until we started using video terminals, and I recommend them, did we start to deliver a standard training package.

The next comment is a tough one for a chief. If necessary, you must be prepared to let the blood flow. That is, move senior officers who do not cooperate, and reward those who do. It is a graphic example to others that you are serious and committed to change. Later on, I will describe a method whereby we identify senior officers who are not cooperating.

The next thing, small in itself but very big in the minds of the men, is to change the name of the consultant's report as soon as possible. Unrest, apprehension and insecurity, are all directed towards the report. Our consultant's report then became the Metropolitan Toronto Police Management Plan and we sold it to the men as "your ideas." "All the consultant did was to take your ideas, so why are you objecting?" Now the consultant naturally will give you a bound report which is an advertisement for them. Change these binders as soon as you can. It's your report. You have paid for it so make sure that it becomes your report. This ownership plan leads to faster acceptance.

Bring in outside speakers to reinforce the ideas and concepts. For example, we had Chris Braiden down to talk just a couple of weeks ago. Although I don't know why, in the police environment it always seems that we give a great deal of credibility to outsiders. Use it! Another important thing is to be patient. We're talking about community-based policing which as we have been told several times, is a concept. It's a philosophy. We've been into it now for approximately three years and we estimate it will take five more years before it takes hold. It is a long range plan. We cannot take a style of policing and the inertia built into that style for 105 years and expect it to change overnight. We're like a big ship at sea with all that momentum and you have to be patient. So we expect that it will take probably two or three police chiefs before it really starts to take hold. That's a long commitment.

It is important to accept the fact that you, at the executive level of a police force, by the very nature of your position have limited powers in certain areas. You can make rules, regulations, procedures and policies but if they do not have any effect or only limited effect on the street, then really they're not worth the paper they're written on. The very nature of your position removes you from the type of hands-on management, the day-to-day contact with the men on the street necessary to effect certain changes. This is especially when you are talking about community--based policing. Rewards, support, participation, consultation, communications, are all necessary. This is a change in police philosophy. To make it work, it has to be understood and accepted by the police constable. They're the toughest group in the world to convince. They have the power to give that style of policing life or to kill it.

What do you do? Well, if you do not have the day-to-day contact the first thing is to identify those people that have. And then, make sure that they do their job. How? Well, you build windows into your force. You make sure they're clear windows so that you, the executive, are getting accurate pictures. It's a fact of life that distortion occurs when information passes up and down the communication channels. A subordinate will tell his superior what he likes to hear. They will omit or soften unpleasant things and will cover up their own weaknesses. We all do this to some degree in everyday conversations. It is not unexpected. The problem is that with the number of ranks in every police force, the information goes through at least three or four protective screenings before it reaches a chief. Conversely, when it comes down from the chief, supervisors will place their own interpretations on the message. We had 60 different versions of our report being implemented. Police executives are often forced into the position of making decisions on partial or incomplete information. Don't do it unless you have to. Make provisions for a clear information flow.

Let's get back to targeting key personnel. Within the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force it was determined that a key rank was

responsible for the success or failure of the management of change. This was the unit commander. He usually held the rank of a staff inspector, occasionally that of an inspector; a senior officer looking after one of our eighteen divisions.

If I can cite one essential ingredient in community-based policing it is that of participation. If the unit commander does not allow the men to participate in the management of their areas, their zones or their communities, then this style of policing cannot work. In order to ensure that unit commanders were implementing what senior management had determined, a compliance audit team was instituted. The purpose of this audit was to provide the chief and the executive, with a fairly comprehensive analysis of the effective and efficient use of resources by the management of each division. It considered the economy of his operations, the effectiveness of his management control systems, the ability of his personnel to perform their assigned duties, and the unit's compliance with established procedures, policies and regulations. It was, in fact, an evaluation of the unit commander. It gave senior management an indication of how well a unit commander was meeting his responsibility. It identified obstructionists, interpretation flaws, lagging, "don't know, don't care" attitudes and other common manifestations of the difficulties associated with change. It obtains accurate information upon which the chief can base decisions because it decreases organizational distance.

Contained in the compliance report are all the essential ingredients to allow something like community-based policing to flourish. Critical questions are asked, such as: "Are the officers involved in zone deployment strategy?" "What is their participation level?" "Does a management committee exist?" "Who is on it?" "Where are the minutes of meetings?" (If the minutes don't exist you don't have a management committee.) "What do they contain?" "What activities and what action plans are employed to meet objectives?" "Do these objectives address local needs?" "Has the community been consulted and if so, how, when and where?" The beauty of this audit system is that it can address any area that you wish. It is your decision what questions will be asked. It can be a complete audit or it can be a partial audit. Often, a crisis can occur in your force and you need to make sure things are done a certain way. So a partial audit is the answer. Remember an old adage, "Whatever you examine, whatever you measure, you will improve." A management audit is usually time consuming though, taking from four to six weeks.

The makeup of this management compliance team is critical when you remember its purpose. Its purpose and intent is to obtain accurate information from the field level in order for you to make a decision, or decisions. You can take remedial action or you can take complimentary action depending upon what you are trying to do. Let's look at community-based policing again because it's the topic of this conference. It won't work without the support of the officer on the street. To find out if the street constable has "bought into"community-based policing a police constable is required to ask the questions.

One of the most essential people on the audit team we found, is the police constable, especially in obtaining accurate information. It is an accepted fact that peer level communication is more forthcoming and more accurate. As a result, our two management audit teams were each composed of a police constable, a sergeant, a staff sergeant and an inspector. For some time during their audit they bring in a civilian member to look at property and the other aspects of our division which are handled by civilian members of the force.

Furthermore, the audit team are required to wear uniforms and work for one week on regular shifts in every division that is being audited; longer if required. The benefit of this is that virtually nothing that happens in a unit being inspected can be concealed from the audit team. And because it removes this protective screening, this organizational distance on information flow, it cannot be concealed from the chief.

There are some considerations that should be noted. Everybody resists being audited to some degree. The unit commander resistance to being audited is quite natural, and although it cannot be eliminated completely, it can be minimized by the following steps. Before we started the program, every senior officer, and unit commander was brought to our college, given a copy of the audit, the method of operation, and the questions that would be asked. A second thing is that I don't want to know about every little minor deficiency. I want to catch people doing things right. If they can remedy something within two or three weeks, it couldn't have been that important to begin with and is therefore not included in the management report. The team's responsibility, as we keep telling the unit commanders, is to gather information, not to inspect. This helps to overcome the fact that unit commanders were a little bit sensitive about being inspected by police constables. But they're not inspecting a senior officer; they're reporting on conditions they find in the field.

When the audit report is in, you must do something with it. Face to face discussions between the officers in charge of the audit team and of the unit being inspected take place prior to a final report being submitted. Then, the unit commander comes to my office with his staff superintendent, the officer to whom he reports, and we discuss the results of the audit.

The results are what count. This form of management audit has turned out to be one of the most effective agents for change and compliance that we have in the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force. After some reservations, unit commanders are now requesting visits from our audit team for two main reasons. Some requests occur when a new unit commander takes over a division and would like to determine the state of that division before he moves in. So he asks for an audit report. Others are not asking for an audit per se. What they are requesting is that the audit team come to the division to speak, to lecture, and to advise; more of a training function. The reason for this is that the auditors

have a great deal of credibility in one area and that is, "this is what the chief wants." What they say tends to be accepted. The audit team is effective. If you are not managing change, it is still a good technique to use within your own police force. You have to build windows in your force to see what is happening.

The last issue I wish to address is, in my opinion, the most interesting and probably the most challenging to us in the police community. I read the descriptive article which accompanied the invitation to this conference. One key sentence in that article caught my attention. I would like to summarize the article to re-fresh your memory and then read the key sentence, which I will address in some detail.

The article comments on the amount of research in the police environment. It casts some doubts about various police strategies such as the need for rapid response in all cases. It identifies some promising initiatives like neighbourhood patrol, police mini--stations, amd community oriented policy development, and con-cludes with this sentence. "Beyond these impressive trends is the emerging reconceptual-ization of policing functions and goals, as yet incompletely reported within law enforcement and within public policy levels." For the last part of my talk I wish to address the issues contained in that sentence. It asks what is the police function in society today? What is our job? Why do we exist? I would like to attempt to answer that.

During every conference on community-based policing that I have attended, continual reference is made to Peel's principles, and to the work of people like Goldstein and Alderson. We pay a great deal of attention to these thinkers. Why? Because they serve a need within the police community, because we are wrestling with our role in society today. I believe the time has come with-in the Canadian police community to have principles of policing that are Canadian and reflect the nature of policing in our country today.

The intent and purpose of these principles is to express in concise terms the high ideals which reflect the nature of the police mission and to provide direction and guidance for the future. These principles should focus on current and on-going policing requirements, as established by legal mandate, in addi-tion to public needs and expectations. They should express an overall philosophy which unifies and directs police activities and, most importantly, imparts a clear understanding of a police officer's role within the society which he serves. Once these principles have been established we, the management, should use them to identify appropriate objectives, goals and priorities for police service in response to the needs of the community. We would thereby assist the strategic planning process in the produc-tive utilization of personnel and technical resources and, in turn, our use of public funds.

Every police officer should be given a copy of these princi-ples and the underlying philosophy in order that he explicitly

understand his role in the delivery of policing services to the members of the community. I believe these principles should become the cornerstone of a police officer's philosophy and training. Once accepted, as organizational and personal principles, they would become the measure against which the efforts of your police force and mine, as well as efforts of individual officers, would be evaluated.

I do not like to pose a problem without offering possible solutions. May I offer for your consideration the following principles which I believe embody the essence of the police mission in Canada today.

I acknowledge the influence of Peel, of Goldstein, of Alderson, and of other prominent authors. I also acknowledge a hundred members of my own force and approximately that many citizens who have assisted me in developing the following eight principles. I would like to read them to you. Each is brief and has an underlying statement of philosophy which will explain why that principle exists.

PRINCIPLE NUMBER ONE: TO MAINTAIN A DEGREE OF SOCIAL ORDER THAT MAKES A FREE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY POSSIBLE.

This principle establishes the maintenance of social order as the basis of police existence. This is fundamental to our role in society and it is our first priority. If this was not so, you could not go to the store, transportation could not run, and your wives and children could not go shopping or to school. The quality of life that our citizens enjoy depends upon the level of social order. This principle also encompasses a major police role in society today; mediating the day-to-day disputes that result from inter-personal and inter-group conflicts.

PRINCIPLE NUMBER TWO: TO SAFEGUARD THE INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE, SECURITY OF PERSON, AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY.

The underlying philosophy is that this principle protects and embodies the constitutional right of an individual, as stipulated in the laws of our land, and our responsibility as a police force to uphold these rights. We as a police force, and as police officers, acknowledge by this principle that the powers granted to officers by statute must be exercised in a manner which is beyond reproach.

PRINCIPLE NUMBER THREE: TO ENFORCE THE LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE.

This principle reconciles the freedom of the individual with the security of the person. It recognizes the conflicting principles of upholding the rule of law while protecting human rights. It defines the responsibility of a police officer, authorized by law, to infringe upon the lives of the citizens, only within the

bounds of justice. Equality, fairness, impartiality, and the exercise of discretion all fall into this principle.

PRINCIPLE NUMBER FOUR: TO RESPOND TO, AND ASSIST, THOSE IN NEED OR THOSE WHO CANNOT CARE FOR THEMSELVES.

This principle incorporates our mandate to serve and to protect. It recognizes that a large portion of police service to the public is humanitarian in nature and the police must assist those in need or obtain assistance for them. It recognizes the social elements of the policing function, and it makes a place for them in our training, our organization, and our liaison with other social agencies. It recognizes the community's dependence upon the police and our responsibility to the community.

PRINCIPLE NUMBER FIVE: TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PUBLIC WHICH BUILDS RESPECT FOR, AND PARTICIPATION IN, THE LAW.

This principle acknowledges that citizen involvement is the most important means we have of dealing with crime and social disorder. It places a responsibility on us to seek actively public participation, to conduct ourselves in a manner which builds respect for the law, and to seek easy and open channels of communication between us and the public. It is the quality of that communication which has given us our police service today. Inherent in this principle, too, is the concept that the community must assume some responsibility for dealing with crime.

PRINCIPLE NUMBER SIX: TO PREVENT CRIME AND CONTROL CONDUCT THAT IS THREATENING TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY, THEREBY PROMOTING A FEELING OF SECURITY WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.

This identifies a mandate to be proactive; to take action before it happens; to take control of our own destiny and to identify and deal with situations which if left untouched would result in disorder or criminal acts. It places prevention as one of the guiding principles of the police community. It also addresses one thing that is not usually considered, a recognition that the security of person and property is dependent upon the feeling of security and safety created by police presence and actions. It deals with public perception of crime, which sometimes is worse than crime itself. We look to the United States and see that the fear of crime there forces people to get Doberman Pinchers and live behind barbed wire fences. They advertise security guards and put video cameras and ten or twelve locks on doors. And you get a very paradoxical situation, the good people lock themselves away and the criminals roam the streets. This principle thus addresses the perception that our public has of crime.

PRINCIPLE NUMBER SEVEN: TO INVESTIGATE, DETECT, AND ACTIVATE THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES WITHIN THE RULE OF LAW.

The enforcement of the law is a necessary response to wrongful behaviour. It places a responsibility on each police officer

to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in rela-
tion to the preservation of peace, the prevention of crime, offen-
ces against the law, and apprehension of the offender. It is the
sworn duty of all police officers to maintain and uphold the law.
This requirement, and the powers granted to do so, distinguish the
constable from his fellow citizens. In enforcing the law, a con-
stable should recognize that its purpose is to compel individuals
to act according to the rules so that we all may live in peace; so
that all may live if not in harmony, at least with a minimum of
discord.

PRINCIPLE NUMBER EIGHT: TO SUPPORT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN
SUCH A MANNER AS TO COMMAND THE RESPECT OF, AND SUPPORT FROM, THE
PUBLIC.

This principle recognizes that law enforcement, and the
judicial and correctional processes are all inter-related and
require the support and cooperation of all participants. And we
know there is often some conflict between the three agencies. We
realize that as police, we are the front end of the system. If we
vigorously enforce one law the effects go all the way through the
system. This principle dedicates the support of the police to all
aspects of the justice system.

These principles are not exhaustive. I consider them in the
nature of a working paper; somewhere to start. It is an attempt
to define Canadian policing principles.

In my opinion, there are critical areas to discuss in the
future. We need to enunciate our governing principles and our
commitments, in order to assist in the determination and the
setting of goals that will prevent drifting and encourage the
development of stable relations with our community. I think we
have been drifting without clear principles and objectives for
years because our role in society has not been clearly defined.
As police leaders, we are central figures for change. This will
require more than the traditional management skills. We must be
aware of the need for change and committed to achieving it. We
must be open, curious, innovative, and willing to take risks and
conduct experiments. All of those are essential.

What is our job? Why do we exist? These are critical ques-
tions facing us today. We have concerns with other major and more
specific issues too: the use of the criminal law, to recognize
the use of discretion; our political accountability and financial
accountability; the control of police conduct. It will require
strong leadership to address these questions and issues. I
believe we have the type of leadership in the police community
today that can address and resolve these problems.

I would like to thank you for your attention.

5. THE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE IN A POLICE DEPARTMENT
THE LONDON EXPERIENCE

Deputy Assistant Commissioner
R.A. Hunt, O.B.E., LL.B
Metropolitan Police

Introduction

During the three years since the Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Newman, rejoined the Metropolitan Police, we have experienced such a period of self-reaching analysis and change, both in operational and organizational matters, that it leaves us a little breathless at times. There is hardly an aspect of what we are doing, why or how that has not been the subject of close scrutiny.

Based on our experience over those years I would like to tell you of a system we have developed, based on judicious consultation, thorough planning and scheduled implementation which enables us to introduce wide ranging changes without traumatic side effects and without interfering with routine policing.

I would also like to sing like Frank Sinatra. The chances are about equal.

I have never been able to make out why I cannot sing in tune, let alone like Frank; but I do now have a good idea why the path of major change, in the Police Service at least, never will run smooth. It is a path beset by pitfalls, and foul-ups – but one well worth the journeying for all that. When I read, in a magazine about public administration, of a nice, stage by stage program for introducing change, I cannot resist a wry smile. Smooth, logical progress has not been our experience.

Nothing I say is intended to deter anyone from the challenge of tackling major change in an organization; nor indeed, to tackle it in an organized, progressive way. Times of change can be frustrating and even confusing but they are always exciting. Hope springs eternal and in spite of set backs, progress is made, slowly but surely.

The account I give is from the perspective of an implementer, as a senior manager, rather than as a planner of change. Although I have been involved in consultation and have co-ordinated some aspects of research and planning, my operational command has placed me at the interface between theory and practice. I will not speak only in terms of mistakes because that undervalues the effort we have all put into it. I will speak frankly of the lessons we have learned and of experiences we would not wish to repeat. We have made a lot of progress, not only in making

changes, but in recognizing the hazards of the process of change. We have not yet found a safe means of negotiating all the hazards, nor do we necessarily expect to. Being alert to them gives us greater confidence to progress further in the development of an organization which has a continuing capacity to adapt to changing needs.

After a little scene-setting about London and the Metropolitan Police, I shall describe two major organizational changes which we currently have in hand; changes which have spread their tentacles into almost every aspect of our operational policing; which have meshed in with changes of earlier origin; and which have spawned the need for fresh changes, unforeseen at the outset.

Using those two major changes and other lesser ones to illustrate, I shall then speak under the headings of:

    Planning for Change
    Implementation
    Monitoring and Evaluation

Three other aspects, resistance to change, resources and communication are relevant to all stages and will receive separate treatment.

Scene Setting

To set the scene, a few words about London and the Metropolitan Police as it was three years ago.

As a Londoner born and bred I can identify with a description by Paul Theroux, the American novelist, which runs as follows ... "London is not a city. It is more like a country. It's hugeness makes it possible for everyone to invent his own city. My London is not your London, though everyone's Washington D.C. is pretty much the same ... "I know nothing about Washington, but that seems to be a shrewd assessment of London, catching the spirit of the diversity and contrast to be found. It is a bustling city where those of different racial origin rub shoulders, where every degree of wealth and poverty is to be found, a great variety of occupations, extremes of political, social and religious thought. It has plenty of problems for policing. The small pockets of different social environment - those cities within the city - call for different shades of policing methods and priorities."

At the beginning of 1983, officers of the Metropolitan Police were dealing with a rising tide of policing problems with inadequate resources. It was, for most of us, a head-down, day to day get-on-with-it existence. We were chasing our own tails, increasingly involved in a reactive, fire-brigade style of policing. As problems had increased, more and more decision making had been drawn into Force Headquarters, followed by much of the cream of our officers, required to support so much central power. Divisions, that is our local policing units, had been left in a

descenuing spiral of quantity and quality of manpower, without even the authority to direct and manage what was left to them. I should make it clear that this was a situation which had developed over a period of more than a decade. Maybe it has a familiar ring?

Such a situation, not surprisingly, led to demand for change, within the Force, over several years before 1983. Not surprisingly either, there were those at the centre of the organization who sought to preserve the status quo and they could point, with some truth, to the inefficiencies of the local policing units, weakened and almost overwhelmed as they were.

About the same time, the demand for change came strongly from the community. I feel quite comfortable in using the same phrase as that contained in the document introducing this conference - the public's demand was for more <u>accessible, responsive and community involved police</u>. In London there was also a demand for political accountability to locally elected bodies.

In 1983, began in earnest our endeavours to decentralize decision making and to establish a social contract with the community. You have heard about Neighbourhood Policing and other initiatives from Larry Roach and you will know that research and experiments in community policing were well embarked upon; but 1983 marked the start of pulling things together by the planned introduction of sweeping change.

Poised to take the plunge, the Government added an element of interest and challenge: financial constraints. Soon afterwards strict cash limits were introduced. Instead of dealing with a bottom up budgeting situation we have now to learn to work within tight financial ceilings.

Two Major Changes

The two major changes I am doing to explain briefly, and later draw upon for illustration, are: introducing a structured planning system throughout the Force; and secondly, re-organizing the Force structure.

In October 1982, on his appointment as Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Newman began an analysis of the problems and priorities, drawing on information supplied by his heads of Departments and his four Area Deputy Assistant Commissioners. The picture was one of static police resources facing escalating and competing demands. It was decided to develop a planning system which would enable Divisions and specialist units to determine their priorities, getting the best possible balance between operational demand and the resources available. It was very much part of the intention that such planning should draw on the views of the police personnel operationally involved and that the views of local communities were to be taken into account.

The importance of this change can hardly be overestimated. It amounted to nothing less than training the Force to plan for change; giving a capacity to research, analyze, plan priorities, implement and monitor at all levels of the Force.

A very small group, a Chief Superintendent and one or two other officers, were installed before the end of 1982 to assist the Commissioner in his analysis of problems. Early in 1983 all the senior officers of the Force were introduced to the theory of 'Management by Objectives' by two guests from America. Very quickly teams of two or three officers from each of the then four geographical areas were given a crash course in some management and research techniques. These were the catalysts to introduce the theory and procedures to the 75 land divisions and headquarter branches. By June that same year each Division had produced a Divisional Strategic Plan, which included Action Plans for dealing with priority problems; some reports were several hundred pages long, others very brief: of very variable quality.

It would not be unfair to say that many Divisional officers hoped and expected that planning would go away after that first year. It didn't; it was repeated for 1984, with refinements based on the experience gained; and this time the plans were published locally to Consultative Groups, local councils, M.P.s and others. Copies were placed in local libraries. The 1985 plans were presented as 'updates' to the public and the same will apply in 1986.

The modifications made each year have been considerable. The plans are now much better, showing a general acceptance of the philosophy underlying the change. The publication of plans is obviously relevant to our being closer and more visibly accountable to the public. In-service, the plans are a prioritized program for action. In reality, circumstances and operational events exercise a substantial frustrating influence on the good intentions - especially on early ones which were over-ambitious. Nonetheless, all Divisions have introduced changes and improvements, many having the effect of being more responsive to local community needs.

Changes in the planning process are still occurring and more are yet to come. What started off as a once a year hiccup has now - nearly - developed into a continuous process of producing management information, making it more possible for divisions to deploy their resources - very little increased - to the best advantage. In this and future years we are looking for more community involvement at the planning stage of the annual report. It is foreseeable that the reports for public consumption will become more professional and indeed more widely read. Already local newspapers take an active interest.

I shall deal with the introduction of Force Reorganization slightly more, shortly. As I have said there was considerable demand for change, far from universal, in the Force, well before 1983. The same analysis of problems and priorities which gave

rise to Force Planning, also gave rise to a review of Force structure. It began in early 1983 and by October of that year recommendations had been made by the working party about the structure and role of Divisions. The report saw Divisions as the prime unit of policing in the organizational structure, all other parts of the organization to operate in support of that unit.

This philosophy was widely welcomed and agreed in principle. It was over a year before the next stage of the re-organization was revealed. One of the intermediary levels of command structure - Districts - was to disappear. The four Headquarter Departments were to have their roles re-aligned and reduced in size. Authority levels for decision making were to be changed to the lowest possible level - Divisions wherever possible.

A year after announcement of that decision, these changes were still being worked through, without greatly affecting policing operations at local level - yet. In November last year the eight Areas replaced the four. Last month, the last of the District Commanders lost his role but some residual units remain at District level whilst decisions are pending. We are on the verge of making the change a reality. Already Divisions are adopting a more independent exercise of their emergent authority.

The reorganization is far from complete yet and we may anticipate that it will take some years before it settles down. In the course of it many headquarters tasks will have been devolved (if not terminated), taken on by Divisions and, to a lesser extent, Areas - along with the authority for decision making. It is more than a change of structure - it is a revolution in our policing management. And like Force Planning, it serves the objective of being more responsive, locally, to public demand.

I will not describe any more changes, but let me list one or two:

    Neighbourhood Watch
    Crime Case Screening
    Neighbourhood Policing
    Computer Technology
    Major Legislation Affecting Police Powers and Procedures
    Policing Skills Training
    Budgetary Control
    Victim Satisfaction and Support
    Revised Public Order Methods
    Consultative Groups
    Inter-Divisional Transfers
    Career Planning

I could go on. Perhaps I have said enough to indicate the scale of change we have and continue to experience.

