

INITIATIVES IN DRUG INTERDICTION
(Part 2)



HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 6, 7, APRIL 16, MAY 14, AND SEPTEMBER 9, 1986

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

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
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INITIATIVES IN DRUG INTERDICTION

(Part 2)

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE,
AND AGRICULTURE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Glenn English (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Glenn English, John M. Spratt, Jr., Thomas N. Kindness, and John R. Miller.

Also present: Representatives Tom Lewis, E. Clay Shaw, Jr., and Senators Lawton Chiles and Dennis DeConcini.

Staff present: William G. Lawrence, counsel; Theodore J. Mehl, professional staff member; Euphon Metzger, clerk; and John J. Parisi, minority professional staff, Committee on Government Operations.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ENGLISH

Mr. ENGLISH. The hearing will come to order. First of all, I would like to ask unanimous consent that pursuant to the rules of the House the hearing be covered by cameras and radio. If there is no objection, so ordered.

In 1981, this subcommittee began a comprehensive review of this Nation's antinarcotic law enforcement program. We have been fortunate to have been joined in that effort by many concerned Members of both the House and Senate, both Republicans and Democrats. In the 5 years that have now passed, and over the course of 32 hearings that we have convened, our objectives have remained constant: To determine the status, the shortfalls, and the needs of what is commonly known as the war on drugs, and try to assist wherever we could.

In the first half of this decade we were staggered by what we found, and by what we did not find. We documented the enormous extent of illegal drug trafficking which threatens our Nation, but also discovered that agencies charged with the responsibility to protect us from that threat were overwhelmed, undermanned, uncoordinated, and poorly equipped.

We found that perhaps as much as 5 tons of cocaine per month is smuggled into the United States in thousands of private aircraft, but that along almost all of the southern border our Customs Serv-

ice has no radars to detect them, and that Customs is manned and funded so poorly that they can really only operate a few hours a day, 5 days a week. In 1984, Customs had only two properly equipped interceptor aircraft for the entire Nation.

We learned that our Coast Guard was attempting to patrol the seas in a fleet of cutters that averaged 40 years of age, which was a maintenance nightmare.

We documented that Customs and the Coast Guard were desperate for tactical intelligence on which to base their limited enforcement efforts, but there was no intelligence flowing to them from other agencies whose job it was to provide it. Drugs were pouring in, but seizures were rare.

We found that, even though the Congress had amended the law to allow the Department of Defense to render greater assistance to the war on drugs, there was a profound institutional resistance in the Pentagon to getting involved.

We listened hopefully to the swelling waves of warlike rhetoric which accompanied the anticipated Federal initiatives, and we geared up for combat to come. Many House and Senate committees began to take action to authorize and appropriate funds for aircraft, boats, radars, and people, so that this war could truly begin.

Battle pennants were raised by the administration. The President announced that Vice President Bush would command the South Florida Task Force, and then it was the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System [NNBIS].

The President vetoed a bill creating a drug czar, a sort of a field marshal, but accepted the creation of a headquarters staff element called the Drug Enforcement Policy Board, which was to assure a coherent national enforcement policy.

But as the second half of the war on drugs decade begins, we see that the administration's posturing has been hollow. This has been a war of words.

Let us review the drug enforcement rhetoric of the past few years. In 1981, President Reagan declared war in Florida. In a blizzard of public statements he created the South Florida Task Force. Recognizing the total lack of strong, centralized leadership, he appointed Vice President Bush to handle it. In 1983, that task force was converted into a nationwide drug interdiction system, still headed by the Vice President.

NNBIS, however, has turned out to be a paper tiger. It never has had a written mission statement; never has had a budget. The General Accounting Office studied it for a year and reported that it accomplished next to nothing.

For awhile its staff was headed by Adm. Dan Murphy, the Vice President's Chief of Staff, but for the past year it has been headed by a person with no law enforcement or military experience whatsoever. Its day-to-day management is directed by a Coast Guard captain. Its mission, whatever it was, has recently been narrowed by the Attorney General, and we now find that the Vice President is no longer even a member of the policymaking group.

So much for the high level commitment to leadership and coordination.

If a war is to be fought, we need troops in the field. What has the administration done to beef up our woefully undermanned interdic-

tion manpower? Nothing. In fact, instead of leaving bad enough alone, the President's budget requests for the past 4 years have ordered crippling personnel cuts, sometimes by the thousands, from the Customs Service and the Coast Guard.

We in the Congress have not allowed the full cuts to be made, but the fact is there are fewer people in the Customs Service today than there were 5 years ago, not more.

So far, no leadership, no coordination, no troops.

Let us look at the equipment. In the Congress, we have attempted to react to the pitiful lack of radars, aircraft, and boats by authorizing and funding new assets. Almost without exception, those programs have been opposed by the administration, even though they have not come forth with better suggestions.

They have opposed land and sea radar aerostats, P-3 radar planes—and the radars, communications intercept, long-range optics, command centers, and data links that were to go into those systems—bust helicopters, and pursuit planes. Even though the President signed legislation to require a new Air Force wing to help find drug smugglers, the Pentagon is now telling us that they are simply thinking it over, and that they may choose not to comply with the law.

We intend to get the drug fighters the equipment they need, but it obviously will be over the continuing objections of the White House.

Speaking of the White House, what is the budget picture for the war on drugs? Surely, a war needs to be funded, if it is really real. Well, for fiscal year 1986 the Congress funded the Customs air interdiction program at \$75 million. Gramm-Rudman legislation would have reduced that by 4.2 percent, or to around \$71.8 million. And what did the White House do? They slashed it still further to \$52.5 million. Why? We cannot even stop drugs 8 hours a day, 5 days a week at that level.

Aside from the hot rhetoric of the past 5 years what has the administration added to drug interdiction? No leadership, when it is desperately needed. No coordination, when it is obviously absent. Less manpower, when we are being overwhelmed at current levels. No equipment, when the smugglers are laughing at us from their Lear jets. No funding, when every study documents the critical need for increased capabilities.

And it continues. Just last month, President Reagan made a public statement linking drug trafficking to terrorism. The President stated, and I quote, "These twin evils are the most insidious and dangerous threats to this hemisphere today."

Did he mean what he said? Is this how he responds?

I believe that the President meant every word. That he honestly, sincerely meant exactly what he said. I am unable to accept that he has so consistently spoken out on drug trafficking, and that the First Lady has devoted so much of her energy to the war on drug abuse, without them both believing deeply that this Nation is in desperate trouble.

But the OMB bureaucrats who work for him, and the Treasury and Defense Department officials, do not seem to believe him. Year after year they pull the rug out from under drug interdiction in spite of the President's call to arms. Now it is to the point that

they feel free to ignore the law. Even when the President personally signs off on drug interdiction initiatives, these bureaucrats feel free to stall, and to decide whether they are going to obey the law of the land.

I simply want to say that I am going to do my best to make sure that this is not allowed.

And with that I would like to recognize Mr. Kindness.

Mr. KINDNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having been a little tardy getting here this morning. I think it is clear that the Nation has a major problem in securing our border in both directions, from the export of critical technology to the import of illegal aliens and contraband, particularly narcotics.

Over the past 4 years, this subcommittee has gone beyond the usual role of the Government Operations Committee, that being oversight, to take an active part in the search for the means to assist in securing our borders from illicit trafficking.

I have supported those efforts, and I think we have tried to be a positive force. At times it has been frustrating. Representatives of some of the agencies that have been involved have not seemed as anxious as we have felt they ought to find the means to deal with the problem. The subcommittee is not infallible, of course, but I agree that the naysayers have an obligation to present alternative means of achieving a reduction in drug trafficking.

While I have supported the subcommittee's efforts in this field, I did not think we should hand over a blank check. In reviewing the President's budget submission, I recall something I said at these hearings 2 years ago about how that budget looked like one that came from the local school board which, when faced with a shortage of funds, announced there would be no football and no music programs in the coming year. We all know how far that gets.

So, I hope that we will go about our task today in a reasonable manner, building a solid record on the needs and the resources of the several agencies, particularly the Customs Service, so as to persuade our colleagues that this is more deserving of funding than other items in the budget in these days of finding ways to bring the deficit under control. I still believe that reason will prevail over rhetoric.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your initiative and drive, if you will, in keeping these hearings right on top of the matter, and I compliment you on it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Kindness. I would also like to state my appreciation for the support that you have given this effort and the dedication that you have put forth.

As I pointed out earlier in my statement, this has been truly a bipartisan effort that has involved many committees in both the House and the Senate. I think it is probably one of the finer examples of a true bipartisan attack upon a problem that we have had here in the Congress. And as I said, I think that you have certainly done a great job in supporting that effort and I appreciate it.

Our first witness today is one of our colleagues, and one of those who is well known for his support of the war on drugs and the fight to try to reduce this threat to our Nation. He is the Honorable Andy Ireland, Congressman from Florida. Andy, we are delight-

ed to have you here and appreciate any words that you might bestow on us this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW IRELAND, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate this opportunity to testify regarding the narcotics interdiction program. I certainly commend the statements that both of you gentlemen have made, and commend the subcommittee for the continuing interest and effort to develop a much-needed, effective, nationwide program to counter the illicit narcotics trafficking activity in the United States.

I also recognize the strides to which you referred that have been made regarding the utilization of the Department of Defense assets, now authorized under the exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. However, today I would like to address my comments to the budget cutbacks that now threaten to gut, in my opinion, the Customs Service's Air Interdiction Program.

As a Representative from the State of Florida, the reduction in fiscal year 1986 funding for Customs from \$75 million to approximately \$52 million is of particular concern to me. Significant resources, both monetary and in terms of equipment, have been committed to our State's southeastern coast. At the same time, Florida's west coast, part of which I am privileged to represent, lacks any significant air interdiction or marine interdiction capability.

And, as if to underline the vulnerability of our west coast I have an article here that might be of interest from yesterday's Bradenton Herald. Almost inadvertently we apprehended an airplane with 500 pounds of cocaine worth \$40 million. We were apparently lucky that we were able to apprehend the plane. It started in one airport and landed in another airport.

However, obviously because of the lack of the overall coverage, the cocaine was left, but we did not catch the guy that brought it in. So if we can stumble on \$40 million, it is obvious that quite a bit else is coming in.

The implications of the 1986 budget cutback for the west coast are as follows: The overall decrease in Customs personnel of 1,450 persons will be partly absorbed by the narcotics program, both the air interdiction and the marine program; and major improvements that had been proposed for the marine program, which has remained virtually unchanged for the last 12 years are eliminated. What will remain after that is an inadequate amount of personnel to man an insufficient amount of equipment.

The west coast's radar detection capability, that is virtually non-existent today, and had been slated for updating, will be totally eliminated. An increased intelligence collection capability, urgently needed so that we can better determine how to use our limited resources, will have to be delayed. Certainly a significant factor in missing the guy that brought in the \$40 million.

But, obviously, Mr. Chairman, Florida is only one point of entry for illicit drugs entering our country from South America and the Caribbean. Our entire southern border is a major transshipment route. In addition, as interdiction efforts to control the flow of

drugs into the United States accelerate in Florida and the southern border area, our eastern coastline experiences a greater influx of traffic from the south. We are facing, literally, a problem of nationwide concern, one which transgresses any regional boundaries.

For the first time, we have begun to take positive, aggressive action against the drug smuggler. Now is certainly not the time to be reducing our national focus and Federal resources. The war against the production, trafficking, and demand for narcotic drugs is one that we cannot afford to lose.

On a nationwide basis, the fiscal year 1986 cuts to the Customs Service budget would, first of all, deter Customs' ability to operate the P-3A planes that you described, eliminating any mobile detection capability. And in addition, these cuts would eliminate Customs' ability to provide an adequate command and control system for air operations.

I would like to submit for your hearing record two letters. One to President Reagan and one to Vice President Bush that I have sent, in detail protesting the cuts in the Customs Service budget.

Mr. ENGLISH. Without objection, so ordered.

[The letters follow:]

ANDY IRELAND
10TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBCOMMITTEE
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
OVERSIGHT AND EVALUATION

COMMITTEE ON
SMALL BUSINESS

SUBCOMMITTEE
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES AND
SPECIAL SMALL BUSINESS PROBLEMS

HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE
CHAIRMAN
TASK FORCE ON SMALL BUSINESS



Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

January 17, 1986

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The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

It has come to my attention that the U.S. Customs Service's narcotics air interdiction program is in serious jeopardy due to proposed budget cuts. Given the gravity of the narcotics trafficking situation in the United States and the emphasis placed on curtailing this insidious threat by your Administration, I suggest that narcotics interdiction should continue to be treated as one of our nation's top priorities.

In August, 1985, along with several Members of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, I visited a number of Latin American nations which are either sources of illicit substances or trafficking centers. I was thoroughly appalled at the magnitude and depth of a problem which seems to reach into all walks of Latin American life. In 1985 a bumper crop of cocaine was produced. Most of it is on its way to the United States and much of it will enter this country by air.


In addition, there is a clear, strong link now drawn between narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities -- activities which threaten to undermine the very foundations of legitimate governments. I know that your recent trip to Mexico served to underscore this phenomenon and led to the agreement between you and Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid to hold a high level conference of law enforcement officials and attorneys general from the Western Hemisphere in an effort to curb drug trafficking.

I remind you of these events only to further emphasize that now is not the time for the United States to curtail its narcotics interdiction activities.

You and I have both embraced the principles of the "Gramm-Rudman" proposal to balance the federal budget by 1991. But, I believe that what Gramm-Rudman dictates is that we define and set our national priorities. Clearly narcotics trafficking is a problem of nationwide significance requiring a national solution. Florida is seriously impacted by the crime and corruption associated with drug trafficking, but the entire nation is suffering from an epidemic of narcotics addiction.

Interdiction is one of our principal weapons against the narcotics trafficker. I believe, for the health and well-being of the nation, we should continue our efforts in this regard.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mickey Helms". The signature is written in a cursive, somewhat stylized script.

API:lm

ANDY IRELAND
10th District, Florida

PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE
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HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE

CHAIRMAN
TASK FORCE ON SMALL BUSINESS

The Honorable George Bush
Vice President of The
United States
Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20501

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Your office has been charged with coordinating the federal narcotics interdiction efforts. As such, I am sure you are familiar with recent directives to severely curtail the funding of the U.S. Customs Service's air interdiction program, reductions which I believe should be reconsidered given the seriousness of the narcotics trafficking problems in the United States today.

The Customs Service is in danger of losing its ability to provide operations and maintenance support for its P-3A aircraft thereby eliminating its airborne detection capability; of losing its ability to provide an adequate command and control system for air operations; and of losing its ability to develop adequate interdiction intelligence.

In August, 1985, along with other members of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, I visited several Latin American nations. I was thoroughly appalled at the magnitude and depth of the narcotics production and trafficking problems which seem to affect all walks of Latin American life. In 1985 a bumper crop of cocaine was produced. Most of it is on its way to the United States and much of it will enter this country by air.

As head of the South Florida Task Force I know you are familiar with the impact that narcotics trafficking has had on the citizens of Florida. The crime and corruption associated with trafficking are devastating enough problems for our citizens and local law enforcement officials, but we must also look at the nationwide trend toward increasing cocaine and other substance abuse and addiction. I suggest that this is not the time to cutback. Narcotics interdiction should be treated as one of our nation's top priorities.



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
January 17, 1986

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As you know, I am a strong supporter of the "Gramm-Rudman" proposal to balance the budget by 1991. But, I believe that what Gramm-Rudman dictates is that we define and set our national priorities. Clearly narcotics trafficking is a problem of nationwide significance requiring a national solution.

Interdiction is one of our principal weapons against the narcotics trafficker. I believe, for the health and well-being of the nation, we should continue our efforts in this regard.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,


API:lm

Mr. IRELAND. I reiterated in both of these letters that I do not believe that my request for additional funds to support the drug interdiction program conflicts with the priority setting principles of the Gramm-Rudman legislation. I believe it is in the Gramm-Rudman legislation that we are dictated to define and set our national priorities. Clearly, narcotics trafficking is a problem of nationwide significance requiring a nationwide solution, and interdiction is one of the primary weapons against the narcotics trafficker.

Florida is seriously impacted by the crime and corruption associated with drug trafficking. But the entire Nation is suffering from an epidemic of narcotics addiction. There are few of us in this country whose lives, families, and friends have not been touched directly or indirectly by drug abuse.

I recognize that this subcommittee deals primarily with the interdiction of illicit narcotics from sources in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Recently, I was able to travel to Latin America with Congressman Rangel and the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. Our findings, as you well know, were conclusive.

The production and consumption of cocaine are out of control. A bumper crop of cocaine is currently headed to the United States.

In addition, the drug trade not only represents a serious internal health hazard to the population of those nations, but it threatens the very governments themselves.

Links clearly exist between the narcotics traffickers and the terrorist organizations that profit from the drug trade. Fragile Latin American democracies are in danger of succumbing to the corruptive influence of the drug smuggler.

Illegal activities are financed and operated by well organized international criminals. They generate such vast volumes of capital that economies are disrupted, legal institutions are menaced, and governments are overburdened.

Upon my return from Latin America I met with the law enforcement personnel in central Florida who, as you can imagine, are deeply concerned about the lack of resources and coordination at all levels related to narcotics trafficking. The reduction in funding that we are discussing today will further exacerbate the lack of support local law enforcement receives from the Federal Government.

The production problem seems as though it is almost insurmountable. Looking over hundreds of thousands of acres in some very remote areas of Latin America, one begins to wonder how best to tackle the situation. I don't believe that the United States has ever been more vulnerable to a flood of narcotics than it is from that region today. Florida and the Southeastern United States will certainly bear the brunt of any increase in narcotics trafficking, and we had better be prepared for it.

I would like to be of assistance, Mr. Chairman, to this committee as it continues to develop a definitive and aggressive response to drug trafficking in the United States. Now is not the time to be reducing our interdiction efforts.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ireland follows:]

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANDY IRELAND
BEFORE THE
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE
AND AGRICULTURE
February 6, 1986

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today regarding the U.S. narcotics interdiction program. At the outset, I would like to commend this Subcommittee for its continuing interest and effort to develop an effective, nationwide program to counter illicit narcotics trafficking activities in the United States. I recognize the strides that have been made regarding the utilization of Department of Defense assets, now authorized under an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. However, today I would like to address my comments to the budget cutbacks which now threaten to gut the air interdiction program.

As a representative from the State of Florida the reduction in FY'86 funding for Customs from \$75 million to approximately \$52 million is of immediate concern to me. Significant resources, both monetary and in terms of equipment, have been committed to the State's south eastern coast. At the same time, Florida's West Coast, part of which I represent, lacks any significant air or marine interdiction resources.

The implications of the FY 86 cutbacks for the West Coast are, I believe, as follows:

- The decrease in Customs personnel of 1450 persons will be partly absorbed by the narcotics program, both air interdiction and marine.
- Major improvements have been proposed for the marine program which has remained virtually unchanged for the last 12 years. What remains is an inadequate amount of personnel to man an insufficient amount of equipment.
- The West Coast's radar detection capability, virtually non-existent today, had been slated for updating, a program which will be eliminated.
- An increased intelligence collection capability, urgently needed so that we can better determine how to use our limited resources, will have to be delayed.

But, obviously, Mr. Chairman, Florida is only one point of entry for illicit narcotics entering the country from South America and the Caribbean. Our entire southern border is a major transshipment route. In addition, as interdiction efforts to control the flow of drugs into the U.S. accelerate in Florida and the southern border area, our eastern coastline experiences a greater influx of traffic from the south. We are facing a problem of nationwide

concern, one which transgresses regional boundaries. For the first time, we have begun to take positive, aggressive action against the drug smuggler. Now is not the time to be reducing our national focus and federal resources. The war against the production, trafficking and demand for narcotic drugs is one we cannot afford to lose.

On a nationwide basis, the FY '86 cuts to the Customs Service budget would:

- deter Customs ability to operate its P3As, thereby eliminating any mobile detection capability; and
- eliminate Customs ability to provide an adequate command and control system for air operations.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for your hearing record, two letters, one to President Reagan and one to Vice President Bush, protesting the cuts in the Customs Service Budget. I reiterated to both the President and Vice-President that many of us in the House and Senate fully embraced the principles of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal to balance the federal budget by 1991. Given the timetable for implementation of the budget cuts, OMB has made a series of reductions in various programs including the Customs program.

But, I believe that what Gramm-Rudman dictates is that we define and set our national priorities. Clearly narcotics trafficking is a problem of nationwide significance requiring a national solution and interdiction is one of our primary weapons against the narcotics trafficker. Florida is seriously impacted by the crime and corruption associated with drug trafficking, but the entire nation is suffering from an epidemic of narcotics addiction. There are few of us whose lives, families and perhaps friends have not been touched directly or indirectly by the scourge of drug abuse.

I recognize that this Subcommittee deals primarily with the interdiction of illicit narcotics from sources in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Recently, I was able to travel to Latin America with Congressman Rangel and the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. Our findings were conclusive. The production and consumption of cocaine are out of control -- A bumper crop of cocaine is currently headed for the United States.

In addition, the drug trade not only represents a serious internal health hazard to the population of these nations, but it threatens the governments themselves.

Links clearly exist between narcotics traffickers and terrorist organizations that profit from the drug trade. Fragile Latin American democracies are in danger of succumbing to the corruptive influences of drug smugglers.

Illegal activities are financed and operated by well organized international criminals. They generate such vast volumes of capital that economies are disrupted, legal institutions menaced, and governments overburdened.

Upon my return I met with law enforcement personnel in Central Florida who, as you can imagine, are deeply concerned about the lack of resources and coordination at all levels related to the narcotics trafficking problem. The reduction in funding which we are discussing today will further exacerbate the lack of support local law enforcement discern is available from the federal government.

The production problem does seem as though it is almost insurmountable. Looking over hundreds of acres in some very remote areas of Latin America, one does wonder how best to tackle the situation. I don't believe the United States has ever been more vulnerable to a flood of narcotics from the region. Florida and the southeastern United States will certainly bear the brunt of any increase in narcotics trafficking, and we had better be prepared to meet the challenge.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to be of assistance to this Committee as it continues to develop a definitive and aggressive response to drug trafficking in the United States. As I stated earlier, now is not the time to be reducing our interdiction efforts.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Andy. And again, I want to commend you for your interest and for the fine support that you are lending in this fight. You have been in the forefront for some time, and your efforts are deeply appreciated. It was a fine statement and I really do not have any questions.

Mr. Kindness.

Mr. KINDNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions for Mr. Ireland. Andy, thank you for being in the forefront of this effort. I would like to add my compliments on your continuing interest and concern and work. Thank you.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you, Andy.

Our next witness is the Honorable Richard Darman, who is the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. This is the first time Mr. Darman has appeared before us, and he is accompanied by one of our regular visitors. I will let Mr. Darman introduce the gentleman who will join him at the table.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD G. DARMAN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM VON RAAB, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Mr. DARMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am accompanied, as you well know, by the distinguished Commissioner of Customs, William von Raab, who as you have suggested is substantially better known to the committee than I am. And I am delighted to have him here with me.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Kindness, I thank you for inviting me to appear before your committee today. It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to do so. Notwithstanding the fact that I am aware, that I find myself in what may be thought of as the Tim McNamar memorial chair. [Laughter.]

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this complete statement be included in the record with your permission.

Mr. ENGLISH. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. DARMAN. Thank you. It is my understanding that the committee is primarily interested in discussing drug interdiction. My introductory remarks, therefore, address first, the Treasury Department's role in drug interdiction through the Customs Service. Second, the allocation of resources to that role. And third, the relationship of resource allocation to the challenge of drug interdiction and to broader issues of drug policy and strategy.

Mr. Chairman, I am not by any reasonable stretch of the imagination an expert in this field. I can, however, try to provide a departmental perspective on the issues involved. And as you and I have both already noted, I am accompanied by the Commissioner of Customs, who can address detailed operational issues to the extent that they are of interest to you and the committee.

After this brief introductory statement, we would both look forward to answering your questions.

The Customs' role with respect to air and marine interdiction may be summarized as follows: The Customs air program has as its

primary mission the detection, identification, interception, tracking, and apprehension of smuggler aircraft.

The current program is based upon the following general concepts: deterrence against air smuggling, achieved in conjunction with the provision of assistance to land and marine interdiction; integration of air interdiction and support functions; use of specialized aircraft to perform the roles of detection, interception, tracking and apprehension of low-flying smugglers; and cooperation with the military to the extent permitted by posse comitatus laws.

The air program has an operations division at Customs headquarters, and operations centers east and west in the field. Headquarters is responsible for management, administration, and operational guidance, with the operations centers responsible for readiness and management of the resources under their command.

Aviation units are deployed across the southern border, staffed to operate on the equivalent of a 5-day, 8-hour basis, with an authorized personnel strength of 385 persons. This authorized level includes 71 new positions allocated to the program in October 1985, and recruitment is in progress to fill the vacancies.

Recent initiatives in the air program have included the following: In September 1982 Customs acquired the use of the Air Force's tethered aerostat radar system at Cudjoe Key and Patrick Air Force Base in Florida.

In fiscal year 1983 Customs received from the Department of Defense the first high-speed Black Hawk helicopter. Customs now has eight such helicopters.

In fiscal year 1983 Customs received the first of four P-3A detection aircraft. All four will be operational for the first time this year.

In fiscal year 1985 the Cariball aerostat was placed in operation on Grand Bahamas Island, providing coverage of smugglers that overfly the Bahamas.

In March 1986 the first Customs high endurance tracker will be delivered, with the remaining seven trackers scheduled for delivery by the end of fiscal year 1986. The CHET's, as they are called, will be used primarily for intercepting and tracking smuggler aircraft.

Customs currently operates 80 aircraft, which are deployed as indicated on the table and the end of section II of the prepared testimony.

The mission of the Customs marine program is to investigate, interdict, and apprehend violators that smuggle narcotics and contraband by commercial vessels, fishing vessels, and pleasure craft.

The current marine program is based upon the following general concepts: integration of case investigations, threat analysis, intelligence and direction interdiction; and coordination of air and marine planning, in cooperation with local, State, and other Federal agencies.

The marine program faces a number of operational difficulties, including smugglers using the following modes of operation to evade Customs: small pleasure craft and speed boats, which are easily available and difficult to detect; small vessels off the coast of the Bahamas and the east coast of Florida, which are increasingly used to receive airdrops; and professionally installed secret com-

partments in all types of vessels, the use of which has significantly increased.

In the President's fiscal year 1987 budget, the administration is seeking \$756 million and 13,231 full time equivalent positions for the Customs Service. Of this amount, \$71.6 million is for the air program and \$33.9 million is for the marine program.

The requested levels for the air and marine programs for fiscal year 1986 and 1987 will allow Customs to bring on line an additional P-3A detection aircraft in fiscal year 1986, for a total of four in fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987. It will allow Customs to bring on line and operate eight new high endurance tracker aircraft for use in 1986 and 1987.

It will allow Customs to continue the development and improvement of Customs' command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities. It will allow Customs to modify two C-12 marine support aircraft in fiscal year 1986 for deployment in fiscal year 1987. And to modify two in fiscal year 1987, for a total of four C-12's that will be deployed in fiscal year 1987.

And it will allow Customs to take delivery of 40 "Blue Thunder" type, high-speed boats for the marine program, with all in operation in fiscal year 1987.

Spending authority for the Customs air program has increased from \$17.8 million in fiscal year 1982 to the proposed level of \$71.6 million for fiscal year 1987.

The fiscal year 1987 request for the air program is four times the fiscal year 1982 appropriated level. The marine request is almost three times the fiscal year 1982 level.

I should note, Mr. Chairman, that these charts, which will be printed in the record, state essentially the same thing. And because there are different numbers used by different people in reporting on this same set of activities, I should clarify that these charts and these numbers refer to budget authority. And they combine acquisition, operation, and maintenance with the related S&E accounts, which I think is the accurate way to look at overall program expenditures.

On a full-time equivalent basis, staffing for the Customs air program has grown from 153 FTE in fiscal year 1982 to nearly 400 FTE for fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987. This increase represents a near tripling of air program personnel over the last 4 years.

Similar growth has occurred in staffing for the Customs marine program. From 150 FTE in fiscal year 1983, the marine program has grown to 472 FTE this year, and will increase to more than 500 next year. This increase in marine program staffing represents more than a 200-percent increase over the last 3 fiscal years.

Air and marine program resources have increased at a greater rate than other Federal law enforcement programs between fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 1986. The Department of Justice and Secret Service, for example, have increased by between 60 and 70 percent for this period. The air and marine programs have increased by over 150 percent.

The increase in Customs budgetary resources for interdiction is reflected in a related increase in assets. The number of vessels deployed in the marine program has more than doubled, from 94 in fiscal year 1981 to 218 in fiscal year 1987. The number of Customs

aircraft has also increased, from 68 in fiscal year 1981 to a projected 80 in fiscal year 1987. And I would note that the quality mix for both vessels and aircraft has also improved.

These air and marine assets have been deployed in rough proportion to the estimated threat, as is indicated by the table and charts that appear on pages 10 and 11 of the prepared testimony.

Not only have Customs' drug interdiction resources increased, so too has the Federal Government's overall investment in interdiction, as is indicated by the chart on page 12 of the prepared testimony.

What is less clear, unfortunately, is the appropriate relationship of this investment to the development and implementation of an optimal strategy for reducing drug abuse in America.

It is obvious, of course, that the retail value of certain drug seizures has increased. But it is significantly less obvious what relationship there is between this fact and ultimate U.S. drug use. Seizures are definitively measurable, but drug use is not.

However, drug use is subject to inherently fallible estimating. So interdiction rates, therefore, are highly arguable, and accordingly, meaningful measures of incremental returns on investment in interdiction are also arguable. This is the case whether one is comparing particular modes of interdiction or alternative levels of interdiction.

The analytic problem is compounded as one broadens the scope of analysis. And broaden the scope one must. OMB has estimated that for fiscal year 1987 the President's budget requests \$1.8 billion for drug law enforcement. Of this, roughly 43 percent is for border interdiction, compared with 24 percent for criminal investigations, 12 percent for corrections, 8 percent for Federal prosecution, 8 percent for international narcotics control, 3 percent for intelligence, and 2 percent for State and local assistance.

While these estimates involve a degree of judgment in classifying and allocating expenditures, the proportions are at least roughly indicative of broad relationships.

A very much smaller amount of money is invested in drug abuse prevention and related drug research. On the basis of what analysis I have seen, one cannot be fully satisfied that either the current or proposed distribution is an optimal allocation of limited resources.

My personal view is that the data and methodology are not yet up to the task of determining what is an optimal allocation. And I would, therefore, place a high priority on more systematic analysis.

I recognize that in the face of a problem as serious as the drug problem, the seriousness of which I would never wish to understate, there is an understandable temptation to suggest, spend what it takes to eliminate the problem. Unfortunately, we—that is, we collectively as a society—do not now have sufficient available resources to do so. Our fiscal deficit has become its own form of addiction, and it, like other addictions, has the potential to threaten our society's health.

Given severe fiscal constraints and considerable uncertainty as to the optimal resource allocation strategy for addressing the drug problem, we have decided essentially to stabilize the investment in Customs' drug interdiction, increasing the current deterrent capac-

ity only marginally, while continuing to examine competing alternatives for incremental investment.

This is an approach that I know some will find frustrating. But while I fully sympathize with the sense of frustration—we all want to see the tragedy of drug abuse eliminated—I do believe that what we are recommending is, in the current context, a prudent approach.

Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for the opportunity to present this perspective. The Commissioner and I will be happy to try to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Darman follows:]

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE RICHARD G. DARMAN
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE AND AGRICULTURE
FEBRUARY 6, 1986

INTRODUCTION

Thank you for inviting me to appear before your Committee today. It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to do so.

It is my understanding that the Committee is primarily interested in discussing drug interdiction. My introductory remarks, therefore, address:

- (I) the Treasury Department's role in drug interdiction (through the Customs Service);
- (II) the allocation of resources to the role; and
- (III) the relationship of the resource allocation to the challenge of drug interdiction and to broader issues of drug policy and strategy.

Mr. Chairman, I am not by any reasonable stretch of imagination an expert in this field. I can, however, provide a Departmental perspective on the issues involved; and I am accompanied by the Commissioner of Customs, who can address detailed operational issues to the extent that they are of interest to the Committee.

After this brief introductory statement, we would look forward to answering your questions.

I. CUSTOMS ROLE IN DRUG INTERDICTION

The Customs role with respect to air and marine interdiction may be summarized as follows:

Air Program

The Customs Air Program has as its primary mission the detection, identification, interception, tracking, and apprehension of smuggler aircraft.

The current program is based upon the following general concepts:

- deterrence against air smuggling, achieved in conjunction with the provision of assistance to land and marine interdiction;
- integration of air interdiction and support functions;
- use of specialized aircraft to perform the roles of detection, interception, tracking and apprehension of low flying smugglers; and
- cooperation with the military, to the extent permitted by posse comitatus laws.

The Air Program has an operations division at Customs headquarters and operations centers East and West in the field. Headquarters is responsible for management, administration, and operational guidance, with the operations centers responsible for readiness and line management of the resources under their command.

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Aviation units are deployed across the southern border, staffed to operate on the equivalent of a 5-day x 8-hour basis, with an authorized personnel strength of 385 positions. This authorized level includes 71 new positions allocated to the program in October 1985. Recruitment is in progress to fill the vacancies.

Recent initiatives in the Air Program have included the following:

- In September 1982, Customs acquired the use of the Air Force's Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS), at Cudjoe Key and Patrick AFB in Florida.
- In FY 1983, Customs received, from DOD, the first high-speed Black Hawk helicopter. Customs now has eight such helicopters.
- In FY 1983, Customs received the first of four P3A detection aircraft. All four will be operational for the first time this year.
- In FY 1985, the Cariball Aerostat was placed in operation on Grand Bahamas Island, providing coverage of smugglers that overfly the Bahamas.
- In March 1986, the first CHET (Customs High Endurance Tracker) will be delivered, with the remaining seven trackers scheduled for delivery by the end of FY 1986. The CHETs will be used primarily for intercepting and tracking smuggler aircraft.
- Customs currently operates 80 aircraft (deployed as indicated on the table at the end of Section II).

Marine Program

The mission of the Customs Marine Program is to investigate, interdict, and apprehend violators that smuggle narcotics and contraband by commercial vessels, fishing vessels and pleasure craft.

The current Marine Program is based upon the following general concepts:

- integration of case investigations, threat analysis, intelligence and direct interdiction; and
- coordination of Air and Marine planning, in cooperation with local, state, and other Federal agencies.

The Marine Program faces a number of operational difficulties, including smugglers using the following modes of operation to evade Customs:

- small pleasure craft and speed boats -- which are easily available, and difficult to detect; small vessels off the coast of the Bahamas and the east coast of Florida -- which are increasingly used to receive airdrops; and professionally installed secret compartments in all types of vessels -- the use of which has significantly increased.

II. CUSTOMS INTERDICTION RESOURCES AND THE BUDGETBudget Request

In the President's FY 1987 Budget, the Administration is seeking \$756 million and 13,231 FTE for the Customs Service.

Of this amount, \$71.6 million is for the Air Program and \$33.9 million is for the Marine Program.

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
BUDGET AUTHORITY AND PERSONNEL
FY 1981 - FY 1987

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	est. 1986	req. 1987
<u>BUDGET AUTHORITY</u>							
All Other Customs	\$458.4	\$496.6	\$536.6	\$564.3	\$617.4	\$640.4	\$650.6
Air	27.3	17.8	26.2	64.8	67.2	68.9	71.6
Marine	12.8	12.8	12.3	26.4	46.6	32.9	33.9
	<hr/>						
Total	\$498.5	\$527.2	\$575.1	\$655.5	\$731.2	\$742.2	\$756.1
<u>PERSONNEL</u>							
All Other Customs	14,145	13,699	13,482	13,496	13,005	13,139	12,330
Air	153	153	165	250	314	385	385
Marine	148	147	150	347	427	472	516
	<hr/>						
Total	14,446	13,999	13,797	14,093	13,746	13,996*	13,231

* The 1986 personnel total above reflects Customs' reduced personnel level as a result of the Gramm-Rudman reduction. This number is in the Congressional materials that will be submitted by the Department to the Appropriations Committees. Note, the President's Budget does not allocate Gramm-Rudman reductions by object class so this number is not reflected in the President's Budget.

The requested levels for the Air and Marine programs for FY 1986 and FY 1987 will allow Customs to:


- bring on line an additional P3A detection aircraft in FY 1986 for a total of four in FY 1986 and FY 1987;
- bring on line and operate eight new high endurance tracker aircraft in FY 1986 for use in FY 1986 and FY 1987;
- continue development and improvement of Customs Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence capability;
- modify two C-12 marine support aircraft in FY 1986 for deployment in FY 1987, and modify two in FY 1987 -- for a total of four C-12's that will be deployed in FY 1987;
- take delivery of 40 "Blue Thunder" type high speed boats for the Marine program with all in operation in FY 1987.

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Budget Trend

Spending authority for the Customs Air Program has increased from \$17.8 million in FY 1982 to the proposed level of \$71.6 million for FY 1987.


The FY 1987 request for the Air Program is four times the FY 1982 appropriated level. The Marine request is almost three times the FY 1982 level.



Personnel Trend

On a full-time equivalent (FTE) basis, staffing for the Customs Air Program has grown from 153 FTE in FY 1982 to nearly 400 FTE for FY 1986 and FY 1987. This increase represents a near tripling of Air Program personnel over the last four years (1982-86). Similar growth has occurred in staffing for the Customs Marine Program. From 150 FTE in FY 1983, the Marine Program has grown to 472 FTE this year and will increase to more than 500 FTE next year. This increase in Marine Program staffing represents more than a 200% increase over the last three fiscal years (1983-1986).


CUSTOMS AIR AND MARINE PROGRAMS
Full Time Equivalent Personnel
1981-1987



Comparative Law Enforcement Resource Trends

Air and Marine Program resources have increased at a greater rate than other Federal law enforcement programs between FY 1981 and FY 1986. The Department of Justice and Secret Service have increased by between 60-70%. The Air and Marine Program have increased by over 150%.

FUNDING TRENDS (1981 - 1986 BUDGET AUTHORITY)
Selected Law Enforcement Activities
Including Customs Air and Marine Programs




Budget Authority reflects amounts as contained in the FY 1986 President's Budget.

Air and Marine Assets (aircraft and vessels)

The increase in Customs budgetary resources for interdiction is reflected in a related increase in assets. The number of vessels deployed in the Marine program has more than doubled -- from 94 in FY 1981 to 218 in FY 1987. The number of Customs aircraft has also increased -- from 68 in FY 1981 to a projected 80 in FY 1987. (Note: The quality mix for both vessels and aircraft has also improved.)

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
Number of Aircraft and Vessels in Inventory
FY 1981 and FY 1987



These air and marine assets have been deployed in rough proportion to the estimated threat -- as indicated by the following table and charts.

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Customs Interdiction
Aircraft Distribution by Region
January 6, 1986

FUNCTION	MIA	JAX*	MSY	HOU	SAT	ELP*	TUC*	SAN*	TOTAL
DETECTION: P-3A			2				2		4
INTERCEPTION (UNITS): Citation II Citation I **	2	1	1		1		1		6
TRACKING (UNITS): Beechcraft King Air (B-200) Beechcraft King Air (E-90) OV-1C Mohawk	1		1		1	1	1		4 1 1
APPREHENSION (UNITS): AH-1G Cobra UH-60A Black Hawk	2	1	1	1		2	2	2	3 8
SUBTOTAL	5	2	5	2	2	3	6	2	27

MISC. SUPPORT AIRCRAFT:									
Twin	6***	8	3	3	3	2	2	4	31
Single-Engine	1	1	0	2	0	2	2	1	9
Helicopter	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	13
SUBTOTAL	8	11	4	6	4	6	6	8	53
TOTAL	13	13	9	8	6	9	12	10	80

* Includes Air Units

** One Citation I not included, not considered mission capable

*** One of these twins is dedicated for Marine Support

The following eight aircraft will be removed from the fleet as the CHET aircraft are received:

East Wing


2 - OV-1C Mohawks (Houston)
1 - Beechcraft A-60 (Jacksonville)
1 - Cessna 402 (Jacksonville)

West Wing

1 - Piper PA-31 (San Antonio)
1 - Cessna 340 (San Diego)
1 - UH-1B (Tucson)
1 - Aero Commander 681 (San Diego)

Customs Interdiction
Vessel Distribution by Region


January 31, 1986



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III. Resources in Relation to Strategy

Not only have Customs drug interdiction resources increased, so too has the Federal Government's overall investment in interdiction -- as indicated by the following chart.



What is less clear, unfortunately, is the appropriate relationship of this investment to the development and implementation of an optimal strategy for reducing drug abuse in America.

It is obvious, of course, that the retail value of certain drug seizures has increased. But it is significantly less obvious what relationship there is between this fact and ultimate U.S. drug use. Seizures are definitively measurable; but drug use is not. It is subject to inherently fallible estimating. Interdiction rates, therefore, are highly arguable, and accordingly, meaningful measures of incremental returns on investment in interdiction are also arguable. This is the case whether one is comparing particular modes of interdiction or alternative levels of interdiction.

The analytic problem is compounded as one broadens the scope of analysis. And broaden the scope one must. OMB has estimated that for FY 1987, the President's Budget requests \$1.808 billion for drug law enforcement. Of this, roughly 43% is for border interdiction -- compared with 24% for criminal investigations, 12% for corrections, 8% for federal prosecution, 8% for international narcotics control, 3% for intelligence, and 2% for state and local assistance. (These estimates involve a degree of judgment in classifying and allocating expenditures -- but the proportions are at least roughly indicative of broad relationships.) A very much smaller amount of money is invested in drug abuse prevention, and in related drug research. On the basis of what analysis I have seen, one cannot be fully satisfied that either the current or proposed distribution is an optimal allocation of limited resources.

- 14 -

My personal view is that the data and methodology are not yet up to the task of determining what is an optimal allocation. And I would, therefore, place a high priority on more systematic analysis.

I recognize that in the face of a problem as serious as the drug problem -- the seriousness of which I would never wish to understate -- there is an understandable temptation to suggest: spend what it takes to eliminate the problem. Unfortunately, we (collectively -- as a society) do not now have sufficient available resources to do so. Our fiscal deficit has become its own form of addiction, and it, like other addictions, has the potential to threaten our society's health.

Given severe fiscal constraints and considerable uncertainty as to optimal resource allocation strategies for addressing the drug problem, we have decided essentially to stabilize the investment in Customs drug interdiction -- increasing the current deterrent capacity only marginally, while continuing to examine competing alternatives for incremental investment.

This is an approach that I know some will find frustrating. But while I fully sympathize with the sense of frustration -- we all want to see the tragedy of drug abuse eliminated -- I do believe that what we are recommending is, in the current context, a prudent approach.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to present this perspective.

* * * * *

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Darman. I notice we have been joined by Congressman Spratt and Senator DeConcini. I would like to recognize them to see if they have any comments they would care to make.

Mr. Spratt, anything you would—

Mr. SPRATT. I have no comments.

Mr. ENGLISH. Senator DeConcini.

Mr. DECONCINI. I have no comments except to say I appreciate being invited to listen to some of the testimony today. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. We appreciate your coming over.

Mr. Darman, I noted with interest that you say of the President's budget of \$1.8 billion—that is almost \$2 billion—that 43 percent is for border interdiction. According to our calculations, it is more like 6 percent being spent for drug interdiction. In fact, I think you can probably even make a case for less than that.

I assume that in your figure you are adding in any money that is spent over in the Department of Defense. For example, if the Department of Defense is flying an airplane along the border and somebody tells them, you guys keep a lookout and see if you see any suspicious looking aircraft and send that information down. I assume then that the cost of that flight is added up as a part of drug interdiction, the war on drugs. Is that right?

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, not only would that cost estimate be included, but so would a host of other costs to get to the larger number. I think the 6-percent number that you would be talking about would probably be the relationship of the air and marine interdiction program in Customs to the overall drug enforcement expenditure.

But this includes—

Mr. ENGLISH. That is the facet on which the President has been the most visible. It seems like every few months we would see the President and the Vice President going down to south Florida, where they have these big stacks of marijuana, and tables loaded up with cocaine, and stacks of money that we have been successful in intercepting. That is how that was apprehended, namely, most of it was air and marine—all of it was air and marine that they are dealing with down there.

That is a very small percentage of the overall interdiction budget. You would agree that it comes nowhere near that 43 percent that you are talking about; is that not correct?

Mr. DARMAN. I would agree that the specific resources allocated to air and marine interdiction, in the sense in which you are identifying that activity, is a substantially smaller percentage.

However, Mr. Chairman, I think in fairness to the President, one would have to say that he has—at least to my knowledge—not confined his view of the war on drugs to the expenditure merely in these one or two subprogram areas. But rather, as is appropriate from his perspective, he has looked at the entire Government's activity in this area.

And, I think it would be fair to suggest, as perhaps you are, that this \$1.8 billion estimate for the overall drug enforcement activity of the Government is an arguable number. And I tried to suggest

that in my testimony. But I think in terms of the order of magnitude, it is probably not that far off.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I think that it is important, though. Because let me state right off, Mr. Darman, that is the reason that you are here. Obviously the Commissioner of Customs would have more information, as you pointed out in your testimony, about the details and day-to-day operations of the Customs Service and the function that they provide under the Treasury. But you are here for a policy position.

You know, the question that I raised in my opening statement—I personally believe the President and the First Lady are committed to this. I do not believe that his hired help feels the same way.

I think there are an awful lot of people within this administration who are thwarting the goals set out by the President. Now I do not know whether the President knows this or not. I would hope that it is the case that he does not. I hope we do not have a runaway administration over there where you have got people just running loose, doing whatever they want to do, regardless of what the President thinks.

But that is what we are going to try to determine here, to at least some extent. You know, we have got these commitments that have been made by the President, statements made by the President telling us in very strong terms where we are going. And then, you know, we do not—the facts contained in the budget do not seem to live up to that.

Now, I think that in order to get at that, it is very important for us to look carefully. You know, whenever we start throwing out figures, it is very misleading. I know our friends in the press and the general public say: 43 percent spent on border interdiction—that sounds like an enormous amount of money.

But as you just pointed out, when we have an airplane that is flying west, and all the guy is doing is looking out the window and saying, hey, if you see anything that looks suspicious why, you know, call it in. That is not exactly what we would call a dedicated mission that is specifically for this function.

Those airplanes are going to be flying anyway. Anytime they are out there—or if the Department of Defense has a ship that is cruising around out in the Caribbean, they say, keep an eye out. Now I do not think that that is fair to lead the American people to believe that this is something that is a part of this overall effort that is being spent.

They just happen to be out there, and conducting their normal duties and responsibilities. And as part of those normal duties and responsibilities, if they come across anything that would be helpful to law enforcement, they pass it on. And that is all it amounts to.

So let us kind of strip all that stuff out. And let us talk about real figures rather than, you know, a lot of window dressing.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, excuse me, but I would like to proceed in exactly that spirit, if I could.

Recognizing—and I am the first one to note this—that estimates are arguable. But just to—

Mr. ENGLISH. Could I—

Mr. DARMAN [continuing]. To understand the number that I was using. When, in terms of 43 percent—again, I emphasize this, and I

just want to mention, 43 percent happens to be for fiscal year 1987, \$772 million. That is printed in the President's budget for border interdiction.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, but—

Mr. DARMAN. No, if I could just add this one point. The Defense component of that, sir, is estimated at \$15.8 million. Of the \$772 million, Defense has put in at only \$15.8 million. So even if you were to knock out all of the Defense money, it would only make it 42 percent.

However, I still say the estimate is highly arguable, because I think it inflates the Customs portion within the estimate. Because, for example, they include what we think is an excessive estimate of the activity of border inspectors in this estimate.

But discounting for that, you would bring that 43 or 42 percent number down to some number in the high 30's. It is still a relatively substantial portion of the overall investment, which is all I meant to suggest by my testimony. I certainly would not want to defend to the end these exact estimates, but just the direction that they suggest.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, let us narrow it down so that we are talking about something that there is no disagreement about. We are talking about as far as dedicated to deal with the smuggling of drugs into this country by air. We are talking about the air program.

We are talking about the effort to smuggle drugs into this country by water, by boat. We are talking about the marine program. Those are the two facets that we are talking about.

And as I said, as you pointed out very aptly, that is much, much smaller than any 43 percent of the overall budget. And that way we strip all these people who have other jobs and if they happen to run across drugs, then they are supposed to take some kind of action.

So, you know, these are the two elements that matter most. These are the real areas of focus. And of course, these are the ones that have received all the publicity as far as what the President has been focusing on. These are the areas—and as the Commissioner of Customs has testified before us many times, that is where the bulk—I am talking about the huge amounts of drugs that are coming in this country. This is the means in which they come into the country. And if we are really going to do something about stopping those drugs, we must catch them in bulk. If we are talking about getting significant amounts, that is where we really are going to come down to.

One other very quick point before I really get into the details of questions. You put in a number of these little graphs in your testimony which I found to be interesting.

But the percentages—I noticed with interest that you refer to percentages here. And if you start out with two airplanes and you increase it to four airplanes, then you have increased it 100 percent. And it looks rather dramatic whenever you can make 100 percent increases or 240 percent increases over various periods of time.

And I do not think that anyone would disagree that the Customs Service, whether you are talking about air or marine programs, in the early 1980's was virtually impotent. You mentioned, I think

there were 65 aircraft, something like that, when we first started looking at this problem that the Customs Service had back in 1981 or 1982. But only a couple of those were properly equipped and could meet the range requirements, the sensor requirements, and speed requirements. The rest were virtually junk.

And I do not think we ought to talk about 80 airplanes today, because a lot of those are still junk. Many of them do not really do anything. They do fly. Nobody uses them. They are sitting out there—they are hangar queens, for a good part. And they really do not perform a function as far as the overall war on drugs.

So, you know, let us try to strip a little of that stuff out. Let us talk about numbers of useful items, numbers of useful aircraft. That gives a little truer picture, so that, again, the American people will not be fooled into thinking that we have had some huge increase in the overall effort when they see a percentage increase like that.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think your point is a fair point, but I would just note that we did present it both ways. The numbers are included, and the growth rates are included. So I think both sets of information are there for the public to see. But if you would like to have additional information included, I would be happy to present it any way you would like.

Mr. ENGLISH. Yes, but the point that we are trying to make here though—I notice you are comparing, for instance on page 8, you have the Justice Department. Well, the Justice Department, when we have looked and reviewed past budgets, has gotten along pretty well. Justice Department through the years, has not really been hurt that much. I have not heard anybody poor-mouthing about how tough things were over in the Justice Department through the 1970's, or through the 1960's, or through the 1980's. So the Justice Department, you know, has been kind of fat and happy, quite frankly.

Let's look at this particular program, look over at the Treasury Department, your agency, and particularly the Customs air program and marine program. My goodness, there has not been a request from an administration for the Customs marine program, I do not think, since 1974 or 1975. It has been 10 years, something like that.

The Congress has provided some help. We have added a little bit. But, there has not been any administration, Republican or Democratic administration, that added anything to this program.

So, you know, when we start looking at these, what we are talking about here is an agency that has just been barely alive. And we are trying to get this thing up to the point that at least, you know, it has some facsimile of being a law enforcement agency with the resources to do some kind of job out there.

To come in and say, oh, my goodness, look at how little percentage increase there has been over here at the Justice Department, but huge increases over here in the interdiction program, I think, is a very, very, misleading comparison. So I would call your attention to that.

And I would like to now ask Mr. Kindness for any questions he might have.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, excuse me. Mr. Kindness, might I just add two points, if you would allow me?

Mr. KINDNESS. Sure.

Mr. DARMAN. I do not want to leave the impression that I disagree with you about your factual point. I do not. There is no doubt that the base is exceedingly small. And when you compare something to a small base, you are going to get a higher percentage growth rate for any given increment than when you compare it with a large base. That is just a fact of mathematics.

I was simply trying to suggest we presented it both ways, that we are not trying to mislead. To some people, rates of growth are significant. To other people, absolute numbers are significant; I tried to present it both ways.

If I might just mention one other thing as we, I take it, leave this point. I appreciated your statement, both to me and to Congressman Ireland, that you take the President and the First Lady at their word. And I, of course, do myself. I think it is the appropriate, and as far as I am aware, entirely sound thing to do in this circumstance.

You went on to suggest that the President's statements were hollow or might be hollow. And I do not mean to belabor this point, but from a Presidential perspective, in a tight budgetary context, \$1.8 billion is not necessarily a sign of hollowness. Particularly when one is eliminating, or proposing to eliminate, agencies and programs in other areas. And that is the significance of that \$1.8 billion.

Now your point, I also take to be sound, appropriate and the relevant focus, as I understand it, for this hearing. And that is, within that \$1.8 billion, are we satisfactorily managing a subcomponent.

But I just want to suggest, that from the President's perspective, in this tight, budgetary circumstances, almost 2 billion dollars' worth of investment is not, in my opinion, a sign of hollowness of commitment to the overall area. I recognize the legitimacy of all your questions with respect to the air and marine programs.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. Well, let me straighten that out then, if there is any question in your mind. It is hollow if the President does not have anybody backing him up. And that is what we are seeing reflected in these budgets. That is what we see reflected in the opposition of administration officials to most of the initiatives that have been put forth.

And you talk about Customs air interdiction as just one component. This component is where 60 percent of the cocaine entering this country comes from. It comes in by air, 60 percent. This is a choke point. It is a place in which you can catch smugglers with the big load.

Some have suggested that we simply ignore air interdiction, and wait until all this stuff gets in the United States and gets dispersed throughout our population, and then start looking for it. I suggest to you that that is not a wise investment of all of our resources. But I would also suggest to you that interdiction is not the only link in the chain. We certainly need to do all that we can overseas to try to prevent drugs from even leaving the shores of those countries where they are produced.

We also need to put investment in areas where drugs transit the countries that drugs go through. Certainly, we need to try to stop as much of it as we can when it comes to our borders. And once it gets here, we need to try to make arrests, and pick up any of it that we can there.

And certainly, the most effective tool—I wholeheartedly agree with the First Lady on this—is education. And I would say, if you look at the budget that we have before us in that area, that one is minimal at the very best. What do we have there, about \$2 million? \$2 million, is that not something?

And what all that indicates to me, with the rhetoric that we are getting here, some of these figures that we are seeing—the President and the First Lady have a bunch of folks out there not paying a bit of attention to what they are doing, hired help, employees, whether it is OMB, Treasury Department, Department of Defense, Justice Department, all through his administration. And that is what makes his words hollow.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I understand your perspective on this. I would think, having tried to suggest that the President's statements are not either false or hollow, if I could interpret the behavior of his employees, or hired help, as you have suggested.

I think it is not a lack of commitment to drug enforcement. I think, at least as far as I have observed, it is genuine differences of opinion about where is the best return on investment. And, I am not trying to judge what I think are the merits of the arguments of the different players. I am really only going to the question of their motivation.

I think that, as far as I am able to determine, they are not seeking to render hollow the President's statements. They have legitimate differences of view of how best to invest. There are some who would agree with you—and I would be inclined to do this myself—that one ought to invest more in education, on the demand side. There are some who suggest one ought to invest more in eradication and attempting to deal with the problem at the source. And there are others who say more in intelligence, and so on down the list, which I know you know very well.

And it is in that context that there end up being rather heated debates over the value of increments in the air program. But it is not really, in my opinion, because people say, let us not take drug enforcement seriously. It tends to arise much more because people say, we think we have a better way of dealing with the drug enforcement problem.

And I recognize that they may be wrong or right. I am just suggesting that their motivation is not to render the President's statements hollow.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, Mr. Kindness has been very patient over here waiting to ask his question while we have had this exchange.

Mr. DARMAN. I am sorry. I apologize to Mr. Kindness.

Mr. ENGLISH. One last parting shot before I turn everything to him is, I would say that the Customs program is the only one in the entire chain that got cut.

Mr. Kindness.

Mr. KINDNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Darman, we appreciate your testimony here this morning. I would like to direct a couple of questions to the implementation of the sequestration process in the current fiscal year required by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, over which this committee has some jurisdiction.

There was \$75 million appropriated to the Customs Service for the operations and maintenance of the air interdiction program for 1986 fiscal year. What specifically was cut from that appropriation in order to achieve that 4.3-percent cut?

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Kindness, again I apologize for taking additional time in responding to the chairman before you could ask—

Mr. KINDNESS. Not at all. I enjoyed it.

Mr. DARMAN. Perhaps it would be useful if I just quickly ran down line by line what the categories of expenditure are and how they would differ at \$75 million and at the \$52.5 million level. I think that is the most direct way to get at it.

Some of the detail is still being negotiated within the executive branch. The aggregate numbers are right, and the numbers I will give you are roughly right at the level of abstraction at which I will give them to you.

In the continuing resolution, the regular air program, as we would classify it, was at \$14.725 million. And in the revised budget that remains the same. This is in the air program. That is for 51 support aircraft.

In the category called support of military assets, the P-3A aircraft operation and maintenance was at \$5.1 million for four P-3A aircraft. We keep that at \$5.1 million.

The Black Hawk and Cobra helicopters operation and maintenance was at \$5.2 million for eight Department of Defense Black Hawks and three DOD Cobras. We keep that the same.

C-12 aircraft modifications were at \$5 million. We keep that the same, to modify two C-12's with fiscal year 1986 money of \$5 million.

The southwest border aerostat was in at \$9 million in fiscal year 1986—and I wish Senator DeConcini had arrived slightly later than he has, because I regret to report that this is at zero for fiscal year 1986.

The Bahamian aerostat remains the same at \$4 million. The C3I centers are slowed in their further development from \$5 million to \$2.475 million in fiscal year 1986. The six Cessna Citations stay the same at \$4.3 million.

There is a slight reduction of a matter of a few hundred thousand dollars in miscellaneous spare parts. The O&M for trackers, stays the same. They were in at \$1.7 million. They are still in at \$1.7 million.

But additional air program enhancements totaling \$8.4 million—\$8.475 million would be dropped under this proposed Gramm-Rudman allocation.

There is \$2.3 million for the integrated logistics system. This is for a kind of communications intelligence, but I do not know what kind. There are also \$1.5 million for electro-optic surveillance and \$675,000 for mission commander systems. These are all air program enhancements that would not be funded under the Gramm-Rudman reduction.

Mr. KINDNESS. That is taking into account the rescission that is proposed?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, that takes into account—yes, that brings—well, it comes very close to the total of \$52.5 million. As I have suggested, these numbers are still under review for exactly how we are going to hit the target within the Department, but this is roughly indicative. And the numbers I have given you will get very close to the \$52.5 million.

Mr. KINDNESS. But after the—

Mr. DARMAN. After both the Gramm-Rudman reduction and the rescission.

Mr. KINDNESS. Apart from the rescission adjustment, then the only differences that I can note attributable to the sequestration, per se, is in the slowdown of the acceleration of the ROCC program—Radar Operational Control Center—and elimination of aircraft spares.

Mr. DARMAN. Some of these air program enhancements, communications capabilities, the southwest border aerostat and the ROCC, as you have referred to it, are the basic elements; that is right.

Putting it somewhat more positively, which I know is not the natural disposition of those on your side of the table, but it does allow substantial—as I suggested in the testimony—it does allow substantial continuation and some augmentation of the pattern that has been developing over a number of years.

Mr. KINDNESS. Then similarly, how is the 4.3-percent reduction in the salaries and expenses account achieved?

Mr. DARMAN. I can give you more detail than you probably want, and more than I probably would want on that. But basically—

Mr. KINDNESS. Would it be fair to characterize it in a more general manner?

Mr. DARMAN. In a more general manner, we are attempting to do it through selective hiring freezes, with an absolute minimum amount of dislocation. I believe we have managed to do it without having to fire anyone, or at least plan to do it without having to fire anyone.

In other words, certain hires that were contemplated based on a presumed higher level of resources, but hires which had not yet taken place, will not take place. Some further adjustment will be made through attrition.

I might note that none of that is intended adversely to affect the air program. In fact, none of it, in my opinion, would adversely affect the air program. It is not taken in the air program. It is taken in other parts of the Customs budget.

Mr. KINDNESS. Could you describe for the committee what other choices were considered in the process of making the determination of where to cut? Again, somewhat generally.

Mr. DARMAN. The abstract version that I have given you is, in a certain sense, so abstract it does not reflect a choice, because it is within the S&E account. Our aspiration, within that account was to hold the air and marine programs—harmless to the maximum extent possible.

The next two general aspirations we had were to minimize any adverse effect on law enforcement activities—I believe we have designed a program that would do that—and next, to the maximum

extent possible, to avoid actually firing people. We intend, as much as possible, to do it through natural attrition and failure to hire.

Given those general principles, the specific allocation had to be made out of positions. So one did not have the option—having established these other constraints—one did not have the option of taking it out of something else. It became a question of exactly which people where.

I would defer to the Commissioner to explain exactly how he decided on which people where, if that is what you are asking.

Mr. KINDNESS. I do not believe we need to go to that point then, except with respect to the air program, 385 positions were referred to in your testimony, I believe.

Mr. DARMAN. That was held harmless in this cut. We did not take any out of that. We continued the planned rate of growth for that area.

Mr. KINDNESS. And some 71, I believe, were unfilled at this point, some being in the process of recruitment, and so on. I just wondered if Commissioner von Raab might be most able to describe for the subcommittee what the problems are in relation to recruiting and putting into operational use the personnel that are represented in that figure of 71.

Am I using the right figure there?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, Mr. Kindness. If I could make a point just before the Commissioner responds. I would like to just clarify that. As I believe you were pointing out, those 71 will be hired. You are now asking, what accounts for the delay in getting those positions filled.

But in the cut in S&E, we did not take it out of the air program. So those 71 vacancies are not of the type that we would fail to fill. It remains our intention to fill them.

Mr. VON RAAB. The 385 positions necessary to staff the air program will continue through this year. Right now we have approximately 109 vacancies in that piece. That includes some vacancies that were in existence prior to 71 positions that were authorized just within the past 2 months.

The purpose of the authorization was, obviously, to prepare ourselves for some of the planes that are coming on line farther down in the year.

The prior vacancies are the area of a problem. And in the most simple terms, the reason that those vacancies were not filled was a very difficult personnel process of hiring, of recruiting, compounded by a performance by the Customs Service that was not adequate to the task.

We have replaced the managers who were responsible for that failure, and we are already beginning to staff up very quickly in that area. I would be happy to tell you why it is difficult to hire pilots. It is very difficult. Obviously, it is very competitive. There are difficulties in, "taking them off the register."

OPM has helped us by giving us direct hiring authority. Previously we had to go through a number of hoops in order to hire these pilots. So it was just a very difficult and cumbersome process, compounded by some managers in the Customs Service who did not do their job properly.

Mr. KINDNESS. Do you feel that is under control at this point?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes, that is certainly under control. And as I said, we are now down to 109 vacancies, of which 71 were only recently authorized. So it would not be expected that those 71 would be filled.

So I am comfortable that the air hiring program is adequate, and that we will be able to staff the planes that are coming on line as a result of the additional moneys that we are investing in them.

Mr. KINDNESS. I guess what I was really most concerned about, is it difficult to recruit and retain pilots, in particular, for this kind of work?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes, it is. You know, we are competing against commercial airlines. The pilots that we get are better than the ones that go to the commercial airlines, because in many cases they are devoted to the war against drugs. And so they have a patriotic streak in them that some of these fellows that go and work for the airlines do not have. They are extremely good.

But the competitive factor, in terms of the salaries that are paid, is a serious problem. Nevertheless, we are very satisfied with the quality of the pilots and crew that we are getting.

Mr. KINDNESS. Are there any problems encountered in recruiting and retaining pilots in that service as a result of regulations with respect to Government service, such as the Ethics in Government Act? Any requirements that are like the problems that are encountered in recruiting some of these top executives?

Mr. VON RAAB. We are—first, let me answer your question directly. The deregulation of the airlines has made it much more competitive. And there are many more pilot positions available outside.

The problems within the Government itself, we are meeting by technically overhiring. In other words, we are accounting for the dropouts that we expect along the line. So that by the time they are actually brought on board, we may have recruited slightly few or more, or done backgrounds on a few or more. But by the time they must be in position to fly the planes, we will have the accurate number.

That is not something that we did before. And that is one of the reasons that we fell below—that is not a typical Government practice, by the way. I mean, typically the Government starts off, they want 60 people. They recruit 60 people, they train 58 people, and you know, 50 come on line.

But as this program is as important as it is, we are making certain that we have adequate resources. So we are taking that into account in our hiring practices.

Mr. KINDNESS. Mr. Darman, has any question been raised by OMB or others about the manner in which this sequestration is proposed to be carried out?

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Kindness, I am not sure exactly what type of question you have in mind. There have been a host of questions.

Mr. KINDNESS. A lot of arguments?

Mr. DARMAN. I think some would question the whole Gramm-Rudman structure itself. I am not one of those, however. What particular kind of question do you have in mind?

Mr. KINDNESS. Your spreading of the 4.3-percent cut in the sequestration: has your authority been questioned as to how you are doing it?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, I understand. I am certain the answer to that will be yes, but I have to report where we are in that process. We only received the detail at the departmental level, I believe it was late the night before last, from the Commissioner's office. I believe the first departmental staff review of that with Customs was taking place yesterday afternoon. I do not know that that meeting actually did take place.

I would think the procedure from here would be, assuming that meeting took place, those differences that cannot be worked out between departmental staff and Customs might or might not come to me. These issues will then be discussed with OMB. These will tend, by and large, to be relatively small matters of detail. But there certainly will be questions, I would think, in the process.

That process has to be resolved some time in the next few days in order that the submissions can be made to the Appropriations Committees. However, the exact questions have not come to me yet nor have they gone to OMB.

Mr. KINDNESS. Mr. Chairman, I think I have exceeded my 5-minute limit.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Darman, thank you for your testimony. There is an old Biblical phrase, that where your treasure is, there also is your heart. And I wonder if you have got your heart in this. You are not willing to put your treasury in it, it seems.

As I understand this year's major policy initiative pamphlet, which came with the budget yesterday, the administration is seeking another \$460 million in user's fees for the Customs Service, generated by the Customs Service. In addition to these, \$60 million in user fees will be generated if the Budget Reconciliation Act is adopted.

Now you say on the last page of your testimony that we do not have the resources collectively as a society to fund any substantial increase in this activity, or in the Customs Service as a whole.

Here we have the potential of \$520 million flowing into the coffers of the Treasury generated by the Customs Service. Why in the world can we not use funds directly generated by the Customs Service to fund its designated activities?

Mr. DARMAN. Well, the problem is, as I know you know well, Mr. Spratt, the Government as a whole is a little bit revenue short. I do not think that the issue involved here is a question of whether one is raising revenue in this case in order to fund particular activities. Rather in a general context, where the Government is clearly short of revenue, is it not appropriate, among other things, to try to impose user fees where they can be fairly identified and assessed and relatively conveniently administered across the board, throughout the Government, just as a general, philosophical principle?

That principle is reflected throughout the budget. We have done it to some degree in IRS at Treasury as well. So the initiative there is, in part, a matter of principle, favoring user fees where possible generally.

When it comes to the question of what should one do with the revenue, as you well know, it is a struggle to meet the \$144 billion

Gramm-Rudman target for fiscal year 1987 as it is. I think, as you know from your colleagues in the Congress, there are an awful lot of claimants for those resources. We have not viewed them as dedicated resources, which is the way, conceptually, I think you are looking at them.

Mr. SPRATT. I am saying the Customs Service has the potential within the next 12 months or within the next 18 months of generating an additional \$520 million. You say in your testimony, we do not have the resources collectively, and yet you are looking at the Customs agency's direct generation of one-half billion dollars.

What you are telling me is you are simply not willing to use those funds for this activity. Your allocative choices are to use them for something else. It is not a matter of lack of revenues, because you are going to generate it out of Customs itself. You just are not willing to use those revenues for drug interdiction or for quota enforcement, or any of the other activities assigned to Customs.

Mr. DARMAN. I think it is a more basic conceptual matter—and I recognize people differ on this—as to whether those revenues are in some sense the property of Customs, or whether they are more generally available for allocation across the board. The manner in which we budget for and treat them assumes they are available more generally.

As to whether one says that money is Customs' money and is not being allocated, one could make the same argument, if one wished about the cigarette tax, which is proposed to be continued in the President's budget.

Mr. SPRATT. I understand the arguments about earmarking taxes. And I understand what we will get in if we start earmarking taxes left and right.

But I am saying, here is an activity that has the potential of being almost self-funding, and it is generating you revenues.

Well, let us take the defense budget. As I understand it, Gramm-Rudman's sequestration order on March 1 will knock about \$11 billion out of budget authority in defense, taking it down to about \$286 billion. The President's request is for \$320 billion the next year. That is a \$34 billion increase. Now we can find \$34 billion for national defense, but we cannot find anything for drug interdiction apparently, or very, very little.

It seems to me that the drug smugglers, are a problem as devastating and dangerous to our country as the threat to our national security. That is a potential threat, for the most part. What we are looking at in drug enforcement is an actual threat, something that is happening daily, going on all the time. It is having a tremendous effect upon our society. It is actually happening; it is not a potential.

I do not understand the allocation decision. I am taking issue with you when you say the funds are not there, since you are actually generating more money. Customs has proved over the years, year in and year out, that as you add people, particularly at the right levels, enforcement levels, they actually generate money.

And it seems to me that you agree with me. Basically, it is an allocation decision.

Mr. DARMAN. It is an allocation decision. I would, if I might, respectfully, disagree with you, or disagree with what might have been a suggestion from your remarks. You were pointing out correctly the substantial increase in the defense budget; and then suggesting that because there is a large dollar increase, although not so large percentage in the defense budget, and there is not in this area, that it represents a lack of commitment to drug enforcement.

Here we go back to the same discussion that I was having with Chairman English, and your point is valid. I am not contesting it. It is a fact there for the eye to see with respect to resource allocation, if one looks at the level of details air program versus, say, some other large category that is increasing in aggregate.

If one looks at the drug enforcement activities of the Federal Government as a whole, one will see a substantial increase, \$1.8 billion, OMB estimates for 1987. That is compared on the same estimating basis with \$1.6 billion for 1986, and if one went all the way back to 1981, with about \$700 million.

So for the drug enforcement area as a whole, there is a pattern of increase. The argument is not, I think, whether there is a decision to allocate resources to drug enforcement. There is clearly a decision to allocate resources to drug enforcement. The argument, more appropriately specifically, is whether within the broad category of drug enforcement, there should be more or less given to the air program or the marine program, for example, of the Customs Service vis-a-vis other subareas that are getting increases. That, I think, is the fairer way to characterize the resource allocation choice involved.

Mr. SPRATT. Looking at Customs as a whole, is it not true that over the last 5 years the number of import entries has increased about 100 percent?

Mr. DARMAN. As you can see, I am ignorant on this subject. But the Commissioner assures me, you are not.

Mr. SPRATT. Fifty percent, how about that?

Mr. DARMAN. No, he seems to accept your number. I will let him speak for himself.

Mr. SPRATT. OK.

Mr. DARMAN. I should not be between the two of you.

Mr. VON RAAB. I can give you the exact numbers over 5 years, but it has been a substantial increase, and 100 percent, I'm sure is—

Mr. SPRATT. I have received the numbers from you before.

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes, right.

Mr. SPRATT. And I, unfortunately, did not have them in my briefcase.

Mr. VON RAAB. The only issue is, the concept of entry changes over those years and the numbers—that is not the worst measuring tool, but—

Mr. SPRATT. But there has been a substantial increase in the number of individual entries—

Mr. VON RAAB. There is a substantial increase in the work that Customs must perform in the commercial area, that is correct.

Mr. SPRATT. In addition to that, Customs has taken on several significant new missions, has it not? I read of Operation Exodus, and the drug enforcement role which has been intensified. Several

new missions have been imposed, superimposed upon the regular—

Mr. VON RAAB. Customs has, as the Deputy Secretary has indicated, broadened its efforts, certainly in the interdiction area, you are correct. We now have a major initiative in the area of preventing the loss of export technology to the Russians. And also, important to your part of the country and also to me is our effort in textile enforcement.

I would also point out, however, that in 1981 it was hard to tell just what the Customs Service was doing. So it is not just a question of whether there are new initiatives, but they finally have decided to take on some initiatives. So they had plenty of resources to take on a lot of these initiatives.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, you have got several new initiatives, several new assignments, and a twofold increase in the ordinary work of the Customs Service. Does this not call for a few more people?

Mr. VON RAAB. We have not needed a few more people in some of those areas. As a matter of fact, we have reduced the people in the commercial area because of the routine nature and the ability for us to take a lot of that work and automate it.

We have spent a substantial amount of money, if you look at our ADP budget, for example, that has increased tremendously. We could call that a new initiative. So we believe that the numbers of personnel working in the commercial area are adequate, given the fact that we have made tremendous investments in automating the way we do business.

And that is not just to save time and money. We actually believe we are doing a better job, a faster job, and a more effective job. For example, in the textile area, you see enforcement today, whereas you did not see it 5 years ago.

Mr. SPRATT. As you probably know, I went up to the New York Customs—this is an extraneous matter—but I went to the New York terminal where an awful lot of containerized goods come in. There was only one terminal at New York which had any data processing capability. That was the Marr terminal, and that had been obtained by donation from the owner of Marr terminal. In fact, he was letting them use his computer offline, and had even given his people for software development.

I do not see your computer stuff coming on line yet.

Mr. VON RAAB. Mr. Spratt, I know and I have been to the Marr terminal myself, and I applaud the efforts of Marr. We are encouraging the private sector to link up with our computers, which is what Marr is working toward.

I am disappointed to hear that you did not see our computer system, which is a very, very effective system. As a matter of fact, we are ahead of the private sector in our development, and we are waiting upon their linking up with us.

I would invite you to return to New York and see what we are doing up there.

Mr. SPRATT. I will take your word for it. Let me ask a couple of more questions that are more directly related.

Do I understand that there is a Gramm-Rudman sequestration, and on top of that a rescission coming up in the Customs Service?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, that is correct. It is a small rescission. The Gramm-Rudman sequestration is about \$31 million, and the rescission is about \$4 million for the S&E account.

Mr. SPRATT. I understood you, Mr. Darman, to say that in your cutting you were trying to hold harmless marine assets and air assets. Is that correct?

Mr. DARMAN. No. No, I hope I did not say that. I may have.

Mr. SPRATT. I may have misunderstood you.

