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Police Management Association
Professional Conference


HIGH PERFORMANCE
POLICE MANAGEMENT

A Source Book

February, 1989

This handbook was prepared for the Police Management Association with grant assistance from the National Institute of Justice, whose Director is the Hon. James K. Stewart, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

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Prepared By
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An Invitation to Project Dare: Drug Abuse Resistance Education

America has a drug problem.

It is a problem that exacts an enormous toll in human suffering, in the expenditure of public monies, and, more importantly, in the enormous waste of human potential.

It is a festering problem whose solution has so far eluded us.

Despite urgent warnings from parents, educators, and the mass media, many of our nation's young people experiment with and use a variety of harmful substances, including tobacco, drugs, and alcohol.¹ An annual survey of high school seniors conducted for the National Institute on Drug Abuse found that, in 1985, only 8 percent of students had never used alcohol, and only 31 percent had never smoked cigarettes. Over two thirds of those seniors reported use of at least one illicit substance, with over one half (54%) having used marijuana.² Children as young as age 9 report that marijuana is "easy to get."³

Until recently, law enforcement strategies have focused on the supply side of the drug problem, with millions of dollars spent each year to control the distribution and sale of illicit drugs. Despite the confiscation of tons of narcotics, and despite thousands of arrests, the drug trade continues to flourish.

Law enforcement experts now recognize that the problem of substance use must be addressed by stemming demand, especially among young people who might become tomorrow's drug users. A recent report issued by the Commission on Organized Crime concludes that the only way to significantly reduce the drug problem in the United States is through eliminating the demand for drugs.⁴

School children must be educated to recognize the dangers of drug use and to resist both the subtle and the direct pressures on them to experiment with and use drugs.

Arresting Demand: The Development of Project DARE

In 1983, Chief Daryl Gates of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) recognized that, to prevent substance use among children, he would need the cooperation of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD).

Under Chief Gate's direction, the LAPD collaborated with Dr. Harry Handler, Superintendent of LAUSD, to launch a drug use prevention education program that employs law enforcement officers in elementary classrooms as regular instructors.

A review of existing substance use curricula by Dr. Ruth Rich, a health education specialist from LAUSD, showed that lessons concentrating on techniques for resisting peer pressure, on self-management skills (decision making, values clarification, and problem solving), and on alternatives to drug use appeared to have the greatest degree of success.⁵ These methods were incorporated into the DARE curriculum, challenging students to consider the consequences of their actions and involving them in classroom exercises that gave them the opportunity to practice what they had learned.⁶

During Project DARE's first year, 1983-84, ten officers taught the new curriculum to more than 8,000 students in 50 Los Angeles elementary schools. Subsequently, the DARE program, which originally targeted senior-level elementary students (fifth- or sixth-grades), was expanded to include a junior high curriculum and lessons for grades K-4. By 1986, the program had grown to reach all 345 elementary and 58 junior high schools in the city.

Based on this success, Chief Gates invited other jurisdictions to send officers to Los Angeles for 80 hours of intensive DARE training. Officers from 33 states representing 398 agencies have now learned how to bring the DARE curriculum to the children in their communities. Because the growing demand for DARE training exceeds the LAPD's capacity, the Bureau of Justice Assistance plans to fund the establishment of up to three DARE regional training centers in 1988.

The excitement about Project DARE continues to grow. In October 1986, the Bureau of Justice Assistance awarded grants to seven jurisdictions for planning and organizing DARE implementation. The Department of Defense plans to establish DARE in all of its schools for military dependents. New Zealand plans to implement DARE in association with its law-related education program. Other countries, including England and Australia, are investigating the introduction of Project DARE in their schools as well.

There are now a Spanish version and a Braille translation of the student workbook used in the classroom. Efforts are under way to develop strategies for teaching DARE to hearing-impaired and other special needs students.

Program Goals and Objectives

Goal:

To prevent substance use among school children.⁷

The DARE program targets children before they are likely to have been led by their peers to experiment with tobacco, drugs, and alcohol. By reaching children at an age when they are most receptive to drug prevention education, Project DARE seeks to prevent adolescent drug use and to reduce drug trafficking by eliminating the demand for drugs.

Objectives:

- To equip elementary and junior high students with the skills for recognizing and resisting social pressures to experiment with alcohol, tobacco, and drugs
- To help students develop self-esteem
- To teach positive alternatives to substance use
- To develop students' skills in risk assessment and decision making
- To build students' interpersonal and communications skills

Project DARE achieves these objectives by training carefully selected veteran law enforcement officers to teach a structured, sequential curriculum in the schools.

An important by-product of Project DARE is the positive impact of uniformed law enforcement officers, working in classrooms in a nonthreatening, preventive role, upon the image of law enforcement in the community.

A Program That Works: Evaluation Results

Evaluations of Project DARE in Los Angeles reveal great enthusiasm for the program among school principals and teachers who say that DARE students are less accepting of substance use and better prepared to deal with peer pressure as a result of the DARE lessons. Moreover, these educators find that, because DARE students get to know police officers in a positive, nonpunitive role, they have a greater respect for both the law and law enforcement personnel.⁸ Beyond that, students receiving the DARE curriculum in elementary school show greater improvement, compared with non-DARE students, in grades for work habits and cooperation during their first semester in junior high.⁹

A short-term evaluation for the National Institute of Justice also demonstrates the impact of Project DARE on the knowledge, attitudes, and self-reported behavior of seventh-grade students who received DARE in the sixth grade.¹⁰ These students, compared with those who had not had DARE, indicated significantly lower substance use since graduation from the sixth grade. Moreover, DARE students, when asked to imagine friends pressuring them to use drugs or alcohol, were significantly less likely to indicate acceptance of the offer than were non-DARE students. DARE students were also more likely to use effective refusal strategies emphasized by the DARE curriculum.

In 1985, Los Angeles initiated a seven-year study of DARE and non-DARE students to assess the long-term impact of the program on students' knowledge, attitudes, and self-reported drug use.

Key Program Elements

To implement DARE effectively, specific elements are essential:¹¹

Joint Planning

DARE requires the investment and collaboration of both law enforcement and education agencies. The initiative may be taken by either agency or by a third party, such as the mayor's office or a parents' group. However, both education and law enforcement agencies must be involved early in planning for implementation. Many issues are likely to arise during the planning period:

- *Will school and police administrators have difficulty working together?* Schools and police have different administrative styles and are not commonly accustomed to working together. Communities find, however, that a structured program and a mutual commitment to preventing substance use among young people provide strong motivation for pursuing this cooperative effort.
- *Will there be resistance in the education community to a law enforcement presence in the classroom?* Police officers are usually viewed as law enforcers, not as teachers. However, DARE officers are well-trained, committed individuals who quickly prove their effectiveness as classroom teachers. When teachers and administrators observe individual officers instructing individual classrooms, resistance evaporates.
- *Are there other school-based programs currently in use or being introduced to combat adolescent drug use?* A long-standing concern about substance

use has generated many approaches to prevention education. School systems must choose among many curricula and allocate their limited resources effectively. Other educators or health specialists may be committed to another approach and may not recognize how DARE can fit into the total health education program. To meet these legitimate concerns, proponents of competing programs should be invited to participate in the planning process. In Massachusetts, for example, where a strong consensus for teacher-led instruction had emerged, DARE came to be viewed as one component of a comprehensive, multicurriculum health education strategy.

- ***How can Project DARE fit into an already full classroom schedule?*** Schools are concerned that the teaching of basic skills may be neglected as the demands increase to address other topics of social concern. The DARE curriculum, which was developed by health education specialists, is multifaceted, emphasizing basic skills that students must learn to make reasoned choices for good health. Moreover, DARE incorporates the application of language arts into many of its lessons. Some programs have identified ways in which the DARE curriculum meets learning objectives established by the State Department of Education.

- ***Can the law enforcement department afford to reassign officers to classroom duty?*** Each veteran officer on patrol is important in the fight against crime. Administrators, therefore, need to decide whether assigning an officer to Project DARE is worth the cost of a reduced presence on the street. Law enforcement administrators in nearly 400 jurisdictions, having recognized the limitations of past approaches to our nation's drug problems, have determined that it is.

One officer instructor can serve as many as ten elementary schools or up to 40 classes per year. Consequently, small law enforcement departments, which may have special concerns about the time required for DARE implementation, will find that an officer can work part-time as a DARE instructor with the balance of the officer's time being devoted to other departmental activities.

Written Agreement

Implementation of DARE requires a partnership between law enforcement and education systems. A written agreement between law enforcement and school officials demonstrates each agency's commitment to Project DARE and defines their respective roles. This agreement generally includes:

- A statement of their mutual commitment to implement DARE as a strategy to prevent substance use among children
- The law enforcement role: to assign in a non-law enforcement role qualified officers who will teach the DARE curriculum in the schools
- The school role: to provide classroom time for lessons, coordinate scheduling, and encourage teachers to support and reinforce classroom activities
- Program scope: the grade(s) to be targeted and the number of schools and students to be reached
- Specification of the agency responsible for providing such resources as student workbooks and films
- Specification of the agency responsible for program oversight
- Procedures for regular communication between the two agencies

Officer Selection

The high quality of the officer instructors is the keystone of the DARE program. Officers must volunteer for the program on the basis of a solid commitment to preventing substance use among young people and must have a clean record, a minimum of two years street experience, maturity, and good communication and organizational skills.

The officers should be from the local community, where they will be seen and recognized by students. However, when communities are small or do not have resources to assign a local officer, state police or sheriffs' deputies can teach the program. As noted above, this commitment may be part-time.

The selection process generally involves posting of the position, preliminary screening, and a formal interview by a review panel that can include both police and school personnel. During these interviews, DARE candidates frequently reveal skills and experience that have lain dormant, yet qualify them for this unique challenge. School panelists have often commented on how instructive participation in officer selection has been in eliminating their misconceptions about police capabilities.

Officer Training

Training for DARE officers consists of an intensive two-week (80-hour) seminar jointly presented by law enforcement and education agencies. Several states now offer DARE officer training, using a format

developed and certified by the Los Angeles Police Department. To maintain the integrity of the DARE program, it is essential that officers be trained by certified agencies.*

The DARE training curriculum includes:

- An overview of current drug use prevention activities
- Communication and public speaking skills
- Learning methodology and classroom behavior management
- School/police relationships
- Police/parent community relationships
- Stages of adolescent chemical dependency
- Audiovisual techniques and other teaching aids
- Program administration
- Sources of supplementary funding

The most important component of the training is the modeling of each lesson by experienced DARE officers (or "mentors"). Each trainee then prepares and teaches one lesson to fellow trainees, who play the role of fifth- or sixth-graders, and who subsequently evaluate the officer's performance. Mentors advise and support trainees throughout the training, by helping them prepare for presentations and offering suggestions for improvement.

Training sites also provide orientation sessions for law enforcement and education administrators. These sessions provide an opportunity for managers to discuss organizational issues associated with DARE implementation and to review forms and systems for monitoring and record-keeping.

Core Curriculum

The DARE core curriculum targets fifth- and sixth-grade elementary school students who will be graduating into junior high at the end of the year. The curriculum consists of seventeen 45- to 60-minute lessons to be conducted by the DARE officer on a weekly basis. The lessons are structured, sequential, and cumulative. They employ a wide range of teaching strategies that emphasize student participation, including question-and-answer, group discussion, and role-play activities.

The curriculum is designed to equip students with skills for recognizing and resisting peer influences and other pressures to experiment with substances. In addition to building refusal skills, the lessons focus

on the development of self-esteem, risk assessment and decision-making skills, interpersonal and communication skills, critical thinking, and the identification of positive alternatives to substance use. A listing of the 17 DARE lessons appears at Appendix C: Page 9.

The DARE curriculum is available only to those officers who have completed certified training.

Classroom Instruction

Typically, officers are assigned to each school for a full day. Thus, one officer can serve up to five schools per week per semester, or ten schools in a two-semester school year.

Officers are to be regarded as members of the school faculty. This means that, while at the school as DARE instructors, they can be called upon to act in a law enforcement role *only* in an emergency. It is recommended that part-time DARE officers be assigned to units such as community services in order to avoid law enforcement duties that may conflict with the DARE image or result in court dates that could interfere with classroom obligations.

Informal Officer/Student Interaction

In addition to their formal classroom teaching, DARE officers spend time on the playground, in the cafeteria, and at student assemblies to interact with students informally. They may organize a soccer match, play basketball, or chat with students over lunch. In this way students have an opportunity to become acquainted with the officer as a trusted friend who is interested in their happiness and welfare. Students occasionally tell the officer about problems such as abuse, neglect, alcoholic parents, or relatives who use drugs. The officer refers these cases to the school principal or to appropriate resources in the community.

Teacher Orientation

The officer needs the support and understanding of classroom teachers to function effectively in the classroom. The DARE officer provides an in-service orientation for teachers at the beginning of the school year to familiarize them with the DARE curriculum,

*States that have developed this training capacity include Arizona, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. Virginia provides its officers with 120 hours of training in order to certify them as classroom instructors.

explain their respective roles, and identify ways they can cooperate in effectively communicating DARE's objectives to the students.

Classroom teachers are expected to stay in the classroom during the DARE instruction. Because they know the students well, teachers can share with the officers ways to handle classroom behavior. Frequently they assist with organizing role-play exercises, seeing that students complete their homework, or providing lessons during the week to reinforce the DARE officer's teaching. To encourage such involvement, the curriculum contains extended activities that teachers may choose to introduce.

Parent Education Evening

The cooperation and understanding of parents are essential to any substance use prevention effort. During the semester, parents are invited to an evening session at which the DARE officer explains the DARE program, describes ways to improve family communications and to recognize and respond to symptoms of substance use in their children, and provides information about available counseling resources. Some communities report that enthusiastic parents have organized follow-up informational drug prevention activities as a result of these DARE officer-led parent education evenings.

Community Presentations

Police, educators, and others committed to the success of this effort need to ensure that the program is visible and widely accepted. Meeting with groups representing all segments of the community, including parents and civic groups, community-based organizations, housing projects, and local businesses, promotes the level of community understanding and support that is essential for DARE's successful implementation.

Community support may also help to ensure program continuity if a scarcity of resources threatens to interrupt program activities. Community service organizations frequently supplement program resources by paying for student workbooks or by providing student T-shirts, bumper stickers, or other promotional materials that demonstrate the community's commitment to substance use prevention. This kind of support reinforces for students the importance of saying no to drugs.

DARE Enrichment Activities

DARE's developers have created several activities to supplement the core curriculum for grades 5 or 6.

● K-4 Visitation Lessons

Typically, an officer can teach up to four fifth- or sixth-grade classes per day. As time permits, the officer can visit each of the lower grades to introduce the students to the DARE concept. A K-4 curriculum is available for this purpose. The lessons, each 15-20 minutes long, cover such topics as personal safety, obeying of laws, and helpful and harmful uses of medicines and drugs.

● Junior High Curriculum

A ten-session junior high curriculum, which targets grade 7, has been developed to reinforce the lessons of the elementary level curriculum. To accommodate an already crowded classroom schedule, these sessions are usually taught during the health education block of instruction. In Los Angeles, DARE officers also visit grades 8 and 9. They use timely events—such as the death of Len Bias—to discuss drugs and their impact and to review critical-thinking and decision-making skills. The DARE officer assigned to the junior high school works closely with the school counseling staff on a variety of activities. These include not only formal classroom teaching, but also taking part in individual and group discussions with students considered "at risk," supervising sports or drill teams, and organizing contests and special assemblies.

● Modified Curriculum

Communities do not always have the resources to establish DARE in every elementary school. To respond to requests for a DARE education program in private and parochial schools not receiving the full curriculum, Los Angeles has developed an abbreviated program. This program includes a morning assembly for groups of students from grades 5 to 8, with follow-up visits to individual classrooms after lunch (reaching students at all these grade levels may require several days). Parent evenings are offered to these schools as well.

What Are The Costs and Who Will Pay?

Personnel

- *One full-time law enforcement officer for every ten elementary schools.* The cost of reassigning a law enforcement officer is generally borne by the law enforcement agency. In some communities, the school department pays the officer's salary or shares the cost with the law enforcement agency.
- *Program coordinator.* Unless a program is very large, the coordinator generally holds another position, such as school health education coordinator or police community relations officer.

Other Costs

- **Officer training.** While the Los Angeles Police Department has provided training to the majority of DARE officers, several states have also developed training capacities. This training is generally offered at no charge, but communities sending officers must pay travel, lodging, and meal costs, which may be paid from school or law enforcement budgets. In some communities, service clubs underwrite the cost.
- **DARE curriculum.** The curriculum supplied by the Los Angeles Unified School District is only released to communities with officers who have been trained to teach DARE. The curriculum is supplied either free or at a nominal charge.
- **DARE workbook.** A workbook, approximately 35 pages long, must be printed for each student who participates in the core fifth/sixth-grade curriculum. Depending on the quality of the cover and the number of copies produced, costs range from \$1 to \$6 per student. The cover and printing costs can be paid by the school department, the law enforcement agency, a local service organization, or a bank or other local business.
- **Films.** The film *Drugs and Your Amazing Mind* is used for the lesson introducing students to the impact of harmful substances. The film *Sons and Daughters—Drugs and Booze* is shown at the parent education evening. Total cost for both films is approximately \$900. To reduce cost, films may be shared by communities or borrowed from local film libraries.

These films may be paid for by the law enforcement agency, the school department, or a local private funding source, such as a service organization, bank, or other business.
- **Handouts.** Officers need to photocopy handouts for students, for teacher orientation, and for parent meetings. DARE officers generally use photocopying machines at the school or in their own agency.
- **Classroom supplies.** Classroom presentations are frequently more interesting to students when there are visual displays. Many DARE officers make

posters or transparencies for selected lessons. Supplies may be provided by school departments or donated by local school suppliers.

- **Promotional materials.** The distribution of brochures, T-shirts, buttons, or bumper stickers enhances support for any program. In many communities, service organizations willingly donate these kinds of items.

Money for DARE activities has come from many different sources. Because substance use prevention education for young people is a high priority in many communities, local revenues are often allocated to cover personnel and supplies. In some local jurisdictions funds from the sale of confiscated drug property have been appropriated.

Information about other possible funding sources is widely available. Notices regarding the availability of federal funding appear in the *Federal Register* and *Commerce Business Daily*, which can be obtained at regional federal offices and some libraries. To subscribe, contact the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402-9731, telephone (202) 783-3238.

State funding may be available through State Departments of Health and Human Services, Public Safety, or Education, or Justice Assistance Act block programs. Many states publish funding notices similar to those available at the federal level.

Information about private foundations and corporate giving programs is available from the Foundation Center through a national network of library reference collections. To find out about the nearest collection, call (800) 424-9836 toll-free.

DARE AMERICA is a national nonprofit corporation established to create nationwide awareness of the DARE program and its effectiveness. It coordinates a national funding campaign to supply printed educational materials, notebooks, films, and other teaching aids to law enforcement agencies interested in establishing DARE. For more information, contact Sergeant Jerry Scott, (213) 485-3277.

Appendix A

Sources of Further Information

Bureau of Justice Assistance/ DARE Program Manager

Dorothy L. Everett
Bureau of Justice Assistance
633 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20531
(202) 272-4604

Los Angeles Police Department/ DARE Coordinator

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Juvenile Division—DARE
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(213) 485-4856

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Syracuse, NY 13202
(315) 425-6169

Officer Karl Geib
Project DARE
Portland Police Department
109 Middle Street
Portland, ME 04101
(207) 775-6361

Detective Robert Tinker
Project DARE
Boston Police Academy
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Hyde Park, MA 02136
(617) 247-4410/247-4625

Sergeant Mary Tumlin
Project DARE
Huntsville Police Department
P.O. Box 2085
Huntsville, AL 35801
(205) 532-7254

Appendix B

Publications

DeJong, W., "A Short-Term Evaluation of Project DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education): Preliminary Indications of Effectiveness." *Journal of Drug Education* (in press).

Arresting the Demand for Drugs: Police and School Partnerships to Prevent Drug Abuse. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1987.

"Project DARE: Teaching Kids to Say No to Drugs and Alcohol." *NIJ Reports*, March 1986, pp. 2-5.

Gates, Daryl F. "Educators + Police = DARE." *NJASA Perspective*. no. 4 (Spring 1987): 7

"Drug Abuse Resistance Education." *The Police Chief*, October 1986.

"LAPD's Project DARE." *School Safety*, Spring 1986, pp. 26-27.

"DARE Program." *California Fraternal Order of Police Journal*. 6, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 47-53.

U.S. Department of Education. *What Works: Schools Without Drugs*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1986. Describes model approaches to drug abuse prevention, including DARE, and contains an extensive list of publications. Available free of charge by calling (800) 624-0100 or writing Schools Without Drugs, Pueblo, CO 81009.

Contact also:

Office of Substance Abuse Prevention
U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services
Parklawn Building
5600 Fishers Lane
Rockville, MD 20852
(301) 443-0365

Appendix C

DARE Lessons

The DARE curriculum is organized into seventeen classroom sessions conducted by the police officer, coupled with suggested activities taught by the regular classroom teacher. A wide range of teaching activities are used—question-and-answer, group discussion, role-play, and workbook exercises, all designed to encourage student participation and response.

The following brief summaries of each lesson capture the scope of the DARE curriculum and show the care taken in its preparation. All of these lessons were pilot tested and revised before widespread use began.