Planning for Change

Under this heading of planning for change I shall be spanning the diagnostic stage, the analytical stage, decision making and the drawing up of a plan for implementation. I shall not be going through each stage however, but picking out some points, putting hindsight to work, where we may have learnt some lessons.

The first point I will mention is the risk if being led on by available solutions rather than by a well identified need for change. Research and analysis should throw up, if at all, a need for change and a fairly clear idea of what it is desired to achieve. That is the time to look at solutions, including other peoples' 'off the shelf' solutions. It is a seductive attraction to start reaching for solutions too early. In early 1983 we reached out towards 'Management by Objectives', 'Key Result Analysis', the 'Problem Oriented Approach', seeing them as potential solutions, in planning terms, rather than the management tools that they are. Our present planning process incorporates much of the philosophy of management by objectives. Key Result Analysis, thrust upon us at the eleventh hour before the first year's Divisional Strategic Plans, nearly sank us and was firmly rejected next year by the implementers. We sent out the Problem Oriented Approach solution, searching for four suitable problems, one on each of the four geographical Areas. We did the approach, (to which, as Dr. Goldstein knows, I am greatly attracted) no favours at all.

Both Crime Case Screening and Neighbourhood Watch were solutions imported from the United States and implemented with only superficial adaptation to Force-wide, not local needs. Case Screening is still giving us problems two years later but Neighbourhood Watch has already been adapted to a shape in which we can use it. Neighbourhood Policing, a home grown product, nearly became a solution looking for problems. Because it is a flexible solution and perhaps because the solution was devised with Londons' problems in mind, Divisions other than the pilot ones have been able to adapt some of the elements of it to their own use.

It is obviously wise, when there are known problems, to look at potential solutions, to learn from the success and failures of others, whether within Police Forces or the management field. That is, of course, what this conference is all about. The risk lies in supposing that solutions translate well from one place to another. They have to be beaten and battered in the tube of experience until the recipients are satisfied they have invented something of their own. Even those who are ready for change do not like to have solutions imposed upon them. Thus package solutions have to be punched into shape during the planning stage on a fairly local basis, by the implementers. Or, as has tended to happen with us, the adaptation has to wait until the implementation stage, with a built in readiness to accept further change.

This leads me on to talk about consultation, both within the service and in the community. Consultation is relevant at the diagnostic stage of planning and then again at the stage just before decision making, when options have been identified. Consultation is one of the 'in' themes, not only in policing, not only in the U.K., but in the Western world. It almost has 'fad' status and it is easy to speak disparagingly of it, especially since it is hard work and often frustrating. It slows down decision making and therefore action. Everyone knows that a camel is a horse designed by a committee. We have to take things as they are, however, and we live in an age when people, including policemen, do not like imposed solutions. Although most people and especially police men accept the need for change in a crisis, when major change is contemplated they like to be consulted, at the very least. Better still if they can plan their own change - which is what our Force Planning system is all about.

Consultation with the community is difficult; almost impossible unless there is a mechanism for it. Even then it leads to delays, dispute and often bureaucratic systems. A decision needs to be taken, at planning stage, how much consultation will be attempted. Of course, that decision needs to be taken after consultation. We are only, in the Metropolitan Police, beginning to get this nearer right. Using line management and local staff association representatives clustered into groups, we have had a good measure of consultation right throughout the Force about reorganization. It is a heavy price, in terms of man hours lost. Most individuals agree that universal consultation is impossible and will accept that a group which contains sufficient representation of their interest - whether a rank level or specialist interest - can and must be replied upon to represent them. Another problem is how to give comparative weight, at decision time, to views which are those of large groups as against those of influential individuals; those with expertise in the field as against those with crude user perceptions.

Introducing change probably means bringing in a new vocabulary which has to be understood before progress can be made. In 1983 we started using common words, such as 'goals', 'objective', 'aims' and even, at one stage 'mission', with new technical meanings. At senior level we all thought we knew what they meant; but there was no concensus. The greatest mystic of all was 'objectives' which never came in the same cloak twice. This totally confused the more junior officer that we expected to actually do something with these words. That they were everyday words given an esoteric meaning was worse than if they had been unfamiliar words. Operational policemen, used to dealing with women liberationists and animal liberationists showed an interest in trying to liberate a word. The early language of planning was dead-pan, academic and stilted. Not welcome, to say the least, or even comprehensible, to the early turn police van driver we expected to participate. The two lessons we learnt were to get the terminology sorted out at planning stage and keep it as simple and straightforward as possible. The price we paid for getting this

wrong at first was a spate of home produced glossaries, expressed often in hilarious but not necessarily complimentary or constructive terms. I though it was a sign of good morale and resilient humour, and what's more we asked for it, but not everyone saw it so. The language of management theory is, of course, an insidious short-hand that it is easy to slip into for those closely involved. In spite of my own mildly cynical view of the jargon, I am aware that I fall into that trap. Our experience has been that it takes about three years for familiarity with new terms to infiltrate down through the organization - if not abandoned before that to middle ranking officers.

A word about setting objectives, which our experience suggests is desirable when introducing change. I think we started off with a reasonably clear understanding that two elements were necessary: a defined proportionate improvement (or contained worsening) in a situation, related to a fixed time scale. For example, for a division to set an objective of reducing burglaries by 5% by a date about 1 year hence, and having plans to achieve it, all seemed reasonable. What we failed to realize was that police do not have sufficient control over how many crimes of that kind are committed, for it to be an achievable objective. The number of unemployed, the effectiveness of the courts - a hundred things - impinge on whether crime goes up or down, quite apart from what police can do. A more realistic objective would be to improve (to a projected degree, within a time scale) the number of crimes cleared up per 100 arrests for the crime. This looks to our professional skills in investigation or interrogation, with outside influence at a minimum. You will have guessed that Divisions (and myself at Area) set objectives which proved unachievable. If the targets were met it was more luck than to our credit, whatever effort we had put in. It is not of course easy to get the public to accept such realistic views, raised on a diet of raw statistics for rising or falling crime, for which they are accustomed to blame or praise the police and no-one else.

I shall need to speak about base-line information which is gathered at the planning stage but I will leave that until I say something about monitoring.

Before going on to implementation, I want to say something about implementation plans. For introducing our Force Planning system we used the concept - I am not sure of its origins - of developing Action Plans. For every strategic plan, Divisional, Area, Force there were action plans, each one dealing with a subject, whether operational or organizational. There was such a backlog of need for change, such a wealth of ideas, that the 1983 action plans contained enough detail to see us all through for a decade. By the 1984 planning cycle less had been achieved than was hoped, at all levels, and the action plans needed re-stating. Action plans are still used at Divisional level, although with more realism and less detail. At Force level, for 1984, 1985 and 1986, Priority Programs superceded Action Plans.

The principle of using action plans seems to us a perfectly good one, provided it is kept under tight control, without too ambitious detail. Plans need to change a bit during implementation and too comprehensive action plans can become straight jackets. At the same time the wealth of detail in the early ones are still used as reference points. There is a constant need to keep checking back to see if anything important has been overlooked. The more wrong we got it to start with, by reason of too much detail, the more value they are today, which is anomolous. Starting out from fresh, however, or at the stage we now are, it is essential that action plans or priority programs are not too cluttered by detail.

The concept of action plans is sufficiently flexible to implement most forms of change, other than those difficult and ambitious ones which may take a generation to have effect – such as changing ingrained institutional attitudes. Some implementation plans need to be staged because of dependence upon other changes in the pipeline.

I shall leave planning there, although there is much more one could say on the subject.

Implementation

They say that the trouble with doing nothing is that you never know when you're through. The same is true with planning for change. It overspills into implementation, whether by design or accident. This is particularly true if decisions made prior to commencing implementation are in broad outline only, leaving detail to consultation. In the case of Force Reorganization, certain 'immutable' decisions were made, leaving the detail to be filled in subsequently, piecemeal, over a period of time. Thus planning the changes continued well into implementation, effect being given to decisions as they spun off from the process of implementation. Neighbourhood policing, which has a built-in provision for Divisions to adapt to local circumstances, is implemented by a similar staged means.

A disadvantage of this means of progress is that it is slow and laborious. Apart from the delays caused by consultation, the mechanics, which I will describe in a minute, may smack of bureaucracy. It is the only way however of ensuring participation by those effected and our experience allows me to commend it, in spite of the frustration caused by delay.

The nature of the change to be introduced dictates the method of implementation. I spoke of Action plans under the heading of planning but these could just as easily be seen as the means of implementation. For Force reorganization, once the 'immutables' defined the framework, progress was by way of 'Option Papers' (which were used for consultation); 'Proposal Papers' (which were for the presentation of options and recommendations to the Force Policy Committee); finally; 'Implementation Plans', (the step by

step procedures necessary to make the changes). The vehicle for implementation of Force Planning, Neighbourhood Watch and case screening was the issue of written guidelines. Other changes, especially the long term ones, aimed at changing culture and attitudes, are being implemented by the introduction of new training. We have learned to have no preconceived ideas about the method of implementing change, each case being decided on its own facts. Even with hindsight, I suspect that we have usually chosen the right general method in each case, although accusations of 'too hasty' or 'too slow' can sometimes be seen, in retrospect, to have merit. Unfortunately we have not found a way of stopping police work carrying on whilst we get these issues exactly right.

I should mention the use of change agents - the employment of teams of officers tasked to ensure a smooth transition. We now have a small Force Planning Unit, headed by an officer of my own rank (who has other major areas of responsibility). This has a change agent role, as does the Area equivalent, the Area Planning and Evaluation Unit. The Force Reorganization team now has a coordinating role, and so is a kind of change agent. We are in the process of extending the transferable elements of Neighbourhood Policing to other Divisions and are employing small (three officers) implementation teams on each Area to assist Divisions to modify and adapt the principles to their own needs; assist in the implementation and, later, monitor progress and consequences. It is rather late in the day that we have identified this last kind of travelling road show, but we look to it with high expectations. We are using a similar road show system to give new training in management skills to senior Divisional officers.

The process of implementation of major change leads to a proliferation of lengthy reports. Reading them all became a very serious problem for senior managers and others regularly consulted. To ensure a degree of uniformity of presentation, a specific format for option papers (involving a description of advantages/disadvantages of each option) was used. To a lesser extent this applied also to proposal papers. In some cases it was carried to the absurd by the writers, to ensure compliance with the format. Greater flexibility would have reduced bulk considerably.

Increased paperwork is unfortunately a necessary consequence of introducing change, but every effort needs to be made to keep it within bounds. Decision making on the basis of oral presentation of options has also been experienced and lends itself to much retrospective criticism by those not party to the proceedings.

It was during the early stages of implementation of Force Reorganization that the local/central tug of war for power appeared at its most bitter and discouraging. Those at the bottom level of the organization, promised greater authority, were impatient for it. Those at Force Headquarters - or some of them - were reluctant to surrender anything. Those in the middle - the eight Areas - were and are viewed with suspicion from both sides.

It has been our experience that this power struggle begins to ease as implementation decisions are made. Divisions begin to appreciate that greater independence within its boundaries does not mean UDI because interdependence with other Divisions, Area and Force HQ remains. Areas come to the same realization and Force Headquarters feels less under threat and begins to realize that its main role is, after all, a supportive one. Perhaps the wish is father to the thought but a better corporate spirit seems to be emerging from the ashes of mourning.

I have not mentioned the Government's imposed cash limits for some time. I mention them now because of their impact on implementation of the major changes I have been describing. Not only have tight budgets curtailed the pace and effectiveness of some changes, but it has embroiled Divisions in the unfamiliar exercise of costing every change proposed. From 1984, local budgeting was piloted, in the form of maneouverable resources, on several Divisions. It was reasonably successful and was extended, becoming integrated with the planning system. At the moment finances are held by the provisioning departments but plans are currently in hand to give Divisions some control. In addition to the ability to interchange equal-cost resources, a 'good housekeeping' benefit is under consideration. So also is the role of Areas to prioritize supply in the case of scarce resources (as they do now for manpower), with a notional budget.

I think it must be said that grasping the financial aspects has been one of the most difficult changes for operational officers to assimilate. We have certainly become cost conscious, which is good, but we have not yet achieved much local control of resources through the purse strings. If, or perhaps I should say when, this is achieved it will match in well with the other changes which are decentralizing authority and making local police more capable of responding to local demand.

Ending this section on implementation, I must mention the knock-on effect of major change. It has led to a demand for better technology, for the better handling both of operational intelligence and management information. It has thrown up many new training needs, some of which have to be met during the course of implementation itself. Thus the pace of change tends to accelerate of its own impetus and although we now speak of 'a year of consolidation', it is inevitable that current changes are going to necessitate many others.

Monitoring and Evaluation

If change is introduced, sooner or later it is going to be necessary to evaluate whether the beneficial results desired have in fact been achieved. In the Metropolitan Police we got away for years with evaluating change on a 'seat of the pants' basis, whether things seemed to have improved or not, and then raising arguments in support of the decision. Nowadays, conscious of the three 'E's', efficiency, effectiveness and economy, which have

become the yardsticks in all public administration, we try to be more precise in evaluation.

From the outset of this great period of change, three years ago, we recognized the need to evaluate eventually and therefore to monitor progress as we went along. What we found ourselves measuring, however, was not what progress had been made towards achieving the desired end results, but the progress of implementing the steps (or change) necessary to achieve it. In short, we found ourselves monitoring 'means' rather than 'ends' objectives.

That is, those of us that were monitoring at all. I have mentioned that action plans were an integral part of Divisional Strategic Plans. Steps to monitor progress were built into the format for action plans which we adopted Force-wide. That first year the monitoring process broke down almost completely, which was not finally realized until an evaluation was necessary prior to writing the next year's plan. That was partly because, as I have said, many Divisional officers thought planning would all go away after that first year; also, of course, because we were all busy with operational matters and the urgent tends to take precedence over the important. Furthermore, there were neither separate resources dedicated to such a task, nor a structure or tradition of it. We were, all of us, pretty green in such matters at that stage and local research and analysis teams which had been quickly assembled to get out the first year's reports were disbanded on most Divisions.

The second year, not only did the Force Planning Unit and Area Planning and Evaluation Units, emergent from the embryo stage by then, have to modify as the result of the first year's experience; they mostly had to work with new Divisional personnel, those involved a year earlier having been re-absorbed into other duties. This lack of continuity was an important lesson, learnt the hard way, and very relevant in the context of monitoring.

At Force level, monitoring was by a high-powered Committee, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner. At monthly meetings, there was a rolling program of reporting back on parts of Priority Programs. Any particular subject would come up at about three monthly intervals, although the co-ordinators - I was one of them - could bring urgent matters forward outside the program. This system, which lasted over two years, was labour intensive, in terms of both meetings and, especially in the early stages, when we were all learning as we went along, but it was discontinued in the autumn of last year. By that time there were other committees, as a result of the Force Reorganization, processing, and its demise was greeted with general approbation.

At other levels of the Force, at Areas, Districts (as they they were) and Divisions, different methods of monitoring progress (after that first year) were tried. Periodic written update reports, carefully scheduled, to the next command level, was one method. Presentations, also scheduled, to the next command level,

was another. The latter avoided paperwork but still needed a lot
of preparation. At the most complex, there was a mixture of
written reports, presentations and on-site inspections of pro-
gress. The opportunity to set out a schedule, with interlocking
reporting-up systems, was really a bureaucrat's dream. The monit-
oring began to take up more time than the implementing and, not
without feelings of guilt, we allowed them to lapse. Perhaps
something like that was necessary originally to bring home the
importance of monitoring (and let people know planning is here to
stay) but once we had all taken the message, over-complex monitor-
ing became superfluous. It was also inconsistent with making
Divisions more autonomous. I now leave it to Divisions to monitor
progress, only making sure that they are attempting to do so and -
the wheel has gone almost full circle - advising them against
over-sophistication.

    These monitoring methods I have been describing both at
Force, local and intermediary command levels were almost exclus-
ively monitoring progress of 'means' objectives. When we came to
have a better understanding of 'means' and 'ends' objectives and
look more closely at the latter, we found ourselves short of base-
line information of the right kind. For example if we have set
ourselves an objective of improving our relationship with black
youth, within a certain area, within a set time (which was not a
proper objective for reasons I stated earlier - but we did it) we
found that we had insufficient information (beyond subjective
guess-work) about the antecedent state of affairs. The same
applied if we were trying to cut expenditure in a certain field of
activity without ever knowing for sure the earlier expenditure.

    When we came to look at the statistics we had been compiling,
and supplying to the public, we found that, although they con-
tained necessary and valid information, they were not very helpful
to assist us to measure our own performance, let alone weigh the
impact of any change. Accidents, for example. What police were
trying to do, by police deployments, might well have less effect
than road engineering. Indeed, fatal and serious accidents have
recently been greatly reduced very largely as a result of making
the wearing of seat belts compulsory.

    Furthermore, many of the changes we were trying to make
involved our relationship with the public - accessible, respon-
sive, community involved again - and this was the area in which we
had little or no baseline information. The use of local, profess-
ionally applied, opinion polls is one of the ways in which we are
addressing this problem.

    The need to monitor and measure our own results - as distinct
from those of society as a whole - led us to look for performance
indicators. Our research department produced a battery of these
(a cafeteria is the 'in' phase, I believe) of over a hundred.
This had quite an intimidating effect upon us all, and I, for one,
shied away from them. Now, a year or two later, 'performance
indicators' is a term which trips lightly off the tongue and we

are finding ways, some of them novel and imaginative but mostly pretty mundane, of measuring our performance on a wider plane that just statistics.

It was monitoring, then, that led us to a better understanding of 'means' and 'ends' objectives. We put ourselves through the mill trying to get means monitoring under control but, although it is important, we no longer allow it to block the light quite so much. As regards 'ends', we have a better understanding of what we can influence and are trying to develop more accurate measuring tools, that is, performance indicators. (I should have mentioned that performance indicators are also appropriate to 'means' issues such as the proportion of uniform officers a Division succeeds in getting on the streets at its peak demand periods). Of course we are a long way from the general public understanding the difference between what police can or cannot influence. We still get the blame if crime goes up, or credit if it goes down temporarily or locally.

We now look for monitoring of both means and ends information on an ongoing basis. The two or three officers on each Division who have, since the second year of planning, been continuously involved in local data collection and analysis are now being brought together, with others dealing with intelligence and manpower deployments, into a Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit. A 'core package' of information is being developed, most of which will be capable of being dealt with on a small computer which each Division will have by the end of the year. This core information will be capable of aggregation to Area and Force level, where it will be invaluable for performance monitoring and resource distribution. The 'knock-on' effect of introducing the Force planning system is well illustrated.

A final word about monitoring. It is necessary to decide at the planning stage how we are going to monitor and evaluate after implementation. It seems essential and obvious now but not at the outset.

The management theory approach to change apparently makes evaluation of consequences a must. I have mentioned the problem of unreliable orunavailable baseline information. Even where that information is good, as time goes on it becomes increasingly more difficult to distinguish the causal influence of one change from that of others. In scientific experiments they have a pilot scheme with other control sites for comparison; the pilot site being isolated from other changes. We have found such an approach quite impossible to achieve. For example, we introduced an Area Intelligence and Surveillance Unit some three years ago to target those actively involved in street crime. Quite apart from outside influences on crime, such as unemployment, we the police have done a dozen other things, all designed towards the same result. When we came to evaluate the Area Units, therefore, it was impossible to attribute any change in results to this cause rather than others. The only thing easy was the costing. Similar difficulty

is being experienced evaluating Neighbourhood Policing, which
Larry Roach spoke about, although an independent 'expert' has been
employed. It is interesting that his interim report is mostly
concerned with 'means' rather than 'ends'.

I am inclined to think that we are still wasting too much
time and resources evaluating changes which are so inextricably
mixed up with other changes we have implemented that they are
impossible to evaluate. Not everyone would agree with me, but I
think a time can come when it is worth going back to the old 'seat
of the pants' view - if we like it and the public like it, let's
keep it; the whys are too academic and difficult to bother with.
I would certainly take this view with something as flexible as
Neighbourhood Policing, which is capable of infinitive adjustment
to local needs.

One other difficulty we have experienced in evaluation is
worth mentioning - the knock-on effect of getting good end results
may themselves be, or appear to be adverse. For example, if we
are active in dealing with street heroin dealers, as the public
expects of us, the street price goes up and the addicts (many
unemployed but none high wage earners for long) have to commit
more burglaries or muggings to sustain their habit. Also, if we
improve relations with the public in an area, more crime gets
reported, eating into the submerged iceberg of unreported crime
for assaults, burglary and many other crimes. In the second case
the adverse effect of our good work is more apparent than real.
Neither side effect constitutes very saleable goods for us on the
public market; because we cannot quantify them they can be made to
look like excuses.

Three Continuing Problems

I will now mention the three most difficult problems which we
have encountered at every stage of every change; resistance to
change, resources and communication.

Policing is largely about supporting stability and maintain-
ing the status quo. One would expect resistance to change to be
even stronger than in the population generally. One of the major
changes I have been speaking about - the Force Reorganization -
had been successfully repelled twice previously in 1968 and 1976.
The years between 1976 and 1982 had, however, seen many changes
introduced, some of them affecting ordinary street officers every
bit as much as those I have been referring to as occurring over
the last three years. There was a demand for change in the ser-
vice by 1982 but from a minority of those who were in fact to be
much involved. There was certainly a very solid block of resis-
tance to change as regards the two main changes, Force Planning
and Reorganization. There was, and still is, resistance to what
Neighbourhood Policing is trying to achieve, as regards the com-
munity. There is less resistance (but some) to new technology,
which I am sure is the case everywhere.

I do not intend to say too much about the ways we tried to over-
come this resistance to change. The subject is well documented in
books and periodicals and I do not think our experience is any
different. We have felt most of the pain that we should. Having
said that, I do think that policemen, the great majority, get on
with it, once decisions are made. It is not a question of obeying
orders, although we do hear references to it being a disciplined
service; nor is it that they are the least reticent in putting
forward their views; nor that they are apathetic, although some
changes, such as Force Reorganization, are only just beginning to
change aspects of street policing. It appears to be this:
policemen take pride in being able to make anything work at opera-
tional level. In truth, their experience with the public makes
them resilient.

I shall briefly mention some of the side effects, such as
morale and stress later, but where we are, I think, at the moment
is that all the major changes are generally accepted or no longer
actively opposed BUT there is general concern about the pace and
volume of change that we currently have on board. I have already
mentioned that many changes now occurring are consequential on the
two main changes and it is difficult to slow the pace. Even
amongst those most concerned, there are many who think we must now
see the main changes through as quickly as possible. It is also
interesting that now Divisions are feeling their feet more, they
are inventing their own initiatives and changes, more than ever
before. This tends to support the view that people don't mind
change they introduce themselves but may be more resentful of
changes imposed upon them, especially if they frustrate their own
initiatives.

The number of officers in the Force has only risen slightly
since 1982. No increases in establishment have been made which
relate directly to the changes I have talked about. The Commis-
sioner has been strongly pressing our overall manpower needs and
the prospects are hopeful but not immediate. We do not want more
officers in offices of course; we need them on the street, prefer-
ably in uniform.

This creates something of a dilemma, in terms of introducing
major changes. Everything I have said indicates that there is a
manpower need to plan, implement and manage change. Because of
our need for men on the streets - part of our contract with the
public - we have been reluctant to put men in offices. Districts
(as they then were) and Divisions, were expected to take on this
extra workload without using dedicated manpower - or only to use
them temporarily or casually.

It did not happen of course. Each District ended up with a
planning Inspector and Divisions ended up with two or three offic-
ers permanently employed. If you give operational senior officers
a job to do they will use what is available to them and get the
job done. This led to operational officers pointing to the new
breed of pen-pushers, as further reducing street resources. Head-

quarters branches - some of them - used this as a criticism of the
way Districts and Divisions manage their affairs. There will, of
course, be several officers employed in the new Divisional Infor-
mation and Intelligence Units but this is only a drawing together
of officers already employed off the streets.

If officers employed in offices whether as planners, change
agents, trainers or whatever, can make more effective those offic-
ers who are left on the streets, then it should be seen as value
for money. If we could get away from fire-brigade policing,
nearer to some pro-active policing, with well directed patrolling,
it would be worthwhile. It has not, however, been seen that way
by many; and the price in terms of morale has been a high one.