Mr. DARMAN. What I thought I suggested was that while Gramm-Rudman cut and the rescission apply to the S&E account, with respect to the people—that is the S&E account—we are trying to hold harmless the enforcement activities to the maximum extent possible generally, and in particular the air and marine program.

Mr. SPRATT. OK. One further question. You gave us the number of full-time equivalent positions. What is the number of people actually employed? Not authorized slots, but how many people do you have employed in the Customs Service today?

Mr. VON RAAB. Today I think it is 12,200—12,456 as of our last monthly run. Those numbers change because we have lot of part-time people, and there are special categories. But that is the last—

Mr. SPRATT. Well, in Mr. Darman's testimony he uses a figure of 13,231, but you actually have 1,000 warm bodies fewer than what is authorized.

Mr. VON RAAB. Today—we are talking—his figures are 1987. We are talking about people actually on board. The most confusing thing I find in this Government is the way personnel is counted; full-time equivalents, slots, manning tables. The number I have given you is the actual number, if you will, of warm bodies on board as of the last payroll run.

Mr. SPRATT. Which is about 12,200.

Mr. VON RAAB. 12,456.

Mr. SPRATT. As I read the appendix—

Mr. VON RAAB. Those numbers would go up substantially, for example, in the summer when we would bring on part-time people, thereby raising the averages.

Mr. DARMAN. There is another difference.

Mr. SPRATT. OK.

Mr. DARMAN. There is one other difference, if I might just mention, and that is, my numbers include reimbursable, and the Commissioner's numbers, I think, do not.

Mr. SPRATT. Do they also include the imputed hours due to overtime and holidays?

Mr. DARMAN. No.

Mr. SPRATT. OK. So in effect, we are looking at about 12,677 actual people, leaving out the reimbursable people. What you call full-time permanent positions is—the estimate for 1987 is 12,677 in your budget appendix. It is not 13,231. Full-time permanent positions is 12,677.

I am not quibbling over numbers, I was just trying to get a handle on—

Mr. DARMAN. They refer—to some extent it is apples and oranges, but you are right.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me thank you for allowing me to sit in with the subcommittee this morning. Having served with the subcommittee for my first term, I appreciate being back with you.

Mr. Darman, I have a couple of questions I would like to ask you. A philosophical question to start off with. When we are talking about increasing a defense budget 40 percent over the next 5 years, what would be the Treasury's recommendation to the President in order to continue the war on drugs?

What kind of a weapons system or what type of equipment could we stretch out in order to provide a continuing amount of money for the war on drugs, or an increase in the amount of money for the war on drugs? Was there any consideration given to this?

Mr. DARMAN. Congressman Lewis, are you asking what might we have recommended or did we recommend in the way of changes in the defense budget in order to fund additional activities at Treasury?

Mr. LEWIS. That is true.

Mr. DARMAN. No, sir, we did not make any such recommendation in the way of a stretchout of a defense program or something of that nature, no.

Mr. LEWIS. Would we not consider the war on drugs, just as important, as the defense buildup for Secretary Weinberger?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, sir. I believe the President would as well. It is more a question of purview and expertise. I do not believe that we at Treasury would have the appropriate analytic capacity to determine what defense programs ought to be stretched or not.

Mr. LEWIS. I think I recognize that. I am just asking what kind of recommendations you would make, or was there any debate in this area, to look at continuing sufficient funding for the war on drugs?

Mr. DARMAN. There was not a debate because the President was absolutely firmly committed, as I believe you know, to the 0.3.3 agreement that was reached with the Congress last year, on the rate of defense increase, and that is in the DOD budget. The issue thereafter was, how would the Department of Defense choose to spend the resources that the President had indicated would be allocated to Defense.

One might well argue that one should stretch one thing out at Defense, but the Defense budget authority line had already been decided by the President, and to some extent, by the Congress.

Mr. LEWIS. I see. What would be the Treasury's argument to continue the P-3A aircraft quipment enhancements, and the addition of an aerostat? What would be your arguments in opposition to their elimination?

Mr. DARMAN. In opposition to the P-3A?

Mr. LEWIS. Enhancements to the P-3A. In other words, adding the enhancements to the P-3A surveillance aircraft, and also to the aerostat system. What would be your arguments against budget reductions for these items?

Mr. DARMAN. That is not the context in which the issue arises.

Mr. LEWIS. I am talking about the rescission, Mr. Darman.

Mr. DARMAN. I am sorry. I do not know how best to put this. This issue arose in what you might consider a negotiating context, where there were some who were suggesting very much less should be allocated to this area, and there were some who were suggesting very much more should be allocated.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, it is my understanding—

Mr. DARMAN. In argument about competing interests, what you see happens to be the resolution.

Mr. LEWIS. It was my understanding, that you had an appeal before OMB, to retain the P-3A enhancements and the aerostat; is that not true?

Mr. DARMAN. Well, sir, I feel that it puts me in a little bit of an awkward position, to have to suggest specifically, what we may have appealed to the Office of Management and Budget, because I have been on the other side of the fence. I think it is a little difficult for OMB to expect good advice from the agencies, if the agencies are then obliged to come up and explain exactly what their appeal was and why, and so on, and why OMB may have turned it down or modified it.

If you wish to press the point, I will be happy to discuss it. I just want to say at the outset, that I think this is an area of intra-executive branch activity, which would be more appropriately not discussed.

Mr. LEWIS. I guess the only—

Mr. DARMAN. I think a general characterization would be—and it is the normal one—the Department, like lots of departments wanted more than it got. That is not an unusual circumstance, and OMB has the difficult job of deciding, in the end, which claims seem to have more merit and which ones seem to have less, in its judgment.

Mr. LEWIS. They make the decision which planes that you should have in order to do your job?

Mr. DARMAN. I would not say that OMB makes the decision unilaterally.

Mr. LEWIS. I thought you just said that.

Mr. DARMAN. There is a great deal of discussion back and forth; but in the end, if it comes to a question of authority, OMB acts on behalf of the President.

Mr. LEWIS. What effect, do you feel, Mr. Darman, that the cuts for the Air Interdiction Program will have on a State like Florida, which is the main highway of drugs into the United States?

Mr. DARMAN. It is my understanding—and I would like the Commissioner to speak to this as well, if you would permit—it is my understanding that we will not be adversely affecting Florida, relative to the capacity present today.

If you mean relative to a higher capacity that might have been possible under the continuing resolution, then there might be some marginal adverse effect, although I believe for Florida it would be marginal. I think the effect is probably more significant with respect to the southwest border.

Mr. LEWIS. How can you say that, Mr. Darman, when the South Florida Task Force was started in February 1982. It stayed in operation about 4 years. We have been playing catchup football for 4 years. We are finally at a point now where we are receiving the

equipment, we have had the approval. This subcommittee has worked on that.

And we are finally getting to a point, where we are starting to move the equipment into Florida and set up the radar nets and this sort of thing. And then you sit there and tell me that it is going to have a marginal effect, or no effect on Florida. I cannot hardly believe that.

Mr. DARMAN. The Commissioner has volunteered to defend my suggestion, because it is my understanding that that is the case.

Mr. VON RAAB. The impact of the Customs budget on Florida is a very positive one. The resources that are going into Florida will be continuing to increase, particularly over the next 6 months. For example, next week I will be going down to Miami to be present at the opening of our joint command center. A very interesting approach that we have established with the State and local officials, which will result in very much better coordination of State and local, and Federal assets in the drug war. A substantial investment has been made there.

Great numbers of boats will be coming on board. I can give you the specifics, but tremendous numbers will be coming on board. Additional men and women to crew those boats will be coming on board. Large numbers of the increases which we are talking about, in the marine area, are being put into Florida, because that is the area of the greatest risk.

In terms of the air assets coming on board, you can expect to see additional Customs high endurance trackers which actually, I might point out, are being made in Florida as well. These are the Piper Cheyenne 3. The C-12's will be coming on board—will be coming on later on in order to help support our marine activities.

I would have to say that the State of Florida is—resources that will be available to it to continue to fight the air and sea war against the smugglers will be considerable enhanced over the next year.

Mr. LEWIS. Commissioner, let me say this in your behalf. I think your cooperation with my office and working with me has been strictly above-board and exemplary in working to defer the drug traffic out of Florida. And I have no personal quarrels with you, and I thank you for your efforts.

I would like to discuss with you a little bit about air interdiction. You have approximately 109 vacancies out of 385 positions, which you would be using for air interdiction which, I believe, comes up to something like flying four P-3's 100 hours a month rather than six P-3's; is that not true?

Mr. VON RAAB. Flying four—

Mr. LEWIS. Four P-3's 100 hours a month rather than six 3's.

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, now we are talking about 1986.

Mr. LEWIS. That is right.

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, we were only going to have four P-3's in 1986.

Mr. LEWIS. That is all? When would you have the six?

Mr. VON RAAB. Any additional P-3's, which are not funded in the 1987 budget would have come on in 1987. So we are talking here in 1986.

Mr. LEWIS. How much surveillance will that give us? Will it give us 6 days coverage, 7, or 5?

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, in Florida we talk about Jacksonville and Miami. There we talk about 7 days, 16 hours a week, in both places.

Mr. LEWIS. Sixteen a week?

Mr. VON RAAB. I am sorry, 16 a day. Seven days, 16 a day in Miami and Jacksonville.

Mr. LEWIS. Now back to the—

Mr. VON RAAB. Now that is higher than other parts of the country.

Mr. LEWIS. I would just like to ask you about the aerostat again. We just got ourselves in a position where we can put this net up and now we are looking at a reduction of this net. Are we saying that we—

Mr. VON RAAB. This aerostat was to go up in Arizona, which is the reason that we are concerned about Senator DeConcini's presence here. The aerostats over Florida are continuing to be flying, although I must—

Mr. LEWIS. No, but I am—

Mr. VON RAAB [continuing]. Admit, the one at Patrick right now is in the water.

Mr. LEWIS. OK, I may have misled you a little bit. Of course, I am personally interested in Florida and what we are doing in Florida. But I am personally interested in the aerostat program period, right across the United States.

Mr. VON RAAB. I am sorry, I thought you were talking about Florida.

Mr. LEWIS. And I want to know why it is necessary to look at reducing that one when we thought it was such a great idea just 6, 8 months ago.

Mr. VON RAAB. I never said it was a great idea. I am not saying it is not a great idea. I am not sure whether it is a good idea or not. But given the reductions that we are obligated to take, I feel that the elimination of the aerostat is prudent. And that enables us to continue to fly our planes at other levels, at higher levels.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have taken more time than I should. Thank you very much.

Mr. ENGLISH. Senator DeConcini.

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Lewis, thank you for your comments on the aerostat. That will save me a little time. I think Mr. Darman and the Commissioner know how I feel about it. I am just absolutely outraged at what I consider a throw-it-aside attitude, after Congress has been so generous to Customs and Treasury.

I do not accept those particular answers that that had to be, Mr. Darman, because just on your personnel—the secretary-treasurer, personnel office operations received \$3.3 million, an increase of 4.4 over 1986 when the Customs drug interdiction program was being slashed below the 1986 level. And I do not know how that happened.

That \$3.3 million could have operated a drug aerostat radar system for a year, either in the Caribbean, or the Southwest, or in Texas, or someplace else. And I find it very ironic that you would

come here—and the Commissioner—and leave us with the impression that this is a prudent cut.

Now I realize that the actual capital outlay is far more than 3.3, but just the operations of it could have been taken up if you could find a way to tighten the belt in the personnel office operating within Treasury. Do you have any comment?

Mr. DARMAN. Senator, the account to which you are referring has increased largely as a bookkeeping matter, in other words, what is in that classification has changed. It is not the same as the previous year. It includes the Federal Financing Bank activities which had previously been off budget, and these represent over \$2 million of that \$3 million increase. The other, I am sure, is probably barely sufficient to deal with inflation.

Mr. DECONCINI. Of course, you did not provide any inflation for the aerostat, did you?

Mr. DARMAN. No.

Mr. DECONCINI. Because you wiped it out. Let me ask you this, Mr. Darman. The Customs' 5-year plan is perhaps the most comprehensive analysis, and I applaud Customs and your office for putting that together.

Among the major recommendations for priority action in 1986 and 1987 were to move ahead with putting sophisticated sensor equipment on six P-3A aircraft; to move ahead with plans for an aerostat or other more detection systems along the southwest border; and three, to bring staffing levels up to 591 people, so that you can operate 7 days a week, 16 hours a day.

Now the President's budget for 1986 and 1987 seems to preclude this. Can we assume by that that the 5-year plan has been scrapped, and we can start from scratch?

Mr. DARMAN. Senator, I do not think it would be appropriate to suggest, at least on my part, that the 5-year plan should be scrapped, because it implies a standing that I am not aware of its having had.

To my knowledge, the 5-year plan was an internal document within Customs. I do not know that it ever had the full approval of the Commissioner. In any case, it did not have the full approval of the Department and the administration.

In saying that, I do not mean to disagree with you about the possible merit of the plan. The problem is this, the plan—I am not qualified to judge its merits—but the plan is basically a plan for determining if there is an interdiction job to be done through air at the border, what it takes to do it on an orderly basis. It attempts to define the resources necessary to do that.

That is entirely appropriate for Customs to do. It would be irresponsible for them not to do that.

Mr. DECONCINI. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, but are you telling me that you have not adopted that 5-year plan and it is not part of our policy?

Mr. DARMAN. We have not adopted that plan.

Mr. DECONCINI. Fine, that is good enough. That is very clear to me that the emphasis is not there.

Mr. DARMAN. I would like though, if I could—

Mr. DECONCINI. Sure, go ahead.

Mr. DARMAN. If I could, Senator, just suggest again what I think is the nature of the problem here. I believe that we may be moving toward addressing this problem satisfactorily.

The problem is, the appropriate level of investment in this area, vis-a-vis, other areas of the war on drugs. That is a problem about which strong people, intelligent people, knowledgeable people seem to have highly differing views.

From the Customs perspective, they have developed a plan that is sound, with respect to their mission, I presume. The problem is, there are others within our own Government, as I was suggesting to Mr. English, who, with what I take to be the best of faith, and what I am sure they believe to be good reason—believe that that is not the best area for incremental investment, that there are other areas in which there is higher return.

As I have gotten into this and have tried to sort it out, it has seemed to me that the whole area suffers from inadequate data with which to address some of these rather fundamental, large tradeoff questions. That is not intended as a criticism of anybody in our Government or in the Congress, or anyplace else.

To some extent it is inherent in the character of the problem. As you know very well, when dealing with illegal activity it is exceedingly difficult to determine how much of it is, in fact, going on, and what effect on that behavior different types of efforts to reduce the behavior are having.

Absent that information, when people make these arguments about whether one area or another is worth the investment, they can argue for a great long time.

Mr. DECONCINI. No, Mr. Darman, I have to disagree with you. You know, you guys are great at this gimmickry, but the commitment is not there. And you talk about a \$1 billion increase, but the commitment is not there.

How can you justify sitting there with a straight face—with foreign assistance up over 9 percent in this President's budget—that is foreign giveaway dollars to our good allies and friends and trading partners. Defense is up 9 or 10 percent, maybe 12 in the outlay area and you come here and tell us that, well, it is a matter of priorities within the law enforcement who is going to get it.

If it is matter of priorities, why do you guys not stand up and say so? How important are your jobs, or are you really committed to this thing? And the same thing goes to my good friend the Commissioner, who has been very responsive to Arizona. It is about time you guys put your jobs and your reputations on the line.

And it just irritates the hell out of me for the American public to hear you say that we are doing and we are committed to this thing. I say, you are not committed to it, or you would raise holy hell, because this is the biggest thing that faces this country right now, as Mr. Kindness pointed out.

I have another question on another subject and I will calm down, I can assure you. Mr. Darman, there is no doubt, in my opinion, that OMB has to bear the major burden of what the administration has done to the Customs air program budget. But your Department is at least partially at fault, in my judgment, for the Customs air budget shrinking back to pre-1984 levels.

First, Customs requested \$189 million to Treasury for the air program; Treasury then cut that request by 62 percent, down to \$71.6, and sent the budget amount to OMB; OMB, through their usual noncommitment to drug interdiction, cut it back \$39.8 million; Treasury appealed, and I compliment you for that, to \$75 million; and the President settled for \$54 million.

And that is the scenario that I get from you folks. If you folks were so anxious to get Customs 1987 air program budget at about 1986 levels of \$75 million, why did you not try to go for a greater amount? And did you, or the Secretary, go to the President and appeal this personally?

Mr. DARMAN. No, sir, we did not appeal it personally to the President.

Mr. DECONCINI. Why not?

Mr. DARMAN. Well, I will give you two kinds of reasons. One, I spent 4 years, as you may know, in the White House. In those 4 years, I served as coordinator of the Budget Review Board. I am very well aware of the internal process, and the type of decision, in terms of magnitude of dollars, that tends to rise to the President.

The internal procedure involves not only OMB review, but following that, if there are still differences, review by what is called the Budget Review Board, where a great deal of sorting out is done. They try to weed out issues that would be of this magnitude, and leave somewhat larger allocation issues for the President.

He might decide the sufficiency of \$1.8 billion for drug law enforcement and review the related subissues. He would not, however, in the way the system works, decide specifically whether there ought to be \$19 million more or less in one account or another.

Mr. DECONCINI. Would the Secretary be prohibited from taking that to the President?

Mr. DARMAN. No, he would not be prohibited. I am just saying, we are very well aware of what the procedures would be.

The second point I will make is one to which I have alluded before. I have seen you shake your head as I have said it, so I sense that it is not exactly received with pleasure. There are people with strongly held differences of view as to what the value of the return on investment is in this area.

Without trying to identify particular individuals, I think if one were to look at the people involved in the appellate procedure, one would be hard pressed to find people who are known enthusiasts for this particular area of investment.

Mr. DECONCINI. I agree with you. Would you not agree that—

Mr. DARMAN. But that is not—

Mr. DECONCINI [continuing.] The Chief of Staff, Donald Regan, was very opposed to Customs air interdiction when he was Secretary? Your predecessors, opposed this? Congress put it into the budget and appropriated it, the President signed it; has said positive things about it; and now, it seems to me, we are back to square one. Perhaps Donald Regan is stopping the Treasury Department.

I have talked to the Secretary, and he says he is committed to this program. When he went into office he said it was going to be different under him than it was under Mr. Regan. But I am very disappointed that that is not what you are telling me has hap-

pened. You guys are losing the battle in the White House, and that really bothers me.

Mr. DARMAN. Well, first of all, I think it would be very unfair of me to suggest that the fault lay with Chief of Staff Regan.

Mr. DECONCINI. I do not blame you. You might not have a job tomorrow if you did.

Mr. DARMAN. I am really not too concerned about whether I would have a job or not. You might not believe that, Senator; but I think it would, just as a human matter, be a little unfair. He is not here and cannot be here to discuss his views.

Mr. DECONCINI. Well, he would not come. I am sure, if the chairman asked him, he would not come.

Mr. DARMAN. Well, that is because of a doctrine of executive privilege.

Mr. DECONCINI. That is because he is chicken.

Mr. ENGLISH. If the gentleman would yield. Let me issue—we are going to have another hearing tomorrow—and let me issue the invitation right now to Mr. Regan to show up. He would be more than welcome, and I am going to leave that as an open invitation for anytime day or night that he might come up—

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I plan to go to Arizona tomorrow, but I would cancel that trip if Mr. Regan would come here.

Mr. ENGLISH. Go ahead, Mr. Darman.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I trust the record is clear that I am not suggesting that you issue that invitation.

May I go back to a couple of elements of the substance of your point? One, you said we are back to square one. Senator, I would respectfully suggest, we are not back to square one. You may be displeased with where we are, but we are not back to square one. There is a pattern of continuing increase in the capacity to perform this function.

It may not be improving as fast as you would like, or as fast as the Customs 5-year plan contemplated. That is clear. But it is still improving. It is not returning to square one.

Second, on the question of whether things would be different or not. My own personal view in this is, that until we have a strong, analytic basis for making the argument for investment in this area, relative to other areas, or in conjunction with other areas, that is persuasive not only to Customs and to you, but to other people who are interested in drug law enforcement, we will not be able to get what you would judge to be adequate investment in this area.

I think that we are moving toward having the kind of analysis done which would allow a reasonable judgment among fair-minded people with respect to that issue.

Mr. DECONCINI. Well, Mr. Darman, I appreciate your feelings that you need another study, but I suspect you are familiar with the 1975 SRI study.

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DECONCINI. The 1984 meter study, which cost \$800,000, the 1985 SRI study, the Silver report, the Joint Surveillance Committee report, the Vice President's NNBS report, the 1985 Boeing report, and the Customs 5-year plan.

Mr. DARMAN. One of the problems with—

Mr. DECONCINI. We have well over \$1 million in studies. Now, you know, that is another copout. You guys have got to come down. Either you are for this or you are not. And you have got to push like hell to get it.

Mr. DARMAN. One of the problems with those studies, Senator, in my opinion, is that most of the ones you referred to analyze what is the optimal resource allocation for performing the border interdiction function. In terms of the argument within the Government, that is not the issue.

The issue within the Government is, what is the comparative return on investment from investment in border interdiction through air and marine programs, versus other kinds of enforcement activities. The studies—and I am not suggesting an outside contractor or \$800,000 or any other dollar amount for a study—needs to comparatively assess that issue in a persuasive way.

Mr. DECONCINI. Well, do you not make available to these inter-agency turf battles your own information that 60 percent of the cocaine comes in by private airplane? Is that not enough in itself, assuming that you can have any substance to base that, to be overwhelming evidence to even Donald Regan?

Mr. DARMAN. I would repeat, if I might, that I do not think that the issue is Donald Regan's view on this.

The answer to your question is, yes, of course, that data are presented. The question then arises, what does one conclude from that data; and to some extent, it is a classic case of Miles law. People who tend to be charged with one kind of activity will tend to think that that money ought to be invested in their activity. People in another area will say it ought to be theirs.

So if you look at those cocaine statistics, some people will say, that is the stronger argument for attempting to eradicate at the source. Or, it is a stronger argument for investment in certain kinds of intelligence. Or, it is a stronger argument for looking at money laundering and ways in which to attempt to get at this through improved enforcement using a capacity to track money, and so on.

It is at that level of argument that this thing tends to founder.

Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is running out. Let me just ask one short one here.

The Joint Marine Interdiction Command Center is going to open next Tuesday, is that correct? Can you tell us a little bit about that?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes. The Joint Marine Command Center will be opening in Miami in the Federal building on Tuesday.

Mr. DECONCINI. And I think Senator Chiles and the chairman of this committee had something to do with getting that funded. Would you agree with that, Mr. Commissioner?

Mr. VON RAAB. The entire Congress and the administration had something to do with that being funded.

Mr. DECONCINI. I am not seeking an invitation, but I think it is very strange that no invitation—

Mr. VON RAAB. Everyone is invited.

Mr. DECONCINI. Those who had a little bit to do with it. But let me ask, Mr. Darman, the last question. And this will be easy for you.

Let me ask about the United States-Mexico mutual drug interdiction efforts. We have been advised that the smuggling threat into the United States may have shifted as much as 30 percent from the Southeast to the Southwest. For example, there were a number of programs which the Commissioner of Customs announced in 1983 that I would like to have you review and tell us what has happened.

One, what happened to the program he announced by which the Mexican Government would provide access to its intelligence data? Two, what happened to the Operation Stash, which was going to loan Customs aircraft to the Mexicans for the purpose of overflying the smuggling staging areas in Mexico? Three, what happened to the negotiations with the Mexicans, which would allow Customs to overfly Mexico in hot pursuit?

Four, what about the establishment of a data link with Mexican air traffic control radars? Five, what happened to Operation Eagle, where approximately 60 United States and 60 Mexican officials were to be dedicated to antismuggling activities? They were to work together along both sides of the border, as I remember.

Six, what happened to the enhancement of tactical command and control facilities at the FAA, ARTCC center in Houston, TX? And last, what happened to the program to establish early warning radars on oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico?

I realize I read those very fast, but I will be glad to go over them a little slower if you or the Commissioner would respond to any of those for us.

Mr. DARMAN. Senator, I think the short answer is, very little. The Commissioner has got the long version of the answer, point by point. I quickly took them down, but as far as I can tell, a great deal less than one might have hoped has taken place.

Mr. DECONCINI. Commissioner, would you like me to repeat any of it?

Mr. VON RAAB. Those agreements were made at a meeting between Mexican Customs and United States Customs at the time that you described. At that time, Mexican Customs had a Director General. Shortly thereafter, Mexican Customs lost that Director General and acquired two Directors General. And it went downhill from there.

Unfortunately, the entire organization of the Mexican Customs Service became elusive. As a result of that, a number of those initiatives, as we had hoped would take place, never took place.

The placement of the 60 additional inspectors by the Mexican Customs Service at the border working jointly with the United States Customs Service. Those individuals at one point were said to have been hired, then they were not. In any case, nothing happened.

The two major initiatives that have come out of that are the continued effort on behalf of the Justice Department, through the Attorney General, and the Mexican Attorney General, to improve our drug cooperation. And in those discussions, the issue of joint crewing of planes that could overfly the border remains a matter for

discussion. I am not—I do not know the present state of that particular issue.

The other important activity I would prefer not to discuss publicly, but it does reflect some good cooperation between United States Customs and Mexican authorities with respect to certain radar information that we obtain.

Mr. DECONCINI. Have these areas, where there has been some failure to obtain what your strategy and tactics were as listed in your budget justification, been brought to the President or to the White House and State Department so that they can be part of the discussions between the President and Mr. de la Madrid? Supposedly, they talked about drugs.

Mr. VON RAAB. They were discussed at the meetings that were held in San Antonio.

Mr. DECONCINI. The ones——

Mr. VON RAAB. Not necessarily every one of those, because some of those are lower level cooperative efforts.

Mr. DECONCINI. Were the ones that——

Mr. VON RAAB. The ones that we felt were important were addressed at that meeting.

Mr. DECONCINI. Have failed were discussed?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes.

Mr. DECONCINI. Like the cooperative efforts and the additional 60 members?

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, the additional 60 inspectors is just not going to happen. I am not sure that the Mexican Customs is capable of organizing that.

Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you, Commissioner.

Mr. Secretary, I applaud you for appearing here before this subcommittee to defend the administration's drug interdiction budget. I know you are a team player, and you are a hard worker and so is the Commissioner. I know that you believe in this interdiction program, and I am convinced that President Reagan does.

Let me just say that, I think we are going to have a hard time this Congress. This program at Customs and Coast Guard has broad support in this Congress, in my judgment. This is not a partisan matter, witnessed by the leadership of Congressman Kindness on this committee, Ted Stevens in the Senate, and other Republican Members who have joined Senator Chiles and Congressman English and many of us. And I think the administration has fought us and appears to continue to want to fight us on this program.

Speaking as only one Senator, I am prepared to fight, because I think we have come a long way, with reluctant support from Treasury. And about last year, that really turned around, I thought. And now we have the budget here before us, which is a disaster, in this Senator's mind, of that continued commitment.

You can talk about the philosophies and the need to study and the need to make adjustments, but I do not think you are convincing me. I know you are not convincing me, and I do not think you are convincing the public.

Chairman English, Mr. Kindness, thank you for your indulgence. I really think this is exceptional that you let me take this much time, but I feel that it is absolutely paramount for all of the American people—not just those in Arizona—that we do something about

this inundation of drugs. And that this administration be called to account for their inability to continue the P-3 program, the aerostat program, and some of the other air interdiction related efforts.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you, Senator DeConcini. I appreciate it very much.

Now, Mr. Darman, to get down to my questions. I have about four pages of questions, so we will try to move along as quickly as possible. I would appreciate it if you would keep your answers very brief.

In reviewing the discussion and the responses that you have given, along with the facts that we are presented with, namely, the budget, is it not true that the administration, in effect, is deemphasizing drug interdiction in favor of investigations? Or in other words, is it not true that the Attorney General and the Justice Department are winning what has been a turf war that has gone on in this area for some time by just taking money away from the Treasury Department's mission?

Mr. DARMAN. I do not think that is the way I would characterize it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I know you would not characterize it that way, but is that not what the budget reflects?

Mr. DARMAN. It reflects a larger increase in the area of investigations than it does in Customs.

Mr. ENGLISH. And you would not argue with the fact that there has been a longstanding turf war, a struggle that has been taking place in this area for years?

Mr. DARMAN. To my knowledge—I have not been party to it—my understanding is that is also correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are we doing so well on the war on drugs, this Nation in our overall effort, that we can afford to allow this kind of infighting to take place?

Mr. DARMAN. I, Mr. Chairman, have served in six Cabinet departments in four administrations and in the White House. I have not ever served in a bureaucratic environment or an interagency environment on any issue in which there was not infighting.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have you ever served in one of those agencies in time of war?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, the Defense Department during the Vietnam war.

Mr. ENGLISH. Did we have this kind of infighting taking place then during that period?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, sir; and a good deal of it is in the press for all to see.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. And did we do so well in that struggle?

Mr. DARMAN. No, sir. And I do not believe we do well whenever we do it. I am only trying to suggest that, unfortunately, it seems to be characteristic of human beings in large organizations.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, it may be, but the point that I am making though, is that this is a struggle we are losing as well. We did not do very well in Vietnam, and we are not doing very well in the war on drugs.

Infighting, bickering, turf fights, whatever you want to call it, it really comes down to the fact that those who are in charge—in this case, the people within the administration—allow it to develop.

You have already stated that you nor anyone else within the administration went to the President. Did not really see this as being important enough to take to the President's attention, even though he just a few days ago called this one of the most insidious threats facing this Nation today.

I have got to say that I am rather amazed that you would pass it off so loosely; that you do not even feel it is worth bringing to the President's attention.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, you asked me to try to be brief. I would like to take a couple of minutes on this one answer. You have raised several different points here.

First, on the question of turf fights, that phrase is your characterization and I am not quarreling with it. I have tried in several different answers and in several different ways to suggest that the people involved are disagreeing on what they take to be the merits as a matter of good faith, or at least to some considerable extent.

I do not think that it can be viewed simply as a bureaucratic problem. There is a legitimate difference of view intellectually as to the relative return on investment in these activities. That is one.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, those people who disagree, are they within the Customs Service?

Mr. DARMAN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are those people within the Treasury Department?

Mr. DARMAN. I have some doubts as to the validity of assertions about all of these areas, in terms of the quality of the data and the methodology involved in determining what is the return on investment.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK, you have got doubts about the data.

Mr. DARMAN. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do those who have doubts about this particular method, this particular link in the chain, this particular defense in the war on drugs, which is at our borders, then come from other agencies?

Mr. DARMAN. Which is natural.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. And you just got through admitting to us that what we have before us is a turf war.

Mr. DARMAN. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, you said that turf war existed, did you not?

Mr. DARMAN. I was only trying to do this. I am not quarreling with the term, but it is your term. I am saying that I would—turf war implies a certain pettiness.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, it is petty.

Mr. DARMAN. In the nature of the concern. Well, there is probably some degree of that; what I am saying is, that unfortunately, it is probably due to the fact that there are humans involved.

In addition, there is a legitimate intellectual dispute here. For example, there has been reference to the increase in investigations. People like the Attorney General—who is as committed to winning this war, I would respectfully suggest, as you are, sir—I think, as a matter of good faith would have a notion as to the higher return on investment in investigations because they are more involved with

investigations than perhaps someone associated with defending the proposition with respect to air interdiction.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let me ask you this, Mr. Darman.

Mr. DARMAN. As a matter of good faith is all I am saying.

Mr. ENGLISH. Does the Attorney General have responsibility over interdiction?

Mr. DARMAN. The Attorney General is, by statute, the head of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, which is responsible for coordinating overall enforcement and presenting to the Congress a plan for resource allocation across all these areas. In that sense, he has a responsibility.

In operational terms, he does not with respect to the air and marine interdiction programs.

Mr. ENGLISH. So he has no operational responsibility whatsoever for interdiction. He has responsibility for investigations. And we think that, my goodness, is this not amazing that the Attorney General has come to the conclusion that his Department's work, his agency's work, the Department of Justice, in investigation is more important than what other people do.

Now that sets us off on some kind of intellectual pursuit that I find quite troubling, Mr. Darman, given the history and given the source of the information the Attorney General is getting.

I think that we need a strong investigative effort. I have always said that. I think every link in the chain in the war on drugs needs to be strong. But I am very aware that a feud has been going on for better than a decade now between the Treasury Department and the Justice Department on this very issue, on interdiction.

And it troubles me a little bit that you folks—someone like yourself—would not expect that the Attorney General, who receives all of his information from the very bureaucrats that have been involved in this feud for better than a decade, would come to that conclusion, that you think that is some intellectual pursuit that is taking place by objective people. I can just tell you that it is not.

Let me go on to a question with regard to intelligence. Would you agree that intelligence is important, Mr. Darman, in this war?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes, sir, of course.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is human intelligence important?

Mr. DARMAN. Yes; in fact, you can run down the list. I might save you a little bit of time. Every link in the chain, I think, is important.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is signal intelligence important?

Mr. DARMAN. All of these things which you may list I will say are important.

Mr. ENGLISH. And that is a part of our overall tactical intelligence, correct?

Mr. DARMAN. Correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Drug interdiction intelligence is one of the areas that has been pointed out that we need to be stronger in. The administration, even the Justice Department seems to agree to that, and in the budget, OMB even agrees to that. Now given that fact and the need for greater intelligence, how do you justify the deletion from the budget of those very types of resources?

Mr. DARMAN. Well, what is involved is a question of the rate of improvement in these capacities, not a diminution of the capacities. And that is what the entire—

Mr. ENGLISH. Let me save you—

Mr. DARMAN [continuing]. Argument is about. We are not trying to diminish any present capacity. We are, as I have suggested, marginally increasing it. And the difference is over the rate at which we should improve.

Mr. ENGLISH. Identify for me, if you would, Mr. Darman, identify for me that aspect of the budget in which we have increased tactical intelligence. Tell me what in the budget is increased—

Mr. DARMAN. I did not assert that we had increased it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Or did you delete it? Reduce it?

Mr. DARMAN. There is a reduction, I believe, relative to the continuing resolution. That is not relative to current performance.

Mr. ENGLISH. But what about with regard to the 1987 budget that the President came forth with? Did it contain deletions of elements of tactical intelligence that were planned for the future? Were not those elements deleted?

Mr. DARMAN. Maybe we have a semantic difference. I am comparing the proposed capacity with what exists in reality, and you are comparing it with what exists on paper.

Mr. ENGLISH. What we are talking about here, Mr. Darman, is the war on drugs. We are talking about the war on drugs. We are talking about the overall effort and what we are going to be able to do to keep this cocaine that is entering this country, and these other drugs, from reaching the street.

And, according to the administration, one of the most important elements that we have got to focus on is intelligence. We have got to have intelligence.

Now that is true of even those folks that are involved over at the Justice Department in this intellectual pursuit that you are talking about on interdiction.

So we all agree that we need tactical intelligence, that it is a critical element that we have to have. Then the question arises, why did the administration eliminate tactical intelligence as well as interdiction?

Mr. DARMAN. Again, Mr. Chairman, I am not trying to disagree with you about the importance of any one of these areas of activity you might point to. Where we seem to be differing—we are differing—is over the rate of increase in the development of capacity. To my knowledge, we are not proposing a decrease in real capacity. I could check that with the Commissioner.

Mr. ENGLISH. The rate with regard to signal intelligence, information that—what we are talking about is the capability to have tactical intelligence from a signal nature, intercepting communications, learning what rug smugglers are doing. That is part of the whole intelligence operation. That is what you struck.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, the point is this, if I might just say, sir. I believe what you are referring to is the rescission in 1986; is that correct? And the COMINT line in that.

Mr. ENGLISH. No, what I am talking about are the intelligence systems that were to go into the F-3. That is tactical intelligence.

Mr. DARMAN. For the P-3A's. But those—this is why I say, I think our difference may be semantic. Those do not exist today in the P. So what we are doing is not eliminating these.

Mr. ENGLISH. Neither does the intelligence. That is exactly the point, Mr. Darman. You come up here and you tell us, well, we have an intellectual disagreement with regard to whether we ought to have interdiction. All right, let us give you that much.

Mr. DARMAN. No, sir; with regard to the relative investment in interdiction.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, whether it is worth it or not. That is what you are saying.

Mr. DARMAN. No, how much is worth it and what kind.

Mr. ENGLISH. All right. Have it however you want to do it. The point is, we are not going to be pursuing the plans that we had for the future, as far as enhancing that overall link in the war on drugs at our border.

What you have said is, we need to focus more on intelligence. We need to focus on investigations. Well, I am sure the Attorney General is pleased as punch about the fact that you have come to that conclusion. That is how it appears—that the Justice Department has won the turf war, and you seem to become all encumbered in this intellectual pursuit with regard to interdiction.

So I am now asking you to focus on this other element that the administration says is important, which is intelligence. And what I am saying to you is, you cut that, too. You wiped that out as well, as far as any kind of tactical intelligence, being able to respond and deal in a timely fashion.

Mr. DARMAN. I suppose we can keep having this exchange.

Mr. ENGLISH. And let me say this. This is something the President had already approved.

Mr. DARMAN. I suppose we can keep having this exchange. But what I am saying, sir, is that we are not increasing the capacity in that area, that specific area as rapidly as you would wish, which is, in my opinion, quite different than heading downward in an area.

I have tried to be as straightforward as I could be about that in my testimony. I am not pretending that we are seeking some massive improvement in the current capacity. I said that explicitly in the testimony.

I said that what we are doing is improving marginally overall, and that is to be distinguished from a reversal on the one hand, and as rapid a rate of increase as some others might like on the other hand.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, let us move on to another area.

We have seen that you are very vulnerable to the drug smugglers' ability to monitor Customs' radio frequencies. You know, they do things as simple as just sitting on a beach and listening to your operational frequencies to see where you are and what you are doing. Then they simply radio that information to a smuggler that is coming in, and he simply avoids where the Customs forces may be. Everyone has acknowledged that is a problem.

But your 1987 budget deletes funds that would have been provided to allow the Customs Service the ability to have secure radio transmissions so that smugglers could not carry out that kind of monitoring.

Why are we deliberately providing the smugglers with that kind of an advantage? And that is what you are doing.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, the smugglers currently have the advantage in this area, as you know, and I am not denying that at all. I agree with you with respect to the desirability of secure communications. Anyone would, I think, who would look at this area.

I think we currently have something less than 40 percent secure voice communication capacity in terms of the number of planes. I am not sure of that, but in any case, it is certainly not anything remotely comprehensive.

But again, the same question arises. What does one get for a marginal change in that investment, compared with a marginal change somewhere else? If one were saying—what we really ought to do is have a massive change in this, and this, I think is a thoroughly respectable approach to the problem. Let us define everything it takes to do this job.

We would find that it is a very large amount of resources. One might well be able to justify the return on the investment at some substantial large scale. At these small increments, it is very difficult to adjust, and in tight budgetary times, things that are difficult to justify tend to suffer.

Because the problem is, as you know better than I do, sir, for the marginal increase there is still a substantial gap—a very large gap—and with that gap, the possibility of diversion continues to exist. The smugglers are sophisticated. They can beat a system that is not balanced and comprehensive.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let me respond very quickly, Mr. Darman. We are going to have to move on as we are short on time. But let me say this though, it was high enough priority and concern that the FBI got it. It was a high enough concern that Secret Service got it. Everybody got it except the Customs Service, you know.

And it might be one of the reasons that in any study that you do in the future, interdiction is going to prove to be weak. It is because it does not have the resources, and it is because the administration has not seen fit to make the fight.

What we see, Mr. Darman—and it is very simple—you all over at the Treasury Department did not feel that this was important enough to go talk to the President personally about it. It was not a high priority on your list. It is not a high priority on the administration's list.

What you, in effect, are doing, is running up the white flag at the shores of this Nation. You have given up. You are saying that we are no longer going to make a strong effort to stop drug smugglers at the border of this country. You are going to let them in. You might as well run up the welcome flag and say, drug smugglers, you have got a free pass to come into this country. We will try to catch you after you arrive in this Nation, after you have broken down the drugs, after you have scattered them all across this country and made them available to our people. That is where the Reagan administration is going to make its fight and make its stand.

But as far as the shores of this Nation, and trying to stop these drugs in bulk while it is all together, where we can make the greatest impact, we are not going to do it. We are going to give up.

And let me say one other thing. Under Gramm-Rudman, as I pointed out in my opening statement, we would have seen the reduction in this program the same as every other. It would have come from that 75 million dollars' worth of operating, gas, and oil money, down to about \$71.8 million.

No, it does not even hit the norm, that you will allow it to take its normal Gramm-Rudman cut. You are going to go beyond that. You are going to try to put some additional money, as Senator DeConcini pointed out, into foreign aid. So you are going to put some money into foreign aid, and are going to cut this program on down even far below that. Down to about—what? Thirty percent. I know it is 52. Is 30 percent reduction of that what we have? Thirty percent reduction in the program?

You know, you can come up and talk to us about how committed you are, or how much you believe in this, what questions you have, what intellectual pursuits you want to follow, and how we need studies, and we need to do this and do that. But what it comes down to, Mr. Darman, is that this is the fifth year of this administration's commitment in the war on drugs, and you are surrendering. You are giving up. That is the bottom line.

Mr. VON RAAB. Mr. Chairman, if I might just make one comment on that radio situation. I do not want to leave the impression that the Customs Service is not increasing substantially its privacy radio situation.

As you well know, 97 mobile high frequency single side band radios, which are state-of-the-art virtually, have been ordered from Rockwell. And as a matter of fact, on January 21, we exercised an option to purchase an additional 30. With these we will be able to outfit very, very effectively our marine fleet, as well as our planes.

And so, I did not want to leave the impression on the record that our air and marine efforts were in any way compromised by this prospective investment of \$6 million, which is really radios for other parts of the country not related to the air and marine effort.

Mr. ENGLISH. I want to recognize Congressman Miller for a question. And then, Mr. Darman, tomorrow we would like to ask that the Treasury Department again be represented. As I understand, Mr. Keating may be available, we would hope that Commissioner von Raab might be available. We do have a number of additional questions to ask in this area. I know that you cannot return tomorrow.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for calling these hearings on drug interdiction.

I come from an area, the Pacific Northwest, that I think, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Darman, that you realize is an area that has a growing drug problem. There has been an increase in drug smuggling activity, and a lot of attention from the national media on that.

Now, Mr. Darman, I think we are all concerned about what is going to be happening across the country. But my concern is particularly the Northwest, in light of the 1987 budget proposals. Last year we fought very hard to get additional Customs agents on board in that area.

Now the rumors are that all those gains are going to be lost, and more. Routine patrols have been suspended.

What can you tell people in the Northwest who have been reading all this about how drug smuggling activities are increasing through the San Juan Islands and all, what can you tell them about the impact of the 1987 budget?

Mr. VON RAAB. Mr. Miller, if I might attempt to answer that. I believe that the issues that have been brought to our attention in Seattle by Senators Gordon and Evans have to do with the inspectors that are, or would be stationed at the Seattle Airport. It is not a question of agents. Agents are our, in effect, investigators. There are plenty of agents out there. They do a good job.

Patrols as such, at a land border are not run. The issue is inspectors. We have responded to that. At this very minute, there is a Customs team from headquarters in Seattle. They are accompanied by members of Senator Gordon's and Evans' staff, as well as some staff from other Members of Congress.

When we receive their recommendations, I can assure you that we will take whatever action is necessary to ensure that there is adequate inspector coverage to prevent drugs from being smuggled at the Seattle Airport.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I know you are anxious to close. May I offer two sentences in response to your rather long criticism of our approach?

I just would like to reemphasize that far from giving up—in a context in which we have what is widely agreed to be a major deficit problem, in which we are proposing to zero out over 60 different areas of programmatic activity within this budget, and in some cases whole agencies—the area of drug enforcement is increasing to a level of roughly \$1.8 billion. It is increasing by a couple of hundred million dollars.

Our difference is over the allocation within that large amount. That, I take to be a legitimate difference and an important one, well worth the attention and investigation that you are requiring of it. But I do not think it is fair, sir, to suggest that anyone in this administration is taking the war on drugs anything other than as seriously as the Congress.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, let me say this in response, Mr. Darman.

The Chief of Staff at the White House, Mr. Regan—when he was Secretary of the Treasury, we found that Mr. Regan felt it was more important to do an office renovation, and to take money out of the drug program to do it.

That is where I got my first real insight as to the priorities of the administration on the war on drugs. When office renovation becomes more important than flying airplanes for the war on drugs, you know, that says a lot to me. This budget says a lot to me.

Now I realize you have got a very difficult problem, and I have got to say, I have got a lot of admiration for you coming up here and trying to defend the indefensible. That is an impossible job, and you have done as well as anybody possibly could under the circumstances. And as I said, I commend you for that mighty struggle.

But still, I would advocate that we need strong links all the way through on the war on drugs. We need to try to stop drugs before they leave South America. We need to deal with crop eradication,

and the governments where those drugs are produced. We need to hit the transit countries and deal with it there.

We need to try to stop it as it comes to our borders. And certainly, we need to investigate and deal with it here at home. And we also need a strong education program.

The only thing I am seeing in this budget is that we are putting all of our eggs in one basket. It is all going into the basket of investigations, and I am sure that makes folks over at the Justice Department very happy.

And I would say to you, I do not think we are going to be very successful in the future, and we are not going to offer much hope to the American people in the war on drugs by saying, folks, we just hope that they catch them before they sell it to your kids.

Thank you.

Mr. DARMAN. Mr. Chairman, could I again state what I said at the outset. That I thank you for the opportunity to have presented our perspective. I am sorry it is not fully persuasive. I hope over time we may come to some agreement, and we will look forward to being represented tomorrow.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much. I appreciate that, Mr. Darman.

Next we have a couple of our outstanding House Members who will accompany our next witness. We are very happy to have Chairman Pepper, as well as Chairman Fascell, who will be accompanying the Honorable Robert Graham, Governor of Florida.

And we have also been joined up here by Senator Chiles. Senator, we appreciate your coming over.

Mr. CHILES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to attend. I want to congratulate you on the work you do in this area on your subcommittee.

Mr. ENGLISH. Over here on the House side, Chairman Fascell and Chairman Pepper are well-known stalwarts in the frontline on the war on drugs. And certainly over in the Senate, Senator Chiles is another one of those champions. We are very proud and very pleased to have you join us.

Governor Graham, we know of the outstanding work that you have been doing down in the State of Florida. We are looking forward to hearing from the frontline, because Florida is definitely the frontline as far as the war on drugs.

So, we appreciate your appearance before us and would be happy to receive your testimony.

Chairman Pepper.

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAUDE PEPPER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, and my colleagues. Florida, as you know is the most adversely affected State by the drug traffic. Fortunately, we have a Governor who is deeply concerned, and has given a magnificent example of leadership on the part of the State, working with the Federal Government in combating this dangerous menace to our people and to our country.

Governor Graham has been, not long ago, chairman of the Southern Governors Conference, showing a recognition that his colleagues afforded to him. He is now chairman of the Criminal Justice Section of the National Governors Conference, making him particularly fitted to deal with the subject of your hearing today.

He is nearing the end of a successful second term as Governor of our State, beloved, respected, and admired by the people of our State. So it is a great pleasure on my part to have the honor to present to this distinguished committee our distinguished Governor, Bob Graham.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Chairman Pepper. Chairman Fascell.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am delighted to be back in this committee room again where I served so happily with you and others on this committee for so many years.

And I would say, Mr. Chairman, that it is no surprise—or it should not be to anybody to see so many Members of the Florida delegation in this room today on this very important subject. Senator Chiles, Representatives Tom Lewis, Claude Pepper, and myself, and others who have been following very carefully the fine work being done by your subcommittee.

First, I would like to express my appreciation to you because of your determined and continuing interest in this entire subject. We in Florida, where we feel like we are the focal point, recognize that this is a national and international problem however, and that it impinges on everybody in the country.

But our Governor has taken a very strong lead on this subject, because of deep personal conviction, as well as carrying out the responsibilities of his office. He has taken leadership on matters of budget and education and drugs, and has made an outstanding Governor, we believe, one of the best in the entire country.

And so we are very proud to have him here today, to continue this dialog that is so essential to Florida. These problems are specifically attributable to our area only because of an accident of geography, perhaps more than anything else.

Nevertheless, it is very real to us and to our constituents. It seems like we are fighting a battle against the ocean constantly in terms of the Federal Government, whether it's because of the recognition or lack of recognition of the problem; whether it is budget problems; or whatever it is.

We feel that the drug problem is a national one. It is not only the responsibility of local and State jurisdictions, where it is far beyond their capability to control.

Down the hall, just 100 feet from here in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, a similar hearing on this same subject is being held on the other end of the problem, as you have suggested, Mr. Chairman. A Floridian is chairman of the Narcotics Task Force on the international side. When we get through here, if that meeting is still in process, we will ask the Governor to come down there and talk about the other end of the problem also.

So we are very proud of our Governor. We are delighted he is here to discuss this matter with you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Chairman Fascell. And I might say I am delighted that you are having those hearings in the Foreign Affairs Committee.

We have just learned today that an even greater load is going to be placed on us overseas, because evidently we are running up the white flag at the borders. We are not going to have a drug interdiction program that is going to be capable of slowing down and stopping drug traffickers coming into this country.

Even under Gramm-Rudman we would have substantially more money available for gas and oil for these aircraft in an effort to keep them flying, than the White House is willing to provide—not to mention new detection devices, but we have gotten some very bad news here this morning, I am afraid.

Governor, we are looking forward to you giving us a little ray of sunshine about what is happening down in Florida.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT GRAHAM, GOVERNOR, STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to meet with you and your colleagues. I want to express my particular gratitude to my good friends, Senator Pepper and Congressman Fascell, who have been two of my lifetime teachers. I appreciate the outstanding education that they have provided me.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize my remarks with these points. First, the issue of drug trafficking is a central issue of national security. Any nation which cannot defend its own borders is a nation whose sovereignty is under assault.

Two, if there is a war against drugs—and I am not certain that that war has, in fact, been declared—we are losing it.

But third, the good news, is that it is a war which can be won. It is within our capabilities in terms of knowledge, resources, and commitment to win this war and protect the borders of the United States.

This issue has the potential of becoming our domestic Vietnam; an issue characterized by indecision, erratic behavior, and the gradual erosion of the will to win.

We in Florida have the second longest coastline in the United States, second only to Alaska. We have more than 1,200 miles of this Nation's border.

Those 1,200 miles are open to invasion by sea and by air. They are penetrated at will and repeatedly by foreign ships and planes and criminals smuggling cocaine and people in, guns and sophisticated electronic equipment out.

Florida is a painful example of just how porous our national borders are. We are vulnerable because we have failed to assert our national sovereignty. Although Florida pays the price for that failure first, we will all pay eventually. No part of America will be untouched.

I am here today to talk about what Florida has learned about protecting our Nation's borders. I am here to share our concerns

and to outline our needs, which we do not consider to be parochial needs, but national needs.

We are under a state of siege. To be anything less than the absolute victor is unthinkable. A nation which can successfully track and force down an Egyptian airliner over the Mediterranean in the middle of the night and bring terrorists to justice ought to be able to intercept a single-engine Cessna loaded with drugs which lands and offloads its cargo in the Florida Keys.

But our lack of a strong commitment advertises that our borders are wide open. This chart indicates the major routes of which drugs are brought into the United States. There is no lack of criminals prepared to respond to the invitation which we are sending.

Today an undetected Cessna brings a cargo of drugs. Tomorrow it could just as easily bring a cargo of terrorists and bombs.

Floridians have been on the forefront for too long. The time has come for real protection, not rhetoric and procrastination.

In 1982, Vice President George Bush declared war on drugs in south Florida and announced the formation of the Vice President's South Florida Task Force on Drugs. Three years later, Drug Enforcement Agency statistics indicate that 70 to 80 percent of all illegal narcotics annually are smuggled into the United States through Florida.

The DEA further estimates that we are stopping only 15 to 17 percent of the drugs coming into this country. Eighty percent of the cocaine seized each year in this country is seized in Florida. The amount of cocaine seized doubles each year. The amount of cocaine which slips across the border undetected increases proportionally. Cocaine consumption rose 11 percent in the United States from 1984 to 1985.

President Reagan has said, "The simple truth is we have lost control of our own borders. No nation can do that and survive." I agree with President Reagan. No nation can lose control of its borders and survive.

We cannot accept this dramatic escalation of drug traffic and abuse. We cannot leave control of our borders to drug smugglers.

Florida, positioned squarely at the convergence of the hemispheres, knows about vulnerability. But we also know about priorities and pragmatic prevention.

We have the available resources to make a difference; the technology, the surveillance tools, the enforcement agencies. What we lack is a national will to use those resources effectively and unstintingly to protect Florida and the rest of the Nation from foreign intervention in any form.

Success in securing our borders calls for a change of attitude. It does not have to be the most expensive. We already have most of the elements we need to stop illegal traffic of any kind from threatening our coastline and our airports and seaports.

I might share with you, Mr. Chairman, the experience in our State. Our State law enforcement agencies, working in conjunction with other States in a covert operation, have shown that it is possible to monitor, and to intercept low-flying aircraft carrying illegal drugs.

We also found that such covert operations are low cost and effective. We have found that the seizure of the aircraft carrying the contraband can offset the cost of the surveillance.

At last count there were 37 different Federal agencies, offices and administration spread over five Cabinet departments, including the Executive Office of the President, waging the drug war.

This sprawling collection of agencies and intelligence cries out for coordination. And indeed, we anticipated, as I believe that you did as well, Mr. Chairman, that the 1984 Crime Control Act which created the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board to be administered by a sort of national drug czar, most likely the Attorney General, would finally bring order to this confusion.

This has not happened. The proposed cuts in the air interdiction program of the Customs Service, which prompted today's hearing and my letter of protest to the President on January 16, indicate unmistakably that there is no centralized program to combat drug trafficking.

In that letter we warned that the proposal to slash the air program of the Customs Service would send a dangerous signal to the drug traffickers that we are not serious in our war to stem the relentless flow of drugs into our country.

We are not stopping enough drug planes now. We cannot cut back on our efforts to detect drug smugglers and deter drug trafficking. The Customs air interdiction program needs more support, not less, if we are serious about winning the war.

We cannot cut back on our support of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard functions as an integral part of our national security. Therefore, to regard it as a domestic program ignores its mission to patrol our coast, identifying and interdicting unauthorized vessels and planes which try to cross our borders.

Florida knows how crucial this effort is in the apprehension of drug and people smugglers. Florida is a continual target for illegal smugglers and for waves of refugees turned out of their homelands by arrogant dictators or by unendurable poverty.

We contacted Secretary of State Shultz twice in December to ask the Federal Government to intervene with the Bahamian Government to forestall the expulsion of as many as 40,000 Haitians living illegally in the Bahamas.

Florida asked that consideration be given to an expansion of the interdiction agreement with Haiti to include immediate repatriation of Haitians attempting to migrate illegally from a third country to the United States when those Haitians are intercepted by the Coast Guard.

Current troubles in Haiti underscore our sense of urgency regarding illegal Haitian migration.

The human cost for this failure to secure our borders and enforce a sensible immigration policy is incalculable. Illegal immigration is not solely a Florida problem, but it is one of which Floridians are painfully aware.

This has given us in Florida a mandate, to share what we have learned with the rest of the Nation about protecting our border. Drugs which are smuggled into Florida today wind up on the streets of North Carolina and Iowa and Oklahoma tomorrow.

Florida has learned to regard the Coast Guard as a defense resource. Therefore, we feel it makes good sense to specifically fund those multimission Coast Guard programs which result in securing our borders. Funding those programs under the Department of Defense is not only appropriate, it serves to encourage increased emphasis on the Coast Guard as the invaluable defense resource it surely is.

Florida heartily endorses continuation of partial Coast Guard funding through the Navy's Coastal Defense Military Augmentation—the account which was created last year to fund capital expenses such as vessels, aircraft and equipment. The \$375 million allocated to the Coast Guard last year through this fund will be critical in maintaining drug patrols in the Windward Passage and other sensitive drug and people smuggling routes into the United States.

We know how important those patrols are. We know firsthand that when the DEA says, as it did recently, that more drugs are on the streets—purer, stronger, cheaper drugs—those streets may be in Miami and Key West and Fort Lauderdale and Orlando, but we know that tomorrow they will be in the streets of your city: Baltimore, Chicago, Brooklyn, New Orleans, Tulsa, Cleveland, and Memphis.

Florida's geography confers on us the responsibility to be the national leader in the war on drugs, and I am pleased at the fact that so many members of our delegation have accepted that leadership. Because we are aware of the extent of the problem, we must all be tireless in educating other communities and in suggesting effective solutions.

America's Constitution confers on the Federal Government the responsibility to protect our citizens from foreign invasion. We have the technology, we have the military means to do this, whether the invasion be of drugs or of terrorism or of anything else unwelcome and uninvited.

It is Florida's experience and our recommendation that the Federal Government assign to the military responsibility for the identification of unknown aircraft and sea vessels entering U.S. territory. With military technology we could do a better job of cutting off the drug trade before it gets to our streets.

It is Florida's experience and our recommendation that we reposition the Coast Guard as a defense resource. We should consider the Coast Guard's mission for military border surveillance with the degree of importance assigned to detection of hostile missiles and bombers.

There is no such thing as a minor violation of our borders.

It is Florida's experience and our recommendation that Coast Guard interdiction and repatriation of illegal aliens attempting to enter our country be expanded and intensified. We are confronted with upheaval in Haiti and the end of amnesty in the Bahamas. We are far from the days of naivete about what this could mean to south Florida.

Nearly 2 billion dollars' worth of cocaine was seized in Florida alone last year. That is less than 20 percent of what Federal drug agents estimate is getting through.

It is Florida's experience and our recommendation that we face the enormous and immediate challenge of securing our borders. There is nothing half-hearted about the attempts of smugglers to breach our borders. There can be nothing half-hearted about our determination to turn them back.

We have the experience of bridging cultures and continents. We can no longer tolerate the daily bombardment of that growth and progress by willful and criminal violation of our Nation's borders.

Mr. Chairman, the good news is that we can win this struggle. With your support, with Federal cooperation, we can make it happen.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]

TESTIMONY PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE, AND AGRICULTURE

GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM
STATE OF FLORIDA

February 6, 1986

Florida has more coastline than any other state in this nation except Alaska -- and Alaska is not the primary destination on the scheduled drug route from Colombia, nor the illegal alien drop-off point from Haiti and the Bahamas and other Caribbean Basin nations.

Florida has more than 1200 miles of national border open to invasion by sea and by air, penetrated at will and repeatedly by foreign ships and planes and criminals smuggling cocaine and people in, guns and sophisticated electronic equipment out.

Florida is a painful example of just how porous our national borders are.

Florida is a graphic statement about how inattention to national security can turn state governments into international gatekeepers.

Florida is undeniable proof that we are vulnerable -- vulnerable in Oklahoma and Arizona and Washington D.C.

We are vulnerable because we have failed to assert our sovereignty.

And although Florida pays the price for that failure first -- we all pay eventually. None of us is untouched.

We are vulnerable to the unchecked arrival of illegal drugs and aliens -- even pests and bacterial diseases such as the Mediterranean Fruit Fly and the Citrus Canker which threaten our health and our livelihoods.

I am here to talk to you today about what Florida has learned about protecting our national borders. I am here to share our concerns and to outline our needs -- not parochial needs -- national needs.

We are under a state of seige. To be anything less than the absolute victors is unthinkable.

A nation which can successfully track and force down an Egyptian airliner and bring terrorists to justice ought to be able to intercept a single-engine Cessna loaded with drugs which lands and offloads its cargo in the Keys.

But our lack of a strong commitment advertises that our borders are wide open -- and there is no lack of criminals to respond to that invitation.

Today an undetected Cessna brings a cargo of drugs. Tomorrow it could bring terrorists -- and bombs,

Floridians have been on the frontline for too long. The time has come for real protection -- not rhetoric and procrastination.

In 1982, Vice President George Bush declared war on drugs in South Florida and announced the formation of the Vice

President's South Florida Task Force on Drugs.

Four years later Drug Enforcement Agency statistics indicate that 70% to 80% of all illegal narcotics annually smuggled into the United States enter through Florida.

The DEA further estimates that we are stopping only about 15% - 17% of drugs coming into this country.

80% of the cocaine seized each year in this country is seized in Florida.

The amount of cocaine seized doubles every year but so does the amount of cocaine that slips across the border undetected.

In 1982 6,500 pounds of cocaine was seized in Florida. In 1983 -- 12,000 lbs. In 1984 -- 21,000 lbs. In 1985 -- 50,000 lbs.

Confiscations are up dramatically right along with cocaine traffic.

Cocaine consumption rose 11% from 1984 to 1985.

Designer drugs and amphetamine consumption rose 15%

The drugs which are delivered here are distributed here and across the country -- and they are being used by more and more people each year.

State and local arrests for serious drug-related crimes in Florida were up approximately 25% last year.

Nationally, the percentage of arrests for major drug crimes is increasing.

The tragedy is that the drug trafficking is escalating faster than the arrest rate.

President Reagan has said, "The simple truth is we have lost control of our own borders. And no nation can do that and survive."

I agree with President Reagan. We cannot accept this dramatic escalation of drug traffic and abuse.

We cannot leave control of our borders up to the drug smugglers.

Florida, positioned squarely in the convergence of the hemispheres, knows about vulnerability. But we also know about priorities and pragmatic prevention.

We have the available resources to make a difference -- the technology -- the surveillance tools -- the enforcement agencies.

What we lack is a national will to use those resources effectively and unstintingly to protect Florida and the rest of the nation from foreign intervention in any form.

Success in securing our borders calls for a change in attitude. Simply put: It has to be the most important thing.

It does not have to be the most expensive. We already have most of the elements we need to stop illegal traffic of any kind from threatening our coastline and our airports and seaports.

At last count there were at least 37 different agencies, offices and administrations spread out over five Cabinet Departments, including the Executive Office of the President, waging the drug war.

The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System is under the nominal control of the Vice-President.

The Coast Guard operates under the Department of Transportation.

The Customs Service is under the Treasury Department.

The Attorney General controls the Drug Enforcement Agency and the FBI.

The Bureau of International Narcotics Matters is the responsibility of the Secretary of State.

Intelligence gathered by the AWAKS is provided by the Secretary of Defense.

This sprawling collection of agencies and intelligence cries out for coordination and indeed we anticipated that the 1984 Crime Control Act which created the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board to be administered by a sort of national drug czar, most likely the Attorney General, would finally wrest order from the confusion.

This has not happened. The proposed cuts in the air interdiction program of the Customs Service, which prompted today's hearing and my letter of protest to the President on January 16, indicate unmistakably that there is no centralized program to combat drug traffic.

In that letter we warned that the proposal to slash the air program of the Customs Service would send a dangerous signal to drug traffickers that we are not serious in our war to stem the relentless flow of drugs into our country.

We are not stopping enough drug planes now.

We cannot cut back on our efforts to detect drug smugglers and deter drug trafficking.

The Customs air interdiction program needs more support, not less, if we are serious about winning the war against drug smuggling.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement seized 105 drug planes within the Florida borders in the last two and a half years. At least 50% of those had not been picked up by radar as they approached the coastline. Some were spotted by citizens as the planes landed on remote airstrips. Some crashed in farm fields or in the Everglades.

That number is not even a fraction of what is getting through undetected. Most planes make multiple drug runs. No one knows how many successful trips occur before a plane is finally caught and confiscated.

A common method of delivering drugs is the air drop. Those

planes slide in under radar, jettison their cargo and continue on their flight. They are unapprehended and uncounted.

We cannot afford to cut back on support for the Customs air interdiction program.

And we cannot cut back on our support of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard functions as an integral part of our national security, therefore, to regard it as a domestic program ignores its mission to patrol our coasts, identifying and interdicting unauthorized vessels and planes which try to cross our borders.

Florida knows how crucial this effort is in the apprehension of drug and people smugglers.

The states share many responsibilities with the federal government and will be actively participating in the balance of necessary budget cuts and the needs of the American people. We recognize this as a shared endeavor.

Nonetheless, we completely and rightly depend on the federal government to protect our borders from illegal immigration and drug smuggling. In fact, one of the primary responsibilities of the federal government is the defense of our country and the protection of our borders.

Florida is a continual target for people smugglers and for waves of refugees turned out of their homelands by arrogant dictators or by unendurable poverty.

We have witnessed Fidel Castro direct our immigration policy at whim -- and we have paid the price.

We have seen the bodies of drowned Haitians on our beaches and we've caught smugglers with Pakistanis and Colombians in speedboats in our waterways.

We have had to brace ourselves everytime there is unrest in some country in our part of the world.

We contacted Secretary of State Shultz twice in December to ask the federal government to intervene with the Bahamian government to forestall the expulsion of as many as 40,000 Haitians living illegally in the Bahamas.

Florida asked that the Bahamian government be encouraged to adopt a realistic immigration policy with regard to Haitians living and working there.

And Florida asked that consideration be given to expansion of the interdiction agreement with Haiti to include immediate repatriation of Haitians attempting to migrate illegally from a third country to the U.S. when those Haitians are intercepted by the Coast Guard.

We feel the State Department response to our concerns and this potentially explosive human situation has been untimely and inadequate.

The current troubles in Haiti underscore our sense of urgency regarding illegal Haitian migration.

The human cost for this failure to secure our borders and enforce a sensible immigration policy is incalculable.

The dollars and cents figures are available. There are many states which can compute them for you.

Illegal immigration is not solely a Florida problem. But it is one of which Floridians are painfully aware.

Florida is still owed over \$150 million dollars as the federal share of responsibility for costs incurred by the Mariel Boatlift. Florida had to fight for the \$300 million federal reimbursement received so far.

Our hospitals were, and still are, overcrowded. Our schools were overburdened. Our social services were overwhelmed. Our jails are, even now, at capacity.

We had people sleeping on the streets and in the Orange Bowl.

We had the glare of national attention focussed on an event and an aftermath that abruptly depressed a major industry -- tourism.

We had racial-economic tensions exacerbated to the exploding point -- riots, the destruction of property, the loss of jobs.

We paid a heavy price for federal failure to secure our borders. And we are still paying.

The irony is that the the U.S. Constitution plainly states: "The Congress shall have the power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization."

Nowhere in the Constitution does it state that Florida shall be responsible for U.S. immigration policy and enforcement.

Nowhere in the Constitution does it state that Florida should patrol the high seas and the skies, protecting the country against invasion.

Nowhere in the Constitution does it state that the citizens of Florida shall pick up the tab for a breakdown in our national security.

Nowhere in the Constitution does it state that Florida shall negotiate with foreign powers to keep their citizens at home and to take back those apprehended trying to enter the United States illegally.

Yet in Florida we have learned that all too often a problem which is first felt here is left to us to deal with.

This has given us a certain unwanted expertise in coping with national emergencies.

This has given us a sense of urgency about laxness in matters of national security.

This has given us a mandate to share what we have learned with the rest of the nation about protecting our borders.

The drugs which are smuggled into Florida today wind up on the streets of North Carolina or Iowa tomorrow.

Those drugs rob our children of their futures and our nation of the productivity of its people.

The refugees who are smuggled into Florida today wind up in the public hospitals of New York, and the jails of West Virginia tomorrow.

All over the country citizens who have waited years to legally bring their loved ones here go on waiting as the INS system bogs down and the quotas fill up.

Florida has learned to regard the Coast Guard as a defense resource. Therefore we feel it makes good sense to specially fund those multi-mission Coast Guard programs which result in securing our borders. Funding those programs under the Department of Defense is not only appropriate -- it serves to encourage increased emphasis on the Coast Guard as the invaluable defense resource it is.

Florida heartily endorses continuation of partial Coast Guard funding through the Navy's Coastal Defense Military Augmentation -- the account which was created last year to fund capital expenses such as vessels, aircraft and equipment. The \$375 million allocated to the Coast Guard last year through this fund will be critical in maintaining drug patrols in the Windward Passage and other sensitive drug and people smuggling routes to the United States.

We know how important those patrols are. We know firsthand that when the DEA says, as it did recently, that more drugs are on the streets -- purer, stronger drugs -- cheaper drugs -- those streets are in Miami and in Key West and in Fort Lauderdale and in Orlando.

And we know that tomorrow those drugs will be on the streets of your cities -- in Baltimore and in Chicago and in Brooklyn and in New Orleans and in Cleveland and in Memphis.

Florida's geography confers on us the responsibility to be the national leader in the war on drugs. Because we are aware of the extent of the problem we must be tireless in educating other communities -- and in suggesting effective solutions.

America's Constitution confers on the federal government the responsibility to protect our citizens from foreign invasion. We have the technology and the military means to do this -- whether the invasion be of drugs or of terrorism or of anything else unwelcome or uninvited.

It is Florida's experience and our recommendation that the federal government assign to the military responsibility for the identification of unknown aircraft and sea vessels entering U.S. territory. With military technology we could do a better job of cutting off the drug trade before it reaches our streets.

It is Florida's experience and our recommendation that we reposition the Coast Guard as a Defense resource. We should consider the Coast Guard's mission for military border surveillance with the degree of importance assigned to detection of hostile missiles and bombers.

There is no such thing as a minor violation of our borders.

It is Florida's experience and our recommendation that Coast Guard interdiction and repatriation of illegal aliens attempting to enter our country be expanded and intensified. We are confronted with upheaval in Haiti and the end of an amnesty in the Bahamas. We are far from the days of naivete about what that could mean to South Florida.

Nearly \$2 billion worth of cocaine was seized in Florida alone last year. Remember, that is less than 20% of what federal drug agents estimate is getting through.

It is Florida's experience and our recommendation that we face the enormous and immediate challenge of securing our borders. There is nothing half-hearted about the attempts by smugglers to breach our borders. There can be nothing half-hearted about our determination to turn them back.

The Spanish word for border is "frontera" -- frontier. Florida is literally our southeastern frontier -- a threshold of discovery.

We have the experience of bridging cultures and continents. We can no longer tolerate the daily bombardment of that growth and progress by willful and criminal violations of our national borders.

We can win this struggle.

We can erase the harsh reality of life on the frontlines -- and replace it with the bright promise of the frontier.

With your support -- with federal cooperation -- we can make it happen.

Mr. PEPPER. Very good.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Governor. That was an excellent statement, and I might say, a very encouraging one too. You are to be commended for it.

I would simply say again, our previous witness was not as encouraging. We learned earlier today that, evidently, the war on drugs is being fought in much the same manner the war in Vietnam was fought, by bickering bureaucrats here in Washington who change priorities and determine where resources are needed based on turf, not based on needs, not based on trying to put together an effort that is going to win.

As I mentioned, it appears from what we are reading that the war on drugs, and particularly that part affecting drug interdiction, which has played such a major role in Florida, of course, is one in which we are surrendering.

The Reagan administration is not even going to stand with the cuts that were brought about under Gramm-Rudman. We are going to cut some 30 percent out of the drug interdiction program. That is bound to have an effect in Florida, and certainly it is going to have an effect all across the Nation.

I think it is a grave mistake. I am going to do my best to make certain that this does not take place. I think I can speak for many of our colleagues from Florida, and whether Republicans or Democrats throughout this Nation, that we are going to do our best to make certain that that does not happen.

I think within the Congress, and within the country, and I know in the discussions I have had with the Florida natives and citizens and certain members of their delegation, that there is the stomach to win in this Nation in this war. And I think that, as far as drug interdiction and catching these smugglers as they attempt to come into our country, that we can win.

I think that we are—were on the road, and I think we can continue to be on the road to a real success, a chance of real victory, and we have to have a strong effort all the way across the line.

Certainly with Chairman Fascell's efforts in trying to deal with these drugs before they ever leave foreign shores, and as they transit through countries coming to this Nation. Certainly as far as the Customs and Coast Guard are concerned in seizing these drugs as they enter our waters or enter our airspace, and attempt to reach our shores through a strong interdiction investigative effort.

I think we have got to underscore time and time again, a strong education program to try to persuade our citizens not to use these drugs.

Again, as I said, I think you had an outstanding statement and I certainly commend you for it.

Mr. Lewis, do you have any comments or questions that you would like to ask our witness?

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Governor, for the excellent statement.

I would like to ask a couple of questions. You have heard probably—and listened to the possible cutback in drug interdiction funding, which this subcommittee would certainly like to avoid, and all of us in the Florida delegation would like to avoid.

In your opinion, since the formation of the South Florida Task Force and the work that has been done over the past 3 years, do you feel that there has been a reduction in the flow of drug traffic into the State of Florida?

Mr. GRAHAM. No.

Mr. LEWIS. What do you think is the overall movement that would have to take place in order to reduce or eliminate the traffic in Florida?

Mr. GRAHAM. We feel that the protection of the borders of the United States is the first line of national defense. Once we decide as a nation that we will not tolerate continued penetration of our national sovereignty, whether penetration is from planes for hostile military purposes, or boats to bring drugs or illegal refugees into our country, when we give it that level of priority, then we will have taken a massive step towards the solution of this problem.

It is not a technologically constrained response. We know how to do it. It can be done. We have the capabilities. It is a matter of will and the deployment of those resources.

Mr. LEWIS. Do you feel with the steps that we have been taking over the last 3 years with the drug interdiction program that we are now right at a point where we would start moving ahead with interdiction and start seeing results?

Mr. GRAHAM. No; I think that, unfortunately, the trend line is in the opposite direction.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, without—if we took away the cutbacks that are proposed under Gramm-Rudman or otherwise, and any rescissions, with the addition of extra aircraft, additional personnel, with the additional boats and things of that nature that have been placed in Florida, which has taken over 2 years to acquire and build, do you not think that we are at a point now where we should start seeing some results?

Mr. GRAHAM. I think with all of those augmentations that you have listed, yes, Mr. Congressman, I think we can begin to see some results. I think before resources there has to be a reconceptualization of what the problem is.

This is not a drug trafficking problem. That is a symptom. The problem is that we are not defending the borders of the United States of America, and that means that we are vulnerable to whoever, for whatever purpose, desires to breach our borders. Once we decide to solve the basic problem, then we will begin to deal with the symptom of the basic problem.

Mr. LEWIS. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement has indicated that they have started to see some progress in the apprehension of drug traffickers, the reduction of air traffic, with the implementation of additional radar in the State. Do you feel that if we augment this that we should start seeing some results?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. That is why I say that this is not a technological problem. With a relatively modest commitment of resources in a covert, multistate operation we have demonstrated that it is possible to seal off our borders by the identification and interdiction of illegal planes and boats.

