State Of California
Governor's Office of Emergency Services

Law Enforcement Operations Report:

LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE

LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

May 1990

George Deukmejian
Governor
LAW ENFORCEMENT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS REPORT:

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The Loma Prieta Earthquake of 1989 was an event that brought out the best in California’s emergency response system. Within that system, the law enforcement agencies performed key roles despite disruptions in the bay area’s infrastructure. In many cases these roles required activities and actions somewhat outside of the traditional order/maintenance duties. A few months after the earthquake, the OES Law Enforcement Division undertook a detailed written survey designed to delineate several specific areas relative to the quake’s impact on the justice system. Those specific areas included:

- Impact on facilities and operational capability;
- Impact on personnel and staffing;
- Development of priorities and ways to meet these requirements;
- Specific impact on communications centers; and
- Lessons agencies would pass on to other law enforcement agencies.

The survey responses yielded learning points in the areas of facilities and equipment, training, and policy development. Every law enforcement agency in California can benefit from these lessons learned. After consideration of these points an assertive program of training and hazard reduction can be designed. Management support can and should bring these issues the importance they deserve. Clearly, all of California is “earthquake country”. Moreover, the preparations the survey results recommend will better prepare a law enforcement agency to meet a variety of hazards thus enabling a better response to any disaster.

I urge you to review this report carefully and to contact the Office of Emergency Services if we can be of any help to you or your personnel.

[Signature]

LAURENCE W. BUFFALO, Chief
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"The quality of your people is everything!" - Santa Cruz PD

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Readers should consider this information with knowledge of the manner in which it was compiled. After the Loma Prieta Earthquake, a written survey document was distributed to each law enforcement agency in the Bay Area. Included were municipal police departments, county sheriff's departments, departments operated by the University of California, the California State University and area community colleges. Surveys were also sent to a limited number of state law enforcement agencies, such as the Department of Justice, Highway Patrol, State Police, Parks & Recreation, etc.

The survey attempted to elicit suggestions, tips, learning points and commentary, as to how law enforcement agencies functioned after the earthquake. This survey is not an empirical study, in the academic sense. There were no statistics compiled, no objective data requested, no hypotheses tested.

To that extent, the survey appears to have had a high degree of success. There was almost 100% cooperation, with almost every agency returning a completed questionnaire. As you will find, these responses included a number of ideas that the law enforcement community may find informative. These ideas might serve as a basis for local consideration in the areas of equipment, training, organization and operations.

The response comments were collated by subject for ease of review, and were included in their original context to the extent possible. Many sections of this survey report include italicized commentary by OES. These are included to reinforce or clarify respondent's suggestions, or to indicate potential solutions to problems identified.

OES in no way intends to focus negative attention on any agency that responded. Comments and learning points are conveyed in order to assist law enforcement managers and staff to better understand the law enforcement role and collective experience in these types of situations.

Comments or questions regarding this survey, or the topic of emergency planning for law enforcement, may be directed to the OES Law Enforcement Division.
"Personal computers and mainframe monitors fell to the floor." - Santa Cruz Sheriff

EVENT REVIEW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT

The magnitude 7.1 Loma Prieta earthquake struck the San Francisco Bay and Coastal area at 5:04 PM on October 17th, 1989. It was the largest earthquake to strike the San Francisco/Santa Cruz region since the Great Earthquake of 1906. The epicenter was on the San Andreas Fault in the Santa Cruz Mountains, about ten miles east-northeast of Santa Cruz, and about 60 miles southeast of San Francisco. The quake was felt over an area of 400,000 square miles, from Los Angeles to the Oregon border.

Locally there were zones of very strong ground shaking, causing structural and contents damage to hundreds of structures. The much-reported collapse of several miles of IS-880 in Oakland, the span collapse on the Oakland Bay Bridge and the numerous serious slides on State Route 17 contributed traffic problems to the list of damage. Fires were reported, but no conflagration occurred. 62 deaths were reported, most having occurred in the Nimitz Freeway incident. The injury count totalled 3,757, and more than 12,000 people were left homeless. Pavement cracked, landslides blocked coastal access, and liquifaction caused road, airport and port disruption. Current estimates place the damage cost estimates at over $5.6 billion.

The law enforcement environment in this area is very dense, with a number of policing agencies at the federal, state, county, city and special district level serving the millions that live in and around the region. All told, within the affected counties law enforcement services are provided by the following agencies:

- 90 Municipal Police Departments
- 10 County Sheriff’s Departments
- 4 California State University Police Departments
- 3 University of California Police Departments
"One off-duty deputy suffered injuries (at home), however he reported to work" - Santa Cruz Sheriff

These are supported by numerous offices of the California Highway Patrol, the California State Police, the California Department of Justice, numerous locations served by peace officers with the California Department of Parks & Recreation, as well as many departments operated by school districts, community colleges and other special districts.

The law enforcement territories range from small agriculturally-oriented towns to the major metropolitan area of San Francisco, Oakland and San Jose. Some jurisdictions have very low activity and crime rates, with smaller staffing to match that requirement. Other agencies field hundreds of peace officers in order to cope with some of the highest activity rates in the nation.

Each of these law enforcement agencies was affected in some way by the quake. Some did damage assessment, found there was none, and resumed normal operations. Others suffered significant losses in terms of capability and equipment. Some changed their entire pattern of staffing and operation, while others continued as before, without necessity for change.
"The slab concrete ceiling separated from a support wall..." - Santa Cruz PD

FACILITY DAMAGE

STRUCTURAL DAMAGE

The first survey topic asked for information as to structural damage to law enforcement facilities. This is most often found in older buildings, but is not limited to those of unreinforced masonry construction. While structural damage was not widespread, there were instances where evident damage indicated structural problems caused by the earthquake. In one facility, the flooring was uneven after the quake. In another, the slab floor in one portion of the building was raised higher than in adjoining sections. These may indicate shifting of the entire foundation of the structure, and may require a great deal of work to repair. In other cases the walls were found to be bowed out - no longer vertical. In another case, separations were found at wall joints. In still others, the doors were jammed, as the openings were no longer square.

Lastly, some of the agencies in the impact area were using temporary modular office space at the time of the quake. In at least one location the jacks that support the modular offices partially gave way, causing separation of the multi-section structure.

