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The Presentence Report, Probation Officer Accountability, and Recruitment Practices: Some Influences of Guideline Sentencing ...................... Harry Joe Jaffe

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Guideline Sentencing: Probation Officer Responsibilities and Interagency Issues.—The recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines system has provided the impetus for further legitimization of the Federal probation profession; yet problematic issues and difficult guideline decisions confront probation officers as they carry out the guideline presentence investigation. This article by U.S. probation officer John S. Dierna focuses on the important, challenging responsibilities placed upon the Federal probation officer conducting guideline presentence investigations and introduces a three-step process to assist probation officers assigned to these investigations.

The Presentence Report, Probation Officer Accountability, and Recruitment Practices.—Under guideline sentencing, the probation officer has become the “fixer of punishment,” according to Federal probation officer Harry J. Jaffe. This new role affects the drafting of the presentence report, heightens the degree of accountability, and argues for a change in the hiring protocol of new officers. As punisher, the probation officer must now function as an evaluator of knowledge rather than as a presenter of simple facts. This untraditional role requires a diversity of analytical skills and competencies, extending beyond the vistas of the social sciences.

Prison “Boot Camps” Do Not Measure Up.—This article by Dale K. Sechrest is about prison “boot camps,” or shock incarceration programs, which are proliferating in the United States and have generated great interest from the public and media. Typical programs provide a 90- to 120-day period of military-style recruit training designed to instill discipline and improve the self-respect of the individual participants, thus leading to improved future behavior.

System goals include reducing prison populations, reducing costs, and perhaps reducing recidivism rates for these offenders. Recidivism evidence to date, however, shows little improvement over national norms for these offenders. In fact, they may be doing worse.

The Greatest Correctional Myth: Winning the War on Crime Through Incarceration.—Reiteration of the futility of trying to win the Nation’s war on crime through overreliance on incarceration is essential, asserts author Joseph W. Rogers. Taken to extremes, the imprisonment solution has become

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Prison “Boot Camps” Do Not Measure Up

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I

T PAYS to advertise, so they say, but is the product advertised the best product? Using available data, the principal objective of this paper is to lay to rest the idea that short-term “shock” incarceration, at least in its present form, is a valid response to the problems of young offenders. These types of programs are not the best response to the problem of improving offenders’ lives or increasing the probability that they will not commit new crimes when they return to the community. They add to the fiction that short term, “quick-fix” panaceas can solve significant social problems.

Prison “boot camps,” technically called “shock incarceration,” known variously as Basic Training (Florida), Special Alternative Incarceration (Georgia), Regimented Inmate Discipline (Oklahoma), are flourishing in the United States. At last eight states now have such programs and at least eight more soon will have them. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) completed a major report on them in 1989, and the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) published an earlier report on them in 1988. New York State has the largest program (600 beds), followed by Georgia (200 beds), which, along with Oklahoma, was one of the first to begin the programs in late 1983. The programs accept young offenders, aged 18 to 24 in most states, who have nonviolent criminal records. These convicted offenders are put through a program of strict discipline and military-style drills for a period of 90 to 120 days, although Louisiana and New York State operate 6-month programs. In New York State 180 days are seen as necessary to calm public fears about the early release of violent offenders and to do a better job of treatment. In exchange for completion of the program, the sentence, which could be up to 10 years, is reduced to the time served and the boot camp experience. In Florida this is an average of 245 days (8 months) and amounts to 20 percent of the sentence (an average of 3.5 years). 2 Four states have boot camp programs for women inmates — Oklahoma, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Orleans Parish and the State of Louisiana — with the largest having 60 beds (Mississippi).

The Florida profile of participants shows the typical offender to be under 20 at the time of prison admission, a user of illegal drugs, of average intelligence, convicted of a first- or second-degree felony (30- or 15-year maximum sentences, respectively). Participants may have no prior commitments to prison and their sentence must be 10 years or less. Selection for boot camp programs varies from state to state, although in most states the participants are convicted of felonies and sentenced to the department of corrections (DOC) and then selected for boot camp participation, often after several months in jail or prison. Judges are involved in the decision in about two-thirds of the program states. Most program descriptions do not point out the significance of the conviction, which precludes military service and carries with it all the problems of loss of rights subsequent to release. 3