It has also been our experience that the value of the seized vessels, aircraft and cargo substantially pays for the operation, which

has the additional benefit of sending a strong economic message to those who would engage in this activity, that it is not going to be very profitable.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Governor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. I would like to make one very quick comment, too. I think with all this discussion of interdiction assets it should be pointed out, we have got 40 boats coming to Florida.

So we are having a very limited impact until these resources actually reach the spot, and until we have got crews to man them, and until we can communicate between boats and airplanes and other boats. And keep in mind that we do not even have that. We cannot communicate from one boat to another. We often cannot communicate from airplanes to boats and so on.

And we also have four P-3 aircraft. There were six that were supposed to be brought on line. These four have just come on line. And we do not even have crews for these aircraft.

So we are just seeing the very emergence of these new resources, and all of a sudden, whack, it has been cut right off. We are not going to be able to field this full P-3A system that we had hoped. They are going to be half a system. They are not going to have the intelligence capability that we had designed for them, which would give them the capability, certainly to do far more than simply see an aircraft through their radar.

And I think also, we have got to keep in mind the new air wing. We have got 10 Air Force Reserve aircraft that would go up that would be equipped with look-down radar and be able to supplement this, not to mention aerostats. We have just the very first ingredients of what could be an outstanding system, and which evidently, the administration has now decided to stop, to end.

I think it is tragic that they took that approach. But as I said, I think that we have plenty of people here in the Congress, and I think around the country that are dedicated to try to make sure that this effort continues.

Senator Chiles, you are one of the outstanding Members of the Senate as far as the war on drugs is concerned, and certainly your contributions to this effort have been mighty. We are very happy to have you join us today, Senator.

Mr. CHILES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate the Governor on his statement. I think it is very comprehensive. It certainly touches at what we all know are the tremendous problems that we face here and the focal point of trying to deal with those problems. And that is will, primarily, and a coordinated plan that will allow us to carry out that will once we really evidence it.

I think Governor Graham made a good point about the need to transfer the Coast Guard construction program to the Department of Defense. We know that the program is of vital importance to the drug war. It finances the procurement of our new cutters and patrol boats, aircraft and helicopters.

Unfortunately, in the transportation appropriation bill that is the first thing that is hit every time. It always is relatively easy to defer or to make construction cuts. Certainly, it is a big mistake to do that when you look at the aging status of our Coast Guard fleet and then the extent of the problem that we have just talked about.

Last year in the Senate I initiated an effort that was joined by 50 other Senators to get Defense funding for the Coast Guard, as you know. The effort resulted in the establishment of a new account at DOD, Coastal Defense Augmentation, and that was funded at \$375 million.

I think you have pointed out our disappointment to find that now the President proposes \$190 million deferral on those funds in his budget yesterday, and requested only \$77.1 million for Coast Guard construction program for this year. \$77.1 million compares to \$592 million provided last year, \$374.2 million in 1985.

I think you would certainly join with me in saying that the need has not reduced any for the Coast Guard construction. And I would like your views as to what the Governor has said about trying to see that this is a vital role for Defense, and that these construction funds should be a part of the Defense account.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would certainly concur. I think that is an outstanding proposal. Let me also state that, of course, the Coast Guard and the Department of Defense do have mutual responsibilities in this area. We have the maritime defense zone over which they have joint responsibilities.

We have got to make certain, of course, that not only the efforts in the war on drugs are maintained, but also we have our national defense to think about. This is an area that, I think, has been long neglected, and I would certainly commend you both for that proposal.

Mr. CHILES. The other item that I just wanted to dwell on a moment, and that is what the Governor has pointed out, and you have many times, about the absence of a real coordinated attack. All of the agencies we see overlapping in this, and we see no real change in that regard.

In fact, in the 1985 supplemental bill, we again wrote language in there saying that no later than the 31st of December 1985, the President shall report to the Congress on how the U.S. Government is organized to interdict drugs and enforce the drug laws of the United States, including a detailed description of the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Department of Defense and other relative departments and agencies, and the mechanisms for coordination. Coordinating the policy and operational control of the elements of each agency in the drug interdiction and law enforcement mission.

That has not been complied with. We have received no answer on that. I wrote the President yesterday pointing out the failure to comply with the requirement for the Presidential report. The Department of Defense has complied with the provision that we asked them, and they have come forward with a plan.

[Mr. Chiles' letter to the President follows:]

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

February 5, 1986

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Knowing of your leadership and strong interest in increasing the capabilities of the various Federal agencies engaged in the war against drugs, I was concerned to learn that the Fiscal Year 1987 Budget made a number of cuts to important drug interdiction programs.

As you know, the Coast Guard and the Customs Service play a vital role in the interdiction of drugs, both at sea and in the air. Of vital importance to improving the Coast Guard's ability to interdict drugs is an adequate funding level for the Acquisition, Construction and Improvement account which funds procurement of additional patrol boats, cutters, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Not only is it important to modernize aging Coast Guard equipment, but it is also important to provide the Coast Guard with additional equipment to increase its capability to interdict drugs. The construction program for the Coast Guard is proposed to be funded at a level of \$77.1 million, \$515.2 million below the level provided last year. The Budget also proposed a \$190 million deferral of 1986 funds provided for this program.

I was also disappointed to see the proposed reductions to the Customs Service's Air Interdiction program. This program, funded at \$75 million in Fiscal Year 1986, is proposed to be reduced thirty percent by a Fiscal Year 1986 rescission and funded at \$54.7 million in 1987, or twenty-seven percent below the 1986 approved level. The U. S. Customs Service's Air Interdiction program is the country's main defense against drug-smuggling by air.

Another matter of concern to me is the Administration's failure to comply with a requirement included in P.L. 99-88 to report on the overall Federal effort to interdict drugs and enforce the drug laws in the United States. The assignment for this Presidential report, due on December 31, 1985, has only recently been given to the Drug Enforcement Policy Board. The failure to meet this requirement, established in law last August, raises new questions about the quality and extent of Federal coordination of Federal drug interdiction programs and the overall level of commitment to this effort.

Mr. President, I know you share my concerns on these matters, and I look forward to working with you and your representatives in your Administration to ensure that we have the strongest possible Federal programs focused on the drug war.

Sincerely,



Lawton Chiles
United States Senator

Mr. CHILES. And yet, with our new law, with our new drug board, we cannot get an answer thus far, or compliance with the law. I think it just sort of highlights what the Governor is pointing out. We do not have anybody running the store.

I would like to know if you have got any views as to how we can change this.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I would wholeheartedly agree, Senator. That is the case, unfortunately. I think Mr. Darman this morning probably hit it on the head. He had not seen anything in the way of turf battles like this since he left the Department of Defense during the Vietnam war.

There did not seem to be much plan and direction when we were involved in that conflict, and there certainly does not seem to be much involved in this one. I am afraid that we are going down the same road that we did there, where we just drift along with no plan, no direction, and no real determination to see this thing through to a successful conclusion.

I think that if we are going to have war, and we are going to make the commitment, then we do so, and we carry out that effort. I certainly do not think that we can simply drift along.

Mr. CHILES. Well, I note that there is a series of stories that seem to come out now in certain of the magazines and all that say, we cannot win the battle. That there is no way you can stop drugs from coming in. And therefore, we have got to start thinking about how we legalize these drugs or how we take the profit motive out.

That kind of attitude certainly begins to build after awhile. When you cannot point out some results, and as Congressman Lewis has pointed out, when we provide the money for the extra boats, and we try to provide some additional planes, and yet when we see the price of cocaine dropping rather than rising, and we see the incidents of the seizures greater rather than less, we know that somehow we are not being successful.

And I think it does add to this defeatist attitude, which will become strong in this country unless we can reverse it. I agree with what the Governor says. We have the ability, literally, through the Department of Defense and others, we have the equipment. We have the personnel. It is a question of, again, getting the will and how we do that, so we stop that kind of thinking, and we convince the American people that it is a battle that we can win if we are willing to pay the price.

Mr. ENGLISH. I think that is absolutely correct. I would say, too, another indication of the retreat that evidently has been voiced by the administration is on page 18 of the budget book that we got.

It states down there, the proposed reductions in the Customs air program reflects a reorientation of scarce resources from interdiction programs into investigations and intelligence. That is another word for retreat.

I would like to recognize Congressman Clay Shaw, who is one of those fierce fighters that we have got in the war on drugs, and certainly one of the real stalwarts here in Congress in this effort.

Clay, we are delighted to have you join us this morning.

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate being invited to sit with this distinguished subcommittee, and I

would like to add words of welcome to our Governor, who I am delighted to see up here in Washington.

I would like to go back to the question that Tom Lewis asked just a few moments ago, Governor. In answer to the question whether you had seen any reduction as a result of the South Florida Task Force, and you said, no. I think that is a correct answer.

But I have another question. Do you see that the South Florida Task Force has been effective in reducing the rapidity of the growth of the problem that we are having in Florida, as well as the rest of the country?

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Congressman, the statistics that we have indicate that there has been a doubling each year in the amount of cocaine coming in through our State. There is no evidence that there has not been a proportional increase in the amount that has entered undetected. So the volume has substantially increased.

We see some evidence of that volume increase in the reduction of the price of cocaine in the marketplace. So I would have to say, sadly, that the evidence of success, of victory, are not to be found.

Again, I do not think this is an issue of drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is a symptom. The issue is the protection of the American borders.

Suppose instead of being assaulted with aircraft carrying cocaine we had intelligence that we were about to be invaded by an equal number of aircraft, each of which would have in its cargo a trained team of terrorists, and the equipment to carry out a specific task against the United States? Would we take the position that it would be tolerable for us to have the same level of penetration of our sovereignty?

Mr. SHAW. No; of course not.

Mr. Chairman, is the Governor going to be available to come back after this vote, or is his schedule where he is going to have to leave? Or does the Chair intend to carry on the hearings after the vote, because I do have—

Mr. ENGLISH. I am not sure what the Governor's schedule is. We are required to be out of this room, unfortunately. I was hoping we were going to be able to go all day, but the Appropriations Committee will meet here shortly. So if you have another question, you might—

Mr. SHAW. Let me hustle. I will be brief with my questions and perhaps the answers could be brief also.

I am concerned. I just got back from Texas with the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. Out in El Paso, TX, we heard from the Governor of Texas, Governor White, I believe it is, and Governor White was very complimentary of what we have been doing in Florida.

Yet he was very critical because he made it very clear, he says, that what you are doing in Florida is pushing the trade in through Mexico, which is coming in through the Southwestern United States.

And he and the Governor of New Mexico both asked our committee to use the Florida experiment as a blueprint, as did the attorney general of California, for their operation. But you are telling us that it is not effective.

I am trying to reconcile that because we do know that most of the heroin and a good part of the other drugs now are detouring into other parts of the country. Georgia is screaming about it, South Carolina is screaming about it. I know that your other Governors have talked to you about it.

I have been of the impression that what we are doing is displacing the problem by intensive law enforcement. I am not saying we solved the problem, because I think until we use the south Florida blueprint and expand it throughout the entire country, that we have got some serious problems.

But if this Congress is going to take what we are doing in the South Florida Task Force and apply it vigorously through the other part of the country, fight to get these flights back, fight to keep all the technology that we have and increase upon it, if what we are doing is not doing us any good then we are going in the wrong direction.

Mr. GRAHAM. You always are faced with the unknown of what would it be like if you were not doing it. But the fact is, that our Nation is being inundated by waves of illegal drugs each year substantially greater than in the previous year. We are a nation dealing with this symptom of drug trafficking, which is an economic crime and a crime of opportunity.

People are in the business to make money. They will engage in the business where they think the profits are the greatest and the risks lowest. If they think that that is in Mississippi instead of Louisiana, they will do it in Mississippi, which underscores the fact that we have got to have a national program to seal off and protect our Nation's borders.

Mr. SHAW. I quite agree with you there, Governor. But I do feel that the south Florida experience has been a very good experience. I think we need to do more of it, as one of the members who worked intensely to put it in effect, as I believe our chairman did, and both of our Senators, as well as other members of our congressional delegation.

Mr. ENGLISH. Could I make one point very quickly?

Mr. SHAW. I think it is very important.

Mr. ENGLISH. If I might explain a little bit of that difference. Keep in mind that we do not have the same effort and have not had for a long time with the South Florida Task Force. You had a very short, concentrated period of time which the South Florida Task Force was putting a lot of resources into that.

Now we no longer have that same kind of effort, and have not had really for 2 or 3 years. So that may—

Mr. SHAW. Well, it has been a shifting one. We have gotten down to working down toward Colombia now for the last 2 years, which I think has been a very important ingredient.

But I agree with the Governor that I am not very optimistic, and not very proud as to the total effect of what we have been able to do as a nation. And I, too, am very concerned about our borders. And I will tell you, Governor, if you think we have got a problem in Florida, go look at Mexico. I have never seen anything that is as scary as what is going on in that border.

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I am optimistic, because I am confident that this is a war that we can win. The question is, where is the com-

mitment to do so, a plan to do so, and a willingness to deploy the resources?

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Governor, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you.

I want to point out to the press very quickly, that some questions have been raised with regard to Mr. Darman's statement on the last two figures. I would simply point out, the last two figures included personnel costs. The earlier figures were operations and maintenance costs only. They threw in the personnel costs on the last two figures. That is the reason it looks like there is not any reduction; in fact, it looks like a small increase. So please note that it is kind of a loaded deal.

With that, we will recess until 10 tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, February 7, 1986.]

INITIATIVES IN DRUG INTERDICTION

(Part 2)

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE,
AND AGRICULTURE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Glenn English (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representative Glenn English.

Also present: Theodore J. Mehl, professional staff member; William G. Lawrence, counsel; Euphon L. Metzger, clerk; and John J. Parisi, minority professional staff, Committee on Government Operations.

Mr. ENGLISH. The hearing will come to order.

Today we will have the second day of hearings with regard to drug interdiction. Today we will lead off with the Department of Defense.

Our first witnesses, a panel, will be Lt. Gen. Dean Tice, who is the Director of the Drug Enforcement Task Force, at the Department of Defense; and the Honorable Karen Keesling, who is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations.

We want to welcome you both here. General Tice, we will let you lead off with your testimony, if you would, please.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DEAN TICE, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), DIRECTOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY KAREN R. KEESLING, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND INSTALLATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE; COL. RICH GRAHAM, U.S. AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR OF PROGRAM INTEGRATION; COL. JOHN ROBERTS, U.S. AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DIVISION; AND CAPT. BILL MARSH, U.S. NAVY, HEAD, FLEET OPERATIONS BRANCH

General TICE. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear again before your subcommittee, along with Ms. Karen Keesling, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations, and to report on the Department of

Defense contribution to this Nation's campaign to reverse the growing drug menace.

We are accompanied by Col. Rich Graham, U.S. Air Force, Director of Program Integration; Col. John Roberts, U.S. Air Force, Director of Operations, Special Operations Forces Division; and Capt. Bill Marsh, U.S. Navy, Head, Fleet Operations Branch.

With your permission, I desire to make a short oral statement and ask that my complete statement be inserted into the record.

Mr. ENGLISH. Without objection, so ordered.

General TICE. Sir, we are proud of our efforts in support of drug interdiction. We are diligently balancing our program of assistance with readiness implications and national security mission imperatives.

In this regard, the Secretary recently forwarded a list of initiatives to the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board which suggests a prudent expanded drug enforcement support role for the Department as a byproduct of our primary mission activity.

These options for future DOD support emphasize the most effective use of military assets for the taxpayer dollar and have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The initiatives fall into three general categories: One, technical and material support; two, planning assistance; and three, intelligence support.

During the last year we have had a truly joint service effort in support of law enforcement: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and Air Guard, and Air Force Reserves. This support has included flying surveillance support, loaning of sophisticated equipment and providing specialized training.

The last comment I will make concerns the fiscal year 1986 Defense Authorization Act, which calls for Department of Defense fixed- and rotary-wing assistance to the national antidrug trafficking campaign.

The Secretary has deferred his report on fixed-wing aircraft support until March 31, 1986, to allow the Air Force to conduct a cost and mission analysis on the AC-130H-30 aircraft. The analysis requirement stems from guidance in the report accompanying the fiscal year 1986 Appropriations Act, which appropriates \$35 million for the Air Force to initiate a drug support element and configure one stretched C-130 gunship for this purpose.

The rotary-wing plan was recently forwarded to the Congress. The Department's multiservice rotary-wing assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies will be provided on a not-to-interfere basis, commensurate with military readiness.

Support will be provided by Air Force Active and Reserve combat rescue and special operations units located along the southern border and coastal areas. These assets include both short-range and long-range air-refuelable aircraft.

The 23d Air Force has operational control of all active duty SOF and combat rescue assets and controls all combat rescue activity. Therefore, command, control, and coordination of both SOF and combat rescue units used in this role should be provided by an element within the existing 23d Air Force headquarters rather than the 1st Special Operations Wing, which controls only a limited number of SOF assets.

The headquarters element will serve as the focal point within the U.S. Air Force for coordinating SOF/rescue support for drug interdiction. Requests for support will be handled within the existing structure for processing quarterly requests through the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, or NNBIS. However, direct liaison between civilian law enforcement agencies, the NNBIS regional centers, and the 23d Air Force headquarters will be authorized.

U.S. Army resources will include UH-1's, OH-58's, and UH-60's from aviation battalions located at Fort Bliss, TX; Fort Polk, LA; Fort Stewart, GA; and from selected Army Reserve units located along the Southern U.S. border.

Command, control, and coordination of U.S. Army rotary-wing units used for drug interdiction will be provided by U.S. Army Forces Command. It will coordinate with U.S. law enforcement agencies through the NNBIS regional centers.

U.S. Marine Corps support will include Reserve rotary-wing resources. Command, control, and coordination of U.S. Marine Corps Reserve rotary-wing units used for drug interdiction will be provided by the 4th Marine Air Wing, which will coordinate with U.S. law enforcement agencies through the NNBIS regional centers.

Mr. Chairman, as I said at the outset, we in Defense are proud of our role in this most important program that you and your distinguished colleagues have so commendably championed. The proposals forwarded to the Attorney General would extend our support near the source, in addition to the contributions along our borders.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee, Mr. Chairman. We are prepared to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Tice follows:]

STATEMENT OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL R. DEAN TICE, USA (RET)
DIRECTOR, DOD TASK FORCE ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE AND AGRICULTURE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

FEBRUARY 7, 1986

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee this morning. It's always a privilege to report on the Department of Defense contribution to this nation's campaign to reverse the growing drug trafficking menace. I might add that we are proud of our efforts in this area. We are diligently balancing our program of assistance with readiness implications and national security mission imperatives. In this regard, the Secretary recently forwarded a list of initiatives to the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board which suggests a prudent expanded drug enforcement support role for the Department as a by-product of our primary mission activity. These options for future DoD support emphasize the most effective use of military assets for the taxpayer dollar and have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, when the President signed PL 97-86 in 1981 a new chapter to Title 10 of the US Code was added which clarified DoD's role in the national effort to combat the entry of illicit drugs into the United States.

Section 371 of Title 10 authorizes the Military Services to share information collected during routine military operations with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials.

The Secretary of Defense may, under Section 372 make facilities and equipment available to such officials.

Section 374 allows for personnel assistance under certain conditions although Section 375 does not permit direct participation of military personnel in drug enforcement arrest and seizure activities.

For example, military personnel may be used to operate and maintain loaned equipment used for controlling air and sea traffic.

And, under emergency conditions, military personnel may provide bases of operations for federal law enforcement officials outside the land area of the United States.

And, of course, the assistance provided by DoD for which there is no essentially equivalent training benefit is subject to reimbursement under terms of the Economy Act. In that regard, we have been able to provide a great deal of assistance without reimbursement when substantial military training benefit is realized from such assistance.

With this framework in mind, let me briefly review examples of the Department's current level of support for 1985.

Navy E-2's provided aerial surveillance for the U.S. Customs Service in the Caribbean, along the Mexican border, the Gulf of Mexico, and the offshore waters of Florida and California. Frequently U.S. Marine Corps OV-10's collocated with the E-2C's and performed complementary operational support missions.

Navy P-3's have flown long-range surface surveillance tracks throughout the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. S-3's flying from San Diego, California flew surveillance tracks off California and Mexico.

The Navy additionally provided 347 ship days (including PHM hydrofoils) days with USCG tactical law enforcement teams (TACLETS) embarked; and the towing of drug vessels by Navy vessels permitted USCG cutters to remain on station. Three more Navy P-3A's with Air Force F-15 radars were turned over to US Customs Service during 1985.

The Marine Corps, in addition to its extensive OV-10 support, provided mobile ground radar surveillance as well as anti-personnel

intrusion detection.

Air Force AWACS flew radar surveillance missions similar to Navy E-2's with Customs Service representatives onboard.

Air Force B-52 aircraft conducting joint training with the Navy in offensive anti-surface warfare strike operations provided anti-drug maritime surveillance reports as an adjunct to this mission activity.

Air Force active and reserve C-130's enroute to and from Panama overflew suspected drug-laden motherships for the Coast Guard.

Since November 14, 1985, the members of the Air Force Civil Air Patrol have been helping in the anti-drug smuggling effort with over 6,000 light aircraft available to perform patrol and surveillance missions for the Customs Service. Civil Air Patrol pilots look for possible drug smuggling boats offshore and potential remote landing sites in addition to patrolling known air smuggling corridors. Reports on suspected drug smugglers are passed to Customs pilots who conduct the actual interdiction activity.

The Air Force continued its support to Operation BAT with personnel operating and maintaining two UH-1N helicopters stationed in the Bahamas. These helicopters provided quick insertion of Bahamian law enforcement teams on drug apprehension missions. During large-scale multi-agency operations such as Hat Trick II, the U.S. Army augmented the Air Force cadre with two additional Black Hawk helicopters.

The Air Force also loaned over 120 Communication Encryption Devices to the Customs Service and DEA.

I'm especially pleased to provide an update on Army training initiatives developed at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona. The first is

Operation HAWKEYE which is designed to present real-world situations in a training environment. By modifying selected flight tracks in the OV-1D Mohawk training program, students conducted missions along the US-Mexico border where selected target areas were imaged with the Mohawk's sensor system and provided to the Patrol division of the U.S. Customs Service for inclusion in their intelligence data base. Seventy-two HAWKEYE missions were flown in fiscal year 1985.

The second is Operation GROUNDHOG which places ground surveillance radar students in a real-world, high stress training environment on the US-Mexico border for one week. As targets are detected, information is passed to the U.S. Border Patrol for their action. In fiscal year 1985, the exercise was conducted 20 times resulting in 518 targets detected and 176 apprehensions by responsible law enforcement authorities.

Fort Huachuca is also the primary candidate site for locating a new Customs Service aerostat radar system to monitor low-level suspect druggie aircraft coming into the southwest United States. The Army has agreed in principle to allow Customs to use the facility, provided there are no technical or environmental constraints. The Army and Customs staffs are presently conducting the feasibility analysis with a projected completion date of March 1986.

While on State Active Duty, the National Guard provided assistance to civilian drug law enforcement authorities in 19 states, primarily aerial observation reports. During the year, National Guard aircrew reports contributed to the destruction of marijuana with a street value of over \$260M.

The Army and National Guard provided a variety of additional

support to drug enforcement agencies including: loan of night vision imaging systems; specialized training, including use of ground radars; use of rifle and pistol ranges by drug enforcement personnel; and use of Army National Guard aviation assets for training, including rappelling.

The Army aircraft loaned to federal civilian drug enforcement agencies included Black Hawk and Cobra helicopters and C-12 King Airs.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force (in addition to the Coast Guard) provided expert personnel assistance to six National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) Regional Centers in addition to the NNBIS headquarters in Washington D.C.

As this review of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force support suggests, the Department of Defense is making significant contributions to the anti-drug effort.

As you recall, the fiscal year 1986 Defense Authorization Act called for Department of Defense fixed and rotary-wing assistance to the national anti-drug trafficking campaign. The Secretary has deferred his report on fixed-wing aircraft support until March 31, 1986 to allow the Air Force to conduct a cost and mission analysis on the AC-130H-30 aircraft. The analysis requirement stems from guidance in the report accompanying the fiscal year 1986 Appropriations Act which appropriates \$35M for the Air Force to initiate a drug support element and configure one "stretched" C-130 gunship for this purpose.

The rotary-wing plan was recently forwarded to the Congress. The Department's multi-Service rotary-wing assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies will be provided on a not-to-interfere

basis, commensurate with military readiness. Support will be provided by Air Force active and reserve combat-rescue and special operations units located along the southern border and coastal areas. These assets include both short-range and long-range air-refuelable aircraft. The 23d Air Force has operational control of all active-duty SOF and combat-rescue assets and controls all combat-rescue activity. Therefore, command, control, and coordination of both SOF and combat-rescue units used in this role should be provided by an element within the existing 23d Air Force headquarters rather than the First Special Operations Wing, which controls only a limited number of SOF assets. The headquarters element will serve as the focal point within the US Air Force for coordinating SOF/rescue support for drug interdiction. Requests for support will be handled within the existing structure for processing quarterly requests through the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). However, direct liaison between civilian law enforcement agencies, the NNBIS regional centers, and the 23d Air Force headquarters will be authorized.

US Army resources will include UH-1s, AH-1s, OH-58s, and UH-60s from aviation battalions located at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and from selected Army Reserve units located along the southern US border. Command, control, and coordination of US Army rotary-wing units used for drug interdiction will be provided by US Army Forces Command. It will coordinate with US law enforcement agencies through the NNBIS regional centers.

US Marine Corps support will include Reserve rotary wing resources. Command, control, and coordination of US Marine Corps

Reserve rotary-wing units used for drug interdiction will be provided by the Fourth Marine Air Wing, which will coordinate with US law enforcement agencies through the NNBIS regional centers.

Mr Chairman, as I said at the outset, we in Defense are proud of our role in this most important program that you and your distinguished colleagues have so commendably championed. The proposals forwarded to the Attorney General would extend our support near the source in addition to the contributions along our borders.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to take questions at this time.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you have a comment that you would care to make, Ms. Keesling?

Ms. KEESLING. No; I am just here to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Before we begin questioning, it came to my attention in the past few hours from the Armed Services Committee that there are certain classified documents that they have possession of that would be of interest to this subcommittee.

Congressman Dan Daniel, in discussing this matter with me, intended to testify here. However, he was unable to be here. He asked that Ted Lunger from the Armed Services Committee staff be allowed the opportunity to brief the subcommittee with regard to the contents of these classified documents.

It should be noted that this will be a sanitized version of those documents. Without objection, I ask Mr. Lunger if he would provide us with the information that Congressman Daniel notified us about.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN DANIEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, AS PRESENTED BY RICHARD T. LUNGER, JR., PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. LUNGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In conjunction with an ongoing investigation that the Armed Services Committee's Special Operations Panel has on the question of Air Force Special Operations Force readiness, the committee is in receipt of certain classified material which is of collateral interest to your committee in your consideration of the eventual adoption or failure to adopt the specific aircraft that is specified in the appropriations legislation.

In essence, Mr. Chairman, what we seem to have here is a situation where internal to the Air Force there is a very favorable report on the use of the AC-130H gunship in the drug interdiction, detection, and surveillance role; that at some point in the transmission of the air staff material either to the front office of the Air Force or between the Air Force and the Department of Defense, or between the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the bottom line on the Air Force's own professional view of how these aircraft impact this mission seems to have been changed.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we have heard in a variety of meetings and briefings, No. 1, that the stretched body, the -30 version of the AC-130, is not of benefit either to the gunship or to the drug interdiction mission.

Internal to the Air Force consideration was that this provided added enhancement for a gunship. It does so in three ways. One is that it allows additional and emerging weapons systems to be later incorporated onto an aircraft. It provides additional opportunity for crew rest on these long deployments. It would allow for the addition of added sensor units at some later point in time, which are going to require a much greater electrical power generation capability aboard the aircraft.

With regard to the question of whether or not the distinctive silhouette of a stretched AC-130 aircraft would curtail its capability

to be deployed in an antidrug role or, for that matter, in a gunship role, the Air Force has told itself internally that this would be of benefit because this aircraft would then correspond with all of those aircraft which are operated overseas by other governments and by a variety of commercial operators.

We have been told, Mr. Chairman, in a variety of media that we can't expect that we can use an AC-130 gunship in the detection and surveillance role without an unacceptable impact on readiness with regard to the training of the crews and the eventual suitability of those aircraft for their wartime mission.

What we find the Air Force telling itself internally is that these crews and the unreadiness, if you will, or the readiness impact stemming from the use of these aircraft in a detection and surveillance mode, has been solely the result of the Air Force not having sufficient AC-130's in their force structure, nor do they have sufficiently trained crews.

The limiting factor here I need to stress for the committee's consideration, Mr. Chairman, is not that the Air Force doesn't have people who are qualified to fly gunships or capable of being trained to fly gunships. It is not that they don't have adequate funding within their program to buy gunships. They have chosen not to do so. So, we have a circuitous logic at work here in which they say, "We can't use gunships in the detection and surveillance role because that then leads to unreadiness," while the actual unreadiness is a function of not having sufficient gunships or crews.

The Chief of Staff, Air Force, I might note, testified in open session in front of the Armed Services Committee yesterday that these aircraft are used on a daily basis overseas in a detection and surveillance role. He said that because of the impact on readiness, that they were looking at a different, lighter weight airframe to perform a similar mission. What the committee was not informed of is that the lack of readiness had nothing to do with the use of the AC-130 itself.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that is as much of this material as we can cover in an open session. I might note that there are two other factors that are pertinent to the subcommittee's consideration.

One is that it is our understanding that—as of this past week—the Air Force has been informed that the current AC-130 Alpha model gunships found in the Reserve component of the Air Force will be logistically unsupportable in a near timeframe, on a date certain. There is no programmed replacement of which we have knowledge for those Reserve gunships during the period of time that they will have to be taken out of service.

The second aspect, Mr. Chairman, is that it is our understanding that you have been informed that the Secretary of Defense has directed that the Air Force embark upon an AC-130H new gunship program of 12 aircraft. That is absolutely correct. With the procurement of those 12 aircraft, the first one beginning in the next decade and the last one being delivered midway through the next decade—I am trying to fudge the actual dates—there appears to be a gap which is going to be widening in the numbers of needed AC-130 assets for the Air Force wartime requirement.

I might note as an aside to that that the unified commanders' minimum number of requested AC-130's for the purpose of the exe-

cution of their operations plans is far in excess of that which the Air Force has in its program, with or without the AC-130H-30's initially configured for the detection and surveillance role.

I believe that is the gist of what the chairman needed to pass along, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Lunger. I would like to ask a couple questions. If I do unintentionally touch upon areas that would be of a classified nature, please identify those so that we won't proceed any further.

As I understand it, what you are telling us is that the Air Force has within its body a working paper which identified, in effect, that those assets that the Congress is providing—namely, the 10 C-130's that would be specifically designed, the stretch version, for the drug mission—that those were not only compatible with the efforts and the mission of the Air Force Special Operations Force but that these assets were desperately needed. I mean the AC-130's that we are talking about. The Air Force simply decided that it did not want to take on this additional mission and, therefore, reworked, fudged, changed that optimistic report in such a way that it was then presented to the rest of the Department of Defense and to Members of Congress as being adverse.

Comment on that if you would, please. Is that correct?

Mr. LUNGER. It substantially appears to be correct, sir. I don't want to characterize it. I have no knowledge of what this evolutionary situation was.

Mr. ENGLISH. But it was changed?

Mr. LUNGER. It appears to have been substantially changed from the best professional advice available in the Air Force.

Mr. ENGLISH. From a very favorable report to one that is unfavorable?

Mr. LUNGER. Yes, sir; to the point at which it gets transmitted.

Mr. ENGLISH. On the original best advice within the Air Force, the original document that was produced, did it have any negatives?

Mr. LUNGER. Basically, sir, the one that we keyed on was that there was not a stretched version of the AC-130 in the current inventory.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, the only negative they could find about this particular aircraft was the fact that we don't have one. Is that right?

Mr. LUNGER. I believe so, sir. Let me check to make sure. Yes, sir; I believe that is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Was there any mention of the fact in any of these documents either pro or con, that the application to the drug mission was affecting the thinking in preparing these documents?

Mr. LUNGER. No, sir. There was reference to the classified detection and surveillance activity and made note of the fact that this had been successfully performed, the degradation of readiness stemming from which was due to lack of aircraft and crews.

Mr. ENGLISH. Was there any reference to drug interdiction and that particular military role and how that interfaced with any type of drug mission?

Mr. LUNGER. Yes, sir. It was cast in the context of, "Could there be successful training by performing both missions?" and the answer is clearly, "Yes."

Mr. ENGLISH. Yes. So, anytime that they would be conducting a surveillance mission that would be a part of the drug mission, that there would be substantial benefit as far as training is concerned. Is there any aspect in the training that would not be approached?

Mr. LUNGER. Until such time, sir, as there were adequate new model gunships for them to all have firing range time, the reservists would not have access to an aircraft that actually had the guns mounted. But in terms of operating the sensors, in terms of flying the infiltration and exfiltration types of routes to the operational areas, and in terms of intercrew coordination, there seems to be no limiting factor.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, the only training benefit, as I understand it—correct me if I am wrong—that would not be derived would be time in firing the guns?

Mr. LUNGER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And all other missions and roles would interface and would provide beneficial training to crews for their normal DOD responsibilities?

Mr. LUNGER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Lunger. I have to say that this information is completely contrary to the information that was provided to us by the Air Force. I have got to say further that it is shocking that we would find such a big change from that original document to the document that was presented to us, or at least the information that was presented to us by some very high Air Force officials. This will certainly put things much more in perspective as we look at this issue.

One last question. Is there a surplus or will there be a surplus in the future of these aircraft, the AC-130's?

Mr. LUNGER. No, sir, not in this particular type of aircraft. I can also relate a series of questions that took place in our Air Force posture hearings yesterday in the full committee; that is, that upon instruction of Deputy Secretary Taft to the Air Force to fund what is called the "Core SOF Airlift Program," in the past week it had come to the committee's attention that the Air Force had then taken that instruction and gone back and redefined what was "Core SOF airlift" such that the original shopping list, if you want to characterize it that way, would probably be cut almost in half. So, rather than there being a reasonable chance that there are going to be sufficient of these assets in the absence of a directed program, you find just the opposite.

Mr. ENGLISH. Here we have a situation in which the Congress has moved up a program to buy equipment that is needed by the military, which the military has a shortage of, and the military now is in the position—at least the Air Force is in the position—of trying to rewrite the report in such a way so that they don't have to accept the equipment, particularly the drug role.

Mr. LUNGER. Yes, sir. It is typical of the difficulty that you have in the military overall. The commanders-in-chief of the unified commands are the ones who are going to fight the wars. They are

the ones who generate the requirements and inform the individual services what they need by way of equipment.

What the CINC's say that they need by way of equipment or what the President or the Secretariats tell the services that they need by way of equipment oftentime do not correspond to the internal service priorities. Therefore, this is just one of those priorities that ordinarily can't compete.

Mr. ENGLISH. If the 10 aircraft that were designated for the drug mission were provided, would there be a surplus of such aircraft in the Air Force?

Mr. LUNGER. There would be a shortfall, best case, of somewhere in excess of 50 percent.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we would still be short even with these aircraft provided?

Mr. LUNGER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. These aircraft, according to these documents, would not in any way impinge upon the military role, training, combat readiness, or anything else?

Mr. LUNGER. Not where there are sufficient assets that they could actually train their people to start with, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you need the equipment to train them with to begin with?

Mr. LUNGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I appreciate that, Mr. Lunger. Thank you very much. I thank the Armed Services Committee on behalf of this committee for allowing you to give us an overview of these classified documents.

Mr. LUNGER. I want to pass along Mr. Daniel's regret that he wasn't able to attend. He is down in his district office today.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much.

I think that puts us in a position now that we are ready to proceed, General Tice and Ms. Keesling.

General Tice, now that the air wing is a matter of law, are you and the Department of Defense developing mutual operational plans between the military, and the Customs Service?

General TICE. Sir, I would like to review for the record where we have been over the last year. I think it is important to——

Mr. ENGLISH. Excuse me, General. We have got an awful lot of questions to go. We just passed this law, and I want to try to stick as closely as I can to the specific questions that I am asking. This law passed 2 or 3 months ago, and the only question I have got at this particular point is, whether the Department of Defense, the military, and the Customs Service, are developing mutual operational plans for this air wing right now?

General TICE. First let me say that the law was passed in the continuing resolution authority on the 18th of December. It provided additional guidance and different guidance than we had ever had before.

We are back now to the drawing board to see how we might provide a surveillance capability within the fixed-wing community of the Armed Forces. We have forwarded a report to you with reference to the initial request on how we would implement the rotary-wing requirement. That was signed off by Mr. Weinberger on Janu-

ary 31. We are now evaluating how we might provide additional fixed-wing aerial surveillance to the Customs Service.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's back up, General.

The question is about the mission. Is the Department of Defense, the military, and the Customs Service developing a mutual operational plan for this air wing as directed by the defense authorization bill?

General TICE. No; we are not.

Mr. ENGLISH. The next question is: What are some of the operational basing considerations that would come into play between the military and Customs? Is this something that you are not even considering at this point?

General TICE. Sir, I think from the beginning the Defense Department's position was that we would provide aerial surveillance. We are providing in compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act, where our normal military training could be accomplished at the same time that we are helping them.

Mr. ENGLISH. But the law is what we are talking about, General, and we are talking about the defense authorization bill and what the Department of Defense was instructed to do. The Congress passed that, if I remember correctly, by a rather healthy margin. The President of the United States signed that into law. That is the law.

Are you telling me that the Department of Defense is ignoring the law?

General TICE. No; we are not ignoring the law. We are trying to determine how we can be in compliance with that law and also the guidance as contained in other statutes; which direct that anything we do to assist the law enforcement community will not degrade military readiness.

Mr. ENGLISH. We just have now learned that there is a document within the Air Force which I assume has not been provided to you. You are not aware of it?

General TICE. No; I am not.

Mr. ENGLISH. I don't know whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of it or whether the Secretary of Defense is aware of it, but this document is within the Department of Defense. I don't think we are responsible for the fact that the Department of Defense doesn't communicate with itself, but the Department of Defense has this document within it that states that not only does it not deter combat readiness but that this substantially enhances the combat readiness and provides tools that the Air Force is short of.

Now, this was before the Air Force went in and rewrote it, evidently to some of the policymakers' specifications as to what they wanted it to say. But the original document, the best judgment of the people in there who had the know, that is what they say.

I think we just put to rest with this document any combat readiness issue. In fact, this gives you a substantial benefit. You have got airplanes that are going to be obsolete, evidently, according to testimony that took place yesterday, in 1989 and you don't have any replacement for them.

The Congress has provided the first one of those aircraft coming on line and have authorized nine more of them. The question that

we come down to is whether the Department of Defense is going to obey the law.

General TICE. I think we would if we had the money to do it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, the Congress provided that in the continuing resolution. It provided \$35 million. Is the Department of Defense proceeding with the construction of that first aircraft and, at the same time—well, you have already told me that you are not developing any plans between the military and the Customs Service. Isn't that right?

General TICE. Not for that specific requirement.

Mr. ENGLISH. And that is specifically what you were instructed to do by the defense authorization bill and the money for that, then, was specifically provided by the Congress under the continuing resolution, so you are ignoring the law.

General TICE. No; we did an internal study on that. We are looking at some new options. I think the Congress would be certainly supportive that we choose the most cost effective way of implementing the guidance.

I know nothing about an internal document of which Mr. Lunger speaks wherein internally within the Air Force they said there was a compatible role between the SOF mission and drug surveillance interdiction. I will go back and see if I can ascertain where that paper is. I think it would be beneficial both of our interests if this committee would share with us that document.

Mr. ENGLISH. It gets kind of interesting whenever the Congress has got to provide the Department of Defense officials with the documents that are generated within the Department. I realize that you have a massive political bureaucracy over there and people who don't like this mission, who don't want any part of it. It doesn't matter what the President of the United States says, they are not going to comply with it and they are going to do their best to keep from it. I think we have seen a prime example of this taking place here with this document.

I would urge, General Tice, that you get the Secretary of Defense to go down there and get a hold of some people in the Air Force and start grabbing some people up by the collar and shaking them down and finding out what is going on with this in this Department, where people feel free to come in and, in effect, falsify reports. That is what they are doing, they are falsifying the darn report.

Let me also make one other quick point, if I could, General. There was a report for Congress that was due the first of December. That was called for again by the defense authorization bill.

Did the Department of Defense provide Congress with that report?

General TICE. We gave only part of it. We have not submitted the report on the fixed-wing assets.

Mr. ENGLISH. Why was that not done?

General TICE. We just could not work it out in that time, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. When will that be forthcoming?

General TICE. By the 31st of March.

Mr. ENGLISH. 31st of March?

General TICE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are you going to be able to meet the delivery schedule on that first aircraft, then, under these circumstances?

General TICE. Well, we also have problems with the first aircraft. Obviously, contractor people are passing information to your committee that has not been passed to us. We have an Air Force team in Georgia right now examining that first stretched 130; we have no intentions of noncompliance about purchasing that aircraft. We have been moving out smartly on that requirement.

We have not received an unsolicited proposal; therefore, we have to develop a referral for bid and move on and try to go ahead and make arrangements to procure this aircraft. And we are using special authorizations that would allow us to speed this process up very similar to sole source procurement.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let me go back and start at the beginning, General. The concept in changing the posse comitatus law was to make it so that the Department of Defense could provide assistance in the war on drugs. The President was wholly in concurrence with that objective and that goal.

We have been moving along in trying to invoice some DOD assets. Last year, we finally reached the point in which we determined that there was a special need, I should say a need within the Department of Defense, a proposal that was already on the drawing boards for the special operation forces, whose mission was basically the same as that of the drug interdiction mission. Namely, the special operations force was to guard this country against terrorists and saboteurs and others trying to infiltrate into this Nation. Of course, the drug smuggling surveillance requirements were in many of the same areas, the same jobs, the same roles and as has just been pointed out by Mr. Lunger, and has been pointed out evidently within the bowels of the Air Force, this is a mission that is identical to one that the Department of Defense had identified.

So it seemed to the Congress, and certainly to this Member, who offered the proposal, that it made good sense to construct those aircraft, meet the special operation force needs, and at the same time provide a substantial increase in the amount of drug smuggler detection taking place in this Nation.

Intelligence information, if you would, detection capability for law enforcement officials, all of which fitted together very nicely; and evidently the Air Force now, at least at the working level, agrees with that, even though the policymakers don't like the concept.

Now, that is the objective. The law also provides for the first aircraft, first one of these, that Congress has already funded and which we now learn that the Air Force is short of. The first one is supposed to be rolling out by January 31, 1987.

Is the Department of Defense going to meet that goal? I will direct that question to Ms. Keesling; I don't think we've given you an opportunity to respond since you are with the Air Force, Ms. Keesling, rather than General Tice.

Ms. KEESLING. Mr. Chairman, as of this morning, neither the Air Force Systems Command, the Air Force Logistics Command, nor Headquarters Air Force has received an unsolicited proposal from Lockheed for the AC-130H-30 gunship. Department officials have

been in contact with Lockheed, and as a result of these conversations, we have reason to believe that we will not receive an unsolicited proposal from Lockheed.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have you asked them for one?

Ms. KEESLING. Yes, we have; not directly, but we have asked when we could expect to receive an unsolicited proposal.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have you made a formal request for a proposal?

Ms. KEESLING. Not a formal request. We have to do that through the bidding process. We cannot make a formal request.

Mr. ENGLISH. So in effect what you are telling me, I guess, is that here we have the law that was passed by Congress last year, with certain targets and goals you have to make; you have to make reports, according to General Tice you are not going to make that report; at least not the portion on fixed-wing aircraft; not going to do it until March 31. Contained in the law is a requirement that this aircraft be out by January 31, 1987; and you have not even requested such a bid. Is that correct?

Ms. KEESLING. We are in the process right now, Mr. Chairman, of taking the necessary steps to develop the concept and the cost analysis in order to make this request an RFP to contractors. This is not an easy task.

As you're aware, the Air Force has \$46.8 million in its fiscal year 1987 budget to initiate a 3-year development program of a prototype AC-130 gunship using the C-130H aircraft as a base. While the continuing resolution provides only \$35 million for procurement of one aircraft, the design of which is undefined other than to use the C-130H airframe.

We do not believe that we can procure the aircraft, radar, and subsystems outlined in the language with \$35 million. It is our view that the cost will be higher. Also, at this time, it does appear doubtful that we can meet the January 31, 1987, deadline established in the language. We are doing everything possible to expedite the process using—

Mr. ENGLISH. Could I stop you right there in the middle of your speech, Ms. Keesling? I just want you to answer my question. I don't want you to give me a speech.

Let me ask you: Which company of Lockheed—there are a number of different Lockheed companies—which company did you make that request of?

Ms. KEESLING. I think they were made of two separate ones.

I think the point is, those were not formal requests.

Mr. ENGLISH. I don't care whether they were formal or informal—

Ms. KEESLING. We cannot legally make a formal request.

Mr. ENGLISH. You seem to feel it's a big deal that you made the informal request. Now don't come back and tell me it's not a big deal.

The question I'm asking—Ms. Keesling; let's quit beating around the bush on it. I understand that people within the Air Force, in making these informal contacts, are telling some companies within Lockheed that what they intend to do is to go in and reprogram this money for other C-130 aircraft; not the ones that are specified within the law that you are required to do.

And this in turn, then, is preventing Lockheed through its internal workings, from making this bid. Has such a message been passed about reprogramming money?

Ms. KEESLING. Not that I'm aware of; however, I think that Lockheed—

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, now, I'm not asking you what you're aware of; I'm asking you whether it's happening or not.

Ms. KEESLING. I think that Lockheed could meet both of those requests, even if a request had been made to look at other options. They are a large company and they can make more than one proposal at a time.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, now, come on, Ms. Keesling. If you've got the Air Force and you've got to work with them, and they are telling you, "Hey, look, don't take Congress serious; don't take the President serious; we're the ones running the show." That's what they do. And say, "We're going to reprogram this money," give you a wink. Don't sweat it. We'll come to you later and we'll give you the reprogram. Particularly if you're the people who have the responsibility within the company to do the reprogram.

Now that causes all kinds of difficulties. The question I am asking you is: Has that message been passed to Lockheed by members of the Air Force?

Ms. KEESLING. Sir, as I tried to state earlier, we are making every effort to look at the C-130H-30 stretch, and people are looking—

Mr. ENGLISH. Come on now, Ms. Keesling. I'm not going to let you get away with that. I want you to answer my question, please.

Ms. KEESLING. What I am trying to tell you is that people are meeting right now from our Systems Command, Logistics Command, and Military Airlift Command, with Lockheed-Georgia today, looking at that aircraft to see what we can do. So we are trying to meet the intent of the language of the law, to look at that aircraft to see what we can do with it.

Mr. ENGLISH. I'm going to ask you, though, did you pass that message—did people within the Air Force pass that reprogramming message over the past few months?

Ms. KEESLING. My answer is, not that I'm aware of.

Mr. ENGLISH. Would you deny that it has happened?

Ms. KEESLING. I am not aware of anything like that happening.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let me tell you flat out that I am informed, by very good sources on the other end, that it definitely has.

Ms. KEESLING. I will be glad to check into it, but I am not aware of it.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would urge you to do that, and again maybe you need to grab some folks by the collars and shake them down a little bit. You know, we've got a lot of fun and games going on with this, and a lot of people who evidently are not enthusiastic about carrying out this mission; they don't want anything to do with it. I don't know why, I don't know why. I cannot for the life of me understand how people can resist trying to do something about the war on drugs; but evidently you've got a bunch of them over there in the Air Force that feel that way.

Ms. KEESLING. I don't know about the memos you're talking about, sir. I did task the air staff the middle of January to come up

with proposals to comply with the law and that report is due to me at the end of this month. So I have not seen whatever documents you're referring to.

Mr. ENGLISH. One of the 16 initiatives endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Weinberger was establishment of, and I quote: "An all-source intelligence center" end quote. General, I want to say that I think that is an excellent recommendation and I would be interested in the progress as it moves through the bureaucracy.

Could you tell us a little bit about what progress is being made in this area so far?

General TICE. Yes, sir. We, through the Policy Board coordinating staff and the agencies concerned, have developed a first draft of some options on how we might implement that all-source intelligence center. We are looking for a decision on that no later than within the next 30 or 60 days.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many E2-C hours were flown in fiscal year 1985 in support of Customs, and how many seizures were made as a result of that?

General TICE. The U.S. Navy in 1985 flew 1,679 hours of E-2 time; and they had 13 cases.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many?

General TICE. Thirteen.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thirteen cases were made as a result. What about AWACS?

General TICE. The AWACS has flown 242 missions, 1,308 hours, and the seizures were 5 cases.

Mr. ENGLISH. Five cases and thirteen cases?

General TICE. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Eighteen cases. How many hours total?

General TICE. We have a total of 1,679 with the Navy and 1,308 with the AWACS.

Mr. ENGLISH. How much?

General TICE. 1,308.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you have about 2,500 or so hours—3,000 hours, I guess out of the two of them, and we ended up with 13 cases?

General TICE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are those radars any good on those aircraft? Is that AWACS any good, is the E2-C any good? The radar on those?

General TICE. We think so, yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. How do you attribute the low hit rate with regard to these aircraft?

General TICE. I think because of a lack of an all-source intelligence center that would be able to vector or at least alert crews on the general area to search based on the intelligence information, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. What kind of intelligence would you classify that as, General?

General TICE. Well, it's a—of course we need the strategic intelligence over the long term to figure out what the patterns have been, but you would need some tactical intelligence capability.

Mr. ENGLISH. Tactical intelligence.

General TICE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So what we're talking about is time-sensitive intelligence information.

General TICE. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Information that would enable those DOD and Customs assets to be on line and waiting whenever drug smugglers try to come into this country. Is that correct?

General TICE. Yes, sir; it would provide a capability to divert a normal mission, if you had that intelligence information. And if it would not interfere with the normal mission, we could change it. We have done that a couple times, and vectored the aircraft in the area where they could track it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Would this same fact be true of any other surveillance platform?

General TICE. I think the biggest challenge on surveillance is having some 360-degree capability. When your limit is less than 360 degrees, I think you're required to have very accurate intelligence so that you can get on their tail and lock onto them and keep them within the coverage of your radar.

Mr. ENGLISH. In my understanding, the AWACS and the E2-C's have got 360-degree capability.

General TICE. They do, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And they only got 13 hits?

General TICE. That's correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Out of 3,000 hours.

General TICE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Must be something else.

General TICE. I don't think that we have an ability today to discern and detect those private aircraft flying across our borders. Without some better intelligence and without a complete screen of radar there would be no way to detect those transgressions of our borders.

Mr. ENGLISH. General, again I am coming back to this issue of tactical intelligence. Now, we had 3 days of E2-C flights over the southern California/Arizona border, and I believe this was back in August, to try to get some idea of how much smuggling activity—and that's certainly not one of the most heavily trafficked areas in the Nation, but there's good traffic in there; but that's a pretty small range: 3 days.

And the estimate that they came up with out of that 3-day intensive survey was, there are 460 planes a month flying across just that little California/Arizona strip, and that's not a very wide strip. But you take the whole southern border of the United States, and I guess up the coast some, out of 3,000 hours of flying, AWACS and E2-C's only picked up 13 hits. So something's missing someplace, and I think that you put your finger on it; it is tactical intelligence.

Would you again care to revisit that and to tell us what the priority is on tactical intelligence in order to increase up to say where we could get—well, let's just say nationwide where we could pick up, let's say, 200. Are you going to have to have a lot of tactical intelligence for that?

General TICE. Certainly, and the alternative of the absence of intelligence is that you must chase and seek to identify every aircraft that crosses our border. We abandoned that system in the Air De-

fense System about 16 or 17 years ago because the cost was prohibitive. We don't have an air defense system per se in the United States for air sovereignty; we have an early warning system. We have combined our intelligence capability with an early warning system to reduce the risk of a possible surprise attack on this Nation.

I am convinced that more use of intelligence is the kind of option we have to examine if we are to make interdiction meaningful. I think the cost would be prohibitive to keep aircraft on station without some prior information about the trafficking patterns or receiving very specific information about potential flights, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And we don't have that, do we?

General TICE. Not today, no, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would wholeheartedly agree with what you said, General. What we are looking for are certain profiles. We are looking for people that are coming into this country, crossing the ADIZ without a transponder working. Looking for someone who is flying below radar, at say, 500 feet or 1,000 feet. Some places, as you well know, we can go far higher than that.

Also, fitting that kind of a profile and having prior knowledge that somebody's coming. That's all tactical intelligence that enables us to respond regardless of how good a platform you have, and I would wholeheartedly agree that AWACS and E2-C's are excellent radar detection devices. It shows that without that type of intelligence, it's extremely difficult or impossible to catch the thousands of aircraft that are coming into this country illegally.

In the 1986 Defense Authorization Act, provisions were made for the establishment of 500 additional tactical law enforcement teams for the Coast Guard. What is the status of that effort?

General TICE. Sir, there is a minor glitch. There is a technical problem in that the \$15 million that's made available in the U.S. Navy budget is in the O&M account. It is against the law to transfer O&M to personnel accounts; but we're working with the Coast Guard and we hope to have that problem resolved within the next couple of weeks.

Mr. ENGLISH. You think it will be resolved, though?

General TICE. Yes, sir. Even if it means going back to the Appropriations Committee for approval.

Mr. ENGLISH. Ms. Keesling, Assistant Secretary McCoy met with Senator DeConcini and Congressman Hutto and myself last week. He led us to believe that there were problems of incompatibility between the C-130's and the stretch C-130-30's. In light of the briefing that we got from Mr. Lunger, would you care to comment on that?

Ms. KEESLING. Sir, I think that we stand by the Air Force policy that there is not compatibility between the AC gunship and the drug detection; and I would like to have Colonel Roberts from our Special Operations Division—

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I'm talking about the specific airframe itself. Is there a problem with that airframe?

Ms. KEESLING. The stretch version?

Mr. ENGLISH. Is there an incompatibility between the two airframes? For maintenance, for parts, for things of that sort?

General TICE. The only incompatibility we have with the first one, Mr. Chairman, is that it does not have U.S. Government military specifications, and that's why the Air Force has a team down there now to examine to see what the costs would be to bring that aircraft up to proper milspecs. For example, it doesn't have the heavy duty landing gear on it. But that doesn't mean that we couldn't go ahead and procure it, and then during normal overhaul and maintenance, we could upgrade the landing gear.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is my understanding that none of those various options that DOD is looking at contains that. The ones that JCS looked at; none of them contained that.

General TICE. You mean on the——

Mr. ENGLISH. Milspecs.

General TICE. On the milspecs?

Mr. ENGLISH. Right.

General TICE. I'm not sure.

The only other aircraft the Air Force knows about already in the inventory are all milspec'd.

Mr. ENGLISH. The three that the JCS looked at, it is our understanding that none of them had the milspecs with them. The C-130 with APG-63, P-3A's, P-3B's. None of them had it. For those radars.

General TICE. No. Excuse me, sir, I misunderstood you. For the radar, that's different——

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, that's what we're talking about, is having the radar on. That's what the Joint Chiefs were considering. So what's the difference in this particular case?

General TICE. We're just looking at the stretch C-130 to determine how quickly we can procure it and whether it meets the requirements for a gunship.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I don't understand, General, then, what the problem is. You've got on one hand the Joint Chiefs looking at this stuff with the radars on them and you don't have milspecs, and that doesn't seem to be any problem over there, but here in this particular case for some reason you see that it doesn't have the milspecs with it, and that is a problem. That doesn't make sense.

General TICE. All the options that JCS were examining were all military aircraft.

Mr. ENGLISH. I realize that, but they don't—with the radar on them, they don't meet milspecs. That's the point. And here we're talking about equipment that may or may not have the radar on it, and it doesn't meet milspecs. None of the others do, either, none of the other options, but that didn't seem to be hindering anybody.

General TICE. Well, certainly on the AC-130, we were not looking at a 360-degree radar system for the gunship. We're looking at a B-1B radar or something similar to that type of radar.

Mr. ENGLISH. That's correct. That's correct.

But other than that, what's the difference? What's the problem?

General TICE. I think the one that Lockheed-Georgia has down there, the one stretch variant, right now is the only one that could possibly meet the delivery date schedules that we're talking about. It's our understanding that that aircraft was made for foreign export and it does not have all of the normal navigational equipment and other things that we require for our military aircraft.

That doesn't mean that it can't be put on the airplane. But what we have now is a team from the Air Force Logistics Command, along with the contractors, who are currently meeting to take a look at that one aircraft that is available to see what the costs would be to bring that particular aircraft into the inventory and still meet the requirements stated in the appropriations act.

Mr. ENGLISH. I guess what I'm getting at, though, is the information that Secretary McCoy gave our group last week, which certainly is totally inconsistent with the information that we have found in these classified documents as alluded to by Mr. Lunger.

For instance, let me ask you this, Ms. Keesling: Mr. McCoy also stated that the P-3 has a significantly longer on-station time than the C-130. Now, our research indicates that there isn't much difference. What are the differences?

Ms. KEESLING. I am going to have to turn to my expert here.

We will have to provide that for the record, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Aw, come on, now, you know what that is. You really don't know how long one of these C-130's can stay up in the air? Didn't you bring your experts with you today, Ms. Keesling?

Ms. KEESLING. As I said, we'll have to provide that for the record, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Tell us what the time is for a C-130 staying in the air. Surely we've got somebody that knows that. We've got an awful lot of blue suits back there.

Colonel ROBERTS. Sir, I'm Col. John Roberts, Assistant Director for Special Operations on the Air Staff. My reluctance in answering your question is that I know what the 130 will do, but I am not familiar with the P-3.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I know what a P-3 is, if you know what a 130 is, we'll get together. How about that?

Colonel ROBERTS. A 130 is good for about 8 hours; unrefueled, 8, possibly 10.

Mr. ENGLISH. Eight to ten hours?

Colonel ROBERTS. Depends on gross weight; altitude, how you operate it, all kinds of factors.

Mr. ENGLISH. What about auxiliary fuel tanks on it?

Colonel ROBERTS. You can jack it up considerably with that; I would guess 6 to 8 hours; although I'd have to take that for the record.

Mr. ENGLISH. How much? Six or 8 hours more?

Colonel ROBERTS. I would think.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you're talking about the potential of this thing going up anywhere from 12 to 16 hours, right?

Colonel ROBERTS. When you put the aux tanks in, there's very little room for anything else; so you've got an airplane that's full of gas and can go far, but it can't do much.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK, if you really cool down a P-3 and if you're not flying with all the engines burning at one time; if you're loitering, you might get 12 to 14 hours.

Colonel ROBERTS. I don't know.

Mr. ENGLISH. That's not much difference, is there? About the same type deal?

Colonel ROBERTS. Well, the counter to that is that you have an airplane that's configured to do those hours and still have equip-

ment and people and activity on the inside of the cargo bay. Whereas in the 130, once you put the aux tanks in, there's nothing left to work with.

Mr. ENGLISH. Nothing left to work with whatsoever?

Colonel ROBERTS. No. Not to do anything appreciable.

Mr. ENGLISH. To do the type of training mission that we're talking about under these circumstances?

Colonel ROBERTS. I don't really know what you're talking about, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. All right, that's the problem, Colonel. You know, the problem is it doesn't sound like you all have really looked at this too far.

Colonel ROBERTS. My area of expertise is in special operations.

Mr. ENGLISH. That's exactly right, and these are being configured for special operation forces. Now, what is it with the auxiliary fuel tanks, what is it that you're going to be losing under the special operation mission? What is it that wouldn't be on there with those auxiliary fuel tanks?

Colonel ROBERTS. You would have almost no capability for any kind of internal sensor; you certainly would have no room for the guns. You would have a gunless gunship. You would have a slick C-130.

Mr. ENGLISH. In peacetime do you have those guns on there, normally?

Colonel ROBERTS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. You do?

Colonel ROBERTS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And you're out there, flying around all over the world with guns hanging out?

Colonel ROBERTS. On occasion we have to remove them for political—

Mr. ENGLISH. When?

Colonel ROBERTS. On occasion we have to remove them for political sensitivities.

Mr. ENGLISH. What about surveillance missions?

Colonel ROBERTS. You can have them in or out—

Mr. ENGLISH. Particularly those in Central America?

Colonel ROBERTS. You can have them in or out; it depends on what—

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, do you normally have them in whenever you're flying surveillance missions in Central America?

Colonel ROBERTS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. You do have the guns in?

Colonel ROBERTS. That's right. You keep the mounts—

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you need to have them in?

Colonel ROBERTS. You still couldn't have aux tanks.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you need to have them in? Have the guns in when you're flying surveillance missions in Central America?

Colonel ROBERTS. It depends on whether you intend to shoot someone, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I see. Do we normally intend to shoot people whenever we're flying surveillance missions in Central America these days?

Colonel ROBERTS. I would not think so, no.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. Thank you very much, Colonel.

Colonel ROBERTS. Sir, if I may, in my area of expertise, I am not familiar with the documents that Mr. Lunger has brought forward. I would argue with them. In my position as the chief SOF operator, there are several areas that this mission fails to support drug surveillance.

One of those which you may overlook is the fact that the gunship works primarily with a ground force, and therefore when we go out and shoot, we do so in coordination with the ground force as we did successfully in Granada.

Therefore, the ability of the gunship to go out and conduct SOF gunship missions is of benefit not only to the U.S. Air Force and its support of SOF, but also to the U.S. Navy and Army Special Forces teams.

On that same line, I would like you to know from my viewpoint as the chief operator, that I am unaware of any attempt to falsify any document provided to the Congress or anyone else by the Air Staff. I felt I had to put that in the record.

Mr. ENGLISH. You and I'll have to have a visit about this, Colonel.

I'm going to make one other point. How often each year do you take each of those gunships out to the range?

Colonel ROBERTS. I'll have to provide that for the record.

Mr. ENGLISH. Oh, come on, Colonel. You know how often you take those things to the range. You're the man that's in charge of this thing.

Colonel ROBERTS. There's a minimum requirement, I believe, of on the order of 12 per 6-month period.

Mr. ENGLISH. Twelve times per 6-month period? How many times have you met that in the last year?

Colonel ROBERTS. You're asking for a level of detail I don't have available. I can—

Mr. ENGLISH. Is it true that most, if not all, of your gunships have not been to the range that often this last year?

Colonel ROBERTS. We have had difficulties because of external tasking. I don't have those numbers.

Mr. ENGLISH. That's exactly my point; you don't go very often. How long do you stay once you go out there? How many days does it take?

Colonel ROBERTS. It depends on whether you're firing at home, in which the mission can be as short as 4 hours—

Mr. ENGLISH. I'm talking about the actual firing time, then, would be 4 hours.

Colonel ROBERTS. I'm sorry?

Mr. ENGLISH. You're talking about 4 hours of firing time.

Colonel ROBERTS. Four hours for a firing mission. Hour to 1½ hours, 2 hours on the range.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK, so you're talking about then even giving you the time getting there and getting back, if it's anywhere in the same area at least, you're talking about 12 days a year. Right?

Colonel ROBERTS. That's per crew, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I realize that. Per crew. For each aircraft, 12 days out of the year, out of 365 days a year.

Colonel ROBERTS. We actually have 1¾ crews against each aircraft. Therefore, you're talking about probably twice that.

Mr. ENGLISH. Why don't you take both crews the same time? That's a simple way to handle that.

Colonel ROBERTS. Sir, I'd like to invite you to ride on a gunship live fire. It's literally physically impossible to have two crews.

Mr. ENGLISH. I'm talking about when you go to that area. Take 2 days.

Colonel ROBERTS. We do that. We certainly do.

Mr. ENGLISH. Even with that, if you're talking about getting the crews out of the way, you're talking about maybe 20, 24 days a year, out of 365, and you're telling me this is the principal problem that you've got? This is what is preventing us providing this kind of detection capability in strengthening the war on drugs?

Colonel ROBERTS. Sir, I wholeheartedly support the war on drugs.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, you could have fooled me, Colonel.

Colonel ROBERTS. My point to you is that we have a responsibility for special operations which demands that we do our very best, use every resource that we're given to make ourselves as good as possible so that when things like Granada or other recent incidents come down, that we send forward the very best trained people that we can.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, then, what are you going to do a couple years from now, 1989, when they tell you your airplane's no longer going to be able to fly?

Colonel ROBERTS. I would hope that we would have programs to keep them flying, and replace them.

Mr. ENGLISH. All right, and here we've got a program that's going to help you replace them, and you don't want it.

Colonel ROBERTS. I don't say that. As a special operator, I would love to have more airplanes. My statement to you is that any significant commitment of flying hours and effort by those units makes them less capable to do the most demanding mission that the Air Force has. In my view——

Mr. ENGLISH. Flying hours, Colonel, is a different situation, and I think a strong case could be made if you're out there performing an extra mission for the Nation such as this drug detection. I'm going to say, given the amount of time you're talking about, at least 75 percent of that would be training for your crews. You'd be getting two bangs for the buck; in other words, you're much more likely to have more flying time; you have here the option, the very likelihood that you're going to have more aircraft, and you're not going to get them any other way, I don't think. You know; I may get fooled, but I'm going to be surprised if Congress is going to be willing to provide you those extra aircraft, after you are sitting here and are saying, "Well, now, we'd only take them on our basis, now, folks; don't assign us any additional roles. Don't worry us about all these drugs coming in, hitting this country. You know, we do it only our way. We're not willing to put out a little extra effort for our Nation."

That's what you're telling us, Colonel.

Colonel ROBERTS. Sir, I think our SOF forces put out far more than their share of effort as——

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, we're trying to help you strengthen that SOF force here. We are going to give you extra airplanes. All we're asking in return is that while you're up there doing that training that you do it on drug smugglers, which is certainly compatible to a very great extent, with the exception of this firing; and we're talking about 24 days each year.

Colonel ROBERTS. It's much more than that, and to say, "with the exception of firing" for a gunship—firing is why we have gunships.

Mr. ENGLISH. We'll have to carry this on a little later in a private visit. We've got a number of other questions.

General, you've known since the summer of 1985 about performing this mission of military command, coordination, and control in support of civilian law enforcement. Why hasn't this joint communication been taking place with the Customs Service then, trying to reach some kind of plan, some kind of program?

General TICE. We have a working group with the Customs Service, and I am not sure of the exact number, but I think they have met at least three times. We just haven't had the time to know for sure what platform or what unit will be used. Because, sir, we do not have a drug mission in the Department of Defense. There are other laws that guide us as to what our primary responsibility is, and to date, I know of no mission that has been assigned to the Department of Defense that requires us to become a law enforcement agency.

We have been working under the policy wherever we can enhance the law enforcement community without degrading military readiness, we've been willing and able to do that. I'm not sure that the law enforcement community, if you identified every potential target coming in, has the capability to go arrest them. And for sure, that is beyond DOD's capability.

Mr. ENGLISH. We would wholeheartedly agree with that, General, but I don't think we ought to accept that; do you? Would you be willing to simply throw up our hands and say, "Golly, folks, we can't catch all these guys so we're not going to catch any of them. Let them go." Is that the approach you think this Nation ought to take?

General TICE. No, it isn't, but I think that we have to comply with the statutes that guide and set forth the mission of the Department of Defense.

Mr. ENGLISH. And who passes those statutes?

General TICE. The Congress does, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And who signs them into law?

General TICE. The President does.

Mr. ENGLISH. Isn't he the same fellow, and isn't it the same group of folks that passed that Defense authorization bill this last year?

General TICE. Of course.

Mr. ENGLISH. Aren't they the same folks that signed and passed into law last year the continuing resolution?

General TICE. They passed the authorization and the money that we have seen today in the continuing resolution is only \$35 million.

Mr. ENGLISH. And that's for that first airplane.

General TICE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And we've seen an awful lot of foot dragging and as I've said, the reports that we've gotten back to us, we've been hearing the Air Force saying how they're going to get it reprogrammed, "Don't you guys sweat it." Namely, trying to screw up the process bureaucratically, any way that we possibly can.

General TICE. Sir, the statutes that guide us on procurement, specifically prohibit any of the armed services from asking in writing for an unsolicited proposal. We have had informal conversations with Lockheed, but in the absence of a proposal we have to go out with an RFP.

Mr. ENGLISH. And I've told you the message that they've delivered, informally, too; haven't I? The message was "to reprogram, don't worry about submitting this thing; we're going to reprogram this money." That's the message that they're sending out.

General TICE. I don't know about that.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I urge you to check on it, General. Let me go across a couple of things, just in case the Department of Defense has forgotten it.

Now this proposal here, this one that was adopted by the Congress, signed by the President; money provided by the Congress, signed into law by the President, now this was adopted in lieu of—and I am going to remind you of some of the other proposals that have come forth from the Congress, being considered, active duty military performing arrests and seizures—does that appeal to you, General?

General TICE. Of course not.

Mr. ENGLISH. Federalizing the National Guardsmen to perform seizure, search and customs inspections at the ports of entry? Does that appeal to the Department of Defense?

General TICE. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. The creation of an active duty, multisource joint military task force whose sole mission would have been, would be drug interdiction support?

General TICE. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That one doesn't appeal to you, either. And the number of variations that we've come up with in fencing DOD obligation authority. We've tried to work, particularly this committee has, and I think there's a large group within Congress that have tried to work with the Department of Defense in finding a proper way in which they can participate in assisting in this effort.

There's an awful lot of resources, an awful lot of money that's spent over at the Department of Defense. Now, we consider—and I think I can speak for most Members of Congress, if anybody would like to disagree with me, I'll see if I can get a little poll on Congress to find out—most Members of Congress feel that the Department of Defense at least has more than a passing obligation to look at this invasion into our country. They have some role to play.

We've tried to work it out so that it enhances combat readiness; does not detract, and I think I've got the record to back that one up. Over the years, you'll have to agree—we have attempted to make certain that this is a way that will enable us to strengthen the war on drugs, and make a mighty contribution. This type of foot dragging by the Department of Defense quite frankly makes it difficult for people such as myself, whenever we see these kinds of

proposals coming forth, to argue against them. You know there's a mighty temptation there in saying "Well, they asked for it. Let them have it."

So I'm hopeful that you go back and look deeply into the Department and particularly into the U.S. Air Force, and find out what in the heck's going on. I hope that the Secretary of Defense will take a look at that. I hope the Joint Chiefs of Staff will recognize that the information that they have been getting is not on the level; that it is, in fact, a fixed report; rigged, doctored, however you want to look at it. I think it's outrageous; I really do.

I know that you are not knowledgeable about this, have no knowledge of it whatsoever. Ms. Keesling, I don't think that you know anything about it, either, quite frankly. And you have all had the unfortunate problem of having to come up here and take the heat; but I guess that's what you all get paid for. I wish we had the people who are responsible up here. I would dearly love to have them, and if we can identify who some of those folks are, at least I think I can have a number of Members of Congress that would like to have a little private visiting with them, and we'll discuss some of these matters privately.

It is just unacceptable. The position that the Air Force has taken on this is unacceptable. That is the bottom line.

Thank you very much. Appreciate you coming up.

General TICE. Sir, we will continue to work with your committee to seek a solution on this problem.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, we intend to continue to work with you, and as I said, we have the highest amount of respect for you and Ms. Keesling. I feel that, as I said, neither of you were aware of this, but I think it has to be brought to light and exposed, and that is the only way we are going to get it corrected. We're looking forward to watching your efforts to make certain it is cleaned up.

Ms. KEESLING. Mr. Chairman, we will take your message back and again, as General Tice said, we look forward to working with you to come to the best way to help the drug interdiction effort.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you, Ms. Keesling. One other point, Ms. Keesling, before I let you go, we would urge and request a private meeting with the SOF people so that we could go over many of these issues. We would like to go over it in detail with them.

So we would appreciate it if you would make certain that those people are available to us, and if you get wind of who some of these folks are that are doctoring this report up, I would appreciate it if you would particularly include them. If you would identify them for me, why, I would like to have a private visit with them.

Ms. KEESLING. And also, as soon as we do get the information back from the efforts that are going on right now on cost and schedules, we will get back to you; and that probably will be in the next 2 or 3 weeks.

Mr. ENGLISH. We would like to have that SOF meeting right away. So we would appreciate your assistance on that.

Thank you very much.

Our next witness is Rear Adm. Donald C. Thompson, Chief of Staff of the Coast Guard. Admiral Thompson has appeared before us before, and we are delighted to have the opportunity to see him again. Welcome, Admiral.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. DONALD C. THOMPSON, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. COAST GUARD. ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. G.F. CROSBY, CHIEF, OPERATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

Admiral THOMPSON. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am Rear Adm. D.C. Thompson, Chief of Staff of the Coast Guard, and it is a pleasure to appear before you again, to provide you with an update on the Coast Guard's role in maritime drug law enforcement. I have on my left with me Capt. Gary Crosby, who is Chief of our Law Enforcement Division.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Coast Guard's drug interdiction strategy had in past years been mainly directed toward intercepting motherships as they transit the major Caribbean passes or "choke points." This is complemented by cutter patrols elsewhere, as available, in areas such as the Bahamas and the Eastern Passes of the Caribbean, and the gulf, and Atlantic and Pacific coastal areas. However, despite our stepped-up efforts and increased vessel seizures, the amount of contraband seized under that operating scenario remain fairly constant.

Since the fall of 1984, a new strategy has been employed. It is markedly different and aggressive, seeking to disrupt drug traffic routes further south. It is forward based, operating in the southern Caribbean, just off the coast of suspected Colombian shipping areas instead of waiting along suspected trafficking routes for the smugglers to come to us. It involves a concentration of forces from many agencies and countries, both ashore and afloat, working with maximum coordination and differing from the usual independent operations of those forces. It relies on the tactics of surprise and deception rather than the more predictable routines.

Adoption of that strategy was facilitated by a growing awareness among our allies in Central and South America of a mutual problem stemming from drug smuggling. Our allies realize that drug smuggling not only promotes criminal activity here in the United States, but it also threatens their own domestic security. Use of this strategy was also made possible by the increased ability to coordinate the efforts of U.S. law enforcement agencies in the Armed Forces under the aegis of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System [NNBIS]. The first operation to bring all of the factors in this strategy together was called Wagonwheel. It was mounted in November and December 1984 on a national and international scale, as part of an even broader operation known as Hat Trick.