Our experience suggests the following: Major changes are
manpower intensive and this applies right down to local level.
There is nothing more frustrating than being given tasks without
the manpower to achieve it; unless it is being criticized for
using manpower diverted for the purpose. If the Force cannot
obtain more resources, especially manpower, for the purpose, then
the reason why diversion of operational manpower is justified
needs to be very fully explained to those at the sharp end.

This leads me on to the problem of communication, especially
in-service. It is a problem that we do not think we have
resolved. The size of the Force, 27,000 officers and 15,000
civilians in support, is a massive audience to reach. We have
used written communication, from a personal letter to every single
officer from the Commissioner, to regular articles in our fort-
nightly Force newspaper. We have used taped video presentations
and our training structures. We have tried a series of cascading
meetings using the line command; expensive of time and with uncer-
tainly as regards the end message. We are definitely open to new
suggestions on this subject.

Unwanted Side Effects and Unresolved Problems

I am going to refer to some of the side effects of coping
with so much change in such a short space of time and some of the
continuing problems. I shall take them quite shortly and you may
see them as possible avenues to explore in the discussion period
to follow.

Bear in mind that most of the changes we have been introduc-
ing have been aimed towards making us more responsive to the pub-
lic at a local level. Progress has been made and it is not easy
to say whether the problems I will outline are as a result of that
progress or as a result of coping with the volume of change. I
shall make no attempt to distinguish them, since both are the con-
cern of this conference.

(1) The age-old antipathy between street officers and 'nine to
     fivers' has been accentuated. Sometimes this is expressed as
     the gulf between paper cops and real cops; or academics and
     doers.

(2) More officers are being employed in a proactive role (off shift work) at a time when the perception of the three shifts as the only 'real' operational role is still strong. There is the potential for 'split level' policing to develop: the shifts (which will continue to deal with most reactive polic- ing) being seen as the cutting edge of policing: with other officers seen as the alternative 'soft' option.

(3) Community oriented styles of policing are being portrayed by the press, when it suits them, and by some policemen also as 'soft' options, where police stand back from doing their job, for fear of local protest.

(4) There is a confusion of identity resulting; so much so that we think it necessary to make some definitive statement to remove this unreal distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' policing, to let our officers know what our expectations of them are.

(5) More officers than usual - there are always some - are saying that morale is at an all time low. This feeling was particu- larly acute after 1985's rioting at Brixton and especially Tottenham, both places where there had been community orient- ed policing schemes and where the capacity of senior officers to cope with the unprecedented scale of riot was called in question at lower rank levels.

(6) It is difficult to quantify, but from the lower rank percep- tion there seems to be more of a 'them and us' attitude between senior and junior ranks. Senior ranks perceive it as more of a communication problem.

(7) Like the rest of the community, we all think more realisti- cally about stress these days, at individual levels, at all operational levels. Our past record in this field has not been good.

(8) Today I have been deliberately speaking about managers and senior managers but we are seriously asking the question whe- ther this emphasis has undermined what we used to call 'lead- ership'; for which we still have the need.

Enough of internal symptoms - what about our relationships with outside bodies?

(1) Landed with the kind of statistics we have been feeding the public for years it is proving difficult for the public to accept - as it is for many policemen - that these are not very good indicators of police performance.

(2) Although we have succeeded in getting the message across that police cannot succeed alone, (witness the success of neigh- bourhood watch and victim support) it has been largely con- strued that we need help rather than that society needs help, from all institutions and individuals.

(3)   The press exploits only bad news or very good news and conse-
      quently gives a misleading impression of the police role.
      For example it praises our attempts at community policing to
      the skies, but ruthlessly exploits the hint of reservation
      that some officers feel, to create dissent and therefore
      news.

(4)   The press and other institutions, such as the medical profes-
      sion, see themselves as taking a neutral stance between
      police on the one hand and the public on the other.   This
      affected our position adversely in the miners' strike.   In
      the aftermath of the Tottenham riots an individual who was to
      have conducted a so-called 'independent' inquiry referred to
      police as 'the other party' to the riots – or so it was
      reported.

(5)   It has been a problem, although I hope it is about to be
      resolved, that our Police Authority (that is the national
      governments' Home Office), after heaping so many new tasks
      upon us and encouraging us along very manpower-intensive
      styles of policing, failed to come up front with the resour-
      ces.

(6)   It has been part of the same problem that cash limits have
      been the cause of frustrating so many worthwhile initia-
      tives.   The language of financial restraint – such as 'proven
      need' – can easily be seen by those who have willingly taken
      on reforms in addition to an existing heavy workload, as
      political delay and manipulation.

      I will stop describing side effects and problems there, in
anticipation that I have said enough to let you know that, as I
said at the outset, the path of change has not been a smooth one.

Conclusion

      I am now coming to my concluding remarks.

      I have tried to talk about change, its planning and implemen-
tation, in a practical way, rather than on an academic plane.   The
insights I have given are my own and another officer from the
Metropolitan Police might legitimately give different views and
emphasis.   My only qualification for coming here to speak about
change is that within the narrow field, I have made most of the
mistakes for myself – an everyman's definition of an expert.   I
have tried to confine my remarks to what lessons I think we have
learned, without implying what others should or should not do.

      I have been deliberately free with admitting errors we may
have made.   I feel entitled to be.   I have been married (as my
wife would say) to the Metropolitan Police for 30 years.   I own a
small part of its history and it owns a large part of mine.   That
entitles me to see and speak of faults as well as strengths.   I am
also very proud of the progress we are making along this path of

change. I am proud of my Commissioner who has had the foresight, courage and tenacity to take it on. I am proud of my senior colleagues who have borne much of the brunt of introducing and implementing the changes. Most of all I am proud of the junior officers who, in spite of the odd moans and groans, have tackled the new concepts, new ideas and extra work manfully. I am not the least ashamed of the faltering steps we have taken; nor even of those who resisted the changes - for most were, or are, good policemen who did not see the need for change. Their resistance to change has helped to keep our feet on the ground, providing a fine sieve through which to squeeze our innovations.

During the course of yesterday an old rhyme came into my mind, which has some relevance. It goes as follows:

Two looked through their prison bars
One saw mud; the other saw stars.

Now we need men with the vision to see the stars but if they step out from that cell in search of the stars, they will step in the mud which is there. However, if the man who sees the mud steadies the other, they both aim for the stars in greater safety. I trust you get my point?

If implementing change can be exciting, reading, talking or listening about is less so. Let me indulge myself by inflicting upon you a nautical metaphor about Force Planning which has helped me preserve my own sanity over the last three years.

Embarking on the uncharted seas of major change, the Commissioner should not head for the open sea and deep waters but keep his sailing fleet close to the shore. Even there, there are rocks and strong currents and the wind of change blows no less strongly. Where it meets the blocking anticyclone of resistance to change, the seas get very choppy and storm clouds gather. It is necessary to know when to trim the sails and drop anchor, turning the bows into the waves. The Commissioner's private lifeboat should patrol the coastline, alert to spot distress flares. Aiming flares into low clouds or thick fog is like whistling into the wind. The Commissioner should not be surprised if one or two are aimed direct at him. He may wonder whether the intention is to sink him or just attract his attention. This is the time to believe that the sailors can all swim, whether it is so or not. It is often darkest just before the dawn. At the first lightening of the sky the little ships can see each other again and feel safer, stronger in the knowledge that a storm has been ridden out, ready to talk about engines and radar for the next trip.

P.S. Look what happened to the Titanic!

My final word: what is the London Experience? My view of it is this:

Experience is a good teacher. He is slow but thorough.
His tuition fees are high, but he gives value for money
if you can put up with his unpredictable moods and
demanding coaching methods.

PART III

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Community policing's attempt to reconceptualize the role and relationship of the police and community has a number of substantive operational implications. Theoretical concepts must have operational equivalents if theory is to influence actual policing practice. The complex process of translating the principles of community policing into operational strategies is the difficult task of police managers. While theory provides a guide to implementation, it is the actual "hands on" experience of police managers and researchers that provide the only real test of innovative ideas and strategies. The following three presentations are particularly valuable in this regard, as all are based on personal experiences with innovative community-oriented police programs and serve as a useful guide to those who wish to operationalize abstract community policing principles.

Commander Lawrence R. Roach of the London Metropolitan Police, provides a particularly insightful overview of the prospects and problems of attempting to develop an effective working relationship with the community. Based on personal experience as an area commander involved in the implementation of community policing in urban London, Commander Roach's presentation illustrates the need for thoughtful planning and management sophistication in the development of community policing programs.

John Eck, currently Senior Research Associate at the Police Executive Research Forum, is well known for his research and program development on managing criminal investigation. Eck's presentation focusses on the potential role of detectives in problem oriented policing strategies and demonstrates how the skills of detectives can be used in an innovative manner.

Robert Trojanowicz, Director of the Michigan State School of Criminal Justice and the National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center, provides an informative account of the Flint Michigan Police Department's foot patrol program. The documented success of the experimental neighborhood foot patrol program in Flint, has made foot patrol once more a valued patrol strategy in policing. Professor Trojanowicz speaks as an academic involved in the evaluative research, but also as an enthusiastic advocate, who has clearly been impressed with the impact of foot patrol on both the Flint Michigan Police Department and the community of Flint.

6. IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY BASED POLICING IN THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE

Commander Lawrence T. Roach
Metropolitan Police

I am grateful for the opportunity which Commissioner Simmond's invitation to Sir Kenneth Newman, my Commissioner, has given me to speak on the experience of my Force, the London Metropolitan Police, on the Implementation of Community Policing in London. Not least because it has caused me to pause in the often tumultuous business of solving (or rather trying to solve), the problems of the moment, to reflect on the wider consequences of immediate decisions. I am sure that every police officer in my audience and everyone else involved in facing the problems of modern policing will recognize the difficulty I have had in finding enough time and space to lift my head from the pressures of events to try to catch ᴸ glimpse of the way ahead in policing. In giving me an immutable deadline - that is today - and a specific topic, the Conference organisers have done me an important service, although I will admit there have been moments during the writing of this talk, with the insistent presence of the telephone and the weight of the in-tray bearing down, when I have had some difficulty in remembering that I ought to be grateful for this chance to organise my thinking and to commit my views to paper.

The opportunity I have had therefore is to explore and perhaps bring some order to the philosophy which underpins and directs what is loosely called 'community policing' as it is practiced in London. A subject in which I am directly and intimately involved as the head of the Community Relations Department for my Force. In a very real sense then what I intend to do today is to share with you my own process of exploration into the concept of community policing and how it has taken the form which can be seen in practice in London today.

I began almost out of curiosity by trying to see if I could find some kind of consensus on what the term meant amongst Londoners and their policemen. I am sure you will not be surprised to find that the words mean many different things and carry many different implications, even amongst people who regularly talk about the subject and even where they frequently talk to others who may not necessarily share the same definition. (See Appendix for some examples.)

I think that provides all the evidence I need to demonstrate my first, and, as you may think later, my most important point. Community policing is an idea used by many but owned by no-one. It means many things to many people and arouses expectations in people who use the words which are rarely matched by those to whom they are addressed. The mismatch may be understandable, even

predictable, but it is not fully recognized, at least not in London in my experience.

But I hope you will also draw the conclusion from the quotations I have given that the concept is a topic of a lively public debate which is on-going and constructive. And which I, for one, heartily welcome and see as a sign not of opposition to the police either as an institution or as a service, but rather of a growing popular understanding of the importance of effective policing in determining the quality of life for the citizen. That debate is motivated not by a desire to denigrate, diminish or destroy the police but rather by a genuine and encouraging wish to improve the delivery of the policing service and to make it more closely match the needs of the people who are its recipients.

I find some common themes in my reading of other people's views on what community policing 'really' or 'essentially' or 'actually' means. No agreed definition it is true but rather a common set of fields of interest, a consensus on subjects or issues to be included.

They are I think: -

(i) **Consultation**
The idea that, in contrast to the past, community policing implies a continuing dialogue between police decision makers and the public whose policing needs they are seeking to meet. And a definition of consultation which goes beyond 'informing', 'telling' or 'educating' the people to accept that influence will flow from the recipients of the policing service into the decision making process itself and not merely the other way round.

The Social Context of Police Work
That policing needs to be examined in its social context. Most commentators begin by believing that police work is about crime or perhaps keeping order in society but soon come to the realisation that no such simple definition of the police role is possible. In attempting therefore to define the police role the debate falls naturally into some sort of attempt to set the police in a context - to define what police officers contribute to social processes as compared to what other agencies do.

(iii) **Police Accountability**
In essence every commentator is faced with the problem of saying what is meant by 'community'. Who is entitled to define the policing service which is to be required? Even James Anderton whose views I have described and who represents a distinct school of thought on this subject does not shirk to give such a definition. For him the only people qualified to make that kind of judgement are the police themselves. He may not attract a substantial

following in taking that view but his opponents must give an alternative, and merely to say 'the community' is not sufficient as I am sure you will agree.

My first and major point therefore is that 'community policing' is not a simple well understood or agreed concept in London. Rather, it is a topic of a sometimes fierce debate. I believe that that debate revolves around three main issues: -

(i) The nature and extent of consultation between the police and the public.

(ii) The relationship between policing and the social context within which it is practiced.

(iii) The proper arrangements for police accountability and control.

If police officers are to enter that debate, they will need to be clear in their own minds what view they are presenting on those three themes. If, that is, they are to make any impact. How much more so must they be clear on these issues if they propose to implement a community policing strategy! I regret that I cannot say that every attempt to adopt a community based policing style has been preceded by the vigorous sifting of ideas which I believe needs to be done if there is to be any chance of gaining the benefits which police officers seem to expect from the adoption of the approach.

That clarity of mind must be achieved however and if I can add a final footnote to this part of my address, let me say that the three themes need to be considered by every officer who intends to adopt the approach. We cannot depend on others to do our thinking in this respect. The reason is of course that in police/public consultation, in the social context of policing and in the definition of the police role and on police accountability, the specific social and political environment is crucial. The views developed by the Metropolitan Police in London are not therefore directly transferable to other British contexts and are therefore hardly applicable in other countries with different social traditions and political structures. And it of course immediately follows that the community policing strategy adopted in London cannot be simply transferred and adopted elsewhere. Every police organisation must in my view begin from the beginning. There are no short cuts, no panaceas and no models for a community policing approach which can be taken off the shelf and simply imposed on a community. If the approach is to succeed it must emerge from a gestation process which requires a great deal of hard labour by police managers.

Given that caveat I think that leads me naturally to an examination of the experience of my own Force in this field. It can be argued of course that the London Metropolitan Police has been a community policing organisation from its foundation in 1829. Sir

Robert Peel, the proposer and founder of the new police said in the House of Commons when proposing the establishment of a police force for London that, "It is the duty of Parliament to afford to the inhabitants of the metropolis and its vicinity the full and complete protection of the law and to take prompt and decisive measures to check the increase in crime which is now proceeding at a frightfully rapid pace."

Not you notice, to control the mob, or to enforce the law or to give expression to the will of Parliament or to support the state or any other of the many justifications for an organised police service which it would be possible to construct. The focus of Peels's concern was the well being and protection of the citizen under the law. That focus on the protective and supportive role of the police is still to be found in the oath of office which every London policeman takes and which binds him throughout his career: -

> "I do solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm that I
> will well and truly serve our sovereign Lady the Queen
> in the office of Constable without favour or affection,
> malice or ill will: and that I will, to the best of my
> power cause the peace to be kept and preserved, and pre-
> vent all offences against the persons and properties of
> Her Majesty's subjects and that while I continue to hold
> the said office I will to the best of my skill and know-
> ledge discharge all of the duties thereof faithfully
> according to law."

When 'Peel was attacked for proposing to introduce a force which his opponents saw as a threat to the liberty and freedom of the individual citizen Peel was scathing in his riposte. "I want to teach people" he said "that liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by organised gangs of thieves and in leaving the principal streets of London in the nightly possession of drunken women and vagabonds."

So from our foundation the London Metropolitan Force has seen its principal role to be to afford the protection of the law to the citizen, to be his support and servant in creating the condi- tions of peace and security which make social life possible and freedom a reality in his daily life. The rock on which the ser- vice is built therefore is one of public consent meaning not merely consent to the existence of the police but also to the man- ner in which the Force performs its duties.

From the outset the Metropolitan Police has taken public co- operation and support to be the starting point for its decision making processes and the preservation of that consent to be its most important objective. Which implies a need to maintain close contact with the people with sensitive channels of communication for their views and needs.

In our earliest days we had to work hard to establish that relationship with the people of London. We were not given the

trust and confidence of Londoners. We had to earn it. And it cost us dear on occasion. A broad sheet published in 1830 and headed 'Peel's Police, Raw Lobsters, Blue Devils or by whatever other appropriate name they may be known' proclaimed. "Notice is hereby given that a subscription has been entered into to supply the PEOPLE with STAVES of a superior effect either for defence or punishment which will be in readiness to be gratuitously distrib- uted whenever a similar unprovoked and therefore unmanly and blood thirsty attack again be made upon Englishmen by a Force unknown to the British Constitution and called into existence by a Parliament illegally constituted legislating for their individual interests consequently in opposition to the public good."

Nevertheless by their adherence to their oath and by their dedication to the protection of the citizen Peel's New Police established themselves in both the public esteem and in the struc- ture of the emerging industrial society.

Our origins and early history inculcated a tradition of com- munity involvement, a community orientation if you like, into police thinking. I like to hope that the British police forces have been able to spread those ideas, those attitudes of mind to many parts of the world. But I would not like to leave this part of my talk without making it clear that the community orientation of the Metropolitan Police and of other police forces in Britain has come under increasing strain since the last world war. There are many reasons for that pressure, not least the social changes in our society which have resulted among other things in a drama- tic escalation in the incidence and severity of crime. Those pressures also include the technological developments in police work and I would especially like to take this opportunity to men- tion both the increased mechanisation of police patrolling, that is the growth in the use of motor vehicles and other means of transportation and deployment, and the parallel spread of radio communication which now reaches the individual officer on foot patrol. Both these developments, necessary as they are held to be to the efficiency of modern police organisations, work against the involvement of police officers with their people. In the case of motor vehicles the separation is physical, but in the case of per- sonal radios the effect is more insidious and I believe more damaging. For the personal radio network separates even the foot patrol officers from the people around him. Too often, like the users of the portable tape players the young are so fond of, the police officer equipped with a personal radio is in a separate world from the rest of us. He is listening to his colleagues and sharing a private world and even a private language with them to which the people around him have no access. Crucially he needs no contact with the public to keep him motivated or content and too often I have seen London policemen, even when standing in full uniform on the streets of their own beats, whose glazed eyes and indifference to events around them reflect total concentration with the far away activities of their colleagues rather than any concern for the policing needs of the citizens under their noses. We did not intend that effect when we equipped our officers with radio but we need to recognise and counter it.

In London today however community policing permeates the structure of the Force. In his statement of the Force goal for the coming period, the Commissioner defined our objectives as being:

"To improve quality of service to the public by:

(a) the reduction of criminal opportunity through crime prevention, public contact, involvement and co-operation"

and later in the same document he specified:

(d) improved effectiveness ... in the preservation of public tranquility through closer community/police relations ..."

Both statements demonstrate our continuing commitment to maintaining and preserving the support of our community.

In practice that commitment takes many forms. Some I am sure you will recognize, indeed some were adopted following visits by Metropolitan Police Officers to this side of the Atlantic. Some are home grown ... But all follow from the decision of the Commissioner to adopt a multi agency community involvement approach to policing problems. Let me give you just a few examples, more to illustrate the style of approach to policing in London rather than to give a full description of our work.

One of the problems we face is that of racial conflict, manifested in racial harassment and attacks on members of minority groups. You may, even on this side of the ocean have heard comment on this problem. If you have you will know that these incidents are not only extremely disruptive of community life, by raising tensions between different sections of the community and thereby reinforcing and perpetuating adverse racial stereotypes but they also tend to corrode confidence in the police. For if the police fail to prevent these incidents or fail to detect offenders, that failure can easily be translated into yet further proof of racial inequalities and discrimination in the society by victims especially where, as is unfortunately the case in London, the Force is overwhelming composed on people drawn from the majority community. Yet these incidents are typically random and opportunist, particularly those which really do have a purely racial motivation, for here the offender chooses his victim purely on skin colour and is perfectly willing to wait for the ideal opportunity before launching his attack. With absolutely no prior connection between victim and offender, the professional police officers in my audience will instantly recognize the problems of prevention and detection of these offences, and will probably be able to estimate the probable low rate of clear up for them. Yet none of these purely professional and objective judgements on the problems which these incidents pose for the police will have any weight with the victim, who, already the sufferer from racial pre-

judice will very easily begin to see such motives in the actions of all those he now comes into contact with. And that includes the police.

You will see the downward spiral which quickly develops with a growth in these incidents. A rising number of incidents leads to a growing level of mutual suspicion between different groups in the community, and a parallel rising number of unsolved crimes in this category in view of the difficulties in successfully detecting them. The suspicion transfers to the police service and expectations and stereotypes of police officers are developed which reduces cooperation with police amongst the very people we now need most to assist us. With less cooperation even fewer crimes are solved, suspicion is raised even higher, the groups under attack conclude they must defend themselves and a whole cycle of random revenge and retaliation builds up in which all sides see the police as the agents of their opponents.

Our traditional response to this situation, and an approach which I experienced in practice as a very young constable during racial rioting in Notting Hill in London in 1958, was to put an overwhelming police presence on the streets in the affected area, and by sheer weight of numbers, coupled with the use of what has to be admitted was some pretty physical methods, to drive the combatants off the streets, arresting such ring leaders as could be caught in the process. There is no denying such methods can restore order but I think the subsequent history of London demonstrates as clearly as is needed, that it does not solve the problem, either for the community or for the police. Indeed I would argue it is actually a counter productive method for its very success in suppressing the symptoms of the problem allows other agencies and the wider community to assume that the problem can be solved by policing methods alone, to conclude that racial conflict is in some way purely a police problem which policemen ought to resolve. And thereby to avoid thinking about the problem or making any contribution to its solution.

A multi agency approach to racial incidents on the other hand begins by recognizing the limits of police power to resolve the problem. It starts by an attempt to specify what the problem is, to penetrate beyond the surface appearance to the roots and causes. Let me hasten to add that this approach does not imply the need for the kind of detailed comprehensive analytic research much beloved of academics. We do not need to delay action for the months and even years that such investigation demands. All we need, as police officers, is to take the trouble to specify the problem sufficiently accurately to enable us to decide which parts of it are amenable to police actions given the resources and facilities available to us. In the case of racial incidents we can immediately conclude that the roots of the problem, that is levels of racial intolerance and prejudice in the community are outside the sphere of influence of the police. And that therefore police can only deal with the symptoms of the problem, their manifestations in racial discriminatory behaviour and violence. Armed

with even this simple analysis I think you will agree that a rational police approach to the reduction of racial incidents in a community must have two prongs. In the first place an attempt to improve, streamline and rationalise the recording monitoring and detection procedures used by the Force in dealing with the incidents, and to attempt to improve relationships with potential victims in order to achieve that objective. But the second, and perhaps more important effort must be to try to mobilise the whole community and other social agencies into a recognition of the importance of the problem and to accept their role in finding a solution to it. Here the police can act as precipitating or initiating agents but once the community is mobilised we would seek to allow the community to take the lead in devising the social and educational strategies which will bring about the social changes needed to remove the causes of the problem. In London this approach has in recent months enabled the Metropolitan Police to focus attention away from the police response to racial incidents and toward the need for community action. Away from police bashing on the issue and into the creation of multi agency bodies who, on behalf of the whole community undertake the long and sometimes agonising process of developing social policies and political programmes aimed at the eradication of discrimination and prejudice.

