


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WHAT IS THE THREAT TO CALIFORNIA ?



COMMAND COLLEGE

CLASS IV

GREGORY J. STOCK

NCJRS

APR 6 1988

ACQUISITIONS

- 1987 -

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U.S. Department of Justice
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This Command College Independent Study Project is a **FUTURES** study on a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is **NOT** to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Studying the future differs from studying the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future -- creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. **A futures study points the way.**

Terrorism 2000 - What is the Threat to California?

Gregory J. Stock, Captain

Santa Barbara Police Department

Provides brief discussion of the threats of terrorism nationwide, however is specifically designed for the threat within the State of California.

Research was conducted by means of a survey and personal interviews, as well as literature scanning to identify the threat potential of terrorist activity within the State of California in the year 2000.

After identifying such a threat, the author discusses three possible scenarios for response to that threat, and concludes by making a strategic plan recommendation to implement a region-wide criminal intelligence capability within the state which will address the subject of terrorism and the mitigation of the likelihood of such attacks.

This document is the result of an independent study project produced for the California Commission on Peace Officer's Standards and Training Command College Class IV.

1987. 68 pp. Tables. Figures. Survey Instrument.

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This Project Is Dedicated

To The Memory Of

ARLEIGH E. McCREE

and

RONALD BALL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In late 1986, while formulating the plans for my Command College project, I attended a California Peace Officers' Association training seminar, and one of the topics discussed at that seminar was terrorism in the State of California. I obtained a Department of Justice document, which addressed the possibility of terrorist attacks in California, and further, specifically addressed targets and areas of weakness within the State. As a result, I then decided to address the area of terrorism in the State of California, and a proposed model for solving such a problem within the State.

The focus of the research that I did was; one, to see if there is a perception on the part of law enforcement officials that terrorism in the year 2000 is a likely possibility, and two, if so, what form would it take and how could we best deal with it. The unequivocal response from all those surveyed, was that terrorism is a major potential problem within the State, and many of those officials surveyed felt that it was an issue which the State was ill prepared to deal with, but conversely was in the best position to, with the proper direction, formulate a plan to address that problem and to solve it.

After much research, both in the area of domestic and international terrorism, I came to recognize that there are many areas of the terrorism problem which we as State law enforcement officials cannot address, as they are outside the realm of our sphere of influence. Specifically, they are those areas such as foreign policy and national response outside the boundaries of the State of California. However, I also recognized that there was a void in our planning in the area of terrorism and response to terrorist events, that we can influence.

Using the 1984 Summer Olympic Games as a model, I found that based on the success of that program, and recognizing the on-going success of those areas of the program still in place, i.e., the anti-terrorist task force used in Los Angeles County, I felt the model could be successfully expanded and used throughout the State. Incorporating the State's mutual aid response regions as the basic framework, I drafted this study on the premise that such a program could be instigated at the State level. Then the program would be staffed at the local level and expanded to include those Federal agencies within the State, who would have joint responsibility for a terrorist event within the State of California.

The direction of the program was to provide a central depository for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence data pertaining to terrorism, and to also provide with a vehicle to institute training and updating of terrorist information back out to the local level. One of the initial, and I think most successful, aspects of the anti-terrorist program at the Olympics was the fact that extensive training was given to line level personnel in recognizing trends and events which then produced intelligence data which could be correlated to provide a viable picture of an operation. This is going to be the primary focus of any on-going state-wide intelligence data network. Without such a network of eyes and ears, it will be very difficult to derive a solid forecast of a pending terrorist event. I was even at one point given the strong recommendation that this training be provided to others in the community such as the Public Works personnel, the meter readers for the gas, electric and water companies, or telephone company employees, to allow them to recognize items which might be beneficial to law enforcement and to provide them with a vehicle to report same. The fact remains, a working model exists, with a proven successful track record. The challenge is to expand the model statewide and sustain it to deal with events which are expected to be part of California's future.

INTRODUCTION

The current wave of terrorism began in the the mid 1960's, and both futurists and experts in the field expect it to continue into the year 2000. Terrorism, once the tool of only a few special causes, has become a method to express dissatisfaction by many. The users range from Palestinians to religious fanatics to issue groups.

Terrorists range from anarchists bent on total societal destruction, to religious fanatics, governments, and single issue oriented extremists, as well as the more common revolutionaries and separatists. While the tactics and techniques of terrorism have diffused widely over the past decade, to strike every major continent and affect every major country of the world, terrorists continue to have one common element; their target of choice remains the United States.

A recent study by the California Department of Justice, looking into whether or not California could be considered a likely target for terrorist activity, concluded, "California has many of the nations most attractive targets", and further indicated, "the State will always have a high potential for terrorist activity regardless of the low interest displayed by them (terrorists) at present".¹ In undertaking this project, the basic assumption was that a consensus must be reached by law enforcement officials as to the viability of these targets, and the likelihood of an attack upon them or some other target within the State. At first, it was thought that identifying targets was the simple part of the equation, but quickly it was recognized that targets of terrorism can be anything which to the terrorist represents the enemy. Protection or solutions then suddenly become a guessing game. Factor in further, the number of local, state and federal agencies, and even other countries engaged in individual target assessment and protection, and one


can see the need for a vehicle to smoothly allow communication and cooperation between those agencies engaged in that protection and detection.

During the last 15 years, a study of terrorism shows that while governments have gotten more effective in combating the terrorists, the volume of terrorism has increased. Dr. Brian Jenkins, of the Rand Corporation, points out that despite the undeniable success of governments, the total

	1984	1985	1986
* Vlc. Killed	3834	5486	5950
* Vlc. Wounded	3739	6228	6842
U.S. Target	115	162	222
* Amer. Vlc.	178	370	389
Total Vlc.	11273	13691	14772
* Threat/ U.S.	not recorded	not recorded	51
* Known Grps	126	147	192

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NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF TERRORISM VICTIMS
1984 - 1986



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COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF TERRORISM VICTIMS
KILLED AND WOUNDED
1984 - 1986

volume of terrorism has increased, and that while there are peaks and valleys in the trajectory, it clearly continues upward. Not only is terrorism increasing in volume, but terrorist events are getting bloodier. Since 1977, the number of international terrorist incidents resulting in fatalities has increased each year.

Why has terrorism escalated? Dr. Jenkins points out many reasons.

*As in war, the long terrorist struggle has brutalized the participants, some of whom have been in the field for over ten years.


*Terrorists can no longer achieve the same shock effect, or obtain the same publicity, with the same tactics they used ten years ago. Staying in the headlines requires acts of greater violence.

*Terrorists have become technically more proficient.

*The composition of terrorist groups has changed over time. We know that each escalation and violence provokes debate and some dissention within the terrorist ranks. Those who have the most doubts, drop out, defect, or are shoved aside by more ruthless men. Eventually the killers dominate.


*A more important element in the Middle East is the religious factor. As we have seen, certain extreme sects believe that the sanction of God permits acts of great destruction and of self destruction.²

A study by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, confirms that in 1986, not only are more terrorist attacks occurring, but they are becoming more violent, with a larger number of victims being killed and wounded. Since 1984, attacks on Americans have almost doubled (refer Graph 3).



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Even more interesting, the number of groups responsible has dramatically escalated from 42 in 1978 to 192 in 1986 (refer Graph 4). These are all trends which we can expect to continue into the 21st century. Of the 782 international terrorist incidents in 1985, 22 percent involved United States citizens or property. United States interests were second only to Israeli ones as favorite terrorist targets. Almost half of the international terrorist incidents involving United States citizens or property occurred in Latin America, primarily in Chile and Columbia. Over one-third took place in Western Europe, with West Germany a favored location. Businesses were the most frequently attacked United States target.³

According to a United States Department of State report, what they term "Terrorist Spillover" has already occurred in Western Europe. This is because of a multitude of reasons, such as fewer travel restrictions, abundant accessible targets, target hardening in the Middle East, the open nature of Western European society and importantly, the fact that worldwide publicity accompanies a terrorist attack in Western Europe. Conversely, in countries such as Lebanon, the level of violence is so high, it all but masks other than the most spectacular terrorist event.

Based on the results of my survey, I see a direct correlation between the western United States, specifically California and Western Europe, in terms of open society, freedom of movement, and accessible targets.

Considering then that California, as a part of the United States, has the following;

- The seventh largest GNP in the world
- The fourteenth largest governmental budget
- The 31st largest population
- Is home to 157 foreign consulates
- Leads the nation in military activity and economic growth
- Banking and financial center of the western United States
- Has a growing nuclear and geothermal power industry
- Is a leader in air and water transport
- Has one of the more ethnically and racially diverse populations in the nation.⁴

In considering these facts, one then realizes that each and every one is a potential attractor of terrorist activity, all accessible through our almost 1000 miles of coastline,

and our porous southern border. These factors, working with outside driving forces in the world, make this State a prime target for terrorist action within the next 15 years.

Additionally, one of the most interesting comments to come out of the interviews I conducted was that California is probably as vulnerable, if not more vulnerable, to terrorism from groups already residing in the State, or those domestic groups which become attracted to California. The respondents felt that this would be one of the more primary concerns of police strategists in the future, and that they must well be equipped to deal with terrorist attacks from this sector.

Groups such as the Weather Underground, and its support groups, have already been a police problem within the State. While California law enforcement has a tradition on successful results in dealing with those groups, we must continue to be cognizant of the fact that we are not immune to those groups now operating in other areas of the United States. Organizations such as The Aryan Nation, The Order and The Arm, The Sword and The Covenant, have proven their propensity toward violence and their ability to obtain sophisticated weapons to further their goals. One F.B.I. investigation of The Order netted 11 machine guns, 67 rifles, 54 handguns and 7 fragmentation grenades.