Hat Trick I was followed by other operations, Blue Lightning and Thunderstorm, in 1985, and these involve coordinated law enforcement efforts between the Government of the Bahamas and the United States, and the goal of those operations was to disrupt the primary maritime smuggling routes through the Bahamas, destroy the cached contraband and facilities on the various islands throughout the Bahamas, and intercept those smugglers approaching the Florida coast who had been "flushed out" by the pressure in the Bahamas. The operations were so successful that members of the Royal Bahamian Defense Force have continued to ride Coast Guard cutters operating near Bahamian waters on a nearly continuous basis since these operations.

Operation Hat Trick II, which is a current operation, is very similar to Hat Trick I, but it is on a larger scale. Again, it is planned and coordinated through NNBIS. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are providing the primary maritime surveillance and interdiction forces, while the Customs Service, Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marines are conducting air operations.

Through the Department of State and Drug Enforcement Administration initiatives, the Federal agencies are working with our neighbors and allies, primarily Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, to provide the maximum coordination of their own domestic antidrug program with our operations.

The benefits of these operations are numerous. We feel that during these operations, maritime smuggling from the participating major source or transshipment countries comes to a virtual standstill. The smugglers are forced to stockpile their crops or seek alternative, more costly methods of transport. The stockpiled contraband risks seizure by in-country forces. Additionally, the smugglers' normal activities are disrupted. The deterrence value of these operations is immeasurable. We feel the reduced seizures of 1985 are partially attributed to the deterrent effect of these numerous major operations.

During the past several years, we have increased the number of cutter patrol days and aircraft operating hours devoted to drug interdiction, as well as our ability to respond quickly to sightings and other intelligence. The lessons learned from the operations I just touched on, however, also show that coordination is the key to increased law enforcement productivity. The operational efforts to stem the overall flow of drugs have also become increasingly dependent on the coordination of all law enforcement agencies' interdiction and intelligence-gathering activities.

Part of our improvements have come about due to our active participation in NNBIS, the Attorney General's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces [OCDETF's], and other ongoing activities. We work and cooperate closely with the other Federal agencies on a continuous basis. Interdiction efforts cannot be focused in one or two agencies, since drug traffickers exploit all modes of transportation and possess a wide variety of resources within their vast crime organizations.

Mr. Chairman, the Coast Guard remains committed to improving the coordination and cooperation among all involved parties—the other drug enforcement agencies, the other Armed Forces, and our Caribbean allies. We see it as essential to improving the productivity and effectiveness of our existing Federal resources.

That concludes my prepared testimony. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much.

Admiral, in looking at the Coast Guard's budget, I noticed that you had a little over \$3 billion in requests and you ended up with about \$2.4 billion that OMB finally approved, finally got in the President's budget. That is a pretty good cut, what, about \$600 million that you got knocked out? Could you tell us what it is that you will have to for go? What was that \$600 million designed to address; what problems will arise as a result of those funds not coming forth?

Admiral THOMPSON. Well, I might categorize them as things we would have liked to have seen as enhancements and improvements, but if we stay at the 1987 figure that the President presented to the Congress, we are going to be able to perform at the level we were performing in 1986, pre-Gramm-Rudman. So it is not perhaps as grim as it may seem based on the numbers you are using.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well I know, but are you telling me then that you intentionally put in 600 million dollars' worth of fat in your budget when you presented it to OMB?

Admiral THOMPSON. No, I wouldn't categorize it as fat. Were the deficit situation better, I think that such investment by the taxpayers would have been warranted.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, why don't you tell me what that \$600 million was destined for, and then maybe we would have a little better idea as to whether or not it's fat or whether it's something that is important?

Admiral THOMPSON. Well, I don't have the list with me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Just kind of—surely you've got some idea of what you're going to have to give up, don't you? I mean, this wasn't just miscellaneous stuff that was thrown in that you don't have any idea what it is, is it?

Admiral THOMPSON. Well, there were additional acquisition, construction and improvement items, AC&I, and—

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that boats?

Admiral THOMPSON. Sir?

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that boats? Ships?

Admiral THOMPSON. There would have been some additional resources.

Mr. ENGLISH. What kind?

Admiral THOMPSON. Well, I don't have the list with me, Mr. Chairman, and we don't anticipate that we are going to receive, from our earliest scratched-up budget, all the items that appear on that.

Mr. ENGLISH. That's your request. That's not an early scratched-up budget. That's your request that you presented.

Admiral THOMPSON. It's the preliminary budget document.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, it went to the Office of Management and Budget, didn't it? Didn't you submit that? Wasn't that for real?

Admiral THOMPSON. It was the Coast Guard submission, but as you know, sir; it goes through several steps before it becomes the President's budget.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, let me put it this way, then. We'll pass on to the various Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate that you were unable to respond to us, so we assume that that \$600 million that was in there could only be fat, since it didn't make enough of an impression on you that you could even tell us what it was that got chopped out. And that this was an early, preliminary budget that evidently was meaningless.

Admiral THOMPSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, it was a list of things that would help us do all of our missions in better fashion.

Mr. ENGLISH. Were they important or were they unimportant? You know, this is drug interdiction. You play a major role in drug interdiction on the seas. I'm trying to figure out whether or not

that \$600 million was going to have any impact as far as drug interdiction is concerned. I assume that if it was going to have a major impact any place, that it would have made an impression upon you, or if any of the other items were important enough to the overall responsibilities and roles and jobs that the Coast Guard plays, that that would have made an impression on you as well.

From what you are telling me, you have no idea what that \$600 million was for, so it must not have been much.

Admiral THOMPSON. No, sir, I didn't say I didn't have any idea.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, then give me an idea.

Admiral THOMPSON. I don't have the list with me. It would have included additional resources, additional vessels.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many; do you know?

Admiral THOMPSON. Different categories, and I don't have the numbers with me.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. Will this have an impact on the Coast Guard being able to perform its mission?

Admiral THOMPSON. It will not deter us from performing the mission at the level we're currently performing at, if the President's budget holds at the OE figure. We will have enough money to operate at our 1986 level, pre-Gramm-Rudman. The AC&I figure that you are probably looking at looks low, but that—I'd like to point out, sir, that AC&I level in 1987 reflects a surge in our AC&I level in 1986 of some \$375 million that was put into the Department of Defense, Coastal Defense Augmentation account.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are you going to be able to catch most of the drug smugglers that are going to be on the seas that are going to come into your jurisdiction?

Admiral THOMPSON. We are going to keep up and hope to improve our level of operation.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are you going to catch most of them?

Admiral THOMPSON. We're going to do as well as we're doing now, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, are you doing well now?

Admiral THOMPSON. I think with the resources we have, we have a credible record.

Mr. ENGLISH. I didn't ask you that. I asked you, are you doing well? Are you catching most of the smugglers that come your way?

Admiral THOMPSON. Those that we detect and those that we have the resources to respond with, we have a very, very good track record; and detection is part of the problem.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK, now we're down to it. So you've got a detection problem.

Admiral THOMPSON. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you detect most of the smugglers that are coming your way?

Admiral THOMPSON. During certain operations, we have high intensity detection.

Mr. ENGLISH. How long do those last?

Admiral THOMPSON. Well, right now, we've had one since the 1st of November, sir, which has pretty well shut down, in our judgment, the outflow of marijuana shipments from the Colombian coast, from the north coast of Colombia.

Mr. ENGLISH. What about on the west coast?

Admiral THOMPSON. West coast, we have been able to conduct surveillance out there, and because of some surveillance activities down toward South America, we were able to track and ultimately seize a vessel up in the Seattle area.

Mr. ENGLISH. You seized a vessel?

Admiral THOMPSON. That particular one had a substantial amount of cocaine on it.

Mr. ENGLISH. How much cocaine?

Admiral THOMPSON. I'll submit the number for the record.

Mr. ENGLISH. I understand 600 pounds.

Admiral THOMPSON. For the west coast, that's a big seizure. For the Northwest, the largest seizure in the Northwest.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK, you figure that was the only boat that's making—

Admiral THOMPSON. No, sir, we make other seizures on the west coast.

Mr. ENGLISH. You can figure that wasn't the only boat, then? Is that the only one that you figure, the only boat that was smuggling cocaine up the west coast of—

Admiral THOMPSON. Oh, no, sir. No, we're not naive.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many more do you figure there were?

Admiral THOMPSON. I don't know that anybody has a finite number of how many vessels inbound to the United States are carrying cocaine. That is part of the risk-intelligence assessment.

Mr. ENGLISH. Don't you have a fleet assessment?

Admiral THOMPSON. Sir?

Mr. ENGLISH. Don't you have a fleet assessment as to what the problem is? Or threat assessment of any kind?

Admiral THOMPSON. We do continual threat assessments, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK, what does your threat assessment show for the west coast?

Admiral THOMPSON. I think the threat assessment at this stage shows that because of the reduced trafficking activity in the Caribbean, because of the intense operation with the largest group of Coast Guard and naval vessels that has been applied to the problem to date, that we can look forward to increased activity on the west coast. That is my judgment of the assessment.

Mr. ENGLISH. That's common sense, right?

Admiral THOMPSON. I would hope so.

Mr. ENGLISH. Yes. I would agree, but that doesn't tell you how many boats you're likely to have coming your way; what percentage you're going to be knocking off.

Admiral THOMPSON. We conduct surveillance patrols on the west coast.

Mr. ENGLISH. I know you do, but—here's the whole thing, Admiral. I don't want to dance around with you on all this stuff. I know you've got very little in the way of detection. You know it and I know it. You get these special missions that get laid on for 30, 60 days, sometimes maybe as much as 90 days; they are very intense periods. Once that is over with, you've got very little.

Admiral THOMPSON. Well, we're trying to tap other resources. On the west coast we're using E-2's and our C-130's.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, that's great. You were supposed to have been using them all along; the Navy is supposed to have been providing that kind of coverage for you out there, particularly in their training zones, whenever they're out there training. We've had that out for some time.

The point I am making is, I am saying here on acquisition, construction and improvement, you had a request for \$520 million, which I am getting the impression very quickly was a lot of fat. You only got \$77 million.

Admiral THOMPSON. No, sir, let me put that in perspective. That \$520, at the time that the \$520 was worked up, we were looking at an AC&I number in fiscal 1986 of something below \$300 million or about that level. It turns out that we got \$217 million in the continuing resolution in fiscal 1986 in the Coast Guard budget, and \$375 million in the Department of Defense account; an aggregate of \$592 for fiscal year 1986, which is one and a half to two times as much as we had anticipated getting. So 1987 is sort of a leveling, and we hope with the reprogramming authority of Congress we will be able to merge 1986 and 1987 ACI into a blend of those things that we need the most.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, we'll talk to the Appropriations Committee and see what they think.

Also, the President's budget contains a cut of 700 people from the Coast Guard. What impact on drug interdiction, if these cuts are allowed to go into effect, will they have?

Admiral THOMPSON. Very slight, sir. We may at some point have to go from multiple crews down to single crews on some of our operations, but I don't see a drawdown. We're still going to contribute an equal or higher percentage of our effort to the drug law enforcement.

Mr. ENGLISH. It's my understanding you just got three C-130's from the Air Force. Is that right, or are about to get?

Admiral THOMPSON. Not from the Air Force that I'm aware of. We had one—

Mr. ENGLISH. From the military, then?

Admiral THOMPSON. Well, we're buying them through the Air Force from Lockheed with our dollars.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, you're getting them from the military account, right?

Admiral THOMPSON. Yes, I think these go back to the 1982 and the 1984 DOD account.

Mr. ENGLISH. Yes, but you're getting them, getting three more, right?

Admiral THOMPSON. Yes, sir; we should have a total of 26 here shortly.

Mr. ENGLISH. Isn't it also true, though, that you're going to have to retire three more that are still operational because you don't have the people to fly them?

Admiral THOMPSON. No, we won't be. In my judgment in the 1987 budget, with the C-130's that are coming on line in fiscal year 1987, we will have enough personnel to operate 26 C-130's, or to have an inventory of 26, and a comparable number of operational aircraft.

Mr. ENGLISH. You're telling me that you're not going to retire any C-130's when these three come on line, that you're going to have crews to man all of these C-130's?

Admiral THOMPSON. I don't know what three you're talking about, Mr. Chairman. We have, I believe, 25 now and 1 more to be delivered. When they are delivered, we will have a total of some 26 C-130's. Now, in the DOD authorization in the CR in fiscal year 1986, we were told to buy four more. Congress directed us to buy four more. There is a substantial question, in terms of reprogramming, of the outcome of that particular line item, to be honest.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's see. You've got plenty of people to do the job, even after you cut 700 out of your force. How many people do you have in your command altogether?

Admiral THOMPSON. 38,300, roughly. I've got the numbers in the book here.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we're going to cut out 700; it's not going to have any impact on drug interdiction—

Admiral THOMPSON. That's the number we'll have at the end of 1986.

Mr. ENGLISH. We cut out \$600 million, and it is not going to have any impact. I don't guess there is any reason to worry then.

Admiral THOMPSON. I am not saying there isn't any impact.

Mr. ENGLISH. Oh, there is an impact?

Admiral THOMPSON. I believe I said that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, tell us what the impact is, then.

Admiral THOMPSON. We will be doing less things in less places but we will continue the highest priority, which is drug enforcement and search and rescue.

Mr. ENGLISH. What things are you cutting out, then?

Admiral THOMPSON. We are going to have to do less in aids to navigation maintenance than we are currently doing. We are going to have to slow things down. We had a nasty budget drill run on us in the fall, as you might remember. In the Senate we were looking at a \$230 million cut. At that point, we really squeezed down and slowed down our spending rate to do those things that are most important on our priority list and to defer those things that we didn't have to do, and to not spend a dollar we didn't have to. You can't continue to do that, obviously, for too long. We are drawing down on our spares.

Mr. ENGLISH. It looks like you are getting ready to take some more cuts, and you are going to squeeze down a little more, aren't you? Just keep on squeezing.

Admiral THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, if we survive at the President's budget in fiscal year 1987, particularly in the OE mark we'll get by. As you know, the Congress has been very generous with AC&I and capital investment, but not so generous with our operating accounts.

If we survive at the President's proposed budget operating account, we will be able to hang in there in 1987 at the level we are performing pre-Gramm-Rudman 1986.

Mr. ENGLISH. I am delighted to hear it.

Admiral THOMPSON. But it hurts.

Mr. ENGLISH. As we look at the Coast Guard and carry on our investigation, you know, I am not going to worry about money, I

am not going to worry about people. I know that everything is manned, it is taken care of, and whenever the budgets come before the Congress I am going to argue before my colleagues that from a drug enforcement standpoint, don't worry about it. We will provide the amounts of reductions that the President has argued. I am going to share that with my colleagues, that you tell us that that is not going to have any impact as far as drug enforcement is concerned.

Admiral THOMPSON. I did not say it would have no impact. We are going to try to maintain our current level. If the Congress wants more performance out of us than we are currently producing, we are not going to be able to do it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, then, what you are telling us is you are going to be able to do the same thing with less. That is what I will tell my colleagues, that they are going to be able to do the same thing with \$600 million less and 700 people fewer than they have been doing.

It seems to me, since you come under the Department of Defense in the event of war, that the DOD would be concerned about your readiness status. Is the Coast Guard required to measure its combat readiness by the same method the Department of Defense is?

Admiral THOMPSON. Yes, sir; we use the c-rating system for readiness for our major units. It is equivalent to the Navy system.

Mr. ENGLISH. How will the budget cuts affect both your peacetime performance and your ability to implement the requirements placed on the Coast Guard under the Maritime Defense Zone concept?

Admiral THOMPSON. I think we are going to have difficulty in achieving the training that we would like to have for our people in terms of maritime defense, but in terms of our overall readiness, we are just going to have to see how far we can hang in there with what we are given and measure it as we go.

Mr. ENGLISH. I realize that. I am a citizen of this country. I am a Government official. How secure should I feel that the Maritime Defense Zone concept is being implemented and that our shores are safe? Do you have the capability to do a good job of carrying out this responsibility, or do you not?

Admiral THOMPSON. I think we have good capability. Mr. Chairman, I would like to assure you that with the advent of the Maritime Defense Zone the citizens ought to sleep safer at night than they did before because there was no standing organization in practice to handle that particular task.

Our field area commands are on the east and west coasts. Our Coast Guard officers who are working for the Navy—it is a Navy tasking, the coastal defense of the United States—we are helping them implement that. MDZ is a naval tasking and a naval function and, yes, the Navy is—

Mr. ENGLISH. I didn't ask you if you could implement it. I asked if you can carry out your responsibilities under it.

Admiral THOMPSON. Our responsibility is to bring to that situation in the best condition we can the resources that we have on hand—

Mr. ENGLISH. No, no. I didn't ask you that, Admiral. I asked you, can you carry out your responsibilities as designated to you under that act, under that concept? Can you do that? Can you fulfill your entire mission?

Admiral THOMPSON. To the best of our ability.

Mr. ENGLISH. Not to the best of your ability, no. I asked you—

Admiral THOMPSON. Yes, sir. I don't think it is a yes or no situation.

Mr. ENGLISH. I do. I think it is yes or no. Either you can do it or you can't do it. What you are telling me is, don't ask me.

Admiral THOMPSON. We are in peacetime, Mr. Chairman, tasked with creating the MDZ plans and exercising the plans. As we march through this Maritime Defense Zone concept, we are identifying what works, what needs fixing, and those become part of our planning for improvements. Obviously, if we got more money, we would improve our capability.

Mr. ENGLISH. I just want to point out to you that my staff has had a classified briefing with regard to your capabilities on that, and you can't do it. That is what the briefing shows. You can't do that job. You can't carry out that responsibility.

Admiral THOMPSON. I don't agree with that assessment.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, whoever presents the briefing within the Coast Guard sure did. You can sit there and disagree with it all you want to. As I said, yesterday we got into the same thing. We got into this Vietnam mentality where whatever we want it to be, that is the way it is. We are not going to look at the reality of the situation, whether we can carry out our mission, do our job, or anything else.

Admiral THOMPSON. There are two routes of funding for the Maritime Defense Zone. We are to take care of the Coast Guard contribution and the Navy takes care of the Navy contribution.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is what I am aware of.

Last year you told us that the smugglers were making increased use of air drops to boats in the Florida area. Is this still the case?

Admiral THOMPSON. They are still at it. I don't have the statistics as to whether it is on the increase right now. I can get them for you, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would have thought you would have brought that with you, Admiral. You knew this was an interdiction hearing. You knew that you testified to that last year. I would think that that would be something that you would bring with you.

Admiral THOMPSON. All right. Let me see if it is in the index. Captain Crosby?

Captain CROSBY. It is still on the increase, Mr. Chairman. However, Operation Bat and several other special operations which we have had over the past year have been specifically designed to prevent the transshipment of drugs through the Bahamas or in the air space over the Bahamas.

Mr. ENGLISH. According to testimony that we received—I shouldn't say testimony, I should say information that was relayed to us by DEA in the Bahamas—you have up to 300 boats a month coming across. How many a month do you get? We know where they are coming from. They are coming straight out of the Baha-

mas, right across to the Florida Peninsula, day after day after day, up to 300 a month.

How many do you get a month? In that particular case, we don't even need strategic intelligence. It is the same. We don't even have enough of a threat down there to make them vary it. How many do you get?

Captain CROSBY. I can't give you the exact percentage right now. I am not really sure. Last year, we got 200 seizures, and by far the vast majority of them were right around that area in southern Florida between the Bahamas and the Southeast United States.

Mr. ENGLISH. 200 for the entire Nation?

Captain CROSBY. That is right, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. 200 for the entire country. How many of those would you estimate is in that route between the Bahamas and the south Florida coast?

Captain CROSBY. How many of those were between there? About half of those. That particular situation—

Mr. ENGLISH. What is that, 150 a year?

Captain CROSBY. I don't know. I will have to get a figure for you, Mr. Chairman. That is the reason why our cocaine seizures went up from 1,000 in 1984 to 6,000 pounds in 1985. A great deal of that cocaine was from those vessels that were proceeding from the Bahamas to the United States.

Mr. ENGLISH. An estimate of 150 last year, roughly. According to DEA, roughly 3,600 came across, and you got 150. We are happy with that. We are pleased. That is satisfactory.

Admiral THOMPSON. We are not happy with that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, you just got through telling me here—

Admiral THOMPSON. What we don't get from DEA is the time of departure and the route from—

Mr. ENGLISH. I didn't ask you that. You just got through telling me that \$600 million had been cut out of your budget, that 700 people are getting ready to be cut, that it is not going to have any impact on drugs and that we are going to be able to maintain the level that we had. I certainly didn't hear you in your testimony saying that we are not going to be able to apprehend a significant percent of the people who are breaking the law and coming across there.

Admiral THOMPSON. Let me suggest, sir, that it is my judgment at this stage that still intact in the 1987 budget are some eight fast boats that we have under contract or close to being under contract to procure that were specifically identified as a requirement for us to combat this high-speed short run from the Bahamas over to Florida.

Mr. ENGLISH. Then the question comes down to, I suppose, are you going to have the people to put on them? You are losing 700 folks, if the President has his way. You are not going to have anybody to put on those boats. Those are new boats and new positions. You are having trouble manning what you have.

Admiral THOMPSON. It is a game of priorities, Mr. Chairman, as you know. If that is the highest priority and the sense is that that is where we need to place our most intensive effort, then we are going to have to drag the people off to there to do that.

That is what we are doing with this Taclet business right now. We aren't waiting for the check from the U.S. Navy to go ahead and employ additional Ledets and Taclets. With the vessels that are employed in the Caribbean, there are probably some 200 people who have been used at one time or another in the last 2½ months as Taclets. We drew them out of other districts, drew them down from other missions to put them down there.

Mr. ENGLISH. It seems to me still that you haven't got people unless you take them from somewhere else. I guess that means that the Coast Guard is going to be unable to perform its responsibilities, whether it is part of its national defense responsibility or whether it is the war on drugs or whatever.

I don't know where the priorities are. We have got some very serious questions here that have arisen, given what is happening within this interdiction budget. You play a role in interdiction. We have got the President's budget here telling us interdiction is not very important. We are going to have to put our emphasis in investigations and in intelligence. This may be the last on your list by the time this thing finally gets in from the President.

Admiral THOMPSON. No, sir. I read the President's budget as saying it is no less important than it was last year.

Mr. ENGLISH. We will read it to you. We are looking for it. We will come back to that in a minute, Admiral.

What is the Coast Guard's participation in the Joint Marine Interdiction Center in Miami?

Admiral THOMPSON. It is located in the same Federal building we are. I believe it is adjacent to the NNBIS Operation, if I am informed correctly. We certainly encourage any enhancement in that area.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are you participating in the Marine Interdiction Center in Miami? Are you participating in that?

Admiral THOMPSON. Captain Crosby?

Captain CROSBY. Yes, sir, we will be.

Mr. ENGLISH. You are not now?

Captain CROSBY. Well, it hasn't been commissioned yet. It is scheduled to go on line the 11th of February.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have you identified the people who are going to be stationed there?

Captain CROSBY. No, we haven't. We fully intend to put people there.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are you sharing the operational costs with Customs on it?

Captain CROSBY. We have provided some funds. I don't know exactly how much. Certainly it is not an equal sharing.

Mr. ENGLISH. I see.

What is the status of the Coast Guard's ship tethered aerostat program?

Admiral THOMPSON. Sir, we have had two on lease. I have the statistics that I can provide. Lease No. 1 has done fairly well after Mother Nature hit it once. It probably had a wind shear and took a dive in the water. It has been repaired and it has been underway 100 out of 137 available days and the underway times exceeded 95 percent. That is the good news.

The bad news is Mother Nature took a hit on lease No. 2 while it was moored at Key West. It was damaged and went over the side. We have attempted to get it repaired. We probably are not going to continue that lease. As a matter of fact, I am told we have not extended that lease because we are not getting very good operations out of it. It has some technical problems.

We have two additional aerostats ready for a fly-off. One will be delivered I believe in February and another one in March or so, provided by two different vendors. The best, or if you would, the victorious aerostat manufacturer, has the option to provide additional aerostats.

Mr. ENGLISH. What is your evaluation of the tests that have been conducted so far?

Admiral THOMPSON. One thing we know is God didn't intend them to stay up there all the time because he has knocked them down twice. Second, I would say that they do provide an expanded area of surface coverage in terms of detection. We have had some seizures as a result of their capability, seizures that we most likely would not have made without that capability.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you know of anything any better? Do you have any detection systems any better?

Admiral THOMPSON. We don't have any stationary detection systems that are any better, sir. For a stationary or slow-moving sea-based, look-down radar, we think they are good.

Mr. ENGLISH. You recently were a major player in Operation Hat Trick. I understand that this was a concentrated effort over a short period of time, as we pointed out.

What impact will Hat Trick have on your operational activities for the remainder of the year?

Admiral THOMPSON. When we sustain that level of effort at sea, Mr. Chairman, for along the period of time—it has been 3 months now that we have been underway on this one, and it will continue—we have to take the ships back ultimately as we cycle them in and out and do some additional maintenance and repair work on them.

It is all programmed in terms of the dollars that are spent on that operation are a part of the annual budget and so is the maintenance and repair, but I wouldn't mislead you, we cannot sustain that kind of an operation over a long period of time. We try to mount it at the most advantageous time to catch the harvest and the trafficking.

Mr. ENGLISH. But you pay for it later, don't you?

Admiral THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So any time you have a sustained effort for 30, 60 or 90 days, some prolonged period like that, it means that that is time that you won't be able to run later in the year?

Admiral THOMPSON. We won't be able to keep that large of a presence down there. We do maintain choke points and additional smaller operations, but there is no way we can sustain that kind of large operation, and certainly the Navy cannot stay down there with us for any really long period of time without impacting their readiness.

Mr. ENGLISH. Isn't it also true, though, that that will be at a lower level than what would normally be the case?

Admiral THOMPSON. It may be for brief periods.

Mr. ENGLISH. Brief or substantial?

Admiral THOMPSON. We are going to maintain a presence in the choke points.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's go down through it, Admiral. You are not getting any additional money for these special operations, are you? That comes out of your hide, right?

Admiral THOMPSON. Right. We have increased that money over the years the best we could by drawing down from other places. It is priorities again, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. All right, but still, if you were to maintain a level activity function throughout the year that would be at say *X* level, you have a special operations and you boost it up for 30, 60, or 90 days, that means you have to come back down below what that normal level would be in order to offset it and stay level throughout the year, right?

Admiral THOMPSON. Indeed. We get 180-plus days a year out of our ships, and that is about all we can get out of them.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you are going to pay for it later on. If you were a drug smuggler, you could simply sit back and wait out one of these special operations. I notice it gets plenty of publicity, it gets announced by political figures, it seems, who get all the nice press that they can get out of it. Smugglers know as soon as it is over with that you are going to have a lower level of activity than you would otherwise during the rest of the year.

Admiral THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, give us credit for considering that prospect and having a few surprises available in terms of a defense.

Mr. ENGLISH. Still, there is no getting around that that is a fact of life, isn't it?

Admiral THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Yesterday Senator Chiles proposed putting the Coast Guard's procurement account under the Department of Defense. He felt that as long as it stayed in Transportation that it would always be the first thing to get cut.

What are your feelings about this kind of suggestion?

Admiral THOMPSON. The record of having additional money in the Department of Defense account—it seems to be coming on even years, 1982, 1984, 1986—certainly gives us renewed capital investment.

My problem with it, if there is a problem, sir, is what we need is counterpart operating funds; in other words, getting additional resources without having an increase in our operating dollars, particularly in personnel dollars and maintenance dollars, creates a dilemma for us, as I think you can appreciate.

Mr. ENGLISH. If Congress sees fit to do that, would you object?

Admiral THOMPSON. We are not going to object to green money, sir, in any form that I am aware of. I certainly would not want to imply that. But it does create a balance problem for us. Carried to an extreme, we could have a magnificent new fleet and nobody to get it underway for lack of operating funds.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate it. We probably are going to have some additional questions in writing for you.

Thank you for your testimony here today.

Admiral THOMPSON. Yes, sir. To the extent that I didn't provide you the numbers that you were seeking, either in terms of the budget or any lists, I would be happy to submit those to your staff. I think you can appreciate some of the information in the 1986 and 1987 budget is still being developed. I am not an old hand at this game, but it certainly does seem to be an unusual year.

Mr. ENGLISH. I think we are going to have some unusual years ahead of us.

Thank you very much, Admiral. We appreciate it.

[The information follows:]

Attached is a three part list showing the Coast Guard's budget requests to the Department of Transportation, the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress. The difference between the Coast Guard's initial and final budget requests totals \$625,265,000. The major portion of the difference occurs in our Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements appropriation--\$443,000,000--of which \$190,000,000 is proposed for restoration by reprogramming from FY 1986 DOD Coastal Defense Augmentation Account, as was discussed earlier.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
U. S. Coast Guard
Three Stage Budget Request
(dollars in thousands)

	BUDGET AUTHORITY		
	OST	OMB	CONGRESSIONAL
Operating Expenses.....	1,959,415	1,849,254	1,832,800
Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements.....	520,100	300,000	77,100 ^{1/}
Alteration of Bridges.....	10,000	5,500	---
Retired Pay.....	377,500	377,500	354,000
Reserve Training.....	72,850	66,232	65,200
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.....	35,000	24,000	20,500
Offshore Oil Pollution	1,000	1,000	1,000
Deepwater Port	1,000	1,000	1,000
Pollution Fund.....	7,000	7,000	7,000
Boat Safety.....	45,000 ^{2/}	29,000 ^{2/}	45,000 ^{3/}
Gift Fund.....	80	80	80
TOTAL.....	3,028,945	2,660,566	2,403,680

^{1/} Excludes \$190.2 million proposed for funding of Coast Guard projects from the Navy Coastal Defense Augmentation Account.

^{2/} \$15 million to be funded toward Operating Expenses.

^{3/} \$30 million proposed to be funded toward Operating Expenses.

Mr. ENGLISH. We will recess until 1:30. We have some additional questions for the Department of the Treasury, and we will attempt to deal with that at that point.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. ENGLISH. The hearing will come to order.

We are very happy this afternoon to have Commissioner von Raab with us to follow up on some of the questions that we had for the Treasury Department that didn't get answered yesterday, and some of the questions that we had, quite frankly, out in Arizona that I didn't get an opportunity to inquire when we were sitting with the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Commissioner, we are happy to have you with us again today, and we will let you start off with any statement that you care to make, and then we will proceed with questions. If you don't have a statement, that's fine.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM VON RAAB, COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM ROSENBLATT, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR ENFORCEMENT, AND CLARK D. STUART, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AVIATION OPERATIONS, CALIFORNIA REGION

Mr. VON RAAB. I have no prepared statement. I believe that Deputy Secretary Darman covered most of the general points that I might have made in my statement, so I am available for your questions, and with your permission, Mr. Bill Rosenblatt who is our Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement, under whom most of the programs about which you will have questions falls, and if it's all right with you, he will be here to answer questions and help me answer some.

Mr. ENGLISH. This committee knows Mr. Rosenblatt quite well, and we're happy to have him with us again. Thank you very much.

In 1983, you estimated that "Multi-ton stockpiles of drugs are allegedly located 30 miles south of Lukeville, AZ, 20 to 30 miles south of Saseby, AZ, and in the Magdalena and Santa Anna, Mexico areas." What have you done to concentrate your resources to take advantage of this intelligence in the past 1½ years, and with what results?

Mr. VON RAAB. Would you repeat the particular location?

Mr. ENGLISH. Yes, it's 30 miles south of Lukeville, AZ, and 20 to 30 miles of Saseby, AZ.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. ENGLISH. And that's in the Magdalena and Santa Anna, Mexico area.

Mr. VON RAAB. Right; I know where it is.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. One of the things that we have been trying to do over the course of the last year and a half, and more particularly with respect to the last 6 months is concentrate additional investigative resources in the various aviation branch locations throughout the Southwest and Southeast.

We've even as recently as last week authorized additional intelligence positions in each one of these branches to be able to identify major smuggling organizations that may be linked up to those stash locations that you are talking about. We feel that with additional intelligence information, we can determine what routes they are taking to penetrate the southwest border, either by air or overland.

Mr. ENGLISH. Where are you going to get this additional intelligence?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. I'm sorry?

Mr. ENGLISH. Where do you intend to get the additional intelligence?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Well, with the——

Mr. ENGLISH. How.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Well, with our investigators and with the intelligence analysts, and also recently we've had agreement with the Drug Enforcement Administration to place one of our personnel in Mexico City, in our office in Mexico City, and other locations. To specifically answer your question, we hope to be able to get that interdiction intelligence and determine the methodology that will bring in those loads that you mentioned, over into the United States.

Mr. VON RAAB. The program that Mr. Rosenblatt describes represents a fundamental, I won't say change, but development in the air program. And that is that these resources will be devoted to the collection of intelligence, some of whom are already on board, were not available to these air branches before now in a formal sense. I'm not saying that there weren't some people doing this in one way or the other.

To answer your other question also, with respect to the Southwest, I am going to have to get you specifics on that particular geographic area, but from 1983 to today we've doubled our aircraft. I realize you have some problems with that use of percentages, but we've basically gone from 6 aircraft to 15; and our staff has increased in the Southwest from 1983; that is, inspectors, pilots, and agents, from about 888 to 986.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many of those are located in the Saseby, Lukeville, AZ area?

Mr. VON RAAB. I'm saying I don't have that particular number and I would have to, if you would permit, provide it for the record. I don't have specific details on the southwest border with me. I had them in Phoenix, but I don't have them here.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would be very interested to know as well, Commissioner, you know, how is some guy down in Mexico City going to help you with a takeoff of an aircraft 30 miles south of Lukeville, AZ. What does he do for you in Mexico City on takeoff of an aircraft south of Lukeville, AZ?

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, he will be reviewing all of DEA's information with respect to whatever information they have, and——

Mr. ENGLISH. How far do you figure it is from Lukeville, AZ to Mexico City?

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, the Mexico City information contains information that DEA collects all over Mexico. So he's not actually collecting information; he is reviewing, analyzing and disbursing to

Customs information that the DEA has collected throughout Mexico.

Mr. ENGLISH. What's the last time that you got tactical information from that fellow that's sitting down there in Mexico City, who received it from DEA, on takeoff of an aircraft south of Lukeville, AZ?

Mr. VON RAAB. We probably have never had that kind of information.

Mr. ENGLISH. I don't think you have, either. So what you're saying there doesn't count, does it?

Mr. VON RAAB. No; because it's a relatively new program. I'm not saying we'll—

Mr. ENGLISH. Whoa, Commissioner; 1983. That's from—

Mr. VON RAAB. No; you're saying when are these people being placed in Mexico City. I'm saying the placement of our intelligence analysts—

Mr. ENGLISH. We've had DEA down there all along. Isn't it part of their responsibility to keep you apprised of intelligence information?

Mr. VON RAAB. I don't want to confuse the two issues. In terms of our intelligence analyst he has not been in Mexico City very long. So, yes, we haven't gotten any information from him separate from and independent from the use of our intelligence analyst in Mexico City; we have not received that kind of information from DEA; that is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, let's not dance around it. Some one down in Mexico City, an intelligence analyst in Mexico City, is not going to tell you a blooming thing about what time tomorrow, unless he is very, very lucky, an aircraft is going to take off from someplace south of Lukeville, AZ; or what time this afternoon it's going to take off. That aircraft is going to take off and you're not going to have tactical intelligence on that. You may learn about it a week later, that he took off from down there, but that doesn't help you to catch him. He's long gone and in the United States at that point. Now, the point that we're coming down to is that you didn't put that intelligence analyst in Mexico City to tell you about takeoffs from airfields south of Lukeville, AZ.

Mr. VON RAAB. No; that's correct, but—and I agree with you, generally, that the probabilities of his coming up with that kind of tactical information are very, very remote. But there is a possibility that he could.

Mr. ENGLISH. It would be a wondrous thing.

Mr. VON RAAB. He could be lucky.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, he believes in Santa Claus and the tooth fairy, too, probably.

Mr. Rosenblatt, do you have something you want to say on that?

So really, as far as being able to meet the challenge of the drug smugglers, of the multiton stockpiles of drugs that are south of Lukeville, AZ and Saseby, AZ, what you tell me is that there are additional assets; you can't tell me how many that have been placed in the area. Do any of those assets tell you when those aircraft take off?

Mr. VON RAAB. Could they?

Mr. ENGLISH. Do they?

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, they have not. Could they; yes. They will be doing intelligence collecting on our side of the border, and if we discover through that effort that a plane is expected from that area, then they could inform us. But I would not disagree with your proposition that the availability of tactical intelligence with respect to movement of loads like that across the border is somewhere in the very, very low percentages, and——

Mr. ENGLISH. How are those aircraft going to provide that kind of intelligence for you?

Mr. VON RAAB. These are individuals attached to the air branches whose responsibility it will be to collect intelligence on our side of the border on prospective flights over the border.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I am just trying to figure out how this works. We don't have anybody down in Mexico except this analyst in Mexico City. We don't have anybody that goes down across the border into Mexico, I would assume, who provides you this information.

So basically if you are looking for intelligence, you have to hope that you arrest some guy, and he might be able to tell you he knows of somebody that's going to take off tomorrow——

Mr. VON RAAB. Or we could have gone to a fixed base station and learned that someone is preparing an aircraft, or that aircraft have been seen to land in particular places.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, that's nice strategic intelligence, but that doesn't tell you that the guy's going to be going down to one of these spots south of Saseby or Lukeville, or anyplace else along the border; they could be going to hundreds of spots.

Now, for instance, you've got intelligence that has identified numerous dry lake beds 80 to 100 miles south of El Paso, which show signs of frequent, large aircraft traffic. What makes you think that they would be going to one of those locations as opposed to Saseby or Lukeville or anyplace else, just because you see some aircraft that looks like he's going to go to Mexico. I mean, he could be taking the family down for a little lunch somewhere down there across the border.

Mr. VON RAAB. I am not at all attempting to argue the point with you; you're absolutely correct that—our tactical intelligence, retrospectively and prospectively on flights coming out of areas just south of the border is very, very poor; and in many cases nonexistent. I will admit that very, very quickly.

Mr. ENGLISH. You mentioned yesterday—well, let me just say that with regard to that, isn't that where the tethered aerostat, isn't that part of the role that it was to play? The tethered aerostat at Fort Huachuca?

Mr. VON RAAB. That's correct. That would be able to identify those planes at some point during their flight.

Mr. ENGLISH. So that is how you would in effect receive tactical information in Mexico?

Mr. VON RAAB. That would be one way that we could receive this information; that's correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you know a better way?

Mr. VON RAAB. A better way would be to have better collection in Mexico made available to the United States Customs Service, and another better way——

Mr. ENGLISH. How would that be done?

Mr. VON RAAB. Just collection efforts by United States officials in Mexico.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, you don't have any U.S. officials except that analyst down in Mexico City, do you?

Mr. VON RAAB. No, I'm saying DEA.

Mr. ENGLISH. Oh, DEA. We have had long talks with the DEA about their willingness to provide you with tactical intelligence; haven't we?

Mr. VON RAAB. We have had many conversations.

Mr. ENGLISH. And those have resulted in what?

Mr. VON RAAB. We have not received sufficient or adequate tactical information from DEA.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have you received any?

Mr. VON RAAB. I'm not aware of any, but there may very well be one or two instances.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Rosenblatt, do you know of any?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. No, I'm not familiar with any of that kind of information, but I would like to add, Mr. Chairman, that in addition to the tethered aerostat that you are talking about, I think with P-3 overflights and some of the military overflights, too, those would be other ways. I'm not saying any one of them is mutually exclusive of the other.

Another way with respect to tactical intelligence is through investigative support. We would like to acquire sources within drug trafficking organizations we identify, and particularly with respect to ground crews. By penetrating these organizations and working in coordination with DEA, we may be in a better position to be at the landing sites in the United States for some of these loads.

Mr. ENGLISH. Isn't it true, Mr. Rosenblatt, that the President's budget took away the prime tactical intelligence potential of the Customs Service?

Mr. VON RAAB. Mr. Chairman, we have gone around on this issue—

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I was asking Mr. Rosenblatt. He's the expert on all these little gimmicks, little items that go into the freeze and go into—

Mr. VON RAAB. If you will permit, if we're going to talk about the President's budget, since I'm the higher level policy official, I would like to be able to answer that question.

Mr. ENGLISH. I wasn't talking policy, though, Commissioner. What I was talking about is hardware. Without this money, without these items, it comes down to hardware, Commissioner.

Mr. VON RAAB. The President's budget has reduced the funds available to Customs, and the Customs Service coordinating group has decided to make those reductions in this case in the aerostat. That's correct, which is a source of tactical intelligence.

Mr. ENGLISH. We'll play it your way, Commissioner. Let me ask you that, then. There's not going to be any new aerostat on the border in the Southwest, is there?

Mr. VON RAAB. Not under the present budget.

Mr. ENGLISH. All right. There is not going to be the additional items of electronic equipment installed in the P-3's that was scheduled to be installed, is there?

Mr. VON RAAB. That's unlikely, unless as we go through the year we decide either in consultation with Congress or as we develop—

Mr. ENGLISH. Well now I ask you on the President's budget, now, you're the policymaker, you told me you wanted to respond on that, now—

Mr. VON RAAB. I have the authority, if I wish, to put that equipment into the P-3's if I feel I can find that money somewhere else in the budget.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, do you know where that money is today?

Mr. VON RAAB. Where it is today?

Mr. ENGLISH. Where is it? Have you got any? Do you have any extra money?

Mr. VON RAAB. Under our present plans, we're not going to be putting it into that particular equipment plan, no.

Mr. ENGLISH. And the President's budget specifically states that it will not be put in; does it not?

Mr. VON RAAB. The present budget does not provide us money sufficient to put it in.

Mr. ENGLISH. With regard to that fact—now I will go to Mr. Rosenblatt since we've got it established that the President's budget does not provide for any tethered aerostats, and now that we have it established that the President's budget does not allow for any of these other items, now we'll go to Mr. Rosenblatt and we'll see what it means, Commissioner.

Without that tethered aerostat and without the detection enhancements for the P-3's, will you have any detection capability on a timely basis, tactical intelligence, coming from the Southwest?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. We will continue to have very little, or the minimum that we have right now, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, what is that right now?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Well—

Mr. ENGLISH. Unless the analyst gets a call in the middle of the night and has the greatest stroke of luck since I don't know what—

Mr. ROSENBLATT. I believe you know as well as I do, the existence of the FAA, also—

Mr. ENGLISH. Oh, let's stop. We'll take them one at a time. I love to pause on all these, Mr. Rosenblatt. Tell me, now, what is—how far down does that radar go for the FAA?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Not very low.

Mr. ENGLISH. Not very low. What, we've had surveys done by Stanford Research and how—there are places you can fly in undetected at 14,000 feet and we didn't even hit the top of that, did we? Now, what about the FAA? Is there anything there?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. In reality?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. Nothing. Now give me the next one.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Minimal. As I said, in my broad general statement, it is minimal.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. So in effect, the President's budget removed any potential for tactical intelligence for the Customs Service along

the entire southwest border, from Brownsville, TX to San Diego, CA. Correct?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commissioner, in 1983, you reported a 300 percent increase in air-related enforcement statistics for the first 6 months of that year. Have we had a substantial increase in air cases made in the Southwest since 1983?

Mr. VON RAAB. Probably not. I don't have those statistics right in front of me.

Mr. ENGLISH. You've got a lot of bright people behind you—

Mr. VON RAAB. I know we do.

Mr. ENGLISH. Don't they know?

Mr. VON RAAB. We'll have to provide that for the record.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I can tell you it's no. Do you have any idea why not? We've all heard testimony about the shifts that are taking place from south Florida to the southwest border—

Mr. VON RAAB. Lack of good tactical intelligence is the answer.

Mr. ENGLISH. You reported that over 50 percent of the aircraft that were seized in the southwest region are the result of transponders or beepers resulting from investigative activity. I know that there has been a significant reorganization in your investigative operations. As a result of that reorganization, how many transponders have been placed on suspect aircraft in the past 4 months, and how many seizures have been made as a result of that?

Mr. VON RAAB. Very few.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many?

Mr. VON RAAB. Very few.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you know the number?

Mr. VON RAAB. I don't know the number; I would say it's less than five.

Mr. ENGLISH. One since November.

Mr. VON RAAB. All right.

Mr. ENGLISH. We ran into situations in which, as a result of your reorganization, and we've seen so far how unproductive it's been, we've ended up with cases where we had bust teams that weren't available when they were needed. There is also the problem of the investigative people now having no direct responsibility for air cases. Doesn't this bring about reason to pause and reconsider the emphasis that's been placed on investigative activity versus the number of arrests and the potential in the air program?

Mr. VON RAAB. The problems with respect to the unavailability of, at least in one case of which I'm aware and I believe it is the one to which you're referring; the reason that that took place is that the bust team was sent on another mission.

Mr. ENGLISH. What was that other mission?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Because of an air crash in the California area, that was being investigated, where there was reportedly narcotics in that aircraft, and the aircraft was called back to pick up some investigators that wanted to get out to the scene. What happened in that particular case is that the aircraft proceeded, our aircraft proceeded out to the crash site without the investigators.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we have undergone in the last several months a change with respect to the investigative resources associated with the air branches; and they are collocated, and we have in

essence put an additionally 62 positions besides the 385 personnel that are directly associated with the Aviation Operation Division. We feel that by having these additional 62 positions totally dedicated and devoted to investigations, that it will improve the overall interdiction and investigations of smuggling of narcotics. At the same time, it frees up the crews to be available to fly the aircraft when detections are obtained.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, we're going to be watching that very closely, Mr. Rosenblatt, to see if it develops in that manner.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. OK.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commissioner, last March at the hearings in Miami, you assured the Congress that sufficient air crews would be available to operate the Customs air interdiction fleet. Two months ago we found that, not only can Customs often not fly the P-3's detection aircraft, but Customs could not routinely man other vital aircraft. Can you tell us why this has developed?

Mr. VON RAAB. I can tell you what happened in the case of the P-3's; and that is that due to the cumbersome hiring procedures through which we had to go in order to acquire pilots, and due to the inattention to which some of our managers gave to this issue, we did not bring pilots or crews on board fast enough in order to meet some of the P-3A requirements.

That situation has been corrected. We now have direct hiring authority from OPM, and we have new managers in those positions. And so there was some shortfall there. We've taken action to correct it.

Mr. ENGLISH. This was pointed out to you a number of times, this problem, this concern.

Mr. VON RAAB. That's correct. It was.

Mr. ENGLISH. And you didn't do anything about it?

Mr. VON RAAB. I did something about it each time, and each time we just lost a few more managers. It's not—it was not a very pleasant experience for me, and I can assure you, it was a less pleasant experience for those who were responsible, below me. And I assure you, it is now corrected.

Mr. ENGLISH. That ultimately was your responsibility.

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. ENGLISH. Last summer, the Director of the Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System testified that the entire Western United States air interdiction effort was under the command and control of a center at March Air Force Base. He further stated that Customs was responsible for this. Would you describe for us how one Customs official, stationed at March Air Force Base with no low-level detection system, poor Customs communications, no intelligence, no standard operational procedures, is able to perform that kind of a miracle?

Mr. VON RAAB. I think the Vice President was badly advised in making that statement, and had he known the circumstances there, he would not have made that statement.

Mr. ENGLISH. In other words, the Vice President didn't know what he was talking about.

Mr. VON RAAB. The Vice President was given bad information.

Mr. ENGLISH. Doesn't that still come down to the fact he doesn't know what he's talking about?

Mr. VON RAAB. No; the Vice President always knows what he's talking about.

Mr. ENGLISH. Always knows what he's talking about; I see. It's amazing.

Last summer, Commissioner, you were questioned at a congressional hearing with regard to tactical intelligence. You indicated that as a result of the improvement in the interaction between DEA and Customs, tactical intelligence would be much improved within a year. In fact, you stated, and I quote: "We'd better or we're going to have a lot of people who are looking for jobs because we're putting a lot of effort into it."

How has the better coordination now led to greater, higher quality tactical intelligence?

Mr. VON RAAB. It has not met my expectations.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, have you got a lot of people looking for jobs?

Mr. VON RAAB. There are a few; yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Not a lot?

Mr. VON RAAB. More than one is a lot in any organization.

Mr. ENGLISH. What are you doing to fix it?

Mr. VON RAAB. We have some new people working on it. We have some new systems. Obviously there are a lot more efforts going on, particularly on the Florida coast.

As you know, we are opening our Joint Marine Command Center, into which we are netting a whole number of sensor radars, condor radars, aerostats. That is one thing we are doing to fix it.

We are pushing harder on putting our analysts in foreign countries. I realize that only has a minor impact on tactical intelligence.

We are putting the 62 investigators with the air branches. That is a capability that the air branches would not have had before. We are actually putting eight so-called series 132 professional intelligence analysts with the air branches.

Those are the actions that we are taking to correct it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are you just starting those, or is that something that is underway?

Mr. VON RAAB. Some of that is underway, but some of it—for example, the eight series 132's—has only recently been authorized.

Mr. ENGLISH. But up to this point, we don't have improved tactical intelligence?

Mr. VON RAAB. Not sufficiently. That is correct, we don't have considerably improved tactical intelligence.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that another one in which you failed in?

Mr. VON RAAB. We are relying less on DEA and more on Customs now.

Mr. ENGLISH. But you are the one that made the statement last summer that we better or we are going to have a lot of people looking for jobs because we are putting a lot of effort into it.

I assume that this was your responsibility, the same as this business over here with regard to the P-3 pilots was your responsibility. Aren't you responsible for this?

Mr. VON RAAB. The whole Customs Service is my responsibility; yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is right, and whenever you make a statement like this, and as you testified in March with the P-3 aircraft, this seems to fall in the same category.

Mr. VON RAAB. I wouldn't say it is quite in the same category. The development of better tactical intelligence is a slower process than the bringing on board of pilots.

Mr. ENGLISH. I believe that you made the statement that there was going to be a significant improvement within a year.

Mr. VON RAAB. I was overly optimistic in my statement.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commissioner, we have been told that the smuggling threat into the United States may have shifted as much as 30 percent from the Southeast to the Southwest. Whatever the correct percentage is on the shift, would you review for me how the Mexican Government has assisted in the air smuggling problem?

Mr. VON RAAB. The only significant assist that we have received from the Mexican Government has been in some sharing of radar information between the two governments or the two Customs Services, in what we call Operation Tequila Fly. That is the sum total of the cooperation.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is not much, is it?

Mr. VON RAAB. No; it is not much.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have there been cases in which Mexican Government officials have refused to cooperate?

Mr. VON RAAB. That is always hard to say. No one will ever say no, but first of all, we don't deal directly with the agencies who are responsible for most of narcotics enforcement in the Mexican Government. Our only direct contacts are with the Customs Service, and their responsibility for narcotics is fairly limited. They are responsible for physical inspections, but once a narcotics case begins to develop it is really the Federal police.

I could not in any way applaud the cooperative efforts of the Mexican officials. They have been abysmal.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thanks to Senator DeConcini we recently repealed the Mansfield amendment, which prevented our law enforcement officials from playing any active role in a foreign country. Why don't we have an agreement with Mexico which would allow us to go in hot pursuit, under the Mexican law enforcement's control, when a smuggler runs back across the border?

Mr. VON RAAB. I wish I knew.

Mr. ENGLISH. What do you think?

Mr. VON RAAB. The Mexican Government doesn't want them.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that a lack of cooperation?

Mr. VON RAAB. I don't know what their motivation is. They usually cloak it in a speech about sovereignty.

Mr. ENGLISH. You are a bright fellow. Why do you think? What is your assessment of it?

Mr. VON RAAB. I always hate to theorize about the theories of a foreign government. I have personally discussed this issue with a number of Mexican officials. Most of them said it was an issue for another Mexican official saying that it wasn't my area, it was some other cabinet ministers.

The only one who actually said no to me and gave me a reason was the Foreign Minister, who told me that this was an issue of

national sovereignty, and for that reason they would not allow us to come into their country.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, DEA doesn't seem to be too timid about stepping out and saying what the situation is, as they did this morning in the New York Times. Why are you so timid?

Mr. VON RAAB. You are suggesting that the reason that the Mexicans do not allow this is because of their corrupt enforcement agencies?

Mr. ENGLISH. I am asking you, is that right?

Mr. VON RAAB. That is a possible reason. I am saying I don't know what goes through the mind of the Foreign Minister when he says that national sovereignty does not allow us to fly our planes into Mexico and for that reason they will not prospectively allow us to fly into it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Wouldn't you say that is a lack of cooperation? If I remember correctly, the proposal that came up was that Mexican officials would be on board and any arrest would be under their jurisdiction once we are in Mexico.

Mr. VON RAAB. That was my idea. I wouldn't characterize it as a lack of cooperation. I would characterize it as a miserable lack of cooperation.

Mr. ENGLISH. Now we are getting down to it. I think that is where we ought to be. Let's get down and call it.

Why do the Mexicans not provide you with early warning of activity at many of these dry lakebeds that we have talked about that are used by smugglers south of the border?

Mr. VON RAAB. Probably a combination of incompetence and corruption.

Mr. ENGLISH. How extensive is the corruption within the Mexican Government?

Mr. VON RAAB. I don't know. I have read the same reports that you have. From the reports and the press, it would appear they are fairly extensive.

Mr. ENGLISH. Intelligence has suggested that Baja, CA, area is a major transshipment point for the west coast. What have you done to confront this?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we do have an air branch down there. We also have marine resources that we are refurbishing or updating in San Diego and along the Pacific coastline.

There is approximately a total of 21 vessels. We have already replaced nine of those vessels, and we have in transit right now a radar platform that will be assigned to the San Diego area, along with some pursuit vessels.

Later on in this year we intend to replace an additional nine vessels over there. We have money in the budget that is for testing of a lighter-than-air balloon to determine and assess the threat in that area over the course of a 4-month period of time.

Mr. ENGLISH. How long has that boat been in transit, that radar platform you are talking about?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. For the last month and a half. We have had some problems with the contractor, his employees, and also some malfunctions in the equipment. My understanding is that boat is

now expected into San Diego next week sometime, barring any other mishaps.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is my understanding that boat started back last summer.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. You are correct, it is 3½ months; my mistake.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is longer than that, since last summer. In fact, it was early summer. And we still don't know when that boat is going to get there, just that it is in transit. That thing could be going by China to get there.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. My understanding is it will be in Acapulco this weekend.

Mr. ENGLISH. In Acapulco?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Coming around; a long trip.

Mr. ENGLISH. I wouldn't be in any hurry, would you, if I were going to be stopping in Acapulco? Any other stops along the coast on the way up?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. I wish there was a way that we didn't have to stop along the coast, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commissioner, who is on this boat, anyway? Anyone who we know from the Washington office who is on that boat?

Mr. VON RAAB. I don't know, but I am going to find out what they are going to be doing in Acapulco.

Mr. ENGLISH. Recently the Navy's E-2C conducted covert surveillance along the Arizona/Mexican border for 3 days. It flew 4 hours of coverage each day, from midnight to 4 a.m. During that total of 12 hours of coverage they detected 14 suspect aircraft, 8 of which crossed the border and were determined to be smugglers.

First, are you aware of that special operation?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes, I am.

Mr. ENGLISH. Second, given that significant indicator, as well as other regional estimates, what have you done to use this information? What plans have you made to deal with it?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. As you know, that was a test period with those targets that was determined.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is about 460 planes a month would be coming across, according to that information. Isn't that right?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. According to the mathematics, with the data that was determined over that period of time.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is also the regional commissioner's estimate, is my understanding.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. We would hope with our P-3's that we could conduct more flights in those areas to pick up on some of those targets and determine whether they are carrying narcotics.

Also, with the delivery of our CHET aircraft, starting in the latter part of March, each one of those eight CHET's will be going to different branch locations, and we would be running special operations in certain areas along the Southwest with those P-3's that are currently on board, along with the CHET aircraft, and see if we could pick up some targets and apprehend some violators.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are you going to have crews for those P-3's? You don't have any crews for them now.

Mr. VON RAAB. That is not accurate. We are capable of flying our P-3's now.

Mr. ENGLISH. All of them at one time?

Mr. VON RAAB. All of them at one time at the very same time? We can average 60 hours a month—

Mr. ENGLISH. Sixty hours a month?

Mr. VON RAAB [continuing]. Per plane right now. We expect to be up around 100 hours around April.

Mr. ENGLISH. With regard to intercept crews, do you have the intercept crews to go with those P-3's if they are flying?

Mr. VON RAAB. We have sufficient crews to fly the planes that we now have in our inventory.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is going to be across the entire southwest border?

Mr. VON RAAB. We can go what is called the 5 by 8 across the southwest border, 7 by 16 in Miami and Jacksonville under present strength.

Mr. ENGLISH. What was your original goal? Wasn't your original goal 7 by 16 all the way across?

Mr. VON RAAB. That would be an ideal goal, that is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Isn't that a minimum goal?

Mr. VON RAAB. It is hard to say.

Mr. ENGLISH. If you are going to go five by eight, that means there are 2 days that the drug smugglers can count on that they are scot free, that they can fly in there any time, day or night, that they want to, that they can come across in broad daylight and there won't be anyone there.

Mr. VON RAAB. There is no question that 7 by 16 is much more effective. It is obvious.

Mr. ENGLISH. Even five by eight, that means there is two-thirds of the day that they can count on no detection coverage.

Mr. VON RAAB. I don't disagree with you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Where these 460 smuggler aircraft are flying these days, according to this survey, in California, that is where one of these aerostats was supposed to go, wasn't it?

Mr. VON RAAB. Over one particular part of that border, yes. I assume if we put the aerostat up there they would go over the other part of the border.

Mr. ENGLISH. Isn't that the reason we have four aerostats?

Mr. VON RAAB. That is why you would have more than one aerostat, yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. But we are not going to now, are we, not if the President has his way.

Mr. VON RAAB. Not under this year's budget configuration.

Mr. ENGLISH. Not if the President has his way.

Another major threat for the Western United States, of course, is by sea and from the South and West. Commissioner, I am concerned over the lack of validated threat assessment for that region and the apparent lack of attention to the West. Customs has only 11 boats for the entire west coast—these are usable boats, not those that are sitting in drydock, usable boats—11 for the entire west coast, some of which are unsuited for the job, no bust teams for the only interdiction helicopter in the entire West, local vendors not accepting Customs credit cards, the region not aware of surface radar capability on the P-3 as they attempt to locate large mother

ships off the coast, and mobile radars only manned in isolated situations.

Can you relieve me of the anxiety by telling me that all these problems have been resolved?

Mr. VON RAAB. Would you mind going through them one by one so we can respond in turn?

Mr. ENGLISH. Sure. I would be happy to tell you, too, that I will be out there next week to take a look at it myself, to see if there have been any dramatic improvements, of which I would be delighted. We will go one by one.

Eleven boats for the entire west coast, some of which, at least, are unsuited for the job that they are required to perform.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. We have 22 vessels, and you are right that there are a number of them that are in the process of being surveyed. Right now we have three vessels that are nonoperational. Effectively, we feel we have 13 of the 22 which are the kinds of boats that we want to continue to put money into. We are in the process of replacing the others.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is the entire west coast? That is from Seattle down to San Diego?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Yes, down to San Diego.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many miles is that?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Maybe 1,800 to 2,200 miles of coastline.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, 11 or 13 boats, somewhere in there.

No bust teams for the only interdiction helicopter in the entire West. That is the whole coast again, isn't it?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. My understanding, since this particular issue came up, is we have bust crews and/or agents available to man those aircraft any time they are on station ready to fly in the five by eight mode that we just talked about.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, you have got a bust crew now for the one helicopter, the only helicopter you have got out there?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. That is correct. We will have a helicopter at Riverside.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are local vendors out there accepting the credit cards yet?

Mr. VON RAAB. Let me go back to that. It got confused there. We have a bust crew available for that helicopter 5 days a week, 8 hours a day.

Mr. ENGLISH. Now?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. When did you add those? You didn't have that a few months ago, did you?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. The latter part of November.

Mr. ENGLISH. Those have been added here within the last couple months.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. They were supposed to be available all the time. There was a miscommunication for a period of a couple weeks there, and as of November 22, there were bust crews available.

Mr. ENGLISH. Another miscommunication.

Local vendors not accepting the credit cards. Any change in the status of that?

Mr. VON RAAB. This is a Puerto Rican issue?

Mr. ENGLISH. No, this is in California.

Mr. VON RAAB. In California?

Mr. ENGLISH. In San Diego, local vendors do not want to accept your credit cards.

Mr. VON RAAB. Do you know which vendor that was?

Mr. ENGLISH. One of the helicopters and the propellor for another aircraft, the local people out there—

Mr. VON RAAB. That is correct. That is a problem that our Government has. In this case, this was an unwillingness on the part of the vendor to deal with the U.S. Government, not with the Customs Service. At no time did we experience any down time.

This was not a problem of unreliability of the Customs Service, this was a vendor who lent us a propellor, would not continue to deal with us until he got his money. He wouldn't give us the propellor until he got his money, and we wouldn't give him the money until we got the propellor because that is the way the Government has to deal.

But the reluctance that he had to deal on credit was not because of the involvement of the Customs Service, but it was because he was dealing with the U.S. Government.

Mr. ENGLISH. I think that the Customs Service problem with credit cards became rather famous the latter part of November, if I remember correctly. That is when it became known that the Customs Service didn't pay their oil and gas bills and we got into this situation down in Puerto Rico, which got some notoriety, and it is my understanding that—

Mr. VON RAAB. The fact of the matter is the bill was paid. What happened there was that the Customs Service paid an office in Houston of Exxon instead of the local office, and the local office refused to honor the payment that was made to Houston. So, we had to straighten out the fact that the payment had been made to Houston instead to Puerto Rico. The Government had paid the bill, but paid it to the wrong office. They suspended our credit card privileges because of that reason.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have you regained that privilege now? Do they let you use credit cards now?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes. That snafu was straightened out, but it wasn't a result of Customs' refusal or unwillingness to pay a bill or its inability to pay a bill. It was the payment of a bill to the wrong office of Exxon.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are the people on the west coast aware now of the radar capability, the surface capability of the P-3?

Mr. VON RAAB. You better believe it.

Mr. ENGLISH. They weren't back in November, were they? We had one suspect vessel that got away because they didn't know that just a few miles away they had a P-3 with that kind of capability, did they?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. That is correct, but we just recently in the Northwest had a very successful case. It was a multijurisdictional, Federal, State and local working together to apprehend an ocean-going vessel with several hundred pounds of cocaine. The P-3 was requested to fly a number of missions in the search of the aircraft. The weather was bad, but the aircraft did detect a number of other

vessels out there. So, we are using the P-3 as of last month in our operations.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, I was out in Arizona when that P-3 took off to go out to the Northwest.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. That is correct, and it took off after that particular day, too, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. The mobile radars, are they being manned these days?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Are you talking about the gap-filler radar?

Mr. ENGLISH. Right. It has been manned only on isolated instances. They are not manned on a regular basis. Are they being manned on a regular basis now?

Mr. VON RAAB. They are brought out on specific information and placed in position.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, they are not being manned on a regular basis?

Mr. VON RAAB. No, they are not.

Mr. ENGLISH. In your 5-year plan you indicated that one of the priorities would be to develop a 360 degree radar to supplant the APG-63. With the imminent development of the Air Force wing, I would agree that we ought to enhance the P-3's coverage.

You indicated that the specifications for the 360 degree radar would be developed no later than June 30, 1985. Are those plans now complete, and what is being done about them?

Mr. VON RAAB. No, they are not complete.

Mr. ENGLISH. Why aren't they?

Mr. VON RAAB. It just hasn't been done because the prospects of a 360 degree radar right now are remote.

Mr. ENGLISH. This was last June this was supposed to be done.

Mr. VON RAAB. That was what the plan proposed.

Mr. ENGLISH. I understand they were to be developed no later than June 30.

Mr. VON RAAB. That was a staff report directed to itself. That was not a report that was issued out of my office. It was a planning document.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is information that came out of our hearings.

Mr. VON RAAB. I am sorry?

Mr. ENGLISH. That was testimony at our hearings, hearings that we have had in the past.

Mr. VON RAAB. I will have to check into that.

Mr. ENGLISH. The 5-year plan also calls for a budget request of \$26 million to exercise the existing contract option for additional CHET aircraft. What is the status of the contract for the initial eight aircraft?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Once we take receipt of the initial CHET sometime in March, we will have 90 days from that date to exercise that option.

Mr. ENGLISH. What about the initial eight?

Mr. VON RAAB. The initial eight come on board starting March.

Mr. ENGLISH. Will the option be exercised?

Mr. VON RAAB. There are two considerations. One is whether the plane that they deliver is up to standards; in other words, it meets our requirements. As Mr. Rosenblatt indicated, we have 90 days to review it from that perspective.

Second, obviously, is whether we will have the money in order to exercise that option.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is the big one, isn't it?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is there any money in the budget that the President has proposed for it?

Mr. VON RAAB. At this point in time there is no money to exercise that option.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, if the President has his way, we won't.

How many times over the past year has Customs taken advantage of the normal Navy E-2C training missions off the coast of California?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. I don't have the number of times, except that we have statistics that show that in conjunction with E-2C and E-3A—

Mr. ENGLISH. Is this along the Mexican border?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Some of it is along the coastal border, the gulf coast border, and the coast of Florida and up the—

Mr. ENGLISH. No, I am talking about off the coast of California, not on the border.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Not on the California coast, no.

Mr. ENGLISH. None?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. And you have a big training area, if I remember correctly, about 500 miles west and 500 miles south of San Diego, a prime area to see smugglers from Baja, CA, but also a prime area for boats, mother ships, to bring drugs up the coast to the United States.

This was part of our 1982 report. This was going to be one of the cooperative efforts by the Department of Defense. Have you talked to the Department of Defense about this at all?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. We have had some preliminary discussions. I personally have talked to Colonel Pothier from General Tice's office on this, as well as with Capt. Howard Gehring, to look into obtaining flight time in the Pacific.

We will make every determination, depending upon the availability, to request assistance from the Department of Defense for such missions.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many training hours do you figure are flown in that area by the Navy? Did anybody care enough to ask?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. While these E-2C's and E-3's are flying, we have made arrangements through General Tice's office and the Navy, and they have procedures to report to Customs any suspect targets during these flights. That is not as good as where we have some of these flights that are dedicated 7 to 10 days each month, as we do in the eastern seaboard. This is something that we will look into.

Mr. ENGLISH. We have been 3 years now. You have all of these thousands of hours being flown by the Navy just off the coast, right down the main corridor, right past what has to be considered one of the prime areas as far as transshipment points. The same thing is true up the east coast, on the so-called New York freeway.

Here we are, out there 500 miles west and 500 miles south, the principal training area for the Navy's E-2C's, and you don't know

how many hours they fly out there. After 3 years you finally got around to the point that you talked to someone about it, but you haven't got anything decided.

That doesn't exactly indicate an aggressive approach to the problem, not to mention innovative. I would hope that this would be one that you would think of yourselves, rather than some Congressman from landlocked Oklahoma to finally see it.

Mr. VON RAAB. Mr. Chairman, we have a standing request for information from Navy flights which are on training missions. We have a procedure set up with the Navy that they do report suspect targets to Customs while they are on these training flights.

If we ask for specifically dedicated missions to Customs, I am not aware of that, but we do receive requested information on suspect targets.

Mr. ENGLISH. What would you think, Commissioner, if I told you that according to the NNBS people out in California, as well as some of your own Customs people out there, that you never even requested that the Navy provide you with that information on those training areas?

Mr. VON RAAB. I would be very interested, if that is the case, because that is not the information I have been given.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, that is the information that we have been given. I don't know why we would be given that information and it wouldn't be available to you, if you check on it.

Mr. VON RAAB. No, I mean that is a different story than I am being given. I will check into it.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would point out to you that the fellow you want to check with is the director of the air program because he was with my staff and they were told that.

Mr. VON RAAB. I am sorry, the director of our air program is sitting right behind me.

Mr. ENGLISH. I am talking about in California, the region.

Mr. VON RAAB. Who is this? Mr. Maxwell?

Mr. ENGLISH. Clark Stuart. Mr. Maxwell was there as well.

Mr. VON RAAB. Clark Stuart is sitting right behind me.

Mr. ENGLISH. Did you hear it?

Mr. STUART. Since the visit to California—

Mr. ENGLISH. I am asking you, did you hear the statement that I just made being made?

Mr. STUART. That was made in November, yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, the point is as late as November of this year, we have the statement made and it didn't get reported to you, Commissioner, from your own people?

Mr. VON RAAB. I am sorry, the question was whether we request this information of the Navy. We do.

Mr. ENGLISH. According to that, that request hadn't been made in California.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. It has been now, since November.

Mr. ENGLISH. I see. Here we went for 3 years after the fellow from landlocked Oklahoma made this observation, and then when our staff gets out there and asks the question, all of a sudden people start scurrying around and decide to make the request. In fact, it is included in our 1982 report that came out of this committee.

What about the flights off of Norfolk? That is another training area. Do we have the same situation there?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. With respect to the flights totally—if you are requesting that we narrow it down by geographical area, we can do that—but in fiscal year 1985 there were a total of 558 flights flown by either E-3A's, E-2C's or the OV-10 Bronco, a total of almost 2,000 hours.

There was a total of 24 cases made by these Department of Defense resources that resulted in a little over 2,300 pounds of cocaine and almost 18,000 pounds of marijuana, along with the seizures of vessels and vehicles, and 25 arrests.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many do you figure got by you, Mr. Rosenblatt? Do you figure that you did such a great job and clamped down on it so hard that we don't need the Navy out there in the training areas?

Mr. VON RAAB. No; too many got by us.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, too many. We don't even have any idea how many, do we?

Mr. VON RAAB. We never know who you don't catch. That is the nature of criminal acts.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is exactly right because we don't have a threat assessment that tells us how many are coming by. The only thing we have got are these little deals like I was referring to, in which we have a 3-day, 4-hour-a-day shot in which we try to take a picture in time of a certain area to try to get some idea.

We found that is enormous, it is staggering. Just one little area of California got an estimated 460 a month coming through. Goodness knows what we would take if we had that kind of snapshot all the way across the southern border.

The thing I am asking you is as far as Norfolk is concerned—

Mr. VON RAAB. We have the same arrangement with Norfolk as we have with the Navy on the west coast.

Mr. ENGLISH. As you had in California, which is nothing.

Mr. VON RAAB. We have the same arrangement today in Norfolk as we have with the Navy on the west coast, which is that they provide us with information obtained during their training missions.

Mr. ENGLISH. We just found out on the west coast that no one had made the request until my staff started digging around in November.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. In the last 5 months we have increased the amount of time with the Department of Defense resources on the east coast. There has been an increase in flights, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. What assets do you have to respond, assuming that this has been done? The Commissioner assumed that has been done on the west coast. Assuming that it got done here at Norfolk, what assets have you got to respond in that training area?

You have radar detection coverage in this training area, running all the way from South Carolina to New York. Let's assume that you get a call from one of these Navy E-2C's and he is out here training and he spots something, he spots an aircraft that fits the profile. What have you got to respond with?

Mr. VON RAAB. We have a 7 by 16 ability out of Jacksonville and Miami, a 5 by 8 capability out of Islip, NY, but they are not sensor aircraft.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's assume that we have got somebody that is coming into Virginia. What is the distance if we can get that aircraft from Florida to catch an aircraft coming in through this corridor?

Mr. VON RAAB. We would have to have a 2-hour leadtime on that plane before it landed.

Mr. ENGLISH. Two-hour leadtime?

Mr. VON RAAB. That is right, before it landed.

Mr. ENGLISH. You mean by the time somebody spotted it you would have to have 2 hours to—

Mr. VON RAAB. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many airplanes do you figure you can catch doing that?

Mr. VON RAAB. That is flight time. How many can we catch? Probably very few.

Mr. ENGLISH. None. I mean, that is going to have to be a mighty slow puddle jumper if you are going to make it up there, and he is not going to be flying out over the ocean with that kind of a puddle jumper, is he?

I would check on Norfolk and see. It would be nice just to be able to get some feel and some idea of how many smugglers are coming through that area. That is also in the 1982 report. This fellow from landlocked Oklahoma noticed that one, too.

With only one properly equipped interceptor in this part of the country, how do you take care of the multiple threat possibilities when the E-2C support is provided?

Mr. VON RAAB. What is "this part"? Do you mean Washington, DC?

Mr. ENGLISH. I am talking about Arizona, excuse me. I am sorry, we are jumping back and forth. I am going to Arizona now.

Mr. VON RAAB. Would you go through the question? I was thinking Washington while you asked the question.

Mr. ENGLISH. This is one of those questions I was going to ask you out in Arizona that we never got around to.

With only one properly equipped interceptor in the Arizona area, how do you take care of the multiple threat possibilities when you do have E-2C or AWACS support provided?

Mr. VON RAAB. That obviously would become problematic, if there were two.

Mr. ENGLISH. You couldn't do it, could you?

Mr. VON RAAB. Probably not.

Mr. ENGLISH. If you only have one airplane, if it is off chasing somebody else, he is not going to be able to take two of them at one time.

Mr. VON RAAB. That is what I am saying.

Mr. ENGLISH. The question is whenever you do have that kind of special assistance from either the Navy or the Air Force, why aren't additional assets made available during those periods from outside the region?

Mr. VON RAAB. Are you saying prospectively why wouldn't they be made available?

Mr. ENGLISH. I am just asking you—it would appear to me if all of a sudden you have——

Mr. VON RAAB. If we were running a special operation over that area, we would put additional interceptors into that area.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is my understanding it has never been done, not from outside the region.

Mr. VON RAAB. I am not aware that we have had a multifaceted threat.

Mr. ENGLISH. With 460 airplanes a month coming in——

Mr. VON RAAB. I am saying spotting two aircraft at the same time.

Mr. ENGLISH. The chances are pretty darned good if you are going to have that kind of situation, particularly if you are covering any territory at all. That is a pretty small area, if you are talking about the base of California.

Mr. VON RAAB. Our approach in basing our aircraft is to move them around. We are not locked into one sensor aircraft in Arizona at any particular time, although that is the normal stationing of our airplane.

Mr. ENGLISH. The point we are making is you haven't moved any in the past. It just hasn't been done. It seemed like a good idea to me.

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commissioner, I do want to commend you on one fact; that is, your decision to establish what I believe is the first real command and control center for drug interdiction in Miami. That command and control center has a weakness in it in that it only addresses the marine problem, but I think that is another issue that we probably will want to talk about later. I think that air and marine should be connected together.

Mr. VON RAAB. We agree with you. It is just a question of the best way to go about bringing the two together and in what time-frame and trying to do it in such a way that we don't disrupt the air command center and, at the same time, we limit the expense as much as possible.