Clearly, the structures that pose the greatest hazard in earthquakes are those of unreinforced masonry. Most of these were built before 1930, and few law enforcement facilities are of that vintage. Other construction types are not automatically "safe", however, particularly non-ductile concrete structures. This type characterizes many buildings occupied by law enforcement agencies. A need exists for recurrent inspection and evaluation of each law enforcement facility, to ensure that foundation connections are solid and that building joints and couplings are secure. Special care must be used in selecting foundation systems used in temporary modular buildings. It should also be noted that in many cases, new law enforcement facilities must meet the standards enumerated in the Essential Services Buildings Seismic Safety Act of 1986, Health & Safety Code § 16000 et seq.
"...lighting fixtures swung into the walls and each other... immediate hazard." - Santa Cruz Sheriff

NON-STRUCTURAL DAMAGE

Law enforcement services can be disrupted when the facility, though structurally intact, is rendered unusable through non-structural damage to its fixtures, furnishings and equipment. This type of damage was far more widespread than that of a structural nature, and in some cases did indeed cause such disruption. Some key law enforcement operations were impaired, often for protracted periods, due to this damage.

Fixtures either broke or were damaged in the earthquake. Glass breakage was widespread. Survey respondents noted breaks in water and sewer pipes in their buildings, sometimes causing interior flooding. In one case, a rooftop solar water heater fell. There was widespread damage to suspended ceiling tiles and light fixtures.

Furnishings moved or fell within many buildings. Of special importance was the disarray caused in many law enforcement records sections. Files were tossed from filing shelves, and in some cases, whole shelves fell with their contents. One agency noted that their motorized file was damaged in such a manner that it would no longer move. Records checks and investigations were delayed in some agencies due to (temporarily) lost files. Another problem involved individual file cabinets. Those without drawer latches, or those with drawers that were open at the time of the quake, often fell. In some cases this resulted in loss of contents, but more importantly, could have resulted in serious injuries to law enforcement personnel, had individuals been in the path of these cabinets. Other furnishings that fell included office dividers, lockers, book shelves, maps, bulletin boards and pictures. One agency noted that their armory was in total disarray after the quake.

Equipment often came loose from its usual resting place or point of restraint. Fire extinguishers flew from holders. An expensive jail booking camera became loose and fell from its support, destroying it. One agency noted that its communications center tape deck, which constantly records emergency calls and radio traffic, fell causing disruption and damage. Many agencies lost computer terminals [CRT's], personal computers and in a few cases, CLETS data terminals. Others noted that unrestrained radio and communications cabinets moved or fell. [Detailed discussion of communications disruptions follows.]
Earthquake studies seem to indicate that more people are injured in earthquakes due to non-structural hazards than from actual building failure. This is significant, since many of the mitigation measures that can alleviate these hazards are fairly inexpensive to perform. Pre-quake attention to securing shelves, files, cabinets, fixtures, etc. can result in fewer injuries to law enforcement personnel, as well as a significant reduction in "down-time" after the quake. This will allow enhanced service to a public that may be in dire need of emergency services after a serious quake. For further ideas and information, consult Reducing the Risks of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide, available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Bay Area or Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Projects, or from your nearest OES Regional Office.
PERSONNEL ISSUES

INJURIES

Injuries to law enforcement personnel seemed to be neither numerous nor serious. They occurred nonetheless, and to the extent possible, information as to the manner of injury might be of help to avoid such injuries in the future. Surveys noted no injuries due to any degree of structural damage suffered in the quake. Most seemed to occur either as a result of non-structural damage, or during rescue and response operations. Law enforcement personnel were injured during the quake by falling lockers, shelves and objects. Bruises and cuts were reported. Operations after the quake resulted in injuries such as sprains, including back injuries, burns, puncture wounds and contusions. While survey documents did not ask for a specific number, based on accounts provided, it appears that less than four dozen law enforcement personnel sustained injuries. Special note should be made of the potential for psychological effects suffered as a result of the quake, and response to the resulting emergencies. Many agencies initiated a program of psychological debriefing, designed to minimize the effects of such problems.

STAFFING

In many respects, this subject did not seem to present the degree of difficulty that might have been anticipated. Specific conditions led to this, however, and emergencies occurring in other places or at other times might lead to different conclusions. This event occurred near shift-change in some agencies. In many, investigative and administrative personnel had not yet left work to return home. As such, non-uniformed personnel were often immediately placed into service, augmenting forces already on duty. Perhaps surprisingly, though many agencies had no set policy to this effect, many off duty personnel either called their agency (when phones were on-line) or went to work without being requested, knowing they might be needed. Many agencies reported they had up to 90% of their authorized personnel on duty within four hours of the quake. Many responded of their own volition, after having checked their own homes for damage. In some cases this presented an interesting problem, as those responding to work had to be sent home, so that those remaining on duty could be relieved by rested personnel at some later time.
"80% of off-duty officers reported on their own prior to recall." - San Francisco PD

Some indicated that, in calling in off duty personnel, communications personnel should be called first. The overload in this vital operation was enormous in many cases, and it was felt that personnel were needed here, prior to expanding the size of other field operations. Also noted was a need to consider callout of reserves, explorers, cadets and other auxiliary units. In a few agencies, these valuable volunteers were not utilized for hours or days. It should be noted that a few agencies had established citizen volunteer "disaster reserve" units. These were used to great advantage.

SCHEDULES

Twelve-hour shift assignments appear to have been the rule in many agencies. Some agencies maintained this staffing for up to fourteen days after the quake. This included a provision that cancelled days off, vacations and court appearances. A few agencies, anticipating difficult commutes for their personnel (due to bridge/road outages) altered their reporting times, allowing officers to commute at off-peak hours.

The need to arrange for work breaks was noted in several survey responses. This is difficult in the first hours, but as the commitment becomes a protracted assignment, some mechanism is needed to allow personnel relief from their duties.
"Top priority was damage assessment." - Marin Sheriff’s Dept.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES

One aspect of the survey document sought information as to the sense of priority each agency placed on the various operations they were called to perform after the earthquake. Based on conditions noted in survey responses, these appear to have been the priorities for law enforcement, from their (collective) perspective:

1. **Internal Capability Assessment**
   - Surveys tended to indicate that some initial assessment was needed to ascertain the capability of the agency to continue operation. Checks of communications, staff and the facility were priorities.

2. **Damage Assessment**
   - Agencies often assigned personnel to do rapid “drive-by” damage assessment checks of patrol areas, in an effort to get a quick impression of overall damage. Some felt that it was important to use specific sectors, to ensure that all areas of the jurisdiction were checked (reporting districts, beats, etc.) Others indicated a need for pre-identification of key, critical facilities in each beat, to ensure that they are checked (hospitals, schools, etc.).

