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
United States General Accounting Office

Briefing Report to the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives

June 1987

COUNTERTERRORISM

Role of Interpol and the U.S. National Central Bureau



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Washington, D.C. 20548

General Government Division

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June 25, 1987

The Honorable Don Edwards
Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As requested in your January 21, 1986, letter, and in subsequent discussions with subcommittee representatives, we have gathered information on (1) the role of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB) in combatting terrorism and on (2) USNCB procedures for safeguarding the privacy of U.S. citizens during the exchange of counterterrorism-related information with U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies.

To identify the role INTERPOL and the USNCB play in counterterrorism efforts, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and policies. We also interviewed officials of INTERPOL, the USNCB, and federal agencies involved in counterterrorism. In addition, we contacted 19 foreign INTERPOL National Central Bureaus (NCB) to determine their perceptions and experiences from using the USNCB's services. To identify issues relating to the protection of individual privacy rights, we met with organizations involved in civil liberty issues. We studied USNCB's terrorism-related case files opened during the period January 1, 1985, through June 11, 1986, and analyzed case processing procedures to determine what safeguards exist to protect the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. Additional details on our scope and methodology are included in appendix I. The information we obtained is summarized below and provided in detail in appendixes II and III.

INTERPOL: AN INFORMATION NETWORK

INTERPOL is a network of National Central Bureaus in 142 countries who provide each other with information to assist law enforcement agencies in the detection and deterrence of international crime and criminals. Each NCB is an agency of the member country's government and serves as the liaison between that country's law enforcement agencies and the INTERPOL network. The USNCB is part of the U.S. Department of Justice and had an appropriated budget of \$2.9 million in 1986.

Information exchanges among INTERPOL members can result from two types of messages. First, an NCB may use the INTERPOL network to request information such as criminal records on a suspected criminal or identification of a suspect through a personal description or fingerprints. Second, NCBs may provide law enforcement information to other NCBs without requesting a response. For example, they may use the network to issue international wanted bulletins.

A case agent screens either type of message received by USNCB to determine if it meets USNCB's criteria for opening a case (see app. II). If the criteria are met, a case is opened to either obtain the requested information from U.S. sources or distribute the information provided to U.S. law enforcement agencies.

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USNCB's policy is to open a file immediately for any request for information that mentions terrorist activities, even if it does not involve a specific criminal incident or provide details of a crime. This is in contrast to requests for information on non-terrorist criminal matters which must supply details connecting the subject of the request with a specific criminal incident. Two criteria are applied to counterterrorism cases. These are: (1) the message must come from a legitimate U.S. law enforcement agency or INTERPOL member country and (2) it must relate to an international investigation. Our case file review showed that all the counterterrorist requests met these criteria.

Before 1985, INTERPOL avoided terrorism-related cases. A provision of its constitution specifically prohibiting member countries from intervening in or investigating matters considered to be racial, military, political, or religious was interpreted by INTERPOL officials as prohibiting INTERPOL involvement in counterterrorism. In 1984, the INTERPOL General Assembly changed its interpretation and encouraged member countries to share information relevant to the prevention of terrorism.

From January 1985 when USNCB started accepting terrorism-related cases, until June 11, 1986, the cut-off date used for our review, the USNCB had opened 119 cases based on terrorism-related messages from 20 foreign NCBs and 22 domestic law enforcement agencies. This was out of a total caseload of 42,000 cases. Overall, the median period between receipt of a request for information and dissemination of information was 32 days for terrorist cases in contrast to 37 days for non-terrorist criminal cases.

In addition, USNCB has established an analytical unit to assist law enforcement agencies in their investigations of terrorist incidents as well as drug and financial fraud cases. The unit analyzes USNCB counterterrorism files, prepares and maintains master files on terrorists, performs research on terrorist groups and incidents, maintains electronic data bases of information and disseminates the information to law enforcement agencies.

Foreign INTERPOL members we contacted expressed varying degrees of satisfaction with the USNCB's contribution in combatting terrorism. Of the 16 countries that agreed to be interviewed out of the 19 contacted, 7 countries were satisfied with the quality, relevance, and timeliness of the assistance given them by the USNCB, 1 country was dis-satisfied, and 8 reported that they had not dealt with the USNCB on counterterrorism cases, although the USNCB had categorized cases from these countries as related to terrorist activities. Several of the countries surveyed reported that they also use alternative channels rather than INTERPOL, such as FBI legal attaches located at various U.S. embassies, for U.S. information relating to terrorism because of concerns over timeliness and security.

SAFEGUARDS FOR PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF U.S. CITIZENS

The Privacy Act of 1974 is the centerpiece of legislation affecting government recordkeeping in the United States and is aimed at protecting the privacy rights of U.S. citizens. The act requires each agency that disseminates a record about an individual to any person, other than a federal agency, to make a reasonable effort to assure that records are accurate, timely, complete, and relevant.

The Privacy Act authorizes law enforcement agencies to exempt their systems of records from many of the act's provisions. The Attorney General exempted the USNCB's Records System from 12 of the act's provisions. As a result USNCB does not need to provide an individual with access to his own records or the opportunity to amend or correct his records. Nor does it have to supply information on the purposes for which the information can be used, nor adhere to the requirement that only relevant and necessary information may be maintained in its records.


The act also requires agencies, including USNCB, to (1) provide public notice of the existence of an information system and (2) insure the security of records in order to protect against anticipated threats or hazards. In addition, USNCB's policy concerning dissemination of information is that addresses and social security numbers of U.S. citizens are not to be released, except in defined instances. Our review of how the USNCB adheres

to these provisions showed that it has adhered to the law's provision to publish notification of the existence of the system in the Federal Register. This notification also describes the steps taken to minimize the risk of unauthorized access to the records system. We could not determine how frequently addresses and social security numbers were released because available documentation did not always show this information.

USNCB officials said they do not usually independently verify the accuracy of the information they receive. USNCB officials also said that there is no practical way to control subsequent uses made of the information once it has been released to an agency or NCB. They pointed out that their files document which agency or foreign NCB received the information and, so far, no examples of information being used for purposes other than stated have been found. They said each country has been made aware that unauthorized information disclosures may result in the USNCB not giving it further information.

Our work was performed during the period May through November 1986, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We briefed USNCB officials on the results of our work, and they agreed with the accuracy of our findings. However, as requested by subcommittee representatives, we did not obtain official agency comments on a draft of this briefing report. As arranged with your office, unless you announce the report's contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of its issuance. At that time, we will send copies to the Chief of the USNCB, the Attorney General, and other interested parties and make copies available to others upon request. If you desire additional information about this report, please contact me on 275-8389.