Mr. ENGLISH. The question is, given the critical need for command and control centers across the United States to deal with this particular issue, when are you going to establish these kinds of functions in San Diego and New Orleans?

Mr. VON RAAB. We have no immediate plans to establish them in either San Diego or New Orleans. New Orleans would be the next place in which we would establish that.

One of the things that this command and control center requires is a very close working relationship between the State and local officials and the Federal officials. That particular potential is not as great in the New Orleans area as it is in the Miami area, so we have chose to establish the center in Miami.

Obviously, that is also the point of the greatest risk for the types of marine smuggling that takes place, but we do not have immediate plans to establish a center like this in those other two areas until we see how it works and how it should work in Miami.

Mr. ENGLISH. I think that that is obviously the direction to go. I think it makes a great deal of sense. I would encourage as soon as

possible that air be brought in and you have a total operation and approach.

I would also say, Commissioner, that I recognize that in many of the questions I was asking you, particularly as they dealt with resources, that you have to play the good soldier and salute and march up to the Hill with what are obviously impossible funds to meet this kind of a problem. I still think that it has to be pointed out what the shortfalls are and what they actually mean.

Again, as I have stated throughout yesterday and today, the basic issue is this question of whether this administration really is committed to the war on drugs, if it really means it; whether the people such as those in the Air Force who are in the policy position to change the experts' opinions with regard to various pieces of equipment and what role that could play and what impact that would have, to the point that a piece of equipment that would have a highly beneficial effect both on the Department of Defense, as well as on the war on drugs, suddenly gets changed to where it turns out to have an entirely negative appearance to it; to people such as those in the Office of Management and Budget who take it upon themselves, without any expert knowledge, to decide that one of the main battles in the war on drugs is not worth fighting and that we are going to retreat and withdraw to the schoolyards of America before we put up any kind of a fight and struggle; or to the Department of Justice, where the turf battles have been raging for better than a decade now, where people attempt to use this effort to gather more turf, more money and more authority in dealing with what is already an impossible situation and one in which they by themselves have no chance to win.

I recognize all that. I think, though, that we have to expose to the American people exactly what is going on. I think, also, that the President himself is going to have to give some indication as to whether or not what he has said, his strong statements, are for real, or whether it is merely a lot of smoke blown at the American people.

I am hopeful that it is not the latter. I don't think that it is the latter, but we are going to find out what it really is. I think that without question this is going to reach the attention of the President and I think also the First Lady, from what I understand.

We will see where we go from here. I am hopeful that we will have an effort that is strong and supported across the board, through all phases, whether it is education, interdiction, investigations, the preventive efforts overseas, whatever it may be.

I appreciate your coming up. I will have some questions for Secretary Keating. I talked to him about it earlier. We will be submitting those questions to him.

With that, I want to thank you again for coming before us.

Mr. VON RAAB. Thank you very much. I have one question. I assume that you are willing to accept Secretary Keating by himself. My schedule over the next month or so is starting to tighten up. Is that all right?

Mr. ENGLISH. That is fine.

Mr. VON RAAB. Thank you very much.

Mr. ENGLISH. We will recess subject to the call of the chair.

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

INITIATIVES IN DRUG INTERDICTION

(Part 2)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE,
AND AGRICULTURE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Glenn English (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Glenn English, Thomas N. Kindness, Jim Lightfoot, and Joseph J. DioGuardi.

Also present: Senator Dennis DeConcini.

Staff present: Theodore J. Mehl, professional staff member; Euphon Metzger, clerk; and John J. Parisi, minority professional staff, Committee on Government Operations.

Mr. ENGLISH. The hearing will come to order.

The Government of the Bahamas and the Government of the United States have worked together on drug interdiction efforts for a number of years. The purpose of today's hearing is to review that cooperation and to determine what needs to be done to improve the situation.

The Caribbean is an important battleground in the war against drugs. A large percentage of the cocaine that enters the United States comes via the Bahamas, and that is the preferred route for drug smugglers. We cannot expect to make a dent in our interdiction problem unless we are able to deny smugglers that route.

In order to catch a drug smuggler, we must be able to carry out three tasks. We need to detect the smuggler. We need to intercept him, and finally, we must have the ability to seize the drugs and arrest the criminals. Right now, we only have a limited capability to do any one of these tasks in the Caribbean. We need to make dramatic improvements before our interdiction rate will increase.

I find it interesting that the Reagan administration is upset with the Mexican Government for refusing to allow hot pursuit of drug smugglers who use the Mexican border as a sanctuary. Yet at the same time we don't take full advantage of the willingness of the Government of the Bahamas, where trafficking is greater, to allow hot pursuit by Customs interceptors.

Clearly, the problem with drugs being smuggled through the Bahamas must be as serious as with drugs coming through Mexico.

Today we have the honor of having the Commander of the Bahamian Defense Force, Commodore Leon Smith, to testify before the subcommittee. Commodore Smith, I certainly want to welcome you this morning. I am looking forward to your testimony and to even greater cooperation between our two countries. Let me also welcome the Honorable Basil O'Brien, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Kindness, do you have a statement that you would like to make this morning?

Mr. KINDNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to welcome today the officials of the Bahamian Government who are with us, Secretary O'Brien, and Commodore Smith in particular. From our conversations prior to today which included Deputy Prime Minister Maynard, who had to return home for an important vote in the Parliament today, I learned that there are a number of things that the Bahamian Government may be prepared to do to assist in the efforts to help stop the trafficking of narcotics to the United States through the Bahamas. Cooperation by sovereign nations is vital in dealing with criminals in today's world, be they drug smugglers or terrorists, who have little respect for human life, let alone international boundaries.

Developing a basis for cooperation is sometimes difficult, and being candid about it, we here in the United States have some internal differences to resolve in tactics and strategy, but today I think it is important that we focus on what the Bahamian Government is willing to consider and able to do.

There are some in this country who have been cynical about the willingness of some of our neighbors to help us in this effort. I believe that the willingness of our guests this morning to put their offers of cooperation on the record is an important step in improving our efforts to stop the flow of narcotics traffic through the Bahamas, and I look forward to receiving the testimony of Commodore Smith this morning.

I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for setting up this hearing for this purpose this morning, which I think is very constructive.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Kindness.

We are also delighted to have with us this morning Senator DeConcini of Arizona. Senator DeConcini, of course, has been in the forefront of the war on drugs and has been one of the real champions in the Senate. We are very pleased this morning, Senator DeConcini, that you could find time to join us. Do you have comments that you would like to make?

Mr. DECONCINI. Yes. I want to thank you and also Representative Kindness for allowing me to participate in a number of your hearings. It certainly is a credit to your leadership not only because you care enough to have the very best, and the other side here too, but because we have such commonality in the area.

I will be brief. As I said yesterday at our press conference, the appearance of these officials of the Government of the Bahamas represents a commitment by the Bahamas to crack down on the narcotics traffic that threatens that beautiful Caribbean country.

We are often critical of those countries that have contributed to the growing drug trafficking problems in the United States, even if

the problem is not necessarily of that country's own making. In many cases the criticism is justified.

However, we should also be willing to acknowledge and support those nations that are committed to tackling the drug menace, both in their own country and in this country. The Bahamas, as this hearing will show, are willing and able to open the door to a new opportunity for fighting the drug smugglers.

I know that I speak for the chairman of this subcommittee and for many of us on the Senate side when I say that we are now prepared to walk through that door and join our friends in whatever joint operations will prove effective in combating drug smuggling in the Caribbean. I respect completely, as I know you do, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kindness, the sovereignty of this great Nation and neighbor of ours and I also respect their willingness to work in such cooperative measures.

I have to chair some hearings later this morning, so I have some questions I may submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, but I do look forward to listening to Commodore Smith. Thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Senator.

This morning we are also pleased to have the Honorable Teresa Butler, who is the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the Bahamas. Ms. Butler, if you will come forward, please introduce Commodore Leon Smith who is the commander of the Royal Bahamian Government Defence Force.

Ms. Butler, we are delighted to have you with us, as we are the commodore. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF TERESA BUTLER, CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES, EMBASSY OF THE BAHAMAS

Ms. BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to thank Representative Kindness and Senator DeConcini for the very kind words of welcome that they have extended to myself and my delegation.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to note the appreciation of the Bahamas Government for the interest and attention for which members of the House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture have given over time to the continuing problems of the traffic of narcotic drugs through the archipelago of the Bahamas.

The scourge which this traffic is rendering on both our societies can only be addressed through the joint efforts of our two countries. As you are aware, having been personally involved, my Deputy Prime Minister only yesterday completed a 2-day visit to Washington, DC, the purpose of which was to review with administration and congressional leaders the progress made through joint efforts with your Government against the illegal traffic of narcotic drugs.

Uppermost on the Deputy Prime Minister's agenda was the exploration of those areas where potential lives for new and/or increased cooperation between the appropriate agencies in our two countries to effectively move against this menace.

This morning, Mr. Chairman, I am particularly pleased to introduce to the subcommittee Commodore Leon Smith of the Royal Ba-

hamas Defence Force. Mr. Chairman, Commodore Smith heads the 500 strong Bahamas Defence Force, which has been intimately involved in our war against the drug trafficker. With his hands-on knowledge he is best placed to review for the subcommittee's benefit, the joint United States-Bahamian corporative efforts against the traffic in narcotic drugs.

At the conclusion of Commodore Smith's statement, he would welcome questions from the committee. Thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much.

Commodore, we want to welcome you this morning. We are delighted to have you and we are looking forward to your testimony, so please proceed. If you would like to summarize your written testimony, your complete written testimony will be made a part of the record. If you would like to read your full testimony, that is fine too, whichever you prefer.

**STATEMENT OF COMMODORE LEON SMITH, COMMANDER,
ROYAL BAHAMAS DEFENCE FORCE, THE BAHAMAS**

Commodore SMITH. Thank you very much. My name is Leon Smith, and I am commander of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force. The defence force is one of the principle arms of the Bahamian Government engaged in the execution of the antidrug traffic campaign. The defence force has worked closely with United States agencies in joint United States-Bahamian programs in the area of drug interdiction.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your invitation to my Government to appear before the subcommittee to share our experience of joint efforts with your Government in narcotic prevention and control.

At this time with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put into evidence a copy of a letter that I received from the American Ambassador stationed in the Bahamas, with reference to one of our chaps who assisted in the monitor patrols when the shuttle *Challenger* went down.

Mr. ENGLISH. Without objection, the letter will be made a part of the record.

[The letter follows:]




Embassy of the United States of America

P.O. Box N 8197
Nassau, Bahamas

March 5, 1986

Commodore Leon Smith
Royal Bahamian Defence Force
P.O. Box N 3733
Nassau, Bahamas



Dear Commodore Smith:

It gives me great pleasure to inform you of the outstanding performance of Petty Officer Will Bethel of the Royal Bahamian Defence Force. This occurred while he was spending a three week January 1986 patrol aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dauntless as a part of the continuing joint effort between the Government of The Bahamas and the United States to halt the flow of illegal drugs across the seas. During his stay, though, Petty Officer Bethel became involved with much more than drug interdiction, as Dauntless was diverted to a pair of the most noteworthy search and rescue cases in her history.

Petty Officer Bethel was not simply a guest aboard Dauntless, but was instead an integral member of the crew. He was constantly available to offer opinions and insights, and his knowledge of Bahamian waters and territory made the hunt for suspected drugs less random. Furthermore, due to a Bahamian-American Agreement, his mere presence allowed Dauntless Boarding teams to search Bahamian registered vessels which would normally lie outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Petty Officer Bethel himself was a trained boarding team member.

Search and rescue was the highlight of the patrol, though, and throughout eight days of exhaustive work, Petty Officer Bethel conducted himself like an old hand. During the rescue of thirty-nine Haitians from the foundering sailing vessel *Fras De Lisful*, on January 26, Petty Officer Bethel aided his Coast Guard shipmates in hoisting the survivors to safety, providing them with warm blankets and clothes, and ensuring that they received a hot meal.

Just two days later, Petty Officer Bethel was again performing a humanitarian mission, this time searching the waters off Florida's Cape Canaveral in support of the tragic space shuttle Challenger recovery effort. During the ensuing days and nights of activity, Petty Officer Bethel was always on hand to aid in the spotting or recovery of debris. Whatever was asked of him, he performed the task in a professional and caring manner.

The conduct of Petty Officer Bethel while embarked aboard Dauntless was truly exceptional. The efforts of him and his fellow countrymen have set a high standard of achievement, and the relationships he fostered while aboard Dauntless will aid in continuing the tremendous relationship of cooperation which exists between the people of The Bahamas and the United States.

Sincerely,



Lev E. Dobriansky
Ambassador

Commodore SMITH. The Bahamas' geographic position, lying off the southeastern coast of the North American Continent, makes it vulnerable to access as a pipeline for the drug trafficking trade. Its transit state status calls for considerable funds to prevent the passage of drugs through its land, sea, and air space.

To properly perform this task requires law enforcement agencies which can operate in all three environments. The enormity of this task may be appreciated when one recognizes that the Bahamas is an archipelagic state comprised of some 700 islands scattered over an area of 100,000 square miles of sea. The Bahamas has a total estimated population of 240,000 people. As a result, the vast majority of the islands have no permanent year-round residents.

At this stage, Mr. Chairman, may I draw your attention to the chart which represents the whole area of the Bahamas to which I refer.

For years the Bahamas Defence Force have faced the seemingly insurmountable task of patrolling the marine areas to curb the three-pronged threat of illegal fishing, drug smuggling, and illegal immigration.

Prior to Bahamas gaining independence in 1973, the onus of patrol fell upon the British. A British frigate patrolled the areas and some military aircraft were based in Nassau. Although the frigates have good communication equipment, this type of vessel was not designed for patrol in the Bahamas where the sea bank's average depth of water is about 10 feet. In addition, the archipelagic nature of the territory was a disadvantage for the Royal Navy frigates.

By the mid-1970's, the marine division of the police was expanded and the Royal Bahamas Defence Force was created to operate the 4 MK 60-foot patrol boats previously owned by the police and 13 other craft ranging in size from 29 feet to 150 feet.

The quickest and the most efficient way to patrol an area is by aircraft. In 1981 the Government formed the Defence Force Air Wing and leased an aero-commander from Bahamasair, the national air carrier. This aircraft has given good service, although it was not built for military purposes.

The numerical strength of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force stands as of February 1986 at 50 officers and 480 marines. Officers have been trained at the Royal Navy College, Dartmouth, England. All seamanship and advancement training is undertaken at Coral Harbour, New Providence, Bahamas, where the defence force base is located.

The Government of the Bahamas acknowledges its deep gratitude and appreciation for the technical training which has been afforded some of the staff from the Bahamas Defence Force by United States agencies in recent times.

During 1985, 23 RBDF personnel, able seaman to lieutenant, benefited from 13 courses offered by the U.S. Government.

To date 20 RBDF personnel have been nominated to attend 12 courses during 1986 and there are 5 more nominations to be submitted when the dates of the courses in the fall of 1986 are known.

Mention must be made of the courses conducted under the International Military Education and Training Programs, which were attended by radio technicians, electricians, and mechanics. As a

direct benefit of these studies, the defence force attributed the ability of its ship to make longer voyages as defects could now be attended to at sea instead of making the time-wasting trips to the base on New Providence for repairs.

At Governor's Island, NY, our personnel were taught the essentials of search and rescue operations to aid them in approaching other vessels at sea.

As far as drug interdictions are concerned, the seamen received invaluable exposure as exchange personnel on board U.S. Coast Guard boats and were able to study methods of interdicting persons engaged in drug trade.

Undoubtedly, this exposure has had the cumulative effect of instilling the much needed confidence in the seamen in their confrontations with drug traffickers during their assignments at sea.

These bilateral arrangements between the United States and the Bahamas are important examples of the strides which can be made toward the eradication of the common enemy of the drug trade which is being faced by both our countries in this period of our history.

Our combined efforts can further carry the message to drug dealers that their activities in these parts will be closely monitored, and that swift action will be taken on our part to bring them to justice.

The drug smugglers have numerous routes and methods of operation. The defence force deploys its craft in areas where they have intelligence reports that smugglers will use, but on numerous occasions have been foiled in their attempts to make arrests as smugglers have used decoys to camouflage their presence elsewhere in the cays and island chain. The defence force has found that smugglers are well organized and are well equipped with an abundance of funds and possess good communication and intelligence gathering networks.

The defence force which is a relatively young agency collaborates closely with other Bahamian law enforcement agencies, namely customs, police, immigration and the department of fisheries. It also works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard with whom it presently enjoys excellent relations.

The experience and expertise of the officers and marines develop daily as they undertake patrol duties. Although some impact has been made on the drug operation, the sophistication of the drug smugglers have been noticed in their modus operandi as is evidenced by the change of primary means of transportation from sea to air.

In 1985, drug interdiction in the south Florida-Bahamas area took a giant leap forward with the first joint United States-Bahamian enforcement operation. Initially dubbed Blue Lightning, the operation originated in a February meeting between Vice President George Bush and Bahamian Minister of National Security, A. Loftus Roker and Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Clement T. Maynard.

Coordinated by the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, Blue Lightning netted 62,000 pounds of marijuana and over 6,300 pounds of cocaine. The operation also established the

groundwork for continued joint United States-Bahamian operations on a day-to-day basis.

Since April 1985, the United States and the Bahamas have quietly worked together to seize over 217,000 pounds of marijuana and nearly 4 metric tons of cocaine. The efforts have also resulted in the seizure of 47 vessels, 8 aircraft, and 6 vehicles. Over 150 persons have been arrested.

The islands targeted in the Blue Lightning exercise were Exuma, Andros, and Bimini. During the raids, U.S. Coast Guard vessels surrounded the islands while Bahamian forces boarded and searched the vessels. Drug enforcement agents and police carried out simultaneous searches in villages and remote island areas.

The effort required the combined forces of 26 agencies of both governments, over 85 law enforcement vessels, over 30 aircraft, a half dozen radar facilities, and a total of more than 775 people.

On August 15, 1985, a similar type of operation called Operation Thunderstorm was initiated and was continued to September 8, 1985. A command post was set up at the U.S. Embassy's Drug Enforcement Agency in Nassau. This command post was manned 24 hours continuously by the DEA, the Royal Bahamas Defence Force and the police. As this was the second operation of its magnitude with U.S. involvement, all went quite smoothly and intelligence information was exchanged between the agencies. Seizures from this operation amounted to 87,200 pounds of marijuana, and 750 kilos of cocaine, and 36 persons were arrested.

In February of this year the Ministry of National Security issued a press statement on the success of the interdiction of the flow of dangerous drugs through the Commonwealth of the Bahamas as a direct result of the cooperative efforts of the Bahamas' law enforcement agencies and the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.

The existence of the surveillance equipment in the northern Bahamas provides a screen for ships passing through that area and has proven to be a vital deterrent. What is required to block the entrance through the Bahamas to United States ports is another device in the southern Bahamas to curtail traffic coming from the south where countries are known to be exporting drugs. Moreover, because of the installation of the aerostat in the northern Bahamas, drug traffickers have now shifted their routes to the southern Bahamas.

In order to cope more effectively, the Bahamian Government has decided to increase the Bahamas Police Strike Force capability in manpower, and transportation and communication equipment. The Bahamian Government has reached an agreement with the United States Government for it to assist by providing air transportation, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, as well as some communication equipment to the Bahamas.

A study team composed of Bahamian and United States officials toured the southern Bahamas and identified a site on Exuma Island adjacent to the airport for the helicopter operations known as Operation Bat.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Bahamas is fully committed to combating the scourge of the illicit drug trade within and outside its borders. It is cognizant of the ruinous effects on the populations

of both of our countries. The policy of the Ministry of National Security in this regard is to spare no effort to accelerate its capability for the apprehension of the purveyors of this illicit trade.

The Government of the Bahamas supports the efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration in cutting off the flow of drugs to the Southern United States and with its fullest cooperation to the continuing joint exercises, and for the exchange of intelligence information and personnel.

The size and sophistication of the drug operation requires that a united front be mounted in the war on drugs. We pledge the cooperation of Bahamian law enforcement agencies toward this end, and look forward to receiving the further support of our neighbors in the United States of America.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Commodore. I appreciate that. I have been informed that there may be negotiations ongoing between United States the Coast Guard and the Bahamian Government pertaining to a Coast Guard base at Georgetown in the Bahamas. Could you tell us if that is the case, and if so, what are the prospects of a joint Bahamian-United States Coast Guard base at Georgetown, and what can we do to help it along?

Commodore SMITH. Sir, in Georgetown the surveys have been recently completed and a suitable site in the southeastern Bahamas identified for a second aerostat. The Government of the Bahamas is willing to sign a long-term lease for this area.

The Operation Bat which was stationed in Nassau has been moved to Georgetown and the area has been cleared, area has been fenced off.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is there discussion taking place though with regard to a joint Coast Guard base, United States Government, and Bahamian forces, a joint Coast Guard base at Georgetown?

Commodore SMITH. No, I am not aware of that, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. But you did refer to the aerostat. There is, of course, a good deal of interest here in the Congress about providing an additional aerostat, as you mentioned, down in the Georgetown area. I gather from what you said that that is acceptable to the Bahamian Government, and the Bahamian Government would support an aerostat at Georgetown; is that correct, or in that area?

Commodore SMITH. In that area, sir, yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Also, Senator DeConcini and I suggested yesterday that it would be helpful if the United States Government, in cooperation with the Bahamian Government, Bahamian law enforcement officials, would have the opportunity to place covert transponders on suspected drug smuggler aircraft. Would the Bahamian Government cooperate in such an effort?

Commodore SMITH. Sir, the position of the Bahamian Government, is that the Bahamas would be prepared to collaborate with the United States authorities in apprehending drug smugglers, smuggling aircraft, as we have been doing in the past, sir. As for the covert placing of things on the aircraft, that is something we would have to investigate further, sir, and it is something that I think would be difficult for me to really discuss openly in the public like this, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Would you provide for the record for this subcommittee a response to whether or not the Bahamian Government is prepared to move ahead and to provide that kind of cooperation?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The Bahamas Government is prepared to cooperate in this respect provided it is part of "Operation BAT."

Mr. ENGLISH. One of the other recommendations that we are urging, of course, is the establishment of an intelligence apparatus to increase the time sensitive, tactical intelligence. Time sensitive intelligence information includes such things as boats and aircraft that are leaving that are suspect, drug smuggler boats moving toward the mainland of the United States, this apparatus be a Bahamian intelligence gathering apparatus, and if you wish, certainly with the support of any United States personnel that might help in some capacities, advisers, whatever. It would provide a communications link, a means of transporting information in a time sensitive manner to Coast Guard and Customs personnel. Would the Bahamian Government be responsive to such proposal?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir, the Bahamas would be prepared to assist in any way it can in speeding up the flow of information between the Bahamas and the command center in Miami. As a matter of fact, I should mention that we have a setup with the DEA headquarters in Nassau which handles all information that pass through the DEA center in Nassau.

Mr. ENGLISH. Would that also include the collection of such information as well as the dissemination of any information?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. One other question, and I realize this would be subject to Bahamian law, but with regard to suspected drug smugglers who are apprehended who are not Bahamian citizens, would the Bahamian Government be willing to assist in speedy extradition through the Bahamian court systems to the United States for trial of those individuals who appear to be smuggling drugs to the United States?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir, the Bahamian Government is prepared to expedite that, but as you know, the courts will deal with that.

Mr. ENGLISH. Yes, of course we have to recognize the Bahamian law. We fully understand that.

Commodore SMITH. They are prepared to expedite.

Mr. ENGLISH. So they would be willing to expedite?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir, but it must go through the courts.

Mr. ENGLISH. Certainly.

Mr. Kindness.

Mr. KINDNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have seen over a period of recent years a growing amount of cooperation between our two countries, and I certainly want to encourage the development of further cooperation to be effective as we can be in the interdiction of drug traffic through the Bahamas.

I recognize, at the same time, that there is an awkwardness about discussing on the record specifics of how that interaction and cooperation can take place. I want to commend you for your visit to

our country and to Washington for the purpose of furthering the progress in this area.

I hesitate about being too specific on some of the aspects of the developments that are of interest to us, but I certainly want to make it very clear that anything that we on this subcommittee can do individually or as members of the subcommittee, I feel sure we all want to accomplish in a very cooperative atmosphere.

I don't have any questions for the record at this point, but I again express my thanks to you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Kindness.

Mr. DioGuardi.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. I, too, want to commend you for your testimony and for taking the time to come to our country. This is a great problem for us, not only in the southern tier, but I come from New York State, and I have to tell you we need a drug interdiction effort right in the southern tier of my district, right above New York City, with the drugs that are now pouring over from New York City. My big concern is that you may be doing such an effective job in the Miami-Bahamian area that now the Port of New York is becoming the new place for interdiction efforts. And that is a concern that I am going to increase the awareness of this committee about.

One question in particular, because I have always felt that interdiction, while it is useful, is not really the answer to the issue of drugs. On the one hand we have to dry up the production. That is probably a State Department issue, and on the other hand we have to dry up the market, which is an education issue. Interdiction is right in the middle, and I think we have to continue interdiction. But to me, it is like putting your finger in the dam to stop the water from coming out. If you plug up one hole, another hole is going to come.

And I would hope that in the interdiction effort that we are putting more and more of our resources, Mr. Chairman, in the area of intelligence, because I feel it is nice to stop a boat and take a couple of kilos off or a couple of tons of marijuana and waive it to the press, we did our job, but that is not going to be the way to stop the flow of drugs.

The way to do it is to infiltrate the sources, the distribution networks, and in some cases the production networks, if they exist in the Bahamas—I don't think that is so much the issue in the Bahamas as in the southern tier—but to get intelligence so that we can really get this thing at the root and not at the leaves or branches, which tends to be what interdiction does.

And I am going to ask you the question, do you feel that we are doing enough in the intelligence area in cooperating with your great country? Are enough of our resources going into that area, and do you have any suggestions that might be useful for us to learn by from your experience, which is a lot greater than mine, certainly, in this whole area of drug interdiction?

Commodore SMITH. Well, sir, the intelligence gathering is very important, sir, and as I mentioned before, I feel that the drug smugglers, their intelligence seems to be better than ours, because they have more funds. And to win this war against the drug smugglers, we have to spend money, sir. It takes money to boost up our

intelligence, get the proper equipment and that is the criteria of the whole thing, sir. We would need more money.

But I agree, we need to boost up the intelligence. We need to infiltrate and get in there and find out what is going on.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Are we jointly maneuvering with your country on intelligence efforts?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir, we have good intelligence exchanges with the United States as I said. They have a center in the Embassy, which is the DEA, and we have exchanged information. That is, the police work very closely with the DEA in exchanging information. We, in the defence force, work more closely in exchanging information with the Coast Guard, on suspect ship movements. As you know, the Bahamas Police is a part of Interpol, so they would get information from that source as well.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Whose responsibility is it to allocate our resources to intelligence as opposed to interdiction? Who makes that decision as to how much of the money going into the efforts in your country is allocated?

Commodore SMITH. That is an administrative decision, determined by the priority at that time, sir.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. I thank the gentleman from New York. I would also like to underscore one point that he was making. In my opinion, there is no magic bullet in the war on drugs. There is no single element by itself that is going to provide the entire answer to the war on drugs. I think it is going to require an effort all the way across the board: from eradication in the country of origin, interdiction at our borders, education, investigation. Each and every facet, I think, of this war has to be emphasized, and I don't think we can do without any one of those particular steps. Interdiction is one that I think has historically been lacking. Another area that may surprise a lot of people is education. I think that is really lacking, too. It is one we have not done nearly enough about.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. ENGLISH. Certainly.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. I would just like to make a point, because this year I was privileged to be the chairman of the Republican Leadership Conference in Baltimore, and prior to that conference, I surveyed 182 Republican Members, and one of the four areas we covered in the conference was the role of the Federal Government here as perceived by these Republican Members. I hope that we can get the other side of the aisle to do the same thing next year because it gave me a useful data base and to frame the agenda from that conference that we held in Baltimore.

In that survey, we listed 25 different programmatic areas and we asked each one of the Congressmen to tell us whether they felt the activities of the Federal Government should be dramatically increased, or remain the same, or dramatically reduced in these areas. And 1 of the 25 areas was drugs. And in that we said, well, the Federal Government only affects your life in three ways; either through taxation, through regulation, or through spending. And we had them answer in those 25 areas along those three ways as I just described.

I think you would find it interesting to know that 120 Republicans responded to that survey, and the area of drugs got the highest in every category in the sense of increased Federal involvement, increased spending, increased regulation, increased anything we can do, so that even among conservative, even among moderate, even among liberal Republicans, there is a great sense that we, even in an era of budget cutting, have to do more in this area. So I just wanted to let that be known for the record, Mr. Chairman.

We are going to be publishing the results of that survey very shortly. But I thought it was interesting that there is such a feeling here that we have to do more and more about this. So, hopefully, we are going to manage these efforts well so that we don't lose credibility in the process when we come back for more money.

Mr. ENGLISH. Maybe you could send a copy of that over to the administration while you are at it.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Lightfoot.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and the rest of the folks here today. I have no questions. I think anything that could be asked in public has been. I would just underscore what all of my colleagues have said, that we appreciate your cooperation in the past, we look forward to more cooperation in the future and, I think the two of us working together as a unit can have a very positive impact on the situation. We appreciate your time and effort.

Commodore SMITH. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I have got a few more questions, Commodore, more in depth on some of these issues.

Pertaining to the issue of hot pursuit, as I understand it, the Bahamian Government has been willing for some time to place Bahamian law enforcement personnel on United States aircraft originating out of Miami. The Customs interceptors are specifically what I am referring to.

I recognize that for some time you have had American law enforcement officials with the Bat team, or our helicopters, many times flown by DEA personnel or others, in carrying Bahamian law enforcement officials to a scene. But that sometimes takes hours to get an effort off the ground. There may be problems from the standpoint of range, fuel supply, speed of the helicopter, and so on, to arrive at one of the many hundreds of islands that you have. That, of course, becomes a problem.

Where it appears that we have a real potential, to me, and one of the recommendations we made yesterday was placing Bahamian law enforcement personnel on Customs interceptors, and as those interceptors spot a smuggler, if he attempts to find refuge on one of the islands, then that aircraft would of course be authorized to follow the suspect in and the Bahamian law enforcement officer then would be in a position to make an arrest. Or if any other activity, air drops, boats, as opposed to islands, the same type of procedure could be followed. Am I correct in stating that the Bahamian Government would support and agree to such an effort?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir; the Bahamian Government is prepared to do that, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is this a recent development?

Commodore SMITH. No; we are always prepared to do it, and as suggested by the Minister of National Security during his visit to Washington in February 1985 when he met with Vice President Bush, he agreed to that at that time, sir, and we have had tryouts during Operation Blue Lightening, and it worked very, very well, sir. We have had chaps stationed in the Miami area.

Mr. ENGLISH. How long did that exercise last?

Commodore SMITH. About 14 days, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And since that time, have there been any Bahamian law enforcement officials on any United States Customs aircraft flying such missions?

Commodore SMITH. I don't know whether they have had members of the police force. They haven't asked the defence force for any, though we are willing to place our men on the Coast Guard craft if they ask for them.

Mr. ENGLISH. Not Coast Guard, but I am talking about on Customs' interceptors?

Commodore SMITH. I don't know. They have not approached the defence force since that operation. The police might have been flying with them.

Mr. ENGLISH. The administration was notified last year that you were willing to do this; tried it out for a couple of weeks, but there has been no similar effort underway since that time?

Commodore SMITH. No; as I said, we were always willing and we are ready now to implement that any time. We have got the manpower available for that.

Mr. ENGLISH. But you have not heard from the U.S. Government about requesting a similar effort?

Commodore SMITH. Not yet, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. In the area of intelligence you said that there was good cooperation. Does that pertain to interdiction or is that just in general? You mentioned Interpol. What about specifically in the area of interdiction, aircraft that are moving through your jurisdiction in the Bahamas?

Commodore SMITH. When it comes to interdiction we get the information. As I say, most of it comes down through the Embassy, the DEA section. But what we have found is that most of the information is late, it is a little late.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you don't have any time sensitive information?

Commodore SMITH. Yes; that is the problem.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you have it more of a historic nature?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. What about, for instance, in Bimini, we suspect Joe Blow at slip such and such at the dock is a drug smuggler? Do you have that kind of exchange of information between yourselves and DEA?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir; we have that type.

Mr. ENGLISH. And what do you do with that kind of information?

Commodore SMITH. Well, the information that we received, we would pass on. In most of the drug suspect areas police or defence force people are located. Information received would be passed to them for necessary action. In cases which require immediate attention, Operation Bat and the Strike Force will act accordingly.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that information passed on, then, by yourself or any Bahamian officials to the Customs Service or to the Coast Guard?

Commodore SMITH. I couldn't say from the Bahamian authority, because all information is passed on to the DEA in the Embassy. Now whether they pass it or not, I can't say, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you acquire a substantial amount of information identifying these individuals and suspects? Do you routinely have information about this particular boat we suspect is being involved in drug smuggling, or we have heard information about this aircraft or anything of that sort?

Commodore SMITH. Most of the information comes down to us from DEA, given their better intelligence gathering capabilities.

Mr. ENGLISH. What about the information within the Bahamas?

Commodore SMITH. Well, the information in the Bahamas is passed on to the DEA, because they have the quick reaction capability to deal with it.

Mr. ENGLISH. But do you pass on quite a bit of information? Do you all come up with quite a bit of information along those lines?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, we exchange information on a daily basis, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's say, on boats, on an average, how much information, on an average, would you pass on to DEA? Would it be about 5 boats, 10 boats, or 50 boats, or 100 boats a month?

Commodore SMITH. I would say about 5 to 10 boats, I would say around that.

Mr. ENGLISH. You pass on information about 5 to 10 boats? What about aircraft? How many?

Commodore SMITH. We find most of that is passed to us from DEA, sir, instead of us passing to them.

Mr. ENGLISH. There are many aircraft in the Bahamas from some of the outer islands. You have got some local law enforcement officials out there who may suspect that an aircraft is involved in drug smuggling, or who may have seen this airplane come in and refuel; and feel like it is on to New York or wherever it may be, and smuggling drugs after it is refueled. Do you get that kind of information?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir, and that is passed on to DEA.

Mr. ENGLISH. About how many airplanes would you feel that would fit into that category? Would you say about 5 or 10 or 50 or a 100?

Commodore SMITH. No, I wouldn't say about 50, sir, I would say in the 5 to 10 range.

Mr. ENGLISH. Five to ten airplanes? So each month we have got an average of about 5 to 10 boats, 5 to 10 airplanes, and this information then is passed on to Drug Enforcement Administration and you don't know what happens to it beyond that point?

Commodore SMITH. That's right.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we could conceivably then have information each year, about 120 boats operating out of the Bahamas with information that you passed on to DEA; is that right?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And the same would be true, then, on aircraft? We could even have 120 aircraft a year that you would be passing in-

formation about, suspect aircraft, suspect boats, other information about that. Do you talk to the Customs people and the Coast Guard at all? Do you have any communications on an informal basis?

Commodore SMITH. The Bahamas Defence Force, we work very, very close with the Coast Guard, more or less on a daily basis. We had it set up for some time, we do a call every morning. We work very, very closely with the Coast Guard. Now, the DEA, yes, we could contact them, but we don't have much contact with the U.S. Customs.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. Do you ever get information from one of your islands, pick up a tip from someone locally that, say, this particular boat owned by so and so, Joe Blow, is getting ready to make a run to Miami tonight and he is going to have on board so much cocaine?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, we do that, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. You get that information?

Commodore SMITH. We get that information and some of that information is a camouflage to throw us off too, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. What do you do with that information? You pass that on to DEA?

Commodore SMITH. Pass that on, but what I am saying is some of it is genuine information and some again is just probably to get us out of the area, to control us.

Mr. ENGLISH. But you do pass this information on to the DEA before the event? You don't wait until afterwards?

Commodore SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So it is passed on before?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir; we do that, as I said, the Police Strike Force which has the rapid equipment to deal with it, act upon it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commodore, do you also obtain similar information with regard to aircraft, again, on one of the islands, one of your local officers saying, well, we understand that this particular aircraft is going to be taking off for someplace in the United States with drugs or there is going to be an aircraft coming through here that is going to be refueled that will be moving on to the United States? Do you get that type of intelligence information?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir, but as I said, most of that information would come to us from the DEA.

Mr. ENGLISH. You don't get those kinds of information?

Commodore SMITH. Very little information on that. We would get the movement of a craft or something like that, but most of it would come down from the DEA.

Mr. ENGLISH. From the DEA?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. How often does that information come down from the DEA?

Commodore SMITH. I would say on a regular basis, not too often, but on a regular basis.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many tips a month would you get on boats and how many on airplanes along those lines?

Commodore SMITH. I would again have to say in the range of 5 to 10, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So again we are into the possibility of another 120 tips that DEA has given you on boats, 120 they have given you on airplanes? I am pursuing this because we have gotten information from DEA that you have an average of somewhere in the neighborhood of 300 boats a month carrying drugs from the Bahamas to the United States, and, correction, the counsel said it could be as many as 300 a month. And you are getting information on, say, 10 boats or 10 aircraft a month?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, it is possible that most of the boats the DEA have information on, are on their way to the United States, but in international waters. And this is the problem that we have. They are passing over our banks and all that, but they are keeping well clear of our territorial limits, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Does that 300 figure sound about right to you, about 300 going over there? More or less, ballpark?

Commodore SMITH. I would say a little less than that.

Mr. ENGLISH. A little less than that? Can you give us a figure? 250, 275, 200, just kind of what feels good to you?

Commodore SMITH. I would say about 200, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That being the case, Bimini is obviously a real hot spot for boats; is that correct?

Commodore SMITH. Bimini, that situation has shifted since the aerostat balloon was placed in Grand Bahama. We have a defence force attachment in Bimini and we also bring the police in the Bimini area.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you think it has shifted to the Grand Bahama?

Commodore SMITH. No, they have shifted further south.

Mr. ENGLISH. Further south; OK.

Commodore SMITH. So you have very little activity around Bimini now. You have the air drops, I think you would find that around the Bimini area now, an operation would take about 15 minutes or so.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do you, either through aircraft or through boats, do you make observations of those air drops? Do you make observations with regard to those boats that have moved down to the Georgetown area? Obviously you know where they are so I assume that you are keeping an eye on those particular vessels, are you not?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir, we do that, but I would like for you to appreciate that the patterns of trafficking have changed. In the past there were mother ships coming through laden down, and these would take some time to offload. If you got some advance information, you might be able to get it to DEA.

What is now happening is that the traffickers are air dropping to fast cigarette boats. This operation takes only 10 to 15 minutes. They have also introduced a relay system whereby an aircraft would land and the drugs are transferred to a waiting aircraft, or as I said, they will drop these drugs to a fast cigarette boat. This can happen anywhere. However, when traffickers spot our boat or they spot the U.S. Coast Guard, they simply abandon their plans. Therefore it is difficult to pin down and say a drop will take place.

We have had incidents where the chaps come in and file a flight plan and say, we are going to Georgetown, then they will complete

their drug drop and change the flight plan. It is confusing given the vast area to be policed.

Mr. ENGLISH. But as the events take place, I realize you are not going to necessarily be in a position where you will be able to respond and make the arrest, that would be very difficult under the circumstances. I can appreciate and understand that, but are you in a position where you can make observations of that activity taking place, either through your own marine efforts or through aircraft or through people on the ground at local airports?

Commodore SMITH. We have police and communications networks on several of these islands where we can observe these things. However, when we block off an airport, they shift to another one. They keep shifting. We block off this one and they move to another one. Like you mentioned Bimini. We have tightened up the Bimini area but they have moved further south in the Bahamas.

Mr. ENGLISH. The point I am particularly interested in though is whether you are able to observe, not necessarily whether you are able to move in and block it off. Are you able to acquire enough information to know when you see them coming in, you see them making the transfer, you see them making the air drop?

Commodore SMITH. No, we are not in that position, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. You do not have that kind of information?

Commodore SMITH. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. You only know the particular region that they are operating out of and that is as close as you come?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, but even when we get that information, in most cases, the drug transfer has already taken place.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. With regard to interceptors—do you have any resources from a marine standpoint to deal with a cigarette boat? What do you have in the way of marine resources to be able to chase down a smuggler?

Commodore SMITH. We don't have much in that area, sir. We are building up. We have about five of the small confiscated craft that we use.

Mr. ENGLISH. How fast are they?

Commodore SMITH. We get about 30-35 knots out of those boats.

Mr. ENGLISH. Nothing like a cigarette boat.

Commodore SMITH. They just make a joke out of us, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. What about aircraft?

Commodore SMITH. We have one aircraft and that is an Air Commander that we use to do a daily surveillance and pass information.

Mr. ENGLISH. Does it have any sensor equipment at all, any capability at all?

Commodore SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you are up there with binoculars looking around?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is the best you can do?

Commodore SMITH. That is the best we can do.

Mr. ENGLISH. One airplane.

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. How much money has been provided to the Bahamas from the State Department for the purpose of drug interdiction over the past 4 years?

Commodore SMITH. Over the past 4 years, the police have received radio communication, to the value of \$250,000.

Mr. ENGLISH. Over the past 4 years?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is my understanding that several years ago the U.S. Defense Department did a survey of the Bahamas to determine the Government's communications needs as it relates to law enforcement. I assume that the equipment that you are talking about was the result of that survey. Has that alleviated your communications problem?

Commodore SMITH. It helped us, sir, but did not alleviate the problem. It has especially been helpful to the police, but we are now looking at the communication needs for the defence force.

Mr. ENGLISH. That survey, though, set out certain minimum requirements or needs for you to be effective; correct?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Has the equipment that you have received met those requirements?

Commodore SMITH. As far as I know, yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. You are able to carry out the communications needs that were set out and specified within that defense survey?

Commodore SMITH. There is room for improvement in communications. As I said, we have a number of islands and the communication equipment received has been a help, sir, but we would need additional communication equipment to do a more effective job.

Mr. ENGLISH. So it does not meet the minimum standards set out by the Department of Defense?

Commodore SMITH. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that equipment secure? Can you transmit in a secure mode?

Commodore SMITH. But in the station, sir, yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Voice privacy is what I am talking about, so you can't be monitored by drug smugglers.

Commodore SMITH. It is difficult for me to say that, sir, as I said before the drug smugglers have better equipment than us. It is difficult to say, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you cannot transmit in a voice privacy mode?

Commodore SMITH. I cannot say it is a safe system.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Kindness, do you have any questions you would like to ask?

Mr. KINDNESS. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Commodore Smith, I would just like to clear up some of the area we have just been over.

Did the U.S. Department of Defense survey of communications equipment cover both the police function and the defence force function together in that survey or was it only the police?

Commodore SMITH. Only the police.

Mr. KINDNESS. And the needs of the defence force and communications equipment are still being studied?

Commodore SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. KINDNESS. In that area, are you presently equipped with radio communication that is useful between the family islands?

Commodore SMITH. Between the family islands we have a set that is linked to the police control room, sir.

Mr. KINDNESS. So that the improvement of the police radio communications equipment does have some helpful effect for the defence force as well then?

Commodore SMITH. Yes; for communications with the police, yes.

Mr. KINDNESS. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Kindness.

Commodore, I would like to thank you for your testimony this morning. I think it has been very helpful to us and we are hopeful that we will take you up on your offer of better cooperation between our Government and yours.

As I said in my opening remarks, it does seem rather ironic to me that we are complaining about Mexico and the lack of cooperation we are receiving from that Government, particularly in the area of overflights. Here we have this offer of cooperation from the Bahamas, and I would still dare say that far more cocaine enters this country either through, around, or over the Bahamas than through Mexico, and we have yet to take advantage of the offers that your Government has made. We appreciate those offers and I am hopeful that in the very near future we will see them being accepted, and that we both will truly have some giant leaps in our overall effectiveness in interdiction in the Bahamas.

Again, I want to thank you for your fine testimony. We appreciate it.

Commodore SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. ENGLISH. And with that, we are recessed subject to the call of the Chair. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

INITIATIVES IN DRUG INTERDICTION

(Part 2)

WEDNESDAY, MAY 14, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE,
AND AGRICULTURE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Glenn English (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Glenn English, Gerald D. Kleczka, Stephen L. Neal, Robert E. Wise, Jr., John M. Spratt, Thomas N. Kindness, and Joseph J. DioGuardi.

Also present: Senator Dennis DeConcini.

Staff present: Theodore J. Mehl, professional staff member; William G. Lawrence, counsel; Euphon Metzger, clerk; and John J. Parisi, minority professional staff, Committee on Government Operations.

Mr. ENGLISH. At a hearing which was convened on February 27, 1986, Congressman Dan Daniel, who chairs the Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, took testimony from the National Guard Association. At that time, Mr. Daniel asked the Association's Executive Director, Lt. La Vern E. Weber, to prepare a white paper outlining plans which would make available the considerable resources of the National Guard in the war on drugs.

I certainly want to thank Chairman Daniel for his deep and continuing interest in obtaining the maximum assistance from our Armed Forces in this battle. He is concerned, as are we all, that the assets of the Department of Defense be brought to bear as rapidly as possible without degrading the combat readiness of our Defense Establishment.

The Association acted promptly on Chairman Daniel's request, and this morning we are meeting to receive and discuss their proposal. The hearing is being conducted by this subcommittee, even though the request was made by the Armed Services Committee. This will come as no surprise to people who have followed the effort of both committees to improve the Nation's efforts to interdict illicit drugs.

It is truly a joint effort, involving Members and committees of both the House and Senate and representing both parties. Because of the multiagency nature of this plan, and in consideration of Mr. Daniel's already full schedule and activities in his subcommittee,

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he and I agreed that the Government Operations Committee would receive Lieutenant General Weber's testimony today.

And I also want to recognize the good Senator from Arizona, Dennis DeConcini, who will be joining us very shortly.

This is the 35th hearing which we have held on drug interdiction. Much of our effort has been spent in reviewing initiatives which would involve the Department of Defense in a more vigorous effort in the war on drugs. I have to say that the plan which Lieutenant General Weber has submitted on behalf of the National Guard Association is one of the best efforts that we have seen.

He proposes to make available the aircraft, radar, personnel, and communications equipment of the National Guard to bolster our Customs Service and Coast Guard.

We will also be hearing again from the Customs Service Commissioner, William von Raab, who is ultimately responsible for all drug interdiction.

The essence of this plan is to augment the Customs Service efforts, and I am sure that Commissioner von Raab will have his own views with regard to the prospects of such help.

Mr. Kindness.

Mr. KINDNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I look forward to today's hearing and the testimony we will be receiving this morning with a great deal of interest. I think there is a very constructive approach that is suggested and that is before us and I look forward to the examination of that more closely, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Neal.

Mr. NEAL. I have no opening statement.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Kleczka.

Mr. KLECZKA. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Wise.

Mr. WISE. Nothing.

Mr. ENGLISH. We are delighted to have appear before us as our first witness today, Congressman Dan Daniel, chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee, and as I said, one of the valiant warriors in the war on drugs. We are delighted to have you join us today, Dan, and appreciate any comments that you could make.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN DANIEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Mr. DANIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Staff member removes nameplates from witness table.]

Mr. DANIEL. Let me say at the outset—don't move that, I am going to need it—those of you here this morning are going to witness a very historical event. This is the fastest promotion in history. I am being promoted from seaman second class to lieutenant general in one full swoop. [Laughter.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me express my appreciation to you and the members of your subcommittee for the enormous amount of effort you have put into this drug interdiction matter.

I had a call the other day from a newsman after the briefing that we had. He asked me if I thought this was an appropriate mission for the Guard, and my response was, I can think of nothing more appropriate for the Guard to do, especially in peacetime.

If there is anything that I can think of that affects readiness more than drugs, it would be hard to define. If I could think of any more serious problem that we have as a nation today, I would have to put the use of illicit drugs in that top category.

I think the Guard is well equipped to undertake this mission. I believe that we will be as pleased with their performance as we are in just about all their undertakings. I am very happy to be here today on behalf of the Armed Services Committee to pledge to you the support of our committee, and I believe the entire Congress, because I cannot recall any issue of greater concern to our committee and other members all of whom recognize that this is perhaps the most dreadful menace that faces the American people today.

I want to express my appreciation to General Weber, as you have done already, for putting together on such short notice, the type of briefing to which you gentlemen will be exposed this morning. I was enormously impressed at not only his work, but also of adjutants general who will be appearing here this morning.

This is work we think can be appropriately described as a community effort because this is where the people are; the "Guard" and the "people" are synonymous.

I think, as I told the press, we may be on to something. There has been a lot of effort put into drug interdiction. We are not making as much progress as I hoped we would make. But it seems to me that this is going to be a tremendous boost, to get the Governors, adjutants general, our civilian citizen soldiers, all working together in this effort.

There are some restraints, as we all know, in what the Guard may perform, but I have enormous confidence in them. I believe that their performance will reflect credit not only upon themselves, but upon the people of this country, and indeed, upon your subcommittee.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity of appearing briefly. I would like to submit my statement for the record, if I may, and to wish you well in this undertaking, and please let us know when we can be helpful.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Without objection, the full complete testimony will certainly be made a part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Daniel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAN DANIEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman: In February, during reserve component authorization hearings, we asked General Weber to come back to us on behalf of the Guard and report recommendations as to what the Guard could accomplish in the near term to assist in drug interdiction. I should not have been surprised at the thoroughness and enthusiasm with which the study was conducted, but I was. The effort that

General Weber and the State adjutants general put forth in a very brief period was just superb.

The committee will hear the result of that effort this morning, and I believe that you will find that the Guard proposal can add a quantum increase in interdiction capability, largely with issue equipment and current personnel strengths. I believe that it will add an entire new dimension in the national war against illicit drugs.

But perhaps the single most important aspect of the Guard involvement is that it will signal a major mobilization throughout our society to support our law enforcement agencies efforts. This won't be some arcane Federal program conceived and administered a thousand miles away. This will be friends and neighbors rolling up their sleeves and going to work across the entire country to defend against the deadly incursion of these drugs.

We appreciate your conducting this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and your evaluation of how this capability can compliment our overall interdiction program. When we were initially briefed, I think that you were as excited about the possibilities as Earl Hutto and I were. We stand ready, as the authorizing committee for this portion of the effort, to help in whatever manner contributes to the greater effort.

And, for the record, we should take this opportunity to thank General Weber and the State Guard participants for an outstanding product, created in a very short time. We deeply appreciate the job you all did.

Thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. We want to commend you and the Armed Services Committee for your vital interest in this effort, and for your leadership in the cooperative effort that is taking place between the House and the Senate, between the Republicans and Democrats.

As I said, I think this is probably one of the finest displays of a true bipartisan effort by Members of Congress that I have seen since I have been in Congress. Certainly the members of the Armed Services Committee, and particularly yourself, have played a vital role in that entire effort. So we commend you.

Mr. Kindness.

Mr. KINDNESS. I would say, Mr. Chairman, ditto. We really appreciate the interaction that has been occurring between a wide number of Members and segments in the Congress and the administration and others who are interested in the war on drugs. I commend you, Mr. Daniel, for joining us this morning and having your support.

Thank you.

Mr. DANIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kindness, gentlemen, for the opportunity to appear.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Neal.

Mr. NEAL. I commend our distinguished colleague. Thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Kleczka, any questions or comments?

Mr. KLECZKA. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Wise.

Mr. WISE. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Dan. We really appreciate it.

Our next witness today will be Lt. Gen. La Vern E. Weber, who is Executive Director of the National Guard Association of the United States, and also I might say a fine native of the State of Oklahoma. He will be accompanied by the adjutants general from the National Guard from the States of Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Arizona.

We want to welcome each of you gentlemen here today, and we are delighted to have you join us. We are looking forward to your testimony. General Weber and I go back quite a number of years and I might say for those who may not be aware, he is responsible for recruiting my wife as president of the Oklahoma State Society, so we have a special place, General Weber, for you, and we appreciate it.

General Weber, we will let you begin the testimony, then.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LA VERN E. WEBER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY ADJUTANTS GENERAL MAJ. GEN. ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR., FLORIDA; MAJ. GEN. DONALD L. OWENS, ARIZONA; MAJ. GEN. JAMES T. DENNIS, TEXAS; AND BRIG. GEN. BEN L. PATTERSON, JR., GEORGIA

General WEBER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let me interrupt you for one moment. Could I say that in this particular instance, Generals, all of you, in any of the questions we may have—for instance, I may have a question for General Weber, if any of you have anything that you want to add to that, please indicate so and don't be shy or bashful. We will try to keep this very informal because we do want each of you contributing as much as you feel that you can, so we will break down the formality a little bit and try to keep it very informal.

General Weber.

General WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We appreciate very much the kind remarks from you and Mr. Kindness and Chairman Daniel. Let me advise the committee at the outset that these are the real experts on my right. They are the people from the field where the problems exist, potential resources are, and they are the experts on the subject.

We are here today, as you requested, the National Guard Association of the United States, to invite the adjutants general from Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, and Texas, to appear before you to discuss a concept which envisions potential utilization of the National Guard in drug interdiction efforts.

Joining me today are General Ensslin of Florida on your extreme left; General Owens of Arizona; General Dennis of Texas; and General Patterson of Georgia.

These general officers are prepared to brief the committee on details of a white paper prepared by the group at the request of Mr. Daniel during a House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee hearing on the 27th of February.

[The white paper is reproduced in the appendix.]

General WEBER. The paper was provided to that subcommittee on the 7th of May. The white paper provides a concept plan outlining the possible National Guard augmentation of several drug enforcement authorities in combating the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

A range of options and estimated additive costs are discussed in detail in the white paper. While the group believes the concept of operation contained in the white paper is feasible, it has not attempted to limit the range of options because of nonavailability of

equipment, manpower or other related resources, nor has it considered any current policy restriction on expanding military operations in support of drug interdiction efforts.

The concept of operation also does not envision any change in the posse comitatus law to allow use of National Guard personnel in civil authority functions, such as apprehension, detention or arrest of suspects.

These adjutants general have simply attempted to respond to Mr. Daniel's request to develop a concept of possible National Guard support operation. It must be emphasized that the white paper represents a concept of possible options which has not been coordinated with any agency of the Federal Government.

We are not here as a proponent of an expanded DOD drug interdiction role. Questions on the ability to implement any of the options and on the availability of the equipment and other resources can only be answered by the Department of Defense. We would hope that submission of the white paper to Mr. Daniel's committee and appearance before this committee would end our involvement in any further action, and that any further action would be referred to the Department of Defense or other Federal agency.

Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to discuss the white paper. With your permission, I have asked General Ensslin, the adjutant general of Florida, to brief you on its contents, after which all of the members will be prepared to respond to questions or discussion.

[The prepared statement of General Weber follows:]



NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

ONE MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NORTHWEST • WASHINGTON, D.C., 20001 • (202) 789-0031

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LA VERN E. WEBER

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

of the

NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

to the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE AND AGRICULTURE

of the

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

14 May 1986

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION,
JUSTICE AND AGRICULTURE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

14 May 1986

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, as you have requested, the National Guard Association of the United States has invited the Adjutants General of Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia and Texas to appear before you today to discuss a concept which envisions potential utilization of the National Guard in drug interdiction efforts.

They are prepared to brief the committee on details of a White Paper prepared by this group of adjutants general at the request of Mr. Daniel during a House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee hearing on the 27th of February. The paper was provided to that subcommittee on the 7th of May.

The White Paper provides a concept plan outlining possible National Guard augmentation of civil drug enforcement authorities in combatting the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. A range of options and estimated additive costs are discussed in detail in the White Paper.

While the group believes the concept of operation contained in the White Paper is feasible, it has not attempted to limit the range of options because of non-availability of equipment, manpower or other related resources; nor has it considered any current policy restrictions on expanding military operations in support of drug interdiction efforts. The concept of operation also does not envision any change in the posse comitatus law to allow use of National Guard personnel in civil authority functions, such as apprehension, detention, or arrest of suspects. These adjutants general have simply attempted to respond to Mr. Daniel's request to develop a concept of possible National Guard support operations.

It must be emphasized that the White Paper presents a concept of possible options which has not been coordinated with any agency of the Federal Government. We are not here as a proponent of an expanded DoD drug interdiction role. Questions on the ability to implement any of the options and on the availability of equipment and other resources can only be answered by the Department of Defense. We would hope that submission of the White Paper to Mr. Daniel's Committee and appearance before this Committee would end our involvement and any further action would be referred to the Department of Defense or other Federal agency.

Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to discuss the White Paper. With your permission, I will ask Major General Ensslin, the Adjutant General of Florida, to brief you on its contents, after which all members of the group will be ready to answer questions on the various concept options:

General WEBER. General Ensslin.

General ENSSLIN. Thank you. I am going to hit the high points of our concept, and you will be provided with much more detail in regard to the personnel, equipment, and funding issues that I will address.

The origins of our concept lie in some joint operations that were undertaken by the Georgia National Guard, Florida National Guard, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and Customs, over the past 1½ years.

Our first attempt involved bringing some ground-based Air Guard radar to Florida to set up over some of the most popular drug corridors for smuggling across the Florida coast line. They were backed up by chase aircraft from GBI and FDLA and Customs. And we, indeed, found a number of targets coming in these corridors, and we could identify them. We had difficulty in vectoring the chase aircraft to the targets and we saw that as a shortfall in that operation.

Last December we ran a 10-day operation with a similar objective and we utilized, thanks to the initiative and ingenuity of the Georgia National Guard and General Patterson and his troops, a C-130 from Georgia as a platform, carrying an F-4 radar from one of the Georgia Air Guard F-4's.

Now, this radar, even though this is not the radar that we are proposing to you would be the best radar to use, we are proposing the F-15 radar, the APG-63, but the F-4 radar worked effectively and we had considerable success in this operation. A number of aircraft were confiscated, a lot of marijuana and cocaine was confiscated, and we found that this added the missing link to our concept. I will now speak to the briefing charts.

As we undertook this task, these were the planning factors that guided us as we met. We wanted to make full use of current assets, minimize the organization of new structure. We wanted no reprogramming of current National Guard appropriations. We wanted to use existing facilities, have a minimal impact on readiness, and we wanted the work that we did to be complimentary to the training of our units.

This is the purpose as we saw it, to present a concept of operation and support that is developed by our senior leadership in the field in response to your request for a concept of National Guard augmentation to civil drug enforcement authorities to combat this tremendous problem.

The scope of this briefing will provide a range of increasing capability options with associated costs, beginning with a base of 160 mission days a year to a dedicated capability of 400 mission days a year. The magnitude of the threat, you are well aware of. Of interest is the fact that the seizures in the United States between the 1st of November of last year and the 21st of February of this year amounted to \$2.8 billion, which tells us that the annual estimate in the upper right-hand corner of \$27 billion a year is understated.

Indeed, General Galvin, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, estimates that \$100 billion a year is the traffic from his area of concern into the United States, and this exceeds, of course, the military budgets of all the nations in the Caribbean.

Here are the aircraft smuggling routes broadly expressed. In other words, we are looking at the whole southern border, and there is perhaps no favorite corridor, but many. This is what the Select Committee on Narcotics estimates in an extract from the Congressional Record dated April 23 of this year, last month.

You can see what a tremendous problem we are addressing. This displays the low altitude radar coverage in the Southern United States. Now, this coverage is from 500 feet and up and you can see the gaps that exist in the coverage. Five hundred feet and below is open to anyone, except coming across the footprint of one of the tethered aerostats or a military radar platform that is airborne.

The mission, as we saw it for the Guard, would be to augment civilian drug enforcement authority efforts along designated drug corridors by providing ground and air identification, chase aircraft, capable of transporting law enforcement personnel, and vectoring those personnel to the target.

We divided the United States into four subareas. We began at the northern border of Virginia, went all the way around to the northern border of California. In each of these subareas there is a National Guard C-130 outfit. Subarea 1, West Virginia; subarea 2, Georgia; 3, Texas, and 4, California.

Those aircraft are capable of carrying the APG-63 radar and you also see displayed in blue the tactical control flights of the Air National Guard that would be available in each area to provide the ground-based radar that would fit into the concept.

The concept, very briefly stated, is that we would employ the C-130's as airborne radar platforms. We would utilize OV-1 Mohawks of the Army National Guard, or other suitable aircraft, to track the suspected aircraft, and we would suggest Black Hawks equipped with FLIR as the helicopters to be used as chase aircraft to transport the law enforcement personnel to make the final apprehension.

These missions we would see as being up to 8 hours in duration during the hours of darkness for a 10-day period. Now, our experience has been that when we operate for 10 days, the targets fall off dramatically in the second 5 days. Experience might dictate shorter missions, because the word gets around when this operation begins.

We are going to discuss a range of options that will cover our involvement from minimal to fully committed. The final option would require additional aircraft and a committed unit.

Mr. ENGLISH. General, Mr. Kleczka, I think, had a question.

Mr. KLECZKA. General, could you indicate to the committee what title 32 status is?

General ENSSLIN. Yes, that is under State control rather than Federal control. Our troops in title 32 belong to the Governor. In title 10, they belong to the Federal Government, and we are suggesting that this work be done in a title 32 status so that they are State forces and not Federal. In title 32, we are not affected by the posse comitatus provisions that apply to us in a Federal status.

Mr. KLECZKA. Nevertheless would these personnel be on active duty for that period of time?

General ENSSLIN. They could be on State active duty, and be paid by the State. That payment could then be reimbursed by the Feder-

al Government. This would allow them to perform in a State status, but still have the funding support of the Federal Government.

Here is a depiction of the concept. It begins with the smuggler aircraft on the left entering the air space and being picked up either by a C-130 or by ground-based radar, which would vector the tracker aircraft, the OV-1 or similar aircraft, to follow the smuggler aircraft until it approaches its destination, at which point it would be handed off to the Blackhawk chase aircraft which would take in civil authorities to make the apprehension when the airplane landed.

It is important to have a helicopter for this particular mission due to the fact that these folks usually block the runways as soon as the smuggler aircraft touches down, and you need something that can enter the air space vertically. The Blackhawk, with its speed of close to 175 miles an hour, provides the required speed that the familiar UH-1H Huey at 115 miles an hour, can't provide.

Here is another look at the mission concept as you would look down on it. You see the coast line depicted and we see the C-130 platform flying the coast line, and obviously, it can offset from the ground-based radar site to broaden the coverage.

When the air space is violated, a tracker aircraft is vectored to pick up the smuggler, and he is followed to where one of the Black Hawks depicted would do the final part of the mission. What we have basically as our territory is an area that is 150 miles wide and 300 miles deep.

The next slide indicates basically the mechanics. We would propose that a National Guard liaison team be located at the NNBIS Intelligence Center in New Orleans. It would be an Army National Guard officer and an Air National Guard officer to advise on the capabilities of the Guard to assist in these missions.

The mission request would be forwarded to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, who would alert the adjutants general of the States who would be involved. When the mission was approved and handed down, it would go to a National Guard operations center, and we propose that there would be one such operation center. It would be manned by six National Guard personnel, again, half Army and half Air, and they would direct the appropriate units in the subarea to undertake the mission.

Now we don't have in mind that this is an immediate response kind of proposition, but these would be preplanned missions to allow sufficient time to assemble the assets and employ them in the designated area.

Here we see a series of options and our estimates of the price tag that would be attached to each of the options, both in terms of a startup cost and a continuing sustainment cost.

The first option would consist of 16 missions a year, 16 10-day missions, 4 in each subarea. What this would provide would be one operation such as I have described in each of the four areas each quarter, 160 mission days, startup cost of \$34.8 million and an annual cost of \$5.8 million. There is a detail breakout of the cost in the material that you will be provided, but the bulk of the cost is to provide the additional equipment in terms of radars and FLIR.

Options 2(a) through 2(d) show an increase in the number of missions in each subarea per year and the number of mission days. These, again, have their associated costs, both in the one-time cost for equipment and the operating costs.

Option 3 involves robusting the existing C-130 outfits by providing two additional aircraft to each of those outfits which would be committed to this mission, and therefore, you see a substantial jump in the original cost.

The fourth option would be the creation of a special operations wing as has been drafted by this subcommittee previously and it is a mission, again, in which we can see the National Guard providing the operational participation, and one in which the Guard would be prepared to participate.

The cost estimate for the additional unit to include 48 additional Blackhawk helicopters and additional Nighthawk helicopters in the special operations wing, MC-130, we would estimate in the neighborhood of \$800 million, with an annual operating expense of about \$65 million.

That concludes the options and a broad overview as we have it. Again, it is presented to you in more detail in the complete material.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, General Ensslin.

General Weber, did you have anything further to say?

General WEBER. I believe not, other than to reemphasize that this is a concept and that there are estimates in there. We think the costs are in the ballpark. We wouldn't want to go before a court and try to come up with the exact dollar, but we think these are ballpark figures and I want to emphasize again, this is a concept. This is not a firm plan, because many things we talked about here, we don't have control over. So it is a concept.

Mr. ENGLISH. Very good.

General Ensslin, one of the primary concerns of this subcommittee has always been the issue of combat readiness. We have tried to be very sensitive in any suggestions that we have come up with that involve the military that it did not have a detrimental impact on the combat readiness.

There was recently a press report that would indicate that the National Guard trains something like 39 days a year and that if you undertook this mission, that would detract from combat readiness. You wouldn't be able to train those 39 days per year and that would have a negative impact.

Could you address the issue of how much of the training in the proposals that you have put before us would enhance or detract from the combat readiness of these various units?

General ENSSLIN. If I may, I would like to comment first on the 39 days. The average National Guard enlisted soldier last year was paid for 49.8 days of duty and the average officer was paid for 71, and what this reflects is the increasing attention being paid to readiness, the additional training that is being done by the National Guard to meet the readiness requirements and employment schedules that are in front of it.

The effort that we present here is very similar to the training that we would do for the war time mission. The resourcing that would be provided would allow us, if that resourcing is provided, to

maintain the combat readiness that we have and not detract from our readiness.

Mr. ENGLISH. So what you are telling me is that you put this plan together specifically with that concern in mind, and it has been woven in such a way that it enhances your combat readiness instead of detracts; is that correct?

General ENSSLIN. That is my opinion, and I would like to ask my compatriots if they share that opinion.

Mr. ENGLISH. General Dennis.

General DENNIS. Yes, sir, most of what we are doing here is related to our readiness mission now. We will have to have additional money to bring the people out to perform this in their off-duty time or in additional time, so I think it will increase the readiness of the units.

Mr. ENGLISH. General Owens.

General OWENS. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. It is not a linear equation, so it wouldn't increase all the way across the board, but there are examples of some of the things that we do in this effort that would increase readiness.

You can take the radar sets, the tactical control units, part of their training is to be able to pack up, mobilize and move. That is exactly one of the things we would be doing here. In that instance, it would enhance the readiness, but I can't say it is a linear increase in readiness.

Mr. ENGLISH. Also, General Ensslin, you have mentioned the Blackhawk helicopters. I believe that the various Guard units across the Nation are now receiving those. I talked to General Morgan in Oklahoma and he told me that they were scheduled to receive two Blackhawks in the very near future in that area, and those could be used to transport bust teams. As the C-130's were able to detect incoming smugglers, you would launch these bust teams to arrive on the scene.

Obviously, we would not want to see National Guardsmen used as a bust team. We would need law enforcement officials. If we are utilizing the resources of local National Guard units, would they be able to then utilize further the local law enforcement, State police, perhaps even local police officers that would be delegated to make up these bust teams in cooperation with the National Guard? Is this something that the National Guard is envisioning with its plan?

General ENSSLIN. That is correct, and we have a degree of cooperation with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and I know Georgia does with GBI, that allows this kind of cooperation at the present time. We have memorandums of understanding with those law enforcement agencies.

Mr. ENGLISH. General Dennis, you are close to Oklahoma. Suppose with those two Blackhawk helicopters that General Morgan is going to have up in Oklahoma, we put together a bust team with the Oklahoma City Police Department and the State Bureau of Narcotics in Oklahoma, and we launch on a target that appears to be heading in our direction. We go down to intercept him along the Red River, and let us suppose that instead of coming on into Oklahoma, he circles back and lands in Texas.

Will it be possible for those law enforcement officials from the State of Oklahoma, then, with the Oklahoma National Guard Blackhawk, would they be able to move in and make the arrest in the State of Texas?

General DENNIS. Yes, sir, I think we are going to have a letter of understanding between the Governors and between the States that this can be allowed to happen.

Mr. ENGLISH. I assume that the Governors of your various States are aware that this kind of discussion has been taking place, that you have been working on this plan.

Has there been any discussion, as far as you know, among the Governors as to how this type of letter of understanding and cooperation could be knitted together? Particularly, I know that the Southern Governors' Conference has been very active and interested in dealing with the drug threat as it affects the various States, as to whether there would in effect be this understanding of allowing law enforcement from one State to make arrests in another State.

General ENSSLIN. I don't think that would be any problem, and it certainly isn't between Georgia and Florida. Our Governors and our law enforcement agencies have that kind of understanding. We have the Georgia National Guard operating in Florida and Georgia Bureau of Investigation operating in Florida and vice versa.

It poses no problems because of agreements that are in place between our two States and I would certainly imagine that the same kind of agreement could be put together between any States that were supportive.

General WEBER. Mr. Chairman, if I may, this is not a new issue for the Guard. In the 1960's we dealt with the issue of civil disturbances. Most all of our States had mutual agreements one way or the other to cross, particularly in those States where they had a major metropolitan area on the adjoining State borders, so it is not an obstacle to this particular concept.

Mr. ENGLISH. So the precedent is already set and implemented?

General WEBER. We know how to do it, yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. One last question. Along the southern border of the United States, how many C-130 aircraft would we have available? How many potential detection of platforms would we have available to us?

General WEBER. Most all of the States that were depicted on the one viewgraph have a neighbor State to assist. As an example, Tennessee has two large units of C-130's and in Oklahoma you have, C-130's; North Carolina has C-130's that go south. Each of these units, with the exception of Memphis and Nashville, have eight airplanes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have eight airplanes in each of the units?

General WEBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we could be talking in the neighborhood of 50 to 75 potential radar platforms from across the entire southern part of the United States?

General WEBER. I would estimate closer to 100.

Mr. ENGLISH. Closer to 100 platforms. And we would simply be outfitting those with the F-15 look-down radar. As far as the Blackhawks, do we know how many of the States would be receiving

Blackhawk helicopters that could be used to transport bust teams, any estimates? General Ensslin, you are shaking your head.

General ENSSLIN. It is in the book here if I can find the right page.

Mr. ENGLISH. All right.

General ENSSLIN. I believe by the end of this fiscal year, we are going to have 13.

General PATTERSON. That is 10.

General ENSSLIN. That is 10. That is fiscal year 1985, 10. Fiscal year 1986 would be a total of 23. By the end of fiscal year 1987, a total of 38 Blackhawks in the Army Guard.

Mr. ENGLISH. And General Patterson, would that affect virtually every State across the southern part of the United States? Would each State, in other words, be receiving some of those Blackhawks then? Would we have gaps?

General PATTERSON. Not all the Southern States, however, by mutual agreement between the States they could be utilized.

Mr. ENGLISH. So they could share in those assets?

General PATTERSON. Just like the tactical control units. The tactical control units are located in New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Georgia, and Utah.

General ENSSLIN. Unfortunately, Florida is not on the list.

General PATTERSON. We propose moving one of those units to the area you need it in.

Mr. ENGLISH. Right. And General Owens, as a part of the training, you mentioned earlier that deployment is a part of the exercise that they need to meet their combat readiness requirement. Would deploying a Blackhawk helicopter from one State to another fit that type of requirement? Is that what you had in mind?

General OWENS. Well, it could be developed so it would fit that kind of requirement, yes, sir. You see that the Black Hawks, there are a couple of States, Kentucky and Texas received 15 of those Blackhawks. And they come in sets of 15, basically, for their war time mission. They could be loaned from State to State, but you just can't loan the airplane, you would have to take the airplane, the crew, and the maintenance people along with it, but they would practice part of what they would be doing in their interaction war time mission, picking up their aircraft and their people and deploying to another site and operating.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Kindness.

Mr. KINDNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to ask if any of our panel of witnesses here, whose testimony I really appreciate this morning, have any thoughts about the interaction between the units that would be operating on this combined National Guard function, on the one hand and Federal civilian law enforcement agencies on the other hand.

There is cooperation that is occurring at the present time with Florida and Georgia operations, I understand. But could you describe, perhaps, what mechanisms you see as being necessary to assure smoothness of operation, particularly with regard to determining when and in what locations operations ought to be undertaken?

General PATTERSON. Well, we propose putting two people at NNBIS, of course. They would be the initial contact from Customs, or the Federal agencies. The cooperation and the exercises we ran were very good.

Obviously, you will have selected routes, selected times, the traffic will be heavier in a certain area at a certain time, and they will recommend areas to set one of these exercises up in, and all they would have to do is recommend the area, tell us where they want it, we would have the two Guard people assigned there to coordinate it with the National Guard Bureau and the States and have the equipment sent to that area. And that is basically how we did it in Georgia and Florida, except we did it through the local law enforcement agencies.

Mr. KINDNESS. Now, in your operations, did you have any Federal law enforcement personnel accompanying the National Guard personnel in the aircraft that would make the arrest?

General PATTERSON. There were Customs people there.

Mr. KINDNESS. Were there any DEA people involved in your operations at all?

General ENSSLIN. I think it was coordinated with DEA. I am not sure if we had anybody onsite.

General PATTERSON. I am not sure. I don't believe we actually had them onsite, but I am not sure.

Mr. KINDNESS. I am thinking also about the electronic communications aspect of this interaction and whether you know of any compatibility of radio communication for use in these operations between civilian law enforcement agencies and the National Guard units. Is there any such compatibility at the present time or would there be a need for additional equipment for that kind of communication?

General PATTERSON. There is compatibility with the UHF radio now. It may require additional, more sophisticated radios—let me make that statement—to set up a good communications net.

Obviously, communications is going to be a problem in any operations and you have to have good communications for it to work. And right now, we do have the UHF compatibility between tac control, the C-130's, and the chase aircraft. We also have a portable HF set that we can use between aircraft on the ground and the tac control site.

Mr. KINDNESS. In all of this, of course, we have the problem of not having enough secure communications so that the dopers can be informed, but we won't go into that at the moment. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you. Mr. Neal.

Mr. NEAL. General Ensslin, you indicated that if the National Guard units were under Federal control that there would be some limitations that you would not experience if they were under State control. What are those limitations?