1. **Practices for Personal Safety.** The DARE officer reviews common safety practices to protect students from harm at home, on the way to and from school, and in the neighborhood.
2. **Drug Use and Misuse.** Students learn the harmful effects of drugs if they are misused as depicted in the film, *Drugs and Your Amazing Mind*.
3. **Consequences.** The focus is on the consequences of using and not using alcohol and marijuana. If students are aware of those consequences, they can make better informed decisions regarding their own behavior.
4. **Resisting Pressures to Use Drugs.** The DARE officer explains different types of pressure—ranging from friendly persuasion and teasing to threats—that friends and others can exert on students to try tobacco, alcohol, or drugs.
5. **Resistance Techniques: Ways to Say No.** Students rehearse the many ways of refusing offers to try tobacco, alcohol, or drugs—simply saying no and repeating it as often as necessary; changing the subject; walking away or ignoring the person. They learn that they can avoid situations in which they might be subjected to such pressures and can “hang around” with non-users.
6. **Building Self-Esteem.** Poor self-esteem is one of the factors associated with drug misuse. How students feel about themselves results from positive and negative feelings and experiences. In this session students learn about their own positive qualities and how to compliment other students.
7. **Assertiveness: A Response Style.** Students have certain rights—to be themselves, to say what they think, to say no to offers of drugs. The session teaches them to assert those rights confidently and without interfering with others’ rights.
8. **Managing Stress Without Taking Drugs.** Students learn to recognize sources of stress in their lives and techniques for avoiding or relieving stress, including exercise, deep breathing, and talking to others. They learn that using drugs or alcohol to relieve stress causes new problems.
9. **Media Influences on Drug Use.** The DARE officer reviews strategies used in the media to encourage tobacco and alcohol use, including testimonials from celebrities and social pressure.
10. **Decision-Making and Risk-Taking.** Students learn the difference between bad risks and responsible risks, how to recognize the choices they have, and how to make a decision that promotes their self-interests.
11. **Alternatives to Drug Abuse.** Students learn that to have fun, to be accepted by peers, or to deal with feelings of anger or hurt, there are a number of alternatives to using drugs and alcohol.
12. **Role Modeling.** A high school student selected by the DARE officer visits the class, providing students with a positive role model. Students learn that drug users are in the minority.
13. **Forming a Support System.** Students learn that they need to develop positive relationships with many different people to form a support system.
14. **Ways to Deal with Pressures from Gangs.** Students discuss the kinds of pressures they may encounter from gang members and evaluate the consequences of the choices available to them.
15. **Project DARE Summary.** Students summarize and assess what they have learned.
16. **Taking a Stand.** Students compose and read aloud essays on how they can respond when they are pressured to use drugs and alcohol. The essay represents each student’s “DARE pledge.”
17. **Culmination.** In a schoolwide assembly planned in concert with school administrators, all students who have participated in Project DARE receive certificates of achievement.

Endnotes

1. R.H. Coombs, F.I. Fawzy, and B.E. Gerber, "Patterns of Cigarette, Alcohol, and Other Drug Use Among Children and Adolescents: A Longitudinal Study," *International Journal of the Addictions* 21 (1986): 897-913.
2. L.D. Johnston, P.M. O'Malley, and J.G. Bachman, *Drug Use Among American High School Students, College Students, and Other Young Adults: National Trends through 1985* (Rockville, Maryland: NIDA, 1986).
3. *Education USA*, May 25, 1987, p. 298.
4. *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, March 4, 1986.
5. A.J. Battjes, "Prevention of Adolescent Drug Use," *International Journal of the Addictions* 20 (1985): 1113-1141; J.M. Polich, P.L. Ellickson, P. Reuter, and J.P. Kahan, *Strategies for Controlling Adolescent Drug Use* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1984).
6. Project DARE's core curriculum for fifth- and sixth-grade students was adapted by Dr. Ruth Rich, a health education specialist with the Los Angeles Unified School District, from a curriculum for Project SMART (Self-Management and Resistance Training), a prevention curriculum designed by the Health Behavior Research Institute of the University of Southern California, with funding from the National Institute on Drug Abuse.
7. See also W. DeJong, "Project DARE: Teaching Kids to Say No to Drugs and Alcohol," *NIJ Reports*, March 1986, pp. 2-5.
8. There are three evaluation reports prepared by the Evaluation Training Institute in Los Angeles and written by G.F. Nyre: (1) *An Evaluation of Project DARE* (1984), (2) *Final Evaluation Report, 1984-1985: Project DARE* (1985), and (3) *DARE Evaluation Report, 1985-1986: Project DARE* (1986).
9. Nyre, *DARE Evaluation Report* (1986).
10. W. DeJong, "A Short-term Evaluation of Project DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education): Preliminary Indications of Effectiveness," *Journal of Drug Education* (in press).
11. See also W. DeJong, *Arresting the Demand for Drugs: Police and School Partnerships to Prevent Drug Abuse* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1987).



National Institute of Justice

Research in Action

James K. Stewart, Director

Reprinted from *NIJ Reports/SNI 208* March/April 1988

Attorney General announces NIJ Drug Use Forecasting system

From 53 to 79 percent of the men arrested for serious offenses in 12 major U.S. cities tested positive for illicit drugs, Attorney General Edwin Meese III said in a recent press briefing. The National Institute of Justice's new Drug Use Forecasting system (DUF) conducted the urine tests on a sample of more than 2,000 arrestees between last June and last November.

"Overwhelming evidence now exists that links drug use to criminal activity," the Attorney General said. The National Institute of Justice sponsored the testing with cofunding by the Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Most of those tested were charged with such street crimes as burglary, grand larceny, and assault. The sample contained relatively few men charged with drug sales, drunk driving, or disorderly conduct. All tests were voluntary and anonymous.

"The program's purpose is to track drug use trends among urban defendants suspected of dangerous crimes," the Attorney General said. "It does not reflect drug consumption among the general population.

"We now have timely baseline statistics for detecting trends in drug use by criminal suspects across the Nation. This valuable barometer will have important implications for public safety. This is most useful. It fits in well with our other strategies for drug control, including prevention and treatment."

National Institute of Justice Director James K. Stewart added, "Increases in drug use among offenders would represent increased peril to the public. Other Institute-sponsored research interviewed California prison and jail inmates and found, for example, that heroin addicts committed 15 to 20 times more serious offenses than did nonusers. Users of

drugs other than heroin committed five times more robberies and burglaries than did nonusers."

Twelve cities are using DUF

The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) system measures drug use in the Borough of Manhattan in New York City; Washington, D.C.; Orleans Parish (New Orleans), Louisiana; San Diego County, California; Marion County (Indianapolis), Indiana; Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona; Los Angeles; Houston; Chicago; Detroit; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon. The cities were chosen to represent various regions of urban America.

The Institute will sample new arrestees four times each year and analyze the trends. During the coming year a total of 25 cities are expected to participate.

Los Angeles, Detroit, and Chicago recently joined the program. Miami, Dallas, Philadelphia, Omaha, and Birmingham are expected to do so in the near future.

Shortly following arrest, the men in the 12-city program were tested for 10 drugs:

cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methadone, methaqualone, phencyclidine (PCP), Valium, Darvon, amphetamines ("speed"), and barbiturates. The most frequently found illegal drugs were marijuana, cocaine, heroin, PCP, and amphetamines.

Figure 1 shows the percentages of those arrested who tested positive for any drug, including marijuana, from June through November 1987. Figure 2 isolates the percentages for those testing positive for cocaine.

"Drug abuse by criminal suspects far exceeds the estimated use in the general population, where it appears to be leveling off," Mr. Stewart noted. "Among criminal defendants, however, it seems to be increasing."

Cocaine use on rise among arrestees

The tests have shown that among those arrested in New York City cocaine use has almost doubled during the last 3 years, and it has more than tripled in the District of Columbia. These are rates from two to nine times higher than in the general population as estimated by



the National Institute on Drug Abuse.

The Attorney General said that much can be done at the local level once specific drug abuse patterns are defined. "There has been encouraging experience with street enforcement strategies against drug dealing and with the routine testing of those on pretrial release," he said.

"As the Drug Use Forecasting system results are reported in each city," he continued, "local officials can develop specific tactics to counter the drugs of choice and the drug marketing strategies prevalent in their communities."

Mr. Meese said the worth of the data is already being proven. "The San Diego Criminal Justice Council has created a subcommittee to develop policy and intervention programs for drug abusers in the county jail," he said. "In Arizona the results have inspired plans for statewide pretrial testing.

"I was in Arizona recently, and I was told that the testing program's results encouraged the Arizona Supreme Court Committee on Drug Testing to start a similar survey of juveniles. Moreover, the State legislature passed significant drug abuse legislation that includes a prerelease, pretrial drug testing plan."

Drug use patterns vary among cities

The testing in the dozen U.S. cities found wide differences in the number of users who tested positive for two or more drugs. Those who tested positive for multiple drugs usually showed marijuana as one of the substances. However, in three cities—New York, Washington, and San Diego—at least 20 percent of those arrested were found to be positive for two or more drugs other than marijuana.

The Attorney General reported the following other research findings:

- Cocaine use has surpassed that of marijuana in New York City and the District of Columbia.
- Heroin remains a significant and continuing problem (10 percent or more) in New York, Washington, Detroit, San Diego, Chicago, Portland, and Los Angeles. In New York one in four arrested persons were found to have heroin in their bodies.
- The use of barbiturates, metha-

Figure 1.

Percentage of male arrestees testing positive for any drug, including marijuana (June–November 1987)





Figure 2.

Percentage of male arrestees testing positive for cocaine (June–November 1987)



qualone, Valium, Darvon, and illegal methadone in most of the cities was less than previously surmised. However, methadone was found in 10 percent of the tests in New York, and Valium was found in 13 percent of the Indianapolis samples. (In some instances these drugs may have been legally prescribed.)

- Amphetamine use may be substantially higher than reported in the test results. The Institute included only amphetamine positives that were likely to have resulted from illicit use. Unconfirmed amphetamine positives, possibly resulting from over-the-counter medicines, were not reported. About one-half of the total amphetamine positives were confirmed as likely illicit.

"These results are being received by the participating jurisdictions as a call to action," Mr. Meese said. "At the national level the system can serve as an indicator of the effectiveness of law enforcement, education, and treatment efforts to reduce drug abuse and crime."

Participation rates by the arrested men approached under the program were high in all cities. More than 90 percent of all defendants who were asked agreed to be interviewed, and more than 80 percent of these voluntarily provided a urine sample.

Trend results will be derived from quarterly samples of 250 arrestees at each site.

Debating the Evolution of American Policing

*An edited transcript to accompany
"The Evolving Strategy of Policing"*

Edited by Francis X. Hartmann

Editor's note: The following is an edited transcript reflecting strongly held opinions by members of the Kennedy School's Executive Session on Policing about "The Evolving Strategy of Policing," a companion piece to this transcript in the Perspectives on Policing series. Excerpts from "The Evolving Strategy of Policing" are included to clarify parts of the discussion; they appear in large, indented type such as that following this note.

We have found it useful to divide the history of policing into three different eras. These eras are distinguished from one another by the apparent dominance of a particular strategy of policing. The political era, so named because of the close ties between police and politics, dated from the introduction of police into municipalities during the 1840's, continued through the Progressive period, and ended during the early 1900's. The reform era developed in reaction to the political. It took hold during the 1930's, thrived during the 1950's and 1960's, began to erode during the late 1970's. The reform era now seems to be giving way to an era emphasizing community problem solving.

By dividing policing into these three eras dominated by a particular strategy of policing, we do not mean to imply that there were clear boundaries between the eras. Nor do we mean

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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that in those eras everyone policed in the same way. Obviously, the real history is far more complex than that. Nonetheless, we believe that there is a certain professional ethos that defines standards of competence, professionalism, and excellence in policing; that at any given time, one set of concepts is more powerful, more widely shared, and better understood than others; and that this ethos changes over time.

Mark Moore: This paper analyzes stages in the evolution of the concept of policing. It is both an analytic framework and a historical analysis. When we last presented the paper, people had difficulty with the distinction between the community policing of the future and the political policing that we imagine as a relic of the past.

Jim Wilson described the central challenge of community policing as protecting the gains that resulted from professionalism, and the separation of the police from political influence without expanding the distance between the police and the community.

Kenneth Newman: As a police chief who sat on top of policing in London, I think it leaves out very important dimensions of policing—for example, the way in which policing problems have evolved over the last two decades, particularly in relation to terrorism and organized crime. It seems to me that we are ignoring a whole superstructure of crime which is at the base of policing. We are talking about fundamentals, but are virtually ignoring many of the evolutionary factors about policing.

I am not sure the paper catches the full weight of the "sea change" that is taking place. If you are looking for a rubric for the change, it is something like the "mobilization of the citizenry in their own defense." It is receiving expression in the whole range of activities like neighborhood watch and business watch. I have no doubt the whole concept has extended in America as it is extending in Europe, that you are getting areas of functional surveillance like cab watch, where you harness the eyes and ears of the cab trade to the purposes of crime prevention.

You have hospital watch; you have programs like crime stoppers, where you mobilize the business community to support policing. Now, this has a very deep political significance, too, because in England these neighborhood watch groupings, although they began as local units, are aggregating to regional and national units. You now have the formation, I believe with the sponsorship of the Home

Secretary, of a national crime prevention organization which will actively encourage these aggregations of citizens' mobilization.

Now, that is a very important, evolutionary "sea change" that is not captured in what we are saying here about policing.

Mark Moore: Chips Stewart has often articulated that there is a frontier of policing that demands regional consolidation or the creation of specialized capability to take on more serious kinds of problems.

Kenneth Newman: Now, about terrorism and organized crime. You must deal with those matters because there is an intimate relationship between the superstructure of organized crime and what happens in communities.

In some of those communities you find that condominiums are owned by organized crime, as are shopping parades. You can find a substantial part of the economic infrastructure is dominated by organized crime. We have to spell out how the organization for community policing interacts with the different kind of organization, the more highly centralized organization, that you need for dealing with those matters.

Michael Smith: When Sir Kenneth was speaking, I was thinking about a paper that Zach Tumin presented¹ to this group. In that paper, he reached for a way of lodging the authority, and to some extent the strategy, of law enforcement in ideas of "community" that were different from the political forces at play at a given moment in a given locale.

It struck me, when Sir Kenneth was talking, that organized crime and terrorism are indeed properly encompassed within the community policing idea because it is the restoration, maintenance, and nurturing of the institutions that are important to community life, which is law enforcement's function. Described that way, "community" lends both authority to what is done and strategic content to the way in which it is to be done.

It does not suggest that patrol officers in beats ought to be handling the terrorism function. To that extent this paper may be misleading. But the idea of community goes well beyond the idea of the beat officer or the idea that community organizing can lend authority to the police. One might argue that it is the vision of community life, held by the larger society, that lends authority to the community policing idea.

1. Zachary Tumin, "Managing Relations with the Community," Working Paper #86-05-06, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 1986.

In retrospect, the reform strategy was impressive. It successfully integrated its strategic elements into a coherent paradigm that was internally consistent and logically appealing. Narrowing police functions to crime fighting made sense. If police could concentrate their efforts on prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals, it followed that they could be more effective than if they dissipated their efforts on other problems. The model of police as impartial, professional law enforcers was attractive because it minimized the discretionary excesses which developed during the political era. Preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service were intuitively appealing tactics, as well as means to both control officers and shape and control citizen demands for service. Further, the strategy provided a comprehensive, yet simple, vision of policing around which police leaders could rally. The metaphor of the thin blue line reinforced their need to create isolated independence and autonomy in terms that were acceptable to the public. The patrol car became the symbol of policing during the 1930's and 1940's; when equipped with a radio, it was at the limits of technology. It represented mobility, power, conspicuous presence, control of officers, and professional distance from citizens.

Patrick Murphy: It troubles me that on the very first page, it says: One, political; two, reform; and three, community. I do not think there was a reform era in policing, except for California, where they were and still are so far ahead. During the era that is labeled reform, there were a lot of other things happening. Vollmer, Wilson, and Parker's effect on American policing was a major happening.

You cannot talk about American policing without talking about J. Edgar Hoover and his enormous contributions. I attended the FBI National Academy in 1957, and for the first time in my career, I had the opportunity to spend 12 weeks with people from other police departments. The exchange of knowledge that went on was so eye-opening to me, after 10 or 12 years in the greatest police department in the world, that it was almost shocking to find out about how advanced some departments were.

If we are talking about the history of policing in the United States, we have to talk about Federal assistance. We have to talk about the crime commissions.

Edwin Meese III: I think the paper is good, but perhaps a shade grandiose. Suggesting that we have "a whole new era" to be compared with the reform era is too grand an approach. It is only one component of the whole picture.

I like the term "strategic policing" because we have been talking about the deployment of field forces. However, a very important aspect that Ken has repeatedly mentioned is the idea of analysis and intelligence as explaining how you use these people and how you use the information that they get.

We have not talked very much about how to support these deployed field forces in the community, with specialist services that are going to focus on homicide, citywide burglary rings, car-theft rings, and organized crime and terrorism. We have neglected to talk about these except when we said, "If we do not have the other resources of the department readily available to those people in the community, the citizens are not going to be happy."

If we talked about community-involved policing as a part of a new era of policing, rather than being the total denomination, many of the concerns raised here would disappear. Everybody would realize that this is a very important contribution which, along with other things happening in the police field, marks a new era of strategic policing in which people are thinking about what they are doing.

Herman Goldstein: There should be some additional acknowledgment of these other concerns. Having deliberated for several years, we are now in a position in which papers that reflect the views of some members can be issued. I certainly do not agree with everything in this paper, but I assume that there will be a caption that will say that not everyone buys into this. While it reflects the benefits of these deliberations, it is the work of the authors and not the total product of this group's work.

Hoover wanted the FBI to represent a new force for law and order, and saw that such an organization could capture a permanent constituency that wanted an agency to take a stand against lawlessness, immorality, and crime. By raising eligibility standards and changing patterns of recruitment and training, Hoover gave the FBI agents stature as upstanding moral crusaders. By committing the organization to attacks on crimes such as kidnapping, bank robbery, and espionage—crimes that attracted wide

publicity and required technical sophistication, doggedness, and a national jurisdiction to solve—Hoover established the organization's reputation for professional competence and power. By establishing tight central control over his agents, limiting their use of controversial investigation procedures (such as undercover operations), and keeping them out of narcotics enforcement, Hoover was also able to maintain an unparalleled record of integrity. That, too, fitted the image of a dogged, incorruptible crime-fighting organization. Finally, lest anyone fail to notice the important developments within the Bureau, Hoover developed impressive public relations programs that presented the FBI and its agents in the most favorable light. (For those of us who remember the 1940's, for example, one of the most popular radio phrases was, "The FBI in peace and war"—the introductory line in a radio program that portrayed a vigilant FBI protecting us from foreign enemies as well as villains on the "10 Most Wanted" list, another Hoover/FBI invention.)

Struggling as they were with reputations for corruption, brutality, unfairness, and downright incompetence, municipal police reformers found Hoover's path a compelling one.

Oliver "Buck" Revell: The myth has grown up that J. Edgar Hoover in particular, and the Bureau in general, sought to limit itself to simple crimes in order to gain positive publicity. That myth is inaccurate. The Bureau of Investigation was founded in 1908 with 32 people, so that the Attorney General would not have to use Secret Service agents. Congress had prohibited the Attorney General from using Secret Service agents to conduct investigations for the Justice Department. Its jurisdiction was essentially the Mann Act, prostitution, and various crimes that the Attorney General designated. When Hoover came in, in 1924, as a young attorney, the FBI had grown to about 200 people and was primarily conducting investigations for which no other entity had a particular responsibility. Very rapidly, as laws were passed, and the Interstate Acts were among the first, the Dyer Act and so forth, they were given to the Bureau.

I have done quite a bit of research in Bureau files and archives, and I do not know that any Federal offense was ever declined or shunted off to another agency, with one

exception. Back in the sixties, Hoover was asked if he wanted to take on the Bureau of Narcotics. He indicated that the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics should not be combined because drug offenses are crimes of a very different type and require a single dedicated agency. That was in an era when we did not have the mixture of drugs throughout criminal activity. And second, he did not want the corrupting influence of drugs on FBI agents. That is how this myth has grown up.

The role of the National FBI Academy as a force within American policing has been raised by Pat Murphy. The Academy brought police together for the first time, allowed them to exchange ideas, and created the awareness that experimentation was taking place in various departments. The Academy made it appropriate for law enforcement officers to pursue academic review of their activities and established that law enforcement could learn from the example of other organizations.

The IACP (International Association of Chiefs of Police) made a very important contribution in centralizing certain police services, such as the identification process, which became the Identification Division of the FBI, the National Laboratory, and so forth. And UCR (*Uniform Crime Reports*) is another contribution, of course.

If you are going to talk about the evolution of law enforcement in the United States, these themes are very important to the overall progress.

James "Chips" Stewart: I want to compliment George because he captured the essence of the issues in one of his other articles better than anybody else has. However, I think that this particular paper is flawed in the way it characterizes policing.

Lee Brown handed out a pamphlet about his new police substation. In it, a paragraph says, "What has happened here is not a revolution but an evolution that will change policing and the management involved in providing that policing." That captures more of what we are doing than George Kelling's statement of community policing does.

One theme of the evolution in policing might be the use of force and the law. The political era's concept of force could characterize police as 800-pound gorillas who sit where they want to sit. Political era police are the law and they manage through intimidation, selective use of force, and harassment.

In the reform era, there is a reaction to this personal and arbitrary use of force. The police become very defensive about their use of force: they use the rule of law as authority for their actions. They did not use the rule of law during the political era at all. In fact, they very rarely appealed to the courts when policing the community.

- The reform era saw a tremendous movement of the courts into the arena of policing. The courts' impact on reform policing has been enormous and it is neglected in this paper.
- The law authorized police actions and courts reviewed them in the context of the law, not the community nor politicians. This influence ought to be included.

The civil rights and antiwar demonstrations can be seen as an extension of the reform movement. They are an effort to extend legalistic control over the police. The police and their use of force had to be authorized by the rule of law, not politics.

Now we are moving into what George characterizes as the community era. I would describe it as problem oriented. Ed Meese articulates it as strategic policing as does Sir Kenneth, I believe. I look at it as an era when police took a proactive approach to their work, in terms of seeking out problems in the community so that they can have impact on them.

The reform era, I believe, directed police to rely exclusively on the criminal justice system and to operate within a narrow, legalistic frame of reference. This coincided with an explosion in crime that overloaded and overburdened the criminal justice system.

The police believed they could not do much because they were not empowered by law and the courts to do it. The public began to say "no, we want more from our police," and the demands of the public forced us out of this legalistic envelope.

Community or strategic policing relies not just on the law to solve crime problems, but on a spectrum of solutions, some of which lie in the criminal justice system. Other solutions are in the community, the private sector, volunteers, and a whole host of resources beyond the justice system.

Another thread that goes through this evolution in policing is the use of discretion, who controls it, and how it is informed.

These themes—discretion, the use of force, and the law—are better ways to approach the description of this evolution. They capture what the group really has in mind and address a number of the areas of concern that have been brought up. In continuing to use the term "community policing," we unnecessarily narrow the evolution that we all perceive is taking place.

I agree with Sir Kenneth that there has been a sea change in public attitudes and the police are part of that change. I think the paper falls short of reflecting that change accurately.

Mark Moore: These are very articulate criticisms. Let me say why we keep talking about this phrase "community policing."

Let us imagine, for a moment, that there are two different fronts on which new investments in policing are likely to be made. One lies in the direction of more thoughtful, more information-guided, more active attacks on particular crime problems. Some are local crime problems like robbery and burglary, and some turn out to be much bigger problems for which additional resources need to be brought to bear. These would include organized crime, terrorism, and sophisticated frauds.

That is one frontier. In many respects it is a continuation of an increasingly thoughtful, professionalized, forensic, tactical-minded police department.