Shock Incarceration Techniques

Shock incarceration stresses discipline and purports to have the same results as military recruit training with respect to developing positive attitudes toward authority and providing physical conditioning. Official goals in Florida are “to divert offenders from long terms of imprisonment while at the same time deterring them from future criminal activity.” Inmates “receive training in psychological methods that promote responsibility and improve decision-making.” 4 Related goals that apply for most programs are providing inmates a chance for re-evaluation of their lives through working with others, learning to accept discipline, and improving their self-respect and ability to control their behavior; in the process they learn to seek realistic goals, and are taught how to live without committing crimes. While education and job training are not part of the Georgia and Florida programs, with vocational training part of none, some programs emphasize education and job skills to a limited extent. As opposed to “rehabilitation,” the New York State shock incarceration program purports to “habilitate,” or properly socialize these offenders. 5 For most states system goals

1 Research assistance for this article was provided by Mr. Carmelo J. Cabareas.
4 Florida Department of Corrections, p.1.
include reducing prison crowding and system costs, and ultimately recidivism and its related costs. 6

The primary technique, or “treatment tool” is teaching discipline through the use of military “boot camp” techniques. A new “recruit” in Georgia (of “both races”) is shouted at and referred to as a maggot, scumbag, boy, a fool, or a nobody, and repeatedly threatened with transfer to the main facility where he may be sexually abused, he is told, if he fails the program. 7 In Florida the “pukes” must pull together or they are all punished as a group, which is standard recruit fare. The NIJ report points out that the Army no longer uses these types of abusive and degrading techniques as part of their training, preferring to use “voice commands” and other forms of motivation. 8 Motivation in the Florida program is provided by moving through stages marked with different colored hats leading to graduation.

Shock incarceration programs appear to have less appeal to corrections officials than to the public or its representatives. 9 The programs have great media appeal, and are widely publicized as meeting the need to “do something” about the crime problem. The public appeal is similar to that for the “scared straight” and “shock” probation and parole concepts of the early 1980’s, none of which have proven effective on close examination. Corrections officials’ arguments are more practical, including better prison management, reduced crowding, and expanded sentencing options.

The Success of Shock Incarceration

What are the successes and failures of these programs? As with the other shock and scare programs, as well as other highly touted social panaceas, such as methadone maintenance, deinstitutionalization, determinate sentencing, and the like, early media and program reports are glowing. Early reports from Georgia claimed 80 percent success rates for graduates “staying out of trouble.” 10 In 1986, Mississippi reported a return to prison rate “55 percent lower than the normal return rate,” which would be about 5 percent, since the national return rate is about 40 percent over a 3-year followup period. 11 Florida always claimed a success rate of 75 to 80 percent, which they can now document, as discussed below. 12

In fact, about half the inmates selected for these programs complete them. Their return rates to prison are not better than the national average for most programs over a 3-year followup period. Georgia had a 23-percent return rate after 2 years (1986 figures) and the U.S. General Accounting Office reported a 39-percent return rate for Georgia inmates at 3 years compared with a 38-percent return rate for controls after 3 years (through July 1988). 13 The NIJ report cites the Georgia figure of 38.5 percent, indicating that those entering in their teens had a 46.8 percent return to prison rate. The NIJ report cites a study of Oklahoma’s program in which return rates of shock incarceration (SI) graduates were compared with similar nonviolent offenders sentenced to their DCO; after 29 months almost half the SI graduates, but only 28 percent of the other group had returned to prison. 14 These data appear to indicate that the programs may have early successes, but in the long term they may not do any better than conventional methods. The real test, as always, is performance in the community. A recent NIJ 3-year followup study of released offenders nationally reported that 62.5 percent of former state inmates were rearrested for a felony or a serious misdemeanor within 3 years of their discharge from prison; 47 percent were convicted of new crimes, and 41 percent returned to prison. 15 Based on these findings, the GAO report conclusions concurred with those of the NIJ report in advising caution to states planning to move ahead with such programs, recommending further study. 16

The Florida Study

Florida’s recently completed study reports on a 1-year followup comparison of a “matched” group of (nonparticipant) offenders of the same age and general background as the boot camp graduates. Unfortunately, the “matched” sample had 257 more inmates than those graduating, a total of 400, which does not make it a truly matched group but more of a comparison pool of offenders with similar characteristics. And, since the possibility of any occurrence was greater in the larger group, comparisons of any kind will be flawed. Nonetheless, return-to-prison rates (probation revocations) after 1 year for the 143 graduates were 5.59 percent (8 graduates of 143) and 7.75 percent for the 400 “matched” offenders (31 of 400), a claimed “likelihood of returning to prison nearly 40 percent greater than that of Boot Camp graduates.” 17