General ENSSLIN. The Posse Comitatus Act, of course, limits the law enforcement activities of any Federal troops, and when our people are in a Federal status, then we are subject to that act. But as State forces were exempt from posse comitatus, and can engage in any range of activities that are allowed by our State statutes.

Mr. NEAL. But ultimately, you are suggesting that these units would be paid for by the Federal funds?

General ENSSLIN. Yes.

Mr. NEAL. In other words—

General ENSSLIN. Let me give you an example. The budget of the Florida National Guard is about \$107 million a year; \$102 million of that figure is Federal support; \$5 million from the State of Florida, so we are basically a federally funded force as it is.

Mr. NEAL. And what you are saying, though, is that you don't see any problem by using this mechanism, you don't see any problems with the posse comitatus law?

General ENSSLIN. No, I think that is well defined. I am not an attorney. I need a jag here to help me with that.

Mr. NEAL. Is that a law that you agree with? Is that a concept that you agree with?

General ENSSLIN. Yes, it is traditional in our country, and it, of course, is to keep the military out of the law enforcement business just as an additional protection to our citizens.

Mr. NEAL. Well, I sense that this is a problem area, but I don't have a well-developed argument on it.

General ENSSLIN. Well, it has not been to us in our operations, and we would foresee that being a State force would give us more leeway than any Federal force would have in dealing with the problem.

Mr. ENGLISH. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEAL. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. One point that needs to be made clear. The National Guard Association is not recommending that the National Guard become involved in making arrests of civilians that may be guilty of this violation.

General ENSSLIN. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. The National Guard is only recommending that they be used, that C-130's be used as detection platforms to fill that role. They would also provide additional communications assistance and secure communications, and would also, then, provide transportation, namely, the Blackhawk helicopter for civilian law enforcement agencies to arrive on the scene and make an arrest.

Now, under posse comitatus in the Federal Government, where there would be a possibility of a difference in the way the Guard would function as opposed to the Federal law enforcement, is the actual piloting of that Blackhawk helicopter. That gets into the area of how close you are to the actual arrest. I think from a Federal level that is something we would want to stay away from.

However, the State could do that if their State laws allow it without any problem.

Mr. NEAL. Is there a precedent for this kind of activity on the part of the National Guard?

General ENSSLIN. Well, we think we had a precedent in Florida with our operations over the past 1½ years. Now, as to a historical precedent, I am not aware over our long history. Perhaps General Weber can address that.

General WEBER. An underlying mission or responsibility of the National Guard is, indeed, support of civil authority, which is a

very key phrase to use, where everything we do is in support of someone else.

We do have—I don't have them here, but in the Guard Bureau they have some examples they can give you in fact, in the drug interdiction business over the years where they have done this in coordination, cooperation with Federal officials, and indeed, with State law enforcement officials.

Mr. NEAL. You mentioned the area of National Guard involvement during the 1960's in dealing with civil disobedience, but that was pretty much of a State-by-State basis.

General WEBER. Yes, sir; in every instance, it was in support of civil authorities.

Mr. NEAL. Local law enforcement.

General WEBER. Now, some States do have laws that permit the deputizing of members of the Guard where in fact under State law they can make the apprehension.

Mr. NEAL. Do you know offhand if the National Guard was involved in the enforcement of the prohibition laws? I wasn't around at the time, but I understand some of the alcohol that was used illegally actually came in from Canada and maybe other countries.

General WEBER. I would like to research that one and get you an answer for the record, if you would like, sir.

[The information follows:]

A review of historical files yielded no information indicating National Guard participation in Federal prohibition enforcement activities. Only one reference was found of the use of Guard personnel in State duty for prohibition enforcement. In that instance, the Governor of Texas used 55 Guard personnel to break up illegal alcohol operations after the proclamation of martial law at Mexia, Texas.

Mr. NEAL. Let me ask just one other question.

I think that you said in your presentation, General, I think both of you mentioned that your plan involved primarily or maybe wholly interdicting drugs coming into the country from outside of the country. Did I hear that correctly?

General ENSSLIN. That is the plan. We also have an ongoing program in many States, and Florida is one of them, for detecting domestic cultivation, and our memorandum of understanding with our Florida Department of Law Enforcement allows them to fly on our helicopters on regularly scheduled training missions to look for domestic cultivation.

We have also trained all of our aircrews in what to look for when you are looking for domestic cultivation. So we have got an ongoing program in that arena, too, but this concept that we presented here is a concept really to protect our borders, which are violated, of course, on a daily basis.

Mr. NEAL. One final quick question.

Would it be appropriate, in your opinion, to use the National Guard in a similar fashion to help enforce the immigration laws?

General DENNIS. I would be reluctant to answer that, Congressman, without doing some research on it. We researched this problem in some depth and I wouldn't want to reflect on that instance.

General ENSSLIN. I spent the first 2 weeks of the Mariel boatlift in Key West and that was a State of Florida problem, and we, of course, were involved up to our ears in at least the first 25,000 refugees that came in. And the Guard really stands ready to support

local authorities in any situation that get beyond the capability of the authorities that are in place. So I would say that if the Guard were needed because existing agencies were overwhelmed, then it would be available to the Governors to use in that way, as Governor Graham used the Guard in the Mariel boatlift.

Mr. NEAL. Well, clearly, the situation concerning illegal immigration into this country is out of hand. Is there a difference, do you think, between using your forces for the interdiction of drugs and using your forces for illegal immigration?

General DENNIS. Congressman, I don't think there is a difference in the concept. The only thing is the drugs have a potential dangerous effect on the use and the moral fiber of this Nation. Illegal aliens is a different subject altogether that needs to be dealt with, and I think Texas is trying to deal with it when you look at Texas, and most of Texas is closer to Central America than it is to right here, and probably we have more border mileage than any other State.

This is especially critical in Texas, and I think our Governor is trying to address both of those problems.

Mr. NEAL. Well, very fortunately we have not been overwhelmed with the problem of terrorism, but it looks like that is a threat, one that we have to be mindful of. It seems to me that if we can't control the flow of people into our country, that we are going to have a great deal of difficulty controlling terrorist activities.

I don't know myself; I am asking questions; I don't know myself to which I would give a higher priority. What you are saying, in essence, as I understand you, is that in your own mind, this problem is of a higher order of priority than the problem of illegal immigration, but you don't see any difference in the National Guard dealing with the two problems. Would that be correct?

General DENNIS. Yes, sir; like General Weber said, it is still in support of local authorities and if we are needed, we stand ready to deal with that, and that is a concern of ours. Terrorism on the southern border is a definite concern of ours. We have just hired 92 additional security police to protect our armories along the border, federally funded, State employees, federally funded through another program. So it is a concern of ours and we think about that daily.

General WEBER. This group, sir, did not deal with that specific issue, and I would add that one of the underlying considerations for the commission of this group dealt with compatible training and if we get into the other issue that you have raised, the opportunities for Guard members to get compatible training, compatible with their Federal mission, would, indeed, be more difficult.

Possibly you would have to deal with primarily military police and that type of soldier or airmen.

Mr. NEAL. Mr. Owens.

General OWENS. Yes, sir, Mr. Neal. I would like to address that. My position is that the National Guard could be used as logistic support to assist in the interdiction of drugs coming into the United States and that is the limit of what I would use them for, and simply the huge investment that we make in this equipment and machines and I think that is reasonable, but only in the drug interdiction role.

Mr. NEAL. What would be the difference between that and the attempt to interdict illegal aliens or terrorists?

General OWENS. Well, the basis of my study was based on the drug problem and I did not address the others, and that is as far as I could go on that in an official capacity.

Mr. NEAL. So you are not prejudiced against it, you have just not studied it to this point.

General OWENS. I have only studied the ability to support law enforcement drug interdiction.

Mr. NEAL. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Kleczka.

Mr. KLECZKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me compliment the Guard Association on a well thought out, well defined white paper. I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the presence of the president of the Association, Gen. Ray Matera, from my home State of Wisconsin in the audience. I am sure he had a part in the preparation of this white paper.

Gentlemen, that is the good news. The bad news is the Congress is facing what we have termed the Gramm-Rudman law. As I look at the back pages of your report, it seems that some of the expenditures here are frankly not affordable at this time and possibly not for the foreseeable future.

Any of the generals can answer. Basically, what assets do we currently have on hand in the four regions? It seems from the chairman's questioning that we do have a number of C-130's and I believe that in a short time we will have an ample number of Black-hawks. What is actually necessary above and beyond that? The radar, is that readily available, or does that have to be purchased?

General DENNIS. It has to be purchased, sir.

Mr. KLECZKA. Are any of the C-130's in the four regions equipped with the APG-63 radar?

General DENNIS. No, sir, that is an F-15 radar, fighter radar. It would have to be purchased and palletized.

Mr. KLECZKA. It seems to me that one of the largest costs of the proposal would naturally be the manpower cost, and that occurs basically because you are going the USC-32 status versus the 10 status. What would be wrong with dovetailing this with your regular active duty training for Federal purposes, instead of having the active duty go on as it is today and have these hours, these missions as an add-on to your State function?

General ENSSLIN. You don't touch all the bases for training in this mission that we need to touch to meet the readiness requirements of the force. The pilots, for instance, would train in a certain number of their skills, but not all of the skills that they would be required to train in. So if we didn't get additional resources it would degrade the readiness of the force, which we have been working so hard to improve and have made great strides in improving over the past half dozen years.

We have to provide instantly ready forces in time of mobilization. There really will be no time to train if we meet the mobilization and deployment schedules that are laid out for the National Guard today. Therefore, we need additional resourcing if we are going to take on additional missions.

Mr. KLECZKA. Additional resourcing at what level or what type?

General ENSSLIN. Well, I think it is spelled out in pretty much detail in the material that we provided you. You get a breakdown on the equipment, the estimated cost of the equipment, the additional manpower required and the cost involved in the concept as we have laid it out, at least our best estimate on that.

Mr. KLECZKA. Now, I don't fully understand that. Basically, if, in fact, a flightcrew would fly one 10-day mission a year, the balance of his or her training could be on other readiness type activity, so to indicate that you wouldn't fulfill your Federal mandate, I don't fully understand it.

It seems to me we could dovetail some of this training to satisfy flight hours or whatever the case might be and in the balance, whatever doesn't meet the Federal regulations, would have to be made up through other training, sending your flightcrews to Nicaragua or whatever the case might be.

General PATTERSON. Well, every time you run one of these missions, you are taking flying hours away from a programmed flying hour program that delegated so many flying hours per aircrew and if they fly one of these things, then they take those flying hours and that is taking them out of their scheduled readiness training.

Mr. KLECZKA. Does that eat up the bulk of the flying hours?

General PATTERSON. No, it wouldn't eat up the bulk of it but it would detract from it. In other words, they would get some type of training, as General Ensslin said, but by the same token, it would use flying hours. Those flying hours would have to be replaced if they did it on a repeated basis.

Mr. KLECZKA. Well, with the budget constraints, for the DOD to supplement the full State personnel cost—I just can't see that as being part of the program today.

General OWENS, you wanted to make a comment?

General OWENS. I don't think that is what we were saying. An aircrew member receives about 150 hours, 126 hours a year, and he must accomplish what we call recurring training. He must perform so many takeoffs, so many landings, so many precision instrument approaches, using the ILS system and so many using the ground control radar systems. They must do certain airlift units, like the C-130's, they have to do air drops now.

They are doing all kinds of combat training which takes up most of their hours, where the advantage comes is all the overhead and equipment and management structure is all there, so you just add the production of another pilot, additional hours, and that is where you get most of your savings.

Mr. KLECZKA. General Ensslin, you have been involved in this activity in the past. Have you faced any legal challenges by those arrested or those representing those arrested by or for the involvement of the Guard?

General ENSSLIN. No.

Mr. KLECZKA. That hasn't been brought up in any court of law up to date?

General ENSSLIN. No.

Mr. KLECZKA. Fine. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NEAL [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Kleczka. We have been joined by our very distinguished colleague, Senator DeConcini. Senator, we would certainly like to welcome you and commend you for all of your hard work. I am just sitting in for Glenn here for a moment. In fact, let me turn it back over to him at this point.

Mr. ENGLISH [presiding]. I would like to make a very quick comment. Most people who are familiar with the efforts of this subcommittee, and generally the coalition that has been put together through the House and Senate, are certainly very familiar with the role that Senator DeConcini has played. He has been one of the leaders without question, and I would say in the U.S. Senate, the leader, as far as the war on drugs, particularly as it pertains to interdiction. So we are delighted that he could take time to join us. Senator DeConcini, we are very happy that you could be with us.

Mr. DeCONCINI. Chairman English, and Mr. Neal, thank you very much, and let me thank the other members for letting me interlope on the House side on this subject matter.

Generals, we appreciate first what the Guard has so far attempted to do. General Weber, you have got some people here who you know better than I do; how outstanding they are in their willingness to do something beyond their first mission, so to speak; and how valuable their assistance is in this area that we are covering today.

I would like to ask, either, General Owens or General Dennis about the low altitude radar coverage. A number of those graphics show that the southern Arizona border and perhaps some areas of Texas, are virtually wide open to any drug smuggler flying at 500 feet off the ground, and they won't hit radar until they are almost half way to Utah, I am told.

Perhaps the scale on your map is off by a bit, but our information shows that there are large radar gaps along the southern border of Arizona, New Mexico, and parts of Texas.

No. 1, can you verify that, and what specifically would the Guard plan be to provide in terms of ground radar coverage or other radar resources to close the gap along Arizona and the other southwest border States?

General Owens.

General OWENS. Yes, sir; Senator DeConcini. The gaps do exist, as I am sure you are well aware of, and you can fly without being detected at low altitudes. Our proposal would put a radar, ground control radar set that we call the TPS-43E, at various locations wherever it was determined that an operation would be conducted.

But this would not be a permanent installation. It would be moved as the operation moved, so the holes that you see in the southern border would pretty much stay there unless the other equipment, such as aerostats are permanently in place.

Mr. DeCONCINI. Do you have that equipment now and do you have that capability now?

General OWENS. Yes, sir; the Guard has that capability and we have a unit in Arizona, in Phoenix.

Mr. DeCONCINI. How much help would some aerostats or an aerostat be?

General OWENS. Well, I don't know the capabilities of the aerostat, sir, so it would be inappropriate for me to answer that, but I can get you those for the record.

Mr. DECONCINI. Yes, if we can get those from you, can you give us some kind of idea of what interplay would be possible between these various types of radar?

General OWENS. Yes, sir, I believe we could provide that for you.

Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you.

General ENSSLIN. In Florida—

Mr. DECONCINI. Excuse me, General, I didn't mean to leave you out.

General ENSSLIN. No, in Florida, what those aerostats do is, they are intimidators and they send the people to other routes, so indeed, they are effective because their locations are well known and their capabilities are well known to the bad guys, and it has been our experience that they avoid them.

Mr. DECONCINI. Along that line, General Ensslin, are you satisfied from your observation—I realize it is a little bit different on the military side than, say, from Customs or DEA or something—with the coverage now of the aerostats that are flying there, both the military ones and the ones that are deployed for law enforcement? Is there greater need, I guess, is my question?

General ENSSLIN. There is.

Mr. DECONCINI. How many more do you think would be necessary, or have you had an opportunity to look at the coverage in those areas that are not covered?

General ENSSLIN. I haven't addressed that, so I wouldn't feel qualified to answer.

Mr. DECONCINI. Do you have the capacity or capability within your organization to give an assessment, though brief as it may be, as to where the gaps are?

General ENSSLIN. Yes, by going back and talking to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, I think we could provide that.

Mr. DECONCINI. I am wondering if the Guard has the capability because we would like to compare it to what the law enforcement people see to determine if we are looking at the same areas and if we are going to cover the same area by one more aerostat or two.

General ENSSLIN. I think we would be pleased to do that.

Mr. DECONCINI. I would appreciate knowing that. If it is a great burden to you, we will put it off until next fiscal year.

General ENSSLIN. I don't think it would be.

Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

Since the entire area encompassed by the southern boundary of the United States lacks radar coverage below an altitude of 500 feet, the entire boundary could be considered the gap for low-flying smuggler aircraft. An aerostat, a balloon-mounted radar platform anchored in place by a 10,000-foot cable, can provide radar coverage out to 150 nautical miles in all directions. Low altitude coverage, above approximately 100 feet, extends out 50 to 75 nautical miles. Using these capabilities, aerostats would have to be placed 250 to 300 nautical miles apart along the suspected drug smuggling air routes/corridors. Radar surveillance, to be effective, must completely cover the 500-foot and below altitude level. If complete coverage is not effected, the smuggler community will determine where the aerostats have been placed and then seek other routes and corridors that are devoid of coverage. If the Tactical Control and aerostat radars remain in a mobile configuration, we would be able to compound the drug smugglers problem. However, to completely seal off the south-

ern boundary of the United States gap-filler radars such as the TPS-43E and aerostats would have to be emplaced with overlapping coverage. We have not attempted to define the specific requirement to accomplish that goal.

Mr. DECONCINI. General Owens, these plans that the Guard has come up with are going to entail cooperative Governors and perhaps even some legislators, but certainly the Governors. Have you had an opportunity to review this with the Governor of Arizona, and have any of you other gentlemen, likewise, had an opportunity, and what is the response, if you can tell us?

General OWENS. I have reviewed this with the Governor and the response is very positive, sir.

Mr. DECONCINI. Gentlemen, is that likewise for all of you?

General ENSSLIN. Yes, Governor Graham is very strongly supportive of anything in this arena. We are, in Florida, of course, particularly sensitive to the problem.

Mr. DECONCINI. Do you have any suggestions that you could either give us today or over a period of time? You fellows, in my judgment, are masters at coordinating civilian and military efforts, just by the nature of what you do for our national security and defense. And to me it is sometimes amazing to see the great success that you have and the morale that you have within the Guard, Air and Army Guard units of this melding of civilian and military, even for short terms, and the personnel that you have.

I would like to see if law enforcement couldn't gain some of the techniques that you use, or suggestions that you have, because in my judgment, that is one of the biggest problems that we have, the failure of close coordination and maintaining good morale at the same time between what sometimes are termed competitive law enforcement agencies because they are dealing with drug enforcement and they have got different budgetary constraints and different emphasis, and different relations with the Justice Department.

I don't need a long expanded answer today, and I hate to burden you when you have already been burdened to come forward with this plan. If you could give us any written suggestions or verbal, if you like, today, and the purpose of that will be to try to integrate when we—I believe we will have a southwest border task force formed.

Mr. Domenici and myself and four other Senators have written the President. He is going to visit with us about it and I think it is going to come about. It may be a little premature.

Congressman English and this committee has pressed for the Southwest as well as the one that has been successful in Florida.

I wonder if you can help me any on some of those types of techniques and ideas that might be useful in law enforcement. Can I start with General Owens?

General OWENS. Well, if I understand your question, sir, we do have an agreement with the Department of Public Safety in the State of Arizona.

Mr. DECONCINI. Is that a written agreement?

General OWENS. Yes, sir, it is a written agreement, and it entails marijuana observation on our normal training mission, incidental to training, and as in Florida our pilots have been trained and our aircrew people have been trained in what to look for when they are on a normal training flight.

And we do have a program that operates through, like I say, DPS and they are the ones that would request support from the National Guard in Arizona, in a purely State active duty status, different from title 32, which is a federally funded duty status.

Mr. DECONCINI. What about other law enforcement? What about the sheriff in Maricopa County or Pima County, over, say, the gunnery range or Yuma County? Do you have any contact with them or do you channel that through the DPS?

General OWENS. For law enforcement support of that nature it comes from DPS. However, in the State of Arizona, if a sheriff, for example, had a rescue mission or a lost person, they would go through the Division of Emergency Services, which is in the Department of Emergency Service of Military Affairs. They work from the sheriff's to that department to us and we would provide them support. But for law enforcement, we go through DPS.

Mr. DECONCINI. That agreement with DPS, does it have a personal contact, your delegate and theirs, that they meet, or is there a council?

General OWENS. I will have to get that for you for the record, sir, but we do have a military support to civil authorities action officer at the National Guard and he coordinates with the DPS action officer.

Mr. DECONCINI. What about the Federal agencies; DEA, FBI, or Customs, anybody?

General OWENS. If they request our support?

Mr. DECONCINI. Yes.

General OWENS. They must go through their chain of authority to their national level, which comes over to the National Guard Bureau down through the State to ask for assistance.

Mr. DECONCINI. There is no agreement?

General OWENS. Not directly.

Mr. DECONCINI. No informal discussions or anything going on?

General OWENS. Well, there are probably some informal discussions, sir.

Mr. DECONCINI. No formal contact?

General OWENS. No formal contact.

Mr. DECONCINI. How about you, General Dennis? Is that about the same?

General DENNIS. Yes, sir; we have a coordination with the Department of Public Safety and we have an additional grant that comes through support to pay our people to carry public safety on the helicopters to pick up the domestic crops, and our people have also been trained.

Mr. DECONCINI. Do you have an agreement? Is it just put together verbally, or do you have a written agreement?

General DENNIS. It's a verbal agreement that is renewed every year.

Mr. DECONCINI. I see.

General DENNIS. They do meet annually. But I don't think that the Department of Public Safety has the equipment to do any operation on a large scale like this. We could certainly look into it.

Mr. DECONCINI. General Patterson?

General PATTERSON. We have a written agreement.

Mr. DECONCINI. Similar to Arizona?

General PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DECONCINI. How about any Federal arrangements?

General PATTERSON. Not a written agreement with a Federal agency as such.

Mr. DECONCINI. Do you have any working relationship with Customs?

General PATTERSON. Yes, sir; we work primarily through GBI.

Mr. DECONCINI. And in Florida, General?

General ENSSLIN. Well, we have good cooperation in Florida, and I think it is because all of us feel we work for the Governor and various State agencies have always worked extremely well together, and usually the Guard is in support of a sheriff. That is who we are usually supporting.

In the Mariel refugee crisis, for instance, the State agencies fell together well in support of Monroe County, which was pretty much overwhelmed by the problem. But there was very good cooperation because everybody understood we were representing the Governor down there in that circumstance.

Now, in the Federal agencies, I have noted more of a tendency to go back up their own chain of command rather than to seek to coordinate on a local basis, but that just has to do with the structure of the agencies.

Mr. DECONCINI. General Weber.

General WEBER. Sir, if I might remind the committee, one of the reasons that the effectiveness is there, as it is, that in many, many instances, key people in law enforcement agencies are also members of the Guard, commanders and senior officials. So they understand the capabilities of the Guard and they are able to relate that into their other professions.

Mr. DECONCINI. Good point.

General WEBER. And this includes Federal agents, as well. So much of it is done on an informal basis, but by regulation to use Federal equipment, as an example, we do need a written agreement.

Mr. DECONCINI. You do need a written agreement?

General WEBER. Yes, sir; between the State and the Federal Government.

Mr. DECONCINI. General Weber, let me just ask you, is there any problem or prohibition that would keep the Guards in their respective States from dealing directly with, say, Customs or the DEA, if, in fact, you know time, personnel, and resources were available to help? Would they have to have your approval or do the other Federal agencies have to go through their—is there any reason why they can't cross over and deal directly on the State level?

General WEBER. In all likelihood, sir, that would vary from State to State by their State law and the State code.

Mr. DECONCINI. You mean as to the Guard's participation?

General WEBER. Yes, to working with the other agencies, to a degree to which they could cooperate.

Mr. DECONCINI. General Owens, do you know of any prohibition from you working with, say, Customs or Treasury, DEA, or the Department of Justice in Arizona?

General OWENS. Yes, sir; whenever they ask for support for drug or law enforcement, the request for support, other than observation

and reporting on a noninterference per training basis, requires approval above State level, and we go to the National Guard Bureau Military Support.

Mr. DECONCINI. You do?

General OWENS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DECONCINI. Before you can give it?

General OWENS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DECONCINI. Now, why is that, General Weber? Is that by law, or do you know?

General WEBER. I would think that in all likelihood that would be by regulation, possibly not by law, but by regulation, because invariably you utilize Federal equipment, and in utilizing the Federal equipment, the State must pay the operations cost for that equipment with other than Federal funds.

Mr. DECONCINI. I guess my point is, can anything be done to facilitate the use of Federal law enforcement agencies at the proper times and available resources and, of course, the Guard units? For instance, if there is a DEA effort on the border of Mexico and the United States, or if there is a Custom effort there, or a Bureau of Tobacco and Firearms on exchange of drugs and there was need to call in some Guard equipment, personnel, communication or helicopters or something without having to go up two chains or three chains of command and back down, is there any reason that couldn't be put together?

General WEBER. I would suggest that this could be accomplished by prior agreement.

Mr. DECONCINI. Very good.

General WEBER. Before the fact, the various agencies would agree from the Federal to the State.

Mr. DECONCINI. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. Again, my thanks for the tremendous efforts you are putting forward and to the Governors that you gentlemen work for, for their willingness to have the Guard involved in this effort. It is very important and we appreciate it.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you, Senator. We appreciate it.

Mr. DioGuardi.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentleman, for your testimony and for the efforts that you are providing to help us with the war on drugs.

I am from New York State. I represent a district just north of New York City. The southern tier of my district is Mt. Vernon, Yonkers, New Rochelle, and I am concerned that the interdiction effort, while it is working well, or it appears to be working well right now at the southern tier in Florida, Texas, California, that it is not working too well in the New York area.

I have always said that the way to deal with this war on drugs is to deal with it on both ends of the spectrum: No. 1 at the source, keep the stuff from being grown and put into the distribution networks—and, at the other end, drying up the market, getting money so that we can educate the kids in the early grades that this is not something they should be experimenting with.

But, needless to say, we still need the interdiction effort. I think it is an inefficient way to deal with it, but we need to deal with it that way.

My biggest problem with interdiction is that, the better the job you do in Florida, Texas, California, the more likely it is going to be that the drugs will now come in through the New York area.

I think that is what we are beginning to see at this point, because there is a tremendous increase in the amount of drugs now coming into my district and the southern tier, those cities that I mentioned being used as dropoff points for the drugs as they come into New York City, can now get them into the Westchester County area.

I mean, you saw the priest that was just shot by an individual who was high on crack. This crack is all over the place right now in New York and, in my county it is being packaged in a very sinister way: It looks almost like candy the way they are packaging these vials with the colors, and we literally have a war on drugs going on when you see the hardware that is being used, the weapons that are being picked up.

So my question to you is, as inefficient as interdiction might be, we nevertheless have to provide as much money as we can to keep it off of our shores, but we need to build a net that is a total net around this country. Otherwise interdiction is only going to be as good as the weakest link in that net. You are tacticians. You understand that. We are in a war. You have got to do now the same as you would do if we were using your tactics against an enemy that we can really see.

Now, I look at the map, and I look at the efforts that we have put in so far and I say to myself, are we able to do the job in the New York area? Is your subarea No.1 equipped well enough so that you can reach out and perhaps interdict what we call the New York Express, because apparently, there are vehicles, planes or boats, which are coming up past Florida on the outside the eastern tier and then coming into New York.

Would you tell me whether or not the Guard, and I guess the New York Guard in this case, but whether your plan contemplates as strong an effort right now in the New York area as it does in the Florida area and, if not, what can we do to get it there? And I address that to any one of you. I guess the gentlemen from Florida and Georgia.

General ENSSLIN. Well, I think General Flynn, the adjutant general in New York would have to address that issue, because I don't think any of us are prepared to speak for him.

Mr. DiOGUARDI. But in your subarea one, which is, I guess, Georgia, that is the headquarters for that—

General PATTERSON. Virginia.

Mr. DiOGUARDI. Virginia, do you see yourselves being able to reach out far enough to interdict vehicles that are going up past the southern tier of the country into the New York area. That is what I guess I am saying.

General PATTERSON. Sir, it would mean if you spread the boundary out, you are going to reduce the number of missions you can operate within that area. But, yes, you would be able to detect people coming up the coast, up to 50 or 100 miles out, if they are high

enough. If they are out on the water, it would be difficult, except with a C-130 with an F-15 radar on it. It would have some capability by itself but not a lot.

Mr. ENGLISH. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. The gentleman is making a good point. That is the training area for the E-2C's for the Navy, and of course, that is a much more powerful radar and has a great deal more detection capability than does even the F-15, so ideally speaking they should be more active in there.

In our discussions with them, the problem has been that the Customs Service doesn't seem to have any people that can respond even if they pick something up. They don't have an interceptor or they don't have any way they could move to make an arrest.

Would there be the possibility or any capability for the Guard to work with the Navy in possibly providing interceptors or some type of intercept capability to utilize that E-2C coverage in that range?

General PATTERSON. Yes, sir; it would require additional resources, as we said, with the Black Hawk or Mohawk or some type of comparable aircraft, to be utilized in that area, or a tracker or a chase aircraft.

In other words, really what I guess I am trying to say is, the concept will work no matter where you put it. It is just going to require additional resources or additional effort to make it operate.

General WEBER. Congressman DioGuardi, if I might, to get a grasp on this and actually to develop a concept, certain assumptions were made, so the assumption was built around the northern coast of Virginia around to the northern coast of California. There was no intent to rule out Oregon and Washington and New York and Rhode Island and the east coast States. You could add another sector there where indeed the Georgia-Florida sector could work hand in glove with the New York sector.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. I think it is important to recognize that, because if you do a great job in one part of the country, all you are doing is putting your finger in the dike, and you are just going to create an incentive to come into the country from another way and they will just get it in there and they will go throughout the country from within with another distribution network, by rail or by truck, or whatnot.

So I think that in coming up with your plan, in bolstering that plan, we have to be sure that you are building a strong enough net around the country on its perimeters so that we don't allow for the effort to be designed around by creative drug dealers that are just going to find some other way into the country.

My fear now is that while we seem to be doing a better job in the Florida area, and as we should be—that has been the major dropoff point—we are now creating incentives for them to come directly in on the northern tier, and I would wish your plan would take into account that probability and work with the Guards in those areas, so that we build a net that is impenetrable at this point or very soon.

With that, I am through with my questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. DioGuardi.

I have got about three more questions. We will try to move through very quickly and get to our next witness.

General Dennis, the plan spends some time focusing on the Guard's special forces participation. Could you elaborate how the special forces in the Guard could play a role in this operation?

General DENNIS. Yes, sir; we did consider a role for Guard special forces in the drug eradication effort. They might perform a reconnaissance role or work as communications coordinators in directing civil authorities into marijuana fields. We did not consider using special forces in the drug interdiction role defined in this white paper.

Mr. ENGLISH. Each of the options that you discussed in your plan includes the use of tactical control centers. Assuming that we can work out the details and DOD approval and funding, would the Guard make such a system available for, say, a 30-day proof-of-concept trial?

General DENNIS. I would have to rely on the Air Force for the tactical air control.

Mr. ENGLISH. General Patterson, or General Owens, either one.

General PATTERSON. Are you saying for the command control and net?

Mr. ENGLISH. Yes.

General PATTERSON. Yes, sir; you could set it up on a 30-day trial basis. It would require funding for the people and bringing them in on a temporary tour of 30 days.

Mr. ENGLISH. Great. General Owens, I think on the southwest border is where that would be particularly important, given the weakness that we have there now. Could you elaborate on that? Do you see any problems?

General OWENS. Well, the control that we thought of on this would be at a C-130 base, and there isn't a C-130 base in Arizona. The nearest one would be Van Nuys, CA, or Dallas, TX. Do you have a 24-hour command post at Dallas?

General DENNIS. Yes.

General OWENS. A 24-hour command post is all you need and, yes, it could, as a command post exercise, determine the command and control procedures that could be done.

Mr. ENGLISH. Very good. And also on the "routing request and tasking" briefing chart, you show that the NNBS Intelligence Control Center is the requesting agency. Would there be any problem if a request came from four separate command and control centers? Customs command and control centers, are particularly what I was thinking about. General?

General ENSSLIN. No, I see no problem in that. The concept will still work very well.

General WEBER. Sir, this is just one idea of how to do this. General Walker, the Chief of the Guard Bureau, may not agree with it at all, as well as the authorities in the Army and throughout DOD. That was only one concept or one idea of how it could be accomplished.

And your previous question about doing this on a trial basis, there again, we want to be very careful that we are not making decisions for the people over in the Pentagon. They are the ones that can really answer those types of questions.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, General, that is a very fitting note on which to end your testimony, and I want to assure you we are going to give them every opportunity to come up and visit with us about that, and we will get their views on this.

I would like to say, though, that you are to be commended. Certainly the National Guard Association is to be commended for putting together this proposal, and we are very appreciative of the Armed Services Committee for requesting it.

I think that it gives us some idea of the real potential that we have within the Guard to assist in dealing with this problem. There is no question that we are very short on resources and assets.

Also, I think that during these difficult times of Gramm-Rudman, it makes a good deal of sense for the American taxpayer to be getting more than one use out of his tax dollar. I think that at least the constituents in my district, and I would think taxpayers throughout this Nation, would applaud the idea that military assets in the National Guard could also be involved in the war on drugs, and that any funds that are spent on training the military could also be utilized to defend our shores against drug smugglers.

I think that that gives us some real hope and it gives us a real chance, and quite frankly, it brings us to the point where I think we can look optimistically to the future; that we might have an honest to goodness real war on drugs. Now, that would be shocking and amazing, I know, but we might finally have the real thing.

For far too long, we have had lots of folks that pose beside bales of marijuana and stacks of money and have photo opportunities and call that a war on drugs, but that isn't what it is. And I think it is time for the real thing, and I think that you have given us some potential in that area.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. DioGuardi.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. I just want to include just a short note, that every crisis presents an opportunity, and the Chinese character for opportunity is also the same for crisis. I would say that with the crisis we face on drugs, on the war on drugs right now, and it is growing every day, there is a great opportunity for the military to improve its credibility with the public by not being reluctant in the least to jump into this.

I have been here now less than 2 years, and I have noticed that these hearings that the chairman has had—I was down in Dade County with him—that there has been a history of a certain reluctance of the military to jump into this, for whatever reason, as though they were admitting that maybe they had money that they didn't need, and therefore, it would disturb their budgets and what-not.

I don't think it is a secret that we have seen a lot of waste in Government. I don't think it is a secret that we have seen a lot of waste in the procurement system. Now we see that it took a disaster with the *Challenger* astronauts to now truck out over 200 audits from the closet to find that there was even \$3.5 billion of waste in that system, and we thought that was the paragon of all programs.

Not to get into that, I am just suggesting that this is a great opportunity for the military to develop tremendous credibility with the public by openly embracing the opportunity to join with this committee in fighting the war on drugs head on. I believe the money is there. We should allocate it and get with the business of dealing with this great problem.

Thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you, Mr. DioGuardi.

And I want to thank each of you gentlemen for your very, very fine contribution. Again, we commend you and we thank you. Thank you very much.

General WEBER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Our next witness, will give us some idea as to how things would look from the civilian law enforcement side at the Federal level. We have with us the Commissioner of Customs, Hon. William von Raab, and we are looking forward to his views and thoughts as to the impact that this might have in the war on drugs.

It is my understanding that appearing with Commissioner von Raab will be Mr. William Rosenblatt, who is the Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement, and Clark Stuart, who is head of the air program.

We are delighted to have you. It is my understanding that you do not have a written prepared statement, that you will simply make comments.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM VON RAAB, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM ROSENBLATT, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR ENFORCEMENT; CLARK STUART, HEAD, AIR PROGRAM; AND GEORGE HEAVEY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE

Mr. VON RAAB. My apologies for not having a written statement. This is my fourth hearing is less than 48 hours, and we have just run out of paper at the Customs Service.

Mr. ENGLISH. We have been looking on with admiration to the comments that you have made in the last 48 hours, Commissioner.

Mr. VON RAAB. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting Customs to comment on some of the initiatives that are underway and are being developed by your committee.

Initiatives are an essential part of the improvement of the war against drugs and I would compliment your committee on having been responsible for not only the thinking of but the implementing of initiatives in the area of the release of some of the restrictions which we typically call posse comitatus, thereby allowing the Department of Defense to play a bigger role in the drug war. Those have been of critical importance to the improvement that I think we have all seen taking place in this case, particularly in the Southeast.

The U.S. Customs Service is also working very hard to try to develop some initiatives. I had a very interesting exchange with Senator Long yesterday regarding what action we are capable of or are allowed to take, with respect to aircraft intrusions and, although I

said I agreed with him philosophically, our restrictions in terms of shooting the planes down are still pretty severe.

But I think that that sort of imaginative broad-ranging thinking must be applied to this area, and I have charged the Customs Service with taking a very good look at the statutes under which we operate and the practices we have been employing, in some cases for as many as 200 years, to see whether there aren't some other clever and effective techniques and tools that we may be able to pull out of our quiver in order to apply to this problem. I am not presenting them to you here today because we are still working on them, but there are possibly opportunities of broadening, for example, the definition of the border, thereby allowing Customs a little more flexibility in the way it approaches possible law breakers.

There are possibilities of the use of forces outside of the Customs Service's control. I have had a long conversation with Ross Perot, who is a well-known imaginative thinker in this area, and he and I have compared notes. There are a lot of old practices that might be resurrected; one of which, amusingly enough, includes letters of Margue, which probably are too ancient in their former use, but nevertheless it is that sort of imaginative approach that I think would be helpful.

It is in that context that I would applaud the suggestion of the involvement of the State militia or the National Guard acting as a State enforcement arm in the drug war.

As you are well aware, and as your staff is well aware, Customs has openly embraced and encouraged the State and local police organizations to join with us in our efforts. This has particularly been successful in the Southeast, where you are aware of our so-called Blue Lightning exercise, in which 24 sheriff and police departments in the Florida area work side by side now with the Customs Service; in many cases on our boats and in other cases our Customs officers are on their boats.

This whole effort is linked by a command center, which is up and coming, and though not completely operational, it is pretty operational, which not only will be linking the combined forces of the State and local officers but also many of the centers that are essential to a good job in drug interdiction.

This brings me to the subject of the southwest border. The success that we have seen in the Southeast has caused a diversion of some of that illegal, offensive, and dangerous activity, smuggling drugs into the Southeast, to be shifted to the Southwest, a natural result of any corrupt businessman who is looking for the easiest and quickest way to make a buck.

This has been compounded by a galloping corruption that has been moving in Mexico. The combination of these two forces has caused the southwest border to become a crisis zone with respect to the illegal importation of narcotics.

There are many, many figures that support this, but basically Mexico now is the No. 1 supplier of heroin, No. 1 supplier of marijuana, and according to DEA, is accounting for 30 percent of the actual smuggling of cocaine into the United States.

I know that you are well familiar with all these figures, but I did want to put them, once again, on the record, because every time we put these figures on the record, I think we do the American public

a service in letting them know exactly the problems that we are facing.

The southwest border is a difficult border to patrol. It is about 1,800 miles. It is all land border. And it is particularly difficult when you can cross back across the border and find yourself in a safe haven.

So the more assistance and the more cooperation, not only among the Federal agencies, but with the State and local resources, the better. So not only do I say that the use of the State militia in the Southeast would be a welcome addition to this war, it would also be a very, very welcome and critical addition in the Southwest.

There are two reasons why the addition of the State militias would be welcome. One is the very, very real assistance it would be in supporting the activities of the other enforcement organizations in terms of its sheer logistics assistance.

I don't want the other factor to be lost, and that is that once you employ a force in fighting a problem, they become emotionally committed 24 hours a day to fighting that problem, not only while they are on duty, but if you have a State militiaman who is involved in the drug war when he is on duty as a guardsman, he is also personally and actively involved in that drug war when he goes home because what he says to his wife and children is, "I was out there fighting the drug war," and that sort of personal commitment of these additional individuals is really critical in terms of just spreading this concern and spreading the involvement of every man, woman and child in the United States in the fight against these terrible menaces.

So with those brief introductory comments, Mr. Stuart, Mr. Rosenblatt, and I would be happy and look forward to answering any specific questions that you have with respect to the subject matter of this hearing.

Thank you very much.

Mr. ENGLISH. I do have some questions, Commissioner, with regard to the threat issue, in particular as it applies to the southwest border and what we are finding. But first of all, I want to go through some questions here and try to set something of a record.

Mr. VON RAAB. I have some facts on the southwest border that at some point I would be happy to and interested in giving to this committee. We have a few maps and other things. I assume those will come out as the discussion develops.

Mr. ENGLISH. I will try to go ahead and set the record with these questions and then perhaps we can move on to that.

Mr. VON RAAB. Fine.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commissioner, is it true that one of the problems along the southwest border is the inability to properly command and control current and future resources to be employed in that region?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes. One of the major problems encountered on the border has been and continues to be that of command and control. The ability to collect all existing detection capabilities, for example, ground and airborne or military and civilian radar, and also to control the law enforcement assets, whether they be Customs or the dedicated DOD assets, or should we get the National Guard in-

volved, the State and local aircraft. That does continue to be a major hurdle in combatting air smuggling activities.

Mr. ENGLISH. And what is your long-range plan to solve that particular problem?

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, specifically, on that particular problem, the Customs is currently undertaking planning to implement what is called in the vernacular a C3I facility in the Southwest to solve the command and control problems in that area. This facility would be the focal point of all planned and existing FAA, DOD, aerostat and other airborne radar or sensor capabilities. This facility, we would hope, would also incorporate all FAA flight plan information, law enforcement and tactical information, historic smuggling data, and the latest intelligence information available.

Also available would be a total communications capability to allow communications among Federal, DOD, State, and local authorities, something that has been lacking in the past.

Mr. ENGLISH. Would it be helpful to have occasional augmentation from the National Guard to assist a command and control aspect?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes, as I indicated in my opening remarks, I openly welcome the employment of additional resources, not only because of their specific assistance to the Customs Service in the mobile command and control facilities. The mobility and range of these modules, for example, would give Customs the ability to be more flexible in their deployment and utilization, and this would enable us to effectively employ the various facets of our interdiction schemes.

And secondly, just because I think it is good for the people of this country to become more involved directly in the fight on drugs.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are there any Customs' funds that might be available in the shortrun to take care of transportation costs and per diem if such support could be arranged?

Mr. VON RAAB. Customs would be prepared to provide some funds in order to evaluate the potential effectiveness of some of the aspects of this proposed role of the National Guard. We could make them available for transportation and per diem.

Of course, the extent and specific types of costs would have to be looked at and we would put them in the context of a special operation for evaluation purposes.

As you are well aware, we do provide funds now for the involvement in the Civil Air Patrol in some of our interdiction activities, so there is some flexibility, and I am sure that the Congress would be agreeable to any modifications that we might have to make in some of our line items in order to do that. But, yes, we would be prepared to do that.

Mr. ENGLISH. The plan that was presented calls for the augmentation of considerable assets in the way of trackers and as far as surveillance support for Customs is concerned. Would such support greatly increase the potential of the Customs Service?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes, by definition, the additional assets would greatly increase the support and therefore the potential of the Customs Service in this area.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have you had the opportunity to review the National Guard Association plan, and if so, what part of the plan do

you believe would provide the greatest support for the Customs Service drug interdiction effort?

Mr. VON RAAB. I only received the plan yesterday, Mr. Rosenblatt and I, and I have read the plan, but I don't assume that I can give an in-depth analysis that quickly. I would like to ask Mr. Rosenblatt or perhaps Mr. Stuart to comment on which aspects of the plan they feel would be of most helpful to the Customs Service.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Rosenblatt.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Well, with respect to the overall plan, as the Commissioner has said, we would appreciate a little bit more time to analyze it. There are some components that I would ask Mr. Stuart to comment on. That, I think we can do right away.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Stuart.

Mr. STUART. To somewhat mirror what the Commissioner said, the command and control element of this complex fighting machine is critical to its success and the immediate item that comes to mind is evaluation of that command and control element in a mobile environment where we can move and react to the threat.

Until the full development of, again, a very complex command and control element for Customs, until that is completed, we are still reacting in a small war zone environment. The particular element of that mobile command post may, in fact, be a commodity which would be very valuable, and that, I think, is one of the first items we would be interested in exploring.

Mr. ENGLISH. Very good.

Commissioner, it seems that any National Guard operational liaison should be at the Customs' operational command and control center. Do you agree with that, and can you point out why it is important?

Mr. VON RAAB. Yes, I do agree with that. If the National Guard is to be involved in the drug interdiction program they should be in a position to take advantage of the most up to date information that is available, and this information would be available at Customs' C3I centers, along with the full communications capabilities.

With this information available at one central location, and then the ability to coordinate activities with all law enforcement entities, it would be ill advised not to locate it at that center.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commissioner, would you please have the appropriate Customs personnel coordinate with the National Guard and develop a coordinated operational plan on all the options presented by General Weber, and then would you please provide the subcommittee with a copy of the plan for further consideration?

Mr. VON RAAB. Absolutely, and I will insure that representatives of Mr. Stuart's office coordinate closely with General Weber and his staff, and when the copies of this proposed plan have been prepared, we will forward them to the committee.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much.

Mr. DioGuardi.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your testimony, Commissioner.

I guess it was about a year ago that I was down in Miami with you or some of your people and managed to see first-hand some of

the new equipment that was on the new boat, I guess you call it Blue Lightning.

Mr. VON RAAB. Blue Thunder.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. A very incredible piece of equipment.

Mr. VON RAAB. You know, it has made a number of seizures by now, so it has been christened.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. That is what I was about to ask. How are things going down there? Have you seen a dramatic improvement in the interdiction effort since we have deployed that equipment?

Mr. VON RAAB. From a statistical perspective the improvement has been very dramatic, and from the operational capability perspective it is great. I would say that when you were down there, we probably had about 40 good boats in the water. We are now close to 80, and when you link in the State and local resources that are pledged on a voluntary basis to this drug interdiction effort, we are looking at a flotilla of close to 160 boats that are working together, and through this operation center, they are being coordinated much better.

I think it is a very, very good operation and the statistics will just continue to grow, and it is just making it much tougher on the smugglers. That is one of the reasons they are moving across to Mexico.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Is there any real way to measure the effect of that effort in terms of what we are preventing coming into the country? It is difficult, I think, for us to understand what is really out there, and I don't know how you can really effectively measure it. I am sure we are doing something valuable, but how valuable is it when you look at the increasing amount of the product, the substance that is being produced?

Mr. VON RAAB. Well, you can look at it two ways: you can look retrospectively, and that is, if the effort had not been launched and it was not operating as successfully as it has been operating, the amount of drugs in the United States over the past 3 years, we would have literally been snowed under by cocaine.

Prospectively, Customs judges its success in terms of the risks that the drug smugglers are prepared to take and the techniques that they employ to try to get around us. They are taking much greater risks and the techniques that they are employing are, once again, much more dangerous and risky to them.

So we are still in a pitched battle with the drug smugglers, but what they have to do is 10 times more difficult than what they had to do 4 or 5 years ago, and we intend to raise that ante from year to year.

The traditional tests of drug availability, price on the street, purity, I think is better addressed by the Drug Enforcement Administration, because they watch that very carefully.

I can only tell you that I make a regular practice of going out with the New York Police Department and the Metropolitan Police Department here in Washington, and the police officers are extremely thankful for the efforts that have been made, because they have seen that the reduction of the amount of drugs on the street, they believe is there, because they sort of can look out on the street and see exactly whether it is 100 people on the street corner, 20 people on the street corner or 5 people on the street corner. The

fact that there are 5 people on the street corner means that there are still drugs available, but it is a little more manageable problem for the local police departments than if we were just snowed under.

So I think that there has been a lot of progress made, but I don't think that anyone in this room would argue with the fact that we just have a long way to go.

Mr. ENGLISH. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Sure.

Mr. ENGLISH. There is one point that might be of interest, and I would certainly like to have it on the record. Take cocaine, for instance. In the last year, do you have at hand the number of tons of cocaine that were apprehended through all the various efforts that we have put forth?

Mr. VON RAAB. Through all the various efforts, I can't tell you, but I know that Customs has booked, if you will, 55,000 pounds of cocaine in its last reporting period, fiscal year.

Mr. ENGLISH. In particular, I was thinking not only of Customs' but the interdiction effort.

Mr. VON RAAB. We have to supply that because there are considerable amounts of cocaine that was picked up in the Bahamas. A recent operation, Hat Trick, that was run, for example, picked up thousands of pounds of cocaine in the Bahamas. DEA has obviously seized a lot of cocaine in the United States. Even Mexico, amazingly enough, largely because they were led by the nose to a particular cache of cocaine in the Tijuana area seized a couple thousand pounds of cocaine. So there are large numbers of pounds of cocaine that has been seized, very impressive, but I have to get you the actual number.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would like, Commissioner, the comparison with the total amount seized through all of our law enforcement efforts here in the United States. Let's say all Federal law enforcement efforts; keep it simple and you don't have to go to the States digging around hunting this information. Let's say all Federal law enforcement efforts, what portion of that came about as a result of interdiction.

The next comparison I would like is how that amount compares to what we were interdicting in the year before, the year before that, say, the last 5 years, each year, whether we interdicted more or less, up or down, whatever. That might be of interest.

The one thing I am looking at is to give us some indication of whether or not, in fact, we are interdicting more cocaine now than we were, say, 3 or 4 years ago.

Mr. VON RAAB. Ten times. I feel quite confident saying we are taking 10 times more cocaine, and the Customs activity in seizing cocaine is always a product of interdiction. I mean that is our job. And so, I know that back in 1981 or 1982, I think we seized about 4,000 pounds of cocaine. We seized 55,000 pounds of cocaine this year. That is about 10 times.

Just for example, Mr. Stuart has passed me information, in fiscal year 1985 just in the air program alone, we seized 15,500 pounds of cocaine, which I can assure you is more than 10 times what we seized in the air program 4 years before.

So, it is a huge leap in terms of the effectiveness of the program.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Commissioner, how about the effort in the New York area? We have a New York area task force. What is the role of your agency with DEA and the others there, and what has happened in the last year that I can feel good about?

Mr. VON RAAB. You can feel good about a number of things. One is that we put 100 Customs officers into New York in addition to the existing forces there. This is largely through the efforts of Senator D'Amato. I am sure you are aware, he personally made certain that 100 additional officers were there, which we put 75 inspectors, 25 agents, all of whom are working solely on the narcotics problem there.

I don't have the figures in front of me, but we have also now got aircraft and marine capability in New York which we did not have before. I would have to provide for the record the actual statistics on New York, because I don't have those with me. But we now do have three aircraft and 100 additional officers. I don't want to just imply it is just 100. There are 100 on top of the ones we had before, and our marine unit is up there as well.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Just a point of information. How many agents do you have nationwide in your agency?

Mr. VON RAAB. Approximately 1,200 agents.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. In the past 12 months, have there been any of your agents killed?

Mr. VON RAAB. We had a criminal investigator killed in Arizona. Officer Glenn Miles was killed by a drug smuggling group and that matter is still under investigation.

We had two criminal investigators shot up in Puerto Rico, just 4 weeks ago. Fortunately, they are both on the mend, although they were badly wounded. I think both of them took two rounds, one of which, amazingly enough, was shot in the head and fortunately it was at an angle that it didn't kill him, and it actually, I wouldn't call it a minor wound, you know, he was badly injured, but no long-term effects.

The life out there for a Customs agent and investigators is really getting rough.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. I guess as you increase the effort, the risk is greater that there will be that kind of physical violence in dealing with that from the point of view of the equipment that they wear.

Mr. VON RAAB. That is right. We have put out considerably greater numbers of weapons. We are issuing body armor. We are continually reminding our supervisors of their responsibilities to insure that the men and women working for them are properly armed and are properly handling situations.

What we are finding is that what the greatest risk to a Customs officer is the ambush. In other words, you are hot on the trail of a particular drug smuggling event, and about 2 miles before you get there, someone is waiting for you. So we are upgrading our training and directives in that area.

We are actually undertaking what we call survival training. It is not how to survive in the wilderness, but it is how to survive an effort in which you are about to hopefully apprehend a criminal.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Keep up the good work. I appreciate your testimony.

Mr. VON RAAB. Thank you.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Commissioner, with regard to your map, could you give us a briefing with regard to what the situation is right now in the Southwest?

Mr. VON RAAB. Although my eyes have made it so far in life, it might be helpful—you do a lot more reading than I do, so you may need a map to look at close up here.

I would ask Mr. Rosenblatt to explain these maps to you. These are xerox copies of the map.

Oh, I apologize. Mr. George Heavey, Director of our Office of Intelligence, will explain the maps. Mr. Heavey is important to this committee for two reasons. One, he is charge of our intelligence operations right now, but within a few weeks, he will be the Regional Commissioner in Miami. So, I am sure that your staff is well acquainted with him and I believe they get along very well, and we look forward to a long and profitable and effective association.

Mr. HEAVEY. There are two initiatives from the perspective of the Customs Service Office of Intelligence in Washington and also our southwest region. One was a national drug threat, and, concentrating on the United States-Mexico border, the other was aggressive tactical intelligence collection effort, covering a period of 45 days in the southwest region using all sources, customs officers, other Federal agencies, State and local, and other sources.

The border spreads really from San Ysidro all the way down to the Brownsville, TX area. Our national estimates show that approximately 4,550 pounds of heroin is coming into the country from Mexico which represents some 35 percent of the national threat.

Approximately 49,500 pounds of cocaine, or 30 percent of the national threat is coming in from Mexico, and approximately 6,600,000 pounds of marijuana, or 30 percent of the national threat.

During this 45-day period, using the sources that I mentioned, we detected about 760 confirmed land border penetrations. Now this is land vehicles and pedestrians associated with drug trafficking.

In addition—

Mr. ENGLISH. If I may interrupt to ask a question. I was curious about how many of those did you catch, of those people that you were talking about, those 760?

Mr. HEAVEY. I don't have those figures. We could provide them under separate cover.

Mr. VON RAAB. Not enough, I can assure you.

Mr. ENGLISH. We would like those. Any figures like that, where you have identified certain numbers, we would also like to know the number that represents.

[The information appears in Mr. von Raab's letter which follows his testimony. See p. 232.]

Mr. HEAVEY. Known or suspected and identified 132 stash houses, drug stash houses north and south of the border.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are the Mexicans doing anything about those stash houses that you are talking about?

Mr. VON RAAB. They are well protected.

Mr. ENGLISH. By their law enforcement?

Mr. VON RAAB. In many cases, yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Of the 132, how many are north and how many are south? Are they all south of the border?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. We will have to provide you with the breakdown.

[The information appears in Mr. von Raab's letter which follows his testimony. See p. 232.]

Mr. HEAVY. In the marine area, or the marine picture, over a period of 1 year, we had 35 seizures of vessels and also floating bale recoveries. Off the gulf coast there is a natural barrier, Padre Island, where there is an awful lot of vessel traffic outside of the Padre Island, mother ship level, and also we do have intelligence of smaller vessels—we also have some commercial fishing traffic we also suspect and know is involved in drug trafficking.

The air smuggling threat. Again, during the 45-day period, we had 81 confirmed air border penetrations. Now, these are confirmed as not having reported arrival, as illicit crossings, again, suspected with the usual air drug trafficking mode.

We identified in the southwest area, including the Customs Service Pacific region, a total of 472 clandestine air strips 100 miles north and south of the border. The breakdown of the 472 in our Pacific region, California, there were approximately 130, and covering the rest of the border, 342.

The eight floating bale recoveries that I mentioned could have been, again, associated with either marine or air drops. That is it.

Mr. VON RAAB. This is, to my knowledge, the first, certainly recent, I will say, compilation of these kinds of sort of rudimentary statistics on how many intrusions can we document, how many airstrips can we document. And this is one of the first steps in a very, very special effort on Customs' part to mount an assault on the problem in the southwest border, in addition to which we are putting additional Customs officers down there and they will be deployed down there within the next 3 to 6 months.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, this is certainly the best and most complete evaluation I have seen of the southwest border, and I certainly commend the Customs Service in their efforts to put it together. I think they did a fine job in that, and hopefully, this will underscore any of those who lack an appreciation and understanding of the serious threat that you are facing down there.

Mr. VON RAAB. I don't think there are many people left in that camp.

Mr. ENGLISH. There are some people down at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, and a few places like that, Commissioner, about whom I really have some question as to whether they have gotten an understanding. I hope that you will circulate this widely at OMB and a few other places that I can think of.

Mr. VON RAAB. I think you will find that that is not the case, and that there are efforts underway, particularly at the Department of Treasury, to pull together a large planning effort to address the southwest border in a broader context. Customs is addressing it in a specific sense. In other words, we are throwing every additional resource we can identify at it, and are using up manpower at a great rate to try to develop this intelligence.

We have a new Regional Commissioner down there. I assume your staff is quite familiar with William "Blue" Logan, and he has really hit the ground running, and I think you will see a lot of action coming out of there.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would also point out that you have very little in the way of resources facing this kind of threat down in that southwest border region.

Mr. VON RAAB. We have about 900 inspectors, approximately 450 investigators or agents, and we will be throwing just short of an additional 200 into that.

Mr. ENGLISH. If we get to dealing with the problem of air——

Mr. VON RAAB. That doesn't include the air.

Mr. ENGLISH. And that doesn't include the difficulties we are running into in the Texas area and the gulf with regard to sea drug smuggling. There is not much in the way of resources, if I remember correctly, down in those regions in those two areas. And if you look at that border, in many of those cases there is not even a barbed wire fence up there.

Mr. VON RAAB. There is no question the physical border itself there is no physical barrier for most of its length.

Mr. ENGLISH. In many cases what people have available to them down there, with the exception of a couple of airplanes, is basically they are looking through a pair of binoculars.

Mr. VON RAAB. The National Guard would be a big help in that.

Mr. ENGLISH. I think that is exactly the point, that we desperately need all the detection resources we can bring to bear on this problem. Certainly, we need to bring to bear any law enforcement officers we can, be they Federal, State, or local law enforcement officials. I think your testimony underscores the assistance that we could have and certainly enhancement of the overall drug interdiction program, if we do, in fact, work out a plan, with the National Guard playing a major role.

I think you are to be commended. We appreciate the briefing and the information that you brought to us.

Do you have any objection, Commissioner, to this information being included in our record?

Mr. VON RAAB. No, we have a rule in Customs, if it is on a piece of paper, it is usually going to make it, and we would just as soon be the first to give it to you, so we would be happy to have it appear in your record.

[The information is retained in subcommittee files.]

Mr. ENGLISH. I appreciate that, Commissioner.

I think that takes care of it. We appreciate your testimony today.

Mr. VON RAAB. Thank you.

[Mr. von Raab submitted the following letter with additional information:]

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

July 22, 1986

WASHINGTON, D.C.

INT-1-E:I:N RKJ

Dear Mr. Chairman:

May I take this opportunity to thank you and the other members of the Subcommittee for inviting me to appear and present testimony regarding the seriousness of the problems the U.S. Customs Service faces along the United States/Mexico border. Following are responses to questions raised at the hearing which required additional research.

In response to the first of your three questions, you asked how many arrests had occurred at the 760 land border crossing points identified on our briefing maps. The crossing points, identified at locations between ports of entry, were located by enforcement personnel in the routine performance of their duties and included reports of holes in fences, tire tracks in remote areas, and sightings of aliens crossing the border. The request for these crossing identities did not include arrest or seizure information. However, from April 1985 to April 1986, there were 47 drug-related arrests between the ports of entry. In addition to the arrests, 10,846 pounds of marijuana, 1.5 pounds of cocaine, 7 weapons, and \$35,414 U.S. currency were seized.

The second question dealt with how many of the 132 stash houses on our briefing maps are located in Mexico. There were 119 stash houses located in Mexico.


With your final question, you asked what was the total amount of cocaine seized by Federal agencies and how much had been seized by U.S. Customs? According to information obtained from the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Annual Statistical Report - FY 1985, DEA seized 17,613.1 kilograms of cocaine, which included Federal referrals of 1,353.4 kilograms. The U.S. Customs Service seized 22,857.5 kilograms of cocaine.

Congressman DioGuardi expressed his interest in the Mexican border problem and especially how it might impact on Customs personnel in New York. At this time, the U.S. Customs Service has no plans to move personnel from the New York Region to the southwest border.

Congressman DioGuardi asked to be provided with seizure information relative to New York, which is enclosed for review.

Thank you again for the candid dialogue and discussion regarding the important issues of Mexico and the southwest border.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William R. Glad". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent flourish at the end.

The Honorable
Glenn English, Chairman
Subcommittee on Government Information,
Justice and Agriculture
Government Operations Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Enclosure

NARCOTICS SEIZURES IN NEW YORK REGION *

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986**</u>
COCAINE	223 - # of szrs. 421,863.8 grms.	196 - # of szrs. 1,051,752.4 grms.	201 - # of szrs. 265,969.6 grms.	243 - # of szrs. 363,852.3 grms.	86 # of szrs. 890,386.6 grms.
HASHISH	122 - # of szrs. 676,565.4 grms.	131 - # of szrs. 455,629.6 grms.	112 - # of szrs. 41,818.8 grms.	120 - # of szrs. 7,483,741.3 grms.	21 - # of szrs. 14,446,526.8 grms.
HEROIN	59 - # of szrs. 139,902.8 grms.	99 - # of szrs. 118,201.3 grms.	165 - # of szrs. 174,250.0 grms.	209 - # of szrs. 136,538.3 grms.	61 - # of szrs. 85,824.5 grms.
LIQUID HASHISH	9 - # of szrs. 44,700.8 grms.	7 - # of szrs. 3,264.5 grms.	13 - # of szrs. 27,555.7 grms.	12 - # of szrs. 20,259.2 grms.	3 - # of szrs. 10,432.5 grms.
LSD	1 - # of szrs. 11.0 grms.	-----	-----	-----	-----
MOR- PHINE	-----	3 - # of szrs. 236.1 grms.	2 - # of szrs. 7.2 grms.	2 - # of szrs. 225.0 grms.	-----
MARI- JUANA	1,093 - # of szrs. 72,323,503.3 grms.	1,497 - # of szrs. 21,748,453.8 grms.	1,212 - # of szrs. 29,684,987.4 grms.	1,033 - # of szrs. 36,815,103.1 grms.	585 - # of szrs. 1,914,819.0 grms.
DANGER- OUS DRUGS	120 - # of szrs. 86,320.7 grms.	70 - # of szrs. 43,540.9 grms.	70 - # of szrs. 18,556,145.1 grms.	36 - # of szrs. 8,293.6 grms.	26 - # of szrs. 37,940.6 grms.
OPIUM	34 - # of szrs. 12,145.1 grms.	41 - # of szrs. 14,167.0 grms.	203 - # of szrs. 43,775.5 grms.	159 - # of szrs. 27,958.2 grms.	28 - # of szrs. 2,676.0 grms.

*Calendar Year

**As of 1 May 1986

Mr. ENGLISH. With that, we will recess subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

INITIATIVES IN DRUG INTERDICTION

(Part 2)

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE,
AND AGRICULTURE SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Glenn English (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Glenn English, John M. Spratt, Jr., Jim Lightfoot, Joseph J. DioGuardi, and John R. Miller.

Also present: Theodore J. Mehl, professional staff member; William G. Lawrence, counsel; Euphon L. Metzger, clerk; and John J. Parisi; minority professional staff, Committee on Government Operations.

Mr. ENGLISH. The hearing will come to order.

Those who have followed the hearings of this subcommittee over the past 5 years know that we have delved deeply into the drug interdiction programs of the Federal Government. We have convened 38 hearings during that time, issued two reports and met endlessly with officials in the interdiction agencies.

Our objective has not been to throw rocks but to identify programmatic deficiencies which have allowed endless tons of illegal narcotics to flow almost unimpeded into this Nation. Tomorrow the House of Representatives will consider the Omnibus Drug Enforcement Education and Control Act of 1986. This legislation will, for the first time, commit the United States to a true war on drugs.

Under its provisions we will, in about 2 years, finally have at least a minimum acceptable level of manpower and equipment which will confront air and sea smugglers. We will soon see whether drug interdiction can be made to work the way that we all want it to.

But those who ignore history are bound to repeat its failures and we cannot afford to do that, even with the vast sums of money that the Omnibus Act will authorize.

Today's hearing is very important. Fourteen months ago I requested the General Accounting Office to conduct a comprehensive review of the deficiencies in the current drug interdiction programs. While they are not yet ready to issue a formal report, they have consented to appear before us this morning and discuss their major findings.

This testimony will serve as a guide to us by again underlining the vulnerabilities of our present drug interdiction programs as we vote on new assets to be authorized for the programs of the future.

Our principal witness today is Mr. William J. Anderson, the GAO's Assistant Comptroller General for General Government Programs. He is accompanied by senior group director, John Viallet, and project manager, Charles Chappell.

Bill Anderson has been involved for many years in major GAO investigations of the drug programs, and has been before us on several occasions in the past.

Gentlemen, we want to welcome you here today.

The Drug Enforcement Administration tells us that 62 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States arrives by private aircraft. Last year the U.S. Customs Service's Air interdiction program, which is the only Federal interdiction program primarily aimed at air drug smugglers, spent \$70 million. These funds were authorized and appropriated over the objections of the administration which at the same time claims that last year it allocated some \$1.8 billion toward the drug law enforcement.

This morning I would like to review the drug interdiction effectiveness of our Government by region, with you commenting on our vulnerabilities based on your current study.

I would like to recognize now, Mr. Miller, for any comments he would like to make.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is very timely that we are having this hearing this morning. I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your work over the last several years in focusing on drug interdiction. This subcommittee has held numerous hearings and the hearings are getting a little more attention than maybe some of them in the past. But I think it is also appropriate that we hear from the General Accounting Office on their study because we are going to be considering some very big measures tomorrow and I think it is important that we get the best understanding possible of what has been going on, how efficient, how effective we have been as we consider broader measures.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller.

I would wholeheartedly agree with the comments you made. I think that none of us who has been familiar with this problem and certainly those of us who have been involved as have members of this subcommittee for years, want to find ourselves simply throwing money at a problem, and leading the American people to believe that that solves it.

We have to target these resources. They have to be targeted very carefully. There are some gaping gaps and I think that that will become very plain to the public today. If we use those resources carefully, if they are targeted, I think in fact we can have a tremendous impact on the amount of drugs flowing into this country, and therefore the amount of drug usage taking place in this country as well.

I think it is particularly appropriate for the GAO, which is noted for its careful scrutiny of programs and needs and particularly the spending of money, and this subcommittee of the Government Op-

erations Committee which has as its responsibility making sure that the taxpayer's dollar is well spent, to be examining what will be addressed by this major package tomorrow.

So Mr. Anderson, with that we will let you begin.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. ANDERSON, ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN VIALET, SENIOR GROUP DIRECTOR, AND CHARLES CHAPPELL, SENIOR EVALUATOR

Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; good morning, Mr. Miller. Mr. Vialet and Mr. Chappell will be supporting me in our testimony.

I would like to start off and with your permission have the full statement inserted in the record, and I will summarize some of the high spots this morning.

Mr. ENGLISH. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. ANDERSON. The bottom line of everything we are going to say quite simply is we are spending millions and millions of dollars on interdiction but have left, and you used the word, so many gaps that the availability of drugs seems scarcely affected.

Federal interdiction efforts that we talk about in our testimony are those directed largely against smuggling on private and commercial vessels and on privately owned planes. It would seem that most attempts to smuggle in cocaine and marijuana are between the ports of entry; heroin seems to come primarily through ports. The great unknown is the smuggler's use of the commercial cargo cover, the thin thin Customs coverage there, something that we have also reported on in another context.

Seizures are high. Cocaine seizures quadrupled between fiscal years 1982 and 1985 from 5.2 metric tons to 22.9 metric tons. Heroin seizures tripled over the same period from 130 kilos to 360 kilos. Only marijuana seizures were down in fiscal year 1985, perhaps reflecting the success of Projects Hat Trick and Wagon Wheel in late 1984—I don't know, it seems like a reasonable cause-effect relationship.

But availability has been seemingly unaffected. Supply continues to be more than adequate to meet an increasing demand for cocaine. Consumption was estimated at 33 to 60 metric tons in 1981 up to 55 to 76 metric tons in 1984 and Customs estimates that almost twice that much, 125 metric tons, will be smuggled in in 1986.

Cocaine, needless to say, is the drug that represents a real and growing threat to American society. Heroin usage seems to more or less have stabilized at the 500,000 addict number that I know you have heard, Mr. Chairman, whereas cocaine seems to be still increasing in popularity and we are not being too successful in our current fight against it.

Our full statement contains an assessment of the interdiction effort across the country and I will start out with the Southeast. Our strongest effort is there but gaps still remain in the barrier despite all the resources that have been put in place. Customs still expect that in 1986, 73 percent of the cocaine and 45 percent of the

marijuana will come through the Southeast. This is where we have mounted our most effective interdiction effort, but it doesn't seem to have scared the smugglers off much at all.

The Customs forces in place in south Florida to counter smuggling by air include a radar surveillance system for detecting suspect aircraft, jet interceptors, tracking aircraft and helicopters for deploying interdicting teams. There are, however, not sufficient resources for Customs to operate around-the-clock 7 days a week. Customs Miami Air Branch operates two shifts, 5 days a week, when personnel are available to monitor radar and when pilots are on alert to launch against a suspected smuggling intrusion.

This leaves long periods of time when smugglers can enter the United States by air through south Florida without being challenged. In addition, the radar systems in south Florida are not always operational at the same time interceptors and tracking aircraft are available to act, thereby increasing the windows of opportunity for drug smugglers. For example, the Customs aerostat in the Bahamas, which has been the most productive south Florida radar for suspect detection, was not in operation 49 percent of the time when the Miami Air Branch was operational in the period February 1985 to March 1986. It was not in operation because of routine maintenance, weather conditions, mechanical problems, and because the aerostat is a contractor-operated facility which is not operated around-the-clock.

With respect to marine smuggling in the Southeast, Coast Guard marine patrols monitor vessel movements between South America and the United States. Marine traffic to the east coast naturally flows through a limited number of chokepoints between islands in the Caribbean; this provides a means of detecting and seizing bulk loads of marijuana traveling through these Caribbean chokepoints.

One of the points we made to you in our last testimony here, Mr. Chairman, was that most of our success in the Southeast region has been in interdicting marijuana. Of the drugs that we are concerned about, and given the fact that all drugs are bad, marijuana provides us with the least amount of concern.

Customs and Coast Guard attempt to interdict shipments of drugs through routine patrols and special interdiction operations but their methods are often unsuccessful because of the smuggler's ability to change their routes and methods and the limited resources available to the interdicting agencies.

In April 1986 the Customs-sponsored Blue Lightning Operations Center began operations in Miami. The Center initially cost \$2.2 million, and has an operating budget for fiscal year 1986 of another \$2.2 million. The Center is intended to identify suspected smuggling vessels through a continuous centralized radar watch over marine traffic into the south Florida area.

It brings together an extensive detection net consisting of the Cudjoe Key radar balloon and five other radars located on rooftops. If suspected smugglers are detected, the Center can direct law enforcement vessels to their location and interdict them. It sounds good as far as it goes, but as we point out in the full statement, because of the options that the smuggler has in routes and methods, the value of the Center very well may be limited to deterring

the smugglers from using their traditional patterns rather than in identifying suspect smugglers.

Traditional marine smuggling methods have been detected by radar; for example, the smugglers' use of fast boats, usually at night, to ferry drugs from offshore air drops or from storage areas in the Bahamas or from mother ships offshore. If the smugglers use secret boat compartments and/or blend in with legitimate marine traffic or if they use fiberglass boats that don't provide distinctive radar images, the Center's effectiveness will be reduced.

Another recent Customs initiative, marine modules, provides detection, sorting, tracking, interception and apprehension capability for marine interdiction. I should say it is supposed to provide those things. A module consists of one 50- to 60-foot boat equipped with radar assisted by two or more 30- to 40-foot interceptor or chase boats. The modules are intended to identify and intercept suspect vessels at night. Routine patrols were not effective against night smuggling because the smuggling vessels operated without lights and with fast boats which could flee Customs' slower patrol boats.

We visited Customs marine stations at Key West, Miami, Houma, LA, Galveston, TX, and San Diego where marine modules had been assigned.

We found they often were not in service because of the need for maintenance and repairs and lack of operating personnel. For example, Houma, LA, was provided with a radar-equipped boat in January 1985. Out of 220 scheduled operational days in 1985, the boat was inoperable for 162 days; 67 for repairs and 95 for the lack of operating personnel. This meant that out of 365 days in 1985, the boat was operable for 58 days, or not much more than 15 percent of the time.

At Galveston, TX, Customs took delivery of a radar boat from a factory in North Carolina in November 1985. However, because of mechanical problems, the trip to Galveston required 6 weeks. At the time of our visit in May 1986, the resident agent-in-charge said that the marine module concept had not yet been employed as it was intended because of maintenance problems.

Records show the two support interceptor boats were inoperable there 84 and 100 percent of the time in the period April 1985 through December 1985.

For the most part, the Coast Guard relies on patrol and utility boats for making seizures in coastal waters. The Coast Guard has 76 patrol boats which range in length from 82 to 110 feet. The boats are old and inoperable a high percentage of the time because of maintenance problems.

In the Coast Guard Seventh District, which includes south Florida, there are 15 patrol boats which on average were removed from active service for maintenance 45 percent of the time. The Coast Guard has 330 utility boats of which 34 are stationed in the seventh district. The patrol and utility boats are slower than the smugglers' small boats. These patrol and utility boats, it should be recognized, have been augmented by 3 surface effect boats, and 10 new high-speed patrol boats delivered in the last few months.

Let me turn to the Southwest briefly. There is general agreement among the drug law enforcement officials we interviewed that the southwest border has reemerged as a prime entry point

for illegal drugs either produced in Mexico or transshipped from Colombia through Mexico. Customs expects that 11 percent of the cocaine and 25 percent of the marijuana smuggled into the United States in 1986 will enter across the land border with Mexico in the Southwestern United States.

Interdiction resources are spread more thinly along this border than in south Florida. In particular, the southwestern land border lacks the intensive radar coverage found in south Florida and the maritime and aviation chokepoints off the coast of south Florida which allow interdiction forces to concentrate their resources on a relatively limited geographic area.

In August 1986 the Vice President and the Attorney General announced a new program, Operation Alliance, aimed at choking off the flow of drugs and other contraband being smuggled across the southern border. Let me describe briefly what Operation Alliance would do and then speak a little bit to what is already there at the border.

Operation Alliance would add 350 Customs agents to the 1,200 currently on duty there. It would reassign 28 FBI agents, 100 DEA agents, 100 IRS agents to the border. It would provide authority to 1,000 members of the INS Border Patrol to conduct customs searches. It would add 60 Federal prosecutors along the border.

In the way of equipment, it would provide five aerostat radar balloons which are supposed to be able to cover the entire border. It would provide for four E2-C radar planes, but I understand that the P-3's that are currently being used would be traded in connection with that acquisition.