Any planning to deal with the possibility of terrorism in California must also recognize the threat from these factions.

In his book, Forecast 2000, George Gallup Jr. points out that currently 11% of those polled felt terrorism was among the five most serious problems facing the United States, and that by the year 2000, that figure grows to 14%.⁵

California has proven itself able to recognize and deal with a potential terror threat, as represented by the

activities surrounding the 1984 Olympic games in Los Angeles. The Olympic model provided us with an effective opportunity to assess, gather intelligence, and interdict any perceived terrorist threat in the State. However, this was only done over a relatively short window of time, and with a fixed area of operations. The question at hand then becomes, is the State capable of sustaining this type of operation over the long term and over a state-wide basis? That is the question this paper will address.

A large part of this study was done in trying to determine if such a problem did in fact exist, and if so, were present methods sufficient to deal with it. The answer I got from all terrorism experts and surprisingly from a group of law enforcement professionals who don't normally work in the area of terrorism, was a resounding "no". The consensus is that California, for all the reasons listed prior, is a viable, vulnerable target of both multi-national and domestic terrorism threats. This same group of professionals feel that in most areas of the State we lack a systematic, concentrated method for the interchange of intelligence data and information which will prevent terrorism or allow us to interdict terrorist activities prior to the victimization of the citizens of the State of California.

While I felt that identifying targets and terrorist trends was the first step in a viable solution, I sought then to carry those trends and targets to law enforcement and civilian experts in the area of terrorism, with the basic question of what can be done in the State to produce a systematic interlinked method of predicting, interdicting, and responding to a terrorist threat or act in the State. The largest part of this study will then address the issues of pre-incident prevention, interdiction at some point along the incident chain, or finally, and most dramatically, I believe, a counter-force response to a terrorist incident.

Since there are a multitude of counter-force programs already in place throughout state and federal agencies within the State, I will concentrate upon the first two issues, pre-incident prevention and interdiction prior to the onset of an incident which requires counterforce.

METHODOLOGY

In undertaking this project, I felt that it would be necessary to include methodology, which not only focused on the future aspect of this potential problem, but also addressed any historical data which may have produced a continuing impact for future consideration. In order to understand not only the basic aspects of terrorism, and therefore any application to California, I found I must understand that terrorism is a tool of many causes and countries. In fact, in some countries terrorism is considered in and of itself a "weapons system". It then became important to understand at least some of the more diverse causes of terror, from the militant Islamic faction of the Shi'ites, to issue group terrorism, such as the animal rights groups and the anti-abortion groups. This is not to deny a growing right-wing terrorist movement within the United States itself. During the course of this methodology I found several terms which must be defined so that the reader is on common ground while reviewing this project. Those definitions are found in the appendix. Not surprisingly, the basic definition of terrorism differs depending on who one talks to.

Terrorism, as a weapon, has encompassed any and all areas of conflict. In 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini said, "We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'there is no God but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle".⁶ Thus began what was first seen as a religious revolution. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran, and the ascension to power of the Ayatollah have since been generally regarded to be the turning point in the unleashing of the fundamentalist Islamic revolution on the world, and more specifically, on their biggest enemy the United States, an enemy whom they refer to as the "Great Satan". One needs to recognize that Islamic militants feel any attack against any American is simply a blow for God against its (Islam's) biggest enemy, and therefore derives a great honor for the attacker. This even goes so far as to be believed by the Islamic culture that the killing of Americans, and the dying during the course of such attacks by the terrorists, is a direct route to heaven.

In referring to the potential of this one group alone, in 1985 Israeli Defense Minister, Yitzak Rabin said, "Among the many surprises that came out of the war in Lebanon, the most damaging is that the war let the Shi'ites out of the bottle. If, as a result of the war in Lebanon, we replace P.L.O. terrorism with Shi'ite terrorism, we have done the worst thing in our struggle against terrorism. In twenty years of P.L.O. terrorism, no one P.L.O. terrorist ever made himself into a live bomb. In my opinion, the Shi'ites have the potential for a kind of terrorism that we have not yet experienced".⁷

In my conversation with experts in the field of terrorism, I found that most felt law enforcement was even less prepared to deal with the type of all-out threat that a religious terrorist group presents, than the military or most governments. But, not surprisingly, most of those surveyed also felt that law enforcement in general, and law enforcement specifically in California, was also the best able to correct that deficiency, and the best able to recognize and solve the problem of terrorism within the State of California. Most of the surveyed parties felt that terrorism could be best dealt with at the level of the street officer, who is able to gather intelligence, recognize trends, and to put in motion action of a preventative nature, which would then eliminate the need, or certainly mitigate the need, for a major assault-type response at some other point. So, at the outset of this project I felt it was important that I not only gain as much insight into existing groups, and project their threat into the future, but also link the upward trends in violence and the state of the art technology which is now in the hands of terrorists with the merging groups and issues which they will bring with them to the year 2000.

To do this, I conducted at first a large-scale literature scanning process, whereby I attempted to make myself, as much as possible, an expert in the area. Hand in hand with this, I began an informal interview process with experts, to gain information which would later be compiled into my survey instrument, and secondly to identify those experts who might be most helpful in the later, formal survey process and obviously the projection of this information into a future oriented mode.

I then conducted a short nominal group technique, to determine what appeared to be the most relevant trends and events affecting the future of this issue. These trends and events, as well as the information from literature scanning and the informal interview process, were then compiled into the survey instrument. This instrument (which can be reviewed in the appendix of this paper) was administered to several experts, primarily in the State of California, but confined to those working at the local Police level and at the Federal level in the area of terrorism and terrorism prevention. Then, in order to validate the survey and to provide myself with a larger base of input, administered the survey to Police Managers who are taking part in the Command College, Class VI, at one of their meetings. In each case, the survey participants were provided with the results of the nominal group technique, and with the target analysis provided by the Department of Justice. The results of the nominal group technique and the survey were incorporated into the forecasting portion of the research, and used at a later point to produce possible scenarios based on the future of terrorism.

Selected as Most Possible Trends

1. Target hardening in Europe - Middle East
2. Availability of targets in California
3. Access to foreign targets in California
4. Ease of ingress/egress to California
5. Growing issue group terrorism
6. Internalization of foreign issues
7. California continues to grow as a culturally rich environment for foreign ethnic groups

Of the several trends selected, seven proved to be the most possible, based on the results of the nominal group. Those included target hardening in the Middle East and Europe (this is a fact which has also been addressed by the State Department), as a driving force in

the escalating violence in Western Europe. Secondly, the availability in targets, an issue which was addressed by the Department of Justice, and readily shown by the NGT results, felt that targets are available to those of a violent nature, and there are a wide range of targets to suit the method, supplies and ability of the attacker. Further, the third trend which appeared most possible, was the fact that the targets in California continue to remain, and even in some cases grow to be more accessible. This is due, in part, to the ease with which persons can move around within the State, even within the United States, and more so, enter and leave the United States itself. Ease of movement was also reflected in trend number four, "ease of ingress and egress to California", which was based on national emigration trends, as well as California's own emigration dilemma, as evidenced by the problems the State of California experiences at our southern border. This was a trend which is expected to continue, and to perpetuate California's problems, not only in the emigration area, but with the groups of people who elect to enter the country illegally for the purpose of a terrorist attack. Frankly, this trend is also recognized as a national problem, and one which must be addressed on Federal level.



The fifth trend which was identified is the fact that within the United States, and specifically again in California, are the growing number of terrorist acts by issue groups, issue groups being those groups who have a specific issue such as animal rights, anti-abortion, or similar ideological movements. In the last few years, the United States and California have seen an increase in this type of violence. One only has to look at the bombings of abortion clinics to recognize that this is a fact which we will have to deal with as law enforcement officials in the future. Six and seven, while selected as important issues, are mentioned only in passing, and they are the internalization of foreign issues, a trend which we have seen in California, and we expect to continue. Examples of such are those of Armenian descent bringing with them the hatred of the Turkish government for the Armenian genocide, and the internalization then by native-born Americans of Armenian descent of that same issue. And finally, coupled with the internalization process, California continues to grow as a culturally

TREND EVALUATION FORM

TREND STATEMENT	LEVEL OF THE TREND RATIO ; TODAY = 100			
	5 YRS AGO	TODAY	IN 10-YEARS	
TARGET HARDENING IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST	80	100	120	120

" Will Be "



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AVAILABILITY OF TARGETS IN CALIF.	90	100	125	60
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" Will Be "


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
TREND EVALUATION FORM

TREND STATEMENT	<i>LEVEL OF THE TREND</i>			
	RATIO ; TODAY = 100			
	5 YRS AGO	TODAY	IN 10-YEARS	
		WILL BE	COULD BE	BE
ACCESS TO FOREIGN TARGETS IN CALIF.	80	100	120	65

" Will Be "




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


EASE OF INGRESS / EGRESS TO CALIF.	75	100	150	50
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" Will Be "





" Could Be "



TREND EVALUATION FORM

TREND STATEMENT	LEVEL OF THE TREND RATIO ; TODAY = 100			
	5 YRS AGO	TODAY	IN 10 YEARS	
	WILL BE	COULD BE		
GROWTH OF ISSUE GROUP TERRORISM	75	100	200	75



rich environment, and that it is an emigration center for foreign ethnic groups, and as such they bring with them not only their mores, values, but their hatreds and their distrust of other ethnic groups, which then affects their life in the United States.