Sincerely yours,


Arnold P. Jones
Senior Associate Director

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|--|
| FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| INTERPOL | International Criminal Police Organization |
| NCB | National Central Bureau |
| NCIC | National Criminal Information Center |
| TECS | Treasury Enforcement Communications System |
| USNCB | United States National Central Bureau |

COUNTERTERRORISM: ROLE OF INTERPOL AND THE
U.S. NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

On January 21, 1986, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary, asked us to review the role of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB) in combatting terrorism. We were also asked to review the INTERPOL and USNCB procedures for safeguarding the privacy rights of U.S. citizens.

In subsequent meetings, subcommittee representatives said the subcommittee was primarily interested in our examining the activities of the USNCB and INTERPOL only to the extent necessary to understand how the USNCB operates as part of the INTERPOL network.¹ We agreed to (1) obtain information on the role that the USNCB and INTERPOL play in counterterrorism and (2) assess what the USNCB does to protect the privacy rights of individuals about whom it exchanges counterterrorism-related information with foreign and U.S. law enforcement agencies.

To accomplish these objectives, we interviewed officials of INTERPOL, the USNCB, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the three federal agencies with lead responsibility for U.S. counterterrorism policies and programs (the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Federal Aviation Administration). To identify issues relating to the protection of individual rights, we met with officials of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service.

To become familiar with USNCB operations, we reviewed pertinent INTERPOL and USNCB written policies and procedures. We also reviewed USNCB's case files for 119 cases involving counterterrorism matters opened during the period January 1, 1985, through June 11, 1986.² This case file review was performed on the first event documented in the file. If several incidents were combined into one case file, or if multiple

¹We previously issued a report describing INTERPOL operations in the United States (GAO/ID-76-77, December 27, 1976, United States Participation in INTERPOL, The International Criminal Police Organization).

²The USNCB opened a total of 120 counterterrorism cases during our review period. One case consisted of press clippings of a terrorist incident and was excluded from our review.

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communiques were received by the USNCB requesting different types of information, only the first was reviewed. We used a data collection instrument to standardize data collection, and the information was compiled into a computerized data base. A summary of each case is presented in appendix IV.

To determine if the USNCB treats counterterrorism cases differently from non-counterterrorism cases, we reviewed a randomly selected sample of 30 criminal cases not involving terrorism which the USNCB acted on during our review period. In addition, we used a structured interview to obtain information from law enforcement officials at a number of foreign National Central Bureaus (NCB) on their perceptions and experiences from using USNCB's services for counterterrorism-related matters. The interview was administered by State Department representatives to officials of 16 of the 19 foreign INTERPOL NCBS that USNCB files indicated had made use of USNCB services in counterterrorism-related cases since 1985. Three countries declined to be interviewed. In developing the interview instrument, we discussed the questions with USNCB officials and, where appropriate, incorporated their comments in the final version.


State Department representatives conducted the interviews rather than our own staff because of the proximity of U.S. embassies to the foreign NCBS and to avoid unnecessary travel expenditures. However, as a consequence, the results must be qualified because of the use of unsupervised third parties. Also, they must be qualified due to the possibility that foreign officials whose native language is not English may have misunderstood the translated interview questions and the possibility that responses were biased because of foreign governments' concerns about their relationships with INTERPOL and the USNCB.

Our work was performed from May through November 1986, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As requested by subcommittee representatives, we did not obtain official agency comments on this report. However, we briefed USNCB officials on the results of our work, and they agreed with the accuracy of our findings.

BACKGROUNDORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
OF INTERPOL AND THE USNCB

INTERPOL, which was established in 1923, is an association of 142 countries which have established a network of NCBs from each country, and a headquarters in St. Cloud, France, to exchange law enforcement-related information and provide mutual assistance in the detection and deterrence of international crimes and criminals. Each NCB is an agency of the member country's government, and serves as the liaison between the member country's law enforcement agencies and the INTERPOL network. (A list of INTERPOL's 142 member countries is presented in app. V.) The USNCB is the U.S. government's liaison between the INTERPOL network and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States (see fig. II.1).


Figure II.1:
INTERPOL Network as it Functions
in the United States



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The USNCB is a separate agency within the U.S. Department of Justice. The Chief of the USNCB reports to the Associate Attorney General. In fiscal years 1985 and 1986, the USNCB had an appropriated budget of \$2.4 and \$2.9 million respectively as compared to \$1.1 million in 1982. The permanent staff consisted of 53 full-time Department of Justice employees as of October 16, 1986. In addition, 16 criminal investigative agents and 3 other staff members were temporarily detailed to the USNCB from 14 federal law enforcement agencies. (See fig. II.2 for the organization of the USNCB.)

Figure II.2: INTERPOL/USNCB Organization Chart a

*Comptroller of the Currency


**Criminal Division

Source: USNCB October 1, 1986

^aParticipating agencies include the U.S. Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Postal Service, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Department of Agriculture's Office of the Inspector General, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, and the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

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The INTERPOL network of NCBs exchanges law enforcement information in two ways. First, the network serves as a means of exchanging information among law enforcement agencies in member countries. Second, the network occasionally acts as a coordinating body by performing such services as arranging for interviews and providing translation services for law enforcement agencies.

The NCBs are governed by guidelines established in the INTERPOL constitution and by the requirements of applicable laws of their own country's government.

In the United States, the USNCB has established policies and procedures intended to encourage the interchange of law enforcement information through the INTERPOL network within both the guidelines established by the INTERPOL constitution and the requirements of applicable U.S. law. The piece of legislation that is most applicable to the USNCB is the Privacy Act of 1974. To comply with the requirements of the Privacy Act, USNCB policies and procedures include restrictions on the types of information which the USNCB can provide to foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies (see app. III).

INTERPOL and the USNCB have only recently become active in terrorism cases. Before 1985, INTERPOL did not exchange information relating to most acts of terrorism because of the interpretation of Article 3 of its constitution at the time. This provision prohibits member countries from intervening in or investigating matters considered to be racial, military, political, or religious, which INTERPOL interpreted as excluding most acts of terrorism from its jurisdiction. At INTERPOL's 1984 general assembly meeting, the membership categorized international terrorist acts as law enforcement matters not covered by Article 3. This allowed INTERPOL member countries to exchange information and provide assistance relating to counterterrorism.

In implementing this policy change, INTERPOL established a special headquarters unit in St. Cloud, France to coordinate cases involving terrorism and developed guidelines for countries to follow in exchanging information relevant to terrorism. The USNCB (1) designated a supervisory agent as the focal point for counterterrorism-related matters, (2) established an analytical unit to determine if counterterrorism information possessed by the USNCB could be valuable to other U.S. agencies, and (3) established policies and procedures for processing and responding expeditiously to counterterrorism-related requests for assistance by foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies.