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7 People, January 1, 1988, p. 95; Life, June 1988, p. 82.
8 National Institute of Justice, Shock Incarceration, p. 21.
9 Ibid., p. 3.
11 Time, August 11, 1988, p. 17.
13 Private Boot Camps, Too Early to Measure Effectiveness, a Briefing Report to the Honorable Lloyd Bentsen, U.S. Senate, September 1987, p.5
17 Florida Department of Corrections, 1989, p. 20.
Since the size of these populations was reported, some statistical tests were possible. A chi-squared test revealed no significant difference between the two groups on return to prison (X² = .73, p M .39). In addition to returns to prison, postrelease failures of all kinds were reported — absconding, or a new felony, misdemeanor, or technical revocation; these figures revealed a different picture. There were 18 failures of graduates and 69 in the comparison group, which proved significant (X² = 5.5, p M .012), indicating that overall failure rates show graduates doing better than the comparison group. However, there were no technical violations for the graduates and 22 for the matched group, which had 257 more inmates. When technical violations are treated as successes there is no significant difference between the two groups (X²=.76, p M .38). The rate of absconders in the comparison group was also double that of the graduates (7.3 % v. 3.5%). These comparisons make it difficult to pronounce the program a success on prison return rates or failures at this time. Florida officials are reluctant to pronounce the program a complete success even with these findings in hand, citing too many unanswered questions at this time. 19

The Florida report also compared program graduates (successes) with nongraduates (failures). Graduates (54% of all admissions) were older (19.5 v. 18.7 years), in better physical condition at program onset, more likely to have completed high school (31% v. 10.2%), lacking full-time employment at arrest (32.2% v. 44.8%), twice as likely to be convicted of a first-degree felony for armed robbery, violent crime(s) or drug sale/ manufacture (44.1% v. 20%), and more likely to have had a prior term of probation or community control (42.7% v. 33.3%). 20 Statistically significant differences between the groups are not provided in the report, only tendencies based on percentages. Chi-squared comparisons reveal that significant differences existed for high school completion (favoring graduates; X² = 13.29, p M .001), employment at admission (less for graduates; X² = 4.1, p M .04), and convictions for armed robbery (greater for graduates; X² = 6.48, p M .02). The question of seriousness of the crimes is an important one. While armed robberies are reported as significantly greater for graduates, total crimes for economic gain (see table 1 footnote for types) are not significantly different for either group, and include armed and unarmed robbery. 21 In fact, when armed and unarmed robbery are combined and compared for the two groups there are no significant differences (X² = 2.2, p M .13). For economic crimes, also, there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups — 80.4 percent graduates, 85.7 percent nongraduates (X² = 1.2, p M .28). The report itself, in discussing differences between participants and other inmates, as shown in table 1, states that “Boot Camp admissions are also less likely to have had a term of probation and more likely to have been involved in a crime for economic gain.” 22

Table 1 is extracted from the Florida Department of Corrections report and compares the characteristics of boot camp admissions with males under 25 admitted in 1987-88 and the general population of males admitted in 1987-88. No actual numbers are reported for the latter two groups, so statistical comparisons are not possible. However, armed robberies and “economic crimes” are shown for each group, and again, even though armed robberies are shown as greater for boot camp admissions, economic crimes are the predominate criterion for admission to the Florida program. These comparisons appear to indicate that boot camp participants in Florida are, in fact, a less serious group of offenders.

TABLE 1—CHARACTERISTICS OF BOOT CAMP ADMISSIONS IN FLORIDA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offender Characteristic</th>
<th>Boot Camp Admissions</th>
<th>All Admissions 1987-1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 24 &amp; Younger</td>
<td>All Males 25 &amp; Older</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed at Arrest</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Probation</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior violation</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Probation or Community Control</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Offense:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Robbery</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcotics</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Injury Crimes**</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Crimes***</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence Length in years</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Includes homicide, manslaughter, sexual crimes, assault, and battery.

*** Includes robbery (armed and unarmed), burglary, larceny, fraud, narcotics (sale), receiving stolen property, possession of burglary tools, and auto theft.