TREND EVALUATION FORM

TREND STATEMENT	LEVEL OF THE TREND RATIO ; TODAY = 100			
	5 YRS AGO	TODAY	IN 10 YEARS	
			WILL BE	COULD BE
TARGET HARDENING IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST	80	100	120	120
AVAILABILITY OF TARGETS IN CALIF.	90	100	125	60
ACCESS TO FOREIGN TARGETS IN CALIF.	80	100	120	65
EASE OF INGRESS / EGRESS TO CALIF.	75	100	150	50
GROWTH OF ISSUE GROUP TERRORISM	75	100	200	75

Selected as Most Likely Events

1. Hostage rescue in foreign country by U.S.
2. Retaliatory strike by U.S. for terrorist act
3. U.S. orchestrates strong worldwide sanctions against "terrorist" countries
4. Extradition of terrorist from the United States for trial
5. Actual terrorist attack by foreign group occurs within California

The most likely selected events to impact these trends, and impact the future scenarios of terrorism in California, were then identified from the list developed as: hostage rescue in a foreign country by the United States, a retaliatory strike by the United States for a terrorist act, the United States orchestrating strong world-wide sanction against terrorist countries, the extradition of a terrorist by the United States to a foreign country for a trial, and as a result of the trend of the growing culturally rich ethnic background of California, two groups opposed to one another in another part of the world attacking each other in California.

Each of these events has specific ramifications, however, surprisingly enough, in a cross-impact analysis, had very little impact on each other. A hostage rescue in a foreign country by the United States, could well cause, and can be expected to cause, a retaliatory strike by a terrorist group at the United States, and as such California, with its target-rich environment, then becomes the focal point for such an attack. The same is true of a retaliatory strike by the United States for a terrorist act. The European and the Middle East experience, have proven that retaliatory strikes by governments themselves are reciprocated with attacks by the same terrorist group on an ever escalating scale.

The United States, which already is second only to Israel as a target for attacks (Chart 8, see Appendix), could certainly move itself into the limelight by continuing its move against terrorism and orchestrating strong world-wide sanctions such as economic boycotts, or even military blockades of terrorists countries such as Libya. Such activity could then cause strikes at the United States by allies of these terrorist countries, or by the blockaded countries themselves. One needs only to recognize that there are approximately 25,000 Shi'ite Muslims living in the United States. The cousin of one of the more famous Nabih Berri, the Amal leader of the Shia movement in Lebanon, lives and was arrested in Detroit, where he told the Detroit police that the fundamentalist Islamic revolution was growing in the United States. This serves to show just how vulnerable we are to those of different

persuasions living within our borders, and the ease with which they could strike from within the United States.

Recent world-wide treaties have allowed for the extradition of terrorists by countries who are signatures of the treaty to foreign countries for trial in matters regarding capital crimes and terrorism. Events in Germany have already proven that even the country considering such an extradition can suddenly become a target of terrorism. In an effort to effect such an extradition, an event such as the United States extraditing to another country a terrorist for trial could be likely to provoke an armed violent reaction within the United States.

Finally, an actual attack within California by terrorist, for whatever reason, would have probably the most dramatic impact of any of the selected events. Such an attack could set in motion most of the other events and would impact the State in areas of Federal, State and local law enforcement, as well as many governmental areas and, depending on the target, private enterprise.

EVENT STATEMENT	PROBABILITY		IMPACT ON ISSUE (-10 TO +10)	IMPACT ON L.E.
	BY 1990 (0 TO 100)	BY 2000		
HOSTAGE RESCUE IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY BY U.S.	75	95	-5	-8
RETALIATORY STRIKE BY U.S. FOR A TERRORIST ACT	75	75	+5	+10
U.S. ORCHESTRATES STRONG 'WORLDWIDE SANCTIONS AGAINST 'TERRORIST' COUNTRIES	50	80	+8	+3
EXTRADITION OF A TERRORIST FROM THE U.S. TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY FOR TRIAL	50	90	+10	+2
ACTUAL TERRORIST ATTACK BY FOREIGN GROUP OCCURES WITHIN CALIF.	75	98	+10	+10

It is important to remember that a great deal of the policy and negotiation which can increase or decrease the threat of terrorism is not within the abilities of the State of California to impact, i.e., United States foreign policy, treaties, etc. With that in mind, law enforcement planners must recognize and work for contingencies which could be set in motion by outside forces, but such forces which could then produce severe consequences for the State. It would take a marshalling of every conceivable source and ally to effectively crush the threat of terrorism in California. There is no room for laxity in consideration of past actions of those terrorists who share the wicked conviction that the path to attaining one's end lies in slaughtering the innocent.

CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION FORM

EVENT	N/P	EVENTS					TRENDS				
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1	85%	X	+5%	+20%	+10%	+40%	+/- 0	+/- 0	+/- 0	+/- 0	+/- 0
2	90%	-10%	X	+30%	+30%	+33%	+/- 0	+/- 0	+/- 0	+/- 0	+/- 0
3	65%	+5%	+10%	X	+10%	+30%	+25%	+/- 0	+/- 0	+/- 0	+10%
4	75%	+/- 0	+5%	+9%	X	+30%	+5%	+10%	+10%	+10%	+/- 0
5	65%	+30%	+30%	+30%	+20%	X	+/- 0	-10%	-20%	-30%	+/- 0
P1	X	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-10%					
P2	X	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-20%					
P3	X	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	-5%					

N/P= NOMINAL PROBABILITY

CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION

EVENT 1

IF there is a hostage rescue in a foreign county by the United States...

THEN THE PROBABILITY OF EVENT:

- | | | | |
|---|---|-------|-------------------|
| 2 | •A retaliatory strike by the United States | (90%) | INCREASES to 95% |
| 3 | •The United States orchestrating strong sanctions | (65%) | INCREASES to 85% |
| 4 | •The extradition of a terrorist from the United States to a foreign country | (75%) | INCREASES to 75% |
| 5 | •The likelihood of a terrorist attack within California | (65%) | INCREASES to 100% |

EVENT 2

IF there is a retaliatory strike by the United States for a terrorist attack...

THEN THE PROBABILITY OF EVENT:

- | | | | |
|---|---|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | •Hostage rescue in a foreign country | (85%) | DECREASES to 80% |
| 3 | •The United States orchestrating worldwide sanctions | (65%) | INCREASES to 95% |
| 4 | •The extradition by the United States of terrorists | (75%) | INCREASES to +100 |
| 5 | •The possibility of an actual attack by a terrorist group within California | (65%) | INCREASES to +100 |

EVENT 3

IF the United States orchestrates strong worldwide sanctions against "terrorist countries"...

THEN THE PROBABILITY OF EVENT:

- | | | | |
|---|--|-------|------------------|
| 1 | •A hostage rescue by the United States | (85%) | INCREASES TO 90% |
| 2 | •A retaliatory strike by the United States for terrorist act | (90%) | INCREASES to 75% |
| 4 | •The extradition of a terrorist by the United States | (65%) | INCREASES to 85% |
| 5 | •The possibility of an actual terrorist attack within California | (65%) | INCREASES to 95% |

EVENT 4

IF the United States extradites a terrorist to a foreign country to stand trial...

THEN THE PROBABILITY OF EVENT:

- | | | | |
|---|---|-------|--------------------|
| 1 | •A hostage rescue in a foreign country by the United States | (85%) | REMAINS at 85% |
| 2 | •A retaliatory strike by the United States | (90%) | INCREASES to 95% |
| 3 | •The United States orchestrating strong worldwide sanction against terrorists | (65%) | INCREASES to 84% |
| 5 | •The possibility of an actual terrorist attack within California | (65%) | INCREASES to +100% |

EVENT 5

IF there is an actual terrorist attack by a foreign group within California...

THEN THE PROBABILITY OF EVENT:

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| 1 •A hostage rescue in a foreign country by the United States | (85%) INCREASES to 100% |
| 2 •A retaliatory strike by the United States for a terrorist attack | (90%) INCREASES to +100% |
| 3 •The United States orchestrating strong worldwide sanctions | (65%) INCREASES to 95% |
| 4 •The United States extraditing the terrorist to a foreign country to stand trial | (75%) INCREASES to 95% |

The benefit of the cross-impact evaluation in this case makes it clear that while terrorism is a worldwide problem, the impact that California law enforcement can have in dealing with it is somewhat limited. It is obvious that California law enforcement can have a minimal, at best, impact on foreign policy and issues involving the whole United States and its foreign allies. However, it is equally clear that the impact of those policies and dealings could have a very striking effect on the State of California and on law enforcement within the State.

The ultimate result of the cross-impact evaluation on the trends and events that the group produced made it clear to me that any policy which might be derived to deal with this situation in California would have only a limited impact, and should be specifically directed at protecting the State from event #5, the actual terrorist attack by a foreign group. This attack could come for many reasons, but primarily was indicated as a retaliatory strike for some direct or perceived action by the United States government against the aggrieved group.

The cross-impact evaluation policy section made it clear to me that event #5 was the only one that a policy could impact, and also would produce the most benefit to the State.

INTRODUCTION TO SCENARIO

Moving toward the 21st century, incidents of terrorism have continued to rise dramatically, showing the same quantum leaps indicated in earlier studies for the period of 1984-1986. The number of known terrorist groups now hovers at approximately 600 worldwide. This includes old groups such as the P.L.O. and Abu Nidal, and the new groups which were founded in the mid '80's, such as the Communist Korean Cells (CKC), which primarily began in Seoul, Korea, during the 1988 Olympics there. This group was founded out of the inability of North and South Korea to come to terms over dealing with the 1988 Olympic Games. CKC has spread throughout the Asian world, and into most areas where there are large groups of Korean people living, including southern California.