During the period of January 1, 1985, when the USNCB began accepting counterterrorism cases, through June 11, 1986, the cut-off date used for our review, the USNCB opened a total of 119 cases based on terrorism-related messages from foreign and

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domestic law enforcement agencies. This compares to a total caseload of over 42,000 cases.

HOW INTERPOL EXCHANGES INFORMATION

Information exchanges among INTERPOL members can be divided into two categories. First, an NCB may use the INTERPOL network to request information such as a criminal records check on a suspected criminal or identification of a suspect through a personal description or fingerprints. Such requests usually require a response from the receiving NCB. Second, NCBs frequently share law enforcement information without making a specific request for assistance. For example, NCBs may use the INTERPOL network to issue international wanted notices, notices of stolen or recovered property, and all-points-bulletins concerning wanted or missing persons. Also, member countries may share information on specific investigations in their countries that concern citizens of other countries. In one case, a foreign NCB sent information to the USNCB concerning bombing activities allegedly aimed at Americans in the foreign country.

INTERPOL has established a standardized system of notices for international transmission of law enforcement messages among member countries. There are six categories of international notices. These notices are usually published at the request of a member NCB, and are routed through INTERPOL headquarters to other NCBs as appropriate. The six international notices include:

- Red Notices - issued to request arrest with a view toward extradition. Red notices received by the USNCB are entered into the State Department's Automated Visa Lookout System. If a subject applies for a visa, the State Department is supposed to notify the USNCB.
- Blue Notices - issued to collect information about persons including verification of identity or to locate wanted or missing persons.
- Green Notices - circulated to give police agencies information about persons who have committed or are likely to commit offenses affecting several countries and who may be in their country. The USNCB forwards this type of information to the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
- Black Notices - circulated to provide information about unidentified bodies.
- Stolen Property Notices - circulated to provide information about stolen property.
- Modus Operandi Notices - to notify NCBs about certain criminal procedures and possible hiding places of criminals.

HOW THE USNCB EXCHANGES INFORMATION

In its role as an international communication channel for criminal justice information, the USNCB distributes information from its files to a worldwide network of INTERPOL member countries and domestic law enforcement agencies. Each time that it receives a request for information or informational message, the USNCB opens a file, collects, and distributes the information to the appropriate place when, and if, all screening and documentation criteria have been met. As discussed below, the USNCB policy manual sets out the criteria which must be met before the USNCB will exchange information.

On receiving a request for assistance or informational message from a foreign or domestic law enforcement agency, the USNCB takes the following steps:

1. Receipt of message and assignment of priority

Messages come to the USNCB by mail, the international INTERPOL radio system, telephone, facsimile, or direct computer link with the Interstate National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. Although a case may be initiated on the basis of a telephone conversation, the USNCB policy requires written documentation that the message came from a legitimate source before any information is released. A telephone request from a participating USNCB agency is an exception to this policy in that a Memorandum of Record or notation to a log book by the USNCB case agent or the outgoing correspondence is regarded as adequate documentation.

As messages are received, telecommunication operators are to assign each message a priority according to its urgency: routine, important, urgent, and critical urgent. All terrorist-related messages are assigned a priority level of urgent or critical urgent. If the message is in a language other than English, a translator translates the message into English. INTERPOL's four official languages are English, French, Spanish, and Arabic.

2. Case Screening

After assigning a priority and before opening a case file, the telecommunication operators and quality control analysts (USNCB's quality control unit) screen the message to ensure that all requests for information comply with USNCB criteria. A second level of review is the case agents. They too are responsible for the adequacy of the information in the requests assigned to them and those that they receive by telephone from their agencies.

Screening criteria differ for terrorism and non-terrorism related cases. Criteria for non-terrorism cases, as discussed in the USNCB's policy manual, are:

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1. the message must come from a legitimate law enforcement agency or INTERPOL member country;
2. it must relate to an international investigation;
3. the crime must be considered a violation of U.S. federal or state law, as well as be a crime in the country involved;
4. the message must not violate Article 3 of the INTERPOL constitution which prohibits intervention in, or activities of, matters of a racial, military, political, or religious character;
5. there must be a link between the crime and the subject of the case; and
6. the reason for a request for information must be clearly documented, indicating the type of investigation and providing the fullest possible identifying details of the subject.

If information provided by the requester is insufficient to comply with the criteria detailed above, the USNCB's guidelines require contacting the sender for more information.

Only criteria 1 and 2 are used to screen counterterrorism cases. According to an USNCB official, the USNCB will respond to any request for information that mentions terrorist activities, is from a legitimate law enforcement agency or NCB, and relates to an international investigation even if it does not involve a specific criminal incident or provide details of a crime.

3. Case Analysis and Research

When a request requires a response, the USNCB has a wide range of information resources available to it. After opening a case, USNCB personnel routinely check three computer systems to determine whether they contain relevant information and then establish a case file and assign the case to an agent. The three systems are described below.

- USNCB's INTERPOL Case Tracking System: The USNCB maintains a case tracking system to organize and use the information in its files. The system allows operators and agents to add, modify, or delete cases, to view cases related to a specific organization or person, or to search records for names, identification numbers, passport or case information, and information related to property. INTERPOL headquarters and members of the INTERPOL network must ask the USNCB for information contained in its case tracking system and cannot independently access USNCB's files.

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- National Criminal Information Center (NCIC): The NCIC is a nationwide computerized information system administered by the FBI which provides federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with information on stolen property, wanted persons, and individuals arrested for serious crimes.
- Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS): The TECS database is maintained by the U.S. Customs Service and contains information on crimes and criminals in violation of laws administered by the Treasury Department, such as customs violations and income tax evasion. Participating agencies include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Internal Revenue Service, Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, Coast Guard, FBI, and the USNCB. The USNCB can also make data such as international notices available through TECS to domestic law enforcement agencies, because TECS has direct access to computerized databases in all 50 states.

In addition to these systems, the USNCB case agent has access to other major U.S. computerized criminal records systems. These include the Drug Enforcement Administration's Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System, the FBI's Interstate Identification Index, the Department of Justice's Administrative Communications System, the State Department's Automatic Visa Lookout System, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Master Index File.

The USNCB also has access to the Interstate National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. Information from state and local law enforcement data bases on vehicle registrations, driver's license records, and criminal history records is available through this system.

In addition to querying data bases, the USNCB case agent may contact other federal law enforcement agencies as well as sources outside of the law enforcement community. The FBI, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Passport Office are among the agencies frequently contacted by the USNCB for information. The USNCB may also request assistance from state and local law enforcement agencies in such matters as verifying addresses or interviewing persons.

The USNCB also gathers information from various private organizations, such as the National Auto Theft Bureau, the American Medical and Dental Associations, and the American Bankers Association.