Interestingly, very few of the boot camp offenders in Florida have been tried on probation and, of those who have been, far fewer have violated community control. This concern is expressed in the NIJ report, which notes that many states have adopted the criteria used for shock probation sentences to target “persons believed most likely to be deterred — young, non-violent offenders who have not been confined before
under sentence . . . most of whom would have gotten probation in the past.” 23

Space and Cost Factors

Costs are difficult when evaluating correctional programs. Institutions have fixed costs that do not vary a great deal when more inmates are added to the population. This is why the facilities can be crowded without major increases in costs; there are “economies of scale.” Programs that claim great cost savings by reducing prison populations 200 to 400 inmates per year are not providing great savings. Georgia provides a cost of $3,523 per inmate/year for Special Alternative Incarceration (SAI), inclusive of probation supervision, compared to $13,450 per year for conventional incarceration. 24 An early report from New York State quoted a cost of $9,000 per inmate compared to $19,400 for regular prison inmates. 25 NIJ figures are for annual facility operations and simply do not support the notion that it costs less to operate these shock incarceration programs. Costs are at least the same. 26 In fact, New York State now reports higher costs for shock incarceration, which are no doubt indicative of the longer time spent in the program and the depth of the services provided. An early report from the Oklahoma program reported that the staff-inmate ratio was about four times greater than that for the general prison population. 27 The program acknowledges being more costly than a comparable living unit in the department, which could be due to greater emphasis on educational and vocational programs. 28 A concern for Florida is that only 61.6 percent of the program beds are filled, on average, indicating that it is difficult to find inmates willing to undergo this type of program, especially when sentence reductions due to crowded prisons might make their sentence equally brief. 29 Still, shorter confinement times, even with more program expenditures, should produce some cost savings in the long term, but how much is unclear at this time. In fact, as the NIJ report points out, if these offenders had received probation, even greater savings could have been realized. 30 All factors must be carefully evaluated to really understand the savings possible — actual prison costs, not inflated daily figures based on original design capacities, the actual need for incarceration, and the effects of these programs on reduced crime and recidivism — the ultimate cost saving.

Problems With Boot Camps

Correction officials do not appear to be as delighted with shock incarceration programs as are judges, law enforcement officers, legislators, and prosecutors. 31 Why is this? Perhaps the military emphasis makes them nervous. In one state the program was originally designed around programs of education, training, and the like. However, the director later became concerned that the military aspect had so much appeal that it became the rationale for the program, not providing emotional support, education, and job skills to these youngsters over the long term. It is further feared that the military style used by correctional officers may bring out their “dark side,” or sadistic tendencies. There are possibilities for abuse of authority, especially since conventional disciplinary procedures are waived by the inmates coming into these programs.

The NIJ report suggests that this “discipline therapy” or confrontation style, which the military has abandoned, can and has gotten out of control in some instances. Experience with confrontational “T-groups” and “haircuts” used in drug treatment programs in the 1960's and 1970's tells us that some individuals find confrontation and abuse emotionally damaging and unlikely to build self-esteem. Further, most evaluations of “shock” programs, whether jail, prison or probation, have shown that gains are most often short term unless followup is available. Sometimes even more hostility toward the system is engendered. The NIJ report notes that program inmates did not object to profanity by officers as long as it was not directed at them — if so, it angered them. 32

Abuses do occur, although there have been no legal challenges to the practices used because it would be difficult to see this as cruel and unusual punishment when it is used by the military. Nonetheless, NIJ investigators found the use of racial slurs in one program that led to transfer of some employees to other duties. It has been demonstrated in other types of programs that rules can be enforced, physical stress used, and firm discipline applied in contexts that will build self-esteem. The “wilderness programs,” such as Outward Bound, use these techniques which, along with scaring straight, appear to make up the roots of the boot camp concept. VisionQuest, a program that places chronic juvenile delinquents in rustic wilderness camps and other settings, appears to show success in reducing recidivism, reducing arrests to 55

24 David C. Evans, Georgia Department of Corrections Probation Division, Report on Special Incarceration Units, undated (c. 1-88).
26 National Institute of Justice, 1989, p. 16.
29 The Miami Herald, April 12, 1988: 11A; Florida Department of Corrections, 1988, p. 22.
30 National Institute of Justice, Shock Incarceration, p. 16.
31 Ibid., p. 9.
32 Ibid., p. 22.
percent for program participants compared to 71 percent for those in a conventional treatment facility after one year. The NIJ report contains an appendix section that discusses “challenge” programs, which have the goals of increasing self-esteem, self-control, and respect for authority through vigorous physical and mental challenges. In fact, Outward Bound was founded by two former merchant seamen who saw the value of building personal confidence through the learning of survival skills and transposed this concept to the civilian world.

Conclusions

Shock incarceration programs — “boot camps” — should not be created as a public relations gimmick. They may be good politics, but they could become programs that will not be good for corrections or society in the long run. Over the past 15 years corrections officials have been criticized repeatedly and resoundingly for failed programs. The “rehabilitation” programs they sold the public in the past were pronounced to be failures, i.e., “nothing works.” Most corrections officials fell back into the incapacitation role, augmented by voluntary program participation, as a matter of simple self-defense. It is now almost unbelievable that these same corrections officials would allow the media to tout these untested programs as they did the old “failed” programs.