In another direction the development of Neighbourhood Watch, a scheme with which I am sure you will all be familiar, is another example of this approach to policing problems. In this case we are dealing at least in the first instance, with crimes in residential areas, principally therefore thefts from homes and the like. Again a careful specification of the problem leads to the conclusion that the success or otherwise of any attempt to reduce those kinds of crime depends not on the level of police activity but crucially on good information from potential and actual victims and a willingness amongst them to take relatively simple precautions for their own protection. Since those conditions cannot be imposed by police (at least not in London and I suspect not here in Canada) then Neighbourhood Watch is a natural answer. I hope you all recognize in view of my earlier remarks the significance of the development, where it has occurred, of Neighbourhood Watch schemes into freestanding community associations to which the police make an important but hopefully diminishing contribution. For in my view and in the experience of most police forces, if they do not so develop they will not only collapse they will cease to have any effect on the crime rate in their area. But if they do become self supporting then police must accept that we will have less and less influence on the way they develop. Like the good parent we must know when to let out off spring go!

More generally we have in London been developing two different approaches to the specific difficulties which particular areas of the capital pose in broad policing terms. One is an attempt to devise a community based method of providing an effective policing service to inner city housing estates and the other is aimed at those run down and declining areas of the inner city blighted by industrial and economic change. Estates pose a problem for police

where their physical design and social composition make the tradi-
tional foot and vehicle patrol patterns inappropriate. The prob-
lem may be specified for police as being to create the conditions
of trust and respect between police and people on estates that is
enjoyed in other residential areas of the city. Attention is
thereby directed to the conditions which make these areas differ-
ent from other patterns of residence and at once the problem
resolves itself into two parts. First the physical design and lay
out of these estates and then the social factors which make rela-
tions between police and people different from those existing
elsewhere. Our Estates policing policy therefore follows the
familiar two pronged attack, first on the planners and architects
and on the builders and maintenance authorities to try to find
ways of designing out crime on the estate. You may care to know
that the Chief Superintendent responsible for the area which
includes the Broad Water Farm Estate in Tottenham in London, where
very serious rioting took place last year, described the lay out
of the estate as being 'designing in crime' in a recent report
following the disturbances. The attempt to design out crime
ext...ds, I think, to trying to ensure that the housing policies
applied to the estate make some attempt at least to balance the
composition of the community. Too often in London, little or no
regard is given to such considerations and all too frequently no
such policy exists at all, allowing some estates, almost be
default, to gain and deserve the reputation of being sink holes
for the disadvantaged, to their detriment and to the destruction
of any chance of the development of community spirit.

     Much of this aspect of estates policing is outside the sphere
of police control and the best we can do is to try to use such
influence as we have to push others in the right direction. What
we can do is to try to adapt our patrolling pattern and the struc-
ture of our operations to meet the needs of the estate. In short
we behave exactly like the best commercial concerns and study our
customers closely to ensure we are providing the service they need
in the way they want it. And since we know that our traditional
methods are not delivering the service, our only real choice is to
ask the customer himself.

     Hence the Estates Project which is a planning package avail-
able to officers commanding areas which contain estates. It lays
out a programme which begins with a process of formal and informal
consultations with the authorities responsible for the estate
(usually the local government council for the area) the builders
and maintenance people, those responsible for the allocation of
accommodation but above all the residents themselves. By and
through that consultative process a joint understanding is to be
developed about how the estate is to be policed. And let me make
it clear that the police role in the discussion is not a passive
one. It is active. It consists in specifying what is or is not
an acceptable level of policing as far as police are concerned.
In insisting on the acceptance of the police role as custodians of
the people and the police right to take action to prevent and
detect offences on the estate. And to do so in a forum where

those issues can be debated and understood so that the precondi-
tions of effective policing can be set. But with that minimalist
approach by police must go a willingness to be flexible. To lis-
ten to the residents and to meet their particular needs and
requirements, be that to open a police office on the estate, or to
post men (and women) permanently to the area.

Once the initial process of consultation and agreement is
concluded, a joint committee may be established as a forum for the
discussion and resolution of problems and as a means for residents
to take a continuing interest in, and exercise an influence over,
developments in policing policies and practices.

Neighbourhood Policing follows the same pattern but is struc-
tured differently. Here the package available to divisions is of
a scheme for designating a distinct geographic area to be policed
by a team of officers posted permanently to it, with their own
command and supervision structure and base within the area. This
package is particularly useful where an area has developed some
symbolic significance for its residents and others, or which poses
unusual policing problems requiring special local knowledge. The
purpose of the Neighbourhood Policing project is therefore to
develop a team of officers who have an intimate knowledge of local
conditions and who develop special skills in dealing with them.
Again, consultation with the community is a prerequisite for
implementation but not on the structure or form of the policing
method, so much as on the acceptability of it in the area to be
covered.

There are other examples of the practical application of the
multi agency approach in London, which I could describe. But I
think I have done enough by way of illustration to show that it
can be a fruitful and effective way of dealing with the kind of
difficult problems we all face. Certainly for the purposes of
this talk I think further examples will be redundant. For the
point I wish to make is that 'community policing' if it means any-
thing at all means different things in London, in New York, in New
Delhi and in Ottawa. Truly understood the concept means no more
than adopting policing methods, tactics and strategies to meet the
policing needs of the people however that grouping may be de-
fined. And that can only be achieved by allowing the people to
specify what their needs are and then to respond to these de-
mands. Too often in the past police officers, and especially
senior ones, have allowed themselves to believe that they have
some special access to knowledge on this subject. That they and
they alone are qualified to judge what the people need. And even
where police officers do not make such judgements, or are not
allowed to, others, including elected officials, do so. When that
is the case and whoever claims the right to impose policing on the
people, community policing properly understood does not exist.
Which leads me to conclude this part of my talk with one simple
but I think unarguable proposition. Community policing is not an
option which police forces can choose to introduce or which they
can impose on their people. It is not an alternative to reactive

or "fire brigade" or "hard" policing methods. Equally it is not a
public relations exercise to gain the love of the people for their
local policemen or to improve the flow of information. It is an
approach which grows out of a desire in the community and in the
hearts and minds of citizens for good order and good policing and
a willingness by them to contribute to the achievement of those
aims. Without that interest 'community policing' not only will
not succeed, it cannot exist.

But involvement by the community in policing in the way I
have described in the examples I have given from the London exper-
ience is not cost free, and while it might solve some problems in-
evitably it creates others. It was ever so in human life and
especially so in police work. The adoption of a community polic-
ing strategy has far reaching implications for the police service,
for its structure, for the attitudes of police officers, for the
planning and management processes of the police organisation, for
the structure of police accountability and through that for the
political structure to which the service is related.

The key idea here is that of consultation. As I have already
stressed community policing requires that policing policies, prac-
tices, planning and decision making must all be open to the influ-
ence of the community affected by them. If that is not the case
then whatever is being done by the police cannot qualify as
falling within the approach. It might be policing, it may even be
good and effective policing. But it is NOT 'community policing'!

Which raises the first problem, which is to define 'communi-
ty'. Who is to be accepted as speaking for the policing needs of
the people? Those elected officials amongst my audience may
leqitimately say that they, and they alone, are entitled by their
democratic mandate to so speak. I am not sure I have a full
answer to that argument. It ill behoves a non-elected public
officer to criticize the credentials of the victors of the elec-
toral system of either my country or of this nation in this mat-
ter. But I am bound, I feel, to do the best I can. I truly
believe that policing is not a political issue. Or if it is it
ought not to be. I think that policing is the process of deliver-
ing to the citizen those rights which the political process says
he ought to have. And demanding from him those obligations that
some process determines shall be required of him. In my view once
the political process has determined these matters it has ful-
filled its function. For police officers that means that the out-
come of the political process is in all cases binding on them, but
for the elected politician it means that he must accept that the
arbitrator of satisfaction in policing terms is not the politician
but the individual citizen. For it is to him that the service is
addressed. As I say I do not feel that I want to try to develop
this theme here any further. It is sufficient to say, I think,
that in seeking to determine who should be consulted when a com-
munity policing approach is adopted there exists a strong case for
involving more than just the elected politicians (who should
of course nevertheless be included in my view).

But once we step outside the electoral process in seeking community representation all the complex problems which the democratic process is designed to solve emerge. Who is a 'representative'. What right has he to speak for others? What is his mandate? How far can he commit his fellow citizens to follow any decision? The danger in police/public consultation is two-fold. Either the police will find themselves only talking to their friends, who will be content to leave the problems to the professionals, or they will find themselves being pushed and bullied by an unrepresentative vociferous minority whose beliefs will not reflect the true wishes of their community. Either outcome is to be avoided and both will destroy the attempt to community police.

There is in my view no alternative to a determined attempt to involve the whole community in consultation if community policing is to be adopted. That means two things. That police/public forums must always be so constructed that access to them is open to all comers provided they can show that they are directly affected by the discussions taking place. And on the other hand the size of the community unit involved in the process must be small. In Estates policing projects and in Neighbourhood Policing in London, the geographic area is deliberatelysmall, making whole community consultation possible. For London as a whole, such a level of contact is obviously impossible, there are after all 11 million people who, on some reckonings might be entitled to have access to the police consultative process. It is for that reason, among others that Sir Kenneth Newman has embarked on the re-organisation of the Force you will be hearing about later today from my colleague Deputy Assistant Commissioner Hunt. As he will no doubt describe in much fuller detail, one of the fundamental purposes of that re-organization is to devolve decision making power down to the basic police unit; in London, the division. And thereby to bring close to the people effective control over police operations in units small enough to make full consultation possible.

On the community side the Government has recently acknowledged the importance of the development of the community policing concept by legislating to provide that in every local government area (in London that means the local borough) arrangements are to be made to set up statutory groups whose membership includes local councillors, local members of Parliament, representatives of statutory agencies, the police and representatives of the community, whose terms of reference allow for the debate and discussion of all aspects of police policy and decision making. This statutory provision creates a permanent forum for obtaining the views of the community on policing and therefore will, in the future, be the place to which senior police officers will bring their plans and proposals, including the kinds of project I have described in this talk. You will also want to note, in view of my earlier remarks about the community representation problem, that in the guidance o the implementation of this statutory provision the Government specified that membership must be open to 'all bona fide groups representing a significant number of local people' and that the

consultative body should be 'independent of any other agency or of the local authority.'

I hope you will see that true consultation between police and public on which community policing must be developed, requires changes in both the organization of the police and and in the structure of the community. Equally importantly however it requires changes in police officers attitudes. In a recent instruction to the Force on the subject of consultation the Commissioner said "Real consultation involves risk and the outcome of a genuine search for agreement cannot be precisely predicted. Police officers must be willing to change their views and actions and be seen to do so, under the influence of discussion." Speaking for myself, as a senior police officer with now almost 28 years of service I find this challenging. My whole training has been to see myself as a problem solver, a decision maker who accepts and expects full responsibility for my decisions. It has been truly said of police officers that we are by training and experience action-oriented. What consultation requires on the other hand is the sort of open minded willingness to discuss and be swayed which earlier in my career we would have described as indecisiveness and lack of drive. In my Department at Scotland Yard, which has a special responsibility for the implementation of consultation, our recognition of this potential problem for senior managers led us to set up a training programme specifically designed, not to give them a set of skills for use in consultation, but rather to help them deal with the inner conflicts the new experience may create for them. And highly successful it has been too, being universally described the the participants as one of the best and most directly useful courses they ever experienced. From men and women of that service and seniority high praise indeed. Which also indicates the importance of recognizing in advance that the adoption of community policing has important implications for the training of senior managers as well as others.

But even if police offices are trained and ready to adopt the approach there still needs to be change in the organization and especially in the planning and policing making processes. Community involvement requires a fundamentally different approach to planning. Our experience in London made us realize that our planning processes are too fast and too compressed for the community to have any real influence. For the Metropolitan Police a yearly planning round was entirely practical and it was quite common to set target dates for responses to proposals or for comments on plans a month or six weeks ahead without imposing too much pressure on those required to act. But the community cannot work at that pace, nor, significantly is it possible to enforce any pattern of time limits on it. For community involvement in police decision making is first of all a purely voluntary activity to which no effective sanctions can be applied, and secondly the attendance of members of the community to these matters has to be fitted in around a full working and social life. In addition of course most of those involved have little or no detailed knowledge

of policing and do not share the unspoken body of knowledge which we have now discovered is assumed in communications written by police officers. To ask a community representative to respond to a police planning document at the same speed and with the same sophistication as an experienced police officer is obviously ridiculous. Yet in the early stages we did just that. Much to the annoyance of our community. Let me tell you that the latest plans put forward by my Commissioner envisage a three year planning cycle. You may easily see the advantage of that time scale in these terms. I hope that as our experience and that of our community with the consultative process increases, our mutual expertise will grow and the pace of planning may increase. But we will never be able to go any faster than our community will allow and that has clear implications for any police organization contemplating the adoption of the community policing approach.

Finally let me deal with the implications of the adoption of community policing for the issue of police accountability. In my Force the Commissioner is answerable to a Government Minister, the Home Secretary, for the discharge of his duties. The Home Secretary is our police authority, a function fulfilled elsewhere in Britain by committees composed of local councillors and magistrates. The details of that system of accountability are not important and I am aware that they vary, not only in my own country but elsewhere in the world and indeed within every nation. But if community policing pre-supposes effective community involvement and consultation, there must be implications for the accountability of the police whatever the present arrangements. There must be a diminution in the level of influence or control which those who have that power presently exercise. Since in most cases, as in my country, those people are elected politicians there is a need for them to accept a slackening or a dilution of their present authority over the police. How much they are prepared to surrender of their present power is an important issue, for if too little is given to the community, the involvement of the people will soon be seen to be what is really is, a sham or a sop, with no real effect on the police. And the transfer of too much power would have equally disastrous effects, although I cannot describe those consequences with equal confidence since I have not yet found an example of a politician willing to freely give up such power which he at present has. However I do accept that total transfer of control of the police to a community consultative group would be undesirable.

In making the decision to adopt community policing therefore, the elected representatives of the people and whatever other organs of the state involved must consciously accept that there will be a change in the pattern and structure of police accountability. A decision to take that course is clearly not just a matter for the police and the people. The political implications must be thought through and accepted also.

Having I hope, set out for you now a view from London of community policing, with all its benefits and problems may I

conclude by observing that my own feeling is that the decision to adopt a community policing approach is much like the decision to marry. To use the words of the Anglican marriage service community policing is not, "by any, to be enterprised, nor taken in hand, unadvisedly, lightly or wantonly ... but reverently, discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of God."

Michael Banton ("Police and Community Relations", Collins 1973/74)

> "... as a means whereby the police learn about the needs
> of minority communities and adopt their procedures so
> that they can provide them with a service comparable to
> that given to other sections of the public."

John Alderson (ex Chief Constable, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
in "A Review of Community Policing", Centre for Contemporary
Studies, November 1984).

> "Community policing begins with an appreciation of
> modern society. It is not primarily concerned with law
> enforcement but is concerned with social protection and
> the amelioration of social conditions which lead to the
> creation of criminogenic circumstances ... It is a sine
> quo non of community policing that ther must be consul-
> tation ... It needs the input of a whole host of other
> statutory agencies from schools to social services,
> housing planning, youth, community welfare in addition
> to all voluntary agencies working in the community."

James Anderton (Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, in the same
publication)

> "... it means one thing and one thing only - the power
> to give orders to the Police and to expect them to be
> obeyed."

Tony Bunyan (Head of Greater London Council Police Committee Sup-
port Unit, again in the same publication)

> "Police policy is at times a political issue and it must
> follow therefore that local councils should be instru-
> mental in determining policing priorities."

Chief Inspector Pridge (Metropolitan Police Community Liaison
Officer for the Tower Hamlets area of London, in the same publica-
tion)

> "Effective community policing depends on an understand-
> ing of what, within reason and law, the public actually
> wants."

Eldon Griffiths MP (Member of Parliament and adviser to the Police
Federation of England and Wales, as above)

"The truth is that community policing - like motherhood
is an unarguable public good. But it can only work
where there is a comparatively settled and homogenous
community."

Gerald Kaufman MP (Member of Parliament and Opposition spokesman
on Home Affairs, from the same publication)

"... however it is defined 'community policing will only
become a reality when it is underpinned by local
arrangements for consultation dialogue and liaison ...
locally based schemes for community liaison offer poten-
tially a more radical and effective exercise of police
accountability than the remote and bureaucratic 'hier-
archic' solution all too often proposed."

Ronald Gregory (Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police, in "Police
Studies," Volume 3, No. 1 (Spring 1980)

"The Community Constable Program was started because we
were losing touch with the community. There is no way
you can effectively police an area without contact with
the people. If your only contact is looking out of the
window of a panda car, or responding to calls, then you
are merely a fire-brigade service and your effectiveness
is severely diminished ... I am convinced that juvenile
crime and vandalism have diminished because of Community
Constables."

D.A. Hunt, Esq. (Commissioner, South Australian Police, in a book-
let issued to all his officers)

"Simply ... applying a more professional understanding,
concerned and sympathetic touch to your dealing with the
wider community."

Penelope Cliffe MA (Department of Social Administration, Universi-
ty of Nottingham, in "Community Policing: A Strategy for Policing
in the 80's")

"... there is great scope for initiatives and develop-
ment of all aspects of the ethic of community policing
... it involves extracting the virtues of (both) tech-
niques to produce a policing strategy which is both
effective and popular."

and later in the same study:

"The key notion ... is that policing in the 1980s must
be policing for the people and not simply of the peo-
ple. That is what community policing must mean."

Roger R. Street (Detective Superintendent Metropolitan Police, Community Relations Branch in a paper entitled "An Analysis of Police Accountability According to, Normative Political Theory. Values and Affect; Epistemologies and Evaluation." (to be published)

"Community policing is that which continuously involves the public in determining the norms which fashion the way the police function is to be delivered in an area, and also encourages the community actively to participate in the processes through which it takes place."

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Community Policing

19. Mr. Meadowcroft asked the Secretary of State for the Home
Department what proposals he has further to develop community
policing.

Mr. **Giles Shaw:** Although it is a matter for the judgment of
chief officers how they deploy the officers and resources at
their disposal, my right hon. Friend has made clear his sup-
port for the concept of community policing, which means
essentially that police officers should know and understand
the people whom they protect and serve. To carry out this
task successfully the police need, and are entitled to ex-
pect, the support and co-operation of the citizen.

7. NEIGHBOURHOOD FOOT PATROL: THE FLINT, MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE

Robert Trojanowicz
Director
School of Criminal Justice
Michigan State University

I'm going to talk today about an experiment that took place in Flint, Michigan, but will also make some generalizations to other communities.

There are approximately 207 American communities that have been identified as having some form of community policing today. Community policing ranges from the officer parking the squad car and walking a certain period of time, to the officer who walks on foot most of the time, with variations in the middle--like scooter patrols, horse patrols, and so on. The idea is basic, simply encouraging a closer partnership between the police and the community through face to face communication. Unfortunately, today in the United States most police officers do not live in their own communities and hence they have difficulty empathyzing with neighbourhood residents and their problems. Not being an integral part of the communities they police has reduced the amount of informal influence that citizens have on police officers and their police department.

For example, my father policed his ethnic community, which was Polish. If he got out of line and used a bit too much force in arresting a suspect or in dealing with a juvenile, he would hear about it in the supermarket; he would hear about it Sunday morning in church; and he would hear about it at the tavern on Saturday night. There was a very close, intimate relationship between him and his community. If he deviated as a police officer, misusing or abusing his authority, he was told about it quickly and vociferously. That helped keep him "on track" so that he delivered appropriate services to the community. He was integrated and integrally involved with his community helping solve problems. It was a very simple process. The more contact there is, the more communication that takes place. The more people communicate, the more trust is built up; and as a result of more trust, there is more of an information exchange. Information is the lifeblood of police work. Information is required to solve and prevent crime.

What I'm going to talk about this morning is not an altruistic method of dealing with the community; a "love your neighbour" approach. It is a very practical approach to get the job done; to make the community a better place to live, to make the police officer safer, and in the process, to make the community and the neighbourhood a quality place to live.

The Flint Police Department operated solely with motorized or preventive patrols until January 1979. At which time the Charles Steward Mott Foundation provided funding for the implementation of experimental community based foot patrols.

Flint's Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program was unique in a variety of ways. It emerged from an initiative which integrated citizens into the planning and implementation process through city wide neighbourhood meetings in 1977 and 1978. It attempted to ameliorate three distinct problems: (1) the absence of comprehensive neighbourhood organizations and services, (2) the lack of citizen involvement in crime prevention, and (3) the depersonalization of interactions between officers and residents. The program began in 1979 with 22 foot patrol officers assigned to 14 experimental areas which included about 20 percent of the city's population.

The Flint program's salient features were a radical departure from both preventive patrol and traditional foot patrol models. Flint's foot patrol officers did not limit their activities to downtown or business areas. They were based in and accessible to all types of socioeconomic neighborhoods. Their crime prevention efforts went beyond organizing neighborhood watches. They attempted to serve as catalysts in the formation of neighborhood associations which articulated community expectations of the police and establish foot patrol priorities and community programs. Foot patrol officers also worked in partnership with community organizations and individual citizens to deliver a comprehensive set of services through referrals, interventions and links to governmental social agencies. The foot patrol officers reconciled their role with the reality of policing: they not only provided full law enforcement services, as did their motorized counterparts, but they made a conscious effort to focus on the social service aspects of their job, bringing problems to a resolution. They were unusual in that they mobilized citizens in order to provide a matrix within which communities could deal with many of their own problems, including--but not exclusively--crime. Since they patrolled and interacted in the same areas day after day, week after week, they developed a degree of intimacy with residents which translated into an effective cooperative relationship.

The results of the Flint experiment have been reported elsewhere. Briefly, the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program reduced crime rates by 8.7 percent. More dramatic were the reductions of service calls which decreased by 42 percent over the period 1979-1980. Citizens began handling minor problems themselves or the foot officer acted as mediator on an informal basis, negating the need for a formal complaint. Although the impact on service calls alone was significant, additional evidence indicated that citizens felt safer, were satisfied with the program, felt that it had impacted the crime rates, and that it had improved police/community relations. There was much closer interaction between the foot officers and citizens. Over 33 percent of neighborhood residents knew their foot patrol officers by name and 50 percent

of the rest could provide accurate descriptions of foot officers. Citizens also felt that foot officers were more effective than motor officers in encouraging crime reporting, in involving citizens in neighborhood crime prevention efforts, in working with juveniles, in encouraging citizen self-protection, and in following up complaints. The foot patrol experiment was so successful that the citizens of Flint passed a tax millage increase in August 1982 which extended the program to the entire city. In June of 1985 they renewed the tax millage by a 68% margin. Presently there are 64 foot beats.

Foot patrol according to the Flint approach, is not the foot patrol officer of the past who basically walked down the downtown beat areas, shook doors to see if they were ajar, with the purpose of being visible in uniform. This was supposed to deter criminal behaviour. We are talking about a different kind of approach to policing. The critics of foot patrol, and by the way there are many, say that the foot patrol officer in uniform, walking the beat has very little effect in reducing crime. To that I say, "absolutely correct." It's not the foot officer walking the beat that prevents crime; crime is prevented by the foot officer being a catalytic agent by helping organize community neighbourhood block clubs, neighbourhood associations, neighbourhood block watches and encouraging citizens to be the eyes and ears of their own neighbourhoods. It is the community that prevents crime.

In Flint the officer is a diagnostician. Professor Sherman alluded to this earlier. The officer diagnoses the community's strengths and weaknesses. He then links the people and problems to appropriate community agencies.

The police officer is not a "social worker." The police officer knows the social agencies and knows the support groups in the community and, after diagnosing, links them to the people in need. This is a proactive approach.

Flint is unique in two ways. First, Flint, a city of 150,000 people with 32 square miles. It is probably the only city that has foot patrol in the entire community. Secondly, Flint is unique because it is the only city in the United States that has a special property tax millage to pay for their foot patrol program.

As mentioned earlier, there was a drastic reduction in calls for service during the experimental period. We analyzed the reduction in the 14 experimental areas. As a result of the foot officers stimulating interest in neighborhood associations, people began to interact and know each other. They not only talked about crime, they talked about disorder in their community. The officer, initially, would mediate between the Jones and the Browns about the "kid problems," the broken windows, the noise and other nuisance occurences. As a result of the mediation, a solution would take place without a formal complaint being made to the

police department. Obviously, the statistics are being reduced, but manpower is still being used.