The other front is the developing theme of how to strike up a relationship with the community so that we can enlist their aid, focus on the problems that turn out to be important, and figure out a way to be accountable in a world in which the story about being accountable for the full and fair application of the law is no longer a plausible story. And we want the freedom to deploy a variety of remedies in addition to the simple application of the law and we want to be able to talk to somebody about whether we are doing that satisfactorily.

The first strand is captured by notions of strategic and problem-solving policing. The second strand is captured by the concept of community policing.

We all know that when you try to move an organization, only a certain amount of energy can go into new investments and the construction of new capabilities. My judgment is that the problem solving—strategic thing will take care of itself because it is much more of a natural development in policing. If you are going to make a difference, you ought to describe a strategy that challenges the police in the areas in which they are least likely to make investments in repositioning themselves. That is this far more problematic area of fashioning a relationship with the community.

Given the opportunities for improvements and advancement along both fronts, that would be the argument why one front might be described in a slightly exaggerated way compared with the other. The other front is going to take care of itself. The one that you want to talk about is the hard one.

The paper is not a whole description of what is going on, it is naming the most problematic thing that needs to be worked out.

Allen Andrews: Then the paper needs to say that, and I hope that it would not be exaggerated, but emphasized.

I have several concerns about the history. "The thin blue line," to my recollection, arose in the sixties, as crime almost

exploded about our ears and, to be perfectly frank, you academics were at war with us as to whether there was a real crime increase. The police felt that they were standing alone, talking about a crime increase that everybody said was not happening. And then, of course, we had disorder to boot, unprecedented in the careers of most of us in service at that time.

I have a concern about the statement "the community need for rapid response to calls sometimes is largely the consequence of police selling the service." I do not recall it that way and I have been mixing with police chiefs for nearly 30 years. The fact is that you have had an evolution here.

Learning from Hoover, police reformers vigorously set out to sell their brand of urban policing. They, too, performed on radio talk shows, consulted with media representatives about how to present police, engaged in public relations campaigns, and in other ways presented an image of police as crimefighters. In a sense, they began with an organizational capacity—anticrime police tactics—and intensively promoted it.

Allen Andrews: The advent of the motor car permitted police to get to some places with the speed that they could not before. As the motor car developed, it became inevitable that the public wanted more response, asked for it, and police responded. It just makes common sense. There are a lot of incidents occurring: you are expected to get there. The impact of the Depression arrived in American cities and on police. There was not a reform movement demand for efficiency to abolish foot patrol—these things developed because of money pressures. Police chiefs went down fighting over the issue of abolishing and retracting foot patrol. In 1954, New York City had Operation Twenty-Five, a major experiment to demonstrate that foot patrol was still valuable and that cutting back foot patrol was a costly mistake in results, although it saved money.

Yet the paper portrays the reform police chief calling foot patrol "an outmoded, expensive frill." Ultimately it got that way, and I have said it myself. But, by then, it was an issue of reversing the tide.

Daryl Gates: Well, I have to agree with Allen. Those of us who are older read this and find it just does not fit the history. For example, our response time has always been

poor principally because we have a very small police department and an awful lot of area to cover and we found that there are many other things that need to be done besides answering calls. We try very hard to answer emergency calls quickly, but it is difficult.

I have a hard time fitting the history of policing, as I know it, to the pattern that I see in this paper. The eras carved out in the paper are not precise at all. For example, in 1969 we began the basic car plan. In 1970 we were fully implementing the basic car plan—that was community-oriented policing. The neighborhood watch—we were meeting with the people. In the early 1970's the entire operation went to team policing. Three thousand people were involved in team policing—detectives, traffic, everything that we did. In 1973, we decentralized our department.

Also, when we talk about these reform areas, we talk about ridding the police of political control. If anyone here believes today that political influence does not prevail in major cities in this country, you are deluding yourselves.

Chiefs today are unfortunately deeply tied to politics and politicians. It's a very sad commentary on local policing. How do chiefs refer to their mayor? "My mayor." "Is your mayor going to win this election? Yes, I think she is going to win; yes, I think he is going to win." And if they do not, that is the last time we see that commissioner or that chief. Gone, because of political whim, not his or her performance as a chief. So, if you do not think politics are tied into policing today, you are being very, very foolish.

George Kelling: Let me respond: little has been said that I disagree with. Allen and I would interpret some things differently. Because I look at it from the outside, I interpret the role of the FBI differently from Buck Revell and maybe Ed Meese.

What we are talking about is a model. To the extent that a model is adhered to or not is of less concern than the extent to which it is a model which the profession identifies with and presents as its ideology. Of course, there are wide variations. Certainly, the reform era did not get politics out of policing.

Yet, we all believe that it is heresy to say that politics should influence the decisions of police and the allocation of personnel, or anything else. But we all know that happens.

What I tried to examine was the development of a set of myths that dominate the profession and against which the profession measures itself, the central beliefs of the occupation.

You may not have had 911, but did have rapid response to calls for service; 911 has come to symbolize that. The paper is an attempt to characterize stages of history by the ideology which dominated.

Edwin Meese III: I think that you are trying to reduce this to an academic definition which is not helpful for either the public or for the people working in the field. Some of us are concerned that these definitions are too rigidly compartmentalized.

You suggested that it is "heresy" to say that politics guides police decisions. Well, it is not heresy, because in our discussions we are substituting new political forces—the community and the people in the community—for the old political forces, which at one time were the mayor or the party leaders. More recently, after reform, the political influences are the people in police work themselves. Mayors and others still have a great deal to say, but the police professionals have a firmer grasp of implementation. This is an evolution of understanding rather than strictly compartmentalized periods.

Francis X. "Frank" Hartmann: George, what do you hear in this conversation?

George Latimer: I hear two levels of criticism. One concerns the historical accuracy of the facts. The more fatal criticism is related to the model itself, that it is not as encompassing as the current challenges. And I hear the mixing of words, for different purposes. Daryl Gates describes politics of a kind which will always play a role. Ed Meese has introduced the notion of a different kind of politics, a good kind of politics, if you will. Not that a minority cannot threaten you with violations of people's rights, but it is different from the "ward heeling" system. That is what Ed is saying.

James "Chips" Stewart: During the sixties, seventies, and eighties, the police have been aligned with the crime victims, while academia, the courts, and the press have seemed more concerned with defendants' rights. In the eighties, however, the courts and the press are talking about a new partnership with the victims movement. This is where the police have been all along.

New legislation talks about greater penalties and the rights of both the accused and the innocent are promoted. Our efforts to work on DNA, our efforts to work on better forensics, to improve the police delivery of service, are all part of this very important change in police and community. That has not been mentioned in the paper. The characteristics that you have identified miss important characterizations of what was going on in the past.

Daniel Whitehurst: What I hear is the same thing that happens when a politician is being labeled either liberal or conservative. They always resist the label. There is resistance to being pigeonholed.

The purpose of the paper is to put today's policing in a box. A model has to be created, which everyone will resist, yet it is a helpful and useful methodology.

I agree with the gist of the paper and buy into the idea of several different eras and yet see that you can find things today that still reflect the political or reform era. There are no neat, carefully drawn lines. But, maybe I do not resist the labeling because I am not the one being labeled.

George Kelling: Let me say that Pat Murphy and Chips Stewart are absolutely right that when I evaluate the changes, I have not included a section on the legal changes, like Miranda. That should be added, because you are right about that.

Mark Moore: The other thing that I keep hearing is that we missed the civil rights movement.

George Kelling: Yes. I believe that several things need redoing: the section on environment is wrong. When I am talking about environment I emphasize the level of intimacy between police and citizens. The concept of environment generally also includes an organization's relationship to technological, social, demographic, and cultural changes and the occupation's response to it.

Allen Andrews: If the history could be elaborated, as George has already indicated, that is well on the way to satisfying my principal concern. In terms of Sir Kenneth's concerns, I think the fact we are zeroing in on the role of the uniformed police officer and the basic police function in the neighborhood needs to be acknowledged.

George Kelling: Well, in England, Sir Kenneth has responsibilities for organized crime and for terrorism, which is much less of a condition here.

Oliver "Buck" Revell: Perhaps the empirical data do not support the conceptualization itself, on the community era response and results. That is as troubling as what I see as inaccuracies in the history which may or may not have a significant impact on the model itself. I do not believe, when we talk about the quality of life and citizen satisfaction, that foot patrol and problem solving and team policing have been demonstrated as successful by the empirical data.

Robert Kliemet: I came on the police department in 1955, when cops beat confessions out of people. I stood outside

while hired guns in the department who were deft at beating the truth out of people got it.

I saw Miranda come and I saw police executives go screaming out of the era of beating confessions out saying that we are going to continue doing what we have always done. Yet, in fact, there was a drastic change in the way police dealt with the community.

I then went through the 1960's, the war, LEAA, and I saw all kinds of new concepts coming into being, team policing being one of them. It was a damn good idea, but the chiefs did not buy it, because academics proposed it. I see the labor relations era of the 1970's differently than you do. We won some major court cases in terms of the rights of police officers. This made them more satisfied and, hopefully, they performed their duties better.

Now, I read a paper that delves into history, and I think it is accurate. I believe that the reform era is not gone; we are still in the reform era. However, I do believe that politics overrides, and that anything that we do here will ultimately come down to the political issue.

I have talked to Daryl Gates at length. He has a good system but that is Los Angeles, California. I can go to Burbank, which is in Los Angeles County, or Redondo Beach, or Sacramento, and they do not have a similar situation.

I travel the whole country talking to police officers who talk about joining our union, or who belong to our union. They are nowhere near where you are. How do we get them to this plateau? Is this group going to put them there?

Nothing is going to happen unless we actively talk about what we intend to do 2, 3, 5 years down the road. History does not mean a damn thing to the cop on the street. He will have to suffer until we implement the real solution to job satisfaction.

Patrick Murphy: The great heroes of policing in the United States are the cops who have to put up with the terrible management and the terrible organization. How can you expect to have decent organization and management when a Philadelphia captain will not spend a day going up the road 90 miles to see what happens in New York, or down to Baltimore, or to Washington? They are all closed institutions. Middle management is the big problem.

You cannot grapple with the problem of American policing at all if you do not start with the fact that we have 17,000 police departments. We have a nonsystem of local policing, but out there among those 17,000 police departments are

some gems of departments, and we have had outstanding chiefs. Unfortunately, chiefs come along and bring about reform or upgrading, and that is lost when they leave.

George Kelling: This paper was my attempt, on the basis of a lot of experience in many police departments, to get way back from the occupation and take a very long view, through binoculars. I suspect that when you do that, you see it differently from somebody who worked inside the field for a long period of time. This long view identifies what I consider to be the central tendencies of the occupation.

Now, in the paper, I deliberately put them in very stark terms. It is intended as a polemic. It is meant to raise issues for discussion.

There was always movement toward community, toward problem solving, that did not fit with the general direction of the organization. Police officers were always problem solving. The Kansas City experiment was a problem-solving exercise by Bob Wasserman. A group decided that the main problem was teenagers around schools. Then came the reaction, "We have to keep doing preventive patrol; we cannot concentrate on that problem because if we depart from preventive patrol the community might be torn apart by the bad people of the community." The rhetoric and the organization did not change.

Why are we making this transition now, and making it faster and with more ease than one would expect? Because there are people with weight now in the organization who have always thought in terms of community and addressing problems. And now, as we go through an evolution or a revolution or whatever, the organization is utilizing these capacities and making them part of the central tendencies of the organization.

Mark Moore: So the fraction of problem-solving or community-oriented things that were sanctioned as opposed to done illicitly is gradually changing.

George Latimer: The model is just crude enough to be perfect for a mayor and for a police chief. It is very helpful from a political standpoint, but that is just one use. I am prepared to simplify, because I am comfortable with it and the voters understand it.

It really does not matter whether the reform era ever ended. What does matter is that, conceptually, it is quite different to approach policing this way than the way we would in the hierarchical operation of a department. Most of the country, and this group of people, believe we ought to move away from the traditional hierarchical management system of operating police.

The rest of our deliberations are about how to connect it up with the community.

Daryl Gates: George [Kelling], when you started to describe what you were doing here as stepping back, from a viewpoint outside the police profession, and looking at the profession with binoculars, that put this paper in a different perspective. But the paper should say that in a preamble. Then the paper begins to make more sense to me. It is not history as such.

I have been sitting with major city chiefs for 19 years and have noted how policing in America is different from city to city. While there are great similarities, there is also a great deal of dissimilarity, even in community-oriented policing or community-based policing. The most interesting aspect of attending a major city chiefs' meeting is listening to the great diversity as expressed by each chief, yet noting how similar some of the problems are.

George Kelling: The existence of a unifying strategy does not mean that there were not regional and other variations among police departments during the reform era. Yet a model developed, and the model shaped how police thought about the business they were in and the kind of organizations police departments ought to be.

Oliver "Buck" Revell: A small elite did, but most police did not.

George Kelling: I think Buck is wrong, and I think Daryl is wrong about this, too. The characteristics of policing during the forties, fifties, and sixties are important issues for this group.

Hubert Williams: I liked the paper. The question in part is one of comprehensiveness. Outside of a few questions related to accuracy, the issues that are raised go largely to comprehensiveness. I have watched police for over 25 years, in departments and in pursuit of degrees in policing and criminal justice.

I see policing primarily as a reaction to the conditions that exist in our society at various times. America was once a very segregated society. A separate set of laws was enforced on the black community, the only significant minority. That has changed. We now have communities with a number of minorities, many of them at each other's throats.

We had, in 1967, a presidential commission on law enforcement, which was followed by the Kerner Commission Report. Both reported on the differences within our society.

The civil rights movement brought about an empowerment, it brought about greater democratization. It brought about a significant change in American life, both in terms of perceptions, and in terms of the acceptance by the minority community of what police and government do. Today there are minority chiefs in many of the major cities.

Unless we include the effect that the civil rights movement had on policing, we are not really dealing with the various movements that have changed policing. Before the riots occurred in this country, the salaries of police and the attention given to police by government officials was negligible. They just did not care about cops. The riots came, and suddenly everybody realized that the police are the ones that protect us out there. The police became important. Then, LEAA came about and there was a tremendous infusion of money into the system.

Patrick Murphy: The police were changed from the villains to the critical role of making this thing happen. The thin blue line of law and order is related to race.

Richard Larson: We have focused on a number of issues primarily because this is an advocacy piece. If I were to write such a piece, it would differ markedly from the current one on such issues as costs and feasibility of implementing these kinds of procedures in today's "tax cap" environments and the role of technology, to name two.

James "Chips" Stewart: My criticism from the beginning is that the community era is not distinguishable from the political era in this conceptualization. Decentralization is present in both, both have intimate relationships with community, both have foot patrol, both have political satisfaction, citizen satisfaction, both have law, both have politics.

Our discussions have reflected the evolution of police accountability and the paper should do that as well. Police accountability in the political era simply maintained the status quo. As Hubert indicated, accountability in the reform era was different. It evolved because police were not providing the sort of justice expected by society. When that happens, other institutions, such as the courts, will intrude on police discretion and hold the police accountable to new standards.

We are now moving out of the reform or legalistic era of accountability and trying to push to a new level of accountability responsive to the broader community. That is what is forcing this issue, a concern with crime and fear that merges

the victims movement, the civil rights movement, and the larger interests of the society. We have talked about how we integrate the notion of accountability with responsiveness to the community. The word "community" can be used as a word for special interests.

We have taken that community idea and homogenized it and we think that we have a new community out there, not a community of special interests but the community of many interests concerned about crime and disorder.

George Latimer: Buck, you made the point that a correlation between community satisfaction and community policing has not been demonstrated by the evidence. In the so-called reform era, was community satisfaction considered a primary good and objective?

Oliver "Buck" Revell: Yes, but I have trouble with the concept of reform movement because as a participant-observer of 25 years, I have probably dealt with four or five hundred police departments. August Vollmer, O.W. Wilson, and Bill Parker were not even known to the majority of these police departments. They had no concept of a reform movement. Most of them had heard of Hoover but they had not read him.

The things that really led to reform are Miranda, Mapp versus Ohio, the civil rights movement, bringing police to the modern era.

In response to your question, though, my point was that I do not think empirical data have proven that community satisfaction and quality of life are in fact improved by the models presented. I hope that we can find a model, because the police and the community need to be integrated on a much more specific and supportive basis.

George Kelling: Buck, you are thinking about the current era. I am talking about the reform that occurred at the beginning of the century. It was an extension of the progressive reform movement, professional management . . .

Oliver "Buck" Revell: Scientific management, machine theory was working its way into police ideology.

George Kelling: Yes, but that is not the 1960's. The 1960's begins the shattering, the unraveling of that.

Hubert Williams: We should take a look at the history and write further on this. I will take some responsibility for that. Pat Murphy and I have had the same perspectives on these issues, so Pat and I can write one together.

Mark Moore: We do not want to proclaim an answer; we want to have a conversation. George and I both feel this very strongly—that papers should reflect the deliberations of the group and genuinely emerge from the group, sometimes in opposition, sometimes in concert with the group. That is our publishing philosophy. The audience that we are trying to find is an audience of people who might be having this conversation at the FBI National Academy, at the PERF (Police Executive Research Forum) Executive Program, at the U.S. Conference of Mayors, at the New Mayors Meetings at the Kennedy School, and in discussions between mayors and police chiefs.

NCJ 114214

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Points of view or opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or of Harvard University.

The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates the activities of the following program Offices and Bureaus: National Institute of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Office for Victims of Crime.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

Drug Stings in Miami

"Miami modified the concept [of stings] for drugs . . . toward reducing the demand . . . by targeting buyers en masse."

By
CLARENCE DICKSON

*Chief of Police
Miami, FL*

When a community is faced with blatant street sales of drugs in an open air, drive-through setting, can traditional police tactics be effective? In South Florida, the answer has been "no." Increased arrests have kept pace with the epidemic drug use indicated by ever-increasing cocaine-induced deaths, but arrests themselves have apparently not curbed the demand.

Federal efforts on an enormous scale are resulting in the interdiction of record-breaking amounts of illegal drugs; yet, a 14-month congressional study shows that more resources are needed. If the Federal Government with a drug-fighting budget of \$1.8 billion needs more funding to cope with the problem, what can a local police agency do? Despite some major victories, the effort has been likened to reversing the tide with a bucket.

Although nowhere near victory, the Miami Police Department has found

that a variety of innovative strategies, legal tools, community support, and concerted coordination among non-traditional support agencies is paying off with some surprising dividends. The narcotics situation is all too common in cities across the country. Drug use is on the increase among all levels of society. The most-convenient source of supply is often the economically depressed areas of the city where children as young as 12 years are earning up to \$250 a day selling marijuana, cocaine, and the deadly addictive cocaine "crack" rocks.

South Florida is by no means unique in patterns of drug abuse, income disparity (and its resulting tensions), understaffed police, or inadequate jails.

Prior to my appointment as chief, the narcotics situation had already grown from a chronic problem to a full-

scale epidemic. Middle-income youth from the suburbs, junkies, and children of the poor would cruise slum streets to purchase drugs and rip off sellers or rivals. Those venturing into the area would often become victims of a robbery or an assault, increasing the city's index crime rate.

Competing groups would stage occasional turf skirmishes. Families living in once-decent areas were terrorized as their neighborhoods turned into open-air markets for drugs. Gunshots penetrated the walls and windows of their homes. Many families were economically trapped into staying. Those that could afford to move had abandoned the area and accelerated its decay.

The worst fears of police and parents came true in West Palm Beach on August 15, 1986, when a 7-year-old child was killed while playing outside her house. The random, senseless gunfire of a territorial dispute between



Chief Dickson

rival factions of small-time dealers had taken another life.

Based on a case-by-case analysis of medical examiner records, "cocaine-related" deaths in Dade County rose from 31 in 1980 to 211 in 1985, mirroring the rapid rise in street popularity of a drug once thought by some to be a harmless recreational drug. These deaths are all those cases, countywide, where cocaine or its metabolite benzoylecgonine was found in the tissues during a post mortem examination. These deaths do not include homicides attributable to gang violence.

Nationally, smoking cocaine represents 20 percent of its abuse, as opposed to Florida's 60 percent of cocaine use being administered through smoking. Addiction to nasal snorting requires about 4 years of intermittent use, while those smoking cocaine report a similar stage of compulsion within weeks of its first abuse.

The commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement echoed the sentiments of most police chiefs when he attributed recent increases in index crimes (which for several years had decreased significantly) to the new popularity of cheap addictive "crack" cocaine in the drug subculture. Confessions of once "normal" people who had turned to lives of crime to support free-basing needs have bolstered the statistical evidence linking drug abuse to street crime.

The Problem — The Strategy

It was evident we had a problem on our hands. The question was how to deal most effectively with the problem. A new strategy was needed.

Approach

In 1984, Miami's traditional enforcement approach had resulted in 227 felony arrests for drug sales and 2,836 arrests for possession. A more-concerted approach was needed involving *all* facets of the problem. It was decided that law enforcement would be split into two units. The Special Investigations Section would continue to coordinate with Federal and State agencies to focus on major dealers, smugglers, financiers, and wholesalers. To augment their mission, a RICO squad was added to attack the infrastructure of organized crime.

However, cities are too limited in terms of resources and jurisdiction to solve problems individually which are international in scope. Local drug enforcement is most effective at the street level, where an immediate impact is possible and direct reductions in related index crimes are achievable. The theory is that unless the demand can be reduced, there will always be suppliers willing to take on the risks of trafficking.

Formation of the Street Narcotics Unit was the first organizational change made early in 1985. To fulfill commitments to the community for an all-out attack on drugs, officers were recruited from throughout the department to staff the new unit. By the end of 1985, drug sales arrests departmentwide had more than doubled to 546 and the conviction rate improved. But still more was needed! On April 3, 1986, Operation STING was initiated.

Traditional stings have for some time been used to capture thieves and burglars. Miami modified the concept for drugs, added mass arrest techniques, civil forfeiture laws, confiscated

"The stings changed attitudes among buyers, because they learned that they were now the targets."

contraband for bait, and community support for the first phase of operations directed toward reducing demand for drugs by targeting buyers en masse. The term STING became an acronym for a more-comprehensive plan, "Strategy To Inhibit Narcotics Growth," which was divided into three overlapping phases. Each phase would target a specific component of the problem — buyers, places, and sellers.

Phase I — The Sting

Once specific "hot spots" were located (based on community input, intelligence files, and computer analysis), a video tape of conditions in each area was prepared to document the blatant nature of the street sales. Photographic evidence was available to show passing motorists being flagged down in the street and besieged by entrepreneurs peddling illicit drugs.