3. **Screen 911 Calls**
   - Simultaneous with restoration of telephone service, communications personnel must rapidly screen incoming 911 calls. Rapid determination must be made as to whether or not the caller is reporting a specific emergency, or merely inquiring as to the extent of the earthquake.

4. **Activate EOC/Augment Staff**
   - Also simultaneous is activity designed to bring in needed support staff such as detectives, etc. Designated personnel also work to set up/staff the EOC.

5. **Assist the Injured**
   - Clearly there is a need to tend to any citizens found to have been injured. Other survey analysis indicates personnel may need more training in this function.
"Have plans for major intersections... already prepared." - Daly City PD

6. **(Light) Search and Rescue**

   In some cases, law enforcement personnel had to search debris for injured citizens. This is an area that was traditionally left for fire personnel to handle. Surveys, however, indicate that law enforcement is often first on the scene, and at times, the only available public safety resource available to perform this function.

7. **Reassure Citizens**

   Both in telephone conversations and in personal contacts, it is clear that the public needs reassurance from those in authority.

8. **Evacuation**

   This remains essentially a law enforcement role, and where necessary, officers and deputies undertook this function.

9. **Hazard Response**

   Personnel had to respond to calls related to natural gas leaks, alarms, power outages, and traffic signal failure.

10. **Security**

    Special patrol of evacuated areas became a priority.

Survey respondents were also asked if they felt they had remained true to the priorities they had set. In most cases, they seemed to agree. However some indicated that they had not anticipated the degree to which officers and deputies would be involved in activity previously considered to be the responsibility of some other city or county agency (fire, public works, etc.).

The survey seems to indicate that law enforcement personnel do indeed engage in activities other than traditional law enforcement after a disaster. While safety and security are still general obligations, specific priorities after the quake were more oriented toward public safety in the wider sense. This seems to support the need for agency heads to consider additional training, equipment and policy development, consistent with this extended role.
"Be prepared for completely independent operation..."
- State Parks & Recreation San Mateo

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

The level of criminal activity after a disaster has been the subject of many discussions, and many in the law enforcement community have for years expressed opinions as to what might be expected in this regard. Some have traditionally felt that looting, among other crimes, could be widely expected. The survey asked about this, and about crime and arrests related to the quake. The results indicate that though crimes related to the disaster did indeed occur, their occurrence was the exception, not the rule. What did occur can be discussed according to existing criminal categories.

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

These were few in number indeed. Some shelters reported disturbances, some of which evolved into assaults. Otherwise, many jurisdictions reported a decrease in the overall number of these crimes in the period directly following the quake.

PROPERTY CRIMES

Thefts, of various types, did occur, but again, these incidents were hardly widespread. There were cases of burglary in "red tagged" (condemned) residences in a few communities. One jurisdiction reported there were thirty-four thefts from a closed residence hall. In one shopping mall hastily evacuated immediately after the quake, several juveniles remained inside, stealing merchandise on their way out. Again, it should be noted that these were isolated incidences, and that theft (or looting as it is popularly termed by the media) was a rare occurrence. In-person follow up interviews with several agency representatives indicated that where theft did occur, it was in either isolated, unpatrolled areas, or in traditionally high crime areas.

QUAKE-SPECIFIC CRIME

A few such situations evidenced themselves, and these should be noted as specific problems that can occur in the aftermath of any disaster. The first are bunco/fraud incidents. Several "scams" became apparent during the "recovery period", as residents and business people attempted to put their lives back in order. One MO involved subjects using a "Williamson Gang" type operation. These individuals, often from another part of the state, arrive in a disaster area intent on defrauding already-distraught victims. One operation was described as being similar to the classic "roof repair" fraud scheme. Suspects approach a potential victim, often an elderly person, and indicate that they are inspecting for disaster damage. They tell the victim that he/she has suffered roof damage, and that their coating...
"Psychological de-briefing was... mandatory... FEMA paid for all costs." - Santa Cruz Sheriff

will "seal" the damage that has occurred. They demand payment in advance, usually in cash, for the work. They then proceed to spray a water solution on the roof. Before the victim realizes that a fraud has occurred, the suspects are far away.

Also of note were several reports of individuals soliciting money for "earthquake relief"; some were found to have had no affiliation with the American Red Cross (or any other legitimate organization). It is suspected that these individuals may have merely pocketed whatever money they collected.

Lastly, some jurisdictions reported that when they "closed" certain buildings or districts (due to damage) they were faced with residents and business people who risked trespass charges, rather than remain out of their property. These are clearly difficult decisions, and each agency handled these cases as they felt appropriate. Citation, warning and in a few cases, arrests, did occur.

There appears to be no solid, accurate count of arrests that were quake-related. From survey responses, observations and interviews with various officials, it appears that arrests are on the order of a few dozen - over the entire Bay Area.

As noted prior, the topic of criminal activity after disaster has been debated for many years. It appears from this survey, and from examination of other disasters in the US, that where local officials maintain some level of law enforcement service, where government remains an organized and visible entity, that the likelihood of post-disaster crime is low. Again, overall, many agencies reported that while service activity levels were enormous, the rate of criminal activity dropped.

As for incidents of fraud, as in pre-disaster times, communication and education are of paramount importance. Information sharing between agencies is important. OES attempted to share MO information regarding these crimes between Bay Area agencies after the quake. This type of information needs to be passed on to the public through newsletters, emergency broadcasts, flyers and announcements at Disaster Application Centers.

Security for evacuated/closed areas is a topic worthy of brief commentary. In earlier disasters, law enforcement agencies have had to expend considerable levels of manpower to secure perimeters of these areas. Use of rental fencing and private security are options worth consideration. Several jurisdictions reported very successful security and access control operations through use of these resources. While each is expensive, proper documentation will lead to payment by state and/or federal relief funds. As such, each jurisdiction should investigate sources for rapid procurement of fencing, and speedy contracting of reputable private security personnel. These do not wholly replace the need for professional law enforcement - they merely augment these resources, freeing some for more important duties in the stricken area.
"All phone lines were not working during various sustained periods..." - San Benito Sheriff

COMMUNICATIONS

Clearly, these systems are both critical and somewhat vulnerable during earthquakes. The capabilities for continued communications varied, according to survey responses. Information is grouped in categories that seemed appropriate for discussion of this topic.