More importantly, however, eventually people began to manage their own lives and began to mediate their own disputes. So, therefore, they didn't call the motorized patrol, tieing up valuable resources. Much of what the foot officer did was to educate the public as to what to call the police and when they should solve their own problems.

We observe that in communities around the United States that have community policing, it initially creates problems. As a result of the closer interaction between the police and community residents, there is more crime reported and calls for service increase. However, after the officer interacts with the people and helps them understand when to involve the police and when not to, the calls for service decrease and usually go to a level lower than they were prior to the introduction of that foot patrol officer.

In addition, the people felt safer. We conducted over 1,500 interviews, most face-to-face, some over the telephone. Over 65 percent felt safer. Three groups in particular, the elderly, women and children, felt better protected as a result of the foot officer program. The officer also felt he/she had a stake in the community and a stake in problem solving.

We also found that there was a challenge to community residents to reduce their apathy. In the United States in the 60s and the 70s, with escalating budgets for city government, in particular police departments, we had the luxury of being able to continually improve services. There were resources. This led to a "we know what's best for you" attitude. "We are the professionals crime fighters." What happened is we gave the community an excuse to be apathetic. "We will handle all your problems, just call us; that is what we get paid to do." We trapped ourselves, however, because probably most American police departments, except in some of the sunbelt cities, reached the peak of their manpower seven or eight years ago. Most departments are decreasing in manpower. So this is why I mention that foot patrol is not an altruistic approach to problem solving. It is a "we need your help to control crime and disorder." We want the community actively involved in the crime solving and control process. We don't want the community to be apathetic. "We will make a bargain with you; if you are not apathetic, we won't be aloof. We won't ride in our squad cars with the windows rolled up and the air-conditioning on or the heaters on; we will become an active participant with you in the crime prevention and solving process."

However, it is not as simple as it sounds. There are many obstacles to community policing. Even though it seems to intuitively make sense to get people closer together, to get them interacting so that there is an exchange of information, it is not always an easy task.

Our society has become enamoured with technology. Technology is fine and computers are great, the way they process information. However, what we have forgotten often is where information originates in the first place. Relevant, meaningful information usually only emanates from face-to-face interaction, people talking on a one-on-one basis, the foundation on which trust is built.

For example, in one area of Flint, there was a problem with arsonists. The arsonists, were ultimately apprehended. The information supplied to apprehend the arsonists was from a retired lady in a neighbourhood. She gave the information to the foot officer, who in turn collected it, and shared it with the investigative division. The people were apprehended and the problem was solved. The foot officer went back to the lady and said, "Why did you give me this information at this particular point in time, because apparently you've had it for over a year. I used to be the motor officer in this area and now I happened to be on foot patrol." She said, "I gave it to you for a couple reasons. First of all, you walk by my house periodically. I got to know you and trust you and can exchange information without it being obvious to the predators in my neighbourhood. You see, if I called you in the motor car and you pull up in the driveway, I then may have the predators knocking on the door saying, 'Mrs. Jones, we saw the police car in your driveway; we handle our own problems in this neighborhood, and if you given them information that implicates any of us, we may do great bodily harm to you." She said, "So you're here every day and I can give you that information without being obvious." She said, "Secondly, you now have a stake in the community. Even though you do not live here, you are concerned about our well-being. Because you have a stake in this community and are going to be back day after day, month after month, I feel that you will protect me better than the motorized officer." This does not mean that foot patrol is better than motor; foot will never replace motorized patrol. It has to be a support to motorized patrol. And it is obvious that cities can not go entirely to foot patrol.

A problem that some communities face when initiating foot patrol is that officers often do not want to leave the patrol car. Foot patrol may also be perceived as punishment. We have heard many times, "I don't want to get out of my car because in the past, foot patrol has been used as punishment; if you put me on a beat, the first question from my peers and colleagues say is "why did they take your office, your car, away from you? What did you do? How did you screw up?

In the Flint program there was also the problem of "I don't want to get out of my car and walk by myself because I will feel unsafe; I will be hassled by the community; I won't have any peace from the community and I don't need that grief." What happened, however, when the foot officers were assigned to their neighbourhoods, is that they were given a great deal of status by residents. They were, if you will, the chiefs of police of their particular neighbourhoods. They were the problem solvers. They had

the reputation of getting things done, of doing things for peo-
ple. After the word got around that there was some positive
effects of being in foot patrol, that negativism and reluctance to
be a foot officer was reduced.

In addition, we compared all of the 64 foot patrol officers
with their motor counterparts on the day and afternoon shifts.
Foot officers do not work the night shift. Motor patrol worked in
two-person cars, while foot officers walked by themselves. Both
groups were full-service police officers. Obviously, if the foot
officer was on the end of the beat, the motor car would be able to
respond quicker. Therefore, the motor cars obviously make more of
the serious calls.

Foot officers felt much safer than their motorized counter-
parts. We asked the Flint foot officers, "It doesn't seem to make
sense that you would fell safer walking by yourself versus being
in a two-person car." They said, "We fell safer for two or three
reasons. First of all, we intimately know our neighborhoods and
our communities. We know what alleys to walk down when and what
time of day, what buildings to enter by ourselves and when to call
for backup. We know what's going on on Friday evening versus
Monday evening. In addition, we know our community so well, we
know the good guys and we know the bad guys." They said "I don't
have to be suspicious with everybody. I only have to be suspic-
ious with those persons who have proven to be untrustworthy." As
an officer related, "Mr. Brown every Friday night gets intoxi-
cated, goes home, beats up his wife and his kids, then tries to
beat me up. If I don't take some kind of defensive action, the
problem will escalate. However, I don't have to be defensive with
the Greens and the Grays, because they don't give me a problem."
In not being constantly defensive, the community residents are
less hostile and antagonistic towards the police officer. This
positive interaction feeds on itself and "snowballs" into in-
creased rapport between the citizens and the foot officers.

In this regard, Flint had a very serious racial problem and
they still do in some areas of the community. It is felt that the
foot patrol interaction of white officers in black communities and
black officers in white communities, has had the effect of creat-
ing a more positive atmosphere between citizens and officers.
Regardless of the color of the officers, they are interacting with
the community on a positive basis, solving problems.

In summary, the foot officer felt safer because they intim-
ately knew the geographic area of their beats; they knew the good
guys and the bad guys; but more importantly, they knew that the
people would come to their aid if they were in trouble. For exam-
ple, there was a situation where a foot officer was being hassled
by a group of aggressive teenagers to the point where he had to
protect his weapon. It was getting very serious. This officer
had organized his neighbourhood into various block clubs. The
neighbours heard the comotion and called other neighbours to the
point where they all turned on their porch lights, surrounding the

predators. That had the psychological effect of letting the predators know that the police officer was not there by himself and that the community was going to take care of him.

A negative example of community involvement concerned vigilante activity in one neighborhood. Community involvement is desired and necessary if crime is going to be prevented and controlled, but vigilantism is inappropriate. The foot officer can be the "pressure cooker valve". The foot officer instructs citizens to go to him first for advice on problem solving. Surrounding the predators with porch light illumination is appropriate; threatening the predators with a 30/30 rifle is inappropriate because then the officer not only has a problem with predators, he has problems with over zealous citizens. Citizens are told that when physical intervention is necessary, that is the police officer's job.

Because of the racial tension that existed in Flint, there was a movement to establish a civilian review board, to have a group of citizens control and manage the police department. The vote to establish a civilian review board was defeated. Citizens were asked why they did not want a civilian review board. They said, "because we have input into the police department through our foot officer. If we have problem and the officer can't solve it, he will link us to the appropriate agency. We are not saying that we are never going to want a review board, but at this point, we have control over the department, the best kind, informal control."

Another finding of our research in Flint was that foot officers were obtaining information in both quantity and quality as good or better than many undercover officers. The use of undercover officers in the U.S. greatly increased in the 1960's and 1970's. With the use of undercover officers there is often antagonism between the officers and primarily two groups, minorities and young people. The thought being, "big brother" is watching us. Also, it can create problems for the officer because undercover work is dangerous. Intimate interaction on a day to day basis by the foot officer and community residents can often culminate with an increased information exchange--information that may be as good or better than what undercover officers are obtaining. There is less risk to the officer and less negativism and antagonism between citizens and the police. Mrs. Jones knows where the the dope house is, Mrs. Jones knows who the predators are. She knows what deviant activity is going on. She looks out her window all day long. I am not saying that foot officers should replace all undercover officers, but in some cases undercover officers may be substituted for by foot officers. The information gained may ultimately be more valuable with less negative consequences.

Foot patrol also increases officer job satisfaction. In the same study where we compared feelings of safety of foot and motor officers, we also compared them on their feelings of job satisfac-

tion. Foot officers felt much more satisfied with their jobs than did motor officers. They said, "I have a piece of a territory. I can see that I am accomplishing results. I can count how many block clubs that I've established. I can count how may juveniles I've dealt with. I can count how may elderly people who give me a smile because they believe that I am making their neighborhood safer. I feel good about myself."

It's not all rosey, however, because being a foot officer can be a highly stressful job. It is a different kind of stress than the stress motorized officer's experience. The motorized officer's stress is running from call to call, going on a high-speed chase, then delivering a death message, adrenaline up, adrenaline down. This is very stressful. The motor officer seldom gets a smile because when the people see him they either say, "He's coming here to talk to me about a problem or to give me bad news. Quite frankly, I don't want the squad car in my driveway because the neighbours will think I have a problem."

Foot officers have a different king of stress. They do get burned out. The reason they get burned out is because they're so intensely involved with their community that they get overwhelmed by the problems. When the officer gets close to the community he has to deliver what he promises.

As a footnote, there is presently a grand jury investigation going on in Flint to determine if there is cocaine use and sale by police officers. There are going to be several Flint police officers who will be indicted for cocaine use. Communities contemplating starting a foot patrol program are concerned that the intimate contact officers have with residents may lead to deviant behavior, i.e., cocaine sale and use. The indictments in Flint will probably be for use off duty rather than selling. The point being made that deviant behavior by police officers is unacceptable regardless of where the officer is assigned. Effective supervision of line officers can reduce many potential problems.

Getting back to stress on foot officers, Mrs. Jones may tell a motorized officer that she has not received her social security cheque, when the officer is interviewing her as a witness to an accident. The motor officer may say "I will look into it for you." She will probably never see him again, and the officer's rationalization is "I didn't really lie to her. If I had the time, I would have tried to help her." The motor officer probably will never see her again. Believe me, if the foot officer, while walking by Mrs. Jone's yard says, "I will find out about your Social Security cheque," he had better find out about it, because the next time she sees him she is going to ask about it and pester him until he provides her with the solution or a satisfactory answer. The foot officer is expected to be a problem solver. If he isn't, this creates stress.

There are examples where officers get too intimate with their beat areas. The officer is supposed to be an advocate and a problem solver, but within the expectations of the role. For example, in one neighbourhood the garbage was not picked up. The officer did his job; he diagnosed the problem—garbage pickup. He linked the people to the government service, the garbage collectors. It still was not picked up. He linked the people to the political leader in that community. The garbage still was not picked up. So the officer said to the residents, "I get off work at 4:00; meet me a City Hall." He changed his clothes, got a picket sign, and promptly went to City Hall. He lead the charge for the garbage pick up. Obviously, this caused grief for the chief administrator, who received several calls from city administrators who did not feel the officer, even off-duty, should have been that aggressive.

There are obstacles to the establishment of foot patrol programs. There is often resistence from upper-middle class communities. The reason there is resistance is because of decreasing police budgets. Most departments do not have the manpower to continue to perform services that citizens have become use to, like unlocking cars when the keys have been left inside.

Upper-middle class communities have become used to such services, and to these communities, barking dogs, abandoned cars and other disorder problems are a priority. If a police department starts a foot patrol program, affluent residents often feel that manpower will be "tied up" at low income areas of the city affecting response time for disorder problems. The comment is made, "I want the squad car here right now to deal with my problem. If you take some of the resources of an already dwindling police department and spread them out in a community policing program, then you are not going to be able to satisfy my concerns."

There are a number of other issues associated with community policing which warrant attention prior to the implementation of a program. Three of the most notable are funding, special interest groups, and community social problems.

The search for funds to support innovation police programs is not easy in this time of contracting budgets. There are essentially three sources of public funding for community policing projects. These include: the reallocation of existing resources, state or federal grants, and special taxes.

The Flint program was initially operated on an experimental basis with private funds and supplemented with public funding. To finance the present citywide foot patrol program, the citizens of Flint, as mentioned earlier, approved a special tax millage. The officers employed as a result of this special tax millage were not supposed to replace existing manpower. Unfortunately, two years after the special millage of 1982, regular support for the police department was reduced to the point where the total sworn strength of the Flint Police Department was substantially the same in 1984

as it was prior to the addition of the 76 foot personnel in 1982. The motor patrol division bore the brunt of the reductions because the special millage law required that the foot patrol division had to be kept at full strength.

Motor officers felt that they were overworked; and when they were delayed in responding to citizen requests, it was not uncommon for them to blame the situation on foot patrol because it was "draining resources from the motor patrol."

In reality, the funding for the two divisions was separate. Regular funding supported motor patrol, the special tax millage supported foot patrol. However, many citizens, not understanding funding issues, were irritated because they felt the increased tax millage did not provide for increased officers as promised.

Policy makers must ensure that citizens understand how programs are funded. If the innovative program is merely viewed as a means of appeasing citizens or gaining increased tax dollars without increased services, then the program will ultimately fail because it will lose citizen support.

Community policing programs, i.e., foot patrol, are very popular and therefore susceptible to pressures from community political leaders. Local politicians will find it tempting to try to exploit foot patrol programs. Foot patrol officers know the community well, are respected, and are in day-to-day contact with a lot of voters. Politicians may well try to have foot patrol officers do favors for selected individuals or help with election year canvassing. Effective supervision can greatly reduce and even prevent negative political influence, and specific departmental policy related to this issue will help avoid unprofessional conduct.

Demands made by individuals other than politicians will occasionally be a problem. Various residents will seek to monopolize the foot officer's time. In addition, business people and school administrators may expect unwarrented foot officer presence in their businesses or schools.

The larger problem, however, is that in some communities special interest groups from the upper-middle and wealthy classes (or businesses) may either misuse a foot patrol program or react negatively to its implementation. Foot patrol is egalitarian, affording police protection to all citizens. Thus, if there are only limited police resources in a community, spreading them out more evenly will reduce the special interest groups' chances of receiving "special treatment".

For this reason, the working class and lower socioeconomic segments of the community are usually much more receptive to foot patrol than the upper-middle class or wealthy who may have had their interests served ahead of others. In many communities, if not most, the impetus for foot patrol comes from the working,

lower socioeconomic or middle class areas in the community. Foot patrol is viewed by these groups as a more personal, human response to community needs as well as a way of increasing police service.

The policy implications are obvious. Innovation police programs need the support of community decision makers. If the decision makers are overly influenced by those groups that resist foot patrol, then the chances for the implementation and successful operation of a program are minimal.

Foot patrol is only one method of dealing with community social problems. The community must have a commitment to solving problems like inadequate housing and education, unemployment, and racial tension. Foot patrol officers can only affect social policy in a limited way. If there are deep-seated racial problems in the community which go unresolved, a foot patrol program will be viewed as a slick public relations effort implemented to gloss over the major community problems and appease residents who are concerned about governmental services, including crime prevention. Effective community policing programs need to have the long term commitment of community and departmental decision makers. They should not "come and go" depending on the social and racial climate of the community at any particular time.

Some traditional police administrators also react negatively to the concept of foot patrol, not only because it may stimulate grass roots citizen involvement, they feel it is a costly method whose time has passed.

Traditional administrators may also look with disdain at the officer being a community advocate. The officers can become a "management" problem for the traditional administrator. In Flint the officers distribute their own newsletters; they place announcements in church bulletins; and they talk to the press. These activities are not screened by the administration.

Also, the traditional administrator may say, "Foot patrol is a luxury. It's something we can not afford. It's more costly to put the officer on foot, and it will negatively affect response time." In the United States, a constant political issue is response time. It is like the crime rate debate, a tangable issue. In reality, response time is often irrelevant to apprehending the offender because it often is several minutes before the victim contacts the police, even when the crime is serious. For example, if I am assaulted in front of my house, by the time I pick myself up, find my glasses, see what has been taken out of my wallet, go in my own house, call my brother to tell him about my encounter, then call the police, it is several minutes. What difference does it make if the officer is there in three minutes or a half an hour?

Response time, although a highly emotional issue, is really an artificial issue many times. There needs to be a massive pub-

lic education effort to inform citizens of the many variables related to the response time issue.

Many police administrators are taking a more proactive approach to criminal justice issues like response time. They are using the media as well as involving citizens via community policing programs to develop partnerships to prevent and control crime.

Another problem that existed in Flint, and still exists by the way, is hostility between motor patrol and foot patrol officers. The foot patrol officers were called the "grin and wave squad." Motor officers can be heard saying, "You people don't do the hard work. We make all the tough calls. You set your own hours. You get to be involved with the community and get positive feedback. We get all the negative feedback. The community says that their foot officer does a good job, but they still think the rest of the department is of poor quality. We're getting tired of hearing that." In fact, some of the concerns and criticisms of foot patrol were true because of lax supervision. Some of the officers were setting their own hours. Some officers were in the program because they wanted to work days with weekends off. Other officers were trying to avoid taking the more serious calls. Closer supervision corrected most of the problems.

There were other problems with the Flint program, namely, beat size, burnout, inappropriate use of "rookie" officers, communication difficulties between units within the department, political interference, location of the base station, working with juveniles, working with social agencies, training and others. Obviously, we do not have time to discuss all of the aspects, both positive and negative, related to community policing.

The National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center housed in the School of Criminal Justice of Michigan State University and sponsored by a grant from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation has four main objectives: training at Michigan State University, on-site technical assistance, research, and dissemination of information relating to community policing. We have developed several publications that address, in more depth than we dealt with today, issues that relate to community policing. We will send those publications to you.

Thank you for inviting me to your conference.

8. THE ROLE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE COMMUNITY

John E. Eck
Police Executive Research Forum

When we talk to groups about running neighborhood watch pro-
grams, the officer standing in front is in uniform. When we talk
about foot patrol, we know that the officer on the beat is in uni-
form. When we talk about store front police stations, the officer
behind the desk is in uniform. Where is the plain clothes detec-
tive? If community policing is the wave of the future, is there
no future for the detective? Or does the uniformed officer get to
play good cop, while the detective plays bad cop? In discussions
of community policing, detectives are seldom mentioned. Do they
have a role to play or have we just ignored them? When I was
first asked to speak at this conference on the role of criminal
investigations in community policing, I thought I would have dif-
ficulty. Although I have done quite a bit of research on investi-
gations management, and am currently conducting research in the
area of community policing, I could not think of how to connect
the two. However, when I reviewed my recommendations in Solving
Crimes and I found that several years ago I had discussed the
application of community problem-solving to investigations work.
With this in mind, I began to think of the work of several detec-
tives in Newport News, where I am nowstudying community problem-
solving.

The work we are doing in Newport News, Virginia involves
getting everyone in the police department to identify, analyze,
and solve problems, and then evaluate the solutions. Although we
have been rather successful, and will be studying several other
police agencies in the near future, this kind of effort involves
some difficulties.

One of the bigger difficulties is the way in which how cops
view their work. At the street level, officers focus on inci-
dents. The radio assigns patrol officers to respond to incidents
and when they have handled one incident, there is another to take
its place. Detectives are assigned incidents in the form of case
reports which they must investigate. When they have finished with
one, they pick up another. This is what we call incident-driven
policing.

Although police officers see their work in terms of inci-
dents, the police department as a whole is judged on a very dif-
ferent basis; the number of crimes. So we have these opposite
extremes which limit our views -- the global concept of crime, and
the particularistic concept of incidents. When we do a study we
are often asked how the results will help to reduce crime.

The work we are doing in Newport News focuses on the inter-
mediate level between incidents and crimes. Though officers han-

dle incidents, and the police agency's view of work is driven by the numbers and types of calls for service, most members of a police agency recognize patterns in the calls: repeat calls to the same address; similar types of incidents; the same group of offenders; and so on. These groupings of similar incidents are what we refer to as problems. We make a deliberate attempt to get all department members to address problems, hence what is referred to as problem-oriented policing.

Detectives have a major role in problem-oriented policing. But perhaps the best way to describe problem-oriented policing is through examples. I will, therefore, give one example and then summarize the research on investigations management. Then I will provide three more examples to show the diversity of detective problem-solving.

The Example of Spouse Abuse

When I met Marvin Evans he was a detective in the Homicide unit. He also had just been appointed to serve on a task force of Newport News Police Department members that had been formed to design a problem-oriented approach for the department. Several months after the task force had been formed he came to a meeting and announced that he was going to study the problem of homicides and find a way to prevent killings. Though this was exactly the type of individual officer initiative that a problem-oriented policing agency wants to foster, I felt that he might be biting off a bit too much.

Three weeks later, after some analysis of department statistics, Detective Evans came to two conclusions. First, half the homicides were the result of domestic disturbances. Second, it appeared that in half of these cases the police had been called to the scene of the disturbance on at least one prior occasion. So Detective Evans focused his attention on domestic violence.

He approached other agencies and organizations in the City of Newport News who might have an interest in this problem. Detective Evans wanted to find out how agencies currently dealt with domestic violence, and to get opinions as to how the problem could be better handled. So he talked to members of the women's shelter, lawyers in the prosecuting attorney's office, judges, church leaders, members of the military (there are several large military installations around Newport News), and members of the police department.

Because the police department played a large role in the handling of these cases, Evans conducted a survey of department members. He found that officers prefer not to handle these cases because they take up a great deal of time, they are perceived as dangerous, and officers seldom feel they accomplish anything. He also found that officers, by and large, were unaware that they had the power to swear out a misdemeanor warrant for assault whether or not the victim wanted to press charges.

Based on this survey, and his consultations with other agencies, Detective Evans put together a steering committee of community members -- representatives from the agencies mentioned above, plus several other groups, including the local newspaper -- to design a coordinated and comprehensive response to spouse abuse. With the help of this group, over the next six months, he set up a response process.

The core of the response is to divert both the victim and the abuser to counselling so that the "cycle of violence" can be broken. When the police handle a domestic incident and no arrest is made, both parties are given information about the counselling program and follow up contacts are made by the counselling agency. If the victim wants to press charges the police officer will arrest the abuser and take him or her (although most abusers are male, there have been a number of female abusers) into custody. By prior agreement, once a charge has been filed, neither the prosecutor's officer nor the judges will drop it until the case has been adjudicated or both parties go into counselling.

The police agency, however, describes the circumstances under which the officer must make an arrest, regardless of the victims wishes. These circumstances include, but are not limited to: signs of injury, presence of a weapon, and a previous history of violence. Again, the charges will not be dropped until the case has been adjudicated or both parties go into counseling. In addition, transportation and housing for victims and their children are provided by public and private agencies. At this point we do not know what effect this program has had. Although domestic related homicides have gone down some since this program was implemented, we cannot be confident that this reduction was due to the program: the reduction is small, the time period is short, and there has been a general decrease in killings in the region. But regardless of the long term effects, this is the type of problem-oriented work we have been trying to encourage.

This is the kind of work we are striving to have become routine in Newport News, not just with detectives, but with patrol officers and every other part of the police department. The Police Executive Research Forum, with funding from the National Institute of Justice, has worked with department members to develop a process for identifying, analyzing, and solving problems, and then evaluating the solution. In addition we are trying to determine the difficulties with applying a problem-oriented approach so that we can find ways of overcoming them.

Is problem-solving something that detectives should be engaged in? I think the answer is yes. Research over the last two decades indicates that investigations of crimes, after the fact, are of limited utility. Problem-solving offers a way to improve investigative effectiveness. Let's review this earlier research and see why an alternative is needed.

Research on Investigations

Detectives, by and large are not generalists and that's one reason why we focus so much on patrol work as opposed to investigations. We think of a detective as someone who basically handles burglaries or robberies or, like Marvin Evans, homicides; not as someone who can help work on community problems. But I think Marvin Evans and others show that good detective work must involve the community. It should because the research we have on investigations suggests that it may be over-specialized, and that detectives may not even be particularly good at handling their speciality.