In California, we see not only the ramifications of these groups throughout the world, but California itself has fostered new groups. Gay rights activists, long dissatisfied with the slow process of acceptance, have turned to terrorism, and have struck numerous times at southern California locations.

The United States has become the focus of several terrorist attacks, as a result of our continuing and escalating presence in Central America. Once again, the nature of these attacks and the fact that a large indigent population of Central American refugees lives in the Los Angeles and southern California region, has made California the brunt of these attacks.

The United States Immigration Service has failed to effectively seal our borders to the influx of refugees streaming out of the war in Central America, and the refugee population of Southern California is stretching public

law enforcement to the limit. Further, the United States has, in the last few years, directed several retaliatory strikes against terrorist countries. These were in response to direct attacks against Americans, which resulted in several American deaths. The reprisals were directed against the countries which harbored or supported the terrorists. As a result there were several attacks on American soil by terrorist operatives of the affected governments in the last four years. Three of these attacks occurred in California, two in southern California, one in northern California. Two of the attacks killed several California citizens. The United States foreign policy continues to be non-negotiation with terrorists, but now is coupled with a direct involvement such as hostage rescue, reprisal attacks, and a strong commitment to move toward worldwide sanctions of those communities which encourage, protect or provide arms and shelter for terrorists.

Worldwide, as a direct result of economic conditions, many third world nations are now recognizing the terrorists as a complete weapons system, and using the individual as such. This provides them with the ability to strike at the super powers with little cost and with, until recently, little chance of reprisal. However, the United States attacks, included unlimited daylight bombing of Libya, have produced no recognizable results in limiting these attacks on the United States.

California law enforcement for the last ten years has quickly recognized that the State is a viable target, and to that end has worked diligently within and without the State to mitigate the target availability within the State. One example is the fact that the State now has 210 foreign consulates, up from 157 in 1987, which are vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

Other targets have kept pace and are equally increased. A comparison of Department of Justice studies from 1986 and today shows a 10% to 20% increase in each and every area.

The State is a timebomb of pending terrorist activity.

SCENARIO I

It is the year 2000. The world has observed, through the 1990's, dramatic and more violent incidences of terrorism. No country and no people were exempt. However, surprisingly, because of restrictions and travel, and stringent security methods at the United States border, no international terrorist was able to strike inside the United States, nor much less the State of California. During this period of time terrorist attacks continue to escalate in violence and number of victims, and in reasoning for the attack.

Worldwide, the range of issues extended from demands, still, for a Palestinian homeland, to anti-nuclear power activists, to animal rights groups. Each and every one of these groups has embraced terrorism as a viable tool for forwarding their issue. Attacks on Americans have continued, as well as attacks on American installations. However, all of these have been outside the continental United States. Outside our borders the United States and Israel remain the number one target of terrorists.

As a result of these attacks, American travel has been severely curtailed, and in many cases, many countries have been placed off-limits by the United States State Department as a matter of course. These countries included those which are unable to offer protection to American. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent worldwide to fortify American installations, both in the governmental and private

sectors. While the United States has been able to stave off terrorist attacks from outside, the country has returned to its early 1900 stance of isolationism and somewhat surrendered its role as a world leader.

Within the United States, domestic terrorism has become a tool of those groups seeking to overthrow the government of the United States, or as a forum for their views, similar to its use outside the United States. The internal groups, which have continued to plague the United States, and even more so California. They have been identified as such groups and issues which have come to the forefront in the last few years such as the gay rights activist movement, the animal rights movement, and as well some extreme right wing groups seeking return to segregation or the isolation of minority groups within the United States. Not surprisingly, many of these groups got their beginning in California, and have as a result plagued the United States from inside California since their birth.

In late 1998, the gay rights movement became more militant, and began a systematic bombing of clinics which specialize in the treatment of AIDS. Their basic premise of attack was that AIDS was a disease which was caused by the governmental repression of the gay lifestyle, and that carriers of AIDS would have sought medical treatment sooner had the government not repressed gays. As a result of these bombings, at least 79 persons have been killed. A similar group, which has now been in existence for approximately 15 years, is the Ecology Now Coalition (ENC). This group began as an offshoot of the Sierra Club, and initially demanded the State place a building moratorium and water use restrictions in place for all areas of the State. It quickly grew to a more militant stance, and within the last two years has, on several occasions, stolen hazardous material from wastesights, and either threatened to, or in one case disposed of it in such a manner as to contaminate a business

which they felt was responsible for damage to the environment. The resulting cleanup cost the business and the State hundreds of thousands of dollars. Since that time, the group on two occasions has threatened to do similar terroristic acts, and used these threats as extortion to obtain funds from private businesses. The funds are seized in the name of the people and the environment, and according to the group, "used to further the goals of the ENC in its struggle".

Since the election in 1990 of the State's first black governor, and in 1994, his subsequent re-election, a group thought to be defunct has once again risen to the surface. The group, called the Sword of the Lord, professes white supremacy, and has been responsible for hundreds of attacks on black and other minority citizens of California. The group has reportedly upward of 20,000 members in the State of California, and most of these communicate via a clandestine computer network. The Sword of the Lord has in the past used computer extortion as a method of funding its operation, and in one case even went so far as to place a computer timebomb, in the form of a logic bomb, in the computerbanks of United Airlines. The logic bomb, which threatened to erase not only the computer's main reservation memorybanks on Christmas Eve, also was programmed to erase all financial and personnel records in the company's computer system. The resulting extortion note, which was paid by United Airlines over the protests of the police, ranged into the hundred million dollar area. Since the time of that occurrence, other groups, realizing the vast potential of computer terrorism, at first made small attempts, but recently have moved into widespread attempts on computer banks of the State government, of financial institutions, of the State military installations, and of private industry. The attacks, or extortion threats, have met with virtual success in every instance. Those incidences where ransoms

were not paid have forced companies to spend millions and millions of dollars in an effort to search their computer memorybanks to de-bug any possible logic bombs planted there. The success to hazard ratio for the terrorist organization is so phenominally high that this can be expected to continue.

Law enforcement in California has been particularly impotent in dealing with these situations, because of numerous court decisions, which have hindered their ability to gather intelligence on these groups, as well as their ability to work in a covert manner within these groups. Court decisions in late 1987 made it virtually impossible for police officers to work in an undercover capacity, much less in an intelligence gathering capacity. These trends are expected to continue in an upward climb, until such time as governmental agencies are allowed to obtain the necessary criminal intelligence information to allow them to interact with and intercede in the chain of events leading to a terrorist incident. The future of the peace and safety of the people of California remains very bleak in this scenario.

SCENARIO II

2001 in California, a year which is of interest because it has brought to light the tenth year of the severe curtailment of personal freedom as a result of the massive terrorist attacks on the State, which nearly crippled government and private industry during the late 1980's. Looking back, it's clear to see that the nature of the attacks, from internal domestic groups to external multi-national terrorist groups, made a continuation of the status quo in the State impossible. In fact, even governmental authorities continue to be amazed at the acceptance by the general public in the State of the limited freedoms which they now have.

In the early 1980's, as a result of our country's growing involvement in Central America, we began to see a growing influx of refugees from that portion of the world. These refugees brought with them both spectrums of the political situation in Central America. As they flowed into southern California, they rapidly began to overload the community services available to them. As with refugees from most nations, they began to congregate in areas common to each other, and soon law enforcement within the State found that the refugees were as equally at war in southern California as they were in Central America. The Los Angeles area itself became a virtual extension of the battle fields of Central America. The most prominent form of attack was that of the terrorist bombing, or the terrorist-type assassination of members of rival groups. Wholesale slaughter of innocents became the mainstay of these indiscriminate attacks on each other. Because law enforcement was unfamiliar with the political situation in Central America, it at first was difficult to deal with these problems. However, more enforcement, increased protection and stricter immigration laws, all of which had to be enacted, have served to curtail the problem to some degree. It is not uncommon now, in California, for immigration police to stop, detain, and deport individuals who are unable to produce proof of citizenship. Technology in 1995 allowed for the production of a State identification card, which is tamperproof,

counterfeitproof, and which can readily be electronically scanned for the identity of the person. Every city in California, as well as every major highway and back road, have immigration checkpoints where individuals are commonly stopped, asked for identification, and travel documents are checked. All residents of the State are required to have in their possession, and produce upon demand, travel documents as they move from place to place within the State. The California Highway Patrol has been relegated to the role of travel enforcement, and after being increased to triple their 1984 size, are charged with manning the checkpoints, and the inspection stations throughout the State. They have been given what amounts to unlimited search ability in cases of suspected contraband transportation.

In 1990, the United States entered into a trade agreement with the country of Columbia, the basis of which was the eradication of the cocaine production facilities within the country of Columbia, based on the premise that those productions were causing a major detrimental economic impact for the United States as well as the country of Columbia. This, coupled with Columbia extraditing four of the five Colombian cocaine cartel family heads for trial (all four of whom were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States), led to several vicious terrorist attacks by members of the M-19 guerrilla faction, which to date had only operated in Columbia. These attacks were staged simultaneously at the Colombian embassies in San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington, and at the American Embassy in Bogota, Columbia. The attacks caused not only the death of many clerical workers and support personnel, but the death by execution of the American Consulate, of his complete staff and family in Bogata, as well as the numerous various Federal agents working in that location, and also took the lives of their counterparts in the Colombian embassies within the United States. Further, numerous law enforcement officers were wounded or killed during the sieges on these embassies, which eventually resulted in the death of most of the guerrillas, and the permanent incarceration of the others. These attacks within the United

States led to a dramatic stiffening of the resolve, and the willingness of many of the people of the State of California to forego some of their personal freedoms in order to protect, or force the State to protect, their personal safety.