TELEPHONES/911

When the earthquake struck, many communications centers were evacuated. Some of these were directed evacuations, while others were spontaneous. The need for a plan in this regard was noted, as was the need for an alternate 911 answering point, should the evacuation remain in force for an extended period. As for the reliability of telephone service, generally business lines remained unavailable for some time, while 911 was out of service for up to 6 hours. In most cases, outages were related to overload, as opposed to damage to circuits. When 911 circuits came back on line, automatic number identification (ANI) returned to operation long before the location information (ALI). As for call load, an enormous number of calls were merely informational, inquiring as to the damage caused by the quake. Additional public education is needed, as evidenced by this problem, according to respondents.

This topic has been reviewed by many communications and telephone utility professionals. This general overview may lead the reader to realistically assess local telephone capability.

GENERATORS

Emergency power capability is often considered in concert with communications concerns. Survey responses provided information as to the degree of reliability in this area. Some agencies indicated that their generators worked well. One agency said that theirs had worked for forty hours straight. This was balanced by another agency that said that they were without power for forty-eight hours, due to lack of commercial power and a generator failure. Other generator comments included:

- Generator was too small for the building and load requirements.
- Gasoline capacity was only adequate for four hours of run-time; the generator ran out of gas, causing another power loss.
- Generator alternator failed, causing loss of power.
"All phones lines tied up... by people telling us there had been an earthquake." - Oakland PD

- The generator worked well, but it had to be started manually; automatic start did not function.
- Lack of ventilation to the generator caused it to fail after one and one half hours.
- Damaged fuel and coolant lines caused the generator to fail.
- Unable to locate a maintenance person qualified to work on the (inoperative) generator; unavailable due to earthquake. No city staff were capable of making the repairs.

While these are not direct quotations, they reflect the comments indicated in survey responses. An underlying message was a recommendation that agencies force-test their generators. This involves intentionally switching off commercial power to the building or facility, to test the generator for automatic start and switch-over capability.

Review of emergencies in other parts of the country has shown similar problems with emergency generators. The need to ensure constant maintenance and testing is clear, as is the need to look at several alternative sources for emergency repair and fuel delivery.

RADIO

Radio system failure occurred in some jurisdictions, but this did not seem to be prevalent. More frequent were selective outages and system overload. Some repeater/transmitter sites suffered power failures or breaks in circuits. One agency stated that they had suffered a water leak, causing a transmitter to fail completely. Others found that though equipment was intact, lack of radio discipline caused channels to be overloaded with traffic. Some agencies in the impacted area utilize UHF band radio systems. These are characterized as relying on repeater sites, due to inherent short range of UHF signals. Problems were noted by some agencies with this type of system, as the quake caused the repeaters to fail. While VHF radio signals can be received over intermediate distances without aid of a repeater, those with loss of UHF repeaters found themselves limited to very short range communications.

Communications systems have grown over the years in sophistication, capability and capacity. Emergency conditions such as these stress such systems to their limit, at times exceeding those limits. Survivability of repeaters, transmitters, consoles and antennas needs to be evaluated. Sophisticated systems, such as those employing voted receivers, repeaters, trunking, etc., need special consideration. Given the critical nature of these systems, they must be made as "fail-safe" as possible.
MUTUAL AID OPERATIONS

Since the 1950's the California Master Mutual Aid Agreement has been in place, eventually forming the basis for the discipline-specific mutual aid plans. California’s Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan provides a format for requesting, processing and assigning additional law enforcement personnel, when certain conditions are present. In review, the situation must be beyond the capability of the existing resources available to the jurisdiction in-need, and they must follow the prescribed manner to request assistance. In the aftermath of the Loma Prieta Earthquake, a number of mutual aid operations were undertaken. Beyond mere listing of which agencies received help from what jurisdiction, survey responses discussed the manner in which the system was, and was not employed.

REQUEST PROCESSING

A number of agencies indicated that before mutual aid could be called for, spontaneous aid began arriving, unrequested. Usually, under the circumstances, this assistance was of great help to the stricken jurisdiction. In other cases, agencies correctly assessed their capability, and contacted their Operational Area Coordinator for assistance, as per the Plan.

In a few cases, agency representatives apparently contacted other departments on their own, without following the information flow mandated by the Plan. Some of these ad hoc requests were honored by the requested department; in other cases the requestor was referred back to the system, to contact the Operational Area Coordinator. These Coordinators, the Sheriffs of each county, turned to the Regional Coordinator, Sheriff Plummer (Alameda County) when they had no assets with which to fill requests in their own counties. The office of Sacramento Sheriff Glen Craig, Coordinator for Region IV was also involved, when for a time it appeared that resources would also be needed from outside Region II.

Where mutual aid requests were made through the system, resources were generally forthcoming in sufficient quantity and in a timely manner. Where resources were requested outside of the usual requesting channels, time delays were the rule, as in many cases the requestor was routed back into the system. It appears that the mutual aid system should be the subject of more widely held training sessions. While many indicated that they understood and followed the system, others admitted that they did not feel comfortable with the system and its operation. Even within a given single agency, some knew the system well,
others did not. In one case, a department employee from a department in one of the primary damage areas apparently sent out an "all points" CLETS teletype, requesting assistance from any and all departments that could send personnel. While well-intentioned, several hours were spent by each level in the system to properly route this request, and to properly assign the needed resources to the stricken jurisdiction.

USE OF MUTUAL AID RESPONDERS

Surveys asked recipients how they utilized personnel that responded for mutual aid. It appears that mutual aid forces can be deployed using one of two models. One manner involves taking incoming personnel and pairing them with local personnel. This has the advantage of increasing overall staffing, while utilizing the local knowledge of the local officer/deputy. The alternative is to assign incoming mutual aid personnel as a team. These individuals can be sent to a particular site or area to perform one or more specific tasks. It has the advantage of utilizing personnel familiar with each other, and the orientation of using "teamwork" aimed at one or more specific objectives. An additional survey question asked departments to identify the tasks which mutual aid personnel were assigned, whatever the model. These appear to have been:

- Traffic Control
- Perimeter Security
- Emergency Medical/First Aid
- Evacuation
- Light Rescue

OTHER AGENCIES

The Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan calls for certain other agencies to assist local law enforcement during emergency conditions. Assignments are coordinated through the State Operations Center [SOC]. This is a crisis management center that operates out of the OES Headquarters in Sacramento during emergency periods. A number of state law enforcement agencies played key roles in this regard:
California Highway Patrol personnel augmented local law enforcement officers in a number of jurisdictions. Their personnel provided assistance in a wide variety of roles, often beyond that of traffic enforcement and coordination. Assistance from the CHP was given on a Local Area basis during the first few hours of the emergency. Local personnel from CHP Area Offices helped police and sheriff’s personnel nearby on a spontaneous basis. As the emergency progressed, CHP deployed personnel from Divisions throughout the state to areas that sustained the most damage. Their response to Santa Cruz, San Benito and Alameda Counties involved the largest numbers of personnel. Operations in and around state highways also involved significant commitments, in terms of staffing and management. Traffic management, crowd control and investigation/documentation were undertaken for the IS-880 collapse, the Bay Bridge span collapse and the slides along SR 17.