It would provide for two C-130's outfitted as radar platforms and six helicopters. Along the southwest border currently the principal aircraft available for interdiction include two P-3's, two of the four I mentioned, two Citation-II's, two King Air 200's, one King Air E-90, three Cobra helicopters, and three Black Hawk helicopters.

Let me speak a little bit to the vulnerabilities that we describe in our report. One of the points we make is that we are thinly equipped and staffed along the border, and that the limited resources we do have deployed can easily be defeated. One thing we have found is the smugglers are sophisticated and learn from their mistakes. For example, a smuggler can identify when people are working at the radar watch sites, since watch personnel are normally not working around the clock. If you are a smuggler, that is when you try to cross the border. You can also check interdiction readiness, just by looking to see whether the aircraft are there and whether you have pilots around or whether the ships are ready to hit the water or whether Coast Guard cutters are on station. I might mention that the Dallas Morning News in June of last year did a big favor to a lot of drug smugglers in providing a map showing gaps in radar coverage along the southwest border. One Customs official told us that some smugglers took advantage of this information.

I would like to turn now to another subject, tactical intelligence, which we cover in our full statement. There is no doubt that some intelligence is being used. I think also that there is room for considerably more effective acquisition and use of interdiction intelligence.

But an analysis that DEA prepared, and that was presented to you, Mr. Chairman, by Deputy Attorney General Jensen last year, DEA indicated that there was prior information on about half the cocaine seizures of 100-plus kilos. They indicated that they had prior intelligence on about 42 percent of the cocaine seizures between 10 and 100 kilos.

In any event, the fact remains that I know a lot of observers of this scene believe that we are falling short in obtaining the amount of intelligence that we need and that we could obtain were the effort properly focused.

When we testified before you last year, we told you that we were informed by at least one NNBS location—the one in Miami—that they were beginning to get a greater amount of tactical intelligence from the intelligence community. You may remember that at that time, sir, we had a specially cleared GAO person, we ourselves have top secret and that is not high enough to get some of this data, look at it and they confirmed that it seemed to be true that there in fact had been an upswing in some of the intelligence coming from that direction. I have no idea how much.

I note that Customs is now going to have some of its own officers overseas at DEA offices in Bogota, Caracas, and Mexico City, presumably to try to develop a little more useful interdiction intelligence.

Let me kind of draw a conclusion now or maybe a lack of a conclusion. I was struck by some things that Assistant Secretary Darman said to you when he testified before this committee earlier this year. I will just quote. "Given severe fiscal constraints and considerable uncertainty as to optimal resource allocation strategies for addressing the drug problem, we have decided essentially to stabilize the investment in Customs drug interdiction, increasing the current deterrent capacity only marginally, while continuing to examine competing alternatives for incremental investment."

I would gather that the increase in assets and other resources associated with Operation Alliance by this definition might have been another increment that the administration proposes to add.

What I don't sense, what I don't know, and I won't say it doesn't exist, is whether there is any kind of a master plan that says—this is what we need, this is the radar, this is the detection capacity we need along the southwest border and elsewhere, this is the chase capacity and tracking capacity that we need in connection with those detection assets.

Let me stop there, Mr. Chairman, and we will try to answer any questions you or other members of the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Anderson follows.]

United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
EXPECTED AT 10:00 a.m., EST
September 9, 1986

STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION, JUSTICE, AND AGRICULTURE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS

extensive interdiction efforts have been geographically concentrated along the coast of South Florida and in the air and water space which separates South Florida from the Caribbean Islands and Latin America.

- Federal interdiction efforts have resulted in the seizure of substantial amounts of illegal drugs in the last 5 years. Cocaine seizures have increased; marijuana seizures have declined; and heroin seizures have increased. Nevertheless, the amounts of illegal drugs captured by federal interdiction efforts are believed to be small compared to the amounts of drugs successfully smuggled into the United States. Consequently, smuggled drugs remain widely available within the United States.
- The drug smuggling threat is dynamic. Drug smugglers respond to changes in the demand for illegal drugs by the U.S. domestic market.
- The federal drug interdiction system is vulnerable to smugglers. Drug smugglers are adept at changing their routes so as to penetrate the U.S. border at its weakest and least defended points. The locations, capabilities, readiness, and operational security of federal interdiction resources and activities present weak points which drug smugglers successfully exploit. At your request, I will discuss the vulnerabilities and weak points in more detail in this statement.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of the review of federal drug interdiction efforts that we are conducting for the Subcommittee. As you requested in your letter of September 1, 1986, my remarks today will summarize our preliminary observations regarding key drug interdiction issues. We will provide the Subcommittee with a report on the results of our work later this year.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by briefly listing our observations, and then discussing them in more detail. Most importantly, we observed that:

--Federal interdiction efforts in recent years have focused primarily on catching drug smugglers who use privately owned aircraft and private and commercial marine vessels as conveyances. Many but not all of these smugglers attempt to smuggle drugs across the U.S. border between ports of entry rather than through U.S. ports. Movements of illegal drugs through U.S. ports of entry via passengers and cargo shipments have also been the object of federal interdiction efforts as part of the normal Customs' inspection process. (We have recently reviewed Customs' cargo processing at the request of Senator D'Amato and the report should be released shortly.) Until recently, movement of illegal drugs by land across the U.S. border between ports of entry has received little emphasis as an interdiction target. The most

We also observed two other issues relating to the federal drug interdiction efforts which we will discuss in more detail later: (1) the role of the military in supporting civilian interdiction agencies, and (2) the limited availability of tactical intelligence (who?, what?, when?, where?, and how?) regarding drug smuggling operations which interdiction agencies can use to target smugglers.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

During our review, we interviewed officials and examined records at headquarters and field locations of the two main federal interdiction agencies (Customs and Coast Guard). We also interviewed and obtained information from officials and representatives of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the military services, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board. The emphasis of our work was on observing the interdiction process firsthand. We observed some of the activities and resources of the civilian and military personnel and units who are responsible for detecting smuggling intrusions by air, sea, and over land; seizing illegal drugs and smuggling equipment; and arresting drug smugglers. Our focus was primarily on efforts to interdict smuggling by private aircraft and boats because these efforts involve most of the federal interdiction activities that occur separately from the Customs Service inspection process at U.S. ports of entry. (As mentioned previously, we have just concluded a review of the

inspection process.) We therefore concentrated our fieldwork on the border areas where most cocaine and marijuana smuggling is believed to occur: along the Southeastern border and off the coast of Florida; in the Gulf of Mexico; along the land border with Mexico; and along the Pacific Coast. Our field work was conducted from November 1985 to July 1986.

FOCUS OF FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS

Federal drug interdiction efforts fall into two broad categories: (1) interdicting drug smugglers in international waters and smugglers who try to avoid the normal U.S. Customs inspection process by smuggling drugs across the U.S. border between ports of entry; and (2) interdicting drug smugglers who try to smuggle drugs through ports of entry and to evade the Customs inspection process by hiding or disguising the illegal drugs.

The first category of interdiction is performed primarily by air and marine units of the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard marine units. These agencies' efforts are augmented by operational and intelligence assistance from other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies--especially the Drug Enforcement Administration--and by air and marine surveillance missions conducted by the military services, and from the national intelligence community. The focus of the interdiction efforts is almost totally on drug smuggling by aircraft and marine vessels. Until recently, very little attention was devoted to smuggling across land borders by motor vehicles or on foot.

Resources applied to interdictions by the Coast Guard and Customs account for most of the federal spending on border interdiction. It was budgeted for about \$522 million in fiscal year 1986. This total includes \$398 million for Coast Guard drug interdiction activities, \$90.4 million for Customs air programs, and \$33.8 million for Customs marine programs.

The second type of interdiction is performed primarily by the U.S. Customs Service. Most of these interdictions occur during the course of Customs' normal inspections of passengers and cargo passing through ports of entry. Customs also has established special Contraband Enforcement Teams whose primary function is to find illegal drugs being smuggled in cargo shipments. Most heroin seizures are made through port of entry interdictions. As with the first type of interdiction, Customs receives operational and intelligence assistance from other federal, state, and local government agencies. Customs expects to spend about \$255.9 million in fiscal year 1986 on other interdiction activities, mostly at ports of entry.

I will devote my remarks today to the first category-- between port interdiction.

Since 1982, interdiction efforts have been geographically concentrated along the South Florida Coast and in the air and sea areas which separate South Florida from the cocaine and marijuana exporting countries in the Caribbean and in Latin America. These interdictions are carried out by the Coast Guard's Seventh District and the Customs Service's Southeast Region, both of which are headquartered in Miami, Florida; and

by the Miami Customs Air Branch. Coast Guard marine units perform multiple missions in addition to drug interdiction, such as search and rescue missions, and environmental and fisheries protection. As of November 14, 1985, the Coast Guard's Seventh District had 28 of the Coast Guard's 122 cutters.

As of February 1986, Customs' Southeast Region was assigned 103 of the 173 marine vessels operated by the Customs Marine Program, and the two Customs air branches in the region (Miami and Jacksonville) were assigned 26 of the air program's 80 aircraft. South Florida is the only geographic area in the country with an extensive radar surveillance system to identify drug smugglers using low-flying airplanes. The Southeast area has also been the location of the largest multi-agency special drug interdiction operations in recent years such as Operations HAT TRICK I and II and Operation BLUE LIGHTNING.

RESULTS

Drug interdiction efforts have resulted in the seizure of substantial amounts of drugs in recent years, but the amounts of drugs seized are relatively small compared to the amounts successfully smuggled into the United States. According to available data, the supply of the three principal smuggled drugs--cocaine, heroin, and marijuana--as measured by the price and purity of drugs sold to consumers has remained high throughout the 1980s. The following table shows the total amounts of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana seized in fiscal year

1985 compared with Customs' fiscal year 1985 and 1986 estimates of the amounts destined for the U.S.

	<u>Seized in FY 1985</u> (Metric Tons)	<u>Customs' estimate of illegal drugs destined for the U.S.</u>	
		<u>1985</u> (Metric Tons)	<u>1986</u> (Metric Tons)
Cocaine	22.90	58.0 ^a	124.6
Heroin	.36	4.5	5.9
Marijuana	1093.60	13,880.0	9,979.0

^aCustoms' officials told us that this estimate was grossly understated as reflected in the 1986 estimate.

Cocaine and heroin seizures have increased significantly in recent years, while marijuana seizures have declined:

	<u>Seizures</u> (Metric Tons)			
	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>
Cocaine	5.20	8.90	12.5	22.90
Heroin	.13	.27	.3	.36
Marijuana	1795.70	1239.70	1485.5	1093.60

Most marijuana and cocaine seizures took place in the Southeast and in international waters adjacent to the Florida Coast. Most heroin seizures took place at three or four international airports outside the Southeast.

	<u>Seizures FY 1985</u>	
	<u>Southeast^a</u>	<u>Rest of U.S.</u>
Cocaine	85.0%	15.0%
Heroin	3.2%	97.8%
Marijuana	71.0%	29.0%

^aCustoms' Southeast Region and Coast Guard Seventh District.

I would like to note that these statistics on seizures were drawn from Customs' computerized law enforcement reporting system. We have not audited the accuracy of this system.

DRUG SMUGGLING THREAT

The drug smuggling threat is dynamic. Smugglers have historically displayed an ability to respond to changes in the U.S. market for illegal drugs, adapt to change in drug interdiction strategy and tactics, and exploit weaknesses in the interdiction system. For example, the use of cocaine has increased dramatically in recent years. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, an interagency group of federal agencies concerned with drug abuse and drug law enforcement, estimates that consumption of cocaine increased from 33-60 metric tons in 1981 to 55-76 metric tons in 1984. Customs officials told us that they estimate about 125 metric tons will be smuggled into the U.S. in 1986, based on the amount seized in 1985 and the lack of effect that seizures had on the price and purity of cocaine sold to consumers. Thus, the market for cocaine has tripled over a five year period--and drug smugglers have responded by supplying that market with a supply so large that prices in some major metropolitan areas have actually decreased while purity has remained steady.

In a similar fashion, drug smugglers have changed their methods and tactics to respond to changes in drug law enforcement strategy and tactics. For example, until the 1970s, Mexican growers and traffickers supplied nearly all of the marijuana consumed in the U.S., smuggling the marijuana in

across the Southwest border by car or truck. The Mexican monopoly ended in 1975 when Mexico and the U.S. began a joint venture to interdict and eradicate marijuana. By 1981, the Mexican share of the marijuana market in the U.S. had dropped to 4 percent. Colombian criminal groups filled the vacuum using marine vessels and large four-engine aircraft capable of transporting large amounts of marijuana. By 1982, Colombia provided 57 percent of the marijuana available in the U.S., and Jamaica provided 16 percent, while Mexico's share remained low at 6 percent. The marijuana from these new sources of supply was brought in by marine vessels and aircraft via the most direct route to the closest U.S. border--(Southeast U.S.) and in quantities which overwhelmed the interdiction forces in place.

The South Florida area has been the geographic focus of federal drug interdiction efforts since the early 1980s. In 1982 President Reagan established the South Florida Task Force, an interagency anti-crime group headed by the Vice-President and focused primarily on drug law enforcement. Drug law enforcement efforts in South Florida were augmented with additional law enforcement personnel and equipment, and the interdiction of smuggled drugs into South Florida became a priority objective of the federal government and the South Florida Task Force.

Substantial amounts of illegal drugs have been and continue to be interdicted in South Florida and the adjacent coastal and Caribbean waters and air space. Nevertheless, drug smugglers

continue to smuggle drugs into South Florida in large quantities, taking advantage of weaknesses in the existing interdiction system. In addition, there are indications that drug smugglers are shifting their smuggling routes to other parts of the country where the interdiction system is more vulnerable.

Customs officials told us that they estimate that 73 percent of smuggled cocaine and 45 percent of smuggled marijuana will enter the U.S. through Customs' Southeast Region in 1986. The continued preference for smuggling across the South Florida border reflects the economic advantages of taking the shortest route to the United States from the supplying countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Islands. It also reflects the ability of drug smugglers to penetrate the interdiction system around South Florida, despite the relative strength of this system compared to other areas of the country.

Finally, although large amounts of drugs are being smuggled into South Florida, drug smugglers are also transporting drugs across to more vulnerable parts of the 96,000 mile U.S. land border and coastline. There is general agreement among the drug law enforcement officials we interviewed that the Southwest border has reemerged as a prime entry point for illegal drugs either produced or transshipped from Colombia through Mexico. Customs expects that 11 percent of the cocaine and 25 percent of the marijuana smuggled into the U.S. during 1986 will enter across the land border with Mexico in the Southwestern United

States. Interdiction resources are spread more thinly along this border than in South Florida. In particular, the Southwestern land border lacks the intensive radar coverage found in South Florida and the maritime and aviation chokepoints off the coast of South Florida which allow interdiction forces to concentrate their resources on a relatively limited geographic area. In August 1986, the Vice President and the Attorney General announced a new program, Operation Alliance, aimed at choking off the flow of drugs and other contraband being smuggled across the Southern border.

VULNERABILITIES OF DRUG

INTERDICTION EFFORTS

I would now like to discuss the vulnerabilities of the federal drug interdiction forces that we observed. Drug smugglers can and do change their smuggling methods and routes in response to changes in strategy and tactics by the government.

Smuggling by air

The Customs' forces in place in South Florida to counter smuggling by air include a radar surveillance system for detecting suspect aircraft, jet interceptors, tracking aircraft, and helicopters for deploying interdiction teams. There are not sufficient resources, however, for Customs to operate around-the-clock, 7 days-a-week. Customs' Miami Air Branch operates two shifts, 5 days a week, when personnel are available to monitor radar and when pilots are on alert to launch against

a suspected smuggling intrusion. This leaves long periods of time when smugglers can enter the U.S. by air through South Florida without being challenged.

In addition, the radar systems in South Florida are not always operational at the same time interceptors and tracking aircraft are available to act, thereby increasing the windows of opportunity for drug smugglers. For example, the Customs' aerostat (a balloon which carries a radar system) in the Bahamas, which has been the most productive South Florida radar for suspect detection, was inoperable 49 percent of the time when the Miami air branch was operational during the period February 1985 to March 1986. It was inoperable because of routine maintenance, weather conditions, mechanical problems, and staffing constraints.

Despite these shortcomings, there are indications that Customs has been successful in keeping some smugglers from flying their illegal drugs directly into South Florida, and thus depriving them of their preferred mode of operation. In April 1986, we observed that the Miami Air Branch identified 18 private aircraft flights on radar which appeared to be suspect. None of the 18 were confirmed as smuggling intrusions into South Florida. The only seizure that the branch was involved in during April involved an aircraft flying with nearly all lights out which was spotted by a Customs' aircraft on routine patrol. The suspect plane was tracked to a public airport in Pompano Beach,

near Miami, where a search showed the plane to be carrying 500 pounds of marijuana.

Outside South Florida, Customs' anti-air smuggling efforts lack the extensive detection capabilities found in South Florida, and the U.S. border is particularly vulnerable to drug smuggling by aircraft. Customs officials told us that, because there is little radar coverage to detect low-flying aircraft outside South Florida, many smugglers who once preferred to fly into South Florida now fly across other parts of the Southern border, from Florida to California.

Outside the South Florida area, Customs operates four airborne radar platforms--converted Navy aircraft equipped with radars designed for use in military fighter planes. In the first 10 months of fiscal year 1986 the four aircraft flew a total of 1,723 hours--ranging from 71 hours in December 1985 to 275 hours in June 1986. Because of their limited flying time and the limited surveillance capabilities of their radar equipment, these planes provide radar coverage for relatively small portions of the U.S. border, and for limited periods of time each month. Additional radar coverage is provided by Navy and Air Force surveillance aircraft. The ability of some of these radar systems to detect low flying aircraft over land is limited because of interference with radar signals resulting from ground terrain features such as hills. Thus, outside South Florida, Customs officials told us they used other methods of identifying

air smuggling attempts, such as the use of confidential informants and the use of covert transponders on suspect aircraft to monitor their movements.

Meanwhile the interceptors, trackers, and other aircraft do not get much use in capturing smugglers. For example, Customs' Tucson Air Branch was involved in 14 seizures in 1985, even though Customs officials believe a much larger number of air smuggling operations occurred during that time in the Tucson Air Branch's area of responsibility. One particular problem in attempting to capture smugglers from Mexico is that there is no international airspace between the Mexican-U.S. border to allow the lead time needed after detection of a target to successfully launch intercept and tracking aircraft. Customs has reported many instances where suspected smugglers across the Southwest border were detected by radar and the suspect simply returned to Mexican air space.

Marine smuggling

Coast Guard marine patrols monitor marine vessel movements between South America and the U.S. Because marine traffic on the East Coast naturally flows through a limited number of "chokepoints" between islands in the Caribbean, this provides a means of detecting and seizing bulk loads of marijuana traveling through the Caribbean chokepoints. The U.S. continues to be vulnerable, however, to marine smuggling of cocaine and to smugglers who travel through the Caribbean chokepoints when the Coast Guard is not on station or who use other routes on the

Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Customs and the Coast Guard attempt to interdict such shipments through routine patrols and special interdiction operations but their methods are often unsuccessful because of the smugglers' ability to change their routes and methods, and the limited resources available to the interdicting agencies.

In April 1986, the Customs' sponsored Blue Lightning Operations Center began operations in Miami. The Center initially cost \$2.2 million and has an annual operating cost for fiscal year 1986 of another \$2.2 million. The Center is intended to identify suspected smuggling vessels through a continuous centralized radar watch over marine traffic into the South Florida area. It brings together an extensive detection net, consisting of the Cudjoe Key radar balloon, and five other radars located on rooftops. If suspected smugglers are detected, the Center can direct law enforcement vessels to their location to interdict them.

However, because of the options the smuggler has in routes and methods, the value of the Center may be limited to deterring the smugglers from using their traditional smuggling patterns rather than identifying suspect smugglers. Traditional marine smuggling methods have been detectable by radar--e.g., the use of fast boats, usually at night, to ferry drugs from offshore airdrops, or from storage areas in the Bahamas, or from motherships anchored off shore. If the smugglers use secret boat compartments and/or blend in with legitimate marine traffic or if

they use fiberglass boats which do not provide a distinctive radar image, the Center's effectiveness will be reduced.

Another recent Customs initiative--marine modules--provides detection, sorting, tracking, interception, and apprehension capability for marine interdiction. The modules consist of one 50 to 60 foot boat equipped with radar, and two 30 to 40 foot high-speed interceptor boats. The modules are intended to identify and intercept suspect vessels at night. Routine patrols were not effective against night smuggling because the smuggling vessels operated without lights and with fast boats which could flee Customs' slower patrol boats.

We visited Customs' marine stations at Key West, Florida; Miami, Florida; Houma, Louisiana; Galveston, Texas; and San Diego, California, where marine modules had been assigned. We found that the modules were often not in service because of the need for maintenance and repairs and lack of operating personnel. For example, Houma, Louisiana, was provided with a radar-equipped boat in January 1985. Out of 220 scheduled operational days in 1985, the boat was inoperable for 162 days--67 for repairs and 95 for lack of operating personnel.

At Galveston, Customs took delivery of a radar-equipped boat from a factory in North Carolina on November 1, 1985; however, because of extensive mechanical problems, the trip to Galveston required six weeks. At the time of our visit in May 1986, the resident agent-in-charge said that the marine module concept had not yet been employed as it was intended because of maintenance

problems. Records showed that the two interceptor boats were inoperable 84 and 100 percent in the period April 1985 through December 1985.

For the most part, the Coast Guard relies on patrol and utility boats for making seizures in coastal waters. There are 76 patrol boats which range in length from 82 to 110 feet. The patrol boats are old, and are inoperable a high percentage of time because of maintenance problems. In the Coast Guard Seventh District, which includes South Florida, there are 15 such patrol boats which on average were removed from active service for maintenance 45 percent of the time. The Coast Guard has 330 utility boats of which 34 are stationed in its seventh district. The patrol and utility boats are slower than the smugglers' small boats. These patrol and utility boats have been augmented by 3 high speed surface effect boats and 10 high speed patrol boats (delivered in the last few months).

Another Coast Guard vulnerability is its need to give first priority to protecting against loss of life and property in marine distress incidents. The extent to which smugglers have used fake distress signals to lure Coast Guard boats away from smuggling intrusions is unknown but drug law enforcement officials believe this practice is common.

The Eleventh Coast Guard District, in Long Beach, California, has one medium endurance cutter which is used principally for drug interdiction purposes together with smaller patrol boats and helicopters. It has been used as a detection

station off the coast of Mexico, San Diego, and Santa Barbara with engines shut down, while smaller boats and helicopters patrol the coastal area and respond to detections. In calendar year 1985, the cutter devoted 117 days to interdiction. Thus, marine smugglers had ample opportunity to cross the U.S. border on the Pacific Coast.

Smuggling by land

Until the establishment of Operation Alliance, the Customs Service did not have a program for interdicting drugs crossing the U.S. borders by land between ports of entry. Federal law enforcement presence between ports of entry consisted of members of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Border Patrol, who have limited search authority and whose principal responsibility is to apprehend illegal aliens crossing the border. Operation Alliance is intended to expand interdiction forces along the Southern U.S. land border.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY AFFECTS

INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES

Because the key surveillance assets--principally radars used to identify smuggling attempts and the equipment used to respond when they are identified--are few in number and are not operational at all times, smugglers can use information on when the assets are operating to avoid detection. The lack of secure communications on air and marine interdiction missions enables smugglers to identify the positions, objectives, and operational status of law enforcement aircraft, vessels, and radar.

equipment. With this information, smugglers can avoid detection and pursuit. In its assessment of Customs' Air Program in September 1983, a "Blue Ribbon Panel", consisting of contract experts and funded by Customs, commented that security within the Customs Air Program was notable by its absence. Although we found that some actions have been and are being taken to provide greater operational security, we believe the panel's comments continue to apply to the Customs' Air Program, and to the Customs and Coast Guard marine interdiction programs as well.

There were no consistent security standards within the law enforcement agencies for protecting information which might be used by smugglers to neutralize interdiction operations. The interdiction agencies are faced with the need to obtain and use such information from a wide variety of sources in their efforts to identify smuggling intrusions. They are also faced with the need, in many cases, to widely share that information, both within and outside of their agencies, in coordinating interdiction operations.

The extent to which smuggling organizations gather information to reduce their risks is not known, and is only suggested by the known cases where such attempts have been discovered. However, the following examples illustrate how relatively low-level espionage can negate the effectiveness of interdiction assets.

--Knowledge of the duty hours of Customs' radar watch personnel, who monitor the extensive network of radars beamed at smuggling traffic by air into South Florida,

allows smugglers to choose the time to leave with their loads to minimize their risk of detection. This information can be obtained by observing the arrival and departure of Customs' watch personnel at their work site, or by obtaining a copy of the watch work schedules--which carry no security classification.

--Knowledge of when Customs' jet interceptors are in operation or in maintenance is obtainable from visual observations and from maintenance records. Some plans for special interdiction operations carry no security classification. Such information could allow the smuggler to pick a point of border penetration where, even if detected by radar, the smuggler could pass through the radar net and be unobservable by radar surveillance before interception efforts could get underway.

--Knowledge of when the Coast Guard cutters are on station in the chokepoints, which can be monitored by use of air patrols, could allow smugglers to choose the time and the particular marine passage they will use to evade detection.

--Knowledge of the meager radar surveillance capabilities to spot low-flying aircraft along most of the U.S. borders, outside South Florida, can be used to plan points of border entrance with minimal risk of detection. The vulnerabilities of the detection system along parts of the Southwest border were published in a metropolitan

newspaper, which graphically showed the elevations between geographical points at which radar surveillance did not exist. This information was based on a federal study of surveillance coverage. The Customs Air Branch Chief at El Paso believed smuggling traffic increased substantially in a corridor within his jurisdiction, not monitored by radar, after this data was published.

Without adequate security standards to govern the handling of information critical to interdiction success as it passes to and from those who need to know, unintentional security breaches may occur. Intentional security compromises have also occurred. In one incident, two Customs marine supervisors were charged with intentionally diverting law enforcement resources away from planned smuggling attempts. According to officials in Customs' South Central Region, this security leak compromised the entire marine interdiction strategy of the Region in fiscal year 1985, as well as the identity of confidential informants who might be known by the supervisors. Customs officials told us that this completely dried up their confidential informant network.

OBSERVATIONS ON OTHER

DRUG INTERDICTION ISSUES

In the course of our review we have also explored other issues which relate to the federal government's ability to interdict drug smugglers. I would now like to briefly summarize our preliminary observations regarding these important pieces of the federal drug interdiction picture.

Military Support to
Interdiction Agencies

Since the passage of the Posse Comitatus Amendment in December 1981, which clarifies the role that the military may play in assisting civilian law enforcement agencies, the military has played an increasing role in the federal interdiction effort. Its primary contribution has been airborne radar coverage of areas thought by Customs and Coast Guard to be major air and marine smuggling routes. Air Force AWACS and Navy E-2 aircraft have flown numerous missions for the purpose of detecting aircraft smuggling drugs across the border. The AWACS and E-2 aircraft, in addition to Air Force C-130s and B-52s, and Navy P-3s and S-3s, also provide surveillance information on suspect marine vessels. Military aircraft also provide interdiction support in other ways. Army OV-10 Mohawks take aerial intelligence photographs along the Mexican border. Marine Corps OV-10 aircraft visually identify and track suspect aircraft until a Customs interceptor is launched.

Other military support is provided to interdiction agencies in a variety of forms. Since 1983, Air Force UH-1H helicopters, operated by Air Force personnel have transported Bahamian law enforcement teams on drug apprehension missions in the Bahamas, as part of a joint U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration - Bahamian government effort known as Operation BAT. As of July 1, 1986, Operation BAT has resulted in the interdiction of 121 metric tons of marijuana and 6.4 tons of cocaine, according to

the Air Force. Coast Guard law enforcement teams have been stationed aboard Navy ships on maneuvers in the Caribbean in order to board suspect vessels encountered by the Navy ships. The Army has made numerous equipment loans to the interdiction agencies. The most notable are the Blackhawk and Cobra helicopters and C-12 King Air aircraft that the Army has furnished to Customs on an extended basis.

The military, Customs and Coast Guard do not maintain complete records on the amount of military support provided to the interdiction effort, the cost of this support, or the number of arrests and seizures linked to the military's contribution to this effort. The following examples, gathered in the course of our review, illustrate some dimensions of the military's role in drug interdiction. The Air Force reports that in the period beginning fiscal year 1984 through the second quarter of fiscal year 1986, AWACS flew 108 sorties specially designated for drug interdiction and nearly 800 regular training sorties in areas of interest to interdiction agencies. Air Force records show that the cost of the 45 specially designated AWAC sorties flown in fiscal year 1985 was about \$3.6 million. According to the Navy, its E-2s flew 867 surveillance sorties in support of drug interdiction agencies during the period fiscal year 1984 through the first half of fiscal year 1986. The Navy reports that from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal year 1985, E-2 drug interdiction sorties cost \$4.7 million.

Information provided by the Customs Service on drug seizures indicates that the AWACS and E-2 sorties have aided in some

interdictions. From fiscal year 1983 through the first half of 1986, Customs reports that AWACS contributed to six interdictions resulting in the seizure of 4,903 pounds of marijuana. Over the same period, Customs estimated that it made 33 interdictions based on information from E-2 flights, resulting in seizures of 2,593 pounds of cocaine and 31,667 pounds of marijuana.

It is difficult to calculate the total cost of military drug interdiction activities. None of the participating agencies--civilian or military--maintain complete cost records on military assistance. Also, it is difficult to allocate costs to interdiction related activities because many military missions are multi-purpose--e.g., training plus surveillance for drug smugglers. Finally, it is difficult to measure the results of military assistance. It is unclear whether results should be limited to seizures and arrests attributable to military assistance, or should include some measure of deterrence--making drug smuggling more difficult and more expensive. As a result, the cost effectiveness of military assistance is still a subject of controversy.

Need for Tactical Intelligence

Tactical intelligence can be defined as information on smuggling operations which is perishable in nature and must be acted upon within a matter of hours in order to exploit its value; that is, the who?, what?, when?, where? and how? of specific smuggling attempts. Tactical intelligence allows the interdiction agencies to use their resources more effectively.

Depending upon how reliable and how specific the intelligence is, resources can be employed in a way that increases the chances of a successful seizure. Intelligence is particularly valuable when radar detection methods are not available or are ineffective. Information we obtained from Customs' computerized seizure reporting system demonstrates the value of obtaining intelligence prior to interdictions. A relatively small portion (16 percent) of fiscal year 1985 cocaine interdiction cases were based on prior information, but over 32,000 pounds of cocaine were seized in these cases. This accounted for 64 percent of the total cocaine seized as recorded in Customs' reporting system in fiscal year 1985.

Customs and the Coast Guard develop intelligence domestically, but have no authority to gather intelligence on drug shipments in foreign countries. The authority for source country intelligence collection rests with the DEA. However, gathering intelligence related to specific drug shipments is of secondary concern to DEA agents stationed in source countries. Recently, Customs and DEA began a trial program aimed at increasing the amount of tactical intelligence Customs receives from source countries. Under the program, Customs officers have been stationed at the DEA offices in Bogota, Caracas and Mexico City and have access to the information DEA agents collect in the course of their work. Customs hopes that these officers will be able to obtain tactical interdiction intelligence that DEA agents may not have otherwise reported, and that the Customs officers will disseminate the intelligence while it is still timely.

According to Customs, this program has not yet produced any interdictions.

The lack of tactical intelligence has forced interdiction agencies to depend heavily on "cold hit" radar detection and random air and marine patrols as the main line of defense against drug smugglers. As drug smugglers have demonstrated an increasing ability to evade radar and random patrols, Coast Guard and Customs have become increasingly concerned about the limited availability of tactical intelligence.

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Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared remarks. My colleagues and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Anderson. I think as you correctly point out there is a vast difference between what we are talking about in marijuana and cocaine. I think that is particularly true whenever you start dealing with such factors as intelligence.

There are a couple of points I want to clarify with you.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Last year the Customs Service was successful in interdicting 210 flights. It is my understanding that only three of those had any type of prior information, not 42 percent that you quoted from Mr. Jensen's letter.

Could you verify that?

Mr. ANDERSON. What I can tell you is that the numbers I cited were for interdictions of all kinds, not restricted to air. So there may not be a consistency. I can get behind these numbers but I would have to do it as a separate effort. We don't have—well, let me check with my staff here.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I don't have that.

Mr. ANDERSON. We don't have that. But as I said the 42 and 50 percent apply to all interdictions, maritime and others.

Mr. ENGLISH. The point is, Mr. Anderson, wouldn't you agree that the primary concern we are focusing on right now is cocaine?

Mr. ANDERSON. Absolutely.

Mr. ENGLISH. And it is crack.

Mr. ANDERSON. Absolutely.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is the issue. That is what we are dealing with. And would you agree that even the Drug Enforcement Administration says 60 percent of that cocaine is coming into this Nation by air?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir. Let me see if I can clarify that. It could even be more. That is the point I want to make. What they say is that in 1985, 62 percent of what actually was intercepted was on airplanes. To me that certainly doesn't mean by any stretch of the imagination that 62 percent of what comes in on a continuing basis was on airplanes. In fact, I would be greatly surprised if that was the case.

I did some quick calculations on some numbers that Deputy Attorney General Jensen had provided on 1984 interdiction results; that is, that 62 percent was based on 1984 cocaine interdiction results. On 1985 results the percentage being seized from airplanes goes down below 50 percent.

But to me the very fact that they had so many big hits on airplanes, the fact that we have such a relatively weak program for intercepting small aircraft, indicates to me we could be talking 60, 70, 80 percent. We don't know. But I would hold out the possibility that 62 percent is not a good number for citing the proportion of cocaine that comes by air.

Mr. ENGLISH. So the indications are that that may be very low.

Mr. ANDERSON. I believe so, because I think we are probably relatively more successful with interdicting cocaine arriving by boats than by small aircraft.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that because of the speed? When you are talking about ships that is a slow moving type of vehicle. You are not talking about the very rapid type of shipment.

Mr. ANDERSON. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. Also, if in fact we are going to apprehend or interdict these drugs before they hit the streets, whenever you can catch them in bulk before they are cut and distributed to thousands of people to be sold, that is where your best chance is, at this particular point. The chokepoint as far as cocaine is concerned is those airplanes, is that not correct?

Mr. ANDERSON. Correct, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Now, with regard to intelligence then, of the 210 flights out of a possibly 18,000—Stanford Research Institute estimates that the flights may be up to 18,000 a year and we got 210 last year—only 3 had prior intelligence.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So how in the world can we say anything other than the fact that there is no intelligence as far as air interdiction is concerned?

Mr. ANDERSON. It is a sad commentary, sir, I agree with you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Another point you mentioned, the Dallas Morning News did the smugglers a favor. I would like to take issue with you on that.

Mr. ANDERSON. All right, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That particular information had been posted on the Customs wall in El Paso in their office.

Mr. ANDERSON. OK.

Mr. ENGLISH. The whole thing is up there on the wall and has been for some time. There is no classification to it whatsoever. So before the Dallas Morning News gets too heavy a rap on that, all I am saying is they picked up what they found on Customs walls and in their own offices.

Mr. ANDERSON. I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. ENGLISH. So that needs to be pointed out, too.

What I would like to do now, is to begin on the west coast and simply take it region by region, all the way around the Nation and examine in depth what we actually have.

Let me say before we go any further, this subcommittee, as I pointed out, has had 38 hearings in which we have revealed numerous shortcomings and problems, particularly in the air branch. Most of the cocaine is coming by air.

We found that there has been very little response to our findings, and also there have been numerous other studies done, million dollar studies have been done time and time again. In 1979 we had a Stanford Research Institute study; 1982 there was a Stanford Research Institute study; 1984 the Mitre study; 1984 the Vice President's Joint Surveillance Committee study; between 1983 and 1985 the President's Commission on Crime looking into all these problems.

Some of these studies have never been made public. Members of Congress have had difficulty getting them to find out what is happening. Have you found any evidence at all that any of that information that resulted from studies—any evidence that anyone has ever taken note of or implemented any of this information?

Mr. ANDERSON. I am not aware of it, sir, of it ever being acted on. Let me turn to my experts here.

Mr. VIALET. I would say probably in general that is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. None of it has been acted on.

Mr. VIALET. Very little acted on.

Mr. ENGLISH. Particularly as far as interdiction?

Mr. VIALET. Particularly.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we paid millions and millions of dollars for studies and haven't done a blooming thing with them, have we?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And now we have others that are once again calling for another study. It is my understanding the Attorney General is calling for this. We are studying this thing to death. There is no evidence when we get the study that anything is ever done.

I might say on a very pleasant note, I would like to recognize Her Excellency, the Ambassador Margaret McDonald from the Bahamas. Ambassador McDonald, we are glad to have you here. We would like to recognize you. Thank you for coming.

Beginning on the west coast, looking at the marine interdiction program, I believe that according to your testimony we have one medium endurance Coast Guard cutter, is that correct?

Mr. ANDERSON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That runs from Seattle, WA, all the way down below San Diego, is that correct?

Mr. VIALET. No, sir, that is the 11th Coast Guard District's cutter based in Long Beach, CA.

Mr. ENGLISH. What do we have in the Seattle area?

Mr. VIALET. North of Santa Barbara there are two Coast Guard districts and there are some additional cutters up there.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many?

Mr. VIALET. I don't have that information. Do you have that?

Mr. ANDERSON. Do we have it here? We will provide it for the record if we don't.

[GAO subsequently stated that there are two high-endurance cutters based in Seattle and four based in San Francisco.]

Mr. ENGLISH. While he is looking for that, let's go south.

Mr. VIALET. Basically, the cutter that you mentioned is working out of Long Beach and covers the area south of Santa Barbara on down to San Diego.

Mr. ENGLISH. All the way down to San Diego; what do we have there?

Mr. VIALET. One medium-endurance cutter.

Mr. ENGLISH. One cutter.

Mr. VIALET. One radar-equipped medium-endurance Coast Guard cutter, mainly used as a radar platform.

Mr. ENGLISH. And that deals with the threat coming around from Baja, CA, and up north, is that correct?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, along the west coast of Mexico and Baja and on the southern California coast.

Mr. ENGLISH. You stated in your testimony that is available for only 117 days, is that what it has been available?

Mr. VIALET. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we have one cutter to deal with all the sea traffic coming from South America up Baja, CA, up to southern California.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir; basically that cutter of course is augmented by Coast Guard patrol boats as well as Customs marine boats and State of California patrols.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is even when those others—the 248 days it is not operating?

Mr. VIALET. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. All these other boats are out there.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, but generally they have to depend on visual sightings rather than radar information from the Coast Guard cutter.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is a lot of ocean out there.

Mr. VIALET. It is an awful lot of ocean.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we have a guy out there in a boat with a pair of binoculars and that is the detection system of the United States on those other 248 days.

Mr. VIALET. Yes.

Mr. ANDERSON. Even when the medium-endurance cutter is out there that radar only has 30 or 40 mile radius so we are not getting too much coverage even when that cutter is at sea.

Mr. ENGLISH. So our detection system to protect this Nation on the west coast, at least along the coast of California from San Francisco south, is one cutter that has a radar of 40 miles and it has been there only 117 days. The rest of the time, the other 248, it is not at sea, no radar, no detection, and we are relying on people in small boats with binoculars.

How many of these men, platforms do we have out there with eyes glued to binoculars? How many boats are available for that?

Mr. VIALET. I would like to provide it for the record.

Mr. ENGLISH. Give me a guess, we need to get a little more—tie this down so we have a good idea of what exists out there.

Mr. CHAPPELL. There are nine boats.

Mr. ENGLISH. Nine boats?

Mr. CHAPPELL. Eighty-five foot patrol boats.

Mr. ENGLISH. Nine 85-foot patrol boats that are able to go to sea.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. And those nine, all they have in the way of detection systems are binoculars?

Mr. CHAPPELL. I think they have radars.

Mr. VIALET. Short-range radars.

Mr. ENGLISH. What would they be?

Mr. VIALET. Basically 4 or 5 miles.

[GAO subsequently revised this estimate, and noted that the patrol boats had a radar range of 12 to 15 miles.]

Mr. ENGLISH. That is about the same range as binoculars, isn't it?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, this is not anything major.

Mr. ENGLISH. You can just about eyeball it as good as the radars can do.

Mr. VIALET. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are those out there 365 days a year?

Mr. VIALET. They are not always operational either. Mr. Anderson mentioned many of the patrol boats are very old and frequently out of service.

Mr. ENGLISH. We have nine boats, many frequently out of service. How many are frequently out of service on average?

Mr. ANDERSON. About close to half, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we are down now to four or five boats.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. VIALET. That is augmented and I cannot give you the number, but that is augmented by State of California boats and Customs marine boats.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do they have sea-going boats?

Mr. VIALET. In the coastal waters, yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is what we must be very careful about. The public gets misled with that sort of business because there is a big difference between a boat that can set around and hug the coast and a boat that will be out there off the Baja giving us warning to be able to put together assets to be able to make an arrest.

So let's focus on what they are doing at sea and we will come in and take a look at those coastal waters later.

We have four or five boats with guys with binoculars, we have one boat with a 35- to 40-mile range radar and that is it. Only the one boat with the radar isn't out there most of the time. He is out there about a third of the time.

Now, where is he usually located? Where is that boat usually located?

Mr. VIALET. Out of Long Beach working down to San Diego and south of there, I guess.

Mr. ENGLISH. How hard is it to keep track of that boat when it is in port?

Mr. VIALET. It is a fairly easy job for someone to know when that boat is in or out of port.

Mr. ENGLISH. So anyone with the resources of the drug smugglers have no problem at all knowing when—

Mr. VIALET. When the boat is down.

Mr. ENGLISH. Of knowing what 2 out of 3 days that boat will be setting in port.

Mr. VIALET. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we have virtually no threat there.

Mr. VIALET. I think in terms of what you have got out there basically. I would like to add there are E2-C flights which the Navy is providing which is giving additional radar coverage.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's examine that now. I wasn't planning on getting to it this quick but let's go ahead with it. I have a red circle on the map which is the training range for the E2-C.

Mr. VIALET. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Did you receive any reports of any E2-C coverage being provided to the Coast Guard? Did they cite any instances of arrest in which those E2-C's had provided detection?

Mr. VIALET. We are not aware of any case where the seizure resulted from E2-C coverage.

Mr. ENGLISH. Are you aware of any system in which that coverage is being provided? That information being provided?

Mr. VIALET. Basically we are aware of the fact that E2-C does report into the Coast Guard.

Mr. ENGLISH. Now, again we are getting into this misleading business. Let's be very careful and precise in what we are saying.

Are you aware of any reports that have ever come from that training area from those E2-C's while they are training to the Coast Guard reporting on a suspect vessel?

Mr. VIALET. I would have to be careful about this. I know we are not aware of any seizures. Let me turn and ask Ed Laughlin who worked with us on that.

Ed, are we aware of any reports of suspect vessels? We are not aware of any reports of suspect vessels either.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK. So in effect we can just take that red, that orange circle up there and take it off the map as far as marine coverage is concerned, correct?

Mr. VIALET. I think—

Mr. ENGLISH. From a practical standpoint.

Mr. VIALET. Yes; but you can also practically say, sir, there is very little interdiction activity going on at all on the west coast.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is the reason we want to focus on this. You know, I want to make certain that the American people and the Congress understand tomorrow when we take up this legislation just exactly what it is we are trying to do. We are trying to put together a system basically where there is nothing now.

Mr. VIALET. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH. Absolutely nothing. And all this talk, all this discussion about the fact that we are doing all kinds of wonderful things in the war on drugs is misleading. There is no effort.

Mr. VIALET. I think that is basically the point. We can talk about specific detection systems and detection vehicles and things like that, but when you talk about it as a whole there is no comprehensive detection system; there isn't this kind of comprehensive net that keeps the smugglers out.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK.

Now, north of San Francisco, what do we find out there, what do we have?

Mr. CHAPPELL. The Coast Guard has four high-endurance cutters in San Francisco and two in Seattle.

Mr. ENGLISH. Four in San Francisco and two in Seattle. Are those involved in the drug effort? I was wondering why we have four in San Francisco and two in Seattle when our greater threat is down in Baja, CA, and we have one boat.

Mr. CHAPPELL. I don't have any breakdown on the days that they spend in drug enforcement.

Mr. ENGLISH. I will trust you on this; I will label this one judgment. Why do we have four in San Francisco, two in Seattle, and one down here where we have the war on drugs going?

Mr. CHAPPELL. I would think it's the Coast Guard's judgment that is relative to its other missions, such as search and rescue, fisheries protection, et cetera.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, in effect they don't have a drug mission, those people are not involved in the war on drugs; is that correct?

Mr. ANDERSON. I would say in terms of deploying west coast assets, they decided that one cutter out of Long Beach would be what they would put into place where it could be used, and likely would be mainly used in the war on drugs and the other six cutters on the rest of the coast, no.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, of the major Coast Guard assets on the west coast, only one-seventh are being involved, dedicated to the war on drugs?

Mr. ANDERSON. That is correct.

Mr. VIALET. That is correct.

Sir, I think we have to emphasize though it is a very, very long coast line and the Coast Guard does have other major responsibilities.

Mr. ENGLISH. I agree with that.

Mr. VIALET. So, really in terms of the total equipment they have, they just don't have much to go around.

Mr. ENGLISH. I agree with that wholeheartedly. That is exactly the point. They have very little to go around.

If we are ever going to make headway in this, we have to catch the drugs before they can be broken down and distributed. This is where we can catch them in bulk. This is where we have a shot at it. This is why I want to find out what is going on.

Dealing with air smuggling, what do we have in the way of assets on the west coast to deal with air? I know that the Navy performed searches for 3 days 1 year ago in the California border there. And they found I believe, what was it, 30 flights a month were coming in?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Over just that short little stretch of southern California border.

What do we have to respond to that threat?

Mr. ANDERSON. Nothing.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's start with detection. What do we have in the way of detection?

Mr. VIALET. Basically, sir, there is essentially no detection except for the FAA and defense radars.

Mr. ENGLISH. Those FAA, do they come down to 500 feet or so?

Mr. VIALET. No; they don't. That is the problem.

Mr. ENGLISH. So there is no—

Mr. VIALET. Effectively what happens is you can fly under the existing radar coverage along there.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, in all honesty and candor, there is no detection on the entire southern coast of California.

Mr. VIALET. Basically that would be it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Now, with respect to—with the exception I might say, let's make sure that we don't mislead anybody, there are 25 hours of E2-C time per month being provided at the direction of the Congress. The Congress is the one that directed that, right?

[GAO subsequently reported that, according to the Navy, over the period fiscal year 1985 through the first three quarters of fiscal year 1986, its Pacific fleet provided an average of about 36 hours of E2-C flighttime.]

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Now the E2-C's on the training range, we were promised by the Navy that they would keep an eye out for drug smugglers. Has there ever been a report from that E2-C training area that you are aware of, of any drug smugglers being seen in that region?

Mr. VIALET. As far as we know, no smuggler aircraft have been caught by Customs crossing the Pacific border in that region.

Mr. ENGLISH. I am talking about E2-C's, particularly that training area that runs 500 miles west and 500 miles south of San Diego.

Mr. VIALET. Nobody has caught any aircraft crossing the Pacific border in that area.

Mr. ENGLISH. All right, so none.

Mr. VIALET. None.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, of all these flights, not a single one got caught.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is not much of a risk to a smuggler, is it?

Mr. VIALET. It is a very minimal risk.

Mr. ENGLISH. You are almost guaranteed if you come blasting across that border you are not going to get caught; isn't that correct?

Mr. VIALET. It is an awfully good chance.

Mr. ENGLISH. One hundred percent?

Mr. VIALET. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is pretty good.

Mr. VIALET. There are detection and interceptor aircraft in Tucson and Customs tries to bring them over to San Diego to help out. But it is basically a wide open——

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's say we spot them. What kind of interceptors do they have down there in San Diego to respond to the call that that Navy E2-C comes in with: I got a hot one coming across the border.

Mr. VIALET. They have none. They have to call on an interceptor from Tucson.

Mr. ENGLISH. Tucson? That is over in Arizona.

Mr. VIALET. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. What are the chances of an interceptor from Tucson to get airborne and come over there and catch some guy before he comes down and they lose contact with him and he lands in southern California at some airstrip or airport?

Mr. VIALET. Effectively nonexistent.

Mr. ENGLISH. Nonexistent. So we have no detection. OK.

Let's assume though that somehow they do it. You know by magic they get over there. I don't know how they get over there fast enough but assume by magic that they do. It happens to be in the air, maybe he is over close to the border.

Mr. VIALET. If they have prior intelligence it might be possible to get somebody out there.

Mr. ENGLISH. Have we ever known of any prior intelligence?

Mr. VIALET. At this point as I say during the past year nobody got caught crossing the Pacific border.

Mr. ENGLISH. There is no prior intelligence, OK.

Let's assume we do, and assume we have an airplane up. He got detected. Assume we have somebody from Tucson out close enough to the border that he could go over there and track him, then he finally lands. What do we have in the way of bust aircraft to make an arrest in southern California?

Mr. ANDERSON. One Blackhawk.

Mr. ENGLISH. One Blackhawk. So the only function we can fulfill out of detection, interception, and arrest, is the arrest function. So we have guys sitting down there with one Black Hawk helicopter as a bust team and nobody to tell them where to go. Is that about it?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. We have been discussing several aspects of this problem, the apportionment of the resources, where the present resources are used effectively, whether they are available, existing resources not used. All of these questions are useful as a prelude to deciding tomorrow what more we want to do in this area.

It is a very basic question, but I think it would be helpful if, starting out with that apportionment issue, you could give your best estimates or guesstimates going around the whole country, the whole border, as to where cocaine to be specific—if you want to include drugs overall, that is fine—is coming in. We just had a question of San Diego versus Seattle versus San Francisco. If you could start there in southern California and give us your estimates on what percentage of the drugs come in there, what percentage of the drugs come in the San Francisco area, Seattle area, Canadian border, and down the coast.

Mr. ANDERSON. When you are talking cocaine now, I have to rely on the estimates of the agencies themselves. They say that three-fourths of it is coming in through the southeast region. In other words, for reasons perhaps of convenient access coming up from South America they say that three-fourths of it is still coming up through the southeast region despite the presence of the radar systems around Florida. It looks like Florida is well covered by radar but despite the forces that we have in place there, the bulk of the cocaine is coming through there.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Anderson, could I again underscore before we go any further; that is a guesstimate.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. The fact of the matter is we don't have enough detection on that border to have any idea where these people are coming in. All we can do is guess. We got windage, somebody licking his finger holding it up, I think he is coming in there. That is the best we can do.

Mr. ANDERSON. That is it, sir, that is right.

Mr. ENGLISH. Whenever we throw these numbers out about 75 percent coming there—we cannot tell you anywhere where it is over 50 percent.

Mr. ANDERSON. We are guessing.

What we don't know, all those planes coming in over that southern border around San Diego that we have not caught that may have had cocaine on board, we have no sense of that at all. But the agencies would estimate, Mr. Miller, getting back to your question, though, that around 73 percent of it is coming in through the Southeast, particularly Florida, and around 10 or 15 percent across the Mexican border and the region.

Mr. MILLER. These estimates are based on what, seizures?

Mr. ANDERSON. Seizures, primarily.

Mr. MILLER. Contacts, et cetera.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. MILLER. So, they are talking about 75 percent southeast and 12 percent did you say—

Mr. ANDERSON. I think they said 11 percent across the southwest border.

Mr. MILLER [continuing]. Across the Mexican border, and did they break it out further or does that just leave 14 percent for the whole rest of the Nation's borders, including that whole west coast?

Mr. ANDERSON. They say 7.5 percent is coming in somewhere along the California coast but not across the land border.

Mr. MILLER. 7.5 percent—

Mr. ANDERSON. 7.5 percent across the Pacific border, 73 percent across the southeast border, and 11 percent across the southwest border with Mexico.

Mr. MILLER. And 7.5?

Mr. ANDERSON. 7.5 percent in the Pacific region. I presume that would be primarily by sea coming in somewhere along the west coast. 7.5 percent.

Mr. MILLER. The whole west coast.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. MILLER. That is Seattle to San Diego.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes; that is correct. And New York region which would be coming in, I presume, basically by sea, although maybe some flights come up that far. I doubt it. Four percent into the New York region.

The only other thing of any consequence is the south-central region, which would be the gulf borders of New Orleans, Louisiana, around that area.

Mr. MILLER. So, that would be 75 percent southeast, 11 percent Mexican. We are up to 86. 7.5 percent Pacific; that brings us up to 93.5. Four percent New York; that is 97.5.

And then you are saying there is something in the gulf port States?

Mr. ANDERSON. 4.1 percent in the south-central region.

By the way, the southeast region was 73, not 75. Then there are minuscule amounts coming into the Northeastern States on up around Massachusetts, three-tenths of 1 percent, if you want to run across the whole table.

Mr. MILLER. That is all right.

It is helpful, because when we talk about this problem to give it some perspective, and recognizing these are guesstimates, we have to have something to go on.

Now we get to the issue of the efficient use of the present resources. You have given numerous examples of how in different areas this boat or that radar balloon is only operable 50 percent of the time or 30 percent of the time or 40 percent of the time, and so one conclusion is that we need more resources, but another conclusion is, my gosh, we are not using the resources we have.

So, let's just take as an example in the southeast area: The Customs Service aerostat radar in the Bahamas was inoperable 49 percent of the time. That sounds like if it were operable 97 percent of the time we would double the effectiveness.

That is what it sounds like, right?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. MILLER. Then you say this is due to routine maintenance, weather conditions, mechanical problems, staffing constraints.

Could you break that down? I assume we don't control weather conditions, but we do control routine maintenance.

If it is not getting done, how much of that is at the root of the problem of this facility being down? We do control mechanical problems. Staffing constraints—what is the staffing constraint? Is it lack of manpower? Is it—

Mr. ANDERSON. Give me just a second, sir, and I will give you some specifics.

Twelve percent of the time it was down for weather and 38 percent of the time it was down for maintenance reasons including scheduled maintenance. I don't have specifics on the remainder of the downtime.

I would suspect that, No. 1, a piece of sensitive equipment like that is going to be down. You could probably, through investing a lot of money and a lot of skill in maintenance, keep it up, perhaps, some greater amount of the time.

But still, either you are going to have to have other resources to provide coverage when the aerostat is down or just forgo coverage for some part of that time when the equipment is down—just like on an aircraft, I am not saying that it is wrong that the aircraft are down 30 or 40 percent of the time, or that the Coast Guard cutters are down 45 percent of the time in the southeast region.

They are going to be down, because ships require that kind of maintenance. But if you want to provide coverage you have to double the number of them.

Mr. MILLER. So, now we are generalizing. We are not only talking about aerostats, but ships and planes.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MILLER. As a Member of Congress, when I look through your testimony and I see these statistics of 30 percent, 50 percent, 60 percent downtime, what you are telling me is that I should not draw the conclusion that that is abnormal, that we should expect, basically, those downtimes, and the only way to correct it is not to improve staffing, not to improve maintenance, not to improve mechanical handling, but to just have more of these ships or planes or radars available.

Mr. ANDERSON. I would say, for example, when you can only man one shift out of three, it is a staffing problem.

You have not put enough people in there to operate around the clock.

So to me, the basic problem is a commitment of resources, generally. We are not saying there is any great problem out there with respect to the way the people on duty are doing the job and the way they are maintaining the equipment and that sort of thing.

Mr. MILLER. This may be getting a little outside your effort, but when we talk about where the resources are going to come from, one of the big issues in this committee, as we have wrestled with it under the chairman's leadership for some time, is the role of the military.

We got into that just a little in terms of the Navy and the Coast Guard. When we talk about additional resources here, is it your

opinion that a small part of these resources, a large part of these resources, almost all of these resources, now exist in the military?

Mr. ANDERSON. I would say that one thing that has come out so far is that dedicated resources produce much greater results than those where, say, detection is an incidental duty.

As long as the DOD assets are primarily devoted to a training mission or to their own mission, then you are not going to get the bang for the buck in terms of the impact on the interdiction side.

I guess my own sense would be that the solution is not to have more DOD ships and planes just looking out the window for a drug vehicle, be it an aircraft or be it a ship.

Mr. MILLER. All right. That is what I asked you for, your opinion.

So, you think it is limited what we can get from further military involvement in terms of effectiveness?

Mr. ANDERSON. Unless they are absolutely turned over and dedicated. I don't think the DOD would ever stand for that.

I think what I am saying is that we have seen the part-time results such as the E2-C of the west coast that really isn't coming up with anything in the way of hits.

I hate to recite the stories on the AWACS flights and the money that those have involved, but again, it is an incidental duty, but there have been very few hits and interdictions as a result of their intelligence.

Mr. MILLER. Is this because the military has so many other missions they are asking the ships or planes or AWACS to do or is it just a lack of commitment or energy on its part to accepting this drug interdiction mission?

Mr. ANDERSON. I think they are bending their mission a little to try and incorporate some kind of an antidrug element to it, but it is not being bent enough to really serve drug interdiction purposes, like for example, on the AWACS flights that are arranged months in advance on where they are going to go because the drug interdiction community says, well, this will be a good place to go.

And I don't know what the problems are in making hits in that type of arrangement, but they are not dedicated resources.

I think that is basically the problem.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much.

I have one final question on that. Has there ever been any indication with respect to the E2-C's out there, saying there is nobody at home if we call, you know, so why should we be out here looking for drug smugglers. There is nobody to respond even if we put in a call.

There are no interceptors in San Diego. What are they going to do if we tell them about it?

Mr. VIALET. Sir, I think it is true that that does occur.

Mr. ENGLISH. Isn't that true of AWACS?

Mr. VIALET. It is a negative thing. Things that are not happening because, for example, there is not a command and control center that is set up because there aren't any detection capabilities out there.

And, therefore, there is not a coordinated way—

Mr. ENGLISH. There isn't an interceptor there, either, so it doesn't make any difference.

Mr. VIALET. That is right.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, if the Navy decides they will respond with the E2-C's, there is nobody for them to call.

Mr. VIALET. That is right.

Mr. ENGLISH. All they can do is say, well, we will chart this one down and turn it in to somebody and make a record, I guess.

And we have had the same thing. I saw a deal on one of the networks the other night I thought interesting, flying the AWACS down on the border. One of the Customs guys was asked why are we flying in the daytime?

He said, "Well, drug smugglers fly anytime." But we have had testimony that over 90 percent of the drug smugglers fly at night.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Was there ever any indication that these AWACS flights were set up and flown during the daytime because they could not get somebody from Customs up that could fly?

They don't have a night capability, so they got a guy with some binoculars that can look around and spot the guy and get behind him.

Is there indication that that is happening? You got one fellow nodding his head.

Mr. LAUGHLIN. There are indications that AWACS planes have not flown at night because there wouldn't be anybody there to respond.

Mr. ENGLISH. Nobody home.

Mr. ANDERSON. He is Ed Laughlin.

Mr. ENGLISH. They would have been in terrible shape, call home and nobody's there.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You mentioned this in your testimony and in response to questions, but what mechanism exists for coordination among DEA, Coast Guard, Customs, INS, FBI, and the various agencies that have a hand in trying to detect and enforce the drug laws and smuggling laws of this country?

Mr. ANDERSON. Right now, as you know, sir, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System [NNBIS], has a role in trying to coordinate interdiction missions. Now in a lot of locales around the country we have the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces which bring together people from these various agencies. We have now in the Department of Justice—

Mr. SPRATT. Does that deal with interdiction?

Mr. ANDERSON. No, sir. Were you just—

Mr. SPRATT. That is right. I gave you a broader question.

Mr. ANDERSON. That is right. I am sorry. Now we have the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board chaired by the Attorney General, which is also providing an overview look at who is doing what and how much money we are spending on it. There is, I presume, a responsibility on the part of the Attorney General, that if he sees anything, any aberrations in what people are trying to do, to raise the flag and try and do something about it. So that is basically—

Mr. SPRATT. Let's take the use of the military assets, E2-C's, AWACS, Blackhawks, whatever it may be. How are these assets

committed to the interdiction effort? Is it sporadic? Is it regular? The routine? Who makes the decision to ask for them and who makes the decision to grant their usage?

Mr. ANDERSON. All right, I am going to let these gentlemen supplement. But I know again, through NNBIS, the AWACS scheduling is done at quarterly meetings looking ahead as to what we are going to have, what do we want in the way of flights at some point in time. NNBIS sits there as a focal point for calls coming in from the agencies, saying that we would like to have a DOD asset of some kind doing this in this particular place.

An important part of NNBIS' function is to be the conduit for taking the requests from the law enforcement community, perhaps showing some discrimination on what might be in order and what won't be in order and then passing them on to DOD.

Mr. VIALET. I guess to supplement that, basically what you have is what you would call designated flights which normally are arranged through an advance request by the interdiction agency, such as Coast Guard or Customs, which goes through NNBIS and then goes up through the Defense Department. Those commitments are made, and arranged 3 to 6 months in advance.

Mr. SPRATT. That was my next question. What is the leadtime?

Mr. VIALET. The minimum leadtime would be about 3 months and the maximum would be about 6. I must emphasize that there are occasions in which the Coast Guard has received a much quicker response for E2-C coverage in specific cases because they have contacts with the local Navy commands. But in the normal pattern, it is a formal process going through NNBIS. Those are called designated flights. In addition, you have nondesignated flights, which are simply routine training flights in which the military might see something happening. Its like, "Let's also take a look out the window and see if we can see a doper coming across the border."

Mr. ENGLISH. If you would yield on that. I don't want the public to be misled. We have just got through saying on those flights nothing has ever happened. There has never been any communication from those routine training missions that you are talking about. We just talked about the Southwest and I think we can go to the east coast and do the same thing.

Isn't it also true basically what we are talking about are 2 days out of every month are being flown by the military? One of them is done by E2-C's, the other one by AWACS. You have 75 hours with the E2-C's, right?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir. I can give you some statistics.

Mr. ENGLISH. Excuse me, 3 days.

Mr. VIALET. In 1985 there were 45 specially designated AWACS missions, about 8 hours a mission.

Mr. ENGLISH. Those are 4 hours on station time?

Mr. VIALET. AWACS missions, sir?

Mr. ENGLISH. That is correct, 4 hours on station?

Mr. VIALET. On station.

Mr. ENGLISH. Again let's not fool anybody by saying, well, you are going to be flying from Oklahoma City to someplace and we are going to say that that is time that we have had drug detection cov-

erage. We don't have any detection coverage at that time. The only time you have got it is when the guy is finally on station.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That has to be scheduled 6 months in advance and has to be done 6 months from today. Six months from now if the smugglers shift their course somewhere, there is nothing there.

Mr. VIALET. I think it would be a shorter period for E2-C's. Some of the AWACS flights are pre-positioned. They will fly out of Tinker and they will move to a staging area, which means they will be spending a longer period of time in the air, on station.

Mr. ENGLISH. Four hours per mission is the information that we have. If you have more than that, we sure would like to see the proof of that. From what we see, only 4 hours. We have never seen any indication of longer time than that.

Mr. VIALET. We will go back to our numbers. My numbers are somewhat higher than that.

[For the record, GAO stated that Air Force records indicate on station time ranges from about 4 hours to about 7 hours.]

Mr. ENGLISH. We appreciate that.

Mr. SPRATT. How about the E2-C usage?

Mr. VIALET. In terms of the E2-C's, there were 303 specially designated E2-C missions. Each of those was about 4 hours' duration.

Mr. SPRATT. That was fiscal year 1985?

Mr. VIALET. Yes.

Mr. SPRATT. Do you have any opinion, having looked at these missions, as to which aircraft is more effective?

Mr. VIALET. I guess, sir, I would have to say probably the E2-C would be a more effective aircraft than the AWACS just in terms of the results that you have gotten out of the two. Neither one of them is really, perhaps, the most effective aircraft. They are military aircraft and they are out there but they are being used for another purpose.

Mr. SPRATT. What about P-3C's or P-3's?

Mr. VIALET. The P-3's are also having some effect and they are producing some results. I think all of these things have been attempts to try to provide some radar coverage. They are not bad ideas necessarily but they are not totally perfectly designed for the mission.

Mr. ENGLISH. Will the gentleman yield? Wouldn't you agree with me the kind of aircraft we are talking about other than range, other than the issue of range it really doesn't make any difference whether you are talking about an E2-C, 2C, a Boeing 707 or a P-3 Orion; the question is, What kind of radar has the thing got on it?

Mr. VIALET. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. As far as the degree of sophistication, there is no radar more sophisticated than the one that the AWACS has?

Mr. VIALET. That is correct. The AWACS has a much, much bigger complement of electronics.

Mr. ENGLISH. A bigger footprint, you have got the whole business. The real question you have with the E2-C is the flying time. They can fly about 6 hours without extra tanks?

Mr. VIALET. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH. I know the real question is, it is simply a platform. It doesn't matter. The other issue it comes down to, if you are

taking an E2-C with an APS-138 radar as opposed to one of the earlier radars, it makes a big difference, because if you fly over land in one of the earlier radars it has all kinds of ground clutter and it doesn't pick it up. So the issue is whether it is an APS-138 on that E2-C, right?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir. It is a B rather than a C. The B's are more affected by the ground clutter than the C.

Mr. SPRATT. Is there any other organization than this Narcotics Board which is involved in central planning on the use of military assets?

Mr. VIALET. Well, sir, basically the way it works is that there is—I think we haven't really gotten into that, but I think that perhaps would be a real gap, that is to say there really hasn't been that much central planning. If there is a request by the interdiction agencies to the military, they go through NNBIS. Then the military responds back.

There has been some attempt on both sides to try to plan, but there hasn't been a central directing agency.

I would also say that NNBIS has planned, and run special projects. There you have had centralized planning of the use of military and other civilian assets.

Mr. SPRATT. Who in DOD—does each service in DOD have a dedicated office?

Mr. VIALET. Each of the military services has officers, and their activities are coordinated through an office in the Department of Defense. I would like Mr. Laughlin of our staff to comment on how DOD's role is organized

Mr. LAUGHLIN. The main body in DOD is the Task Force on Drug Enforcement, and that serves as a clearinghouse in DOD. Requests are submitted to that office, and then they are farmed out to the various services depending on what kind of—

Mr. SPRATT. I know how those task forces operate, that are a confederation of different officers. Is there a particular officer in DOD who has this as his sole or one of his major responsibilities?

Mr. LAUGHLIN. Up until very recently, General Tice headed the DOD task force, and his sole responsibility was drug enforcement.

Mr. SPRATT. One further question. You indicated that it would be better to have dedicated assets than assets that were occasionally and at random available for these missions. Would it also be better to have a particular service that was dedicated or a particular branch of one service dedicated to coastal surveillance for drug interdiction and to border surveillance; for example, the National Guard Reserve components of some particular wing of the Air Force or something like that?

Mr. ANDERSON. I really haven't thought about that, sir, and we would hesitate to say anything off the top of our heads.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

Mr. ENGLISH. Staff informs me I did misspeak a minute ago when I talked about the 25 hours of E2-C time on the southern border. The Congress directed the investigative flight. The Vice President is responsible for the existing 25 hours, so we want to give the Vice President credit in those cases where credit is due.

Mr. DioGuardi.

Mr. DioGUARDI. Thank you.

You mentioned before that only 4 percent of the cocaine comes through New York. I represent Westchester County, NY, which is the county just on the north end of New York City, and New York City has been dubbed the capital of crack in the world right now.

If only 4 percent is coming through to New York, how do you think all this cocaine is getting to New York?

Mr. ANDERSON. Apparently it is coming into the Southern United States and then being transshipped, sir, just that simple. In other words, they are making the border penetration apparently by plane in the majority of the instances and then transshipping from the southern tier of the United States into their northern markets.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Do you think by rail or is this again by water?

Mr. VIALET. The volume that you are talking about is so small, I mean in terms of the physical volume, that you can pretty easily put that in a container, a truck container or a rail container. I mean, there is no real problem carrying that up. You can put it in the trunk of a car, except that is more likely to get stopped by somebody.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. I guess the point I want to make is that 4 percent can't be representative of the amount of cocaine being sold in New York at this time.

Mr. ANDERSON. Oh, no, sir, that 4 percent just represented their estimate of what actually came in from overseas to that part of the country. New York probably represents at least 10 to 15 percent of the American cocaine market, based on the size of the population in that area.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. It raises the question in my mind of how effective interdiction is just as a method, not that I would say we shouldn't do it, but I think what you are saying here, you have done an operational audit. I spent a good part of my life in auditing, as you know, and I am trying to figure out whether or not you have learned enough by your exercise that you can give us a macro view as to how to design an effective interdiction system.

Because what you have just told me is that even if we do a good job here or there New York State may have to have its own interdiction effort around its borders to keep it out. And, it begins to tell me that maybe we have got to look at the broader picture here. Let me ask you a couple of questions.

I guess these are going to have to be guesstimates at this point. Reading your testimony, and looking at the numbers which you say can't be validated, because you didn't go into the systems used to accumulate the estimating procedures for how much cocaine and other substances are coming in, it appears to me that, looking at cocaine, which is the problem right now, interdiction is responsible for about 20 percent. I think the number was 22 out of 124.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. You can see that the difference between the estimate from 1984 to 1985 was tremendous, which means that we are probably still learning about the real amount of cocaine coming into this country, and no one probably knows, although you try to make a stab at it. But just looking at these numbers, and they are pretty raw, I think what you have said is that about 20 percent are being interdicted, is that correct—cocaine? Are you comfortable with that?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes. Well, I don't know, sir. Fifteen, twenty percent probably. If you believe these guesstimates, that is where it would be, yes.

Mr. VIALET. They are so rough, I think you shouldn't be too quantified about it.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Again, I don't know that you are really capable of answering many of these questions, but you probably right now are the repository of more knowledge than anybody else in Government as to the overview of these interdiction efforts.

I think the GAO does a fine job in these operational audits, by the way, but going forward, if you want to again conclude or try to conclude about the effectiveness of our current interdiction operation, if the current operation were efficient, if we could conclude that the resources, the assets and the people deploying our working with those assets were operating efficiently, they were effective, what would be the percentage that we could interdict under the current mode that you have described and witnessed?

Mr. ANDERSON. I would say marginally more, sir, yes. With the resources that are currently assigned to the task, even if they were operating with considerable more efficiency and the equipment was up and that sort of thing, I guess I wouldn't feel that we grabbed more than another couple of percentage points.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. That is the answer I expected. Does that tell us that really no matter how much money you put into interdiction—let's wait a minute here—I guess you are staying with the current configuration?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. I guess there is a design that you may have in mind, whereby this can be expanded so that the percentages can go up?

Mr. ANDERSON. Obviously the one thing that I haven't seen—and this would probably be a war gaming exercise that the folks in the Pentagon might be able to do for us, by looking at 18,000 flights a year with these types of characteristics—and determining what type of a system is it going to take to detect, track, and seize. Obviously I think 100 percent would be totally impossible. I have no idea, but you could probably get more than you are now with some different mix of resources. But I don't know exactly.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. You don't know?

Mr. ANDERSON. That war gaming exercise, to my knowledge, I don't know if it has been attempted. SRI might have taken a stab at it, but I don't think there is anything that has been done that is really credible to the chairman or to people who are really knowledgeable about the area.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Mr. Chairman, you see this is really an example of the nonsense that goes on here in Washington, and this is not directed at you. Here we are being asked in Congress to make multibillion-dollar decisions, and I can't get reasonable data, information upon which to make those decisions. I came to Congress—I am a new Congressman—thinking I was joining the board of directors of Government, the agency or the entity that would do the strategic planning, set the policies.

What I have witnessed in 2 years is more micromanaging than I would like to talk about. The point here is another example. We

are going to be asking Congress in the next few weeks to make some decisions to deploy billions of dollars of manpower and equipment. Some have estimated that we need to find maybe \$5 billion and many of us are saying if that is what it takes regardless of the budget crisis we can't hold the youth of this country hostage to that budget crisis, let's do it. And yet I am beginning to get the feeling that we are not going to be presented with the data that I need, Mr. Chairman, in order to make that decision.

For instance, what is it costing us right now to interdict about 20 percent, if that number is—

Mr. ANDERSON. The 1987 budget will be over \$700 million. It has been running over \$500 for a couple of years now.

Mr. ENGLISH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Sure.

Mr. ENGLISH. Again, what I think we are getting into here is extremely misleading, because we are talking about \$1.8 billion has been spent on the war on drugs. That is what the administration puts out. But, Mr. Anderson said well over 60 percent of cocaine comes in by air. That is what you are talking about. You are talking about crack. Well, of that, we find that there has only been \$70 million out of \$1.8 billion that has been spent on the air program.

You have only got seven airplanes, interdiction airplanes, for the whole darn Nation. Now, the amazing thing to me—if you want to get in and look at the numbers, if that is what the gentleman is interested in—it is amazing to me that we have been able to interdict, if you will, as much cocaine as we have. Seven airplanes for the whole blooming country, up against 18,000 flights?

You know that is the amazing thing—\$70 million out of \$1.8 billion, that is what it really comes down to. This country has never seen an effort. We have yet to see a war on drugs. That is the whole darn point, and the bottom line is the question of whether this Nation has the commitment to provide the resources to really do it.

There is no single magic bullet. It is going to take treatment, it is going to take crop eradication where these crops are grown, interdiction, education. Education across the board. It is that serious.

That is what a war is all about. That is the reason I say if we are really going to look at this, we look at not \$700 million, we are looking at \$70 million. That is what the air interdiction program costs. That is it. That is all we spent.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Those are good observations, and I conclude though, from what I have heard, that I am going to have a lot of trouble deciding in the next few weeks how much of the money in the omnibus drug bill is going to be dedicated to interdiction versus the other important things, like drying up the market, getting to the farmers down there, drying up the market up here by education, because I don't see right now the data that I need to make those decisions on what is the quintessential interdiction program. How far can we go with money on interdiction before we are playing a marginal game, as you just said? Who is qualified to answer that question?

Mr. VIALET. If I could make one point on that, we too are very troubled by the lack of data that you find, and I think one thing that is fairly clear, one of the reasons why you lack good data

about how much drugs is coming into the country and what kind and where and by what mode is that we lack a surveillance system which would enable us to know even who is coming in and how they are coming in.

So until you have the capability to detect the number of smuggling intrusions and intelligence about the amount of drugs that are coming in, you are not going to be able to make a very good judgment. You won't have the data you need to accurately deploy the interdiction resources.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. \$1.8 billion, is that the price tag for interdiction?