4. Information Dissemination

After the case agents have gathered the requested information, they are responsible for preparing and disseminating the outgoing response in accordance with USNCB and INTERPOL guidelines. These guidelines confine the dissemination of information to official

law enforcement and criminal justice agencies and include provisions to protect the privacy of individuals whose names appear in USNCB files. For example, agents are instructed not to release information that is not relevant to the case, that pertains to an individual's exercise of his/her First Amendment rights, or that may injure innocent persons.

In addition, USNCB's policy is that the addresses and social security numbers of U.S. citizens are not to be released, except in defined instances, such as applicant requests for employment related background checks by law enforcement agencies. If another country needed to contact a U.S. citizen, INTERPOL or the State Department would serve as the conduit.

USNCB officials told us that case agents exercise independent judgment in preparing outgoing communications. Communications leaving the USNCB receive no supervisory review until after the case agent has taken all the necessary action and the case is closed.

Many of the messages coming to the USNCB that result in the opening of a case are of an informational nature and do not require a response from the USNCB to the originating country. After the USNCB receives an informational message and all the normal processing steps have occurred, a case agent determines who should receive the message and refers the information to the appropriate agency(s).

5. Case Closing

When the case agent completes all the actions deemed to be required in a case, he/she is to mark the file closed, or closed except for receiving information on the disposition of the case. The USNCB is not supposed to close a case involving a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien until it receives information as to the case's disposition. It is then the agent's responsibility to send the case to his/her supervisor for review. The purpose of the review is to determine that the request was answered and that the release of information has been in accordance with the Privacy Act and USNCB guidelines. In the event the supervisor's review reveals deviations from USNCB's standards, the supervisor is responsible for appropriate corrective action and counseling.

USNCB INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERTERRORISM CASES

Since INTERPOL began allowing its member agencies to exchange information on counterterrorism matters, the USNCB has opened 119 counterterrorism-related cases based on messages from 20 foreign NCBs and 22 domestic law enforcement agencies. Messages from the FBI, the Italian NCB, and the Spanish NCB have resulted in the highest numbers of cases being opened. Table II.1 shows the country of origin for requests resulting in opening of counterterrorism cases.

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Table II.1:Country of Origin for Opening Counterterrorism Cases

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Number of Cases</u> |
|--|------------------------|
| United States | 46 |
| Italy | 24 |
| Spain | 13 |
| Belgium | 6 |
| Greece | 4 |
| United Kingdom | 4 |
| Turkey | 3 |
| Germany | 2 |
| Countries responsible for opening 1 case each: | |
| Chad, Guyana, Honduras, India, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden | 12 |
| Secretary General of INTERPOL | 5 |
| Total | <u>119</u> |

The USNCB has also established an analytical unit to assist law enforcement agencies in their investigations of terrorist incidents. The Drugs, Financial Fraud, and Terrorism Unit analyzes USNCB counterterrorism files, prepares and maintains master files on terrorists, performs research on terrorist groups and incidents, maintains data bases of information, and disseminates the information to law enforcement agencies.

REVIEW OF COUNTERTERRORISM CASES

We reviewed the 119 counterterrorism case files to obtain information on the cases themselves and on the services the USNCB provides to U.S. law enforcement agencies and to the INTERPOL countries. As shown in tables II.2 through II.5, we found USNCB receives and sends counterterrorist messages to various law enforcement agencies.

Our review of the 119 USNCB counterterrorism case files revealed that the USNCB receives various messages from many law enforcement agencies. Table II.2 shows the types of agencies that were the sources of messages that resulted in opening counterterrorism cases.

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Table II.2:Sources of Messages

| | <u>Counterterrorism Cases</u> | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| | <u>Number</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
| Foreign NCBS | 68 | 57 |
| USNCB Participating federal agency | 28 | 24 |
| State agency | 1 | 1 |
| Local agency | 11 | 9 |
| Secretary General | 5 | 4 |
| Nonparticipating federal agency | 3 | 3 |
| Other U.S. sources | 3 | 3 |
| Total | <u>119</u> | <u>100^a</u> |

^aPercentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

Fifty-three (44.5 percent) of the 119 cases reviewed were based on messages sent to the USNCB with information on international crimes, criminals, or other law enforcement matters. In these cases the USNCB was not asked for assistance, so its role was limited to disseminating the information to domestic agencies which might use it. In the majority of cases, the USNCB sent information to the FBI and other agencies. In addition, USNCB frequently issued notices through TECS. Table II.3 shows actions that the USNCB took to disseminate the information received.

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Table II.3:
Actions Taken to Disseminate
Informational Messages Received by USNCB
 (Number of Cases: 53)

| <u>Actions</u> | <u>Counterterrorism Cases</u> | |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| | <u>No. of Actions</u> | <u>Percent of cases</u> |
| Contacted FBI | 31 | 58 |
| Disseminated information to agencies other than FBI | 12 | 23 |
| Issued notice through TECs | 27 | 51 |
| Other | 6 | 14 |
| | <u>76^a</u> | |

^aMore than one action was taken for some cases.

In the other 66 cases (55.5 percent), the USNCB was asked to supply information. USNCB policy states that all requests should be documented and all 66 requests we reviewed were documented.

Our case file review also showed that all the counterterrorist requests met the applicable screening criteria of coming from a legitimate law enforcement agency, relating to an international investigation, and having a general reference to terrorism.

Even with the less restrictive screening criteria used for counterterrorism cases, the USNCB retains the discretion to ask for additional information or documentation before opening a case. The USNCB asked for more information in 11 of the counterterrorism cases examined. In 7 of these cases, the USNCB asked for and received more details of the crime involved in the request.

The USNCB used 71 sources of information to respond to the 66 counterterrorism requests of which 42 originated within the United States. Nearly two-thirds of the information sources were foreign NCBs. Table II.4 details the information sources.

Table II.4:Sources of Information for Terrorist Cases

| <u>Source</u> | <u>Number of times USNCB Requested Information</u> (Number of Cases: 66) |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Foreign NCBs | 45 |
| FBI | 11 |
| ATF | 4 |
| Passport Office | 5 |
| Local Law Enforcement Agency | 3 |
| State Law Enforcement Agency | 1 |
| Other | 2 |
| Total | <u>71</u> |

Verification

The USNCB generally does not attempt to verify the data it receives from other law enforcement agencies or automated systems, but relies on the collecting agency to insure accuracy. However, the USNCB does require its agents to confirm information received from the FBI's NCIC because the information contains active law enforcement data. The agents are required to confirm with the originating agency that information such as arrest warrants are still valid. Our case file review revealed that this confirmation was not always documented as required by USNCB policy. Of the 66 terrorist requests, the NCIC contained information on 6. Of these 6 cases, the USNCB files contained documentation that information relating to 3 cases was confirmed according to USNCB procedures.