These acts of terrorism by the Columbians were only the culmination of several years of terrorist attacks by numerous groups, for numerous reasons. In California, particularly, it became clear that domestic groups became more and more violent, and more willing to attack not only the government, or those visible aspects of the government such as the police, but individual citizens and private businesses and individual enterprises to gain a forum to change the political climate of the State. These attacks, however, had a surprising result, in that thereaction of most of the people in the State was to force the State to take a stronger reaction, and as earlier indicated, most people in the State were willing to give up most of their personal freedoms in order to curtail the activities of these terrorists.

The resulting past few years have produced a relatively quiet time in the State of California, but at the expense of these personal freedoms, and there are indications now that the pendulum is starting to swing the other way with more insistence on those freedoms being re-established. Police intelligence units, which have been able to gain great insight into these terrorist groups and their workings, however feel that the terrorists are continuing to recruit, train and polish their ideology underground in the State, and that any relaxation of the strict posture the State is taking now would result in re-emergence of the problems which occurred in the early 1990's.

It is interesting to note that the philosophy of the State of California has begun to be reflected by the United States, as a whole. In fact, many of the provisions of the United States constitution have been suspended in regards to terrorist activity, and the United States, in and of itself now has taken a strong defensive posture, not unlike the political climate and laws of northern Ireland during the 1970's and 1980's.

SCENARIO III

Since the mid-1980's until this year 2001, terrorism worldwide has shown consistant increases. Many of these increases have been in short bursts, with relatively long periods of calm in between, but generally the course of terrorism throughout the world has risen overall. These rises have not been as dramatic as seen in the mid-70's and early 1980's, but once again they have continued to rise, while the general rate of increases dropped off somewhat. Experts believe that the slowing is from several factors, not the least of which is continued target hardening within the regions most prone to terrorism - Europe and the Middle East - but also the strong reprisals now being seen as the only viable response to terrorism worldwide.

Governments, in the last five years have banded together to bring economic boycotts to bear on countries which are suspected of supporting terrorism, or countries who have been proven to use terrorism as a weapon. The initial response of these countries was an increase in terrorism, but this shortly dropped off as supplies of commodities to the countries and monetary interests were withdrawn. The boycotted countries' economic base rapidly began to collapse. Further, most countries now have adopted an "Israeli type" response, of a direct military strike on the country which is believed to be responsible for the terrorist attack. The last few years have shown a marked decrease in the amount of evidence necessary to warrant such a retaliatory military strike. While these strikes are still publicly condemned worldwide, they are also privately believed to be one of the major forces in the world ability to at least slow this problem.

The United States, in mid-1990, began to take visable proactive role in fighting terrorism, making available its military forces as a resource to countries who have a terrorism problem, or who

have suffered a terrorist attack. Additionally, the United States has been the driving force in the boycott and sanctions movement. The United States during this time was able to garner much support from other countries, and as a result is seen world wide as a leader in the anti-terrorism movement. Thus, the United States also came to be the leader in being victimized by terrorist attacks, surpassing even Israel in this dubious honor. Not only have these attacks occurred outside the United States, they have occurred with great regularity within the United States, and even more alarmingly, within the State of California. The increase in the United States and in California has dramatically exceeded the increase worldwide, and has far exceeded the pre-1995 level of terrorism within the United States.

In California, some unusual aspects of the problem surfaced and then spread eastward throughout the United States. Not the least of these problems was a coalition of foreign terrorist groups and United States domestic terrorist groups. 1997 saw members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) join with the remaining members of the Weather Underground Organization (WUO). These members formed a network which then began to systematically attack the military framework of the State of California. In communiques received from the RAF/WUO, law enforcement saw the first declaration of war on the military establishment within the United States, and primarily its bases in California. The organizations claimed that California was the headquarters for the United States military establishment. This appears to be an extension of the mere fact that California has more military installations than any state in the United States. These attacks are also the logical extension of the Red Army Faction's attacks on NATO bases in West Germany, which occurred quite frequently through the 70' and 80's. The techniques of terror used by the Red Army Faction, have now been embraced by the Weather Underground, and are being seen more and more frequently. Timing mechanisms located on bombs in California have been traced to manufacturer in West

Germany, and all suspected to have been designed and built by the same RAF technician in West Germany. Intelligence reports gathered by United States and West German Police and Interpol, show WUO members traveling to West Germany to be trained in counter-surveillance techniques and returning to the United States to employ those same techniques.

The RAF/WUO coalition has further stated its goals are to break the back of the United States military establishment in its home nation, to show the world that the United States is not invincible. This, according to RAF/WUO literature, was to "encourage third world nations to strike against their imperialist oppressors". A second claimed function was to strike at the United States for its "intervention in worldwide liberation struggles". This later was believed to be an example of the RAF/WUO attempting to deter the United States from its anti-terrorist intervention policy. Unfortunately, due to the difficulty of striking fortified military installations, many attacks have been directed against targets of dubious military value. Such an example was the May 1st bombing and fire at Campbell Hall, the University of California at Santa Barbara campus. This occurred during a R.O.T.C. recruitment rally, and was later claimed by the RAF/WUO to have been done because U.C.S.B. was "involved" in military research and active in military recruitment. As with most similar attacks, casualties on civilians and damage to the school were tremendous.

Further complicating matters is the fact that in 1990 the United States dramatically increased its military presence in Central America in spite of much opposition. Aid to the Contras was dramatically increased and as a further result of the widening war in Central America the flow of refugees into the United States tripled. As had been occurring prior to this increase in refugeeism, most of those displaced in Central America came to

southern California. One fact which confounded law enforcement initially was that, once arriving in southern California, members of these groups apparently, for no reason, began to attack each other. After some time it was recognized that the war has displaced both sides of the political struggle in Central America, and that those attacks which were recognized here are merely an extension of the conflict in Central America. Most of these attacks have traditionally taken the form of terrorist attacks in either drive-by shootings, or firebombings of cars and homes. As California continues to grow in size, and assimilate people from other nations, it was long recognized that the State would continue to assimilate not only the peoples, but their discord and their factionalism from their home countries. Along with that discord came the recognition that many of these displaced would continue their struggle within the boundaries of the State of California.

The primary targets of these foreign terrorist groups within the State have been obviously the military establishment, but additionally foreign consulates of opposing governments. These attacks were somewhat expected, as likely targets. However, unlikely targets for unlikely reasons quickly became banking and financing institutions, and public transportation; the former simply as a financial resource, and the later because the capture of a public transportation system such as an airliner, or even a city bus, provides a terrorist group with a forum for their viewpoints. They found a ready audience in the media in California. As always, the primary unit to these problems has been the local police. In recent years there has been increased assistance at the Federal level, but only in the case of attacks on military installations where the substantial military intervention is expected. In the near past there has been a movement toward a combined force of local police and Federal agencies, to deal with terrorism in California. However, the extent of the problem nationwide has left California ostensibly alone to solve the dilemma. It is interesting to note that during the early years of this problem in California a combined State

response unit was attempted, but failed dismally, basically because of rivalries within jurisdictions and the size of the State, causing extraordinary response time, which allowed situations to escalate to unsatisfactory levels prior to intervention.

A study of the problem of terrorism in the State has shown that the terrorists, to a great degree, used the same tactics that they have always used, but the level of violence escalated. In an earlier study, Dr. Brian Jenkins, of the Rand Corporation, pointed out this may well be simply because the terrorists are becoming hardened to their longterm struggle, as well as the world having become more violent. It then requires greater violence to retain the same media attention. In the two years prior to this year, we have seen three examples of terrorists using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons as the vehicle for their act. This is a trend which is expected to continue, however, may well have been the driving force in the formation of the problem solution.

It should be noted that state-sponsored terrorism, or that terrorism which is financed by a country or a state, other than the victim, i.e., a terrorist attack on the State of California or some business within the State of California which is launched from Central America and funded by the government of another country, has also shown a marked increase.

While all this was going on, the State began to see increases in incidents of domestic terrorism. Groups who had been dormant for some time quickly realized that terrorism was a means to get their viewpoint, or their demands met, and as a result bombings, hostage takings and assaults quickly escalated. Far right wing groups quickly sprung up, advocating the overthrow of the government in response to such issues as equal rights and affirmative action programs. As is typical of most terrorist groups, the right wing groups quickly evolved from a protest profile working within the confines of the political structure, to a radical militant quasi-military movement.

Groups on both side of the political spectrum, ranging from far right to far left, and covering the full range of political issues, have plagued the State of California now for ten years. As always, law enforcement is the first and foremost authority to deal with these types of criminal acts. In late 1997, law enforcement officials throughout the State met to formulate a plan to deal with terrorism and it impact on society in California. Issues that were dealt with ranged from restriction of personal freedoms in such areas as travel and personal identification to unlimited police power to search or seize in the case of a suspected terrorist event. Discusses also was the consideration of increasing law enforcement presence and establishing a state-wide response team, or the establishment of an anti-terrorism intelligence network.