University of California Police Departments have their own, internal, mutual aid plan. This outlines procedures for inter-campus mutual aid during emergency situations. In the Loma Prieta quake the UC Campuses in the area (Santa Cruz, Berkeley and San Francisco) were affected. As a result, UC Officers from throughout the state were deployed to the bay area. In Santa Cruz, UC officers from Southern California were loaned to the City and County for a variety of mutual aid tasks. Similar activities were undertaken in other bay area communities.

Department of Justice personnel assisted in a variety of areas, both in the bay area and in the SOC. Also playing key roles were the California State Police and peace officer Rangers of the Department of Parks and Recreation. State Police officers evacuated state facilities throughout the bay area, many of which sustained significant damage in the quake. They provided security in and around state facilities and assisted local law enforcement, as well as assisting at the SOC. Ranger personnel from various State Parks and Recreation Areas performed damage assessment, evacuated closed areas, performed search and rescue, and assisted local officers. Their personnel handled security at some of the evacuation shelters, in some cases handling gang-related problems until these duties could be returned to local officers.

FEDERAL PERSONNEL

Emergency management concepts call for the use of civil law enforcement personnel in California, even in emergency situations. While state and federal military personnel are ready and are capable of security and law enforcement duties, the existing civilian mutual aid system is used to augment local capabilities. That notwithstanding, it should be noted
that in San Francisco, Military Police from the Presidio of San Francisco responded spontaneously to assist in the heavily damaged Marina District. Their assistance in crowd control was of great help to local officials, until such time as local personnel could fill these assignments. Officers from the US Park Police assigned to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area also assisted in San Francisco.

The Law Enforcement Mutual Aid System works when used in a timely and procedurally correct fashion. Literally hundreds of officers from a variety of agencies responded to calls for assistance, both immediate and protracted. Clearly there were many assisting agencies not mentioned in this summary. Personnel from these agencies performed roles just as critical in management of the emergency, to be sure.

It is also clear that more training is necessary. OES has, and will continue to present these concepts and procedures on request. Moreover, local agencies need to undertake internal training, so that this knowledge is shared throughout the supervisory and management ranks, not just held by a few individuals.

It must be added that there were thousands of additional law enforcement officers ready and willing to assist in the affected area. Some agencies polled admitted that they did not request needed mutual aid because they felt the emergency was more wide-spread than it actually was. Emergency managers have long 'preached' that local communities could be on their own for up to seventy two hours, without help from the outside world. In some cases it was this thought that kept local law enforcement managers from asking for more personnel and other resources.

Lastly, there is an additional consideration that some managers discussed, when deciding whether or not to ask for additional mutual aid. Under the Plan, local personnel remain in charge, regardless of how many mutual aid responders are brought in. Some apparently felt that they had as many personnel on duty as they could reasonable manage, given the situation and activities that presented themselves. Some felt that in the final analysis, this had been the correct decision. Others wished they had called for the assistance that remained untapped.

In each future case, local law enforcement executives must balance the need for additional resources with the ability to manage these personnel. The Incident Command System offers a viable model for management of emergency organizations subject to rapid expansion during disaster conditions, and should be considered as a management structure.
“(Need) emergency supply of gasoline that can be pumped without electric pumps.” - US Park Police

EQUIPMENT NEEDS

Each agency surveyed was asked to list items of equipment they found valuable in handling emergency response to the earthquake. In some cases the agencies did not have these items in inventory. In other cases, their supply was insufficient to meet the needs brought on by the quake. Responses are presented in two formats. These pages will discuss items of equipment noted by respondents, with information that elaborates on need, usage or specifications. (These notes are in no particular priority order.) Also annexed to this report is a listing of equipment by item with estimated procurement cost for each.

POLICE/SHERIFF’S STATION

Emergency generators were listed almost universally. Based on the experiences noted elsewhere in this report, it is clear that many agencies feel uncomfortable with their capability for emergency power generation. Generator comments includes perceived need for:

- Greater load capacity
- More reliable automatic starting capability
- Seismic mounting
- Reliable fuel system
- Larger fuel capacity for longer run time

Many agencies also indicated that they were considering trailer-mounted or portable generators for stand-by use. Also mentioned frequently was a need for an emergency generator capable of powering gasoline pumps so that emergency vehicles could be refueled, even in the absence of commercial power. Also important were wet cell emergency building lights. These lights remain on trickle charge so that in the event of a power and generator failure, emergency lighting remains available for several hours. Many agencies indicated that they intend to place these throughout their buildings.

Polaroid Cameras were mentioned several times. Though their film is somewhat expensive, agencies felt that the ability to instantly document conditions, situations and status boards, made these valuable to have on hand. Cots were noted by agencies that had several personnel working several consecutive shifts. Other items the station should stock include adequate supplies of traffic flares, traffic cones, portable barricades, barricade tape, and marking crayons. As priorities dictated extended periods of traffic control, the need for extensive inventory of these items became acute. A great deal of inter-agency borrowing
"County stores ran out of flares almost immediately." - East Palo Alto PD

occurred, as suppliers could not be reached in the early hours. The need for portable (cardboard) stop signs was apparent throughout the affected area. Many agencies only had a few of the metal variety available. This necessitated stationing personnel at critical intersections, in lieu of signage. Other needs listed included "No Trespassing" and other perimeter signs. Some agencies identified a need for increased use of Cyalume-type lightsticks for traffic control, emergency illumination, signaling, etc.

Flashlights became problematic in some agencies, particularly those using the rechargeable-type lights. Some agencies only charge these lights in the station, between shifts. In some agencies the emergency power was not sufficient to power all plugs in the facility, so only essential lines were "hot." Many of these same agencies did not outfit their units with vehicular chargers for the lights, and as a result, there was little ability to recharge the lights. In other cases, the lights simply did not have sufficient battery capacity for continuous, extended use. In flashlights of more conventional types (D or C disposable cells) battery inventory was a problem. Many agencies ran out of batteries in the first day of the emergency. Traffic direction cones for flashlights were listed as items many agencies no longer had, but intended to procure.