Task force teams of uniform patrol officers, traffic enforcement motemen, undercover personnel, and SWAT members were assembled. Careful planning covered every contingency. Each task was coordinated; divisions of labor insured maximum efficiency and minimized control problems. Roll calls involving 75 - 100 officers were usually held at 4:00 p.m. to take advantage of the peak dealing hours between dusk and early morning. Operations began with undercover officers in rental or confiscated vehicles making buys from all the dealers in the target area. The law-abiding residents who had asked to have their blocks cleaned up would sit silently outside and savor the sweet irony of the situation.

Once the street was cleaned of real dealers, undercover officers as-

sumed the role of street dealers. Purchasers who had become accustomed to frequenting the same location would drive up and stop either to buy or to do some comparison shopping. On drive-up sales, the undercover officer would make the sale and then give a predetermined signal. The cover vehicles (unmarked confiscations or rentals) would close in with blue lights on. The vehicle would literally have to be boxed in or else the buyer would attempt to squeeze through the smallest opening. Once stopped, the buyer was removed and taken to the "arrest apartment." There, in the "arrest apartment," a uniformed officer would search and flex-cuff the prisoner. When the "selling" officer completed his or her paperwork (some of which is so standardized that charges and partial narratives could be pre-completed for the most-common situations), the evidence, usually consisting of the narcotics and the buy money, was placed in a sealed envelope and then dropped into a locked box.

Walk-up sales were much simpler and reduced the chance of escape. As the sale is made, two other officers approach, badge the subject, and then walk their prisoner back to the "arrest apartment." The undercover "seller" is then issued more narcotics and is returned to join the other "sellers" awaiting the next buyers. Amazingly, the buyers were often so intent on "scoring" or were so oblivious to their surroundings that toward the end of an evening's operation, when television camera crews were allowed to turn on their lights, buyers would approach the undercover officers, even when marked police vans were parked on the street and officers were making arrests in

plain view. In one incident, a police sergeant was positioned near an arrest team car in a full SWAT uniform when he was approached by a buyer who inquired, "Hey, man, you got any dope?" When the SWAT supervisor answered, "No, go talk to one of the other OFFICERS," the would-be customer actually went to make a purchase and was arrested.

Once six to eight buyers are brought into the "arrest apartment," a transport wagon is requested. A rear exit from the apartment is a necessity and is one of the first considerations when scouting for a sting location. The arrestees are led out of the rear door to the awaiting transport van. They are then taken to the command post. The command post is generally a large vacant lot either at a school yard, park, or parking lot. It is equipped with a generator, portable lights, and a portable copier. The arrestees are taken to a booking sergeant, who logs the prisoners. Corrections officers on the scene take photographs and fingerprints. After an inventory of personal items is completed, the prisoners are placed on waiting buses. Felons are separated from misdemeanor arrestees (as are females and juveniles) until they are transported to the various jail facilities.

Prior to the sting operations, the average buyer had little to fear from police or the courts. Arrests tended to be sporadic, as they were either the chance result of a buyer giving an officer probable cause during routine patrol or the result of a call-for-service dispatch. Small-time buyers knew that dealers were the primary targets. Even when arrested, the buyer with a minor

"Prominent leaders of community groups joined in promoting a cleanup campaign . . ."

record had little to fear from a criminal justice system which was overburdened with career criminals and overcrowded jails.

The stings changed attitudes among buyers, because they learned that they were now the targets. Although the probability of long-term incarceration remained low, there was a chilling effect on those caught when they lost their car through civil forfeiture, and sometimes, their driver's license through statutes designed to keep drug abusers off the roads. The intense news coverage helped convey the message that the police were serious, and that if buyers ventured into the city to buy drugs, they were likely to end up on a police bus en route to a booking.

Phase II — The Drug House

Following the success of the first phase, the department directed its energies to the derelict apartment houses where freebase operations were being conducted in ostensibly vacant quarters. Based on data collected during previous drug operations, the most-notorious base house was targeted for forfeiture pursuant to Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act 934.701. Armed with clear evidence that one 45-unit apartment house, valued at \$270,000, had been the scene of 73 drug-related incidents over an 18-month period, the chief assistant State attorney of the Dade County State Attorney's Office, a member of Dade County's HUD Task Force, and the City of Miami's chief building code enforcer each successfully argued before a judge for seizure. The court ordered the few remaining tenants to vacate and the building permanently sealed. Con-

crete blocks and mortar to cover windows and doors were required by the court after Miami police argued that a mere boarding up would be defeated within days. The court recognized that the building was both unfit for human habitation and created a crime problem. County housing officials provided relocation assistance for the few legitimate tenants.

Once the precedent was set, cooperation between other owners and the police was rapid. The City of Miami offered low-interest loans to encourage the owners of similar properties to clean up their buildings, eliminate freebasing operations, and begin the revitalization.

In a stipulated agreement to a similarly situated group of four apartment buildings, which had accumulated 2,539 housing code violations, the owner agreed to plead guilty to a lesser number, cooperate with the police, evict those who engaged in drug activity, establish a drug hotline to obtain tenant assistance, correct all violations, and remove trespassers. Eight more apartment sites are on Miami's list for closure or compliance by the owner. Slum lords have been given fair warning that unless they help eliminate drug houses and serious code violations, they may be next.

Phase III — Buy-Bust

Traditional buy-bust operations run by police departments across the country, including Miami, target a limited number of dealers. The operations are hazardous, expensive, and time-consuming. It was decided to attempt the use of mass arrests of buy-bust procedures that have worked so well on the sting operations.

The first buy-bust targeting street

sellers began on August 26, 1986. To complement the usual force of plainclothes officers and uniformed patrol officers, four K-9's recently trained to detect narcotics were added. Knowing that dealers are more wary than purchasers, it was conceded that the volume of arrests would be much lower than those arrested in a sting. Surprisingly, the first night netted 31 dealers and the seizure of 86 grams of cocaine, 173 grams of marijuana, 2 guns, and \$1,461 in cash.

The K-9 dogs have been especially productive in the followup search of an area after the arrest teams have completed their work. Dogs turned up many of the hidden "stashers" that would have gone otherwise undetected. It has become a common practice for dealers to limit the amount of drugs and cash on one's person for a dual purpose: If caught, the penalties will be less harsh and concealment reduces losses to rip-offs.

One difficulty in seizing cash under RICO or Florida's Contraband Act is establishing that the money was a part of a narcotics transaction and not merely incidental assets of a suspect. Dogs trained to alert to narcotics are being used to sniff test cash recovered in drug arrests. The only police personnel to handle the cash have not handled drugs. A positive alert to the money can be strong evidence in a civil forfeiture trial that the funds were an instrumentality or fruit of the crime.

Community Support

Broad-based support is probably the most-critical element in a successful long-term operation aimed at changing behaviors, attitudes, and

perceptions. In those areas plagued by street sales, the community was outraged by the depravity that accompanied the blatant sales of drugs. Prominent leaders of community groups joined in promoting a cleanup campaign which is even more vigorous than when the stings began.

Initially, there had been a fear that after one or two operations, the police would move on to other areas of town and let the pushers return to their corners to resume business as usual. An important part of the strategy was, however, to return time and time again until the situation was under control, repeat customers had vanished, and the area once again a safe place to live. Two or three operations are not sufficient to reduce patterns of behavior that have taken years to grow. It is necessary to go back at frequent intervals in the hardcore areas. Some locations have been repeatedly targeted so that it becomes apparent that the police mean business. This is not a one-shot operation, but a continuous enforcement program.

Education

The day after a sting operation, the target area is canvassed by the Crime Prevention Unit for two reasons: (1) To disseminate information on the number of arrests in the area, and (2) to check the pulse of the community. For several months, this procedure has been followed with great success. Almost all residents in the impacted areas were grateful for the clean-up efforts. Some of the comments heard from the community were, "Nice to see you are interested in what's happening here," "When are you coming back?" "What took you so long to get to our community?" "I am glad to see you getting

them off the street," and "Come back tomorrow night." During this contact, crime prevention personnel can answer any other questions, reducing the likelihood of rumors and false information triggering community tension.

In addition to distributing warning flyers in neighborhoods adjacent to targeted areas the day following a sting, the police department participates in a number of educational and awareness programs. One goal is to educate area youth about the evils of drug use. To that end, the department is in the process of creating a "Drugmobile," a mobile home which will be converted into a showcase/theater for presentations in schools and neighborhoods. Inside the Drugmobile, visitors can view a video tape presentation on the dangers of drugs, a narcotics and paraphernalia display case, and a photo display graphically depicting the results of drug abuse (i.e., effects on the body, including death).

Use of Force

The use of minimal force in making sting arrests was stressed in roll calls prior to an operation. It was perceived that community support of antidrug efforts would be diminished by over-zealous enforcement action. Miami's philosophy was that with the number of arrests that were being made, if a few offenders escaped capture or destroyed evidence, they would be too afraid to buy again or would be caught during a following sting.

Mass Arrests

To be a deterrent, police tactics must appear to a potential law breaker to have sufficient probability of detection, multiplied by the severity of loss to outweigh the potential gains. To reduce the demand for drugs, the casual user

presents the largest market, as well as best opportunity, for reform. He or she is less sophisticated, represents the highest profit margin for organized crime, and is the most likely to be diverted from a life of dependency on substance abuse. To be successful against a mass market, mass arrests are required. While it is conceded that mass arrests are less prosecutable, the sentences meted out in small quantity cases were ordinarily tantamount to acquittal.

Confiscation/Forfeiture

Given then, that in most metropolitan areas of the country, the court calendars are crowded and the jails are full, what meaningful sanctions exist when an otherwise nonviolent drug user is caught purchasing or holding drugs? RICO-type sanctions are strong deterrents and community safety devices, protecting the community from the use of various means of transportation in crimes and from irresponsible operators who may be under the influence of drugs or fleeing the police. Except for the most affluent of criminals, forfeiture of vehicles, funds, property, or driver's licenses are all strong incentives to comply with the law.

Media Support

Word-of-mouth communication that it is unwise to "score" in a particular area is too slow to achieve the desired impact in reducing demand or cleaning up a given neighborhood. The news media was a valuable partner during the sting operations. Not only did the media help spread the word that police were cracking down on buyers, but the reporters were exposed to the dangers of police work, the professionalism of the police, and a real-life view of the

"The news media was a valuable partner during the sting operations."

enormous demand for drugs that until then had only been an abstract problem.

Editors gave each successive operation the same coverage after 20 stings that they gave the first. It seemed that the newness never wore off. Editorial writers, who help shape public opinion about drugs, accompanied officers on the stings and were as impressed by the police tactics as they were dumbfounded by the magnitude of the problem.

Risks: Officer Safety

Drug busts are always a risky business. During mass arrest sweeps, however, the potential is heightened. Of the 3,074 arrests covering 37 operations involving 2,219 man days of activity, there were 3 occasions where undercover officers were the intended targets of gunfire. Luckily, no officers were hurt, and arrests were made on all offenders without serious injury. As a precautionary measure, Miami's SWAT team is deployed on every drug raid. It was considered prudent to have SWAT on standby during the stings. The three occasions where gunfire resulted are thought to have resulted from insufficient identification by the arresting officers to passengers or others. As it becomes increasingly popular to impersonate police when staging a rip-off, it becomes more important that multiple officers display credentials when making a sting arrest. The possibility of recognition of undercover officers increases with each operation.

Delayed Arrival Times On Calls For Service

Commitment of large numbers of personnel always carries the risk that routine dispatching of calls for police

service will be delayed or that normal preventive patrols will have to be sacrificed. Our studies have shown that there has been no measurable negative impact on service to the public; an analysis of delayed response to calls for service showed no significant difference during the hours of stings as opposed to other times of the day.

Displacements

Any time selective targeting is used, the probability is high that crime is not reduced as much as it is displaced to other parts of the community, perhaps to nearby cities. It appears, however, that displacement is not occurring to any significant degree. Buying patterns are not easily reestablished; the infrastructure and support networks take time to rebuild. Other jurisdictions are now employing simultaneous strategies to suppress drug sales in their areas.

Successes

Traditional measures of success do not apply to mass arrest tactics. Invariably, conviction rates are low given that the jails are full and that a majority are first offenders in the eyes of the court, despite years of drug abuse. A more-fundamental set of criteria ask the following questions: Were the objectives accomplished? Is the operation cost-effective? What is the recidivism rate? Is the community safer?

All of these indicators show results which exceeded expectations. In addition, the stings provided unexpected dividends in the form of increased morale, citizen support, community awareness, media support, and legislative awareness which is stimulating lawmakers to enact laws at the State and Federal level aimed at curbing the de-

mand for drugs and providing law enforcement with the tools to combat crime.

As of March 6, 1987, stings alone have netted 927 felony arrests, 2,147 misdemeanor arrests, 153 computer "hits," seizure of 1,000 vehicles, and forfeiture of \$73,577. Personnel committed to the 37 stings amount to 20,459 manhours or an average of 6.6 hours per arrest. Sting productivity is significantly better than the average of 19.2 hours of field-hour per arrest in uniform patrol. Overtime costs are less than half of the monetary forfeitures. As a result, the program (while not generating a positive cash flow) is at least paying for itself without draining the taxpayers.

Since April of 1986, total drug arrests average 665 per month. By the end of the year, total drug arrests exceeded 7,000. That is twice the department's drug arrests for 1985.

Of the 3,074 people arrested during a sting, only 12 have been caught more than once, a good indicator that the demand has been reduced. If demand were unaffected, the normal "learning curve" would dictate that arrests-per-manhour would increase in relation to the officers' increased proficiency. The opposite has occurred. Officers are having difficulty in sustaining their momentum. Arrests per operation have declined despite high initiative. The once notoriously dangerous areas are returning to places where a family can live free from fear.

Anyone desiring more details about operational aspects of stings, buy-busts, or apartment closures should contact Lt. John Brooks, Miami Police Task Force/SNU Commander, (305) 579-6580.

FBI

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice
Office of Communication and Research Utilization

Targeting Law Enforcement Resources: The Career Criminal Focus

by

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with

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September 1985

Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice is a publication series of the National Institute of Justice. Designed for the criminal justice professional, each *Issues and Practices* report presents the program options and management issues in a topic area, based on a review of research and evaluation findings, operational experience, and expert opinion in the subject. The intent is to provide criminal justice managers and administrators with the information to make informed choices in planning, implementing and improving programs and practice.

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice by the University City Science Center under subcontract to Abt Associates Inc., contract #J-LEAA-011-81. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In spite of the efforts of criminal justice agencies to address the problem of crime, during the past decade rates of criminality have remained high and are a continuing source of public concern. While the public remains concerned about crime, law enforcement agencies have been forced to work in an environment of fixed or declining resources. In this era of cutback management, law enforcement officials have been called on to do more with less.

One approach to crime control that has emerged in recent years is the effort to target resources on the repeat offender¹ - the offender who commits not only a large number of crimes, but also very serious and violent crimes. Recent research and expert opinion suggests that scarce resources may be better used if they are focused on the apprehension and prosecution of the career criminal.

This **Issues and Practices Report** is part of an effort by the National Institute of Justice to learn more about career criminals. The Institute program includes research about offending patterns, evaluations of criminal justice system operations and efforts to acquaint criminal justice practitioners with what can be done to solve the career criminal problem. Other recently completed NIJ reports related to career criminals include:

- Henry Rossman and Debra Whitcomb, **New York State Police Violent Felony Warrant Squad: An Innovative Approach to Apprehending Fugitives**, Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, September 1984.
- William F. McDonald and Lonnie A. Athens, **Habitual Offender**

¹The terms repeat offender and career criminal are used interchangeably in this report.

Offender Laws in the United States: Their Form, Use and Perceived Effectiveness, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center, forthcoming.

- J. Fred Springer et al, **The Effectiveness of Selective Prosecution by Career Criminal Programs**, Sacramento, CA: EMT Associates/University City Science Center, 1985.
- Susan Martin, **Catching Career Criminals: A Study of the Repeat Offender Project**, Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1985.

1. FOCUS OF THE REPORT

The purpose of this **Issues and Practices Report** is to review what is known about career criminality and to describe ways in which various law enforcement agencies are dealing with the problem of repeat offenders. While this report does not answer all questions about career criminal initiatives, it can provide the reader with a basis for better understanding the career criminal phenomena and the practical steps that can be taken to address this problem.

The report is written for both law enforcement executives and operational personnel. For executives, the document points out issues involved in developing a practical definition of the career criminal, selecting an operational strategy, working with other agencies in the criminal justice system and program evaluation. For operational personnel, the report provides information about strategies and tactics.

Although this report focuses on what law enforcement can do to target the career criminal, we recognize that police are but one part of a larger system. Hence, efforts should be made to coordinate special law enforcement activities with the prosecutor, court, juvenile, jail and correctional authorities to ensure that these efforts will have an impact as the repeat offender moves through the justice system.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the document and reviews some of the significant literature regarding the characteristics and activities of the repeat offender. It also outlines techniques police departments are using to focus attention on repeat offenders. The strategies and tactics discussed are based on existing career criminal programs that we reviewed in preparing the report.

2. STUDY METHODS

Our research was conducted on several levels. First, a thorough search of the existing literature was made to identify issues and practices related to the development and operation of career criminal programs. Second, a telephone survey of 80 law enforcement agencies was conducted in order to: 1) identify the extent to which law enforcement agencies are developing special initiatives to target career criminals; and 2) to gather information about the kinds of strategies and tactics agencies are using. Although the agencies contacted were not a random sample, the survey provided valuable background information, which is discussed near the end of this chapter. Third, on-site field studies were conducted in eight local law enforcement agencies. Sites were selected in an attempt to obtain information about different program types in various jurisdictional, organizational and geographic settings.

3. PATTERNS OF OFFENDING

Law enforcement officers have long known that some very active criminals exist in the community. It has been only in the past fifteen years, however, that criminologists have begun to explore career criminality to a depth

that can allow justice executives to make informed judgments about how best to attack the problem.

Marvin Wolfgang and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania were pioneers in establishing the basis for identifying patterns of repeat offending. They studied two groups of juvenile males, born in 1945 and 1958 respectively, and raised in the city of Philadelphia.² Findings from the Wolfgang studies have influenced juvenile justice policy and decisions about how adult offenders should be handled by the criminal courts and law enforcement agencies.

Wolfgang's studies revealed that approximately one-third of the boys had some delinquent contact with the police. This contact included arrests for juvenile or status offenses as well as misdemeanors and more serious felonies. Wolfgang identified a particularly active set of juvenile "chronic offenders" who had five or more police contacts. The chronic offenders comprised a very small part of the study populations - between 6% and 9% - yet they accounted for a very large portion of the delinquency contacts of all boys in the studies - between 52% and 61%. These chronic delinquents averaged more than eight police contacts in each study.

While the Wolfgang studies focused upon juvenile patterns of criminality, other studies have used official criminal justice records to study adult patterns of offending. Kristen Williams examined the official records of 45,575 persons who were arrested in the District of Columbia

²Marvin Wolfgang, Robert Figlio and Thorsten Sellen, *Delinquency in a Birth Cohort*, the University of Chicago Press, 1972 and Marvin Wolfgang and Paul Tracy, "The 1945 and 1958 Birth Cohorts: A Comparison of Prevalence, Incidence and Severity of Delinquent Behavior", in Daniel McGillis et al, *Dealing with Dangerous Offenders - Volume II Selected Papers*, Harvard University, 1983.

from 1971 through 1975.³ The records accounted for 72,510 separate arrests. Williams found that among adult arrestees a small proportion of the defendants accounted for a large proportion of the arrests, with 7% of the arrestees responsible for almost one-quarter of the arrests. This seven percent averaged 5.7 arrests each, while the average criminal was arrested only 1.6 times.

Other studies, based on both official records and self-reported information from criminals, provide additional information about patterns of criminality.⁴

A recent Rand Corporation study, authored by Jan and Marcia Chaiken and

³Kristen Williams, *The Scope and Prediction of Recidivism*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Law and Social Research, 1979, pp. 5-6. The way in which the data were collected in the Williams study may have underestimated the criminality of the group and the extent to which criminality is clustered among a small number of very active offenders. Because some of the arrestees did not become adults until well into the five year data collection period, offense opportunities for this part of the group were reduced. Likewise, some of the offenders undoubtedly continued to engage in crime after the study ended.

⁴The self-reported method of data collection has both strengths and weaknesses. Without self-reports, one must rely on official records that identify only a portion of an offender's illegal activities. According to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, only about 20% of the crimes that are reported to the FBI result in the identification and arrest of a suspect. If one were to include victimless crimes and/or the level of crime estimated by victimization surveys, the proportion of crime in which a suspect is identified would deteriorate even further. Thus, studies based upon official records have been useful in identifying patterns of offending, but they have been based only on snapshots of offender's criminal activities that consist only of arrests.

sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, represents a comprehensive effort to review the criminal history of high-rate offenders.⁵ The data were gathered from 2,200 prison and jail inmates in California, Michigan and Texas.

By using criminal justice records and self-report data, the Rand researchers identified the most active and violent criminals among the surveyed inmates. They found that criminal justice records of arrest, conviction and incarceration alone do not allow meaningful distinctions between the violent high rate offenders and other types of offenders. The study identified a small number of individuals who committed a large portion of the total crime for the group. Overall, the median annual crime commission rate (with the exception of drug dealing) was approximately 14.8 crimes per person per year, while the crime commission rate for the most active 10% of the study participants was generally 40 to 50 times greater than this. The most active 10% averaged 605 nondrug crimes per person per year. The "violent predators" - those who commit robberies, assaults and drug deals and who comprised 15% of inmates surveyed, generally tended to commit all crimes at higher rates than other survey respondents.⁶

The Rand study described the typical violent predator as a relatively young drug user who began committing crimes as a juvenile. It summarized the salient characteristics of the violent predator as follows:

Age

- onset of crime (especially violent crime) before age 16,

⁵Jan Chaiken and Marcia Chaiken, *Varieties of Criminal Behavior*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1982.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 44-66.

- frequent commission of violent and property crimes before age 18,
- multiple commitments to state juvenile facilities,

Drugs:

- frequent use of hard drugs as juvenile,
- use of heroin at cost exceeding \$50/day,
- use of combinations of drugs

Employment and family:

- unmarried and with few family obligations,
- employed irregularly and for short times

The Rand study also provided a foundation for dispelling the general idea that most offenders fail to specialize in one type of crime. The researchers found that their study population engaged in a variety of crimes, but that it was possible to identify patterns of criminal behavior. Generally, the most violent criminals committed all sorts of violent and nonviolent crimes, while nonviolent criminals confined their activities primarily to property crimes. For example, most robbers in the study also were involved in burglary and other forms of theft. On the other hand, the burglar-drug dealer in the Rand study was not involved in the more serious crime of robbery.