It had to be recognized initially that much of the cause of terrorism was not something that State law enforcement officials could deal with. Such things as foreign policy and U.S. involvement in other countries, while causal factors, are not something that could be dealt with on a State level, therefore, much of the resource allocation for such a program at the State level would need be out of necessity focused at the recognition, prevention and interception of a terrorist event at its onset, or at the very least to mitigate its effects on society after it has occurred. After extensive meetings, it was determined that the most efficient way to both maintain the high degree of personal freedom within the State and to allow law enforcement the flexibility to deal with problems of terrorism in the 21st century, was to establish anti-terrorism task forces, based within the Office of Emergency Services designated mutual aid regions.

Law enforcement officials felt that the best vehicle for this was a series of anti-terrorism intelligence and response centers fashioned after the Olympic anti-terrorism program used during the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. This program would be expanded state-wide and established within each of the mutual aid regions within the State. Thus, with each agency in that mutual aid

area required to make a commitment based on its size and economic ability, each one of those anti-terrorist strike forces would be able to provide protection on several levels.

The first of which is, each region possesses a training section, which then produces training for the street level and the detective level officer in recognizing terroristic trends or events which might be observed at some point early in the chain of events leading to a terrorist act or incident. Recognition at this early stage in the chain is of paramount importance, in that it allows quick reaction, and it allows law enforcement the ability to plan ahead and to intercede at a point which is convenient to law enforcement and not the terrorist, thus in effect diffusing many of these situations. This proved to be the case in 1984 in the Olympics, where it was effectively used, and continues to be the case.

The second step then is obviously an increased intelligence gathering capability to deal with the multitude of intelligence type reports which would need then to be correlated, evaluated and again disseminated to the proper authorities. For example, intelligence data gathered in the Region IA area could well fit in to information which was currently being received in Region III, for instance. This information must then be part of a network which allows for widespread dissemination and analysis by all parties to the network. It was the opinion of the law enforcement officials at the meeting that the Attorney General's mutual aid regions would fit quite readily into such an arrangement, and allow for dissemination via a high security computer link-up, to aid the immediate transfer of information to agencies with a need to know. Such a system would also allow the State to have a central depository to gather and analyze such data while it was all being currently, actively worked. Clearly the biggest problem with such a system was the initial outlay, and with a matching funds grant authorized by the State at the insistence such a program. Shortly after the inception of the anti-terrorism task force plan, it was recognized that there was a need to expand

the program to include Federal agencies. The F.B.I. and other Federal law enforcement agencies committed their resources and were quickly brought on board as part of the network.

Part and parcel, but an area which required considerable more effort, was a comprehensive legislative package which changed drastically the requirements for search warrants in terrorism cases. Included in that package was a bill allowing local law enforcement officials to provide for electronic eavesdropping and telephonic monitoring of suspected terrorist locations. This bill was finally passed after much debate, and is very similar to the Federal statute which allows Federal agents the same authority. Finally, the key to all of this was the State's ability to bring in Federal authorities such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and those other agencies such as United States Customs and the State Department who are aware of and taking part in on-going terrorism investigations both in the United States and worldwide, as each of these agencies, because of their willingness to solve this problem, produced support in the way of funding and personnel to take part in each of the region anti-terrorism groups.

Each one of the anti-terrorism groups functions as a task force, with a commitment from each agency involved, to provide personnel and monetary support as needed, based on a budget that each establishes. The outcome of this was quickly recognized that the intelligence data would pass to those police agencies who are able to move toward stopping a terrorist activity, but each Chief or Sheriff involved expressed a real reluctance to call in an outside SWAT or anti-terrorist assault team, to act within their jurisdiction, and the similar reluctance to allow their team to be utilized outside their jurisdiction. This was solved by mutual agreements and a legislative change which mitigated the responsibility of the agency in civil courts for these types of terrorist activities, and secondly the formation of region-wide SWAT teams which were then able to respond and operate

within all areas of the region on short notice, using personnel from each agency. Each of these teams trained together on a regular basis, and were able to then respond and expand the size of the team as needed to encompass the problem's extent. Each of these issues has been addressed and proven successful, and the last eighteen months of the program have already shown marked results in our ability to deal with this problem. Numerous arrests have been made and each of these individuals is now being moved through the court process. At least three groups, for all intents and purposes, have been effectively negated in their ability to act, in that much of their above ground support and their main members have been arrested and are currently in prison. One of the interesting facts that came to life through the investigations of these groups was that for each underground active terrorist member of a group there are between one and nine above ground support people who are actively working in the interest of the cause. It then really became clear to law enforcement that the need for intelligence was to identify these individuals and to be able to build cases which would effectively remove them from circulation and eliminate their ability to provide support for the group.

As we move into the 21st century with the workings of the anti-terrorist regional task force in place, it appears that we will be able to effectively control, if not resolve the problem of terrorism in California, and hopefully this is a model which will work for the rest of the United States.

STRATEGIC PLAN

This strategic plan will offer a planning alternative to provide law enforcement with the ability to organize, staff and operate the basic framework for a state-wide integrated anti-terrorism resource center. The trends and events established and discussed earlier in this paper have shown several considerations, in relation to the impact of terrorism on the State of California. The most basic fact is that many of the causal pressures of terrorist events are beyond the capability of the State to effect, and will lay in the hands of national policy. That is not to say, that the State of California and law enforcement officials within the State are helpless, or are at the mercy of foreign policy. This paper will then attempt to identify a means of dealing with the problem in the best possible manner, in light of the basic limitations within which we are forced to operate. I believe the most functional method is the formation of regional anti-terrorist resource centers.

Environmental Analysis

The trend evaluation form reflects that several of the trends can be affected by policy within the State. Availability of targets within the State can be reduced dramatically, as can access to foreign targets within the State. This would have to be a cooperative effort on the part of those identified targets and law enforcement, and as such could be addressed by the resource center by way of liaison. The ease by which ingress and egress to California can be obtained would require considerably more effort to correct. While it can be impacted, it would necessitate the cooperation of the United States Immigration Service and quite likely the Coast Guard, as well as stronger law enforcement along the exposed coastline and borders. Issue group terrorism can also be impacted, and certainly reduced at least to the level it was five years ago, with a proactive role by the Olympic

anti-terrorist operations center in identifying those groups and acting to intercede in their behavior prior to a terrorist event. This is one of the key functions of the anti-terrorist resource center.

Of the events, the one with the most impact, obviously, on law enforcement in California, and with the highest probability of occurring within the next ten to fifteen years, is an actual terrorist attack by a foreign group within California. That is to say, that a group of foreign nationals attack some target within the State, using terroristic tactics. Interdiction in a case like this is one of the key functions also to be addressed by the anti-terrorist resource center and a matter for which they would be directly responsible for mitigating.

As I portrayed in the scenario, the first step in this program which will ultimately end in the formulation of an anti-terrorist resource center, is to bring together those law enforcement executives with the power to make a commitment and begin the planning for such an arrangement. The key to such an arrangement is probably the recognition at the onset that not all agencies within the State will be able to participate on an equal basis. Those agencies with larger staff and budgets may well be required to carry a greater deal of the burden. Notwithstanding, I found through my interviews and my surveys that the majority of those I interviewed at the upper level of management within the law enforcement agencies in the State, and at the Federal level, recognized that terrorism is a problem with which this State will have to deal. This would then make today the opportune time to propose such a program and to move into the formulation stage.

The second factor involved in the initial strategic planning is budgetary. There is going to be required a large allocation of funds to move this program forward. The technology is available to allow each of the regional sites to be securely interlinked

via computer, and also have instant access to each other. Such a program which will require extensive funding, probably at the State level. As such, the program will require not only the assistance and backing of the governor, but the legislative and ultimately the citizens of the State. The environment of the State is such at this time that any large funding requirement for a specialized program in law enforcement is clearly going to have to withstand the scrutiny of many groups of interested people.

A final environmental consideration that must be evaluated is the fact that in spite of what the anti-terrorist resource center is able to produce in terms of hardcore intelligence data, there is traditionally a reticence on the part of law enforcement agencies within the State to work together in a tactical situation, allowing their tactical people to move with relative freedom into and out of other jurisdictions. There also appears, and perhaps justifiably so, that the chief executives of law enforcement agencies are reluctant to let specially trained tactical personnel into their jurisdiction to work an operation. This is a fact that will have to be addressed in the planning and in all likelihood may well be the biggest problem to overcome. I do think it is inappropriate in a study of this type that I make recommendations for the specific deployment of tactical operational personnel.

The first step after agreement to produce an anti-terrorism resource center, is the formulation of an intelligence sub-committee. After reviewing the material, I feel that the Office of Emergency Service's mutual aid regions (see Appendix) best lend themselves to the regionalization of such a program. It must be recognized that the State, due to its size and diversity, is incapable of controlling response from one end of the State to the other. Therefore, the mutual aid response network may well be the best method for organizing the anti-terrorism resource centers. There are several reasons for this, but the most prominent is that this system is already in

place, and already possesses the capability of interagency cooperation and communication, two of the biggest requirements of any state-wide program. Secondly, the groups within each mutual aid region are already, in most cases, familiar with each others' work habits.

I will address a single mutual aid region for purposes of this discussion, as it can be easily recognized that the same program will apply to each of the others. In the identified region, the first step is that the chief law enforcement agency or agencies, call together a meeting and identify those persons who will be members of the committee. Each agency in the region should be requested to attend and make a commitment on the basis of resource availability. This may be well handled as a matter of policy or direction from the governor's office, in that it may then prevent agencies who are capable of making a commitment from declining to do so on hopes of simply drawing benefits. Additionally, this type of problem should not arise, having been addressed already at the agency head level in the initial formation meeting.