Generally speaking, we find some of our most talented people in our detective branches. I can't think of a single police agency in which someone is promoted to the detective branch because they're incompetent. They're usually there because they've been very good at something. So if detective units are not performing, it's not due to lack of talent or trained personnel. It's probably because of a lack of something else. How do we capture that talent? How do we get detectives to do something more worthwhile if indeed the research is correct?

Back in 1967, Herbert Isaacs conducted a study of arrests in Los Angeles for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. He found three things, all of them basically confirmed by most of the research that has followed. First, patrol officers make more arrests than detectives. Second, patrol officers also gather most of the available suspect information when they interview victims. And third, detectives generally limit their efforts to cases with good suspect information. He concluded that investigative work, especially in the property crimes area, produces few arrests and is generally not particularly productive.

Three years later, in 1970, Peter Greenwood conducted a similar study in New York. Somewhat in conflict with Isaac's findings he found that the detective's time was often wasted on cases that could not be solved. But his most important conclusion was that "the solution of any particular property crime is a chance event, insensitive to the amount of investigation conducted." It's random. You could flip a coin and do as well and maybe better. Since about 90% or more of burglaries are never solved, flipping a coin at least solved 50% of them.

I call this description the "circumstance-result" hypothesis; that is, circumstances determine results. This contrasts with how detectives, the public, and maybe many of you, consider detective work; what I've called the "effort-result" hypothesis. That is, detective effort, intuition, and labours in the field contribute to arrests or other good results.

Based on his work, Greenwood recommended that detectives only work on cases that have some chance of being solved and that they

should ignore cases with little or no information. Why waste time on cases which are going nowhere? That particular concept has been pursued as part of virtually every single piece of research and reform effort in the investigations area. It is usually referred to as case screening.

In 1973, Bernard Greenberg and several other researchers reviewed burglary case files in Alameda County, California. They found that information given to the patrol officer by victims determined follow-up investigation results, again confirming the "circumstance-result" hypothesis. Furthermore, he found that this information, collected by patrol officers could predict accurately, about 80% of the time, whether or not a case assigned to a detective would be solved. Now imagine that you have the ability to make 80% accurate predictions. You could go to Atlantic City or Las Vegas, and make a fortune. But that's what he claimed, and in some follow-up work in 1979 in 26 different police agencies throughout the United States I found that this held true for burglaries. Research in several smaller jurisdictions in Minnesota also confirmed this.

But Greenberg went further than Greenwood and constructed a statistical screening model; essentially a list of clues called solvability factors. Each clue on the list, and there are about seven of them, has points attached. For example, a witness gets seven points; if there is physical evidence, one point; if the crime was reported to the police within a half an hour, five points, and so on. In operation, a detective sergeant or supervisor gets the report from a patrol officer. They scan the report, looking for the clues, or solvability factors. Every time they find one they circle the point value for that particular clue and then total them. If there are more than 10 points, the case is assigned to a detective for work; if there are 10 points or fewer the case would not be assigned, but filed. Greenwood later constructed a similar model for robbery. It turned out though that he couldn't really construct useful screening models for rape, auto theft and several other crimes. The deciding question in these crimes was: "do you have a suspect or not." That was the best predictor. But for both burglary and robbery, there are enough differences in particular clues that construct screening models can be constructed.

The SRI (Stanford Research Institute) model really didn't shock the world. Not many people used it. When I came to work at the Police Executive Research Forum in 1979, I don't think anybody had really used it for any length of time. Maybe one or two departments that had experimented with it during Greenberg's study had looked at it and subsequently dropped it. But at that time, no one had pushed it.

In the meantime, research was being conducted in the Rochester Police Department in New York State where they were implementing a team-policing project. Team-policing was in some ways a precursor to what we now call community policing. But in

part, team-policing has its origins in the chief of police asking, "How am I going to control my detective unit?" If you look at the reports on team policing efforts written back in the late 1960s early 1970s, you will find that they spent an enormous amount of time talking about investigations management. Team-policing, by and large, is not a community policing effort so much as it is an investigation control method.

In Rochester they divided the city into teams, putting the general assignment burglary officers, the detectives, under a uniformed officer who ran the team. Patrol officers were given a lot more training in how to do initial investigations. Usually, the patrol officer filled out the form, handed it in and somebody else would screen the case. In Rochester, the patrol officer screened the case himself before it even went in. After talking to the victim, he'd look through his incident report which had the Rochester solvability factors listed right on it. He would say, for example:

> "Madam, here's what you've told me. Your antique clock was taken and that door was kicked in. Now we don't have any physical evidence here. You didn't see anything. You don't suspect anyone you know. I've talked to the neighbours who were here at the time and they didn't see anything. There's no other evidence. From what we have here, it does not look like we'll be able to solve this case."

> "We will keep this case on file, okay. If new information comes up, we'll reopen it. If you find more information, here's my card: call me. But this is probably as far as we can go."

After I started doing research on this, I would run across Chief Tom Hastings at various meetings. When he talked about the Rochester program, I would always ask him, "Have you ever had any complaints about this?" "No, certainly not," was his response. Well he's the Chief of Police, what does he know? Maybe their complaints were coming in at a lower level. So I talked to other people in the department as occasions came up, and they couldn't recall any complaints either.

When you set the public's expectations realistically, this indeed is probably what will happen. There is a rational reason for it. The initial investigation is conducted by the uniformed officer. This is done in such a way that the officer knows whether there are leads to follow or not. When that officer walks away from the crime scene, the victim feels they've received full measure for their tax dollar. Most importantly, they're not led to believe that Kojak or somebody else is going to arrive at the door the next day and solve the case.

In Rochester they also followed up at periodic intervals with letters. The officer would review "Mrs. Smith's" file and then

send her a letter recapitulating what had been said or done and updating as necessary. If an arrest was made, she would also be informed. If she called in with new information that led to an arrest, she would get a letter describing what happened. In fact, the Rochester Police Department followed through all the way to the time somebody was sent to prison, saying "Here's where your case is." Some officers felt that they did a lot of "hand holding" and that it cost a lot for postage. I heard many objections to this process. However, if we are sending officers who cost I don't know how many dollars a minute to handle cases, should we then worry about postage?

The Police Foundation did an evaluation of this whole effort and found, by and large, that prosecutions and arrests went up. It was effective. Interestingly enough, this is one of the few pieces of research which suggests that investigations can make a difference. That finding was in large measure lost on both the research community and the police community. It suggested that the "effort-result" hypothesis made sense, but that you had to manage your resources a little better. After all, if training your patrol officers to do better preliminary investigations and doing case screening can improve things, we are not talking about random results anymore. But the lesson here somehow was missed.

By far the best known study of investigations was done by the Rand Corporation, by Peter Greenwood and others, back in the mid 1970s at about the same time as the Rochester research was going on. They arrived at a long list of conclusions. In a press release it was suggested that 50% of all detectives in the United States could be eliminated by sending them back to patrol or making them take early retirement. Nowhere in the report, of course, does it say that, but in the press release it did.

However, four of the definite conclusions in the report are particularly important. First, most reported crimes receive no more than superficial attention from detectives. This contradicted Greenwood's earlier research. Second, victim information describing suspects, as provided to patrol officers, proved to be the biggest determinant of whether the case would be solved. This confirmed all previous research and underscored why the Rochester experiment seemed to work. If most of your information comes at the early stages of an investigation, that's where you should have your people doing the most work. It follows then that the first person at the scene should have a better training. Third, workload, staffing and training had no effect on arrests. Fourth, the particular organization of investigation, such as team-policing, had little effect on arrests. This directly contradicted the Rochester study. Overall, the Rand Corporation work supported the "circumstance-result" hypothesis.

However, it was generally felt at the U.S. Justice Department, for a variety of reasons, that possibly this was due to poor management: the problem was not with the detective, the problem was with the supervisor.

Every time I become sufficiently familiar with a burglary sergeant that I can ask pointed questions without him being insulted, I ask "what do you do? What is the role of a burglary sergeant?" I still have a few friends who are sergeants. They can never tell me; they don't know. By and large, the work of first line supervisors, in investigations units, is a mystery. I try to find out what these guys do all the time. Do you know what the first line supervisor in one small police department did? He investigated obscene phone calls so that someone else in his unit didn't have to do it. That's all he did. He followed up on those so that his subordinates could do the important work of investigating burglaries and robberies. That's just one example.

This suggests that the problem lies with investigations management. In order to address investigations management, the National Institute of Justice created a program called Managing Criminal Investigations. It had five components. One was to upgrade the investigative role of patrol officers; the second was to do case screening; the third was to have the first line supervisor monitor investigations more closely; the fourth was to improve police-prosecutor relations; and the fifth was to develop a case monitoring system for overall improvement in management decision-making. This system was evaluated in five different cities and found to have mixed results. In several departments they were able to improve prosecutions and in others, arrests. In a couple of departments they were able to move detectives out of their normal units into other assignments to free up time. In other departments nothing was accomplished. But this is one of those things in which you don't really know where the answer lies. My feeling is that if some agencies can increase efficiency then maybe it's a useful program. The theory was correct, but if it doesn't always work on the street, maybe it's not being pushed hard enough. It is hard to tell.

That's basically where things stood in 1979 when I started doing work on what later became a research report called Solving Crimes. While it seemed that the "circumstance-result" hypothesis was correct and thatdetective work was pretty much a random effort, there really wasn't any good research examining what detectives did or what patrol officers did.

We collected data from three departments on 3,300 burglaries and 300 robberies. Through the use of case logs, we documented what the detectives did and what the patrol officers did; what information these activities produced, how much time they took, and what results came of it. As in previous studies, we found that information collected by patrol officers is important. But we also found that detectives contribute to arrests, even when you account for the information already gathered by patrol officers, and that victims are not a very good source of suspect information.

Yes it is true, if you piled up all the suspect information you ever received in one large barrel the vast majority, something

on the order of 90%, will have come from victims. But, if you go
and interview a particular victim, the probability of that victim
having suspect information from victims is small, we obtain more
from them because we talk to so many.

There are areas in which we often do less work yet which have
the highest probability of providing information, such as canvass-
ing for witnesses. In St. Petersburg for example, one of our
three study sites, we found that the police department canvassed
for witnesses in at least 25% of burglary cases and a third of the
robbery cases. Why here and in neither of the other sites? When
I asked the Chief he said "I don't know. It's the tradition."

This brings up a point which I think worth mentioning; that
research very often documents what we already know and what we
already do. The research results I'm reporting here are likely
not particularly new and inspiring to many. These are things that
good detectives and good police officers and good supervisors have
thought of before. But in St. Petersburg we had a case where in
one department, detectives and foot patrol officers were already
doing something very worthwhile while in other departments, they
were not.

We found that informants were rarely used, although inform-
ants had the highest probability of providing information.
There's a lot of difficulty in working informants, but a lot of
this is due to a lack of willingness to try.

We made several recommendations based on this research. One
of them dealt with case screenings; we strongly recommended the
adoption of the Stanford Research Institute case screening model.
Later, the former Executive Director of the Police Executive
Research Forum spent six months working with the London Metropoli-
tan Police and they implemented the SRI model. A year later, I
went back to evaluate it and found that they would do much better
if they created their own model. Therefore, working with several
of their officers and detectives, we developed a new case screen-
ing model specifically for the London Metropolitan Police. The
best approach is to develop your own. If you can't, then use one
that's already tested.

What do you do with all the extra time you now have? You've
screened out perhaps 80% of your cases and your detectives are no
longer handling a lot of the cases that formerly came in. Are you
going to get rid of a detective, send him back to patrol, have him
work stake-outs or other special assignments? Are you going to be
able to document that they have indeed gained all this time? What
supervisor is going to say, "Yeah, of the five detectives I've got
under me, two aren't doing anything." It is very difficult to do-
cument that you have saved time. To me, the best strategy for
dealing with that is to say "what do we want to do?", assume you
have the time and fit everything around it. And that's precisely
the kind of work we're doing in Newport News.

Problem-Oriented Policing

This research is based almost entirely on Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented approach to policing. If you haven't already, I strongly recommend that you read his 1979 article in Crime and Delinquency entitled "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach."

Crime analysis has been talked about in the United States and used for some time. The idea is that if we take patrol and investigative work which is not particularly productive and if we manage it better and direct it, we can get something done. But in order to direct it, we need better information and where are we going to get that? The answer was to create special units to collate information and produce useful reports on criminals and criminal activity. This information is sent to the street level, to a sergeant or a lieutenant who determines an action plan and his officers, be they in uniform or in plain clothes, then race out and do something about it.

But it doesn't work that well. One reason is poor communications between the crime analysis unit and line operations which hamper gathering of necessary information. The patrol officers got frustrated filling out all the extra forms. Moreover, they kept getting recommendations for action that were either out of date or seemed incongruous given their information from the street.

The crime analysis units that did function well had to go to an incredible effort to make sure that the line of communication was kept open in both directions. This meant that a lot of time was spent on just doing PR work. The crime analysis units spent time massaging people, patting them on the back, saying they were doing a great job, and "won't you give me some information." But the people who actually knew about the problem were the ones they had to pull the information out of.

Crime analysis units also tended to focus on a few particular crimes such as burglaries and robberies and ignore other calls for service, for example, drug dealing or prostitution or noisy kids or runaways. The data they used, mostly from offence arrest reports and field interrogation reports, was insufficient to describe what was going on. Third, and probably most important, their solutions were predetermined. "We're going to send a patrol officer, just tell us where or when. We're going to have a detective do a follow up investigation or do a stake out. Just tell us where and when."

To use a medical analogy, doctors are supposed to diagnose patients' problems and recommend solutions. If you have a child suffering with a sore throat the doctor will probably take her temperature, examine the throat and ask the child to describe the symptoms. Then your doctor may treat her with a few words of sympathy, instructions to avoid certain foods, maybe some medica-

tion, and possible suggest minor surgery to have tonsils removed. But what if you had a doctor who, every time a child was brought in with a sore throat, immediately put her on the operating table and removed the tonsils. That's what we do; every time there's a crime problem. We either send the patrol officers faster in their cars, or send more of them, or send investigators to do a follow up investigation.

In his 1979 article Herman Goldstein said in essence "We've got to start focussing on problems in the community. We've got to start looking at those issues that police are being asked to deal with and stop defining them in terms of broad, legal definitions."

For example, in Newport News, one problem that was addressed by a sergeant and one of his patrol officers concerned robberies related to prostitution on several blocks of Washington Avenue. Not all robberies, just prostitution related robberies on that section of the street. And they devised a solution for it. We've got to start defining the problem better and collecting more information about them, not just relying on the information we already have. One of the best sources of information you have are the officers on the beat.

Let me cite another problem we've had in Newport News. The single biggest employer in the state of Virginia is Newport News Shipbuilding. It employees hundreds of thousands of people and they have parking lots up and down the city. The contents of the cars left in the lots have been ripped off, right and left: stereo equipment, guns, drugs, you name it. If it's in the car and it's worth something, people take it. This constituted 10% of serious crime in 1984. The problem has existed virtually as long as the parking lots have been there.

Traditional policing never really made a dent in the problem. Then they assigned a patrol officer to look into it. The first thing he did was interview a couple of detectives and found that they knew that there were a couple of brothers living just north of the parking lots who were heavily engaged in this. Pursuing this information, he interviewed these kids, some of whom were under arrest. He de-briefed them, not with the intention of solving a specific crime, but to find out what was causing the problem. So he said, "I'm doing a research project on these thefts, can you help me? Whatever you tell me won't be used against you." The guy had already been through court and so the officer got the names of three other people working the area and their descriptions. These individuals were arrested, convicted, and debriefed. Through these efforts, thefts have gone down by 60%. Now that's not a permanent solution to the problem but it indicates a different mind set. Instead of trying to solve one particular crime, solve a class of incidents that have some similar characteristics. Look for solutions that are not obvious; an uninhibited search for solutions as Herman Goldstein would say.

Detectives as Problem-Solvers

Let me describe three other problem solving efforts in Newport News. These are all problems handled by detectives. Detective Linda Robinson is part of the Juvenile Unit and has been handling runaways for several years now. She is very, very concerned with kids and works very well with them. She is very, very concerned with kids and works very well with them. She works so well with them kids call her up when they want to come back home. All of you probably have officers like her in your department; officers who work very well with some groups of people who will call them for help.

Between 1983 and 1984 she noticed a very large increase in the number of runaways being reported. So she received permission from her sergeant to interview runaways when they came back. Instead of just saying, "Oh yes. You're back. Thank you very much, we'll close the case now." She sat down with them, and using an interview format, went through a very long, detailed discussion. "Why did you run away? Where did you go? What would keep you from running away again? What is home life like? Have you ever been abused? When you were out on the street, were you ever stopped by a police officer?" (It turns out that a lot of them had been, only the police officers never did anything about it). She wanted to find out everything she could.

As she started examining this information, she found that she had a small group of habitual runaways. The vast majority of the people she interviewed ran away once and that was it, so she's now focussing on these habitual runaways. She's far from solving that problem. She is still collecting data and has interviewed about 50 runaways.

In the process, she found that her colleagues in the juvenile unit went through a metamorphosis. First they said, "Why are you doing this? I'm handling your case load." She got very upset and there were times when she wanted to withdraw from the whole thing. However, she had a lot of support from her sergeant and because of the problem solving effort we were doing department-wide she had, by inference, the backing of the Chief of Police. So she pursued it. Now the whole juvenile unit, as a matter of routine and policy, is doing those same interviews every time someone comes back. Furthermore, the juvenile court Intake Unit discovered that the police had all this information on juveniles and runaways. They are now coming into the juvenile unit and asking for information with the result of a much better working relationship between the court and police. Like I said, she's far from solving the problem but it shows the kind of things that one can do.

Let's look at another effort involving general assignment detectives. One of the things that they do is investigate gasoline drive-offs: someone fills up at a self-service gasoline station and leaves without paying. This comes to the general assign-

ment detectives and they investigate it. First of all though, a
patrol officer has to goout and take a report. They go out right
away, not fast I'll grant you, but they do go out and spend about
40 minutes taking a report while the clerk, who reported the
crime, is filling customer orders. These reports eventually come
to the general assignment detectives. To make a long story short,
they decided that drive-offs were a problem and they would try to
handle them as such. This was assigned to detective Laura
Harwood.

When she started to look into the drive-offs, Laura Harwood
confirmed that most of the owners would not prosecute even if they
have a licence plate number and even if she could produce a sus-
pect. She reviewed the case records and found no pattern related
to time of day, or day of the week, or location. Even if crime
analysis had ever bothered to look at this, which they hadn't,
they would have found nothing useful. But she did find out that
the self-service gas stations that were having more of these
thefts than anything else, were ones that were attached to conven-
ience stores and/or did not have an attendant outside. Well that
stands to reason: no one's around to watch so they leave. It's
merely shoplifting.

They are now in the process of exploring several options.
They are going to meet with the regional Gas Station Dealers
Association and talk about things like changing these gas stations
to 'pay first, pump later' and hiring more attendants. They're
also exploring the possibility of taking drive-off reports over
the telephone and not sending a police officer; an officer can do
something a little more productive with his time. And although
they haven't quite arrived at this point yet, they've talked about
possibly not investigating at all. The theory being that if these
people, the gas station owners and managers, have so little con-
cern about what's going on that they are notwilling to prosecute,
why should the police department do more than just take a report
over the phone?

My final example comes from the burglary unit. Detective
Rick George used to be in burglary in the northern end of the city
but was moved south. He thought he was going to have an easier
time of it but ended up assigned to the area which included the
Glen Gardens apartment complex. That was one area which had been
identified by the crime analysis unit as having a burglary prob-
lem. He went into the complex and talked to the manager. He
didn't get much cooperation when he suggested some crime preven-
tion tips like putting information about how to keep yourself from
being ripped off in the community newsletter, having the manager
cut the grass occasionally, improve the lighting, and trim the
bushes. He didn't have much impact but he continued to pursue the
matter.

Subsequent interviews with the manager revealed that a sub-
stantial number of units were leased by the Navy on a long-term
lease arrangement. Navy ships would come in for repair and when

they needed a place to put their officers and men, they had these apartments available. They left stuff there while they were absent and were thus prime targets. He also found a high turnover among maintenance personnel. When he started talking to the maintenance people he found something very interesting. He recognized a couple of them from up north where he had arrested them for burglary and larceny. So Detective George, on his own initiative, sat down with the entire group of maintenance people and had a discussion along two lines. First, he said, "Residents of this complex think the maintenance people are ripping this place off. I don't believe it but we're going to try and keep this from going too far. In order to keep you people clear, any time there's a burglary we're going to do a polygraph." He also said, "Now, you guys are out here all alone, wandering around. You have an opportunity to see burglaries and other things. Here's how to record information." He mentioned little things like "If you see something and you have a pen, write it on the back of your hand. If there are two of you, send one to call the police." Very simple things; essentially how to be a good witness. Two of the maintenance people resigned and left. The burglaries declined. Management woke up and is now being very cooperative. They've trimmed some of the bushes which were blocking the visibility at the rear windows where a lot of the break-ins occurred. Detective George's way of investigating these burglaries is not the traditional way, but it seems to be particularly effective in this apartment complex.

Conclusions

Given these examples, I'm sure all of you look at your departments and say, "Yes, we've done that." "I know a detective who acted exactly like Detective George," or "I know somebody whose done something like Marvin Evans," or "We've got a detective whose very good with runaways, too." You can pick out these individual examples. What is different is that this kind of behavior in Newport News is not just a one-of-a-kind effort. These are only four of twenty such problem solving efforts which are currently underway in the city. These four are in investigations, the rest are in patrol. They are all being handled by first line people and their supervisors, patrol officers and detectives. Solving problems is not just something that is done when things get out of hand, or that a single officer does because he is different. It is done by everyone everyday. This is what we are striving for in Newport News. The department has a long way to go but that is the goal.

It is not the particular solution to the problem which I'm trying to get at, it's the whole concept of going out there and handling it. What this requires is a lot of discretion right down to the lowest ranking person in the department, the officer on the street, whether that person be uniformed or in plain clothes. It requires the capability to identify a problem and to say "This is something, Sergeant can I handle it? I'll need a couple of weeks, though." It demands the ability to collect information, to talk

to people, and to say "This problem looks like this ..." The officer must be able to take risks and come back and say "Sergeant, I'm sorry, there wasn't a problem. I was wrong." Or, "The problem is not this, it's something else." We don't always know the real issue right off the bat. If you are going to collect information, you have to be able to act on it. And some of that information may suggest you were wrong to begin with. Nevertheless, go off, collect the information from whatever sources are available, come up with a possible solution and work with others to help solve the problem.

Now, I'm not certain how conditions are in your jails and prisons but I know in the United States we don't have 'vacancy' signs hanging out; we don't have to go out and beat the bushes to find people to fill them. In Washington, D.C., we're now busing prisoners up to Pennsylvania who are busing them back to us. One of the things we really push in problem solving is looking for alternatives to use in the criminal justice system. If Detective George can sit down with these maintenance people and alleviate a problem without making an arrest, far be it for me to say that he's done wrong. To the people who live in Glen Gardens Apartments, that's probably far more effective than if he had arrested those people.

These cases I've used are only examples because we're on the cutting edge of something and we're just in the process of developing it. But this approach, problem-oriented policing, is at the heart of what we mean by police work. So while we may never put detectives out on foot patrol beats, or have them run store front stations, or organize neighborhood watch groups, we will expect them to solve problems. Detectives have the time -- research over the last 20 years has shown how to improve the management of investigations units in order to gain this time -- and they certainly have the intelligence. What is needed is support and guidance from police executives.

PART IV

THE ROLE OF RESEARCH

In recent years conventional police strategies and practices have been the subject of a growing body of applied research. Research on random patrol, the management of criminal investigation, and rapid response to calls for services, has led to the development of a variety of alternative and innovative police strategies. Police managers now recognize that analysis, strategic experimentation and evaluation are valuable ways of insuring that costly police resources are being deployed effectively and efficiently.

Lawrence Sherman has long been a proponent of the benefits of social science research as an essential tool for modern policing. His impressive record, as both a university academic and as a senior researcher with the Police Foundation, has resulted in important research findings on issues such as police education, police corruption and police use of force. Professor Sherman's address focusses on his current work in repeat calls for police assistance in domestic assault cases and on the benefits of experimental design as a basis for evaluating police programs. His address illustrates clearly how research can not only provide valuable insight into complex police problems but also how these insights can be used as a basis for developing more effective police response strategies.

9. EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY POLICING: RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

Lawrence Sherman
President
Crime Control Institute
Washington, D.C.

I understand that my good friend and colleague, George Kelling, yesterday gave you a taste of his performance in the pulpit, and as a good preacher's kid, I'd like to start off this morning with a scripture lesson as well.

The scripture lesson is from the first chapter of the book of Daniel and I'll tell you the story in modern language. The Babylonians have just conquered Israel and they've taken away the best and the brightest that Israel had to offer to the court of Nebuchadnezzar. The guard in the court wants to ensure that this very valued group of captives is healthy so he feeds them the standard Babylonian diet of meat and wine. Of course that's not the kind of diet they were used to so Daniel says to the head guard, "Look, we don't want to eat this stuff." And the guard says, "If you people don't look good, I'm literally going to lose my head over it, I'm responsible for your care." And Daniel says, "Give me 10 days in which I and my group eat nothing but grain and water and see how good we look compared to the others who are eating wine and meat." And the guard said "OK, we'll give it a try for 10 days." Ten days later he compared the Israelites to the Babylonians and sure enough, the Israelites looked a whole lot better.

Well, what's that all about? That's an experiment. That was probably one of the first recorded experiments in the history of mankind. It contains two of the important elements of an experiment and is a systematic variation of what you're doing and observation of the follow-up. About 50 years ago R.A. Fisher, a great agriculture scientist, introduced a third idea that's really important in figuring out cause and effect relationships, which is the whole point of doing experiments. That is the idea of random assignment. The way to improve on Daniel's experiment would have been to take a mixture of Israelites and Babylonians and randomly assign them to groups who will get one diet or the other and then follow up and see what impact it has.

What has all that to do with community policing? It has to do with the power of the simple, beautiful, elegant idea of controlled experimentation as the best method man has ever devised for determining cause and effect relationships.

I suspect there are some of you here who think experiments are fine for agriculture, for medicine, or for engineering, but that they don't apply to people. The premise of what I want to say this morning is that, in fact, you can detect patterns in

human behaviour, that things like domestic violence have a lot of predictability to them, and that the whole criminal justice system works every day on the assumption that things like sentencing and sanctions have deterrent effects without which human behaviour would be very different. I'm sure everybody here would agree that one could predict that if the police were abolished tomorrow crime would be quite different. Why can't we use the power of experimentation to come up with a much more refined, precise, specific and helpful set of predictions about human behaviour that police officers can use on the street in policing their communities; reducing crime, maintaining order and establishing a high quality of life.

The benefits of experimentation in other fields are so clear, that the application to policing seems to me to be almost a moral obligation for anybody in the research field or anybody with an opportunity to apply that sort of experimental method. I want to give you an example of how it's already having an enormous impact, in the United States. In 1980 the Minneapolis Police Department agreed to host and co-conduct an experiment to determine what impact police response to domestic violence would have, not just while the officer was there on the scene, but over a much longer 6 month follow-up period.

The people who trained me and the generation of police research in the 1960's, took the police as the objects of study, as the thing to be thought about and worried about, rather than working with the police as co-researchers. My sociological colleagues had been treating the problem of crime in a funny way, they were more interested in studying how the doctors behaved in the hospital than they were in figuring out the causes and cures of diseases. The Minneapolis Experiment, was a very good example of co-partnership research, in which the police officers who agreed voluntarily to conduct the experiment shared in the research effort, just the way doctors conducting clinical assessments of new cancer treatments or new surgical techniques, share in the research. In Minneapolis, we organized a joint experiment, with some 33 officers. After a 3-day retreat, 32 of them agreed to give up their discretion for over a year in domestic violence incidents. When they would walk into a situation where they had probable cause powers to make an arrest, where there was legally sufficient evidence to make an arrest, for a minor assault and not an aggravated or life-threatening assault, they would follow what was indicated on color-coded sheet which was arranged in random order. If there was a pink sheet, they would make an arrest. If there was a yellow sheet, they would separate. If there was a white sheet, they would advise. These are three leading methods of dealing with domestic violence historically in the United States. Like so many situations where you have three methods that people are very fond of, there are a lot of opinions on all sides of the argument. Many police argued that arrests were a bad idea the accused would get angry and come home and beat up the victim even more seriously. Feminist groups, perhaps more from a sense of vengence, justice and moral philosophy, rather than any know-

ledge that it was a good thing for the victim, were in favour of arrest. And, of course, psychologists, many of whom had not even thought about statistical evidence for the assertion, were arguing for years that negotiation and mediation was a better approach. But nobody really had any evidence. Like situations in medicine where for years how to treat breast cancer was a very big debate. Medicine resolved that debate by having a controlled experiment with 10,000 cancer victims. They randomly assigned them on voluntary basis to receive one treatment or another and found, incidentally, that lumpectomy was as effective as the radical mastectomy.

That kind of research had never been done with respect to police officer responses to particular situations, especially in terms of arrest. The Minneapolis experiment, was a breakthrough in the willingness of police to experiment with sanctions, and to get over what some people think is an ethical obstacle. I would point out that the controlled use of discretion for experimental purposes is really no different in principle from the individual officers exercise of discretion on a day-to-day basis, which I think none of us here have any ethical problems with. We conducted the experiment and there were some problems, but there are always problems in conducting experiments. The three different treatment groups, - the arrest, the separate and the mediate groups, - resulted in the 314 cases, with no differences on any of the demographic characteristics. They had the same percentage of Blacks, of American Indians, and the same levels of education, income and that sort of thing. It looked like a successful experiment in the sense of producing groups that were no different with respect to anything else that might cause repeat domestic violence. We found through interviewing the victims and looking at official records over a six-month follow-up period that the arrest group, had half the rate of repeat occurrence, compared to the two non-arrest treatment groups. The official record showed a 20% repeat rate for the non-arrest treatments and only a 10% repeat rate for the arrested offenders. That's, a very powerful finding and it's had a powerful impact on American policing.

Just before the final report was released, we conducted a telephone survey of cities over a hundred thousand in the United States, asking police department what their policy was for domestic violence and what did they encourage their patrol officers to do in cases of minor domestic assault. We found that the most common response was no policy at all. Over 50% of the departments said they didn't encourage the officers to do anything in particular, and left it up to the experience and judgement of the officers. The second most common response was, officers mediation. This is an interesting reflection of the success of the American federal bureaucracy in getting police officers to do what they recommend . In the early 1970s the U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funded hundreds of police training programs to encourage the police to use the skills of crisis intervention and mediation, without emperical evidence, that that was the best way to reduce violence. The Minneapolis Experiment, suggests it

wasn't. That was, at the time the leading policy, if you had a policy. After that it was arrest. About 10% of the departments encouraged arrest. After that, some said they literally encouraged telling the people to leave for the night, even though there's no legal basis for doing that in American policing. Certainly it's not illegal to suggest that if they don't go that they will be arrested.

So in 1984, the study is coming out, and only 10% are making arrests. A year later, a survey of the same police departments finds 30% of them now encourage arrest, a 300% increase in the number of departments that encourage arrest. And one-third of the departments say that the Minneapolis Experiment has influenced the police department's policy.

I'm not going to fool myself into thinking that the only reason we saw that dramatic increase in the percentage of police departments encouraging arrest, was the Minneapolis Experiment. Incidentally I just saw in the paper that the Quebec Justice Department has announced a new get-tough policy in domestic violence. The Minneapolis Experiment was cited by the New South Wales police in getting new legislation that gave them greater arrest powers in domestic violence. The point I want to make is that we probably would have seen a crackdown on domestic violence even without the study. The study has the good fortune of fitting into a political trend, that flows out of the women's movement and a broader concern with crimes within the family; that hadn't received much emphasis before. I think that we would have seen the trend towards greater use of arrest powers anyway, but I think the Minneapolis findings were fuel for this movement and certainly helped to push it along. I think researchers love to feel that they are relevant and love to feel that they are making a contribution. That's really why we're in the business at all and it's very flattering to think that a lot of this impact was due to the experiment.

But there is some concern that the experiment may be over-interpreted, that it may in some cases be doing more harm than good. In order to help victims, arrest may not always be the best policy. Why? Most important is the fact that when somebody was arrested, they spent the night in jail, almost always they spent at least one night and some of them spent several more nights because they couldn't get bailed out. So it wasn't just arrest, it was arrest and temporary incarceration. In many communities in the U.S. you can get bailed out within a few hours and you may still be drunk, high on drugs and still be very angry for being arrested and for the reasons that lead to the fight in the first place. In those communities, it's possible that somebody may be arrested, be bailed out and go back and do even greater damage. It's a matter of prediction, an empirical question. A question to which we don't know the answer. When you have limited evidence, limited research, you go with the best information available and make a guess about what's going to work best.

We had no evidence, prior to the Minneapolis Experiment, on the effects or the effectiveness of any of these methods at reducing short-term and long-term prospects for repeat violence.

The federal government is funding a replication of the Minneapolis Experiment and proposals have been submitted. Seventeen different police departments have co-operated with research proposals. Our survey of cities over a 100,000 showed that some 25% of them said they'd be willing to conduct a similar experiment in which arrest was randomly assigned. I think that that's a good indication of the breakthrough in attitude about the potential for conducting those kinds of experiments in the United States. Once these experiments are conducted we will have a much better idea of whether what works best in Minneapolis will also work best in other cities. Whether people who are released quickly after they're arrested will also be deterred or not be deterred, compared to those who are held overnight or longer. Another issue that the replications will address is whether a stronger version of mediation or negotiation may work better. Whether the special unit that the Atlanta Police Department employs for these kinds of situations, might not show a much greater effectiveness over a 6-month follow-up period than the sort of half-hearted attempts at mediation that the Minneapolis police officers employed for that category of the experiment.

So there are many unanswered questions. The replications will, I hope, deal with them. But in the meantime, the officers on the street have to do the best they can with the limited evidence. There is a danger that we could shut off research too soon. I'm very happy that hasn't happened in this case. I think it may have happened in some areas of community policing and that's why I want to lay the foundation for discussing the role of experimentation in community policing by citing these examples, the Minneapolis Experiment in particular.

Community policing is a strategy that obviously deals not with individual cases of wife beating or individual cases of anything else, it's a strategy that deals with much larger units. And in experimentation, the units of analysis, the number of units, is a very important element of success. The Minneapolis Experiment was able to detect statistical differences between the arrest and non-arrest groups because there were three hundred cases, and incidentally it was only barely able to detect a difference of a 50% reduction with those three hundred cases. Because you've got a hundred some cases in the arrest category, you're talking about a difference of maybe 5 or 6 cases. It turns out to be statistically significant but it's still rather small numbers of actual repeat cases that are being compared across the treatment groups.

Now, when you start dealing with differences of 15% or 20% in crime rates across communities then you've got a much greater problem if you don't have hundreds of cases. And how many police departments have three hundred precincts or even three hundred pa-

trol beats that can be used in this kind of experiment. Let me illustrate this problem more concretely by talking about what is an even more famous and more important experiment in policing, and certainly a prominent experiment in community policing and that's the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. Published in 1974 it concluded that variations in the level of motorized patrol in patrol beats in Kansas City had no impact on the crime victimization rates measured over a year. It was perhaps more important than Minneapolis in establishing experimentation and the idea of controlled variation in police methods to evaluate their impact than the Minneapolis Experiment. The Kansas City Experiment has been widely cited as a basis for abandoning traditional O.W. Wilson omnipresent patrol, abandoning the idea of simply driving around so people can see you and as a way of reducing crime and reducing fear of crime, in favour of other kinds of patrol strategies. I think that many people viewed the driving around as a waste of time anyway, that the officers really could be doing much more productive things. The Kansas City Experiment supported their views. But I'm not sure that's the conclusion that we ought to draw. Let's look at it more closely. We're talking about 15 patrol beats, not 300 patrol beats, but 15 patrol beats--5 in the same level of patrol category, 5 in the double or a little better level of patrol category and 5 in the category of getting no patrol at all except for calls for service going in and out of the area. Now there's been a debate with Richard Larson about whether the calls for service generated as much of this variability as the areas that had routine patrol. But set that aside and assume that it did in fact have less police presence in those areas. Can we conclude from 15 cases with relatively low rates of serious or visible street crime, that the level of patrol made no difference? If you look at the technical report, you will find that there was a rather large percentage difference in street robbery in the direction of showing higher robbery rates in the patrol beats, the 5 patrol beats that had no routine preventive patrol. The problem is the number of cases, there was not enough size or number of units to show a statistically significant difference. The researchers concluded that the difference, higher robbery rate and other kinds of crimes, were higher in the area without patrol but that those differences occurred by chance. That's the conclusion you have to reach statistically if you're trying to determine whether it is something you would find over and over again. That's correct but I think we have to understand the limitations of doing something with 15 units of analysis.

Professor Albert Reiss at Yale University, wrote a re-design of the Kansas City Experiment in which he suggested not only that future patrol experiments, but future experiments of all kinds in community policing try to use many more units of analysis. He suggests researchers use as many patrol beats as are available and that experiments should probably only be conducted in larger police departments with lots of patrol beats, and they shouldn't be limited to the number of units in which you can do victimization experiments because of the enormous cost involved in estimating the victimization rate even in one patrol beat. You need to

conduct over a thousand interviews to pick up anything like a measurable rate of some of these crimes like robbery, in each community. If you're going to do 300 communities, that's 300,000 interviews. And at $100 an interview, it's expensive. The problem is that we have less and less money for research. Professor Reiss and his colleagues suggest that we use official statistics in more creative ways, not just relying on reported crime data, but looking at measures like the distance between the residence of offenders who are arrested and where they're committing their crimes. Presumably if that distance changes in response to systematic variation in community policing then you're having some kind of impact.

The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment in fact cost $1 million in 1972 dollars and today that would be closer to $2-$2.5 million and that was just with the 15 beats. But again, the lion's share of that was in the victimization surveys. So if we forget about the victimization surveys and go towards creative use of these official statistics, then we may be able to get larger units of analysis for conducting community policing experiments. I think that that perspective is very important because much of what has been done in the name of community policing has gone unevaluated. The neighbourhood team policing efforts in the early 1970s, that I had the opportunity to study, time after time were put into place and nobody was following up to see whether the officers were in fact holding meetings to talk about the neighbourhood problems; whether the officers were in fact staying within their patrol beats rather than being assigned all over the city to take calls as they occurred; whether the officers were in fact holding community meetings to get input let alone whether or not in the areas where team policing was established that there was any change in the level of crime, or in the level of fear. We didn't know what impact it had other than the political impact, which in New York City meant that once the program was announced, almost every precinct in every community in the city demanded that they get a neighbourhood police team. The commissioner could respond very easily by simply painting a sign on the side of a patrol car door that said neighbourhood police team and hold a local press conference and get a lot of community newspapers saying, "This is great. We're going to have a big improvement in our local quality of policing." About a year later I was driving down the street and I pulled up next to a police car with the sign on the door, neighbourhood police team. I was in a civilian car and civilian clothes, and I said, "Hey officer, what's that mean? What's the neighbourhood police team." And the officer said, "I don't know. It's just some sign they painted on the door."

That kind of problem, the implementation of the community policing is one of the main reasons we need to study these things when they go into effect to see whether, they're happening the way they're supposed to happen. But even more important than implementation or once you've established that the community policing program you want is being implemented, we need to know whether it works and what effect it's having on the community. And I'm sug-

gesting to you that one of the only ways we can be very sure about what impact it's going to have is to use a very large number of beats, not necessarily 300 but with the Reiss's design, get away with about 50 or 60 beats. Systematically comparing those beats with the community policing program or some sort of new innovation and compare that to the areas that don't have it or that have traditional kinds of community policing.

Let me review some things that we've done recently in the United States that were done with one unit of analysis, basically with one experimental precinct within a city and compared to a patrol or comparison precinct.

I've been involved in, a set of experiments on fear reduction that The Police Foundation conducted in Newark and Houston. The history of those experiments is that they originally started out to be experiments in order maintenance. Jim Wilson and George Kelling suggested in a very influential magazine piece in 1982, that broken windows lead to disorder in the neighbourhoods which ultimately lead to violent crime. This prompted the National Institute of Justice to solicit proposals for developing experiments in ways in which police could try to restore order to disorderly communities, the communities that had lots of trash and broken windows, communities that had lots of kids running around in the street being wild and intimidating older people, communities that had prostitutes soliciting and panhandlers intimidating people, and drunks lying down on the sidewalk. How can police, restore order to that kind of community? We submitted a plan for designing experiments in collaboration with police departments, utilizing the street police officers and getting them involved in a planning process for systematically varying the community approach to order maintenance problems.

The National Institute of Justice appointed a new director shortly after we were selected to design the experiments and he wanted to undertake a major effort so we quickly expanded the scope of the process. The Attorney General was to announce the experiments in Newark, which was one of the two sites selected. The idea was to have a traditional eastern city and a modern sunbelt city, which was Houston. It has much lower density, much greater square mileage (560 sq. m) than the 17 square miles of inhabited land in Newark, The Attorney General did not want to announce an experiment in order maintenance. It sounded a little too bit authoritarian and dictatorial. It had the wrong symbolic overtones. So as we were going to do talk about how if you maintain order, you also reduce fear, we decided to call them experiments in fear reduction. We had found earlier in the Newark foot patrol experiment that in those beats that had foot patrol officers there were lower levels of fear of crime than in the beats that did not have foot patrol officers. Fear of crime is measured through surveys. And we expected that we could find other ways of reducing fear as well as perhaps getting other benefits like increased business in the community. So the name was changed to Experiments in Fear Reduction. Symbolically it may have been even

worse because there's a very strong survivalist instinct in the United States that says fear is a very good thing. The editorials from Arizona and from many parts of the country, said it's crazy for the Justice Department to try to reduce fear of crime because then people won't take the steps necessary to fight crime. It's like trying to reduce the fear of disease or fear of heart attacks, people should be afraid of those things because it motivates lots of good responses.

Whatever the symbolic arguments might be, I think there's a very real empirical argument that fear of crime hurts the economy of cities, it keeps people off the streets, and ultimately may make the streets safer for the criminals and in fact create a crime problem. From that logical standpoint, I can argue that it's a good thing to try to reduce fear.

How do you accomplish this through community policing? The Houston team of police officers who came up with designing community level experiments tried a variety of strategies. One idea was a community police station. Houston, is a very spread out city, with few precincts. The precincts that are there are entirely police oriented facilities and not an inviting place for the public. So they created a police station as one of the strategies to be systematically evaluated. A community police station, a store front in a shopping centre, with a big sign and lots of meetings and functions going on. There is furniture for people to sit around and talk to the police, a place to fill out reports and conduct some minor business with the city, but also it is a place, a base to reach out into the surrounding community. That was one of the strategies that they adopted in Houston and they also adopted it in a very different kind of neighbourhood in Newark.

Another strategy adopted by police in Houston was organizing community crime prevention. Not a new idea but one that had not been evaluated systematically with respect to its impact on crime or fear of crime in the community. In Houston, in particular, both the store front and the community organizing managed to do what had not happened naturally in this new booming community. With rapid growth, you have situations in which people don't know each other and neighbourhoods don't even have names. The store front in Houston gave the name to the community that eventually the people in the community started to adopt. Before it had just been tracks and tracks of housing, where people didn't talk to their neighbours, didn't know what was going on and just sort of drove to and from work. Police efforts were very important in building community identity, whatever other impact it may have had, and I think it's a testament to the success that the police can have at working at the community level and analyzing the problems.

A third strategy which has not been tried very much, although it's been suggested very often, is what I call door to door policing. Houston police officers in this one area called what they

were doing citizen contact patrol. Rather than driving around, they made an effort, some of them made an effort, to contact as many people as possible and over the course of a year, police officers knocked on the door and went in to chat, introduce themselves, "Hi, I'm Officer Epersen. I want you to know that I'm working in this area. Won't you let me know if you have any problems you'd like me to be addressing, anything that we should be worrying about in particular in this area." Of course, you get complaints about a man in cars and a lot of minor things. Officers did visit one-third of all the households in their beat over the course of a year and had other contacts with people in shopping centres and other places outside of homes within the community. However out of the ten officers involved in that particular community policing strategy, one of the officers accounted for half of all of the recorded citizen contacts. One officer made that project work and the others let it slide. I think that's a pattern we see again and again in any effort to get officers to do something other than simply answering calls. The hard part about community policing implementation is to motivate the officers to get them to have the initiative on a day-to-day basis, to get out there and work with the community rather than staying in the comfort and relative luxury of the police car or the police social environment as opposed to the hostile environment in the community. A related experiment in Minneapolis which we were conducting at the same time also involved knocking on doors and many of the officers found that the doors were getting slammed in their face or in other respects they didn't feel welcome and so they stopped doing it all together. So door to door policing is not without its problems. It's not something the officers want to do willingly and it's not something the community is always willing to accept or understand. In Brooklyn, where the police recently undertook door to door contacts they found that New Yorkers are so suspicious about these things that they were getting a lot of calls of complaint saying there's a police impersonator out here. I know no police officer who would really ever take the time to come and knock on my door and talk to me, so this must be a problem.

Well, what impact does it have if you can get the officers to do it? In the Houston case where one-third of the households were visited, there was a substantial reduction in fear of crime in those neighbourhoods compared to the comparison neighbourhoods where nothing was changed, with a similar demographic set of characteristics in that neighbourhood. Not only was fear of crime reduced but the prevalence of victimization in the households in that community was significantly and substantially reduced as well. There was less crime with door to door policing of the community as well as less fear of crime. I think it's a very encouraging statement about the impact that pro-active community contacts can have on the crime problem as well as on the fear problem. It's also consistent with some of the findings out of the foot patrol research by Bob Trojanowicz in Flint. I think it's perhaps a good way to motivate officers to take the initiative to get out of the cars.

After we had the preliminary results I flew up to Minneapolis. Where officers were trying to do door to door policing, I told them "Look what happened in Houston. See how successful it was. If you really care about the community, you get out there and do it." The response I got was, "there's three feet of snow out there, I'm not going to get out of the car and go knock on doors. It's crazy." Until you have a middle management structure which is supportive of that idea, there's really no pressure or incentive on the officers to actually implement it. In Minneapolis because of a controversy over the chief being an outsider and a running battle with the union there really was no support from middle management. In community policing experiments we've found that middle management is often against what's going on, they feel threatened by community policing and they'll do everything they can to undermine it. So it's not surprising that you run into that sort of implementation problem like getting officers to get out of their cars and knock on doors.

I'm sorry that the publicizing of the Houston Experiment was bundled together with all the other results from the Newark Experiments and the other findings in Houston. This one finding about citizen contact patrol, or door to door policing, was the most important finding in my mind, out of the entire $2 million effort to conduct ultimately 7 different experiments in the two cities of Newark and Houston.

Here are some other findings. In Houston they were calling victims back on a random selection basis. Half of the victims got called back a few weeks later by police to say, "Hi, I'm Officer Jones. I just want to know how you're doing, see if there's anything else we can help you with". We found that overall, that didn't make any difference in fear of crime or psychological adjustment to crime. Among communities or among families that didn't speak English, or English was not their native speaking tongue, when they were called by the police, their fear of crime increased and their fear of police increased. So for the non-English speaking households, the call-back strategy backfired and I think it's another good example of how you've got to do experiments to know what effect you're having or else you can do more harm than good. Just as a delinquency program in Massachusettes in the 1940s showed over a 30 year follow-up, that the kids who got the counseling had higher crime rates and were more likely to die than the control group that was left alone. There are lots of examples of experiments backfiring. Good intentions don't guarantee good results. And I think we have moral obligations, just as we test drugs before we put them on the market, to try to test anything new and even old things that have been untested, that we're doing to people. So the victim call back was not a success.

Another experiment in the Houston set of experiments was the store front. There we found a very strong impact on quality of life in the community, reduction of crime fear but no reduction in crime. The community organizing effort in Houston also had a mea-

sured reduction on fear of crime, improvement in perception of the quality of the police and much more favourable views of the police in the community in the year after that experiment was implemented.