Using the Research Findings

These findings support the idea that a small portion of the criminal population commits a disproportionate amount of crime. However, while researchers have identified a set of characteristics which tend to be common among career criminals, the use of suspects' characteristics (profiles) to predict who the most serious offenders will be may be problematic. Concerned researchers argue that the prediction accuracy is not good enough. Peter Greenwood, using data from the Rand study, was able to predict accurately

50% of the high-rate and low-rate burglary and robbery offenders. The prediction accuracy rate for the remaining offenders, however, was much lower.⁷ Compounding the problem is the fact that much of the information used by the Rand researchers to characterize the violent predator is not readily available in most criminal justice records systems. Accordingly, it is difficult for practitioners to distinguish accurately between career criminals and other less dangerous criminals.

4. ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES

In spite of uncertainties about our ability to predict accurately, the research suggests that we do need to try to identify and take more forceful action against the repeat offender. Such action need not imply Draconian activities that violate the civil rights of those designated for special attention. Rather, it is enough that vigorous investigative procedures and the full force of the law be applied whenever evidence suggests that a serious repeat offender is involved in a crime.

The traditional operation of law enforcement agencies does not necessarily offer the best way to attack the career criminal. First, the traditional focus on **reported crime** means that most investigative activity is initiated at the request of a citizen, after a crime has occurred. While this may be effective in dealing with low-rate offenders, it can be disastrous when applied to the career criminal. This is because high-rate offenders are arrested for only a small proportion of the crimes they commit. Self-reported studies of heroin addicts, for example, indicate they may be arrested for less than 1% of their criminal acts.⁸ Delay in

⁷Peter Greenwood, **Selective Incapacitation**, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1982, pp. 57-61.

⁸Gloria Weissman, "Opiate Addiction and Criminal Behavior: A Brief Discussion of Major Issues and Recent Findings", mimeo, National Institute of Drug Abuse, 1981, pp. 158-162. John Ball et al, "The Criminalistics of Heroin Addicts in the **Drug Crime Connection**", Sage Publications, 1981, pp. 5, 13.

identifying and targeting high-rate offenders for action leaves the law-abiding population at substantial risk.

Second, the **case orientation** of detectives in traditional investigations may not be appropriate for the apprehension of career criminals. The amount of time investigators allocate to a case is affected by the perceived seriousness of the offense, the probability of an arrest, the likelihood of positive prosecutorial review and, sometimes, the expected judicial outcome. Violent crimes, property crimes with a high dollar loss and those with some information that can lead to the identification of a suspect generally receive the greatest attention. Throughout this process it is the case and its quality that receives the attention of the investigator - not characteristics of the suspect, whose identity and criminal history are usually unknown.

While this method of prioritization is appropriate for most cases, it is not adequate when dealing with a suspect who is a serious repeat offender. When the career criminal is involved in a low-level or "victimless" crime (e.g., low-level drug dealing or larceny) the case may often be given the same priority as if an average criminal were involved.

In addition, although an officer may derive satisfaction from apprehending a repeat offender, under this traditional system of operation, most agencies are unlikely to give the officer any more credit than for a case against a first-time offender who has committed a similar crime.⁹ This systems of rewards

⁹Studies of prosecutorial decisionmaking indicate that most prosecutors, like the police, are case-oriented rather than suspect-oriented. With the possible exception of offices with specialized career criminal programs, prosecutorial decisions are influenced by the seriousness of the immediate offense and the evidence available and not by a defendant's prior record. See Barbara Bolan, "Identifying Serious Offenders" in Daniel McGillis et al, **Dealing with Dangerous Offenders**, Volume II Selected Papers, Harvard University, 1983, Section 7, pp. 7-8.

ignores the greater danger of the repeat offender who continues to commit crimes despite his earlier involvement with the criminal justice system.

In the past several years, law enforcement agencies have begun to recognize these deficiencies and develop programs specifically to address the career criminal problem. In our nationwide review, we found three basic types of programs. The first two methods involve increasing the attention given to a case after an arrest has occurred, while the third method seeks to target career criminals before they are arrested for a new offense. Following are brief descriptions of these methods.

Post-arrest Case Enhancement: Special processing of a case after a suspect has been arrested and identified as meeting an agency's "career criminal" criteria. The objective is to develop a very solid case and to ensure the successful prosecution of that case in court. These cases typically are assigned to a senior detective with a reduced caseload. This gives the detective time to verify the suspect's record, work with the prosecutor in developing and presenting the case and, if necessary, provide victim/witness assistance. For such a program to be effective, law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies usually have to agree on the criteria for identifying career criminals and on the selection of cases for enhancement.

Warrant Service: Special efforts designed to ensure that when an outstanding warrant on a repeat offender exists, the offender is apprehended. Officers in career criminal warrant service programs have a reduced caseload so that they can spend more time "investigating, locating and apprehending career criminals wanted on warrants.

Pre-arrest Targeting: The selection of career criminals for special attention before their arrest for a particular crime. Pre-arrest targeting is the most complicated, time consuming, and controversial of the three career criminal strategies. Pre-arrest targeting programs spend a great deal of time and resources cultivating informants,

conducting surveillance and attempting to observe the commission of a crime. Exhibit 1 provides a summary of the major characteristics of the three career criminal program types.

Program Costs

While it was not possible to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the three program types in this report, some general comments can be made. Costs per suspect handled are lowest for the post-arrest type program. This is because one is dealing with a crime for which a suspect has been identified, and for which both witnesses and evidence usually exist. For many post-arrest cases, a detailed follow-up is

sufficient to bring about a successful outcome. Warrant service and pre-arrest targeting are more complex in that suspects have to be located, and, with pre-arrest, a case must be developed.

While costs for post-arrest and warrant service cases will be lower than those for pre-arrest targeting, in some instances the additional expenditure for the latter may be justified. Commanders emphasized to us that it is important to engage in pre-arrest targeting in order to bring to an early halt the activities of high-volume criminals who are only infrequently arrested. The benefits of this incapacitation may outweigh the heavier departmental costs of a pre-arrest program.

EXHIBIT 1

LAW ENFORCEMENT CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAMS/OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

Type 1: Post-Arrest Case Enhancement

Objective - Successful prosecution, conviction and incarceration

Activities

- Assign case to experienced investigator
- Develop suspect screening criteria
- Develop and maintain a repeat offender list
- Verify criminal records
- Conduct extensive case follow-up
- Assist prosecutor in case preparation
- Provide victim/witness assistance

Type 2: Warrant Service

Objective - Immediate service of warrants

Activities

- Develop suspect screening criteria
- Screen outstanding warrants for career criminals
- Gather background information
- Conduct surveillance
- Locate and apprehend suspect

Type 3: Pre-Arrest Suspect Targeting

Objective - Interruption of criminal activities

Activities

- Develop suspect screening criteria
- Target repeat offenders
- Recruit and cultivate informants
- Verify criminal activities of target
- Conduct surveillance of targets
- Conduct property/drug buy/sell scams
- Infiltrate criminal networks
- Assist prosecutor in developing case

Program Effectiveness

Each local jurisdiction will have to decide for itself which kind of program would be the most effective for its particular needs. Evaluations of each of the methods have been done, and these can help guide administrators to make decisions. In this section, we will discuss those evaluations.

Post-Arrest Enhancement: Post-arrest case enhancement programs in Baltimore County, Maryland and New York City, both of which are reviewed in this report, have maintained detailed records of their cases. In both jurisdictions the results have been promising. In Baltimore County during 1983 and 1984, two career-criminal detectives handled 162 repeat offenders. The majority were arrested for robbery (58%) and burglary (28%). At the time of their arrests, 70% were under some type of judicial supervision.

The Baltimore program has shown impressive results in regard to pre-trial detention, conviction and incarceration. Eighty-six percent of the targets were detained pending trial. Of those cases that have been disposed of, 75% resulted in a conviction for the original offense, and 10% brought convictions on a lesser offense. The convictions have resulted in lengthy periods of incarceration. Twenty-seven percent received mandatory 25-year or life sentences without parole. Thirty-eight percent received sentences of over ten years, and 32% received terms ranging from one to nine years. Only four percent of those convicted received probation. While no systematic data was available to compare these results to similar cases, interviews with police and prosecutors suggested that the pretrial detention rate, incarceration rate, and the sentence lengths were substantially higher than those normally imposed by the courts.

In New York City, the results also are impressive. Virtually all of the enhanced cases (97%) were arraigned as felonies. In only 6% of the cases did the prosecutor file a lower charge than that filed by the police.

Cases handled by the unit achieved a 67% indictment rate in 1982. This was substantially higher than the city-wide felony indictment rate of 15%. For those cases on which final disposition data was available, the conviction rate was 73% and 58% of those convicted were incarcerated.

The information from Baltimore County and New York may not answer all of the questions we have about postarrest case enhancement programs. Information about program costs as well as more comparative information about case outcomes would illuminate with more certainty the value of the programs. But in spite of these shortcomings it is our impression that in situations where a department has limited resources, focusing extra post-arrest attention on the serious repeat offender can result in high rates of indictment, conviction and incarceration.

Warrant Service: Warrant service has sometimes been a neglected aspect of crime control. The failure of the police to diligently serve warrants, especially bench warrants issued by the courts for failure to appear, and warrants issued by parole and probation agencies, seriously short-circuits the sanctioning capacity of the criminal justice system. At a minimum, warrant service failure reinforces the view among criminals that justice is neither swift nor sure. In the worst case it exposes the public to substantial unnecessary risk.

Two recent evaluations provide information about the value of repeat offender-focused warrant service. Bowers and Gay, in a study of a federal/local felony warrant program in California, found that service of a warrant usually led to the immediate incapacitation of the wanted person. Approximately two-thirds of the arrestees were held in jail after the initial bond hearing. Furthermore, 77% of the arrestees were eventually found guilty. Ninety-one percent of the guilty were incarcerated.¹⁰

¹⁰Robert A. Bowers and William G. Gay, **Evaluation of the U.S. Marshals' FIST Program**, University City Science Center, 1985, pp. 44-47.

More evidence of the efficacy of a career criminal warrant service program can be found in the recently-completed Police Foundation study of Washington, D.C.'s Repeat Offender Program. The researcher found that targeting warrant suspects was a particularly effective way to apprehend repeat offenders. A comparison of arrest rates for a group of repeat offenders targeted for apprehension and a non-targeted control group yielded marked differences. Fifty-one percent of the targets were arrested while only 9% of the controls were arrested.¹¹

The Washington, D.C. evaluation also found that warrant service was an effective incapacitation strategy. Forty-three percent of all warrant arrest made by the unit led to immediate incarceration. The rate for bench warrants was even greater, at 66%.¹²

The findings from the California warrant study and the Washington career criminal study indicate that warrant service is an effective way to remove repeat offenders from the street.

Pre-Arrest Targeting: The Washington evaluation provides the only in-depth evaluation of a pre-arrest program, and indicates that this program type, can also be effective. Pre-arrest targeting is the only way to apprehend active offenders who are committing a high volume of crime and who are not coming to the attention of law enforcement agencies, either because of their stealth or because they have insulated themselves from the point at which the crimes are being committed. Using an experimental design, the Washington evaluator tracked the arrest experience of 116 known offenders. Half were assigned to be targeted by the repeat offender unit, while the remainder were assigned to a control group. During the study period 47% of the 58 experimental groups were arrested, while only

6% of the control group met a similar fate.¹³ The data strongly indicate that pre-arrest targeting is a very effective method to apprehend repeat offenders.

The available evidence suggests that pre-arrest targeting can lead to the arrest of active criminals whose likelihood of arrest through normal police practices is limited. Administrators should, however, understand the following problems:

- the development of these cases is time-consuming and expensive;
- the arrests will involve active criminals who may not have records serious enough for them to be considered by prosecutors as career criminals; and
- the offense may not be one serious enough to trigger sentence enhancement laws.

5. WHERE PROGRAMS ARE OPERATING

Our research found police departments around the country using career criminal programs in various ways. We found programs in 33 of the 80 police departments we contacted, with 26 in large agencies employing more than 200 sworn officers, and seven in departments with fewer than 200. The smallest department found to have a program employed 94 sworn personnel and was working with several other departments in a regional program. Exhibit 2 shows some characteristics of the programs we surveyed.

Our survey indicated variety in the orientation and intensity of the programs. They ranged from minimal efforts to increase officer awareness of career criminals (4 programs) to labor-intensive pre-arrest targeting strategies (10 programs). In part because of uncertainties about which type of initiative would be most effective, 11 departments engaged in more than one strategy. The most fre-

¹¹Susan Martin, **Catching Career Criminals: A Study of the Repeat Offender Project**, Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1985, pp. 5-3.

¹²*Ibid.*, 5-14.

¹³*Ibid.*, 5-3.

EXHIBIT 2

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF CAREER
CRIMINAL PROGRAMS

Number of
Departments

AGENCY SIZE

More than 1000 officers	8
500 to 999 officers	11
200 to 499 officers	7
Less than 200 officers	7

TARGETING STRATEGY

Officer awareness	4
Post-arrest case enhancement	8
Pre-arrest targeting	10
Mixed post/pre-arrest system	11

ORGANIZATIONAL LOCATION

Investigations	14
Chief/Commissioner/Director	6
Special operations/organized crime	5
Field operations/patrol	4
Other	4

UNIT PERSONNEL LEVELS

None	2
1 to 5 officers	12
6 to 10 officers	10
More than 10 officers	9

FACTORS SUPPORTING PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT

Federal Grant (ICAP)*	11
State Grant	11
Prosecutorial Encouragement	6
Internal Priority	6

*Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program

uent combination involved pre-arrest targeting and warrant service.

The career criminal units were assigned to a variety of commands in the departments, the majority to investigative or special operations bureaus. In some agencies the units were attached directly to the chief executive. In only four departments were the units attached to patrol operations.

Personnel levels were modest. Most of the units tended to operate with a single squad - usually a sergeant and five to nine officers. The supervisory level was generally greater for pre-arrest targeting units because of the need to monitor investigations that often became very complex and sensitive.

The programs grew out of a number of circumstances. A major contributor to

the development of these units was the availability of external funds. Eleven of the 33 departments previously had participated in the federally sponsored Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP). ICAP encouraged participants to work with their local prosecutors to develop career criminal initiatives. Their current programs are continuations of the ICAP effort. Nine of the 33 jurisdictions received some state funding. These programs all were located in California, Maryland and New York. While outside funding has been important, nine departments acted on their own; six of these were initially encouraged by local prosecutors.

Eight of the 33 programs surveyed were visited for on-site assessments. Exhibit 3 provides program characteristic information for these. More detailed descriptions of these eight programs are provided below.

EXHIBIT 3

CHARACTERISTICS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAMS REVIEWED

City	Population	Sworn Officers	Career Criminal Officers	CC Staff as % of Sworn	Unit Type
New York, NY	7,057,000	22,467	144	.6%	Post-arrest case enhancement Warrant service
San Diego, CA	919,000	1,395	18	1.2%	Pre-arrest targeting
St. Louis, Co., MO	990,000	580	8	1.3%	Pre-arrest targeting Warrant Service
Baltimore Co., MD	662,000	1,553	2	--	Post-arrest case enhancement
Washington, D.C.	631,000	3,861	63	1.6%	Pre-arrest targeting Warrant Service
Kansas City, MO	451,000	1,141	17	1.5%	Pre-arrest targeting Post-arrest case enhancement
Albuquerque, NM	345,000	557	9	1.6%	Pre-arrest targeting
West Covina, CA	82,000	101	5	5.0%	Pre-arrest targeting

Baltimore County, Maryland Post-Arrest Case Enhancement

The Baltimore County post-arrest case enhancement program is part of a state-wide initiative to encourage police, prosecutors and corrections officials to establish coordinated career criminal programs. Local agencies fund their own initiatives, but the state has encouraged them by awarding small planning grants.

The goals of the county program are to quickly identify repeat offenders and to remove them from the community through long-term incarceration. The program was developed to make use of a state career criminal statute that mandates heavy sentences for persons convicted of three or more violent felonies. The statute specifies a number of target crimes, but Baltimore targets only persons apprehended for robbery and residential burglary because of the seriousness of these crimes and because of a desire to control caseload size. The two police officers assigned to the program review all patrol case work, appear at preliminary and bail hearings to present evidence against pretrial release, and work with the prosecutor in preparing evidence. They also provide victim/witness assistance. Cases are assigned to senior attorneys in the prosecutor's office.

New York City, New York: Post-Arrest Case Enhancement and Warrant Service

New York City's post-arrest case enhancement and warrant service programs are separate entities operating under the same command. Programs are a product of a larger state effort to provide funds to local police, prosecutors and courts to target career criminals. The state also provides the police department with a list of names of offenders who meet the state career criminal criteria for legislatively mandated sentence enhancements. The list is used to select arrestees for special career criminal processing. In order to control caseload size, selection is generally limited to suspects with the instant offenses of robbery and burglary. Cases are referred to special career criminal prosecutors.

Eighty-three officers are assigned to the case enhancement unit and 41 officers to the career criminal warrant service program. The career criminal warrant service unit pursues repeat offenders wanted on all charges that fall under the state career criminal criteria.

New York City discontinued a pre-arrest targeting program because of the large amount of time and personnel needed to conduct pre-arrest investigative activities.

Kansas City, Missouri: Post-Arrest Case Enhancement and Pre-Arrest Targeting

Kansas City operates several programs that apply extra resources to career criminal cases. However, because there is no state career criminal statute, the units target both career criminals and other serious cases. The inability of the police and the prosecutor to develop a mutually agreed-upon career criminal definition has hurt development of an integrated program. The prosecutor favors adherence to the candidates' prior conviction records, while the police favor candidates with long arrest records and others with lesser records whom they know to be active. Partially because of these differences, the prosecutor dropped the career criminal initiative shortly before our site visit.

The special investigations division in the Kansas City police department routinely targets career criminals and white collar criminals, while a property recovery unit works to identify and arrest fences. Approximately 17 officers are assigned to these functions.

St. Louis County, Missouri: Warrant Service and Pre-Arrest Targeting

The St. Louis County police department's pre-arrest targeting unit is engaged primarily in intelligence gathering and case development against offenders who not only commit crime but who also coordinate the activities of other criminals. The

unit generally avoids common street criminals and drug addicts.

The unit operates on a 90-day investigative plan. At the beginning of each planning cycle the unit commander meets with other departmental commanders to choose targets. At the end of the 90-day period recommendations are made for closure of the case or for its transfer to other units, which usually make the necessary arrests. The unit works closely with the prosecutor so that its cases are given priority. Of the seven officers in this unit, one is assigned to career criminals with outstanding warrants.

Washington, D.C.: Warrant Service and Pre-Arrest Targeting

The 63 officers of Washington's career criminal unit split their time equally between pre-arrest investigations and warrant service. The warrant service component has led to about half the unit's arrests while targeted surveillance accounts for slightly over one quarter. The remaining are arrests of non-targeted suspects that happen to be working with targets, or who are observed committing crimes during surveillances.

Relations with the prosecutor are sometimes strained because not all suspects handled have formal records that would qualify them as career criminals, and because the arrests sometimes involve minor property crimes that the prosecutor does not perceive as career criminal offenses.

Albuquerque, New Mexico: Pre-Arrest Targeting

Albuquerque operates an aggressive pre-arrest career criminal squad that uses a variety of methods. Suspects are initially identified by searching pawn lists for stolen property and gun transactions, by receiving referrals from the department's crime stoppers program or by developing informants. It is not unusual for the unit to infiltrate criminal networks and to make several arrests on each case.

Nine officers are assigned to the unit. The unit enjoys a close working relationship with the local prosecutor, so its cases generally receive preferential treatment. The prosecutor often is involved with cases as they are developing, and reviews apprehension strategies with the career criminal team.

San Diego, California: Pre-Arrest Targeting

The 18 officers in the San Diego career criminal unit prefer to develop property crime cases and use two types of targeting activities. The first method relies heavily on confidential informants to identify active suspects, while the second is a sting/storefront operation. Each of the officers in the unit is encouraged to identify several informants as a means to developing workable suspects. The unit's commander attributes the majority of the unit's arrests to information obtained from confidential informants.

While the San Diego prosecutor has a special career criminal program, the police department's unit has little contact with that initiative because the prosecutor's screening criteria are more restrictive than those of the police.

West Covina, California: Pre-Arrest Targeting

West Covina, the smallest agency studied, has 101 sworn personnel, five of whom are assigned to the pre-arrest targeting career criminal unit. The department has tried to enhance productivity throughout the department in order to sustain its career criminal program.

Because of limited confidential funds and a command decision to aggressively identify and arrest persons for being under the influence of drugs, many informants with drug convictions have come to the attention of the unit. Thus, while the team prefers to pursue property crimes, drug offenses dominate the unit's output.

Although the prosecutor has a special career criminal unit, there is little interaction between it and the police. As in the case of San Diego, the prosecutor restricts case intake to robbery suspects in order to control the workload. This action disqualifies many of the units cases from special prosecutorial attention.

Organization of the Report

The remainder of this report is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 discusses some of the planning issues one needs to consider in developing a career criminal program. Among the issues discussed are determining program need, defining a target population, legal challenges, police-prosecutor relations, resource allocation and justice system coordination. Chapters 3 through 5 discuss in detail, each of the program types: post-arrest case enhancement, warrant service and pre-arrest targeting. These chapters contain sections on organization and staffing, case selection criteria, operational procedures and summary recommendations. Chapter 6 contains a discussion of the way in which program monitoring can support efforts to develop a strong and viable program.

This **Issues and Practices Report** is meant as an overview and guide to law enforcement career criminal programs. As such, it may not answer all of your specific questions. The chief executives and unit commanders of the career criminal units we reviewed should be able to help you with additional details. Finally, Appendix A contains an annotated bibliography of relevant research and operational literature.

CHAPTER 2

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Developing a career criminal program is similar to creating any other specialized investigative unit in a police department. Post-arrest case enhancement units operate very much like specialized major crime units, and pre-arrest targeting units work like organized crime, intelligence, narcotics and other undercover operations.

However, there are a number of specialized considerations in planning a career criminal unit. These include: (1) how to define a "career criminal"; (2) which of the three basic approaches the program should take; and (3) how to resolve conflicts with the prosecutor. In addition, police administrators will need to decide on the amount of resources that should be allocated to the program, and what types of linkages should be maintained with other parts of the criminal justice system. Special attention should be given to working with the prosecutor, as this is where tension and problems arise most consistently.

1. DO YOU NEED A PROGRAM?

Before any of these issues can be addressed, the executive should examine whether the community needs such a program, and if so, how to generate support for it. A first step in this process is a review of local criminal justice records to determine whether or not they are sufficient enough to identify the active career criminal. When these records are insufficient, efforts should be made to improve the collection of information. Second, a review of the records of arrestees will enable a jurisdiction to identify the scope of the career criminal problem and the crimes for which career criminals are being arrested. This information can be used to estimate the amount of resources that will be needed if special attention is devoted to the entire population of repeat offenders, or to a subset of that population.