Battery powered televisions and AM/FM radios were listed among equipment items to buy. The ability to monitor media reports was regarded as one of the keys to effective damage assessment and rumor control. Also important in listings were commercial television satellite dishes and receivers, as some agencies feel they can get enhanced damage and situation information by monitoring network feeds, regardless of the availability of local signals. Laptop personal computers were mentioned frequently. Damage assessment, resource tracking, personnel time-keeping and call/incident tracking are possible uses. Battery capacity and charging concerns hold here as well.

Manual gasoline pumps were listed in many survey responses. These hand-pumps were regarded as important, as many city pumps were found to have no source of emergency power, rendering them inoperable until commercial electricity service returned.

The availability of a mobile command post was indicated as a priority in many cases. Many felt that their existing communications facility should be supported by such a vehicle, both in case of facility failure, or for adjunct use closer to damage sites. Lastly, some agencies wrote that they would be looking into purchase of one or more storage containers (maritime shipping containers, often called "seavans") for use in storing emergency supplies outside of their usual facility. These containers are seen as survivable and yet fairly inexpensive.
"You will never have sufficient supplies on hand." - Santa Cruz PD

VEHICLE

In emergency situations such as these, law enforcement vehicles become a "rolling station-house - supporting not only that officer, but many public safety efforts in a given part of the community. This extended role underlies the many items of equipment listed as appropriate for inclusion in police/sheriff unit standard equipment lists. The availability of well-stocked, frequently checked first aid/trauma kits was highlighted on numerous survey documents. These should be appropriate for the existing level of training, yet contain enough trauma supplies to handle the variety of injuries that could be encountered in disaster conditions. At times, the kits and their contents were used not only by officers, but by other public safety personnel involved as well.

Light rescue seems to be a role law enforcement personnel may find themselves assigned to, or at least assisting-in. As such, surveys listed acquisition of bolt cutters, pry bars and wrecking bars as intentions. Also included in this category were various types of utility ropes. Another activity personnel found themselves engaged in was that of shutting-off natural gas valves for residents that were at risk, or at least felt that they were. Many agencies are considering purchase of gas wrenches for their vehicles, based on this experience.

As for vehicles themselves, some agencies noted a number of flat tires, due perhaps to vehicle operations in debris-littered areas, hence a need for a supply of spare vehicle tires. Some agencies added that based on their terrain, they need more four wheel drive police vehicles in their fleets. Other agencies stated that vehicles or any kind were in short supply. Some had personnel use their own vehicles, while others considered rentals or inter-agency loans.

COMMUNICATIONS

Many agencies felt that there was an acute need for more interagency radios. Both in mutual aid and damage assessment coordination, this capability was regarded as critical. Cellular telephones were also listed almost universally. Most agencies have at least one, and based on survey documents, many intend to purchase additional phones in light of the quake. Also listed as purchases were additional portable two way radios (packsets/HT's). Additional batteries and chargers were also listed, although battery memory was noted in some cases as having been a problem. The availability of facsimile machines was considered very important to many respondents. Some have portable models. Provision for the additional safety of uninterruptable power supplies for computers and communications equipment was listed several times as a priority.
"Be prepared to feed your officers if... restaurants are closed." - Daly City PD

The ability to contact off-duty or off-site personnel was considered very important, so that pagers were on several equipment lists. There was some discussion of the type of paging service used. Commercial/common carrier pagers often rely on telephone activation systems - vulnerable should telephones fail. Others are activated by broadcasts on police or government radio frequencies, based on codes generated on the public safety dispatch console. Each appears to have certain limitations and strong points. A few surveys added that they needed two way radios in all of their vehicles, not just in marked or detective vehicles. As noted prior, vehicles were in short supply, and administrative or support vehicles were often pressed into service by uniformed personnel.

PERSONAL

The wide variety of assignments given field personnel tended to dictate comments in this category, as in the others. Reflective (traffic) vests were listed, as there was often no lighting at all in areas where personnel directed traffic. Other agencies listed raid jackets as important apparel, as many personnel were called to field duty with little time to put on a more formal uniform. In line with earlier discussion of light rescue duties, departments indicated they were considering purchase of hard hats, dust masks, (work) gloves, and coveralls or utility uniforms, such as jump-suits.

Budget availability is a necessary constraint on any purchasing a law enforcement agency might engage in. Executive-level awareness of these equipment needs is essential however, so that priorities can include these types of disaster-related equipment. The formation of a multi-year program for acquisition of local-specific equipment items is a process many have found to be effective.

Also of concern is the ability to retain adequate levels of stock of certain critical supplies, such as batteries, flares, etc. Two alternatives might be worth considering. One is the development of a resource-network, wherein local agencies regularly share information as to stock levels and resource availability. This enhances the ability to give short-term supply loans for use during emergency surge periods. Another possibility is that of appropriate emergency purchase agreements with local safety supply vendors. Many such organizations will consider special arrangements for rapid emergency delivery of critical safety equipment, but only on prior arrangement.

Of special concern is the availability and capability of law enforcement vehicles. These appear to be more than just "patrol platforms" during disaster operations. They are caches of equipment, shelter, intelligence-gathering tools and local-site command posts. The need to ensure their availability, their reliability and that of the equipment carried within them is paramount, to allow the public safety personnel that operate in them to best deliver emergency service to the community.
"...explorers, reserves, jeep posse were left... without a mission." - Santa Cruz Sheriff

TRAINING NEEDS

There was a certain amount of crossover between responses specifically designated as training needs, and those that are part of wider-reaching comments in the "Lessons Learned" portions of the survey. Those that were listed as needs for further training are discussed here, along with ideas on how to best fill those identified needs.

FIELD-ORIENTED TRAINING

Based on the extended roles played by law enforcement, the training perceived as appropriate for field personnel was not criminal justice oriented but public safety oriented in nature. Orientation training in light rescue and urban heavy rescue was noted repeatedly as needed within the law enforcement community. Also a frequent response was that of Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) training for more law enforcement officers. Law enforcement personnel apparently need training in how (and when) to safely shut off utilities according to the surveys. As noted prior, a great many officers and deputies found themselves engaged in this type of activity.

Also along these lines, there were a number of responses indicating a need for personnel to receive more cross-training with fire, public works and utility personnel, again in light of the fact that law enforcement personnel tended to become part of a wider public safety response.

Radio discipline should be the subject of further training, as should briefings on duties and responsibilities of state agencies. The latter tended to confuse many law enforcement personnel (field and management alike), as many state-level agencies not often seen in these jurisdictions assisted local efforts.