The boot camp programs are often underfunded, sometimes underused or poorly implemented, clearly untested, and mostly incomplete efforts to provide full correctional programs for young offenders. Followup programs that may exist are never mentioned by the media, probably because they appear to be little used by shock incarceration programs anyhow. Surely they are not newsworthy. Some probation departments have special programs for these individuals, but these do not appear to be well-organized or well-funded. New York State claims to have a treatment program that is “more extensive” than others, lasting 6 months, and involving drug treatment, which is a sound direction for the future. The program provides early contact with parole officers in an “aftershock,” or intensive parole supervision, phase, but no extensive evaluation of that appears to be planned. Many probation officers report that offenders released from these programs are easier to manage, so continuity appears to be important. What about the program dropouts? No program appears to take positive steps with dropouts, although Oklahoma appears to move them into other programs that will assist them upon their release. The NIJ study did not address this issue.

Unfortunately, the emphasis lies with the military aspects of the program, the notion that we can shock or scare young people out of crime by drilling it out of them! The programs are not unlike scared straight in their emphasis on fear and intimidation to transform offenders into upstanding citizens. Grueling exercise and labor are the bywords, and punishment surely occurs. After all, it works for the military — but those aren’t criminal offenders, either. Further, the boot camps are not like the military, which has entirely different purposes. Military boot camps train people to kill other people; their dropout rates are considerably lower than the prison programs; and, they provide followup, i.e., young men and women stay in the service long enough to realize the benefits of their initial experience. Prison boot camp graduates cannot get into the military because the military won’t accept either a G.E.D. certificate or a convicted felon. In fact, this is exactly what they don’t want! Curiously, no shock incarceration program appears to be attempting to break down this barrier to military service, which may now be possible in view of upcoming personnel shortages in the military.

What Does the Future Hold?

Regardless of the media hype, there is no evidence that shock incarceration “works” for the offenders that need to be reached any more than scared straight or shock probation worked to any great degree. None. Yet these types of “quick-fix” solutions linger on. Shock programs like scared straight and boot camps appear to be “right” methods based on our middle class understanding of how punishment works. The American Correctional Association notes that “This deeply-rooted social problem [of juvenile delinquency] cannot be eradicated by exposing juveniles to threats of force, intimidation, verbal abuse, or other practices that are meant to shock youths out of delinquent-prone behavior.” Generally, programs like these will not erase the social conditions under which these people must live upon release. Where are the community programs that are required both before and after incarceration? Corrections officials must demand these resources before committing themselves to a program that may produce only limited benefits in its present form and again show that “nothing works.”

Most experts agree that without the help of the family, and without addressing social problems emanating from poor schools, unemployment, poverty, and racial discrimination, there is little likelihood that the “scare” or the “drill” will last for any length of time. Young men and women require well-rounded, community-based programs which will assist them in growth at home, in school, and in finding and financing training for jobs. Frightening or “discipline drilling” people who have resorted to crime will not have a long-term deterrent effect if these people cannot get satisfaction through legitimate alternatives.

\[\text{Criminal Justice Newsletter, March 1, 1988, p. 5}\]
\[\text{National Institute of Justice, 1980, p. 57.}\]
in society. Nor will determinate sentencing, metha-
done programs, selective incapacitation, more prison
space, better law enforcement, or increased punish-
ments solve deeply rooted social problems.

This is not to say that properly used and evaluated,
these programs may be successful for some types of
inmates, although the possibilities of abuse are evi-
dent and the programs lack long-term commitments
to the offenders involved. In the final analysis, proper-
ly run shock incarceration programs should be an-
other of many tools for use in helping selected offend-
ers. This may occur if they can be expanded to include

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[3] Commissioner’s Commentary, D.O.C.S. Today, New York State Department of Cor-
rectional Services, April, 1988.

education, job training, and skill development compo-
nents starting in the facility and continuing into the
community. Corrections staff may be learning how to
evaluate offenders better for programs along some
continuum of need. Now that corrections has the atten-
tion of its constituency, it would appear to be time to
ask for sufficient resources to explore the full poten-
tial of this early intervention approach to young offend-
ers. As Commissioner Coughlin of New York State
says of shock incarceration, “It is a major step in
recognizing that incarceration, on its own, is not neces-
sarily the proper punishment for all offenders. Now
we must look ahead to see if this alternative provides
habilitation of inmates and protection of society.”

But how will we know?