Mr. VIALET. No, sir.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. That is all law enforcement?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. What would you say is being spent? You say \$700 million was the price tag?

Mr. ANDERSON. That includes an awful lot of Coast Guard money.

Mr. ENGLISH. I believe the figures that I have seen are \$400 and some odd million, between \$400 and \$500 million, and over \$350 million of that is Coast Guard. Whenever you get a Coast Guard cutter out there—for instance, that Coast Guard cutter out of Long Beach that we are talking about, obviously if it has an air and sea rescue need, it is going to be involved in air and sea rescue.

It has a lot of functions other than strictly drug interdiction, and those cutters that are up out of San Francisco, those four cutters and the two out of Seattle I would dare say are being counted as a part of the war on drugs even though they have virtually no function. That is what is misleading, I think.

Mr. VIALET. Mr. Chairman, we have looked at the numbers that are put out. These are basically coming out of the drug law enforcement budget that the White House puts out. They collect those numbers from the budget offices of the different agencies including the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard does have a system, a cost allocation system, which is, we would say, pretty reasonable, and the numbers they put out in terms of drug interdiction are basically based on mission hours that are dedicated to this. They would not be including search and rescue type missions.

Mr. ENGLISH. The point I am making is, though, if an air and sea rescue mission team came up for that boat in that area, they certainly wouldn't say, "No, we are doing drugs today, we are not going to perform air and sea rescue."

Mr. VIALET. They would divert to that.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is exactly right.

Mr. VIALET. But the budget numbers are only the interdiction hours.

Mr. ENGLISH. Still, the point we make is that primarily the Coast Guard money has been spent on marijuana.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. DioGuardi's concern is cocaine and crack.

Mr. VIALET. If I can just give you some numbers. In fiscal 1986 when we talk about Federal spending on drug interdiction, border interdiction, not talking about the stuff at the ports of entry—

Mr. ENGLISH. Can you separate out between that which is predominantly spent on marijuana as opposed to cocaine?

Mr. VIALET. You can do a pretty good job because you can say the Coast Guard is mainly catching marijuana and you are talking about \$398 million for Coast Guard drug interdiction activities. They are catching some cocaine but mainly what Coast Guard is catching is marijuana.

You have got \$90.4 million budgeted for fiscal 1986 for Customs air programs and you have \$33.8 million budgeted for Customs marine programs. So in total you are talking about \$120 to \$130 million budgeted for those two Customs programs where you would be catching a major portion of the cocaine that is being seized. That would be the predominant way you would catch that cocaine coming into the country.

In other words, you are talking about \$120 million being budgeted primarily to catch cocaine. There is also cocaine coming through the ports of entry and being seized by Customs inspectors.

[For the record, GAO added that approximately \$250 million was budgeted for Customs' interdiction efforts in addition to the air and marine programs: most of this is spent at ports of entry.]

Mr. DIOGUARDI. As one member, I have concluded we need to devote substantially more resources to the overall effort involving drugs in this country, and now I have got to decide how much of that money should be interdiction money, and I need to get my hands on better information, both quantitative and qualitative. Let me ask you another question here, a few more questions.

If you were to guess or if you were to—I don't know whether you can conclude. How do you think the present interdiction system was put there? Do you think it was because a couple of Congressmen got so excited they yelled and screamed, put pressure on the system and therefore we have it here and there; or is there some design that you see, some overall macro design, so that we can look at the country and be sure that the interdiction net is an effective one?

Mr. ANDERSON. You know the Southeast situation, the relatively effective coverage there goes back to the Vice President's South Florida Task Force, when the marijuana and cocaine situation absolutely got out of hand there and Colombians and Cubans were killing each other on the streets of Miami. That focused national attention and high-level administration attention on the Florida area. All at once the resources, the aerostats, the Coast Guard presence, the aircraft were made available, and so that is I think what lays behind that.

I am not aware of any master plan that drives what we have in place here. It has been reactive and, I think, at the prodding of Chairman English and others.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let me correct you very quickly. The two aerostats you talked about, one at Patrick and one at Cariball, came about because Congress put them in, and the administration fought those. Congress was responsible for those aerostats. The only one that was there earlier was the one at Cudjoe Key, an Air Force aerostat, and again the Congress insisted on the information being given to Customs.

The Air Force was not in favor of that particular idea. I think you would need to be careful as far as exactly who is responsible for what went on down in south Florida.

Mr. ANDERSON. I think a real problem here, Mr. DioGuardi, is that people responsible for interdiction say that Customs saw the problem but given the financial problems we are operating in where Customs has seen 2,000 people go off the payroll in the last 5 years it was absolutely unrealistic for them to think that they could ever acquire the resources that they probably saw were needed to do the job. I think that is a consideration here as well.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. The thing that concerns me most is that if we do a very effective job, which I think we are beginning to do maybe in the Miami area, and others, it is like putting your finger in the dike. We have seen that interdiction is really not working, because the amount of cocaine is increasing that is coming into this country, and it seems to me that we have to look at a macro system here, a net, if you will, so that if we do a good job here and they try to get around it it is going to be caught somewhere else. Whose responsibility is it to design this system?

Mr. ANDERSON. I would say that right now if you look for a place in Government where that responsibility resides, it would be part of the Attorney General's role as Chairman of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Mr. Chairman, shouldn't we maybe have the Attorney General down here at one of our meetings to ask him what he is doing to come up with a strategic plan?

Mr. ENGLISH. He has been invited numerous times, Mr. DioGuardi. He is not interested in coming before this subcommittee. We also had the Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Jensen, come up, and he enlightened us with regard to the Drug Enforcement Policy Board's knowledge on interdiction, which seemed to be extremely limited. In fact we talked to him a good deal about the fact that they took a White House policy paper and reproduced it, and sent it over to the Congress as their report to the Congress.

I have got to say personally I haven't been terribly impressed with the Drug Enforcement Policy Board's sincerity in this area, and particularly their knowledge as far as interdiction in general is concerned. So I would be delighted to have the Attorney General any time that he is willing to come, and we will continue to invite the Attorney General. But we have not seemed to be able to do it.

Let me also say time is getting away from us. We have two members who haven't had an opportunity to ask questions, and I would like to move on as soon as we complete this round. I want to go to the 5-minute rule and we will try to restrict discussions.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Just to conclude then, I think what I am looking for is something that is cost effective. Certainly something that is effective, but something that is cost effective. Is the public getting its money's worth from the money we are going to spend? I think we need to design a system that is going to convince me that it will work before we can start talking about the money. I think that in the next couple of weeks you will find many Congressmen who say, hey, we have got to allocate money in spite of the budget crisis. This is something we can't hold back on, but how much and why. I think we need a lot more information before we can do that, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, we are going to be able to get that information, because I would like to see an effective net designed that can protect all of us.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would simply say, Mr. DioGuardi, that there are 38 hearings backing up the recommendations in the interdiction area, and I would dare say that that is probably more in the way of substantiation, information, whatever you would like, to back up that portion of the bill than perhaps any other. So you might want to review the hearings, the 38 hearings that we have had, and I think you can see at each and every point the need for those items that are contained in that portion of the proposal. Mr. Neal.

Mr. NEAL. I am sorry I had to miss the earlier part.

Mr. Chairman, maybe you are the one to ask this question of. You have been a real leader in this field for a long time, and have held numerous hearings on the subject. I know you have come to the conclusion that we need a multifaceted program, interdiction being an important part, education, and so on.

Have you concluded in your own mind a list of priorities in this program? Do you know what percent of our resources we ought to commit to education, how much to interdiction, and so on?

Mr. ENGLISH. The only observation I could make on that, Mr. Neal—I appreciate that—is from the standpoint that we are in fact fighting a war. It is one we are losing and we are losing badly. We have two options available to us. We can continue along with the rhetoric. We can issue the press releases, you know, and every 3 or 4 years we will have some politician that is going to rediscover that we have a problem with drugs in this country, and he will declare a new war on drugs.

The first one, as far as I know, was back when Jerry Ford was President, and he declared the first war on drugs. I think Jimmy Carter declared one. And now Ronald Reagan has declared one. The situation has continued to deteriorate, continued to get worse, and we have found that very few Presidents, Democrats and Republicans, have really put their money where their mouth is. That is the bottom line.

Now, if this is a war, if it is that serious, if this country really wants to do something about it, we are going to have to fight it like a war. It is going to have to be approached on that basis. That means that each and every facet of it, from the point where that crop is grown all the way down to the individual who consumes it, through education and treatment, we are going to have to fight that war.

Now, there is not going to be any easy way out, and quite frankly it is going to take a commitment of resources. But I don't know that we can go in and say, you know, this percentage ought to go for education and this percentage for treatment and this percentage for investigation. I think we have got to look at where the real gaps are, and we have got to make a total effort, a solid commitment all the way across the board. I am hopeful that is what the Congress is going to do. The package that I have seen that has been put together I think certainly comes very close to meeting those requirements. It is a minimum. This is not a package with fat in it. It is a trimmed-down version, and certainly can only be viewed as being a minimum. But if we are going to fight the fight and if it is worth fighting, let's make the commitment now and let's do it.

Mr. NEAL. Have our witnesses interpreted—

Mr. ANDERSON. Here is how I would respond to that question, Mr. Neal. Let's think of the components of the drug war, and where the probabilities of success might lie, if we attack that part of the problem. I think with respect to education, when I look at what happened to alcohol and cigarettes—and 35 percent of American adults are still smoking, after everything that we have heard I can't be too optimistic that that boat can be turned around anytime soon through education of young folks. I don't know. That would be my sense of it, that might help a bit in the long, long run, but it is not going to turn the situation around anytime quickly.

As for overseas eradication, some of the hinterlands of too many countries are really, you know, almost out of the control of the central government. It would seem to me there is always going to be a supply—Burma, the bandit warlords and that sort of thing and the hinterlands of Bolivia and Peru. Source eradication, crop substitution, I think, has been shown to be really a bankrupt idea. So that kind of leaves it to interdiction to keep the drugs away. I see what DEA is trying to do in breaking up the criminal networks arresting the big crooks is a means of keeping the drugs out of circulation. It is a tough war all across the fronts.

My priorities? I don't know, but I guess what I am saying is that I don't see much hope in drug abuse education in the short run. Maybe what we can do is constrain the supply, and perhaps through criminal penalties try to discourage some people from getting involved in drug trafficking.

Mr. NEAL. I am struck with several observations, and I don't really know what they all add up to. Back in the earlier part of this century, we declared war on alcohol apparently, and that war went on. I believe people would say that was a fairly serious war. We changed the Constitution of the United States, went through a war. That war was not won.

I am struck by a couple of other things. I understand that the heroin population, heroin-using population, heroin addict population in this country, has remained almost constant at about 500,000 people for many, many years.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. NEAL. I remember 20-some years ago that the drug called speed, methylamphetamine, was very popular for a while, and I don't know that there was any war on speed, but the word sort of got out that speed was harmful to people, and people pretty much quit using it. I don't hear about people using that drug anymore. Maybe they do. I don't read about it in the paper. Maybe it is a major problem.

These are sort of unrelated, it looks like unrelated facts, but it seems to me one of the things it says, it would seem to me if education didn't work, then you would probably have a much larger heroin-using population in this country. I mean, I raise the question: Why do we only have—any is too much, I guess, but why has that population remained about static?

Certainly we haven't stopped the flow of heroin. It apparently comes in just like cocaine does. It is grown in many parts of the world. Why don't we—why aren't as many people using speed? Why don't we read about the problems with it?

Mr. ANDERSON. It seems that the younger people are turning to the other drugs. The younger folks seem to be going for PCP and some of the other drugs like cocaine. I don't know the reason. Maybe some of the folks here with me can venture a guess.

Mr. NEAL. Is it possible that a lot of people have a little bit of common sense, and they say, "We don't want to be addicted to a drug for the rest of our lives," and therefore don't take it?

Mr. ANDERSON. When I see those numbers going up on the people that are using cocaine year by year by year——

Mr. NEAL. Let me stop you. I think that is correct, but wasn't it felt for a long time that cocaine was not addicting, and it appears now, from what I read, that more and more folks are telling us that it is addictive, and that this crack, a derivative of cocaine, is very highly addictive. I don't know how widely that word is spread, but my guess is that the more people that know that, the fewer that will be tempted to fool with it.

Mr. ANDERSON. GAO studied high school seniors annually, and I know in the last couple of years cocaine use has been going up, up, up. My recollection is that about 6 percent of high school seniors admit to using cocaine in the last 30 days. I can't remember exactly how the question is posed. It will be interesting next year, after we have had the Len Bias and other widely publicized situations, to see whether we have a down turn in high school seniors using cocaine. As I said, until this year it has been a straight lineup, and, you know, your premise will be tested, sir. I will be interested to see the results of the next survey.

Mr. NEAL. I will, too.

Mr. ENGLISH. It might be best if we get someone from NIDA or some psychologist to respond. GAO studied strictly interdiction.

Mr. NEAL. That is all you looked at, is interdiction?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. NEAL. May I just ask one other question. You mentioned, I know hesitatingly, a few minutes ago that you thought the interdiction rate was about 15 or 20 percent. How do you make that estimate? Let me tell you why I ask the question.

I remember years ago along with the chairman on the Select Committee on Narcotics, was given estimates by DEA and other Government officials. It turned out the way they were estimating the amount of drug interdiction was to multiply by 10 whatever it was that they picked up. They said we are interdicting about 10 percent of what is being used.

Mr. ANDERSON. I can lead you through that, sir. First, it really starts with overseas estimates on gross cocaine cultivation, estimated coca leaf yield, maximum capacity, diversion to other countries. That is how they estimate the amount available, then they try and account for its distribution.

In terms of consumption, it is through surveys of what people are buying on the streets, that they guesstimate the user population and what quantities they are buying. The whole thing is very, very soft, especially in terms of coca production. I can never forget that a couple of years ago in Mexico they seized about five times more marijuana than they thought we were taking in from Mexico. In any event, they do start with actual production capacity in the coca-producing countries.

Mr. NEAL. May I ask just one final question. If you were spending x amount of dollars on interdiction now, and we are getting 20 percent, is it your conclusion that if we spend five times that amount we would get 100 percent? If we upped the interdiction—

Mr. ANDERSON. What we haven't had anyplace along that border yet is a very good detection capability. In other words, I won't say that we could achieve 100 percent with people being people and equipment being equipment. But we have never even come close to that. I really don't know. If the whole border were covered with continuing detection ability so that we actually knew when they were coming in all instances and had the necessary assets to pursue, chase, and capture, it would make a difference, but we have never had that or even on any part of the border, so we really don't know what is achievable. I guess I can say that it is an untested assumption.

Mr. NEAL. Have you ever looked back at our war against liquor and tried to draw any conclusions on that?

Mr. ANDERSON. No, we haven't, sir.

Mr. NEAL. I wonder if there are any lessons to be learned there?

Mr. ANDERSON. The lesson is probably the futility on the education side of trying to change people's desire to seek some kind of a mental high in one fashion or another.

Mr. NEAL. Thank you.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Lightfoot.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let's go back to numbers for just a minute. Last February this subcommittee was told that the Customs Service had a number of authorized, in fact a large number of authorized positions that were not filled. Basically, some of them due to trying to recruit pilots and this type of thing. Did you, when you were going through the Customs Service resources, did you take a look at those vacancies and the cause for them being vacant, and how much they hurt interdiction efforts?

Mr. VIALET. Well, sir, we can say a couple of things about that. First of all, Customs has been in recent months undergoing a reclassification of many of its personnel to investigative positions.

When we were out in the field we talked to operating people at the air and marine branches and they told us that there were problems occurring simply as a result, first of all, of a long period of uncertainty about who was going to be affected by this.

And then there was a problem in terms of the shifting of people at these air and marine units specifically, out of their former jobs and into investigative positions so that they no longer directly reported to the air or marine branch. Although they remained there physically, they are reporting to the Customs special agent in charge in the area.

Mr. ANDERSON. I think on an overall basis what we do know is that Customs has taken about a 2,000-person cut over the last 4 years or so. In the work we have done on the cargo inspection side, the other part of what the Customs mission is all about, we heard severe complaints about shortages of people to do that work. They were saying that their people were going over to the interdiction side of the business, that Customs was trying to man as best they

could this side of their mission at the expense of effectively inspecting cargo.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Are there vacancies, authorized vacancies, in Customs now?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. How much?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir; there are. I can't give you a number at this point in time but I will be happy to provide it for the record.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. I would appreciate it if you would.

[The information follows:]

The Customs Service's fiscal year 1987 budget submission provides the following information on unfilled positions:

	Fiscal year 1985	Fiscal year 1986 (estimate)	Fiscal year 1987 (estimate)
Total permanent positions.....	14,301	14,078	13,358
Unfilled positions end of year.....	(1,616)	(521)	(494)
Total permanent employment end of year.....	12,685	13,557	12,864

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. It seems strange that they are talking about cuts but yet they still have vacancies. It doesn't pan out too well, unless my country mathematics don't work all that good, which they don't at times.

What about Mexico? We are having some problems with Mexico, as most of us are aware, I guess. There is no international air space. The aerostats that we used over in the Southeast, we had some problems there with efficiency. I believe you testified it is 49 percent operational. Do you think that is a route we should pursue in that area? What are your feelings on that?

Mr. ANDERSON. Right now we do not have that detection capability in most places along the border to even detect smuggling aircraft. There are real problems with interdicting smuggling aircraft arriving from Mexico. Of course I presume we could look into Mexico with radar, so smuggling aircraft would not be visible for the first time when they cross the border. But it is going to be a tough situation to sort out the real smugglers from legitimate traffic and track them, because I presume there will be some traffic on the radar that is going to stay in Mexico.

You would have to be capable of quick reaction once they cross the border. You would have to spot them in Mexico, seemingly bent on an intrusion, and get your aircraft up in the air, recognizing in some instances they are probably going to turn around once they know that they are locked on radar and turn around and go back. There are difficulties on that border because there is no international air space.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. What about cooperation with the Mexican Government?

Mr. ANDERSON. I am sorry, all I know about that, sir, is what I read in the paper. Unfortunately, we are not privy to the specifics.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Due to the fact that we don't have the international air space, is the aerostat the best system we have available

under today's technology to put in that area, or do you see something else that could work better?

Mr. ANDERSON. I gather what we need is the capability to reach into Mexico as far as we can, in order to detect the targets as they are heading in our direction. I personally am not technically qualified to speak about the best system.

Obviously we have surveillance aircraft, the E2-C's would be up there with radar, perhaps, looking into Mexico at a farther distance than the aerostat could. I don't know what all the options are, sir, but obviously the higher you go and the more sophisticated the radar, the farther you can look into Mexico, the better off you are going to be in anticipating a target coming through.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. I lived in Texas at one time and, being a pilot, was making a late-night flight for a legitimate reason and was accosted by people who thought we had something on board. It is kind of a shattering experience. They do, a lot comes across that border, and most of it at night. You can fly that border and see all kind of places where aircraft can land, that have been deserted. Operational security, you mentioned in your testimony, I think, that you feel that that is lacking in some areas. What can we do about it?

Mr. ANDERSON. Some vulnerabilities are going to remain regardless, such as the smuggler identifying whether a cutter is in the harbor or at sea. There is not much you can do about that. A correctable vulnerability is the lack of secure voice communications. I am sure you are aware that in some drug busts they have found extensive hours of taping by smugglers of communications among law enforcement folks, but secure communications, even at this late date, still hasn't been accomplished throughout the law enforcement community, and so smugglers still have the opportunity to monitor conversations—at least that is the latest information I have. They are working at it, high-frequency single-side band communication of some kind or another. But they are not there yet. That is something that they could address.

I guess the information on deployment schedules and that sort of thing, now unclassified, could be better protected with security classifications. The point that the chairman made earlier about the map on the radar coverage just being up for public display in the Customs headquarters in El Paso, there is not a sensitivity to this kind of information as there would be if it was military-type information.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. I am not trying to read something into what you are saying, but something that is available, encrypting equipment, for example, the technology that we have, equipment is available today. The introduction of that into these units that are trying to patrol these areas, that would be of benefit then?

Mr. ANDERSON. I am sure that the Department of Defense has ways to secure communications in some fashion. Even big business encodes its communications.

Mr. VIALET. Just to expand further, sir. For example, there is a lack of extensive detailed background checks on many of the people that are working in some of the customs stations. There are very simple kinds of security problems which I think a good security survey could identify and fix with a minimum amount of money, so

that although there may be some major problems that cost something to fix there are also some low-cost fixes that are available; such as background checks, keeping sensitive information classified and put in safes, not letting just anybody in the doors, and other security improvements.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Then it would be possible and a very good idea if we would introduce some of those measures right now?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. And that could be done at a relatively low cost?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir; and that would be a top priority in my judgment.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Thank you very much, Mr. Lightfoot.

I would like to very quickly take you around the rest of the border, Mr. Anderson, and to see what we have available there. As I understand it, we now have, say in the Tucson area support branch, we have two P-3's that have F-15 radars, we have one Cessna Citation as an interceptor, and two Blackhawks.

At the El Paso air support branch we have no detection. We have no interceptors. We have no seizure aircraft.

At San Antonio, TX, we have no detection aircraft, one interceptor, no seizure aircraft.

In Houston, TX, we have no detection aircraft, we have no interceptors, and we have no seizure aircraft. Is that correct?

Mr. ANDERSON. That is correct, sir. There are some helicopters in El Paso. I know you are aware they have two Cobras. And in Houston they have a Cobra as well.

Mr. ENGLISH. Do those helicopters have the range?

Mr. ANDERSON. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And can they carry a bust team?

Mr. ANDERSON. No.

Mr. ENGLISH. So they are not properly equipped. In effect, you are carrying one guy who has to turn his back on smugglers as he crawls out before making an arrest. We have little in the way of detection resources other than the two P-3A's. The aircraft that we have there, how many days a week can they fly? How many hours?

Mr. ANDERSON. They are scheduled for alert for 8 hours, 5 days a week.

Mr. ENGLISH. Two-thirds of each day even of those 5 days that they will be flying there is no crew?

Mr. ANDERSON. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. There is no one there to fly them, right?

Mr. VIALET. Tucson does extend that a little bit, 3 or 4 days a week they will be on alert an additional shift, but El Paso and San Antonio are on alert one 8-by-5 shift.

Mr. ENGLISH. But this 8-by-5 situation exists all the way around the border?

Mr. VIALET. Basically.

Mr. ENGLISH. All the Customs air support branches?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir; that is correct, except, for Miami which operates two shifts, 5 days a week and Tucson which is increasing its weekly schedule to over 40 hours.

Mr. ENGLISH. Increasing or have increased?

Mr. VIALET. Have increased it somewhat.

Mr. ENGLISH. Somewhat?

Mr. VIALET. Three to five days a week they are on alert for an additional shift.

Mr. ENGLISH. The other thing that we get down to, then, that means two-thirds of the time—well, better than two-thirds of the time, that would take us up, what, at least 70 percent of the time we don't have anybody there to detect, do we?

Mr. ANDERSON. That is right.

Mr. ENGLISH. There is no crew, no nothing. We can't even fly. Even with the aerostat down in the Florida region off Freeport, Cariball, even when it is up flying there may not be a crew there to respond to the targets that they find; is that correct?

Mr. VIALET. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many additional personnel would it take to bring that up to the Customs Service's target of 7 days a week, 16 hours a day?

Mr. VIALET. We would have to provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

As of March 1986, Customs had 258 persons on board its Air Program compared with 392 authorized. In its Five-year Force Structure and Financial Plan, 1986-1990, Customs projected a staffing need of 591 for a 16-hour, 7-day a week operation with the number of aircraft expected to be in service. With planned additions of aircraft, Customs projected a staffing need of 867 in 1987 and 1,002 in 1988 to sustain a 16-hour, 7-day a week operation.

Mr. ENGLISH. I believe that Customs has testified it takes 650 people, and they now have 280?

Mr. VIALET. That sounds about right.

Mr. ENGLISH. In effect, they are going to have to more than double what they have in place. Also I noticed, Mr. Anderson, when you were talking, you were talking about on the southwest border they are increasing by 350, but isn't it also true that the President earlier this year requested cuts of 770 personnel?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. So the 350, in effect he is restoring 350 of the 770 he had already cut, which still leaves a loss?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir. We are not sure where those 350 would be coming from or in what capacity they would be deployed. It is possible that some of those would be in investigative positions.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is also my understanding none of those would be in the air?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir. We don't know where they are going to put them.

Mr. ENGLISH. So that would not in any way put us in a position to respond to the air threat. These people would be on the ground. They can be down there watching those smugglers as they fly over in the nighttime, I guess. That is about what location they would be in, wouldn't it? Isn't that correct?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And if they are investigators, as far as FBI and DEA and people that are being brought down there, they are not involved in interdiction, are they?

Mr. VIALET. No, sir; they are not.

Mr. ENGLISH. That has absolutely nothing to do with interdiction?

Mr. VIALET. No, sir. The Operation Alliance is an expansion of what was called the Southwest Border Initiative several months prior to that time. At that time it was more clearly aimed primarily at drug interdiction. Since that time the concept has been expanded somewhat, so it does include these other things like the prosecutors and the FBI and ATF and so forth.

Mr. ENGLISH. It takes on more of a Justice Department hue, right?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. After the Attorney General has had a chance to kind of massage it a little bit; is that correct?

With regard to the gulf coast, you were mentioning the boats that we have down there. Would you go through that again, Mr. Anderson? Specifically, what do we have in the way of boats in the gulf coast area?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir, let me dig that out, if I may.

[The information follows:]

GAO subsequently stated that Customs marine interdiction programs has 28 vessels in its South Central Region, and the U.S. Coast Guard has 4 medium-endurance cutters based in its 8th district which includes the gulf coast area. These cutters are used to patrol the Yucatan Channel.

Mr. ENGLISH. Could I touch on another subject very quickly, Mr. Anderson. With regard to all these areas, whether talking about the west coast, southwest coast, gulf coast, the southern Florida area or up the east coast, what kind of command and control is there? Is there a command and control center that coordinates the marine and air traffic and coordinates with what detection we may be pulling down from the military, to make certain that these resources mesh and work together?

Mr. ANDERSON. I think the closest thing we have to it is in Florida, where we have a jointly colocated facility. where we have the various agencies relatively accessible to one another. Beyond that—

Mr. ENGLISH. Is there any evidence that those agencies are working together? Do we have those various agencies, the Customs and the Coast Guard, working together, meshing plans? "We are going to be here tonight, you be over here so we get all this entire broad expanse of water and air covered." Is there any evidence of that?

Mr. ANDERSON. I can't speak to that, sir.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir; I can say that the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System has been engaged to some extent in coordinating these activities, not obviously to the extent that we would like to see, but compared to what we saw in our prior look, there has been an increase in the coordination.

Mr. ENGLISH. You are telling me then that the National Border Interdiction System is telling Customs, "You will have your boats here, you will have airplanes there"?

Mr. VIALET. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. "You will have Coast Guard there"?

Mr. VIALET. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. What are they doing then?

Mr. VIALET. They are passing information along, basically serving as a conduit.

Mr. ENGLISH. All they are doing is passing information as to what one person has done?

Mr. VIALET. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. So there is absolutely no one that says, "OK, let's get together here, we are going to plan this thing out. We will have our boats in this particular area. You have your boats in that area, and we are going to have our airplanes in this region." Is there any of that going on?

Mr. ANDERSON. We know that the arrangements have been criticized because there is this disconnect on marine versus air, and now we have some of the smugglers coming in with a combination of the two, and we are really not geared up to address that.

Mr. ENGLISH. The majority of the smuggling activity in south Florida is taking place that way, isn't it?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that happening? Is there coordination there? Did you find any evidence of it?

Mr. VIALET. The negative of it, sir. We have seen complaints that it isn't occurring.

Mr. ENGLISH. I want to know, though, if you have any evidence that it has taken place.

Mr. VIALET. Sir, I would have to say that when we talked to operating personnel, they said that NNBIS was giving—

Mr. ENGLISH. I am not talking about passing information on. I am talking about planning sessions where these people work together, whether this system is meshed together. Keep in mind you have your own test, you have Cariball operating at times when you haven't any airplanes up. You will have to explain that to me if you come back and say yes.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir; I guess I would have to say that the NNBIS people, members of the NNBIS group, are.

Mr. ENGLISH. NNBIS, you have already told me, is not operational. You said all they have done is passed on information. Have they done more than passed on information or not?

Mr. VIALET. They are, for example, planning special operations, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is not what we are talking about. We are talking about day in and day out activities.

Mr. VIALET. In terms of coordinating, I guess I would have to say, sir, that passing on information is a pretty valuable thing.

Mr. ENGLISH. What about execution of operations?

Mr. ANDERSON. I am afraid there are questions out there we didn't ask, Mr. Chairman. That is why we are hemming and hawing here. Most of our attention was on individual agency missions, and I am afraid something may have slipped through that we don't know about.

Mr. ENGLISH. Look, OK, let's get down to it, though, gentlemen, and just say so if you don't know. Is there joint planning taking place on a day-by-day operation as far as the Coast Guard and Customs, air and marine branches are concerned in south Florida?

Beyond that, if there is any planning—which I certainly don't know about—but if there is any such planning, is there any evidence then that those activities are executed in cooperation?

Mr. ANDERSON. Can we caucus for just a second, sir?

Mr. ENGLISH. Sure.

Mr. ANDERSON. They are not getting together on a daily basis to coordinate operations, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is the point I am getting to. So there is no coordination of operations.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir, that is what I am told.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we have the left hand that doesn't know what the right hand is doing?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is the point I want to come down to.

Now, we have at Patrick Air Force Base the Patrick balloon. We have it listed up there. You mentioned it as one of the aerostats. Congress provided the money for that particular aerostat.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that aerostat operating today?

Mr. ANDERSON. I think it is.

Mr. VIALET. Would you repeat the name?

Mr. ENGLISH. Patrick.

Mr. VIALET. Patrick has been down since the *Challenger* went down.

Mr. ENGLISH. Why?

Mr. VIALET. I am not privy to the exact reasons. I know it was damaged in some violent weather. As to why the Air Force has chosen not to redeploy it, I don't know.

Mr. ENGLISH. The Air Force has chosen, even though the Congress provided the money—the Air Force decided they don't want to do it.

Mr. VIALET. It is my understanding they have not put it back up again. As to why they didn't, I don't know, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we can take that one off, can't we?

Mr. ANDERSON. You can, yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Take that one off, then.

With respect to the one at Freeport, I believe you mentioned that that is up around 50 percent of the time.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is down the rest of the time. Why?

Mr. ANDERSON. Weather, scheduled maintenance and maintenance problems.

Mr. ENGLISH. What percentage of the time it is down is maintenance?

Mr. ANDERSON. I have some numbers on that, sir.

Mr. VIALET. We just gave those earlier in a question.

Mr. ANDERSON. Twelve percent down for weather, 38 percent down for maintenance reasons, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. The other is staffing, isn't it?

Mr. VIALET. A large part of it would be, yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK.

Are you talking about 12 percent of the 50 percent or are you talking about 12 percent of the total?

Mr. ANDERSON. Twelve percent of the total.

Mr. ENGLISH. And isn't it true that that aerostat is only contracted for 16 hours a day?

Mr. VIALET. I believe that is the case, yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, the rest of the time would be the fact that we simply—the Government has not contracted for any more additional time than that.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, we could cut off half that aerostat, couldn't we?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir; that is effectively what you are doing.

Mr. ENGLISH. So that remains for the entire east coast of Florida which is where we have the majority of our effort. That is our show case place, right?

Mr. VIALET. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH. Of the entire Nation, that half the time there is nothing that can detect anything on the east coast of Florida.

Mr. VIALET. Not much, no, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, more than half the time?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK.

So then, all the smugglers have to do then is to see when the aerostat is up.

Mr. VIALET. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH. And whenever the contract time runs out, bring the aerostat down, and boom, that is where they go. Ninety miles across, boats 70 miles an hour.

Tell us about the marine program out of Florida, south Florida. How many boats do they have available, interceptors, properly equipped interceptors that can communicate with each other, interceptors that can communicate with aircraft?

Mr. VIALET. In terms of communication, or how many boats they have in total?

Mr. ENGLISH. I don't want total. I want properly equipped. I don't want to get back in the business of this guy out there in a rowboat with a pair of binoculars and we count them in our overall detection system.

Mr. VIALET. I would have to defer to Mr. Chappell to get the number.

Mr. ANDERSON. I have gross numbers that are too large, but we will have to break that down.

Mr. ENGLISH. Let's limit to high-speed interceptors. That ought to simplify it.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Customs Miami has one marine module which includes a radar platform, and two high-speed interceptors.

Mr. ANDERSON. I know there are three hydrofoil—sorry, Navy hydrofoils further south at Key West, one of which is on standby to take on a Coast Guard law enforcement group for interdiction purposes. So, apparently we are talking three high-speed interceptors.

Do you want to add to that?

Mr. CHAPPELL. To clarify what I said. Miami Customs has one marine module, with two intercept boats, but they also have five other high-speed interceptors.

Mr. ENGLISH. How many of those interceptors are generally operational?

[GAO provided the following information for the record: Customs' Miami marine vessels were reported out of service an average of 51 percent of the time in 1985—42 percent for maintenance

and repairs, 7 percent due to lack of staff, 2 percent for other reasons.]

Mr. ENGLISH. Let me get through this so we don't take a lot of time.

Isn't it true that some of those interceptors are interceptors that have been taken from drug smugglers. They are broken down much of the time. Much of the time we have had problems. There is often no money available for maintenance. They have set at the docks. Therefore, we have had absolutely nothing to challenge smugglers.

Mr. VIALET. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Isn't it also true that the Congress is providing 40 new interceptors coming on line now? Do they have personnel in Customs to operate those 40 new interceptors?

Mr. VIALET. Not at the present time, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. So we don't have anyone to put on them to man them. With respect to communications—and we mentioned this communications a little bit ago, particularly as far as Customs is concerned.

I think you were talking about DEA as far as secure communications. Does Customs have any secure communications coming on line?

Mr. VIALET. They are, I think, in the beginning stages of trying to test some secure communications equipment there, but they have not yet implemented a secure communications program.

Mr. ENGLISH. So at the present time, have no secure communications. There is no money that has been requested of the Congress for secure communications, is that correct?

Mr. VIALET. I would have to go back to the record, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I can assure you it is correct.

And is it not also true, then, that those interceptors, unless we get the communications equipment, they will not be able to speak to each other securely?

Mr. VIALET. Not securely.

Mr. ENGLISH. So the smugglers can listen in to what they say, where they are going, what their plans are, the whole business?

Mr. VIALET. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. And they cannot talk to aircraft above whom they see who may see smugglers.

Mr. VIALET. They can't talk securely to the aircraft, no.

Mr. ENGLISH. So, basically, we have half an aerostat out of Freeport—

Mr. VIALET. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH [continuing]. That cannot see boats. And we have detection aircraft that can fly 8 hours a day. We have some, at least. We don't have very many. We have two interceptors as far as aircraft and a couple bust helicopters.

Mr. VIALET. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH. And that is pretty much it, isn't it?

You mentioned the radars on some of the condominiums which I thought was an innovative idea. Do they have crews to man those? Up until recently they didn't have any crews.

Mr. VIALET. At the time we looked at it they were not manned.

Mr. ENGLISH. So you have radars up there but nobody to man them.

The President has asked for a cut of how many people this year?

Mr. VIALET. I believe 700-plus, something like that.

Mr. ENGLISH. So 770 people cut out, and we don't have enough people to man the boats, radars, and aircraft that we already have on hand, is that correct?

Mr. VIALET. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLISH. OK.

Mr. DioGuardi was talking about New York. We have the training area for E2-C of Norfolk and the Navy committed to us that they would keep an eye out for drug smugglers in that particular region. They would notify us if they saw anybody who fit the profile of a drug smuggler.

The New York Freeway goes through the Windward Passage, through Bahamas Strait north to New York, yes?

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. That is heavily trafficked. They don't call it a freeway for nothing, do they?

Mr. VIALET. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. A lot of smugglers are running that route, aren't they? So they are going right into New York.

How many reports have we had from the E2-C's to the Customs people about smugglers that are running through that route?

Mr. VIALET. None that we are aware of.

Mr. ENGLISH. Not a single one. So we might not as well have that orange E2-C up there.

You might as well peel off that one, and you might as well peel off the one on the southwest coast, because we don't use that either. Is that fairly accurate as the detection system of the United States on our borders to it?

[Staff removes indicators from map of United States.]

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

I think the important thing we ought to emphasize is that there is not very much out there in the way of detection equipment. Overall, there is just basically more hole than there is cheese.

Mr. ENGLISH. I would say there is more hole than cheese. You are naked.

Mr. VIALET. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. Absolutely naked. There is not even a fig leaf out there, is there?

Mr. VIALET. That is pretty close to the truth.

Mr. ENGLISH. And we have been talking, as I said, 10 years' worth of rhetoric from both political parties talking about the fact we have a war on drugs, by golly.

Mr. VIALET. And I think—

Mr. ENGLISH. The American people believe that. They have been misled, haven't they?

Mr. VIALET. Well, sir, I think it is important to say, if you look at the military flights, that the military flights themselves, obviously are a good idea, but they are augmenting flights and not intended to provide a full-scale detection capability.

You don't have that capability, and therefore the military flights obviously can't perform as effectively as they might have if you

had a full-scale detection system set up with adequate tactical intelligence.

So, I don't want to knock the military for what they are doing. I think it is——

Mr. ENGLISH. What are they doing?

Mr. VIALET. They are flying some detection missions.

Mr. ENGLISH. Just out there cutting donuts in the sky, aren't they? Isn't that right?

Mr. VIALET. It tends to end up that way.

Mr. ENGLISH. Putting in their time. That is what we call putting in your time, cruising around, just flying around, and if you see something, it doesn't matter. Of course, you know nobody is down there to respond, so why bother to call in.

Isn't that right?

Mr. ANDERSON. I guess the main thing is the probability of getting caught is so low even in south Florida where we have put a lot of assets that we still expect——

Mr. ENGLISH. Tell me, you said it—we put in a lot of assets. Tell me what.

Mr. ANDERSON. I say that relatively. We have done——

Mr. ENGLISH. Half an aerostat?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. Is that what you call a lot of assets, half an aerostat? Those run \$13 million apiece. The drug effort of the United States as far as we are where we put a lot of assets, we put \$7.5 million. No, \$6.5 million, excuse me. My arithmetic is a little high. That is the shame. That is what it is. It is a shame.

You know, that is what I hope, Mr. DioGuardi—when we consider this legislation and you look at what we have done, it is a wonder to me we caught any of those 18,000. A good portion of them crashed. That is the reason we caught them, frankly.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes; that is right.

Mr. ENGLISH. It is a wonder. How in the world did we catch 210 with no more than that? Just pure blind luck. We ran into the guys up in the sky. That is all it is. It is sad.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. DioGuardi.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. No questions.

Mr. ENGLISH. Again, I am serious about that aerostat up at Patrick Air Force Base. The Congress put the money up for that and directed that aerostat be flying. Isn't that your understanding?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. And it is not up and hasn't been up since February.

Mr. ANDERSON. Right.

Mr. ENGLISH. You have no—you have heard no explanation as to why that aerostat is not there?

Mr. VIALET. We don't know. We don't know why that is not up, sir. We have heard gossip, but I don't know what it is.

Mr. ENGLISH. What is the gossip? That is all we got to go on these days.

Mr. VIALET. Sir, I respectfully decline to say, sir. I think it would be hearsay.

Mr. ENGLISH. I was told by staff it is operational but it is not being used. That is even a greater mystery. You won't even give me a hint from the rumors standpoint?

Mr. VIALET. No, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I understand we have Col. Harvey Pothier here.

Would you like to come up? Do you have any explanation for us from the Department of Defense as to what—why this aerostat is not being utilized?

I know I am putting you on the spot, and I apologize for that, but my curiosity is killing me. I don't understand, as naked as we are in this country, why that thing is not up there performing its duty.

**STATEMENT OF COL. HARVEY POTHIER, USAF, DOD TASK FORCE
ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT**

Colonel POTHIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe that the point of its not being utilized—may I ask for clarification of that, because it is up and operational since June 28 and it is digitally linked to the Miami C-cubed just as the Cudjoe Key aerostat is.

Mr. ENGLISH. I appreciate that very much.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. DioGuardi.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Another comment here. It just seems to me that, No. 1, I have to applaud your efforts. I think you have done a great job in getting information to the public on the interdiction effort. Many of those meetings preceded my coming to Congress.

You have referred to 10 years of interdiction. But yet in the next few weeks you, probably more than any other Congressman, are going to be looked to in terms of making a recommendation to Congress as to how much money we have to now allocate to this effort. Based on what I have heard here, the management of what we now have allocated, which apparently is not enough in terms of quantitative resources, is not good.

Is this going to be another example, Mr. Chairman, where we are going to be throwing money at a problem and it is going to be wasted because we don't have in place right now the quarterback, we don't have in place the team to carry out the mission to do the job? Yet, because of political pressures we are going to have to be forced to allocate the money to make it look like we are doing our job.

What I have heard here, Mr. Chairman, and I think you have made a good point, is that we are not getting the responsiveness we need. There is not in place right now a team that is linked. There is certainly not in place right now a quarterback that is calling the shots and communicating.

Yet, Congress, it seems to me, will have to allocate a lot of money in the next couple weeks. So I want to work with you in coming up with the best possible system. But doesn't that scare you in the sense that we may be allocating \$1 billion or more just for interdiction and yet we don't have the comfort of a management system here that seems to be able to deliver the services?

Mr. ENGLISH. I think you make a good point, Mr. DioGuardi. Obviously, as you know, the Congress can authorize. The Congress can

appropriate. We can make available the tools. The bottom line is, it is up to the President of the United States and the administration to utilize those tools.

Now, I have, let me say, the greatest respect for the President, and particularly for the First Lady's efforts. I think she is very sincere in what she is doing. I cannot say the same as far as others within the administration.

When I find this kind of activity coming out of the Defense Department, when we find that the Department of Defense takes it upon its own to interpret and carry out the law the way that they want to carry it out, not the way that it was written, when I find that the former Secretary of the Treasury and the man who is today Chief of Staff for the President of the United States decides it is more important to refurbish some offices down at the Treasury Department than it is to provide the gas and oil for detection aircraft, I have to wonder about his priorities.

That is the bottom line. At some point the administration has to assume the responsibilities to carry out this program.

We have a lot of dedicated law enforcement officials out there, people who really want to do the job. They wouldn't be here if they were not dedicated.

Given the starvation that they have had over the years in assets to carry out their responsibilities and do their job, you know it is amazing that they are still there and willing to go out day in and day out and go up with a pair of binoculars and take on this kind of onslaught.

It is amazing, but they have been willing to do it.

I think that we have an obligation to them to give them a chance. Let them do the job. I think that we have a responsibility to put the heat on the administration to make sure that those assets are well used. There is no question about the need.

There is no question that we can bring a tremendous amount of pressure to bear as far as interdiction is concerned. We can do it in investigations. We can do it with crop eradication. We can do it with treatment, but we have to do a complete program, a complete effort.

You are absolutely right in requesting documentation as to how those assets can best be utilized. The program I put forth that I offered in the five bills that I submitted cost \$970 million. It is a lot of money.

Most of that is first time—or one time, I should say, purchase of assets—aircraft, radars, command and control centers, so we can make sure all this stuff works together, as it obviously is not doing today, making sure that we do have a united effort that those assets are spread and used in the most effective way.

I think that in the 38 hearings—39 with this hearing—that we had, we can go through and document each and every one of those dollars. There is no question in my mind if those dollars are utilized correctly it will have a big impact, a powerful impact.

I am hopeful it will be done.

Staff had generally put up where those assets would be located, and they do include the utilization of the military, and it does require the military to cooperate and play a major role in supporting law enforcement officials, particularly using detection assets.

I think with those kinds of assets in place we can have a tremendous impact on the war on drugs.

Mr. Anderson, do you have any comments?

Mr. ANDERSON. I would comment that in terms of the overall management of these assets, you know, it is something that obviously you and the Congress should be concerned about, sir.

I think the point might be well taken that you are placing the responsibility on the people that will get these assets to use them effectively, and you obviously should be assured that these coordination problems that NNBIS isn't solving in terms of joint fashion should be part and parcel of the package, and I don't know what provisions have been made or should be made in that regard.

Mr. ENGLISH. Now that you bring it up, there is another of those bills—one of the five bills deals with reorganization.

I think that is a very, very important issue.

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. ENGLISH. It requires—in fact, it requires the President within 6 months to submit his ideas as to how he thinks this should all be pulled together.

I think the law enforcement assets of this Nation with its interdiction, investigations, should be pulled together in a coordinated effort. As it is now, though, as you well know, they are far too often in rivalries, fight with each other, struggle with budgets.

All this gets in the way of a comprehensive effort, one that is coordinated and makes sense.

That piece of legislation asks the President to submit his recommendations, and it will require those of us on this committee to come back, examine those things, and to move forth legislation that may be necessary for a more effective utilization of these assets. But first of all, we have to give them the assets.

Mr. ANDERSON. Very good, sir.

Mr. ENGLISH. I appreciate having your seal of approval on that one.

Mr. ANDERSON. You don't need it, but you have got it.

Mr. ENGLISH. Well, great.

As it stands now, we can't take seven interceptors and expect that anybody is going to be able to hold the line. We can't take four detection aircraft and expect that that is going to detect 18,000 flights coming across each year.

You have to provide the resources and then we have to make certain that those resources are utilized and utilized well, and that is the responsibility of this subcommittee, and we will definitely be calling on the GAO to play a major role in making sure that that is implemented properly.

Thank you.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. English.

Excellent hearing. I don't have any questions.

Mr. ENGLISH. With that we will recess subject to the call of the Chair. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

"WHITE PAPER FOR INCREASED ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN
DRUG INTERDICTION," SUBMITTED BY THE NATIONAL GUARD ASSO-
CIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

WHITE PAPER

FOR

INCREASED ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN DRUG INTERDICTION

PREPARED AT CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST

by THE NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

WHITE PAPER
FOR
INCREASED ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN DRUG INTERDICTION

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DRAFT

WHITE PAPER

FOR

INCREASED ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN DRUG INTERDICTION

PURPOSE

To present a concept of operation and support developed by National Guard senior leadership in the field in response to a congressional request for National Guard augmentation to civil drug enforcement authorities in combatting the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

SCOPE

This paper provides a range of increasing capability options and their associated costs from a base of 160 mission days to a dedicated capability of 400 mission days per year.

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WHITE PAPERFORINCREASED ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN DRUG INTERDICTION

1. Mission --

The National Guard will augment civilian drug enforcement authority efforts along designated drug corridors by providing ground and air identification and chase aircraft capable of transporting law enforcement authorities and vectoring aircraft to targets.

2. Concept of Support --

a. Area of operations will include the southern boundary of the CONUS running from the northern border of Virginia to the northern border of California.

- 1) The Threat (See Attachment 1).
- 2) Existing radar coverage (See Attachment 2).

b. This paper will discuss two areas of consideration in drug interdiction; long-range airborne detection and reporting of aircraft and ships and chase aircraft capable of following drug aircraft and transporting law enforcement officers who will apprehend, detain and arrest drug traffickers to include:

- 1) C-130 E/H aircraft (equipped with the APG-63 radar) employed in long-range airborne detection in conjunction with ground based radar (TAC Control flight unit).
- 2) OV-1 (equipped with FLIR) or other suitable aircraft used to track suspect aircraft to the approximate target area.

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3) UH-60A (equipped with FLIR) used as chase aircraft to follow and transport law enforcement officials to target area.

4) Missions will be of a maximum of eight hours in duration (hours of darkness) for periods of ten days.

c. A range of options will be discussed which cover a full spectrum of involvement.

d. All activity by Guardspersons will be in a USC Title 32 status.

e. The method of using ground tactical control units in conjunction with a C-130 E/H specially equipped aircraft has been tested in a joint Florida and Georgia operation and has proved successful.

f. The area of operations has been divided into four sub-areas. This is a recommended method of linking mission support units to geographical areas and of defining support for operations in designated locations. (See Attachment 3).

3. Routing of Requests and Command and Control. (See Attachment 4).

a. Establish a two-man liaison detachment in the National Narcotic Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) intelligence facility in New Orleans. These should be an Air National Guard TAC Control weapons controller and an Army National Guard aviator. Their function would be to advise NNBIS on National Guard capabilities and limitations and coordinate requests for National Guard support through the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB). Costing at Attachment 5.

b. Simultaneously with the receipt of the mission request from NNBIS, the CNGB sends a warning order to TAG(s) concerned and the National Guard Operations Control Center of the impending mission and determines if sufficient resources are available to meet mission requirements.

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c. With the determination by CNGB that sufficient mission resources are available, the mission is tasked through the TAG(s) concerned and the National Guard Operations Control Center to appropriate AFNG/ANG units .

d. A National Guard Operations Control Center (NGOPCC) is established at an Air National Guard (ANG) base currently having a 24-hour operating command. This center would be responsible for controlling all National Guard assets in support of the interdiction mission program. This center would be manned with two Army National Guard officers (aviation and logistics) and two Air National Guard officers (C-130 pilot/navigator and TAC Control weapons controller), and two administrative personnel (one Air National Guard operations sergeant and one Army National Guard clerk). Costing at Attachment 5.

v. In each option discussed in the following paragraph, there is unlimited opportunity for innovative mission-oriented integrated training for both the Army and Air National Guard forces. Training opportunities exist for joint operations, command and staff operations planning and execution, instrument training, night flying operations with night vision devices, airlift, etc.

4. Options. A summary of the options to be discussed appears in the chart below. These options conform to the area of operation defined. Expansion in geographical area would of necessity increase a part or all of the requirements/resources to meet the expansion.

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<u>OPTION</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	NUMBER IN		<u>ANNUAL</u>	<u>ONE-TIME</u>
		<u>EACH SUB-</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>		
		<u>AREA (10-</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>RECURRING</u>	
		<u>DAY DURATION</u>	<u>DAYS</u>	<u>COSTS</u>	<u>COST</u>
				\$	\$
I (Base)	16	4	160	5.8M	34.8M
2A	20	5	200	6.7M	49.4M
2B	24	6	240	7.7M	61.4M
2C	28	7	280	10.2M	61.4M
2D	32	8	320	11.1M	61.4M
3*	40	10	400	23.1M	449.7M
4*					

* Utilizes dedicated aircraft and crews.

** Special Operations Wing (congressional initiative)

a. Option 1 --

As a starting point Option 1 was developed to provide a degree of support at minimal cost.

1) Air National Guard -- Place eight (APG-63) radar sets, palletized for quick installation and removal at four C-130 E/H units (two per unit). This will require two APG-63 radar technicians per unit. Charleston, West Virginia; Savannah, Georgia; Dallas, Texas; and Van Nuys, California, would be the squadrons utilized. West Virginia would be responsible for Sub-Area I,

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Georgia for Sub-Area II, Texas for Sub-Area III and California for Sub-Area IV. The tactical control units participating would be those with co-located (two TAC Control Flight units per location) flights, (Kenesaw, Georgia; Blue Ash, Ohio; Salt Lake City, Utah; Alcoa, Tennessee and Syracuse, New York). One C-130 E/H would be specially equipped with an APG-63 radar and the remaining radar set would be used as a spare. Designated C-130 units will transport the selected TAC Control flight to the operating area. When they arrive at the site the local Army/Air National Guard units would furnish all necessary ground transportation and logistic support. Initially, operations would be for ten days, but would probably be reduced as field experience is acquired. Intermediate maintenance support for the radar would be provided by ANG F-15 units.

a) Problems which arise during an operation would be addressed to the National Guard Operations Control Center for solution.

b) The specially equipped C-130 E/H would operate out of home station. It would remain on station from two hours prior to dusk through the hours of darkness.

c) The concept of operations would be for the TAC Control radar to identify a suspected drug aircraft by the established profile and vector the C-130 E/H to intercept while at the same time alerting tracker aircraft. Once the C-130 E/H has the suspect on its radar, he will vector the tracker aircraft into a position to follow. The C-130 E/H will then return to its designated orbit position. The tracker aircraft will follow the suspect aircraft and notify and guide chase aircraft, with law enforcement personnel aboard, to the exact target site. See Attachment 6.

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d) The C-130 E/H specially equipped aircraft would require a crew of two pilots, a navigator, flight engineer, loadmaster, and two APG-63 radar operators (WSO qualified preferred, but not necessary). Two radar operators should alternate so that continuity will be maintained during the mission.

e) The TAC Control unit is a minimum Forward Air Control Post. Equipment will consist of: TPS-43E, an operations van, two power generators, four M-series vehicles (one M-35, one M-49, two M-1009), one S-530 shelter (WRSK, bench stock, test equipment). Personnel will be five officers and 14 enlisted. Airlift requirement for this package is three C-130 aircraft.

f) Communications between the TAC Control facility and FAA would be by land line. Ultra-high frequency (UHF) would be the primary communication between the radar site, the C-130 E/H and the chase aircraft. Communications between the site and the Operations Center would be with portable high-frequency (HF) sets backed up by commercial telephone lines, if available.

g) Approximately 18 working hours will be required to install the APG-63 radar on the C-130 E/H and approximately four working hours are required to return it to its airlift configuration.

h) Costs for the option are shown at Attachment 7. Tab to Attachment 7 defines assumptions used for TAC Control support estimates.

2) Army National Guard -- The Army National Guard is currently equipped with OV-1 Mohawk fixed-wing aircraft and UH-1H and UH-60A (in very limited quantities) helicopters. The OV-1 Mohawk is a suitable aircraft to perform

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the tracker aircraft mission. (Other possible candidate aircraft are shown at Attachment 11). UH-1H helicopters have a range of 200 statute miles and an operational speed of 115 statute miles per hour. These characteristics render the UH-1H ineffective in a chase aircraft role. Because of the enhanced speed (173 statute miles per hour) and greater range (288 statute miles), the UH-60A helicopter must be used for the chase mission and lifting law enforcement personnel on short notice to potentially widely dispersed target areas.

a) The chase aircraft plan (see attachment 13) assumes a radar fan coverage of 150 mile chord of the coast and provides for response to a depth of 300 miles and the availability of 20 UH-60A helicopters to meet the chase mission requirement. (The National Guard will have insufficient UH-60A in its inventory through 1986 to cover this requirement -- see Attachment 10). The plan provides for the five dedicated crews of three personnel each for a ten-day period per area of operations. There are opportunities to use individuals in a training status, depending on the scenario and geographic location of the 150-mile chord which would dramatically reduce operating costs to crews in full-time duty and TDY status. Maintenance plans can be developed by the separate States with contact teams and backup support provided by the servicing Aviation Classification and Repair Activity Depot (AVCRAD.)

b) Costs for this Option are shown at Attachment 3.

b. Option 2.

1) Air Guard -- This would be an expandable option which will cover a spectrum from 16 missions per year (Option 1) to 32 per year. The following chart will indicate capability along with additional assets needed to achieve each level as we progress upward.

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<u>Missions Per Year</u>	<u>TDY for C-130 Augmenta- tion</u>	<u>TAC Control Augmenta- tion</u>	<u>APG-63 Radar Sets</u>	<u>Full- Time Radar Main- tenance</u>	<u>Full-Time Aircrews (AGR)</u>	<u>Flying Hours</u>
16 (Base)	0	No Aug*	8	8	4	1,280
20	2		8	8	4	1,600
24	6		12	12	4	1,920
28	6		12	12	8	2,240
32	10		12	12	8	2,560

* At no time will more than five TAC Control units be available for simultaneous employment without impacting on the federal mission. Costs for incremental increases are shown at Attachment 7.

2) Army National Guard -- Same concept as Option 1. Costs for the incremental mission increases are shown at Attachment 8.

c. Option 3.

1) Air National Guard -- This option uses the same concept of four primary units of C-130 E/H aircraft. Each unit is robused with two additional C-130 H aircraft and two Active, Guard and Reserve (AGR) aircrews (five officer and two enlisted). A maximum of 40 missions (3,200 flying hours) can be flown assuming home station operation and the addition of ten AGR enlisted maintenance personnel to each unit. One-time costs include the purchase of C-130H aircraft (eight) and 12 APG-63 radar sets.

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2) Army National Guard --

a) To participate on a full-time basis, the Army National Guard would employ a different concept. Army National Guard aviation requirements for State Area Command (STARC) headquarters are now being addressed by Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCSOPS) with NGB input. Combining the wartime requirements with the drug control effort could possibly justify four UH-60A in STARC headquarters. Under this concept, each STARC aviation section to be authorized ten AGR aviators. In addition to other duties, they would be the aircraft commanders for all interdiction operations. Other manpower requirements will be filled by the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) authorizations for the aviation section of the STARC.

b) Costs for this option are at Attachment 8 and are categorically different than Option 1 and 2 since some part of the operation is in keeping with the wartime mission of the STARC aviation section.

c) Maintenance plans would be the same as other options.

d. Option 4.

1) Air National Guard -- Same concept as Option 3 utilizing an Air Wing consisting of two groups dedicated to the interdiction mission. Each group consists of eight MC-130 aircraft and six HH-60X Nighthawk helicopters. This option is consistent with a previously articulated congressional initiative.

2) Army National Guard -- Same concept as Option 3.


5. Total cost Recap for all options is at Attachment 9.

6. Sub-Area resource allocation chart is at Attachment 12.

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
THE MAGNITUDE OF THREAT




RNBIS SUMMARY 1986

ATTACHMENT 1

LOW-ALTITUDE RADAR COVERAGE SOUTHERN UNITED STATES




AREA OF SUPPORT - INTERDICTION PROGRAM



ROUTING REQUEST AND TASKING

LEGEND:

- REQUEST
- . - . - . RESOURCES DETERMINATION
- - - - - INFORMATION, COORDINATION, WARNING
- ===== TASKING/COORDINATION



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ATTACHMENT 5

NNBIS AND NATIONAL GUARD OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER PERSONNEL COSTSCost of NNBIS Liaison Personnel - Continuous Manning

<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1 Air Guard Officer	\$ 66,430
1 Army Guard Officer	<u>66,430</u>
Total	\$ 132,860

Cost of National Guard Operations Control Center Personnel - Continuous Manning

<u>Requirement</u>		<u>Cost</u>
2 Air Guard Officer	(2 X 66,430)	\$132,860
2 Army Guard Officer	(2 X 66,430)	132,860
1 Operations Sergeant (ANG)		36,865
1 Clerk (ARNG)		<u>29,930</u>
Total		\$332,515

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ATTACHMENT 5


INTERDICTION CONCEPT

DETECTION

INTERCEPTION

TRACKING

APPREHENSION



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ATTACHMENT 7

AIR NATIONAL GUARD COSTSBase Cost-16 10-Day Missions (4 per Sub-Area) - Option 1

<u>o Recurring Costs*</u>		
<u>Category</u>	<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Costs</u>
		\$
C-130 E/H		N/A
Flying Hours	1,280	960,000
Aircrews	20 Officers	1,456,000
	8 Enlisted	272,000
Travel and Per Diem	Home Station	-0-
Workdays (Add'l Crew)	80 Officers	137,600
	32 Enlisted	25,600
Maintenance (Add'l AGR)	16	540,000
Radar Tech (APG-63)	8 Civilian	236,300
	C-130 E/H Subtotal	<u>3,627,500</u>
C-130 A/B	(TAC Control Spt Airlift)	252,300
TAC Control**	(16 X 30,350)	485,600
	Pers 5 Officers \$ 9,100	
	14 Enlisted 11,200	
	Log Food \$ 4,750	
	Fuel (JP-4, 3,800 Diesel)	
	Supplies and <u>1,500</u>	
	Spares	
	\$30,350	
	Grand Total (Recurring Costs)	4,365,400

o One-Time Costs

APG-63 Radar	8 X 3,000,000*	24,000,000
--------------	----------------	------------

*Includes acquisition and installation costs.

Base Total Cost-Option 2

<u>Category</u>	<u>Option</u>			
	2a (20Msn)	2b (24 Msn)	2c (28 Msn)	2d (32 Msn)
	\$	\$	\$	\$
C-130 E/H	4,051,700	4,603,500	6,765,200	7,199,400
C-130 A/B	315,375	378,450	441,525	504,600
TAC Radar	607,000	728,400	849,800	971,200
Sub-Total	<u>4,974,075</u>	<u>5,710,350</u>	<u>8,056,525</u>	<u>8,675,200</u>
<u>o One-Time Costs</u>	24,000,000	36,000,000	36,000,000	36,000,000
(APG-63 Radar)				

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ATTACHMENT 7

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ATTACHMENT 7

Base Total Cost*-Option 3-40 Missions

<u>o Recurring Costs*</u>		<u>Cost</u>
<u>Category</u>		<u>\$</u>
C-130 E/H		N/A
Flying Hours		2,400,000
AGR (2 Crews) Officer		2,912,000
Enlisted		544,000
Maintenance		1,350,000
Travel and Per Diem		-0-
Workdays		204,000
Radar Tech (APG-63)		<u>354,000</u>
Sub-Total		7,764,000
C-130 A/B Costs (TAC Control Spt Airlift)		630,750
Tac Radar Costs (40 X 30,350)		<u>1,214,000</u>
Total (Recurring Costs)		9,608,750
<u>o One-Time Costs</u> (8 C-130 H)	150,000,000	
(12 APG-63)	<u>36,000,000</u>	
Total One-Time Costs		186,000,000

Base Total Cost - Option 4 - 40 Missions

Recurring and one-time costs are under study.

*Costs do not include ANG manpower cost at Attachment 5 (\$236,155).

**Assumptions used for costing are at TAB to this attachment.

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ATTACHMENT 7

TAB TO ATTACHMENT 7

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TAC CONTROL SUPPORT

Assumptions:

- Only colocated TAC Control radar units equipment will be deployed; GA, OH, NY, TN, UT.
- Operational period - 12 hours per day.
- Bare base concept is base line, as support is made available equipment/personnel may be subtracted.
- Full complement of equipment considers road march deployment, for airlift package reduce equipment by one generator and one M-1009, will equal three C-130s.
- Shuttle concept is considered for equipment movement from deployed airport to radar site location.
- Support Required:
 - Fuel (JP-4 or Diesel) 360 gal per day.
 - Quarters (motel or tentage).
 - Food and food preparation capability.
 - Security (Personnel and weapons).
 - Water.
 - One VHF AM and FM radio.
- Personnel: Five officers, 14 enlisted.

Number	Duty Title	AFSC
1	Air Weapons Controller NNBIS Intel Center, New Orleans	17XX
2	Air Weapons Controller ANG Command Post	17XX
2	Air Weapons Controller Radar Site	17XX
2	TAC Control Weapons Controller	17XX
2	Weapons Technician	276XX

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2	Air Surveillance Operator	276XX
2	TPS-43E Radar Maintenance	303X2
2	Ground Radio Maintenance	303X4
2	Power Production Specialist	423X5
<u>2</u>	Security/Command Post	276X0/303X2

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TAB TO ATTACHMENT 7

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ATTACHMENT 8

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COSTSBase Cost/10-Day Mission - Option 1o Recurring Cost*

<u>Category</u>	<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Cost</u> \$
Tracker		
Aircraft	(OV-1)	N/A
Flying Hours	(30 hours X \$275)	8,250
Aircrews Off	(2 X 10 X 182)	3,640
Travel and Per Diem Off	(2 X 10 X 60)	1,200
Enl	(1 X 10 X 50)	500
Maintenance	Enl (1 X 10 X 82)	820
Sub-Total		<u>14,410</u>
Chase		
Aircraft	(5 UH-60A)	NA
Flying Hours	(30 hours X \$329)	9,870
Air Crews & Spt Pers Off	(12 X 10 X 182)	21,840
Enl	(6 X 10 X 82)	4,920
Travel and Per Diem	Off (12 X 10 X 60)	7,200
Enl	(6 X 10 X 50)	3,000
Sub-Total		<u>46,830</u>
Total One-Mission Cost		61,240
Total Recurring Cost for 16 10-Day Missions		979,840

o One-Time Cost

<u>Category</u>	<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Cost/Sub-Area</u> \$
Tracker		
Night Vision Goggles	(20,000)	20,000
FLIR	(850,000)	850,000
FLIR Installation	(Estimated)	10,000
Sub-Total		<u>880,000</u>
Chase		
Night Vision Goggles	(1 per aircraft)	100,000
FLIR	(5 X \$20,000)	1,700,000
FLIR Installation	(2 X \$850,000)	1,000,000
Sub-Total		<u>1,810,000</u>
Total One-Time Cost for One Sub-Area		2,690,000
Total One-Time Cost for Four Sub-Areas		10,760,000

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Base Total Cost - Option 2

<u>Option</u>	<u>Msn/yr</u>	<u>Cost/Msn</u>	<u>Cost X Msn</u>	+ One-Time Costs (\$10,760,000) (4 Sub-Areas)	+ One-Time Costs (\$25,420,000) (12 States)**
		\$	\$	\$	\$
2a	20	61,240	1,224,800	11,984,800	26,644,800
2b	24	61,240	1,469,760	12,229,760	26,889,760
2c	28	61,240	1,714,720	12,474,720	27,134,720
2d	32	61,240	1,959,680	12,719,680	27,379,680

Base Cost/10-Day Mission - Option 3o Recurring Cost*

<u>Category</u>	<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Cost</u>
		\$
Tracker		
Aircraft	OV-1	N/A
Pay and Allowances	Off	
	Enl	
Travel and Per Diem	Off	
	Enl	
Flying Hours		
Maintenance		
	Sub-Total (14,410 X 40)	576,400
Chase		
Aircraft	(UH-60A)	
Pay and Allowances	Off	6,600,000
	Enl	3,840,000
Travel and Per Diem	Off	60,000
	Enl	30,000
Flying Hours	(5,700 hours X \$329)	1,875,300
	Sub-Total	12,405,300
	Total Recurring Cost	12,981,700

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ATTACHMENT 8

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ATTACHMENT 8

o One-Time Cost

<u>Category</u>	<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Cost</u>
		\$
Tracker (OV-1)	(880,000 X 4)	3,520,000
Chase		
Aircraft	48 Blackhawk X \$4.8M/acft	230,400,000
FLIR	24 (2 per state) X \$850,000/FLIR	20,400,000
Night Vision Goggles	48 (1 per acft) X \$20,000/goggle	960,000
Navigation System	48 (1 per acft) X \$100,000 (est)	4,800,000
Ground Commo	12 (1 per state) X \$100,000 (est)	1,200,000
Maint Spt Equip	12 (1 per state) X \$200,000 (est)	<u>2,400,000</u>
Sub-Total		260,160,000
Total One-Time Cost		<u>263,680,000</u>

Base Cost/10-Day Mission-Option 4Recurring and One-Time Cost-Under Study

*Costs do not include ARNG costs at ATTACHMENT 5 (\$229,220).

** 880,000 X 4 =	3,520,000	(Tracker -- One-Time Cost X 4 Sub-Areas)
1,810,000 X 12 =	21,720,000	(Chase -- One-Time Cost X 12 States)
	<u>25,240,000</u>	

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ATTACHMENT 8

ATTACHMENT 9

D R A F T

TOTAL COST RECAPOPTION 1 -- 16 10-DAY MISSIONS

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Recurring Costs	\$	\$	\$
NNBIS Liaison Pers	66,430	66,430	132,860
OPNS Control Ctr Pers	169,725	162,790	332,515
C-130 E/H OPNS	3,627,500		3,627,500
TAC Control Spt Airlift	252,300		252,300
TAC Radar	485,600		485,600
Tracker		230,560	230,560
Chase		749,280	749,280
One-Time Costs	<u>24,000,000</u>	<u>10,760,000</u>	<u>34,760,000</u>
Total	28,601,555	11,969,060	40,570,615

OPTION 2A -- 20 10-DAY MISSIONS

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Recurring Costs	\$	\$	\$
NNBIS Liaison Pers	66,430	66,430	132,860
OPNS Control Ctr Pers	169,725	162,790	332,515
C-130 E/H OPNS	4,051,700		4,051,700
TAC Control Spt Airlift	315,375		315,375
TAC Radar	607,000		607,000
Tracker		288,200	288,200
Chase		936,600	936,600
One-Time Costs	<u>24,000,000</u>	<u>25,420,000</u>	<u>49,420,000</u>
Total	29,210,230	26,874,020	56,084,250

ATTACHMENT 9

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ATTACHMENT 9

TOTAL COST RECAPOPTION 2B -- 24 10 DAY MISSIONS

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Recurring Costs	\$	\$	\$
NNBIS Liaison Pers	66,430	66,430	132,860
OPNS Control CTR PERS	169,725	162,790	332,515
C-130 E/H OPNS	4,603,500		4,603,500
TAC Control Spt Airlift	378,450		378,450
TAC Radar	728,400		728,400
Tracker		345,840	345,840
Chase		1,123,920	1,123,920
One-Time Costs	<u>36,000,000</u>	<u>25,420,000</u>	<u>61,420,000</u>
Total	41,946,505	27,118,980	69,065,485

OPTION 2C -- 28 10-DAY MISSIONS

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Recurring Costs	\$	\$	\$
NNBIS Liaison	66,430	66,430	132,860
OPNS Control Ctr Pers	169,725	162,790	332,515
C-130 E/H OPNS	6,765,200		6,765,200
TAC Control Spt Airlift	441,525		441,525
TAC Radar	849,800		849,800
Tracker		403,480	403,480
Chase		1,311,240	1,311,240
One-Time Costs	<u>36,000,000</u>	<u>25,420,000</u>	<u>61,420,000</u>
Total	44,292,680	27,363,940	71,656,620

OPTION 2D -- 32 10-DAY MISSIONS

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Recurring Costs	\$	\$	\$
NNBIS Liaison Pers	66,430	66,430	132,860
OPNS Control Ctr Pers	169,725	162,790	332,515
C-130 E/H OPNS	7,199,400		7,199,400
TAC Control Spt Airlift	971,200		971,200
TAC Radar	504,600		504,600
Tracker		461,120	461,120
Chase		1,498,560	1,498,560
One-Time Costs	<u>36,000,000</u>	<u>25,420,000</u>	<u>61,420,000</u>
Total	44,911,355	27,608,900	72,520,255

ATTACHMENT 9

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ATTACHMENT 9

TOTAL COST RECAPOPTION 3 -- 40 10 - DAY MISSIONS

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Recurring Costs	\$	\$	\$
NNBIS Liaison Pers	66,430	66,430	132,860
OPNS Control Ctr Pers	169,725	162,790	332,515
C-130 E/H OPNS	7,764,000		7,764,000
TAC Control Spt Airlift	630,750		630,750
TAC Radar	1,214,000		1,214,000
Tracker		576,400	576,400
Chase		12,405,300	12,405,300
One-Time Costs	<u>186,000,000</u>	<u>263,680,000</u>	<u>449,680,000</u>
Total	195,844,905	276,890,920	472,735,825

OPTION 4 -- 40 10 - DAY MISSIONS

Recurring and One-Time Costs - Under Study

ATTACHMENT 9

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ATTACHMENT 10

STATUS OF UH-60A DISTRIBUTION*

<u>STATE</u>	<u>FY**</u>				
	<u>85</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>90</u>
KY	4	13	15	15	
OH	2	2	2	2	
AK	4	4	4	4	
OK		2	2	2	
VA		2	15	15	
TX				8	
Total	10	23	38	46	83

* Dynamic at Best -- as of 4-3-86

** End FY Year Totals

ATTACHMENT 10

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ATTACHMENT 11

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POSSIBLE ARMG TRACKER AIRCRAFTa. Operational and Statistical Data:

Type/Quantity Aircraft	*** U-21 (14)	*** C-12 (12)	**** OV-1 (37)	T-39 (4)
Speed (KTAS)	180	230	230	425
Range (NM)	1,250	1,150	350	1,300
Direct Flying Hour Cost	\$195	\$65 *	\$275	\$300
FLIR (each)	\$850K	\$850K	\$350K	\$850K

b. Operational Costs for One-10 Day Mission for One Aircraft:

Personnel				
2 Pilots (Off)	\$ 3,640	\$ 3,640	\$ 3,640	\$ 3,640
Tvl/Per Diem @ \$60/day	\$ 1,200	\$ 1,200	\$ 1,200	\$ 1,200
Flying Hour Cost Rate x 30 hours	\$ 7,800	\$ 2,600	\$ 8,250	\$12,000
Total **	\$12,640	\$ 7,440	\$13,090	\$16,840

c. One-time Costs:

Four FLIRs	\$ 3.4M	\$ 3.4M	\$ 3.4M	\$ 3.4M
Install/maint	\$10,000+	\$10,000+	\$10,000+	\$10,000+

* POL only - does not include Repair Parts Contracted thru TROSCOM.

** Maintenance Costs to be Determined.

*** AK	AR	TX		**** GA	85 FH 4,057
CO	CA	UT	In place	OR	85 FH 1,943
AL	IL	NY			
DC	PR	VA			
			Coming on Board		
	GA	MI			
	ID	NC			
	PA				

ATTACHMENT 11

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SUB-AREA RESOURCE ALLOCATION

OPTIONS	NUMBER 10-DAY		C-130 F/W	AP-63		TAC CONTROL FLT		TAC		CHANG	
	MISS. OPS PER YEAR			RADARS	LIFT C-130 A/B	CONTROL FLT	CONTROL FLT	DU-1	UN-60 A		
1	4 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA		2 PER SUB-AREA II	3 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	5 PER STATE II		
2A	5 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA + 2/4 AUGMENTATION		2 PER SUB-AREA II	3 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	5 PER STATE II		
2B	6 PER SUB-AREA	2 PER SUB-AREA + 2/4 AUGMENTATION		3 PER SUB-AREA II	3 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	5 PER STATE II		
2C	7 PER SUB-AREA	2 PER SUB-AREA + 2/4 AUGMENTATION		3 PER SUB-AREA II	3 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	5 PER STATE II		
2D	8 PER SUB-AREA	3 PER SUB-AREA + 2/4 AUGMENTATION		3 PER SUB-AREA	3 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	5 PER STATE II		
3	10 PER SUB-AREA	2 PER SUB-AREA III		3 PER SUB-AREA II	3 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	4 PER STATE III		
4	10 PER SUB-AREA	16 TOTAL		4 PER SUB-AREA	3 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	1 PER SUB-AREA	4 PER STATE III		
NOTES: 1. ONE Radar (61425) is spare 2. Sites Per Sub-Area: I VA, NC, SC 3 II GA, FL, AL, MS, LA 5 III TX, NM 1 IV AZ, CA 2 TOTAL 12 3. Dedicated to Interdiction mission											