With all due credit to the Los Angeles Police Department, and the 1984 Olympic security committees, it is clear that the framework which they established is quite effective in dealing with the situation. It is the task of this paper to expand it to a state-wide system. In that committee, the initial charge of the intelligence sub-committee was to design a system for collection and dissemination of intelligence information, to develop the concept of inter-agency intelligence management center, and to create a mechanism for threat analysis capability. The formation committee was then made up of members of the local police and sheriffs departments, the F.B.I., the California Department of Justice, Customs and United States Secret Service. This should continue to be that basic makeup of any committees set up in each region. The biggest task of the sub-committee is in fact going to be agency liaison, and at the outset they should recognize this and establish contact persons within each

local agency, and move to assure that information flows through that person into the agency. Another task of the formation committee in order to allow for a smooth transition into this program is going to be the formation of a training committee, which then must carry forth from the committee meetings not only the data they gather, but a pro-active training program aimed at continuing to maintain acceptance of the formation of the program, as well as to begin a grass roots movement, as it were, training street officers and line level personnel in the fundamentals of terrorist operations as well as enhancing the officers ability to identify precursors of terrorist activity. This is a two-fold mission for the training committee, in that it allows them to multiply exponentially their eyes and ears on the street, but it also maintains a high degree of interest at the level needed to make such a program successful. Training and this type of on-going "sales program" also will allow the anti-terrorist resource center to maintain its credibility and its stability over long periods of time.

The function of the anti-terrorist resource center will be to operate under several main guidelines. Number one is the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information on terrorist activities. Secondly will be the production of threat analysis and situation summary reports, which are then disseminated through the regional electronic mail system. This section also continues to maintain a threat level analysis and by prioritizing the date and the threats. It is then capable of making recommendations as to the probable threat and the recommended response in any given location. Finally, as I spoke to prior, there would be the formation and the use of a training committee, to maintain a high degree of training in the area of terrorism, in order to open conduits for intelligence data, or data which well may be useful and is not recognized as such at the line level of law enforcement organizations.

As each region committee is then formulated under similar

guidelines, each must be linked not only by personal contact, but also by a secure computer network which allows for the immediate dissemination of data as it is received, and updated as it is analyzed. The central repository for all data would then have to lie with the state, most appropriately the terrorist analysis section of the Bureau of Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence. As with all intelligence data, it is imperative that the data be disseminated in its raw form, as well as again later after it has been analyzed, with the accompanying analysis. This must be done in order to prevent filtering, which may remove a critical part of a report that may have specific relevance to another region. The anti-terrorist resource center is expected to be fully integrated with each department's criminal intelligence section, which then allows the center not only the capability of drawing further resources if needed to be used in a surveillance, an arrest situation, etc. It also maintains liaison with each department, and it further allows the reverse flow of intelligence information from those units to the anti-terrorist research center. Each agency involved must demonstrate its commitment by making the anti-terrorist resource center an integral part of their internal information flow.

By using the anti-terrorist resource center as a central point within each mutual aid region, and then spreading its network state-wide, we have allowed for the integration of all intelligence data on terrorist units, and have allowed law enforcement the ability to review data, have recommendations produced, and act according to threat evaluation to intercede at any given point along the chain of events leading up to a terrorist incident. The key to this interdiction is the selection of a time which will allow for the most disruption of the terrorist project with the least risk to law enforcement and civilian populations. The anti-terrorist resource center provides us with the capacity to make those type of decisions on a state-wide basis, and coordinate the efforts in multi-jurisdictional incidents.

Transition Management Plan

Any transition plan must first address the following policy considerations. Number one, the initial formulation meeting should begin the impetus for state-wide uniform policy making, which allows for the formation and support of the unit, and secondly, which will start in motion those legislative changes which are required to cause the success of the program. Policy issues which must be considered include commitment of resources, based on size and capacity to operate of the agencies involved, mandatory identification of a liaison person within each agency to provide that function for the anti-terrorist resource center. Directives from the governor's office, similar to those involved with mutual aid agreements, allowing the anti-terrorist resource center to operate under similar guidelines to the mutual aid pacts.

Further, we would instigate a comprehensive legislative package, which would include specific statutes for terrorist acts, as well as the ability to use wiretap information, similar to Federal guidelines, in the investigation of terrorism; a bill which would allow for enhanced punishment in cases involving explosives, weapons or hostage-taking for the purpose of terrorist activity. These enhancements would then add additional penalties to statutes already on the books, when those statutes are violated for purposes of terrorism.

The transition state itself will be clearly marked by high uncertainty in the area of the formation of the anti-terrorist resource center as well as high uncertainty as to the actual ramifications of the problem of terrorism. While the latter is already a fact of life in California, I believe that the uncertainty can be used as a driving force to move the State into the business of terrorism prevention at all levels of law enforcement. The transition state can best be mitigated by solid preparation, and to a large degree, utilization of structures which are already in place, similar to mutual aid agreement and

the mutual aid regions, as well as the experience gained as a result of the 1984 Olympics. Since this occurred not too long ago, it becomes relatively easy to project it into the future and to utilize the lessons learned in a pro-active role. The challenge becomes continuing the high energy which was achieved during that short span of time into the year 2000, and direct that energy level into a viable solution for law enforcement throughout the State. Finally, probably most importantly, it becomes incumbent on the founders of the anti-terrorist resource center to make it clear that the purpose of the center is not to usurp the authority, the power, or the responsibility of any local agencies, but to increase their capability for handling a situation which could in a short matter of time tax their resources to the extreme. The responsibility of the resource center goes even further, in that it must earn its ability to operate by proving that it can produce viable data, which will allow planning and interdiction of terrorist operations prior to them becoming an excessive threat. This is the key, in my mind, to the successful organization of an anti-terrorist resource center, in that it can by virtue of its existence, convince law enforcement officials through all levels of the organization that they are capable of producing data, analysis and recommendations to assist them doing their job in this specific area of operations.

Conclusion

Throughout the research on this proposal, and in discussing it with law enforcement officials at various levels of both Federal and State organizations, I found that almost each and every one agreed that the 1984 Olympics program as a successful model, but that each was also somewhat reluctant to commit to the viability of using such a program. Most believed the greatest problem would be maintaining the program over a long period of time. Conversely, it was also clear that each felt that some

program was necessary to deal with their perception of the problem facing law enforcement, i.e., the problem of terrorism within and from without the State. I believe that the primary thrust of my research is that we must now begin to build the anti-terrorist resource center in such a manner as to allow us to expand it in the future to face what is agreed by all those interviewed, to be an increasing threat level of terrorist operations within the State. As law enforcement officials, we must never allow complacency nor the fact that most terrorist acts currently appear only to be occurring outside the United States and outside the State of California, to allow us to relax our pro-active role. The occurrence of attacks and incidents within the State should be sufficient at this time to make us recognize that we are vulnerable to such attacks, and that while our perception of our vulnerability at this time may be somewhat low, we must never allow ourselves to lose sight of the fact that responding to such an incident with other than exhaustive prior planning and intelligence data, is a sure way to fail in the proper solution of such a problem. Until such time as there is a state-wide on-line organized method for dealing with the various fragments of data which are obtained prior to a terrorist incident, and the correlation of that data with known facts from other incidents, and from other intelligence sources, we, in the State of California, are at risk. We have available to us now a model, which has proven successful, from which to expand our base of operations in solving the problem of terrorism in the State in the year 2000.

It is paramount to remember that we must not base our future preparations on what terrorists have done, but upon their total capabilities.

APPENDIX

Footnotes

¹Marynik, Jerry, Supervisor, Terrorism Section, Bureau of Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence, Department of Justice, "California Terrorism - or the lack thereof", memorandum to B. E. Sanderson, Chief; February 10, 1986

²Jenkins, Dr. Brian, "The U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma", Terrorism, Violence Insurgency Journal; Vol.5, Number 4, Spring 1985, p. 31

³U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985", October 1986, p. 15

⁴Marynik, "California Terrorism - or the lack thereof"

⁵Forecast 2000, George Gallup Jr., Copyright 1984, quoted in "Terrorism in the Year 2000", TVI Report, Vol 6, Number 2. Fall 1985, p. 58

⁶Wright, Robin, Sacred Rage, the Wrath of Militant Islam, published 1985, 1986, Simon & Schuster, Inc., N.Y., N.Y., p. 27

⁷IBID, p. 237

DEFINITIONS

- terrorism**.....the sytematic use of terror, violence and intimidation to achieve an end. Terrorism is normally premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets, usually intended to influence an audience.
- international terrorism**.....terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than one county.
- domestic terrorism**.....terrorism which is instigated and occurs within a state or boundaries of one country.
- state sponsored terrorism**....that terrorism which is funded and supported by an outside agency, such as another country.
- hard target**.....a target which could be a person, location, business or country which has taken specific steps to make their penetration by a terrorist attack more difficult, i.e., concrete barricades around an embassy.
- soft target**.....that target which, by virtue of its role, or by its nature, is not defended and is by definition then vulnerable to attack.