Finally in this category, responses indicated that personal physical fitness remains important, perhaps moreso during situations this stressful. Several law enforcement officers were apparently reminded just how "out of shape they were." Continued training and attention are needed here.
"...ongoing training in disaster preparedness, which paid off." - Los Gatos PD

MANAGEMENT TRAINING

Training in the concepts and use of the law enforcement Mutual Aid System was seen as being of key importance by those responding to the survey. Likewise of importance was a need to train all personnel in the priority and techniques involved in damage assessment. Further training in the use of the incident command system is important to many affected law enforcement agencies, as is specific training for Sergeants on the importance of their key role in the early stages of an emergency.

Repeated mentions of the various courses offered at the California Specialized Training Institute were made, as respondents indicated that their training courses were effective, important and timely. Some noted that department head and executive-level training of this nature was still problematic. They wrote that strict sanctions need to exist across-the-board, mandating training and exercise participation by all staff, from the highest levels on down.

The POST Manual lists a number of certified courses that deliver emergency management training. A listing of courses appears as an appendix to this report. Beyond this formal level of training, it should be stated that other opportunities exist to further local expertise in these areas. Many of the training topics listed as field-oriented could be taught locally by nearby allied government agencies. EMT training, though time consuming, can often be arranged through local community colleges.

A number of organizations are currently active in developing and providing training in light/urban heavy rescue topics. OES is working closely with the fire service, the State Fire Marshal and others with expertise in these fields to further refine training appropriate for local law enforcement personnel.

Lastly, the OES Law Enforcement Division welcomes requests for presentations at local law enforcement training sessions, staff meetings, team building sessions, etc. Topics that can be presented include: The Mutual Aid System, Law Enforcement’s Role in Earthquake Incidents and Emergency/Mutual Aid Radio Systems.

OES is also working closely with POST to develop a sixteen to forty hour course on emergency planning for law enforcement.
"...file cabinets and unsecured stacked records overturned."
- San Francisco PD

LEARNING POINTS

To a great extent, the survey responses consisted entirely of learning points that each agency has identified since the earthquake. The survey asked specifically for additional points that agencies wished to highlight. In some cases, these included ideas not captured elsewhere in the responses. In other cases, the responses reinforced comments that had been included elsewhere. These notes seem to be related to three specific areas; hence, the headings. Note that responses were collated and paraphrased.

PERSONNEL

- Personnel need to be trained on their roles after such an event. Training needs to include specifics on what their first activities should be.
- Personnel should receive cross-training. This includes inter-disciplinary training, such as that provided by utilities, fire agencies, public works, etc. It also should include intra-departmental training. This refers to that which can be conducted in-house, so that officers/deputies learn more of the communications center function, community service officers learn more about damage assessment, deputies learn more about the coroner function, etc.
- The role of volunteers (reserves, explorers, etc.) should be stressed, and perhaps expanded.
- Agencies should consider conducting a skills/qualifications inventory, to identify personnel with special skills, language ability, etc.

CAPABILITY

- Communications centers, emergency operations centers and command facilities need to retain operational capability after such events.
- Communications and electrical power systems must be redundant, and must be subjected to force-testing, to ensure adequate reliability, capacity and capability.
"You are never prepared enough." - Santa Cruz PD

o Interagency communications capability must exist; existing systems must be familiar to personnel.

o Supply items (such as flares, barricades, batteries) must be available, accessible, and stored in sufficient quantity. Storage should be dispersed, to guard against loss of all supplies if one site is destroyed.

PROCESS

o Traffic control points should be pre-identified, and a priority list available to all personnel so that critical sites can be staffed as personnel become available.

o Personnel need to better understand the state mutual aid system, and the responsibilities and capabilities of state agencies.

o Personnel should receive training in hazard-specific activities, such as shutting off natural gas valves, etc.

o Documentation and record-keeping need more emphasis.

o Damage assessment should target key critical facilities first; communicate results to the EOC. Ensure that all personnel receive this information so that they can understand the "big picture".

o Prepare personnel to take independent action, in lieu of supervision or guidance during emergencies.

o Law enforcement's role changes in terms of focus, priorities and activities.
"You must be willing to deviate from SOP's." - Salinas PD

OTHER ISSUES

Several issues, though of great importance, were beyond the scope of the survey. While survey response comments touched on these issues, more detailed review is needed to delineate specific learning points regarding these topic areas.

CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

Within the quake damage area there were detention and corrections facilities operated by the federal government, the state, counties and cities. No major incidents were noted in survey reports, however there was no specific inquiry made into this vital area. Some facilities were evacuated for short periods. Issues in need of local consideration include:

- Provision for these facilities in local emergency plans
- Training on actions custodial staff should take
- Policy decisions regarding transfer and/or special release
- Facility survivability and hazard mitigation
- Emergency power availability
- Proper operation of custody doors after possible structural damage
- Fire suppression and evacuation capability

COURT SYSTEM

There were several court operations disrupted by the earthquake. The Alameda County Courthouse was evacuated for a time, as were the offices of state-level appellate courts in San Francisco. The impact to the justice system was significant; in many cases defense attorneys sought release of their clients, due to the inability of the courts to arraign their clients within legally prescribed time limits. Additional delays resulted from non-structural damage inside court system facilities, including broken computer terminals, files that fell from shelving, etc. Again, local plans need to take this branch of the justice system into account. Provisions could include alternative booking/arraignment locations, more survivable record storage systems, arrangements for backup courtroom sites, etc.
"...we used approximately 15 cases (of flares) the first evening..." - Scotts Valley PD

CORONER OPERATIONS

In California, coroner operations in several counties come under the jurisdiction of the County Sheriff. To the extent that these become operations under law enforcement jurisdiction, there is a need to consider the impact of these operations on overall law enforcement commitments within a disaster area. The California Coroner's Mutual Aid Plan, recently revised, serves as an excellent tool for mobilizing additional personnel to augment local coroner resources. Management of disaster fatalities remains an area that local emergency managers need to consider. OES will continue to assist as necessary in further refining these important plans.

PUBLIC INFORMATION OPERATIONS

While not necessarily a law enforcement-specific function, police, sheriff and Highway Patrol personnel played key roles in providing information to the public through the news media. In the key damage areas, law enforcement personnel worked alongside PIO's from other government agencies. Together they put together media centers, held press conferences, provided media with tours and assisted with hundreds of interviews. As with any operation, some aspects of these activities resulted in learning points for all involved. These are effectively beyond the scope of this report. Authoritative sources for critique and training in this area include the California Specialized Training Institute and the California Association of Public Information Officials.
Attachments that follow include:

- Survey area diagram
- Photographs
- Suggested Equipment List
- Sample Dispatch SOP
- Mutual Aid Radio Systems
- Disaster Training Courses
- Ten Steps Toward Preparedness
- Fact Sheet on the OES
  Law Enforcement Division
Damage assessment results were often marked by use of spray paint.
One of the first officers on the scene at the Cypress structure, a California State Police Officer checked for signs of life in the collapse.