Third, the department should examine how it is currently handling career criminals. In conducting this type of assessment departments generally have found that a small number of repeat offenders account for a substantial portion of the jurisdictions caseload.¹ They also found that cases involving these offenders did not receive more attention than cases involving other arrestees charged with similar crimes.

Finally, the information generated through such a "needs assessment" can be used in several ways. Some of the study departments used this information to answer questions about the appropriate thrust and scope of a career criminal program. Others provided it to the public through the media as well as through crime prevention programs in order to generate public support for career criminal initiatives.

2. DEFINING THE CAREER CRIMINAL

One of the more difficult decisions in developing a program is the selection of criteria for defining a career criminal. As we have said, research indicates that available criminal justice records may not allow an agency to identify accurately all the highest-rate offenders. Even when researchers have access to information not found in criminal justice records, their ability to predict the highest-rate offenders is flawed. The definition decision is

¹For example, Baltimore County found that among 355 adults arrested for serious personal and property offenses, 70% had prior adult arrest records and 27% had prior adult incarcerations. Furthermore, within two years 40% were rearrested. Baltimore County, MD, **Repeat Offender Planning Project**, Baltimore County, April 1983.

further complicated by state legislation that may sanction a particular definition of career criminals. The legislated definition may be broader or narrower than the definition local jurisdictions feel is appropriate. The following section discusses these and other factors that make the definition process difficult.

Role of Legislation

At first glance, the existence of state legislation defining the career criminal appears to be an easy answer to the question of whom to target. Many states have this type of legislation and in most, offenders must meet two criteria: a certain number of previous convictions and a qualifying instant offense, usually any one of a list of serious crimes. Certainly, a review of existing legislation should be a first step in developing a program. The legislation can help focus the attention of the criminal justice system on the career criminal. Several of the programs reviewed did develop their programs around state career criminal legislation. However, such legislation is not always the best or the only way to define repeat offenders.

The effectiveness of career criminal legislation depends on several factors, including the early identification of repeat offenders by law enforcement officials, the willingness of the prosecutor to accept a case, and the willingness of the court to apply longer or enhanced high sentences. In some states, sentencing enhancements are mandatory or automatic; in others, prosecutors must file special motions. There are substantial opportunities for each agency in the criminal justice system, through discretionary powers, to short-circuit the intent of the legislation. Experiences in several states illustrate the pitfalls in implementing state career criminal legislation. They also illustrate the tensions that commonly arise between police and prosecutors in implementing career criminal programs.

- In Maryland, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor to file an addendum for enhanced sentencing of career criminals.

Although the law dates from 1976, it was used infrequently until recently. Prosecutors and judges were opposed to the law because of the extra case preparation work it requires, the mandatory period (25 years) of the enhanced sentence and the fact that those convicted were not eligible for parole. Support from a state task force and police-prosecutor agreement on a program has led to increased use of the law in several urban counties.

- In California, the case enhancement law applies to all felonies. However, the California study jurisdictions focused almost exclusively on violent crimes, primarily robbery, because of heavy caseloads. If a qualifying repeat offender was apprehended for a minor felony, the case would receive neither special attention from a prosecutor nor enhanced sentencing. These latter policies were a concern to police officers because they felt that even when the instant offense was not a robbery, they were still developing cases against repeat offenders who required greater attention and longer incapacitation than non-career criminals.
- Following the passage of the New York State act, which mandated enhanced sentencing of felony recidivists, the state monitored the extent to which judges followed the statute. Initial compliance was limited, but surveillance, training and reminders by state court officials reinforced the judges use of sentencing enhancement. Nevertheless, until the police and the prosecutor were able to agree to limit career criminal case enhancements to persons arrested for robbery

and burglary, the program languished in New York City.

While sentencing enhancement legislation may have substantial potential for increasing the prison time of repeat offenders, it is not being applied as vigorously or as universally as it could be. Variation exists across states and within states according to whether local prosecutors have their own career criminal programs. And, while police can ensure that appropriate cases are brought to the attention of the prosecutor, the ultimate decision about how these cases will be handled is largely a prosecutorial or court matter. Several of the jurisdictions we visited placed special attention on prosecutorial/judicial liaison and were successful in encouraging these officials to fully implement the state legislation.

Judicial, Prosecutorial and Police Views of the Career Criminal

Definitional concerns are of primary importance to the judiciary because where state career criminal statutes exist, there is limited judicial discretion in determining a convicted felon's fate.

The prosecutor, like the judge, must adhere to career criminal legislation in developing a program because application of sentence enhancements is constrained by law to defendants meeting special conditions. For the prosecutor, the legislation effectively defines a universe of defendants for whom enhancements may be sought. However, the prosecutor has substantial latitude in determining whether to be even more selective than the legislation in choosing suspects for special enhancements. This is usually done by targeting only selected felonies and/or excluding cases of a minimum evidentiary quality.²

²Alternatively, even if a defendant does not meet the minimum statutory requirements for sentence enhancement, the case may still be assigned a high priority. This is a common practice among prosecutors in dealing with very serious violent crimes or crimes that may receive an unusual degree of public attention.

Some prosecutors in the sites we visited have been more willing than others to assign special priority to cases singled out by law enforcement agencies. This willingness usually depends on prosecutorial caseload and available resources. In many jurisdictions, law enforcement officers generate a larger repeat offender caseload than the prosecutor can provide with special attention. The prosecutor then handles part of the caseload by plea bargaining and charge reductions.³

In general, prosecutorial attention is determined by the seriousness of the crime. Prosecutorial career criminal programs recognize this fact, but generally add seriousness of the offender as another criterion. Career criminal programs merely allow the prosecutor to do with a select number of defendants and cases what would, in theory, be done for all cases if adequate resources were available. For example, while the state program in California provides additional funds to some prosecutors to enhance cases involving career criminals, the funding is not sufficient to apply maximum effort to all cases involving repeat offenders. Accordingly, in the California study jurisdictions, enhancement was applied primarily to robbery cases.

Law enforcement agencies have the greatest latitude of all in selecting cases and suspects for attention. Because they are the gatekeepers for the rest of the criminal justice system, their activities determine both the size and make-up of the total caseload.

Perhaps because the law enforcement agencies have responsibilities for crime prevention and deterrence, their definition of who should be considered a career criminal often

³Prosecutors use other mechanisms as well. Many have case screening units that review all new cases. Most are organized into units that perform various functions (misdemeanor, grand jury, trial, homicide, rape/sexual assault, economic crimes, etc.).

differs from the prosecutor's and the judiciary's. While the latter usually consider a lengthy conviction record as a requisite, law enforcement agencies with pre-arrest targeting programs are often concerned with suspects who apparently are committing crimes on a daily basis, but who often do not have the requisite number of convictions to qualify them as a career criminals according to state statutes. These cases present a dilemma for law enforcement officers, who may believe that criminal justice resources should be spent primarily on those who are most active, regardless of prior convictions. Such cases create considerable tension between police officials who are trying to control crime and the prosecutors who are trying to devote more resources to cases that will produce longer periods of incarceration.

Police selection methods that increase the prosecutor's workload also can be a source of tension. Post-arrest case enhancement and warrant service programs select their target suspects from among those routinely arrested by other units of the department and, accordingly, they do not have an appreciable impact upon a prosecutor's total caseload. However, they do affect the prosecutor's workload, by requesting that designated cases receive special attention.

Pre-arrest targeting police tactics often increase the caseload of the prosecutor and other agencies because the goals of such efforts are to identify and apprehend repeat offenders in the act of committing a crime. As with post-arrest programs, the prosecutor usually places constraints on the types of cases that will receive special attention, often to the chagrin of the police.

Juveniles and Young Adults

A final consideration in selecting suspects for special targeting involves the treatment of juveniles and young adults between the ages of 18 and 21. State-mandated lack of access to juvenile records often discourages special police targeting of active youthful offenders, in spite of the

fact that the Rand survey of inmates in California, Michigan and Texas found the "violent predator" to be among the younger members of the criminal population.⁴

In nearly all states, crime records are sealed when a juvenile passes into adulthood. While limiting the use of juvenile records has helped many persons avoid being harmed by youthful mistakes, it has enabled others to commit crimes with relative impunity. The crux of the problem is that active juvenile felony offenders and those who have only recently legally become adults appear as non-offenders when first appearing in adult court. The result of current policy is that sanctions against active and dangerous young offenders (18-23 years old) are often minimized.

Some efforts are being made to deal more effectively with serious repeat juvenile offenders. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has been sponsoring a program in several jurisdictions to deal more effectively with the chronic, serious juvenile offender, especially those with drug dependencies.⁵ Among the jurisdictions we studied, Baltimore County is working with the local prosecutor, the court and state juvenile justice authorities to gain better access to the juvenile records of young offenders and to transfer cases involving repeat juvenile offenders to adult court.

3. RESOLVING POLICE-PROSECUTOR TENSION

Can the tension between the law enforcement agencies and the prosecutor be resolved? The experience in the study sites yields mixed results. On one hand, some programs are able

⁴Chaiken and Chaiken, *op cit.*, p. 64.

⁵**Serious Habitual Offender Drug Involved Program: Communication of Programs Issues:** U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, October 1984.

to achieve substantial law enforcement/prosecutor agreement over case selection procedures. Agreement is usually easier to attain for post-arrest programs, particularly if the police are willing to ask for enhancement only on suspects having the requisite conviction record.

For example, substantial cooperation exists in the New York and Baltimore County post-arrest case enhancement programs. The prosecutors provide extra effort to police-designated career criminal cases because the police forward only carefully prepared cases, and confine their referrals to robbery and burglary instant offenses, even though the state legislation makes many other crimes eligible for sentencing enhancements.

In contrast, pre-arrest units sometimes find it difficult to reach agreement with the prosecutor. The difficulty revolves around two main issues: the instant offense and the record of the suspect.

The types of arrests most often produced by pre-arrest units often are not regarded by prosecutors as being particularly serious offenses. Furthermore, they may not be for one of the target crimes designated in career criminal legislation. While pre-arrest units do make some arrests for burglary, most arrests are for buying, selling or receiving stolen property; larceny; and sale or possession of drugs. Seldom do the charges involve robbery or other violent felonies.⁶ Although many of the persons they identify for investigation are

⁶The special prosecutors in Albuquerque and St. Louis are willing to handle the entire police career criminal caseload. This probably occurs because prosecutorial resources are adequate, and the cases referred to the prosecutor are of high quality. The police frequently witness these crimes, had physical evidence and sometimes audio and visual recordings. Thus, while these cases somewhat expand the prosecutors' workload, they are frequently easy cases to successfully prosecute.

criminals with extensive arrest records, the pre-arrest units' instant offense charges are seldom for career criminal target crimes.

The second difficulty involves the official conviction record of the suspect. This record is frequently the triggering mechanism for legislatively allowed sentence enhancements which is a major factor in a prosecutor's decision to devote extra resources to a case. Some pre-arrest units attempt to solve this problem by targeting only suspects with extensive prior convictions. Two sites, New York and Washington, D.C., initially used this approach. They found, however, that developing cases only on certified career criminals was a difficult and very time-consuming task that yielded limited results. As a consequence, New York dropped its pre-arrest program and Washington, D.C. altered its program.

Prosecutor case selection procedures based on career criminal legislation produce a dilemma for pre-arrest targeting units. It is not unusual for the units to target criminally active suspects who, although they may have an extensive felony arrest record, may not have enough felony convictions. If an arrest is made, it will likely be of a suspect with too few convictions. But if the unit fails to target the suspect, an active offender may be ignored.

In spite of the above-mentioned problems pre-arrest units in San Diego, Washington, D.C. and West Covina opt to target active suspects with limited official records and have continued their programs in spite of limited prosecutor support or interest. While their cases do not result in special enhancements, the units feel the programs still disrupt the careers of active criminals.

In developing a program it is necessary to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of prosecutorial cooperation against the need to control the criminal activities of persons who do not have extensive conviction records but who, nevertheless, are a threat to community safety.

4. LEGAL ISSUES

By and large the police career criminal programs reviewed do not pose any serious legal problems. Of the 33 programs contacted, only seven reported any legal challenges to their career criminal initiatives. Most of the challenges resulted in dismissals. In the successful challenges, the issues were procedural, and did not concern the validity of targeting repeat offenders for special attention.

In two jurisdictions, suits based on claims of racial prejudice were dismissed. In three other jurisdictions, police officers were barred from bringing special career criminal case jackets into court because they were deemed prejudicial to the defendant. These cases did not result in dismissal of the charges against the career criminal, but rather in orders from the courts forbidding the police and prosecutors from identifying defendants in court as career criminals. In one jurisdiction a challenge to the maintenance of career criminal suspect files was dismissed.

The fact that few legal challenges have been directed at police career criminal programs is not surprising. Courts generally have allowed police wide discretion in targeting individuals for investigation as long as there is a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed. In the case of post-arrest case enhancement and warrant service programs, this criterion is easily fulfilled. Most pre-arrest targeting cases also involve sufficient evidence to fulfill the suspicion criteria.

The most likely challenge to career criminal programs lies in the area of pre-arrest programs that use a list of targets based on criminal history. But even here the issue is clouded. This study disclosed no successful challenges to career criminal cases based on the use of lists for targeting.

Other case law would seem to permit such activity. Support for this conclusion comes from a series of court decisions that approve the use of police officers' experience to establish ade-

quate cause for investigative actions. In the first of these cases, Terry v. Ohio,⁷ the Supreme Court accepted police use of "stop and frisk" under a "founded suspicion test." Under the case, if a law enforcement officer's experience suggests that criminal activity is occurring, this is sufficient justification for briefly stopping a suspect and determining his identity. There must, however, be some credible reason for the inquiry. More recently, the Supreme Court has authorized the use of criminal profiles to help identify drug abusers.⁸ In a very real sense these profiles are a quantification of the law enforcement experience based upon suspicion, as approved in Terry.

However, where the individual is targeted solely because of his legal criminal career status, or association with suspected career criminals, the legality of law enforcement activities may be challenged through charges of harassment or invasion of privacy. The degree of obtrusiveness resulting from the targeting of suspects is likely to be a relevant consideration in any such case. The career criminal units we looked at operated very cautiously when opening investigations with limited information, in order to preclude charges of harassment.

5. RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Career criminal programs can involve significant costs. As in most police programs, the primary cost is personnel; career criminal programs are labor-intensive.

The type of program is the primary factor in determining personnel costs. Post-arrest case enhancement programs are less costly than career criminal warrant service and pre-arrest targeting programs because career criminal investigators become

7393 U.S. 1 (1968).

8U.S. v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 (1980).

involved only after a suspect has been arrested. In such a program, the resources devoted to a case vary depending on the amount of time needed to complete the investigation, document the arrestee's prior conviction and incarceration record, and the extent to which the police work with the prosecutor in presenting cases to the court.

Warrant service and pre-arrest targeting involve substantial commitments of time to identify, locate and document the criminal activities of a suspect before an arrest can be made. Because surveillance activities usually require several officers, costs can mount rapidly. Such programs remain costly despite the fact that the pre-arrest units spend little time on a case after the arrest, primarily because of the strength of the evidence they already have collected.

Other costs are generally greater for warrant service and pre-arrest cases. Because of the surveillance tactics used by these programs, there is a need for special vehicles including unmarked cars and vans, equipped with special surveillance equipment. Confidential funds are a common expense among the pre-arrest units. Such units usually have more money to buy information and reward informants than do most other units in the department. However, this money is still limited and has to be used sparingly. If a substantial amount of money is needed to buy evidence, usually drugs, the units often must turn to a federal partner for assistance.

As mentioned, with one exception, the departments studied fund their programs internally because administrators have decided that a career criminal initiative is a worthwhile investment. In most instances, program resources have been created simply by transferring personnel and equipment to the career criminal program from other units in the department leaving the department's bottom line budget unchanged.

It is unclear what impact the transfers of resources have had on the departments' existing operations. Because law enforcement agencies are emergency response providers, there is a certain

amount of uncommitted time built into staffing levels. Because of this, the transfer of small numbers of personnel from several commands may not have a detectable impact on overall service. However, as the commitment of resources becomes greater, one needs to examine how the program affects total operations.

West Covina has been particularly aggressive and innovative in building a program from existing resources without infringing on other police functions. The department has implemented a number of patrol and investigative procedures to make up for the former patrol officers who were transferred to career criminal work. For example, the department:

- conducted a patrol workload study to reallocate patrol personnel more efficiently;
- increased the number of reports taken by communications personnel;
- hired community service officers to handle portions of the patrol workload; and
- implemented an investigations management system with a case review and screening component.

By using these techniques, the department is able to provide routine services efficiently and maintain a high level of commitment to its career criminal program.

It is possible that by developing a profile of the extent and severity of the career criminal problem in a community, law enforcement agencies will be able to persuade the public and elected officials to fund a special initiative. But the experience in the study sites has been that in spite of the merit and appeal of their programs, special funding is not forthcoming. Thus, the methods used in West Covina to "create" resources through efficiency measures may be the only viable approach to program development.

A recent report by the National Institute of Justice, **The Efficient Use of Police Resources**⁹ reviews a number of resource allocation and workload control measures police agencies have used to control service costs. The use of some of the procedures listed in Exhibit 4 may allow law enforcement agencies to create a career criminal program without increasing their total budgets.

6. JUSTICE SYSTEM COORDINATION

What happens at each point in the criminal justice system has an impact on the outcome of a case. If, for example, law enforcement officers file an incomplete case, the ability of the prosecutor to obtain a conviction is critically affected. Likewise, if the prosecutor does not give a case sufficient priority, the case may be jeopardized. An effective career criminal program demands constant vigilance by authorities in each agency, including the police, the prosecutor, jail and

juvenile authorities and the courts. If only one of these participants fails to diligently pursue the handling of career criminals cases, the work of the other units will be of limited value.

However, the traditional fragmentation among the various agencies militates against a unified effort to process cases. Coupled with this fragmentation is a tremendous amount of discretion in each agency. The police exercise discretion in assigning resources to cases; the prosecutor exercises discretion in preparing charges and in deciding whether to plea bargain or seek a trial. The courts are able to establish bail and decide both the type and amount of punishment. While there is a need for independence in making these decisions, there is also a need for greater cooperation on policy. This is especially true in regard to the treatment afforded the most active

EXHIBIT 4

POLICE EFFICIENCY TECHNIQUES

- Telephone reporting of minor crime incidents.
- Citation in lieu of arrest for minor crimes.
- Consolidate communication/dispatch operation (police/fire/EMS)
- Close of unpromising cases at the conclusion of the patrol investigation.
- Increase committed time rate for patrol.
- Match deployment of personnel to temporal workload patterns.
- Increase the use of one-officer rather than two-officer units.
- Use civilians for tasks that do not require a sworn officer.
- Use police reserves and volunteers for supplemental and backup services.

⁹This publication is available from the National Crime Justice Reference Service, P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850 (301) 251-5500.

and violent criminals. In too many instances, cases against violent and repeat offenders do not receive adequate treatment because of the failure of one or another agency to cooperate with others.

Baltimore County is a good example of a jurisdiction that has made a concerted effort to develop a systemwide approach to the career criminal problem. The post-arrest case enhancement program has involved extensive cooperation between the police and the prosecutor on case selection criteria. Furthermore, the police have taken an active role, with the prosecutor's encouragement, in assembling court records, preparing cases and assisting victims and witnesses. As a case moves through the system, jail, probation and state penitentiary officials are notified. The justice agencies in the county also have enlisted the support of elected officials and they regard this support as a key ingredient.

7. STATE INITIATIVES

Several states have recognized the need to assist local criminal justice agencies in focusing special attention on the repeat offender. California, Maryland and New York have done this by providing assistance and funding. California and New York have sought to coordinate and stimulate local programs by recommending procedural guidelines and by providing grants to cover some program expenses. Maryland, after providing small planning grants, has sought to stimulate local initiatives by developing a program model and encouraging state agencies including state police, corrections and juvenile authorities, to cooperate with and assist local programs. The state programs have been an important stimulus to local action, as evidenced by the large number of local career criminal initiatives in these states. The state programs are briefly described below.

New York

New York State, through its Division of Criminal Justice Services, is making the violent recidivist a top priority.

During 1984 approximately \$66 million was distributed by the state to local criminal justice agencies. Of the \$66 million, approximately \$12 million was awarded to police departments, and \$28 million went to local prosecutors. These funds allow participating agencies to handle larger caseloads by providing additional court, prosecutorial, law enforcement and public defender resources. The objectives of the state's involvement are to:

- increase the number of violent felony indictments by decreasing the number of felony cases with misdemeanor pleas;
- increase the proportion of violent convictions on the highest possible charges;
- increase the number of violent felony cases that go to trial;
- speed the adjudication of felony cases;
- increase incarceration rates and sentences for violent recidivists.

While most of the objectives are only tangentially related to the role of the police, all contribute to the resolution of common police complaints, such as lack of prosecutorial attention, which frequently frustrates police career-criminal initiatives.

California

The California program provides prosecutors and police with financial and technical assistance. The prosecutorial effort, funded at slightly over \$4 million in 1984, preceded the police effort. Prosecutors are encouraged to adopt

vertical prosecution,¹⁰ to assign senior attorneys to career criminal cases, and to reduce caseloads for career criminal prosecutors. They are also encouraged to:

- resist pre-trial release of recidivists;
- seek a guilty plea or trial conviction on all charges;
- reduce the time between arrest and disposition; and
- persuade the court to impose the stiffest sentence allowed.

The police program contains a crime analysis initiative and patrol and investigative operational enhancements as well as a career criminal program. The California law enforcement program was funded at \$2.5 million in 1984. As a result, 28 law enforcement agencies have established special units.

Maryland

Unlike California and New York, Maryland has not committed any state funds for operational purposes. Instead, five jurisdictions within the state were given planning grants to identify the extent of the local career criminal problem and to design an integrated justice system response centered on the state's career criminal sentence enhancement statute.

Staff from the state's criminal justice coordinating office and from one of the participating police agencies spearheaded the effort. Each of the jurisdictions conducted research to identify their career criminal problems and to develop a response. The research and development effort identified a number of impediments to creating an effective

development effort identified a number of impediments to creating an effective local initiative. Among these were opposition to the severity of the state's career criminal statute, the lack of adequate criminal history records for adults and juveniles, and the failure of the various elements of the criminal justice system to coordinate their activities.

The response of the various participants has varied. Some local jurisdictions have moved forward with programs while others have not, but in general, there seems to be a greater awareness among the participants of the need to develop special procedures to handle the career criminal.