Information released

Our case file review included both open and closed cases, and indicated what types of data the USNCB disseminates. Regarding the relevance of the information disseminated, it is difficult in a law enforcement environment to determine what information may be relevant or irrelevant before the investigation is completed. At the time of our review, USNCB had released information on 27 of the 66 information request cases. The types of information released for the 27 cases were generally limited to law

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enforcement information related to suspected criminal activity. Table II.5 shows the types of information released.

Table II.5:

Types of Information Released
by USNCB For Counterterrorism Cases
(Number of Cases: 27)

| <u>Type</u> | <u>Number of Releases</u> |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Criminal Records Check | 12 |
| Personal Description | 10 |
| License/Auto Check | 3 |
| Addresses | 6 ^a |
| Fingerprints | 4 |
| Location of Suspect/Fugitive/Witness | 3 |
| Passport/Credit Card Check | 2 |
| Other | <u>11</u> |
| Total | <u>51</u> |

^a Addresses were released in at least six cases and possibly more. We are uncertain of the exact number because of inconsistent file procedures discussed below. USNCB met its release criteria for the six cases noted.

Regarding social security numbers and addresses, we were unable to determine from the files how frequently the information was released. According to USNCB officials, some agents black out addresses or social security numbers on any outgoing communications while leaving file information unmarked. On these occasions, we could not verify that USNCB policy was observed. On the other hand, one agent used red transparent tape that blocks out sensitive information when it is photocopied and leaves evidence that the agent applied appropriate safeguards regarding its release.

Timeliness

The case file review also focused on the timeliness of USNCB's response and found that the time varied between terrorist and non-terrorist cases. Overall, the median period between receipt

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of a message and dissemination of information was 32 days for terrorist cases in contrast to 37 days for non-terrorist criminal cases. All terrorist requests are considered urgent or critical urgent. The USNCB does not have complete control over how long it takes its source agencies to respond to its requests, so it cannot completely control how quickly it can respond to its requesters.

However, the USNCB has complete control over the amount of time between receipt of a message and the first action it takes to process the request. In the majority of cases (53 percent) the USNCB took some action on terrorist requests on the day of receipt of the message. In two cases, however, we noted a delay of several months between receipt of the message and the first action taken by USNCB. This delay forced one requester to go to another source to get the data it needed.

As discussed earlier, the USNCB conducts no supervisory review of a case before it is closed. Of the counterterrorism cases we reviewed which requested information, 40 were open and 26 were closed. All of the closed cases had documentation of supervisory review. However, we noted two instances where a supervisor functioned as the case agent and also conducted the case closing review for the case. This supervisor said this practice no longer occurs because he now assigns all cases to subordinates.

REVIEW OF NON-TERRORIST CASE FILES

Non-terrorist criminal cases make up the majority of INTERPOL's 42,000 cases. We reviewed 30 cases to compare USNCB's processing of non-terrorist related criminal cases with that of counterterrorism cases. In general, we found the USNCB adheres to its screening criteria for non-terrorist criminal cases. These criteria include ensuring messages are from domestic law enforcement agencies or foreign NCBs, requiring written documentation of requests for information, and requiring specification of details of the crime being investigated and the linkage with the subject of the request and of the international nature of the crime. The most frequently requested and released types of information were criminal history checks, personal descriptions, and information on weapons and vehicles. The files did not always document that agents followed required NCIC confirmation procedures.

USERS PERCEPTIONS OF USNCB'S CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTERTERRORISM

USNCB's contribution to combatting terrorism is difficult to assess due in part to the inherent difficulties of judging the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts. Also, USNCB's involvement is relatively recent and, as a result, its counterterrorism policies and procedures are still evolving.

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Our review disclosed that law enforcement agencies use additional communication channels, besides INTERPOL, for exchanging counterterrorist information because of timeliness and security concerns. Various officials said the USNCB, and the INTERPOL network, is a valuable source of information and assistance for many criminal cases. In our interviews with representatives of the U.S. agencies that have been assigned lead responsibility for counterterrorist programs within the United States and with representatives of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and in our surveys of foreign NCBs, we were told that INTERPOL is one of several channels used for international communications on counterterrorism matters.

These officials also said that for counterterrorism cases, law enforcement agencies sometimes use alternative channels of communication such as direct police-to-police communication, embassy channels, or the FBI's legal attache system.³ The reasons given us for the use of alternative channels were to exchange information quickly, to avoid the security problems inherent in using an international network of 142 countries as a channel of communication for information on crimes with political aspects, and to maintain traditional direct contacts with U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Our case file review showed USNCB was not always timely in its handling of requests for counterterrorism information. In one case, the USNCB lost/misplaced the original request. The USNCB finally opened a case 5 months later when the requester called to ask about the case. Soon after, the requester withdrew the request due to the elapsed time. In another case, a foreign country requested information from the USNCB, but after a 3-month delay went to the FBI legal attache at the local U.S. embassy to obtain the information.

Foreign INTERPOL members reported varying degrees of satisfaction with the USNCB's contribution in general and specifically with its contribution in combatting terrorism. Of the 16 countries that responded to our request for an interview out of the 19 contacted, 12 answered that in general they were either satisfied or very satisfied with the quality, relevance, and timeliness of the assistance given them by the USNCB. Three countries expressed general dissatisfaction or were uncertain about the quality, relevance, or timeliness of the USNCB's assistance. (Two of these countries were moderate users of USNCB services and the third had relatively little experience with USNCB.) The remaining country said it had not requested any assistance from the USNCB and terminated the interview after the first question.

³The FBI has legal attaches attached to the U.S. embassies in 13 countries. Their major objective is to develop and maintain liaison with foreign law enforcement and other agencies.

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When asked specifically about the USNCB's contribution on counterterrorism cases, seven countries said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the USNCB's performance. One country said it was dissatisfied with the USNCB's responsiveness. (This country was a moderate user of USNCB services.) Eight of the 16 responding countries reported that they had not dealt with the USNCB on counterterrorism cases, although the USNCB had categorized cases from these countries as relating to terrorist activities. This discrepancy may be due to USNCB's broad definition of "terrorism". Rather than classifying cases by only a single incident or crime, the USNCB classifies as terrorist cases those where crimes may be only potentially related to general terrorism, such as stolen passports. According to USNCB officials, the broader classification system allows the USNCB to assign high priority to cases that mention a terrorist element, even if they do not involve a specific terrorist incident.

A USNCB official said the use of INTERPOL for terrorist matters will increase as the guidelines for dealing with terrorism cases are fully implemented. Since INTERPOL only recently became involved in combatting terrorism, the USNCB official said countries are not accustomed to working through it as an international channel of law enforcement communication. Thus, many countries are continuing to use the channels such as the FBI legal attaches that have been available longer to disseminate information regarding terrorism. According to USNCB officials, INTERPOL and the USNCB will be used to disseminate information more frequently as foreign countries and U.S. agencies learn more about how INTERPOL can be of service.