In Newark, one neighbourhood had so many strategies that it was everything but the kitchen sink. It had a store front, it had door to door citizen contacts, it had foot patrol, it had a lot of things. That neighbourhood had a measured reduction in fear but there was an increase in the crime rate which shows you, again, the problem of small number of cases. If you've only got one area, you don't know whether the findings you're getting are simply a chance occurrence or whether they're due to the police strategy. Which brings me back to the interpretation problem and the limitations of research. Specifically the citizen contact patrol with door to door policing in Houston, why did crime go down? I like to think that it's because the citizen contact works and that if the police are out there, the citizens know it and the criminals know it, and consequently there's going to be less crime. But I also know that if there was one particularly active juvenile criminal in that neighbourhood and somebody yanked him and sent him away for the rest of the year, early on in the experiment, that that alone might have reduced the crime rate substantially.

Which takes me back to the point about, having lots of beats. You can't conclude on a final basis that something works simply because it has an effect in one beat or in five beats compared to another one or five beats. We've got to move on beyond these sort of one shot, one area tests of community policing and move into much larger tests. The federal government in both our countries is putting a pitifully small amount of money into dealing with these questions. Given the level of concern that Americans and Canadians have for crime as an issue, we could be pumping a lot more money into community policing studies.

That brings me to another issue and that is whether community policing is the most effective level for police to focus their attention on. Is there, something inherently difficult about dealing with modern, low-density especially residential communities, where people are so spread out, and where people because of telephones and automobiles have relatively limited contact with their neighbours. The real community of modern men and women is the work place. The little villages that we all live in and know about gossip in and are concerned with and, are not the communities where houses are located. It's the community around the office water cooler. It's the professional network of our colleagues within the same company or within the same industry around the country or even in other countries. Those are the people who are our community, and that fact of modern life can't be altered by having neighbourhood meetings where we live. It can't be altered by trying to create an artificial sense of residential neighbourhood community where it really doesn't exist. And so, although I'm enthusiastic about citizen contact patrol and some of

the other things that research has helped us to understand a little better, I wonder whether as a matter of theory rather than research we ought to be giving an exclusive emphasis to community policing and putting all our eggs in that basket, to the exclusion of other approaches to policing. There are other levels of analysis for thinking about police problems.

And one level of analysis that I'm very excited about and hope to begin an experiment with very soon, is on calls for service. We have enormous amounts of data on calls for service stored in police computers in both of our countries and I think for the most part, we're ignoring it. In the United States, typically, that information gets thrown off line within a few months so that you can't look at patterns of calls for service over a long period of time. I'm sure you're all aware of the statistic that 5% of the offenders commit over 50% of the serious violent street crimes. If we focus on repeat offenders, we might be able to get a very large reduction in crime. Theoretically, if you lock up the 5% of repeat offenders, you get a 50% reduction in crime. The problem is figuring out which 5% to lock up and that's a pretty big problem. But we don't have that problem in calls for service. That is, with calls for service data we can look at the same pattern, it's not quite as skewed, you don't get 5% of the households that ever call the police producing 50% of the calls. You do get a pretty skewed distribution according to NIJ funded research done at Northeastern University in Boston. Over a five-year period, 10% of the households that ever produced a domestic call in Boston accounted for over 30% of the domestic calls. So if you could do something about the problem at those 10% of the households you might get a 30% reduction in domestic calls. The same could be said for juvenile gang problems, which were pinpointed at certain locations and generated very high percentages of all calls about juvenile problems. Same thing can be said about burglar alarms. If you look at false alarms, you'll find a very high concentration of all of the alarms you're getting are in just a few of the businesses that are generating those calls. This sort of analysis of where is the greatest concentration of calls can produce a police strategy that I like to call 'RECAP'. Repeat complaint address policing, or RECAP.

The RECAP strategy would consist of four steps. Firstly, doing this kind of analysis, for any type of crime, but take a specific type of crime and say, "where are we getting the most business? who are our biggest customers,". Who are our biggest customers and then the next step would be to learn more about each specific location where you're getting all that business.   That would be a sort of diagnosis of the problem by looking at the official reports that police have generated, by perhaps going out and talking to neighbours or looking over the situation.   The third step after this analysis and diagnosis of the problem would be an action plan that police officers could sit around and discuss and debate, what actually can you do about this problem? Maybe you can't do anything. Maybe if it's the burglar alarm problem at the local bank, they've got to redesign the way the

door is built. If it's a domestic violence problem, maybe some-
body's got to go in and read the riot act to the guy. But in any
case, kick around the solutions, the possible creative approaches
that experienced street officers might have for dealing with a
problem, and get the approval of the supervisor and go out and do
it. So the third step would be the action. The fourth step; we
all talk about the experience of policing but what we don't have
good experience on in many large, anonymous communities is what
happens after we leave? What's the follow-up? Down the road six
months, what effect did what I do as an officer here have on what
was going on? You don't need an experiment to know that. You
just need to get the information. So the fourth step of RECAP is
follow-up of what goes on at that address each month after you've
gone in and tried to fix the problem. Did it work? Is the prob-
lem persisting? Do we have to go back? Those are the kinds of
questions that you can deal with through follow-up and, again, the
data coming into the calls for service computer can provide all of
that information if we just set ourselves up right to organize and
analyze those data.

Now, how do you test this strategy of RECAP, in an experimen-
tal fashion? Well, unlike communities, it's very easy to get
large numbers of units. We could take, for example, the 200 most
frequent addresses for domestic violence in a city and go every
other one. Leave half of them alone, don't touch them. If they
call the police, send out a police car routine response but no
special effort. Take the other half that's been selected at ran-
dom and have the officers go through the RECAP strategy. Go
through the pro-active effort to deal with the problem. And, in
fact, the experiment we're going to undertake in the States will
consist of. On domestic violence, a standardized target threat
statement within the limits of legality and constitutionality. If
an offender has been identified as being the subject of repeat
complaints of wife beating, the officers will locate the offender,
read to him in standardized language saying "It is a crime to
assault your wife. We will be monitoring this situation to see if
you commit this crime and if we gather sufficient evidence, you
will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, be ye so
informed." Now that sort of directed sanction threat has worked
in California with respect to drivers who were about to lose their
licences because they were acquiring too many traffic violations
and there's some evidence that it makes a difference in people
paying their income taxes. Whether it will work in this situa-
tion, we don't know until we conduct an experiment. But it's the
kind of experiment you can conduct within a RECAP strategy. And
it's only one of thousands of possible responses you could think
of to those locations that are generating the greatest number of
calls.

So, that's one area that you might focus on instead of or in
addition to community policing. Another area, of course, is
repeat offenders themselves and many police departments are focus-
ing on them. The Washington, D.C. Police Department created the
Repeat Offender Project that I was involved in evaluating with the

Police Foundation. Out of a department of some 3,000 officers, 50 officers were assigned full-time to identify, surveil, and in some cases, help to trap offenders to commit the crime in police presence. In a controlled experiment in which they chose two targets and we flipped the coin and they went out and worked on one and we saw what happened with the other target to see whether these people would get locked up anyway. We found that 50% of the targets that were identified by the repeat offender project, they arrested 50% of those targets. Whereas the control targets that were identified but not investigated, only 10% of them got arrested during the comparison period. So this kind of unit can make a difference in arresting those people and the people they arrest turn out to have substantially longer criminal records than a control group of people who were arrested for the same offences but not targeted by the repeat offender project. I think there's some encouraging conclusions that can be drawn about another way to allocate police resources. If you have a large community with many repeat offenders in it, it may be worthwhile establishing a special unit to focus on just those repeat offenders. Just as a special unit using RECAP might focus on the repeat complaint address policing.

So those are two other examples of units of analysis we can focus on in addition to community policing. But that's not to say I think we ought to give up on community policing. In fact, I think given all of the effort that goes into patrol and into focusing on gathering information at a geographic level of the community, we need to do even more than we've done. I think the basic idea of community policing is personal contact between police officers and citizens. And what many people cry out for, What they miss from the good old days, is that kind of personal contact. If we can all put our thinking caps on and come up with more creative ideas that will work in the context of responding to police calls for service that get officers to get to know people who are living in an area all the better. Certainly in most American big cities, it is a terrible problem. If we can encourage more personal contact, then I think we may get a long way towards reducing fear, getting people feeling better about the police department and perhaps reducing crime. Certainly door to door policing is an effort that has a lot of promise but somebody's got to do it with 50 or 60 beats, not just one.

In summary, I want to say that I am a true believer in experiments which is about as silly as saying I'm a true believer in the automobile. An experiment is tool, it's not an ideology, it's not a system of right and wrong, like a religious set of morals or principles. It can be used well and productively, just as most tools can help us live a much better life if we use them. Certainly the computer is a good example of that. But if we don't use it well, we can draw the wrong conclusions or perhaps over-interpret limited evidence rather than understanding that we have to repeat our experiments and see if the findings hold up and that we have to do experiments with large enough numbers of cases in them or numbers of units for us to have statistically reliable findings. We need to be very suspicious about things with one case,

or 15 cases we can get the tool used properly and effectively. But if we do that, I think that research can not only have influence on changing police policy, as the Minneapolis Experiment has already had, it can also have a good influence at making policing more effective and reducing the problems of crime in the community.

PART V

PLENARY PANEL SESSION

The final presentation of the Conference was designed as an opportunity for representatives of the Canadian police community to articulate their response to the Conference proceedings and to present their own personal perspectives on community policing issues. The important task of chairing the Plenary Session was given to Chief Robert Lunney of the Edmonton Police Department, and Past President of the C.A.C.P. The panel consists of Assistant Commissioner R.R. Schramm of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Chief Greg Cohoon, Moncton Police Department, President of the C.A.C.P.; Mr. Shaun McGrath, Chairman of the Ontario Police Commission; Ms. Olivia Butti, Alderman, City of Edmonton and Member of the Edmonton Police Commission; Const. James Griffin, Halifax Police Department, Vice-President C.P.A.; and Dr. Rick Linden, Sociology Department, University of Manitoba.

The following is an edited version of the panel discussion and represents only a portion of the entire session.

CHIEF ROBERT LUNNEY
Edmonton Police Department
Chairman

The panel has been requested to discuss the future of community policing programs in Canada and the members have been asked to respond from the perspective of the constituencies that they represent.

CHIEF GREG COHOON
Moncton Police Department
President of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police

The discussions of the past few days have really reinforced my beliefs about Canadian policing as a component of the total justice and legal systems, and about the mentality of police practitioners in this country. I have rediscovered that on the one hand we find the United States' system with the perspective of its practitioners and on the other Great Britain and its orientation. Somewhere in the middle, it seems, lies our own unique Canadian system. And really, I think Canadian policing has a track record and an approach by its practitioners that speaks well for itself. Nonetheless, we should continue to be receptive to, and learn from, the research and experience of our good friends south of the border and continuing developments in Britain.

However, this conference has really heightened my realization that there is a lot of expertise in Canada about effective policing. This expertise is found not only among our colleagues within the Canadian police community but also people in government who have become involved as students of policing in a wide variety of ways.

We have vehicles in place in this country that enable us to share each others experiences with different strategies and models of policing, including those of community-based policing. Those strategies have been shown here, as well in the work of the Canadian Police College, the Research Branch of the Solicitor General and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.

When I look at policing in the future and consider some of the ideas that have been highlighted here, there's no question that if we are to look at community-based policing we must address the multi-cultural and multi-racial fabric of this country. It is also clear that we will have to establish better and more open lines of communication, not only with communities but also with the other components of the criminal justice system.

Unless we are able to engage in policing strategies and community-based policing models that make and enhance such relationships there is the real danger that citizens, our constituents, will become totally disenchanted with the system. We're the front line people so they will certainly become disenchanted with us. Up to now the relationship between the police in this country and the average citizen has been pretty good. But unless we are able to come up with strategies to maintain it, the relationship that has been so rewarding historically is not going to continue into the future.

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER R.R. SCHRAMM
Royal Canadian Mounted Police

It is easy these days, to let a variety of economic and fiscal issues crowd out the equally important, but sometimes less dramatic, concerns for social justice and development. The very fact that this conference is being held, particularly in this period of financial restraint, graphically demonstrates that there is a sensitivity in Government and the Canadian police community to the social justice needs of Canadians. The common thread that has run throughout this conference, and the one I want to emphasize, is that the criminal justice system is a powerful vehicle for social development. It is important to underscore the protection of the values of Canadian society by recognizing the social role and activities, of our law enforcement institutions.

For most Canadians, and even for the victims of crime, the first and often only contact with the criminal justice system is

the police. The police therefore cannot neglect the human face of criminal justice; we must respond appropriately to the perceptions, concerns and fears of Canadians living in changing and varied communities. Even as law enforcement becomes increasingly professional, effective crime control demands greater sensitivity and responsiveness to the community.

To improve the quality of life for Canadians, and to maintain peace and security for Canadians, there are few issues more important than the prevention and containment of crime and violence. To this end, the delivery of police services by the R.C.M.P. at all three levels of policing (i.e., Federal, Provincial/Territorial and Municipal) is based on two cornerstone considerations. They are: (1) ensuring the preservation of the rights of Canadians; and, (2) ensuring the protection and safety of society by dealing sensitively and constructively with those who would seek to undermine the values of Canadian society by operating outside the law, in exploiting and doing violence to law abiding citizens.

In practical terms, the delivery of police services is dependent on four basic factors: (1) community co-operation, support and trust; (2) the active participation of the community crime control; (3) the active involvement of the police as advisors to identify and resolve problems within the community which have the potential to threaten peace, order and security; and, (4) the right of police to exercise discretion in the enforcement of the law based on the principles of fairness and equity, and supported by the public and the criminal justice system.

In essence, this means police working with individual communities to identify the crime problems and develop enforcement and social strategies to prevent crime, control violence and assist those affected by violence. In this way, emphasis can be placed on developing approaches which will focus upon special groups most vulnerable to crime and its consequences; for example, children, the elderly, women, Native people, and other minority groups. Implicit in this approach are such things as treatment programs for violent offenders, more effective rehabilitation programs for those who become captive to drug abuse, more effective programs aimed at reducing the demand for drugs, to mention but a few.

To summarize, it is generally acknowledged that the criminal justice system alone cannot resolve the crime problem, and that active participation by the general public is critical to effective crime control. Community Based Policing is an approach which encourages police involvement with the community as advisors who assist individual citizens, business, and concerned local groups in promoting and enhancing security in the community. This approach implies a broader conception of policing than crime control or crime prevention, requiring instead that the police and the community accept jointly the responsibility for maintaining public order, peace and security. Crime control is clearly an im-

portant element in this, as are more general "policing" activities aimed at enhancing the general sense of community safety. Community policing is also a style of policing which demands a broader policing mandate and places emphasis on community involvement in the establishment of enforcement priorities to meet the needs of the community.

While the delivery of police services by the R.C.M.P. has always been community-oriented, the principles and objectives of Community Based Policing have now been formally adopted and will be incorporated into the Operational Manual of the Force and published shortly. The principles and objectives of Community Based Policing will also be incorporated into the R.C.M.P. basic recruit training program and into the course training standard for divisional in-service training programs, and will be used by Commanding Officers in discussions with Attorneys/Solicitors General in terms of establishing policing objectives and priorities pursuant to policing agreements. Also, the Canadian Police College has incorporated a Community Based Policing module into the Executive Development Course, and the concepts will be advanced in other appropriate courses.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, it is our view that each police force will have to chart its own course. The ideas generated at this conference should assist police managers to experiment, to innovate, to take risks, and to reconceptualize the role of policing in their communities. We must become better students of our profession; we must have and encourage bold leadership which can decide among options using on the best information available. If this conference operates to facilitate this process, which I believe it will, then it will go down in history as a watershed event of significant importance for policing in Canada in the decade of the 90's and into the 21st century.

MR. SHAUN McGRATH
Chairman of the Ontario Police Commission

Currently in Ontario, we are reviewing our total training program at the Ontario Police College, from the probationary constable to the management level and our specialized courses. In 1985, the Ontario Police College provided training for about 6,000 police officers. One thousand of these were recruits, or probationary constables and the remaining 5,000 represented all ranks on a total of 61 different courses.

I have received approval from the Solicitor General for the province of Ontario, to stage at the Ontario Police College a three or four-day seminar for police college directors from every country in the commonwealth. This is planned for October 1987, to coincide with the International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference.

Hopefully, this seminar will provide these police college executives with a comprehensive overview of major issues and directions in police training. [Editor's Note. This seminar was cancelled due to insufficient interest from the police training community.]

MS. OLIVIA BUTTI
Alderman, City of Edmonton
Member of Edmonton Police Commission
and Chairperson of the Crime Prevention Committee
of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities.

I took a minute yesterday to look in the dictionary for definitions of the words "community" and "policing." What I found was interesting - "community: unified body of individuals; people with common interests in particular areas; a group of people with a common characteristic or interest; living together within a larger society; a group linked by a common policy and professional interest," and "policing: control and regulation of affairs effecting the general order and welfare of any unit or area, to supervise operations; to make clear and put in order; governing powers with respect to general comfort, health, morals, safety or prosperity." Could community policing really mean that everyone should be policing and not just the policeman?

I also reviewed the paper that Graham Muir and Chris Murphy put forward. They state that community-based policing is an umbrella term used to describe approaches in policing that encourage police involvement with the community. The very first one states the importance of the community being active in police decision making, not simply a passive recipient of police services.

I've been an alderman for almost 12 years. I was an alderman almost six years before I became a police commissioner, and in those six years I was responsible for setting police budgets. Every year the Chief made his "pitch" and when he waled out we went back to sorting dollars and priorities and we assigned an amount to the police without really considering what it was doing. It wasn't until I became a police commissioner and started to learn how much more I need to know about where those dollars were going that I finally felt able to make good decisions.

On our council we have an engineer, a purchaser, a printing shop owner, a former reporter with a newspaper, professors, a lawyer, a union business agent, advertising representatives, sales representatives, a nurse, a planner: a good cross section of citizens. But consider the knowledge they have of what policing is about. Probably the majority of it would be impressions from the idiot box. That is where you have to play a major role and why I was so delighted to hear what I did in the last three days about

the way policing is going. Don't assume that your politicians
know what you're doing and what you need. In fact, assume exactly
the opposite. They don't know and neither do many of your citi-
zens. And if we're going to get citizens involved and they ask
questions, take the time to inform them.

I find it interesting that many provincial police acts use
the term "law enforcement officer". What does that immediately
say? Enforcement - a negative connotation. I don't want to be
enforced, I want to be free. Think of the reaction if we changed
all our literature to read 'peace officer'.

CONSTABLE JAMES GRIFFIN
Halifax Police Department
Vice-President of the Canadian Police Association.

The panel has been asked to comment on the future of communi-
ty policing programs in Canada and I feel that many police forces
in the country have an excellent opportunity for implementing com-
munity-based policing.

The executive of police departments, however, must be con-
vinced that this is the road their forces should pursue. Objec-
tives should be clearly defined, understood and perceived to be
attainable by members of the department. Healthy and consistent
lines of communication should be established to provide personnel
with explanations and accurate, current information.

Communication is a major factor in preventing the distortion
of particular goals and dispelling suspicions about the motives of
certain policies. Some of the magic words such as "dysfunctional
personnel" and "accountability" that have been circulated in con-
sulting reports can strike fear into the hearts of many veteran
officers.

The initial presentations made to police personnel are crit-
ical. Dynamic personalities that can radiate excitement when
explaining the concepts of community-based policing should be con-
sidered when making these presentations and can do much to over-
come resistance and pessimism. Cooperation, honesty, fairness and
trust between chief administrators of the police departments and
police associations would also surely create a solid foundation on
which to build community-based policing.

DR. RICK LINDEN
Department of Sociology
University of Manitoba

After the first day's proceedings which seemed to focus on the joy of community-based policing, Chief Lunney asked me to focus on some of the problems or some of the negative aspects of community-based policing.

The first difficulty with community policing is that we really don't specifically know what it means. This conference has looked, by and large, at geographic communities. That implies police programs such as storefront mini-police stations and officers getting out of cars and talking to citizens. Again we should emphasize that the concept is actually broader and can refer to a community of interest. For example, we could think of including programs whereby pharmaceutical associations deal with pharmacy alert programs, or we could try to get the community of accountants to deal with problems like corporate crime rather than just making sure all the numbers add up. So let us try to broaden the concept in order to use whatever communities are out there because, as was pointed out by several speakers, a community of residents may notalways have a community of interests.

I think that the bottom line is that community-based policing is an orientation rather than a specific program. Developing specific programs therefore requires a good deal of work and a good deal of creativity. You start with a concept, and how it is implemented is up to you.

Secondly, we've learned that community-based policing can be a pretty hard sell. Even if you get senior managers behind the program, there may be problems getting cooperation from middle managers, perhaps from police associations or from their members, even from police recruits. Politicians may interfere with the programs and even the public may not cooperate as well as we might like. To deal with both the internal and external problems of lack of support, senior managers have to work very hard to educate and to motivate subordinates. Officers who are involved with citizens and citizen's groups have to constantly work to keep them involved. You can't just expect volunteers to keep programs running without such contact and support.

And third, as some people have pointed out, there are ethical dilemmas that have to be addressed by people who want to get into community-based policing. One example relates to the question of community standards. If you give communities a real say in how you deliver police services the result could well be different standards ofenforcement in different communities within the same city, or in different communities within the same province or country. If the police are going to listen seriously to the public these kinds of results may be difficult to avoid. At the same time they can also be difficult to justify to critics in or outside the police.

Given these difficulties, why would anyone want to become in-
volved with community-based policing? We have heard a number of
reasons. The first is that the public want it, as the Toronto
mini-station shows. In Flint, Michigan, we have heard that people
even pay extra taxes for it. Secondly, the concept works. Again,
the Flint example provides some tangible evidence of this. Pro-
perly managed neighbourhood crime prevention programs can be
effective. But proper management is crucial.

It is important to remember that these programs aren't cure-
alls. One should consider the community as one resource that you
have to operate with. Ideally the first step in any kind of pro-
gram should be problem identification and analysis. Once that has
been done, the solution to any particular problem may lie in the
community or it may lie with the police or it may lie with the
city administration or it may be a problem for environmental
design specialists or, as is likely, it may be some combination of
these. But again community-based solutions are not the answer to
everything. There are some police-based programs that really
don't need much input from the community.

Finally, departments are adopting community-based policing
because there may be no choice. Our cities are becoming more and
more diverse. Various interest groups are increasingly insisting
on their rights and rightful opportunities. The result may well
be that greater attention to, and concern with, the needs, values
and interests of the community by the police is the only way that
communities can be policed in the years ahead.

Finally, a very brief look at the role academics might play
in the implementation of community-based policing. It has been
pointed out that Canadian academics haven't been as involved with
the police as in the United States or in Britain. One reason is
that there just are not many of us. Another is that the relation-
ship between criminologists and the police has not always been one
of respect and trust on both sides. A third is that in terms of
the kind of experimentation and of program development that vari-
ous speakers have talked about, I think that Canadian departments
have been a little more cautious than their counterparts in the
United States and Britain, despite the fact that our chiefs have
tenure, as was pointed out, longer than 2.8 years. Or maybe it's
because our chiefs have such tenure that they're less venturesome.

I would like to finish by looking at some areas where academ-
ics can assist in community-based policing. First, we can often
help in planning some large police organizations like London
Metropolitan and the RCMP have the resources to do their own plan-
ning. Most municipal departments are not so fortunate, and aca-
demics could help in several ways. One way is by reviewing pro-
grams from other locations. While it is true that you can't just
transplant programs from one area to another, it is also true that
you can borrow much of value from other places. Particularly, we
can learn from the mistakes of others. In addition it's important

that planners clearly articulate a philosophy or a rationale for change and I think academics can help with this.

A second general area is training, before, during and after the implementation of new programs. Here again, academics can assist with both course development and teaching as has been the case with the recent courses developed at the Canadian Police College. In fact, this conference is one of the best examples I've seen of a training session or program involving presentations by both academics and police to the benefit of both.

And finally, a third area is evaluation. I think it's reasonably fair to say that existing police programs and procedures have evolved over the years on the basis of common sense at best and on what's fashionable in the industry at worst. Ultimately program evaluations can become an internal function but for new programs there are a lot of advantages to using both the expertise and the outside objectivity that academics can provide.

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