The effect on state agencies has been more noticeable. When the local planning grants were given out, a task force composed of state police, corrections, probation, parole and juvenile authorities developed strategies to help the localities. As a result, statewide efforts are being made to upgrade criminal history data systems and to coordinate correctional policy and parole procedures for the special handling of career criminals. The State Police are implementing a program to assist local jurisdictions in developing career criminal cases and they are taking a more active role in serving warrants on repeat offenders. Progress also has been made in sensitizing the state Juvenile Service Administration to the need to identify serious repeat juvenile offenders, and to make their records more readily available to other justice agencies.

¹⁰Vertical prosecution is a strategy in which one prosecutor is assigned to handle a case during all pre-trial hearings and at trial. Normal procedure in most offices involves several prosecutors handling a case, no one of whom is responsible for the entire process.

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**On
subway graffiti
in
New York**

NATHAN GLAZER

FOR six years or so one of the more astonishing sights of New York has been the graffiti on the subway trains. The word "graffiti" scarcely suggests, to those who have not seen them, the enormous graphics which decorate the sides of subway cars—murals which march relentlessly over doors and windows, and which may incorporate successive cars to provide the graffiti maker a larger surface on which to paint. They are multicolored, and very difficult to read, but they all, in one way or another, simply represent names. There are no "messages"—no words aside from names, or rather simplified and reduced names, nicknames, or indeed professional names, often with a number attached. (One will not see an Alfredo, Norman, or Patrick, but Taki 137, Kid 56, Nean.) There are no political messages or references to sex—the two chief topics of traditional graffiti. Nor are there any personal messages, or cries of distress, or offers of aid. There are just large billboard-type presentations of the names of the graffiti-makers, in an elaborate script which, with its typical balloon shapes, covers as much surface as possible.

If that were all, then the view that this is art-as-personal-expression, that graffiti are controlled productions reflecting a canon of aesthetic criteria that is beyond middle-class understanding or ap-

preciation, and to be welcomed and savored rather than suppressed, might make sense. Alas, there is more. The insides of the cars are also marked-up—generally with letters or shapes or scrawls like letters, made with thick black markers, and repeated everywhere there is space for the marks to be made, and many places where there is not. Thus the maps and signs inside the car are obscured, and the windows are also obscured so that passengers cannot see what station they have arrived at. The subway rider—whose blank demeanor, expressing an effort simply to pass through and survive what may be the shabbiest, noisiest, and generally most unpleasant mass-transportation experience in the developed world, has often been remarked upon—now has to suffer the knowledge that his subway car has recently seen the passage through it of the graffiti “artists” (as they call themselves and have come to be called by those, including the police, who know them best). He is assaulted continuously, not only by the evidence that every subway car has been vandalized, but by the inescapable knowledge that the environment he must endure for an hour or more a day is uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and that anyone can invade it to do whatever damage and mischief the mind suggests.

I have not interviewed the subway riders; but I am one myself, and while I do not find myself consciously making the connection between the graffiti-makers and the criminals who occasionally rob, rape, assault, and murder passengers, the sense that all are part of one world of uncontrollable predators seems inescapable. Even if the graffitiists are the least dangerous of these, their ever-present markings serve to persuade the passenger that, indeed, the subway is a dangerous place—a mode of transportation to be used only when one has no alternative.

Of course the *sense* of a dangerous place is different from the *reality* of a dangerous place. The thoughtful head of the transit police, Sanford Garelik, will point out—and has statistics to prove—that the subway is less dangerous than the streets. It is well-patrolled, and the occasional sensational crime is no index to the everyday experience of the passenger. Yet the cars in which persons unknown to the passengers have at their leisure marked-up interiors, and obscured maps, informational signs, and windows, serve as a permanent reminder to the passenger that the authorities are incapable of controlling doers of mischief. One can see earlier graffiti underneath a fresh coat of paint that itself is beginning to be covered by new graffiti that mock, as it were, the hapless effort to obscure their predecessors. Thus the signs of official failure are everywhere. And

the mind goes on, and makes a link between the graffiti and the broken signs—behind broken glass—that are supposed to tell passengers where the train is going, the damaged doors that only open halfway, and the other visible signs of damage in so many cars.

The graffiti artists, who have been celebrated by Norman Mailer and others, are to the subway rider, I would hazard, part of the story of “crime in the subway,” which contributes to the decline of subway ridership, which in turn of course contributes to increasing the danger because of the paucity of passengers. (Official signs in stations warn passengers that between 8 P.M. and 4 A.M. they should congregate in the front cars of the trains, to give what protection numbers may provide against the marauders whose presence must always be assumed.) If this linkage is a common one, then the issue of controlling graffiti is not only one of protecting public property, reducing the damage of defacement, and maintaining the maps and signs the subway rider must depend on, but it is also one of reducing the ever-present sense of fear, of making the subway appear a less dangerous and unpleasant place to the possible user. And so one asks: Why can't graffiti be controlled?

A litany of proposals

Interestingly enough, as Chief Garelik points out, this is one crime whose perpetrator is known by the mere fact of the crime itself. The graffiti artist leaves his mark, his name, or a variant of it. Most of these names and marks are known to the police. Chief Garelik will show the visitor an astonishing “mug book,” consisting of color photographs of the work of each graffitiist, accompanied by a name and address. Almost every graffiti artist becomes known. Indeed, the police have invited graffiti artists up to police headquarters and engaged in “bull sessions” with them to try to figure out the best course of action. Nor is the number of graffiti artists so great—from one perspective—as to present too diffuse a target for police action. There are, at any given time, only 500 or so. They begin at about age 11, the mean age is 14, and they begin to graduate from graffiti after age 16—by then it is presumably “kid stuff.” Or perhaps penalties rise as graffitiists stop being considered juveniles. Young ones begin by marking the inside of cars, and later advance to the grand murals. There are aesthetic traditions. There are also rules, more or less observed, such as: One does not paint on another's graffiti.

Commonly, paints are stolen. The number of spray-paint cans

required to embellish the side of a subway car is prodigious and it is hardly likely that young teenagers would have the money. In any case, the police assure the visitor that most paint is stolen. Moreover, Chief Garelik emphasizes—against the chic position that graffiti are art and fun—that the graffiti artists do graduate to more serious crime. The police studied the careers of 15-year-old graffiti artists apprehended in 1974: Three years later, 40 percent had been arrested for more serious crimes—burglary and robbery. Graffiti may be self-expression, but they are not only self-expression. For almost half the graffiti artists there is evidence that graffiti-making is part of an ordinary criminal career.

But if the police know most of them, and there are only 500, then why can't graffiti be controlled? One can go through the litany of proposals—only to end up baffled.

The first suggestion: Arrest them, punish them, make them clean up the graffiti. Indeed, for a while the police were arresting them (or giving out summonses) in very substantial numbers. There were 1,674 arrests in 1973; 1,658 in 1974; 1,208 in 1975; 853 in 1976; 414 in 1977; and 259 in the first half of 1978. As one can see, the arrests dropped radically after 1975, but not because graffiti artists could not be caught—rather because the effort seemed futile. The police began to concentrate on the more determined graffitiists and to uncover more serious crimes with which to charge them. For after all, what could one do after arrest that could deter graffitiists from going back to graffiti? Put them in juvenile-detention centers? What judge would do that when there were young muggers, assaulters, and rapists to be dealt with, who were far more menacing to their fellow-citizens—and who themselves could not be accommodated in the various overcrowded institutions for juveniles?

But even if juvenile graffitiists were not punished by detention, could they not be required to clean-up graffiti? This was popular with some judges for a while, but it turned out that it was expensive to provide guidance and supervision (the cleaning usually had to be done on weekends, requiring overtime payment for those who taught and supervised the work), and the police believe that its main effect was to teach the graffitiists the technical knowledge necessary to produce graffiti that effectively resist removal.

Could one, so to speak, "harden the target" by securing the yards in which the cars are stored, and where, as is evident from observing the graffiti, much of the work is done? (The large murals extend below the surface of the subway platform, and clearly t be

cessible.) Chief Garelik points out that there are 6,000 cars, that one car-yard alone is 600 acres in extent, that many cars cannot be accommodated in the yards and stand in middle tracks, that there are 150 miles of lay-up track, and finally, that wire fences can be cut.

Is there a "technological fix"—a surface that resists graffiti and from which it can be easily washed off? Perhaps, but so far nothing has worked, though certainly the shiny surfaces of new cars put into service make it somewhat harder to apply dense graffiti to them. In time, however, the new surfacing wears off and will take paint. The more serious problem here is the fact that once graffiti gets on a car, it must be taken off immediately so as not to encourage other graffitiists. This is the practice in Boston where, as in other cities, the mass-transit system does not have graffiti. But the New York system, so much huger, does not have enough maintenance men, and so the policy of immediately eliminating graffiti cannot be implemented.

One could give graffiti artists summer jobs, as a way of providing them with something else to do, and indeed the police have been instrumental in finding summer jobs for 175 of the young people involved. Well, it is worth a try. But one wonders whether most jobs available for unskilled youths would match the excitement of painting graffiti onto silent subway cars in deserted yards, watching for the police, stealing the paints, organizing the expeditions.

There are more imaginative proposals, such as hiring them to paint the cars in the first place. But one can imagine the technical problems involved in handing over such good (and well-paid) jobs to 11- to 16-year-olds.

One proposal after another has been considered, evaluated, tried. The police have not given up—far from it. Their favored approach, if it could be financed, would be intensive work, on a one-to-one basis, by youth workers (students in psychology and sociology), a "big brother" program that would involve young graffitiists in other activities and introduce them to young adults who would help find other outlets for their energies. But one wonders whether the youth workers might not be converted by the graffiti artists, who do not believe they are doing anything wrong. They do see their graffiti as art and self-expression (and create albums in which fellow graffiti artists reproduce miniatures of their designs—the police have a few of these, which are quite beautiful examples of urban, vernacular art). They are not at this point in their lives engaged in the uglier crimes that are so common in New York t arguments

that has given approval to making graffiti (as to smoking marijuana, and other formally illegal activities), be able to present to convince the young graffiti artists to give up their work? What could they provide them in its place?

There have been some efforts to divert the energies of the young graffiti artists from the sides of subway cars to canvases. Some of the graffitiists produce canvases for sale, with the assistance of the adults who work with them. Some have gone on to art school—have indeed gained fellowships because adults working with them saw talents that could be developed. But it is hard to imagine this kind of thing making much of an impact on the problem, though it may be a solution for a dozen or two a year. Indeed, these very opportunities might be attractive enough to serve as an incentive for others to try to develop and demonstrate their talents by working on subway cars!

As one learns more about the graffiti artists, realizes that most of them are known to the police, that their more serious crimes (if they move on to them) will take place after they have given up graffiti, and that among all the things urban youth gangs may specialize in this is not the worst—then, one's anger at the graffiti makers declines. One begins to accept graffiti as just one of those things that one has to live with in New York. But this tolerance should not lead us to forget the 3-million subway riders per day who do not have the opportunity to study the graffiti problem, who are daily assaulted by it, and who find it yet another of the awful indignities visited upon them by a city apparently out of control and incapable of humane management. Even if graffiti, understood properly, might be seen as among the more engaging of the annoyances of New York, I am convinced this is not the way the average subway rider will ever see them, and that they contribute to his sense of a menacing and uncontrollable city. The control of graffiti would thus be no minor contribution to the effort to change the city's image and reality.

Systematic deterrence?

But how? Chief Garelik suggests some food for thought. Why are there so few graffiti on trucks, he asks. Trucks provide great surfaces, without windows or doors. If one motive for making graffiti—as the kids tell us—is seeing one's name being sped through the four contiguous boroughs, and the thrill of the thought that one's name will be seen by people unknown, then trucks should offer an

attractive opportunity. But truck drivers beat up the kids they find trying to deface their trucks! And there are no graffiti on trucks.

Why are there no graffiti on commuter railroad trains? Their car yards are as accessible as those in which subway cars are stored, and their trains run through low-income areas. Perhaps it is because the graffiti artists and their friends don't ride the commuter lines and don't care to advertise their skill and daring in unknown places. But Chief Garelik has a simpler answer: The maintenance men for those lines use buckshot. "They do?" I asked incredulously. Well, that is what the kids believe. Either there was such an experience, or rumor of it, and that seems enough to protect the commuter cars. Certainly here is a hint of something that might work. In fact, early in the graffiti plague, there was a proposal to use guard dogs in the subway yards. It might have been impractical for various reasons. But it might have worked, too. In any event, there was such an uproar at the prospect of juveniles being bitten or mauled that the idea was abandoned.

So it is possible, perhaps, to deter graffitiists. But it is not possible to deter them through the regular juvenile-justice system, in which a weary judge, confronted by many difficult and intractable problems, can think of nothing better than asking Johnny to promise he won't do it again. Punishment at the scene of the crime seems to deter marvelously: being beaten up by a truck driver or facing a burst of buckshot if you are caught. The dogs also might have worked.

In other words, there are methods to deter graffiti artists. But are there any ways to institutionalize these methods in an orderly, rule-bound, and humane system of law enforcement? It is not possible to tell the transit police, "Don't bring the kids in, just beat them up." We would not want the transit police to do so, and the transit authorities would not want to encourage such uncontrolled and uncontrollable behavior: A transit police force of 3,000 members must be governed by rule and order rather than informal sanctions, informally applied. And rule and order mean that the graffiti artists are brought into a system of juvenile justice which has more important crimes to deal with, and in which punishment, if any, will be minimal.

Is it possible to apply deterrence in a systematic way in a large bureaucratic system? It should be. Chief Garelik points out that a natural experiment, comparing the treatment of those who avoid paying tokens in two boroughs, suggests that deterrence does reduce illegal acts. In one borough, for some reason, those given sum-

mones for trying to get into the subway without paying a fare were fined on the average 99 cents; in the other, during a comparable period, they were fined on the average \$10.45. In the first borough, 20 percent of those caught were repeat offenders; in the second, only 3 percent. Obviously there are other plausible differences between the two boroughs that would have to be taken into account to explain why fare-avoiders in one are so much more commonly repeaters than in the other. But it is not unreasonable to take as a first possibility that in one borough this act is more severely punished.

Undoubtedly there is some form of deterrence that would reduce graffiti-writing. Some graffiti artists, we are told, inform on others when threatened by a term in a tough detention center. (Whether the police could deliver on such a threat is another matter.) Would a few days in the detention center have more effective results than a few weekend sentences to erase graffiti? What would be the problems in trying to test such an approach? In trying to institute it?

New approaches

Aside from deterrence approaches, there are what we might call "education" or "therapy" approaches. Trained juvenile officers, social workers, counselors, or other youth workers would work with the apprehended graffiti artist, either directly or by finding some social agency with which he would be required to maintain contact. Such programs have been begun on an experimental basis. Chief Garelik favors such approaches, has gotten some grants to institute them, and needs more such grants. It is certainly premature to evaluate these new programs, though certain considerations immediately come to mind. Unlike the case with some other crimes, it is difficult to enlist a youth's conscience or sense of right and wrong to combat his desire to make graffiti. There will be problems as well in getting youth workers to discourage graffiti-writing, both because it does not offend their sensibilities, and because they may view it as a comparatively insignificant offense. Nevertheless, these new programs constitute one of the few approaches that is available, and, in light of the proven ineffectiveness of other approaches, are certainly worth trying.

Graffiti raise the odd problem of a crime that is, compared to others, relatively trivial but whose aggregate effects on the environment of millions of people are massive. In the New York situation especially, it contributes to a prevailing sense of the incapacity of

a resultant uneasiness and fear. Minor infractions aggregate into something that reaches and affects every subway passenger. But six years of efforts have seen no solution. Graffiti of the New York style came out of nowhere, and strangely enough do not afflict other mass-public-transportation systems, except for that of Philadelphia. Maybe graffiti will go away just as unexpectedly, before we find a solution. But in the meantime, 500 youths are contributing one more element to the complex of apparently unmanageable problems amidst which New Yorkers live.

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Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach
by Herman Goldstein

Abstract

The police have been particularly susceptible to the "means over ends" syndrome, placing more emphasis in their improvement efforts on organization and operating methods than on the substantive outcome of their work. This condition has been fed by the professional movement within the police field, with its concentration on the staffing, management, and organization of police agencies. More and more persons are questioning the widely held assumption that improvements in the internal management of police departments will enable the police to deal more effectively with the problems they are called upon to handle. If the police are to realize a greater return on the investment made in improving their operations, and if they are to mature as a profession, they must concern themselves more directly with the end product of their efforts.

Meeting this need requires that the police develop a more systematic process for examining and addressing the problems that the public expects them to handle. It requires identifying these problems in more precise terms, researching each problem; documenting the nature of the current police response, assessing its adequacy and the adequacy of existing authority and resources, engaging in a broad exploration of alternatives to present responses, weighing the merits of these alternatives, and choosing from among them.

Improvements in staffing, organization, and management remain important, but they should be achieved--and may, in fact, be more achievable--within the context of a more direct concern with the outcome of policing.

Complaints from passengers wishing to use the Bagnall to Greenfields bus service that "the drivers were speeding past queues of up to 30 people with a smile and a wave of a hand" have been met by a statement pointing out that "it is impossible for the drivers to keep their timetable if they have to stop for passengers".¹

All bureaucracies risk becoming so preoccupied with running their organizations and getting so involved in their methods of operating that they lose sight of the primary purposes for which they were created. The police seem unusually susceptible to this phenomenon.

One of the most popular new developments in policing is the use of officers as decoys to apprehend offenders in high-crime areas. A speaker at a recent conference for police administrators, when asked to summarize new developments in the field, reported on a sixteen-week experiment in his agency with the use of decoys, aimed at reducing street robberies.

The Problem-Oriented Approach

One major value of the project, the speaker claimed, was its contribution to the police department's public image. Apparently, the public was intrigued by the clever, seductive character of the project, especially by the widely publicized demonstrations of the makeup artists' ability to disguise burly officers. The speaker also claimed that the project greatly increased the morale of the personnel working in the unit. The officers found the assignment exciting and challenging, a welcome change from the tedious routine that characterizes so much of regular police work, and they developed a high *esprit de corps*.

The effect on robberies, however, was much less clear. The methodology used and the problems in measuring crime apparently prevented the project staff from reaching any firm conclusions. But it was reported that, of the 216 persons arrested by the unit for robbery during the experiment, more than half would not have committed a robbery, in the judgment of the unit members, if they had not been tempted by the situation presented by the police decoys. Thus, while the total impact of the project remains unclear, it can be said with certainty that the experiment actually increased the number of robberies by over 100 in the sixteen weeks of the experiment.

The account of this particular decoy project (others have claimed greater success) is an especially poignant reminder of just how serious an imbalance there is within the police field between the interest in organizational and procedural matters and the concern for the substance of policing. The assumption, of course, is that the two are related, that improvements in internal management will eventually increase the capacity of the police to meet the objectives for which police agencies are created. But the relationship is not that clear and direct and is increasingly being questioned.

Perhaps the best example of such questioning relates to response time. Tremendous resources were invested during the past decade in personnel, vehicles, communications equipment, and new procedures in order to increase the speed with which the police respond to calls for assistance. Much less attention was given in this same period to what the officer does in handling the variety of problems he confronts on arriving, albeit fast, where he is summoned. Now, ironically, even the value of a quick response is being questioned.²

This article summarizes the nature of the "means over ends" syndrome in policing and explores ways of focusing greater attention on the results of policing--on the effect that police efforts have on the problems that the police are expected to handle.

The "Means over Ends" Syndrome

Until the late 1960s, efforts to improve policing in this country concentrated almost exclusively on internal management: streamlining the organization, upgrading personnel, modernizing equipment, and establishing more businesslike operating procedures. All of the major commentators on the police since the beginning of the century--Leonhard F. Fuld (1909), Raymond B. Fosdick (1915).

August Vollmer (1936), Bruce Smith (1940), and O. W. Wilson (1950)--stressed the need to improve the organization and management of police agencies. Indeed, the emphasis on internal management was so strong that professional policing was defined primarily as the application of modern management concepts to the running of a police department.

The sharp increase in the demands on the police in the late 1960s (increased crime, civil rights demonstrations, and political protest) led to several national assessments of the state of policing.³ The published findings contained some criticism of the professional model of police organization, primarily because of its impersonal character and failure to respond to legitimate pressures from within the community.⁴ Many recommendations were made for introducing a greater concern for the human factors in policing, but the vast majority of the recommendations that emerged from the reassessments demonstrated a continuing belief that the way to improve the police was to improve the organization. Higher recruitment standards, college education for police personnel, reassignment and reallocation of personnel, additional training, and greater mobility were proposed. Thus the management-dominated concept of police reform spread and gained greater stature.

The emphasis on secondary goals--on improving the organization--continues to this day, reflected in the prevailing interests of police administrators, in the factors considered in the selection of police chiefs and the promotion of subordinates, in the subject matter of police periodicals and texts, in the content of recently developed educational programs for the police, and even in the focus of major research projects.

At one time this emphasis was appropriate. When Vollmer, Smith, and Wilson formulated their prescriptions for improved policing, the state of the vast majority of police agencies was chaotic. Personnel were disorganized, poorly equipped, poorly trained, inefficient, lacking accountability, and often corrupt. The first priority was putting the police house in order. Otherwise, the endless crises that are produced by an organization out of control would be totally consuming. Without a minimum level of order and accountability, an agency cannot be redirected--however committed its administrators may be to addressing more substantive matters.

What is troubling is that administrators of those agencies that have succeeded in developing a high level of operating efficiency have not gone on to concern themselves with the end results of their efforts--with the actual impact that their streamlined organizations have on the problems the police are called upon to handle.

The police seem to have reached a plateau at which the highest objective to which they aspire is administrative competence. And, with some scattered exceptions, they seem reluctant to move beyond this plateau--toward creating a more systematic concern for the end product of their efforts. But strong pressures generated by several new developments may now force them to do so.

The Problem-Oriented Approach

1. *The Financial Crisis*

The growing cost of police services and the financial plight of most city governments, especially those under threat of Proposition 13 movements, are making municipal officials increasingly reluctant to appropriate still more money for police service without greater assurance that their investment will have an impact on the problems that the police are expected to handle. Those cities that are already reducing their budgets are being forced to make some of the hard choices that must be made in weighing the impact of such cuts on the nature of the service rendered to the public.

2. *Research Findings*

Recently completed research questions the value of two major aspects of police operations--preventive patrol and investigations conducted by detectives.⁵ Some police administrators have challenged the findings,⁶ others are awaiting the results of replication.⁷ But those who concur with the results have begun to search for alternatives, aware of the need to measure the effectiveness of a new response before making a substantial investment in it.