PRIVACY ISSUES RAISED BY USNCB ACTIVITIES

The United States has privacy protections grounded in both the Constitution and in legislation. The increasing exchange of computerized personal information about individuals has raised concerns about possible violations of privacy.

Constitutional Protections

The Constitution of the United States has historically played a major part in protecting an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to nondiscriminatory treatment, and procedural fairness. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, for example, have long provided individuals a sphere of privacy. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from compelling individuals to provide information about themselves that would implicate them in criminal activity. These constitutional requirements create a zone of privacy around an individual, but they do not protect that zone completely. In the case of the Fourth Amendment, for example, persons and property may be searched upon a showing of "probable cause"; in the case of the Fifth Amendment, criminal investigations may be conducted and evidence obtained as long as the individual himself is not forced to divulge incriminating information.

The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution also provide some protection of individual privacy relating to the limits of data collection and use. Under the due process clauses, an individual has the right to challenge the factual record on which a government decision affecting an individual's interest in life, liberty, or property is based.

However, the USNCB is not engaged in the type of law enforcement activity that is likely to result in violations of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. Since the USNCB is not involved in searches and seizures of individuals or their property or in interrogation of individuals who may be involved in criminal activity, it is unlikely that USNCB would violate rights protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The USNCB does limit the use of information that pertains to the exercise of an individual's First Amendment rights, which restricts the government's use of information on individuals. According to USNCB officials and policy manuals, the agency would not disclose

information concerning an individual's political and religious beliefs and associations unless this is directly relevant to a terrorist act.

The constitutional guarantees of procedural due process do not appear applicable to USNCB. Procedural due process means that an individual is entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing to contest, among other things, the factual basis of a proposed deprivation of life, liberty, or property. USNCB's limited function as a liaison between the INTERPOL network and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies would not ordinarily involve USNCB in activities that would raise procedural due process issues.

Legislation: Privacy Act

The Privacy Act of 1974 is the centerpiece of legislation affecting government recordkeeping in the United States and is aimed at protecting the privacy rights of U.S. citizens and aliens admitted for permanent residence. The Privacy Act applies to personal systems of records--any items, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency and that can be retrieved by the person's name or other individual identifier. The USNCB exchanges information with other federal agencies and is therefore subject to some of the provisions of the Privacy Act. Our review of how the USNCB adheres to applicable Privacy Act requirements showed that the agency does not usually independently verify the accuracy of the information received. USNCB officials also said there is no practical way to control subsequent uses made of the data disseminated. Our review also showed that USNCB (1) has adhered to the law's provisions to publish notification of the existence of the system in the Federal Register and to take steps to ensure that appropriate safeguards exist to protect the security and confidentiality of the records, and (2) is exempted from adhering to many of the act's other provisions because of the law enforcement nature of its operations.

USNCB's Limited Ability to Control the Quality of Data Obtained and Use of Data Disseminated

The act requires each agency that disseminates a record about an individual to any person, other than a federal agency, to make a reasonable effort to assure that records are accurate, timely, complete, and relevant.

USNCB officials said they do not usually independently verify the accuracy of the information they receive from other agencies or automated systems. According to USNCB officials, when agents are unsure of the quality of the information they receive or whether it relates to the right person, they are permitted to release information with a caveat stating that the USNCB could not verify the data or positively identify the suspect.

In addition to data quality, we discussed USNCB's control over the data after dissemination with USNCB officials. They said they have little control over uses made of the information disseminated to investigative agencies. These officials also told us that information provided to recipient countries by the USNCB is intended for use in connection with specific criminal investigations and is restricted to police and criminal justice channels by an INTERPOL resolution on privacy. This resolution conforms to the third agency rule (44 U.S.C. 3500) which stipulates that materials or documents from one agency are not to be provided to another agency without the originating agency's authorization. The USNCB's policy extends the third agency rule to local and state law enforcement agencies and foreign NCBs. USNCB officials said, however, that there is no practical way to control any subsequent uses made of the information. They pointed out their files document which agency or foreign NCB received the information and that no examples of subsequent distribution have been found. They said they have made each country aware that unauthorized information disclosures may result in the USNCB not giving it further information.

The quality of data and control over dissemination are significant privacy issues, particularly regarding counterterrorism cases for which USNCB waives its normal screening criteria. As discussed on page 17, a counterterrorism case may be opened and information disseminated on an individual without evidence that the person has violated or is suspected of having violated any U.S. laws. USNCB's guidelines assign priority to requests for information containing a general reference to terrorism and this reference is considered sufficient basis for USNCB to open a case file on an individual and gather and disseminate information to the requesting agency or country. USNCB officials explained that the reasoning behind waiving the normal case opening criteria is to enable them to provide immediate responses to terrorism issues.

Public Notice and Security
of the USNCB System of Records

Two additional provisions of the Privacy Act for which USNCB is responsible are to (1) provide public notice of the existence of the system and (2) insure the security of records and protect against anticipated threats or hazards. The following shows the steps USNCB has taken to comply with these provisions.

The objective of publishing a description of the system of records in the Federal Register is to prevent the existence of secret systems and to achieve a policy of openness about the development, practices, and policies concerning personal data. The Department of Justice last published a description of the USNCB system in the Federal Register on September 13, 1984, and the system is included in the Department's inventory of the Privacy Act's systems of records. According to USNCB officials, the system has not been significantly modified since that time and therefore, that notice has not needed to be updated.

To ensure security and confidentiality of records and to protect against anticipated threats or hazards, the act requires agencies to establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.

Agencies are instructed to provide a brief description of the steps taken to minimize the risk of unauthorized access to the record system when it reports the creation or modification of a system of records in the Federal Register.⁴ Our review showed that the USNCB's Federal Register notice of its system described the risks and safeguards. In addition, the system was included in vulnerability reviews required by the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982. This review pointed out the vulnerability of not reviewing investigative cases until after closure. Because of funding restraints, the USNCB has been unable to institute an internal audit program to fully monitor cases and releases of sensitive investigative information.

⁴These instructions, while not specifically required by the Privacy Act, are specified by the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources.

USNCB Exemptions from Some
Privacy Act Provisions

The Privacy Act authorizes law enforcement agencies to exempt their systems of records from many of the act's provisions. The Attorney General exempted the INTERPOL - USNCB's Records System from 12 of the act's provisions. We summarized the effects of those exemptions below:

- USNCB need not provide an individual with access to his/her own records, or the opportunity to amend or correct his/her records;
- An individual has no civil remedy for violation by the agency of any of the act's provisions;
- USNCB need not inform those who supply information of the purposes for which the information can be used;
- USNCB need not adhere to the requirement that only relevant and necessary information may be maintained in its records. However, as noted previously, USNCB's guidelines restrict the dissemination of information that is not relevant to the request.