Law enforcement officers from many agencies found themselves involved in assisting in Coroner functions.
Perimeters were manned for extended periods.

Law enforcement personnel played a key role in the delivery of public information through the media.
Law enforcement records were often difficult to locate after the quake. These are non-structural hazards that are not complicated to prevent.
Although not involved in a law enforcement role, federal personnel and canines from the US Immigration and Naturalization Service assisted in search and rescue.

Supplies were often exhausted rapidly.
### SUGGESTED EQUIPMENT ITEMS: Law Enforcement Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQUIPMENT ITEM</th>
<th>ESTIMATED COST</th>
<th>TIME FRAME</th>
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<tr>
<td>First Aid/Trauma Kit</td>
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<td>Cot</td>
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<td>Storage Container</td>
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<td>4-Wheel Drive Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Un-interruptible Pwr Supply</td>
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LAW ENFORCEMENT DISPATCH CENTERS:
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
EARTHQUAKE

√ Get away from things that might fall
√ When shaking stops, check for damage and injury in the comm. center
√ Check all radio channels: still working?
√ Broadcast:  
  - There was an earthquake
  - Units should hold all traffic
  - Units should make rapid visual check of their areas

√ Priorities:  
  - Major life safety threats
  - Fires endangering life
  - Collapsed structures with potential for rescue
  - Gas leaks/hazmats that endanger lives

√ Call each unit by beat, obtaining BRIEF description of types/levels of damage in that area
State of California

Governor's Office of Emergency Services

Statewide Mutual Aid Radio System

Systems and Priorities

Several radio systems exist to serve public safety needs in California on a jurisdiction-specific basis. The state has also designated several frequencies and networks for intersystem use. These are available to public safety and government agencies so that maximum use may be made of the available frequencies, with the goal of increased sharing of information during emergency situations.

Among the systems considered are:

- **CLEMARS** [Calif. Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System]
- **NALEMARS** [National Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System]
- **CLERS** [Calif. Law Enforcement Radio System]
- **Fire White** [Mutual Aid Fire Channel]
- **OES Fire Radio System**
- **FIREMARS** [Fire Mutual Aid Radio System]
- **CESRS** [Calif. Emergency Services Radio System]
- **CALCORD** [Calif. On-Scene Coordination Channel]
- **HEAR** [Hospital Emergency Aid Radio System]
Common to each of these systems is a set of priorities. These set precedence, as to which situations have priority over others in use of these interagency systems:

**PRIORITY 1**

Disaster and extreme emergency operations, for mutual aid and interagency communication.

**PRIORITY 2**

Emergency or urgent operations involving imminent safety of life and property.

**PRIORITY 3**

Special event control activities, generally of a preplanned nature, and generally involving joint participation of two or more agencies. [PRIORITY 3A, is listed as drills, tests and exercises of a civil defense or disaster nature.]

**PRIORITY 4**

*When no traffic of a higher priority classification is in progress*, agencies may use certain of the channels for local communications as a secondary channel. This may include "administrative traffic" or similar usage.

Note that these frequencies are provided by OES and the FCC so that emergency operations may be coordinated. Any misuse of these frequencies impairs public safety. Please take steps to ensure that operations on these frequencies are necessary, professional and coordinated.

For information, contact your nearest State OES Office.
## DISASTER PREPAREDNESS TRAINING COURSES

The following disaster preparedness courses are currently certified by POST:

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<tr>
<th>Planning Courses</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft Disaster Prep.</td>
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<td>Damage Assessment/Recovery</td>
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<td>Police Planning</td>
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<td>Santa Rosa Center</td>
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<td>Emergency First Responders</td>
<td>Chapman College</td>
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<td>Stress, Post-Trauma/Suprvs</td>
<td>National Council on Alcoholism</td>
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<td>Tactical Operations and Intell.</td>
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<td>Crisis Communication/Media (ADV)</td>
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<td>Dispatcher/Critical Incidents</td>
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<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<th>Search and Rescue Courses</th>
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<td>Search Function Management</td>
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<td>Search Function - Winter Ops</td>
<td>OES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dive Rescue (ADV)</td>
<td>Santa Barbara CC</td>
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TEN STEPS
TOWARD LAW ENFORCEMENT EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS

1. Arrange for structural assessment of law enforcement facilities
2. Assessment and mitigation of non-structural hazards
3. Assess survivability of 911, communications equipment and dispatch facility
4. Assess capability and capacity of generator; force test system
5. Develop personnel policy regarding special schedules, staff recall, automatic reporting and alternative reporting sites
6. Develop a shared system of operational priorities for use during emergency periods
7. Become more familiar with mutual aid systems: who do you call?
8. Design multi-year plan to procure needed equipment
9. Design multi-year plan to train all personnel, sworn & non-sworn
10. Develop procedures and forms necessary to capture response costs, hours, statistics
The Office of Emergency Services reports directly to the Governor of California. OES, as it is known, has responsibilities before, during and after emergencies that strike the state. City and County government agencies receive planning assistance from OES, so that local emergencies can be better managed. During emergencies, OES personnel represent the Governor, assisting with access to state resources and mutual aid coordination. OES also facilitates emergency assistance from federal government agencies. After emergencies, OES coordinates the disaster recovery process, working closely with the agencies that provide funding assistance to those affected by disasters.

Within the Governor's Office of Emergency Services are several Divisions, aligned geographically and by discipline, to best serve the needs of client government agencies. Among these is the OES Law Enforcement Division. Staffed by experienced peace officers, this Division is prepared to assist all California law enforcement agencies in the execution of their missions, particularly as regards operations in mutual aid or disaster conditions. Specific assignments include:

- Mutual Aid Planning and Coordination
- Management of the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System, known as CLEMARS
- Coordination of Interagency Search and Rescue Operations
- State Point of Contact in Diplomatic/Consular Issues
- Develop and Maintain Special Equipment for Loan to Local Agencies [Including: Radio Caches, Communications Vans, Logistics Vans, etc.]
- Consultation/Coordination Assistance to Local Agencies for Special Operations Planning

Personnel from the Law Enforcement Division are available before, during and after emergency situations. For assistance, call your closest OES Office, or call OES on a 24 hour basis at (916) 427-4341.