5. Which of the following statements most closely reflects your view of the course of terrorism over the next 15 years. (circle one)

- Terrorism will gradually diminish as a worldwide problem.....1
- We will see more of the same with no great change in terrorist tactics or targets, or in the level of terrorist violence.....2
- Without changing their basic tactics, terrorists will continue to escalate their violence.....3
- By the year 2000, terrorists will employ chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.....4

6. By the year 2000, what do you think is the likelihood of terrorist use of the following methods:

(circle one number for each method)

	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not very likely	Not at all likely
a. shoulder-fired precision-guided surface-to-air missiles to shoot down civilian planes...	1	2	3	4
b. penetration of computers to cause major disruption to government or corporate operations.....	1	2	3	4
c. routine operations in the maritime environment attacking ships at sea or offshore platforms...	1	2	3	4
d. the attack of energy systems and power grids to cause widespread blackouts.....	1	2	3	4
e. seizure or attack of nuclear facilities.....	1	2	3	4
f. employment of nuclear weapons.....	1	2	3	4
g. employment of chemical or biological weapons in such a way as to cause or threaten widespread casualties.....	1	2	3	4

7. What do you believe are the most likely sources of future terrorist violence?

- Ethnic conflict and separatist struggles.....1
- Ideological struggles.....2
- Religious fanaticism.....3
- Contentious issues such as abortion, animal vivisection and environmental pollution.....4
- State-sponsorship.....5

8. The 1980's have seen growing state sponsorship of international terrorism. Do you predict that during the next 15 years state-sponsored terrorism will increase or decrease?

- Increase.....1
- Decrease.....2

9. Do you expect to see major terrorist attacks launched or instigated from abroad occur in California?

(circle one)

- within the next 5 years.....1
- by the year 200.....2
- or, are you doubtful that such attacks will occur.....5

10. Between now and the year 2000, what do you think is the likelihood of the United States Armed Forces being employed in responding to terrorists either in the rescue of hostages or reprisal operations?

Very likely Somewhat likely Not very likely Not at all likely



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3

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
11. What, in your opinion, is the most significant terrorist threat of the future?



2. Which of these presumed targets do you feel are the most likely?
 (Using the above number ratings according to their categories)

Military	1	2	3	4
Nuclear/geothermal	1	2	3	4
Public transportation	1	2	3	4
Foreign consulate	1	2	3	4
Banking/finance	1	2	3	4
Governmental	1	2	3	4
Some ethnic population	1	2	3	4
Private industry	1	2	3	4


If none is listed, what do you feel may be a target?



3. Assuming the premise that a terrorist attack is likely in California, what do you foresee as a primary response?


Local police	5
Federal agency	4
Military	3
State police	2
Combined forces	1

If combined, what combination?





4. Do you believe there is a likelihood of the formation of a State/recognized terrorist response unit?

- | | | | |
|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Very likely | Somewhat likely | Not very likely | Not at all likely |





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 - We will see more of the same with no great change in terrorist tactics or targets, or in the level of terrorist violence.....2
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 - By the year 2000, terrorists will employ chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.....4



6. By the year 2000, what do you think is the likelihood of terrorist use of the following methods:


(circle one number for each method)

	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not very likely	Not at all likely					
a. shoulder-fired precision-guided surface-to-air missiles to shoot down civilian planes...	1	2	3	4	d. the attack of energy systems and power grids to cause widespread blackouts.....	1	2	3	4
b. penetration of computers to cause major disruption to government or corporate operations.....	1	2	3	4	e. seizure or attack of nuclear facilities.....	1	2	3	4
c. routine operations in the maritime environment attacking ships at sea or offshore platforms...	1	2	3	4	f. employment of nuclear weapons.....	1	2	3	4
					g. employment of chemical or biological weapons in such a way as to cause or threaten widespread casualties.....	1	2	3	4




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
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Increase.....1
 Decrease.....2



9. Do you expect to see major terrorist attacks launched or instigated from abroad occur in California? (circle one)

within the next 5 years.....1
 by the year 200.....2
 or, are you doubtful that such attacks will occur.....5



10. Between now and the year 2000, what do you think is the likelihood of the United States Armed Forces being employed in responding to terrorists either in the rescue of hostages or reprisal operations?

Very likely Somewhat likely Not very likely Not at all likely
 1 2 3 4

SELECTED AS MOST POSSIBLE TRENDS

1. Target hardening in Europe - Middle East
2. Availability of targets in California
3. Access to foreign targets in California
4. Ease of ingress/egress to California
5. Growing issue group terrorism
6. Internalization of foreign issues
7. California continues to grow as a culturally rich environment for foreign ethnic groups

SELECTED MOST LIKELY EVENTS

1. Hostage rescue in foreign country by U.S.
2. Retaliatory strike by U.S. for terrorist act
3. U.S. orchestrates strong worldwide sanctions against "terrorist" countries
4. Extradition of terrorist from U.S. to foreign country for trial
5. Actual terrorist attack by foreign group occurs within California

TRENDS LIKELY TO AFFECT:

1. Target hardening in Europe - Middle East
2. Availability of targets in California
3. Access to foreign targets in California
4. Ease of ingress/egress to California
5. Lack of co-ordinated response - jurisdiction conflictss
6. Likelihood of wide media coverage
7. Increasing terrorist attacks on all "super powers"
8. U.S. foreign policy - increase presence in Central America (or elsewhere)
9. U.S. taking a higher profile in Middle East
10. U.S. continues to lead anti-terrorist movement worldwide
11. "Liberal" legal system. Less sanctions for terrorist acts now in California (U.S.) than other countries
12. Restrictive legal systems. Movement toward stronger sanctions
13. Decline of intelligence systems
14. Escalation of U.S. practice of asylum to political undesirables. i.e., Marcos, Shah of Iran
15. More INS/customs arrests of suspected terrorists
16. Trend to react to terrorist incident with increasing force
17. Growing trend of small nations to react with terrorism as viable tool of political/social change
18. Issue group terrorism
19. Internalization of foreign issues - P.L.O.
20. California continues to grow as a culturally rich environment for foreign ethnic groups
21. Terrorist as a "weapons system"

PLANNING VALUE

CANDIDATE TREND	PRICE	VERY HELPFUL	NOT	WORTH
	LESS	HELPLI	VERY HELPFUL	LESS
TARGET HARDENING EUROPE / MID. EAST		***		
AVAILABILITY OF TARGETS IN CALIF	***			
ACCESS TO FOREIGN TARGETS IN CALIF.	***			
EASE OF INGRESS/ EGRESS TO CALIF.		***		
LACK OF CO-ORDINATED RESPONSE / JURISDICTION CONFLICTS				
LIKELY HOOD OF WIDE MEDIA COVERAGE				
INCREASING TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ALL "SUPERPOWERS"				
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY - INCREASE IN OUR PRESENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA				
U.S. TAKING A HIGHER PROFILE IN THE MIDDLE EAST				
U.S. CONTINUES TO LEAD ANTI- TERROR MOVEMENT WORLD WIDE				
" LIBERAL " LEGAL SYSTEM = LESS SANCTIONS IN CAL. THAN ELSEWHERE				
RESTRICTIVE LEGAL SYSTEM / MOVEMENT TOWARD STRONGER PENTALTIES				
DECLINE IN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS				
ESCALATION OF U.S. PRACTICE OF GIVING ASYLUM TO POLITICAL UNDERSIRABLES				
TREND TO REACT TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS WITH INCREASING FORCE				
GROWING TREND OF SMALL NATIONS TO USE TERROR AS A TOOL OF SOCIAL CHANGE				
ISSUE GROUP TERRORISM		***		


EVENT LIKELY TO CAUSE:

1. Hostage rescue, in foreign country by U.S.
2. Retaliatory strike by U.S. for terrorist event
3. Covert U.S. role in a foreign government uncovered
4. U.S. orchestrates strong worldwide sanctions against "terrorist" countries.
5. Major high visibility meeting - political - financial - world leaders, within California
6. War of liberation by a U.S. territory, i.e., Puerto Rico or some new acquisition
7. U.S. seizes oil industry of a foreign country
8. Extradition of terrorists by U.S. to foreign country for trial
9. As a result of California's culturally rich ethnic background, two groups opposed in another part of the world strike at each other in California
10. Strong legal action against terrorist causes attack
11. Actual terrorist attack by foreign group occurs within California

VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 1985

Chart 8

	Number of Incidents		
Afghanistan	10	Jordan	10
Algeria	3	Kurdistan	4
Angola	6	Kuwait	8
Argentina	3	Laos	1
Armenia	5	Lebanon	15
Australia	4	Lesotho	1
Austria	4	Libya	17
Bahamas, The	2	Mexico	4
Belgium	5	Middle East	15
Bolivia	2	Morocco	2
Botswana	1	Mozambique	6
Burkina	2	Nepal	1
Brazil	3	Netherlands	6
Bulgaria	3	Nicaragua	6
Canada	6	Nigeria	1
Chad	1	North Korea	1
Chile	17	Norway	2
China	3	Pakistan	12
Colombia	14	Palestinian	45
Costa Rica	1	Panama	1
Cuba	3	Peru	4
Cyprus	2	Philippines	3
Denmark	4	Poland	2
Germany, East	1	Portugal	13
Germany, West	27	Romania	2
Ecuador	5	Saudi Arabia	6
Egypt	5	Seychelles	2
El Salvador	2	South Africa	8
Ethiopia	1	South Korea	1
Fiji	1	Spain	37
France	46	Sudan	2
Greece	11	Sweden	3
Guatemala	4	Switzerland	7
Honduras	3	Syria	22
Hungary	1	Thailand	2
India	6	Tunisia	4
Indonesia	1	Turkey	2
Iran	14	Uganda	2
Iraq	11	United Arab Emirates	2
Ireland	3	United Kingdom	29
Israel	198	United States	170
Italy	19	USSR	13
Ivory Coast	1	Vatican City	1
Japan	6	West Bank	10
		Zambia	2



OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

MUTUAL AID REGIONS