SUMMARIES OF USNCB COUNTERTERRORISM CASES

(January 1985 - June 1986)

1. Foreign country requested trace of two American-made grenades seized during investigation.
2. Information from foreign country regarding a terrorist attack and bomb explosion.
3. Foreign country requested search for a terrorist suspect.
4. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service requested criminal history of suspect in drug smuggling, firearms violations and terrorism case.
5. Information from foreign country authorities regarding suspect in terrorism investigation.
6. Information from foreign country regarding investigation of suspect wanted for arrest for illicit possession of arms and explosives, robbery with intimidation, and other crimes.
7. Message from foreign country authorities regarding a terrorist attack on a public bar giving U.S. information that the group claiming responsibility said the act was aimed at Americans and that they will attack Americans again.
8. Foreign country requested assistance in locating suspect in attack on naval officers.
9. Message from foreign country regarding a suspect wanted for murder, robbery, auto theft and other crimes.
10. International wanted notice from foreign country regarding a suspect wanted for terrorism and organized crime.
11. Foreign country authorities requested information on an American citizen wanted for narcotics smuggling, fraud, firearms violations and other crimes.
12. Message from INTERPOL Secretary General requesting information on a commando group concerning a planned hijacking.
13. Tulsa, Oklahoma Police Department, requested information regarding persons believed to be involved with terrorist activities.

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14. Message from foreign country regarding an investigation of a planned attempt against the U.S. Embassy in that country.
15. Request from the Reading, Pennsylvania, Police Department for trace of telephone number in a foreign country in conjunction with terrorist activities.
16. U.S. Border Patrol requested information regarding subjects arrested during a smuggling attempt.
17. Los Angeles Police Department requested background check from foreign country on person suspected of money laundering.
18. Foreign country requested international search and arrest of subject wanted for hijacking an aircraft, unlawful imprisonment of persons for terroristic aims, and unlawful possession of firearms and explosives.
19. Department of Defense and FBI requested assistance in identifying victim of terrorist murder during hijacking and in obtaining information on the hijackers.
20. Information file from a news service regarding investigation of suspected members of terrorist organization for allegedly plotting a bomb attack on a U.S. embassy.
21. FBI requested information on the hijackers of TWA Flight 847.
22. Foreign country requested criminal records check on a possible terrorist group.
23. The FBI requested information on an individual detained after attempting to board an airplane while carrying firearms.
24. Foreign country authorities requested that U.S. authorities assist in a terrorist operation by confirming dates a U.S. citizen stayed at hotel.
25. Foreign country requested help in identifying victims of aircraft crash.
26. Law enforcement agency requested a file on international network for the supply of arms to terrorists in this country.

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27. FBI requested criminal records check for subject deported from U.S. to foreign country. Subject was convicted of fraud, counterfeiting, etc., in foreign country.
28. U.S. Border Patrol requested criminal records check on individual suspected of terrorist activities.
29. Santa Fe, New Mexico, Police Department requested criminal record check on individual in connection with auto theft and terrorist activities.
30. Foreign country requested investigation concerning explosion at hotel for which a terrorist group claimed responsibility.
31. Message from American authorities in foreign country informing the USNCB of the arrests of members of a terrorist group in foreign country.
32. Foreign country authorities requested information on subjects wanted for organizing the export of explosives to be used in terrorist activities.
33. Foreign country authorities requested criminal record check on suspected subversive individual.
34. University police requested information regarding suspects in a suspicious death on campus. Suspects were also suspected terrorists.
35. Message from one foreign country to another foreign country concerning persons suspected of terrorist activities: information to USNCB.
36. Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation requested criminal record check on suspected terrorist from foreign country.
37. Department of Justice through USNCB requested foreign authorities to hold persons involved in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and murder of U.S. citizen.
38. FBI requested assistance in the arrest of an individual believed to be associated with a foreign terrorist group.
39. FBI requested assistance in placing an all-points-bulletin on subject wanted for bombings.
40. Foreign country requested criminal records check on subject suspected of terrorist activities.

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41. Foreign country authorities requested assistance in locating, arresting, and extraditing suspect wanted for theft of passports used by persons involved in terrorist activities.
42. Foreign country authorities requested information on individual suspected of connection with Libyan terrorist activities.
43. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization service requested criminal records check on individual apprehended entering the U.S. in violation of immigration laws.
44. Pearl, Mississippi, Police Department requested criminal records check on individual suspected of multiple major felonies including immigration law violations.
45. INTERPOL Secretary General requested investigation on charter airplane flights after information was obtained that terrorists planned a hijacking to obtain the release of their friends.
46. Foreign country requested international assistance in the search, arrest, and extradition of individual involved in Achille Lauro hijacking.
47. Foreign country requested international assistance in the search, arrest, and extradition of individual involved in Achille Lauro hijacking.
48. Foreign country requested international assistance in the search, arrest, and extradition of individual involved in Achille Lauro hijacking.
49. Foreign country requested international assistance in the search, arrest, and extradition of individual involved in Achille Lauro hijacking.
50. Foreign country requested international assistance in the search, arrest, and extradition of individual involved in Achille Lauro hijacking.
51. INTERPOL message to all NCBs regarding subject wanted for his implication in the hijacking and other terrorist activities aboard the Achille Lauro.
52. Foreign country authorities requested international cooperation in the arrest of a subject charged with complicity with others arrested for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and charged with illegal possession of firearms and explosives.

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53. INTERPOL message regarding information alleging that a terrorist attack would take place on a flight to foreign country.
54. FBI requested USNCB issue an international wanted notice on suspect wanted for participation in an assassination and armed robbery.
55. Information from foreign country regarding anonymous letter postmarked in the U.S. to its NCB regarding terrorist activities.
56. Message from foreign country authorities regarding suspected terrorist activities.
57. Message from foreign country authorities regarding forged documents.
58. Message from Federal Aviation Administration advising of information on planned hijacking received from airline sources.
59. Foreign country authorities requested criminal records check for individual believed to be involved in terrorist activities.
60. Foreign country authorities requested increased surveillance and protection services at foreign country diplomatic and consular offices, and commercial centers.
61. Memphis, Tennessee, Police Department requested criminal records check for subjects of investigation concerning purchase of arms and ammunition of suspected terrorists.
62. U.S. Border Patrol requested criminal records check on suspected terrorist.
63. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service requested criminal records check on suspect under deportation proceedings claiming membership in known terrorist organization.
64. Foreign country authorities requested data on persons aboard the Achille Lauro at the time of hijacking.
65. Foreign country authorities requested search for fugitive wanted for explosive and violent crimes charges.

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66. U.S. Department of State requested criminal records checks on suspects under investigation for potential terrorist activity.
67. Foreign country authorities requested criminal records check on individuals arrested for possession of explosive devices obtained in the U.S.
68. Message from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms regarding persons involved in conspiracy and falsification in purchasing firearms and possible illegal shipping of firearms to foreign country.
69. Morris County, New Jersey, Police Department requested criminal record check on individual convicted of terrorist threats.
70. Message from foreign country authorities regarding investigation of the assassination of that country's Prime Minister.
71. Message from U.S. Customs service regarding individual suspected of terrorist activities.
72. Foreign country authorities requested international search and arrest of individual belonging to terrorist organization and wanted for kidnapping and murder.
73. Foreign country authorities requested information on the whereabouts of subject wanted for membership in an armed gang, possession of explosives and property damage.
74. Message from foreign country regarding bomb explosion in a foreign country.
75. Message from the FBI regarding suspect wanted for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, assault with a deadly weapon and other crimes.
76. Foreign country authorities requested American authorities to examine the legality of a magazine ad offering the possibility of obtaining a second passport, assuring citizenship and naturalization.
77. Message from foreign country authorities regarding an explosion of a handmade explosive device.
78. Foreign country authorities requested checks relating to an American passport seized during a terrorist investigation.

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79. U.S. Border Patrol requested records check on subject under investigation for terrorist threats.
80. Foreign country authorities requested search and arrest of subject wanted for possessing and carrying incendiary devices, illegal possession and manufacture of arms for purposes of terrorist activities; and other crimes.
81. Foreign country authorities requested information on the whereabouts of an individual under investigation for membership in an armed terrorist organization and other crimes.
82. U.S. Border Patrol requested criminal history check on an individual apprehended carrying a bomb.
83. Message from foreign country authorities regarding pistols seized from a terrorist organization.
84. Foreign country requested a search for individual wanted for participation in a terrorist group.
85. Message from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms regarding unconfirmed information on planned bombing.
86. Alert from the INTERPOL Secretary General regarding possible terrorist hijacking.
87. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service requested information on subject suspected of involvement with a terrorist murder.
88. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and Federal Aviation Administration requested information concerning individuals suspected of terrorist activities and fraudulent use of names.
89. International wanted notice from foreign country authorities for subject wanted for destruction, looting, and illegally possessing and carrying firearms and incendiary devices with view to committing attacks.
90. FBI requested criminal records on individual involved in theft of U.S. government property possibly associated with terrorists.
91. Foreign country authorities requested search for individual wanted for organizing a terrorist organization, theft and possession of firearms and possible use of explosives.

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92. Foreign country authorities advised U.S. of unconfirmed information that a suspected terrorist was en route to the U.S. to commit terrorist acts.
93. Foreign country authorities requested search for forged passport suspected of having been used by terrorists.
94. Message from foreign country authorities regarding American citizens who were victims of an ambush.
95. Foreign country authorities advised that penal proceedings were being taken against an American citizen for causing an explosion.
96. Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas, Department of Public Safety requested information on a national in custody for being restricted airport areas.
97. Foreign country authorities requested information to update their files on a subversive organization.
98. Columbia, Missouri, Police Department requested information regarding foreign national engaged in suspicious activities, possibly a terrorist.
99. Foreign country authorities requested a check of a school in the U.S. which offers courses with intense training in guerrilla warfare, the use of explosives, arms, and ammunition.
100. Foreign country NCB requested information regarding individual suspected of involvement with terrorist groups.
101. Foreign country authorities request detention of individual sought for collaboration with terrorist organization in assassination of military personnel.
102. FBI requested information concerning the bombing of American citizens in a foreign country.
103. Foreign officials requested information on subjects of terrorist investigation.
104. U.S. Customs Service requested information on subject wanted for bombing incident.
105. Foreign country requested master file on foreign country terrorist group.

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106. Foreign country authorities requested information regarding persons suspected of having attempted to furnish firearms and military equipment.
107. Foreign country officials requested information on subjects wanted for arms violations, terrorist activities, and other crimes.
108. New York City Police Department requested information regarding subjects wanted for a wide range of criminal activities.
109. FBI advised of foreign country license plate linked with terrorist activities.
110. Authorities in foreign country advised other NCBs of subject allegedly working for a group of terrorists.
111. Foreign country authorities requested search for subjects wanted for terrorist activities.
112. Drug Enforcement Administration provided information regarding a foreign drug violator arrested in the U.S. and linked to an organization smuggling drugs into the U.S. and using the proceeds to buy guns, ammunition, and other armaments for terrorist activities.
113. Foreign country authorities requested information on an American company with offices in foreign country which had received a bomb threat.
114. Foreign country authorities requested search for subject wanted for participation in terrorist activities.
115. Foreign country authorities advised of an American citizen who allegedly traded his passport for drugs; the passport could be used by terrorists.
116. Message from the INTERPOL Secretary General that the headquarters had been attacked by terrorists.
117. Winder, Georgia, Police Department requested criminal records check regarding individuals suspected of terrorist activities.
118. Foreign country authorities requested information on the whereabouts of persons charged with kidnapping and membership in an armed gang.

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119. Foreign country authorities requested search for individuals wanted for complicity in subversive association, possession of explosives, bombing, and intimidation.
120. International wanted notice from a foreign country for suspects wanted for organizing and participating in criminal associations to commit international terrorism and for possession of arms and explosives.

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INTERPOL MEMBER COUNTRIES

| | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| Algeria | Guatemala | Norway |
| Angola | Guinea | Oman |
| Antigua and Barbuda | Guyana | Pakistan |
| Argentina | Haiti | Panama |
| Australia | Honduras | Papua New Guinea |
| Austria | Hungary | Paraguay |
| Bahamas | Iceland | Peru |
| Bahrain | India | Philippines |
| Bangladesh | Indonesia | Portugal |
| Barbados | Iran | Qatar |
| Belgium | Iraq | Romania |
| Benin | Ireland (Republic of) | Rwanda |
| Bolivia | Israel | Saint Lucia |
| Botswana | Italy | Saudi Arabia |
| Brazil | Ivory Coast | Senegal |
| Burkina-Faso | Jamaica | Seychelles |
| Brunei | Japan | Sierra Leone |
| Burma | Jordan | Singapore |
| Burundi | Kampuchea | Somalia |
| Cameroon (United Republic) | Kenya | Spain |
| Canada | Korea (Republic of) | Sri Lanka |
| Central African Republic | Kuwait | Sudan |
| Chad | Laos | Suriname |
| Chile | Lebanon | Swaziland |
| China | Lesotho | Sweden |
| Colombia | Liberia | Switzerland |
| Congo | Libya | Syria |
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