3. *Growth of a Consumer Orientation*

Policing has not yet felt the full impact of consumer advocacy. As citizens press for improvement in police service, improvement will increasingly be measured in terms of results. Those concerned about battered wives, for example, could not care less whether the police who respond to such calls operate with one or two officers in a car, whether the officers are short or tall, or whether they have a college education. Their attention is on what the police do for the battered wife.

4. *Questioning the Effectiveness of the Best-Managed Agencies*

A number of police departments have carried out most, if not all, of the numerous recommendations for strengthening a police organization and enjoy a national reputation for their efficiency, their high standards of personnel selection and training, and their application of modern technology to their operations. Nevertheless, their communities apparently continue to have the same problems as do others with less advanced police agencies.⁸

5. *Increased Resistance to Organizational Change*

Intended improvements that are primarily in the form of organizational change, such as team policing, almost invariably run into resistance from rank-and-file personnel. Stronger and more militant unions have engaged some police administrators in bitter and prolonged fights over such changes.⁹ Because the costs in terms of disruption and discontent are so great, police administrators initiating change will be under increasing pressure to demonstrate in advance that the results of their efforts will make the struggle worthwhile.

Against this background, the exceptions to the dominant concern with the police organization and its personnel take on greater significance. Although scattered and quite modest, a number of projects and training programs carried out in recent years have focused on a single problem that the public expects the police to handle, such as child abuse, sexual assault, arson, or the drunk driver.¹⁰ These projects and programs, by their very nature, subordinate the customary priorities of police reform, such as staffing, management, and equipment, to a concern about a specific problem and the police response to it.

Some of the earliest support for this type of effort was reflected in the crime-specific projects funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.¹¹ Communities--not just the police--were encouraged to direct their attention to a specific type of crime and to make those changes in existing operations that were deemed necessary to reduce its incidence. The widespread move to fashion a more effective police response to domestic disturbances is probably the best example of a major reform that has, as its principal objective, improvement in the quality of service delivered, and that calls for changes in organization, staffing, and training only as these are necessary to achieve the primary goal.

Are these scattered efforts a harbinger of things to come? Are they a natural development in the steadily evolving search for ways to improve police operations? Or are they, like the programs dealing with sexual assault and child abuse, simply the result of the sudden availability of funds because of intensified citizen concern about a specific problem? Whatever their origin, those projects that do subordinate administrative considerations to the task of improving police effectiveness in dealing with a specific problem have a refreshing quality to them.

WHAT IS THE END PRODUCT OF POLICING?

To urge a more direct focus on the primary objectives of a police agency requires spelling out these objectives more clearly. But this is no easy task, given the conglomeration of unrelated, ill-defined, and often inseparable jobs that the police are expected to handle.

The task is complicated further because so many people believe that the job of the police is, first and foremost, to enforce the law: to regulate conduct by applying the criminal law of the jurisdiction. One commentator on the police recently claimed: "We do not say to the police: 'Here is the problem. Deal with it.' We say: 'Here is a detailed code. Enforce it.'"¹² In reality, the police job is perhaps most accurately described as dealing with problems.¹³ Moreover, enforcing the criminal code is itself only a means to an end--one of several that the police employ in getting their job done.¹⁴ The emphasis on law enforcement, therefore, is nothing more than a continuing preoccupation with means.

The Problem-Oriented Approach

Considerable effort has been invested in recent years in attempting to define the police function: inventorying the wide range of police responsibilities, categorizing various aspects of policing, and identifying some of the characteristics common to all police tasks.¹⁵ This work will be of great value in refocusing attention on the end product of policing, but the fact that it is still going on is not cause to delay giving greater attention to substantive matters. It is sufficient, for our purposes here, simply to acknowledge that the police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral and social problems that arise in a community--that the end product of policing consists of dealing with these problems.

By problems, I mean the incredibly broad range of troublesome situations that prompt citizens to turn to the police, such as street robberies, residential burglaries, battered wives, vandalism, speeding cars, runaway children, accidents, acts of terrorism, even fear. These and other similar problems are the essence of police work. They are the reason for having a police agency.

Problems of this nature are to be distinguished from those that frequently occupy police administrators, such as lack of manpower, inadequate supervision, inadequate training, or strained relations with police unions. They differ from those most often identified by operating personnel, such as lack of adequate equipment, frustrations in the prosecution of criminal cases, or inequities in working conditions. And they differ, too, from the problems that have occupied those advocating police reform, such as the multiplicity of police agencies, the lack of lateral entry, and the absence of effective controls over police conduct.

Many of the problems coming to the attention of the police become their responsibility because no other means has been found to solve them. They are the residual problems of society. It follows that expecting the police to solve or eliminate them is expecting too much. It is more realistic to aim at reducing their volume, preventing repetition, alleviating suffering, and minimizing the other adverse effects they produce.

Developing the Overall Process

To address the substantive problems of the police requires developing a commitment to a more systematic process for inquiring into these problems. Initially, this calls for identifying in precise terms the problems that citizens look to the police to handle. Once identified, each problem must be explored in great detail. What do we know about the problem? Has it been researched? If so, with what results? What more should we know? Is it a proper concern of government? What authority and resources are available for dealing with it? What is the current police response? In the broadest-ranging search for solutions, what would constitute the most intelligent response? What factors should be considered in choosing from among alternatives? If a new response is adopted, how does one go about evaluating its effectiveness? And finally, what changes, if any, does implementation of a more effective response require in the police organization?

This type of inquiry is not foreign to the police. Many departments conduct rigorous studies of administrative and operational problems. A police agency may undertake a detailed study of the relative merits of adopting one of several different types of uniforms. And it may regularly develop military-like plans for handling special events that require the assignment of large numbers of personnel.¹⁶ However, systematic analysis and planning have rarely been applied to the specific behavioral and social problems that constitute the agency's routine business. The situation is somewhat like that of a private industry that studies the speed of its assembly line, the productivity of its employees, and the nature of its public relations program, but does not examine the quality of its product.

Perhaps the closest police agencies have come to developing a system for addressing substantive problems has been their work in crime analysis. Police routinely analyze information on reported crimes to identify patterns of criminal conduct, with the goal of enabling operating personnel to apprehend specific offenders or develop strategies to prevent similar offenses from occurring. Some police departments have, through the use of computers, developed sophisticated programs to analyze reported crimes.¹⁷ Unfortunately, these analyses are almost always put to very limited use--to apprehend a professional car thief or to deter a well-known cat burglar--rather than serving as a basis for rethinking the overall police response to the problem of car theft or cat burglaries. Nevertheless, the practice of planning operational responses based on an analysis of hard data, now a familiar concept to the police, is a helpful point of reference in advocating development of more broadly based research and planning.

The most significant effort to use a problem orientation for improving police responses was embodied in the crime-specific concept initiated in California in 1971¹⁸ and later promoted with LEAA funds throughout the country. The concept was made an integral part of the anti-crime program launched in eight cities in January 1972, aimed at bringing about reductions in five crime categories: murder, rape, assault, robbery, and burglary.¹⁹ This would have provided an excellent opportunity to develop and test the concept, were it not for the commitment that this politically motivated program carried to achieving fast and dramatic results: a 5 percent reduction in each category in two years and a 20 percent reduction in five years. These rather naive, unrealistic goals and the emphasis on quantifying the results placed a heavy shadow over the program from the outset. With the eventual abandonment of the projects, the crime-specific concept seems to have lost ground as well. However, the national evaluation of the program makes it clear that progress was made, despite the various pressures, in planning a community's approach to the five general crime categories. The "crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation" process employed in all eight cities had many of the elements one would want to include in a problem-oriented approach to improving police service.²⁰

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Defining Problems with Greater Specificity

The importance of defining problems more precisely becomes apparent when one reflects on the long-standing practice of using overly broad categories to describe police business. Attacking police problems under a categorical heading--"crime" or "disorder," "delinquency," or even "violence"--is bound to be futile. While police business is often further subdivided by means of the labels tied to the criminal code, such as robbery, burglary, and theft, these are not adequate, for several reasons.

First, they frequently mask diverse forms of behavior. Thus, for example, incidents classified under "arson" might include fires set by teenagers as a form of vandalism, fires set by persons suffering severe psychological problems, fires set for the purpose of destroying evidence of a crime, fires set by persons (or their hired agents) to collect insurance, and fires set by organized criminal interests to intimidate. Each type of incident poses a radically different problem for the police.

Second, if police depend heavily on categories of criminal offenses to define problems of concern to them, others may be misled to believe that, if a given form of behavior is not criminal, it is of no concern to the police. This is perhaps best reflected in the proposals for decriminalizing prostitution, gambling, narcotic use, vagrancy, and public intoxication. The argument, made over and over again, is that removing the criminal label will reduce the magnitude and complexity of the police function, freeing personnel to work on more serious matters and ridding the police of some of the negative side effects, such as corruption, that these problems produce. But decriminalization does not relieve the police of responsibility. The public expects drunks to be picked up if only because they find their presence on the street annoying or because they feel that the government has an obligation to care for persons who cannot care for themselves. The public expects prostitutes who solicit openly on the streets to be stopped, because such conduct is offensive to innocent passersby, blocks pedestrian or motor traffic, and contributes to the deterioration of a neighborhood. The problem is a problem for the police whether or not it is defined as a criminal offense.

Finally, use of offense categories as descriptive of police problems implies that the police role is restricted to arresting and prosecuting offenders. In fact, the police job is much broader, extending, in the case of burglary, to encouraging citizens to lock their premises more securely, to eliminating some of the conditions that might attract potential burglars, to counseling burglary victims on ways they can avoid similar attacks in the future, and to recovering and returning burglarized property.

Until recently, the police role in regard to the crime of rape was perceived primarily as responding quickly when a report of a rape was received, determining whether a rape had really occurred (given current legal definitions), and then attempting to identify and apprehend the perpetrator. Today, the police role has been radically redefined to include teaching women how to avoid attack,

organizing transit programs to provide safe movements in areas where there is a high risk of attack, dealing with the full range of sexual assault not previously covered by the narrowly drawn rape statutes, and--perhaps most important--providing needed care and support to the rape victim to minimize the physical and mental damage resulting from such an attack. Police are now concerned with sexual assault not simply because they have a direct role in the arrest and prosecution of violators, but also because sexual assault is a community problem which the police and others can affect in a variety of ways.

It seems desirable, at least initially in the development of problem-solving approach to improved policing, to press for as detailed a breakdown of problems as possible. In addition to distinguishing different forms of behavior and the apparent motivation, as in the case of incidents commonly grouped under the heading of "arson," it is helpful to be much more precise regarding locale and time of day, the type of people involved, and the type of people victimized. Different combinations of these variables may present different problems, posing different policy questions and calling for radically different solutions.²¹

For example, most police agencies already separate the problem of purse snatching in which force is used from the various other forms of conduct commonly grouped under robbery. But an agency is likely to find it much more helpful to go further--to pinpoint, for example, the problem of teenagers snatching the purses of elderly women waiting for buses in the downtown section of the city during the hours of early darkness. Likewise, a police agency might find it helpful to isolate the robberies of grocery stores that are open all night and are typically staffed by a lone attendant; or the theft of vehicles by a highly organized group engaged in the business of transporting them for sale in another jurisdiction; or the problem posed by teenagers who gather around hamburger stands each evening to the annoyance of neighbors, customers, and management. Eventually, similar problems calling for similar responses may be grouped together, but one cannot be certain that they are similar until they have been analyzed.

In the analysis of a given problem, one may find, for example, that the concern of the citizenry is primarily fear of attack, but the fear is not warranted, given the pattern of actual offenses. Where this situation becomes apparent, the police have two quite different problems: to deal more effectively with the actual incidents where they occur, and to respond to the groundless fears. Each calls for a different response.

The importance of subdividing problems was dramatically illustrated by the recent experience of the New York City Police Department in its effort to deal more constructively with domestic disturbances. An experimental program, in which police were trained to use mediation techniques, was undertaken with obvious public support. But, in applying the mediation techniques, the department apparently failed to distinguish sufficiently those cases in which wives were repeatedly subject to physical abuse. The aggravated nature of the latter cases resulted in a suit against the department in which the plaintiffs argued that the police are mandated to enforce the law when any violation comes

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to their attention. In the settlement, the department agreed that its personnel would not attempt to reconcile the parties or to mediate when a felony was committed.²² However, the net effect of the suit is likely to be more far reaching. The vulnerability of the department to criticism for not having dealt more aggressively with the aggravated cases has dampened support--in New York and elsewhere--for the use of alternatives to arrest in less serious cases, even though alternatives still appear to represent the more intelligent response.

One of the major values in subdividing police business is that it gives visibility to some problems which have traditionally been given short shrift, but which warrant more careful attention. The seemingly minor problem of noise, for example, is typically buried in the mass of police business lumped together under such headings as "complaints," "miscellaneous," "non-criminal incidents," or "disturbances." Both police officers and unaffected citizens would most likely be inclined to rank it at the bottom in any list of problems. Yet the number of complaints about noise is high in many communities--in fact, noise is probably among the most common problems brought by the public to the police.²³ While some of those complaining may be petty or unreasonable, many are seriously aggrieved and justified in their appeal for relief. Sleep is lost, schedules are disrupted, mental and emotional problems are aggravated. Apartments may become uninhabitable. The elderly woman living alone, whose life has been made miserable by inconsiderate neighbors, is not easily convinced that the daily intrusion into her life of their noise is any less serious than other forms of intrusion. For this person, and for many like her, improved policing would mean a more effective response to the problem of the noise created by her neighbors.

Researching the Problem

Without a tradition for viewing in sufficiently discrete terms the various problems making up the police job, gathering even the most basic information about a specific problem--such as complaints about noise--can be extremely difficult.

First, the magnitude of the problem and the various forms in which it surfaces must be established. One is inclined to turn initially to police reports for such information. But overgeneralization in categorizing incidents, the impossibility of separating some problems, variations in the reporting practices of the community, and inadequacies in report writing seriously limit their value for purposes of obtaining a full picture of the problem. However, if used cautiously, some of the information in police files may be helpful. Police agencies routinely collect and store large amounts of data, even though they may not use them to evaluate the effectiveness of their responses. Moreover, if needed information is not available, often it can be collected expeditiously in a well-managed department, owing to the high degree of centralized control of field operations.

How does one discover the nature of the current police response? Administrators and their immediate subordinates are not a good source. Quite naturally, they have a desire to provide an answer that reflects well on the

agency, is consistent with legal requirements, and meets the formal expectations of both the public and other agencies that might have a responsibility relating to the problem. But even if these concerns did not color their answers, top administrators are often so far removed from street operations, in both distance and time, that they would have great difficulty describing current responses accurately.

Inquiry, then, must focus on the operating level. But mere questioning of line officers is not likely to be any more productive. We know from the various efforts to document police activity in the field that there is often tremendous variation in the way in which different officers respond to the same type of incident.²⁴ Yet the high value placed on uniformity and on adhering to formal requirements and the pressures from peers inhibit officers from candidly discussing the manner in which they respond to the multitude of problems they handle--especially if the inquiry comes from outside the agency. But one cannot afford to give up at this point, for the individualized practices of police officers and the vast amount of knowledge they acquire about the situations they handle, taken together, are an extremely rich resource that is too often overlooked by those concerned about improving the quality of police services. Serious research into the problems police handle requires observing police officers over a period of time. This means accompanying them as they perform their regular assignments and cultivating the kind of relationship that enables them to talk candidly about the way in which they handle specific aspects of their job.

The differences in the way in which police respond, even in dealing with relatively simple matters, may be significant. When a runaway child is reported, one officer may limit himself to obtaining the basic facts. Another officer, sensing as much of a responsibility for dealing with the parents' fears as for finding the child and looking out for the child's interests, may endeavor to relieve the parents' anxiety by providing information about the runaway problem and about what they might expect. From the standpoint of the consumers--in this case, the parents--the response of the second officer is vastly superior to that of the first.

In handling more complicated matters, the need to improvise has prompted some officers to develop what appear to be unusually effective ways of dealing with specific problems. Many officers develop a unique understanding of problems that frequently come to their attention, learning to make important distinctions among different forms of the same problem and becoming familiar with the many complicating factors that are often present. And they develop a feel for what, under the circumstances, constitute the most effective responses. After careful evaluation, these types of responses might profitably be adopted as standard for an entire police agency. If the knowledge of officers at the operating level were more readily available, it might be useful to those responsible for drafting crime-related legislation. Many of the difficulties in implementing recent changes in statutes relating to sexual assault, public drunkenness, drunk driving, and child abuse could have been avoided had police expertise been tapped.

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By way of example, if a police agency were to decide to explore the problem of noise, the following questions might be asked. What is the magnitude of the problem as reflected by the number of complaints received? What is the source of the complaints: industry, traffic, groups of people gathered outdoors, or neighbors? How do noise complaints from residents break down between private dwellings and apartment houses? How often are the police summoned to the same location? How often are other forms of misconduct, such as fights, attributable to conflicts over noise? What is the responsibility of a landlord or an apartment house manager regarding noise complaints? What do the police now do in responding to such complaints? How much of the police procedure has been thought through and formalized? What is the authority of the police in such situations? Is it directly applicable or must they lean on somewhat nebulous authority, such as threatening to arrest for disorderly conduct or for failure to obey a lawful order, if the parties fail to quiet down? What works in police practice and what does not work? Are specific officers recognized as more capable of handling such complaints? If so, what makes them more effective? Do factors outside the control of a police agency influence the frequency with which complaints are received? Are noise complaints from apartment dwellers related to the manner in which the buildings are constructed? And what influence, if any, does the relative effectiveness of the police in handling noise complaints have on the complaining citizen's willingness to cooperate with the police in dealing with other problems, including criminal conduct traditionally defined as much more serious?

Considerable knowledge about some of the problems with which the police struggle has been generated outside police agencies by criminologists, sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists. But as has been pointed out frequently, relatively few of these findings have influenced the formal policies and operating decisions of practitioners.²⁵ Admittedly, the quality of many such studies is poor. Often the practitioner finds it difficult to draw out from the research its significance for his operations. But most important, the police have not needed to employ these studies because they have not been expected to address specific problems in a systematic manner. If the police were pressured to examine in great detail the problems they are expected to handle, a review of the literature would become routine. If convinced that research findings had practical value, police administrators would develop into more sophisticated users of such research; their responsible criticism could, in turn, contribute to upgrading the quality and usefulness of future research efforts.

Exploring Alternatives

After the information assembled about a specific problem is analyzed, a fresh, uninhibited search should be made for alternative responses that might be an improvement over what is currently being done. The nature of such a search will differ from past efforts in that, presumably, the problem itself will be better defined and understood, the commitment to past approaches (such as focusing primarily on the identification and prosecution of offenders) will be shelved temporarily, and the search will be much broader, extending well beyond the present or future potential of just the police.

But caution is in order. Those intent on improving the operations of the criminal justice system (by divesting it of some of its current burdens) and those who are principally occupied with improving the operating efficiency of police agencies frequently recommend that the problem simply be shifted to some other agency of government or to the private sector. Such recommendations often glibly imply that a health department or a social work agency, for example, is better equipped to handle the problem. Experience over the past decade, however, shows that this is rarely the case.²⁶ Merely shifting responsibility for the problem, without some assurance that more adequate provisions have been made for dealing with it, achieves nothing.

Police in many jurisdictions, in a commendable effort to employ alternatives to the criminal justice system, have arranged to make referrals to various social, health, and legal agencies. By tying into the services provided by the whole range of other helping agencies in the community, the police in these cities have taken a giant step toward improving the quality of their response. But there is a great danger that referral will come to be an end in itself, that the police and others advocating the use of such a system will not concern themselves adequately with the consequences of referral. If referral does not lead to reducing the citizens' problem, nothing will have been gained by this change. It may even cause harm. Expectations that are raised and not fulfilled may lead to further frustration; the original problem may, as a consequence, be compounded; and the resulting bitterness about government services may feed the tensions that develop in urban areas.

The search for alternatives obviously need not start from scratch. There is much to build on. Crime prevention efforts of some police agencies and experiments with developing alternatives to the criminal justice system and with diverting cases from the system should be reassessed for their impact on specific problems; those that appear to have the greatest potential should be developed and promoted.²⁷ Several alternatives should be explored for each problem.

1. Physical and Technical Changes

Can the problem be reduced or eliminated through physical or technical changes? Some refer to this as part of a program of "reducing opportunities" or "target hardening." Extensive effort has already gone into reducing, through urban design, factors that contribute to behavior requiring police attention.²⁸ Improved locks on homes and cars, the requirement of exact fares on buses,²⁹ and the provision for mailing social security checks directly to the recipients' banks exemplify recent efforts to control crime through this alternative.

What additional physical or technical changes might be made that would have an effect on the problem? Should such changes be mandatory, or can they be voluntary? What incentives might be offered to encourage their implementation?

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2. Changes in the Provision of Government Services

Can the problem be alleviated by changes in other government services? Some of the most petty but annoying problems the police must handle originate in the policies, operating practices, and inadequacies of other public agencies: the scattering of garbage because of delays in collection, poor housing conditions because of lax code enforcement, the interference with traffic by children playing because they have not been provided with adequate playground facilities, the uncapping of hydrants on hot summer nights because available pools are closed. Most police agencies long ago developed procedures for relaying reports on such conditions to the appropriate government service. But relatively few police agencies see their role as pressing for changes in policies and operations that would eliminate the recurrence of the same problems. Yet the police are the only people who see and who must become responsible for the collective negative consequences of current policies.

3. Conveying Reliable Information

What many people want, when they turn to the police with their problems, is simply reliable information.³⁰ The tenant who is locked out by his landlord for failure to pay the rent wants to know his rights to his property. The car owner whose license plates are lost or stolen wants to know what reporting obligations he has, how he goes about replacing the plates, and whether he can drive his car in the meantime. The person who suspects his neighbors of abusing their child wants to know whether he is warranted in reporting the matter to the police. And the person who receives a series of obscene telephone calls wants to know what can be done about them. Even if citizens do not ask specific questions, the best response the police can make to many requests for help is to provide accurate, concise information.

4. Developing New Skills among Police Officers

The greatest potential for improvement in the handling of some problems is in providing police officers with new forms of specialized training. This is illustrated by several recent developments. For example, the major component in the family-crisis intervention projects launched all over the country is instruction of police officers in the peculiar skills required to de-escalate highly emotional family quarrels. First aid training for police is being expanded, consistent with the current trend toward greater use of paramedics. One unpleasant task faced by the police, seldom noted by outsiders, is notifying families of the death of a family member. Often, this problem is handled poorly. In 1976, a film was made specifically to demonstrate how police should carry out this responsibility.³¹ Against this background of recent developments, one should ask whether specialized training can bring about needed improvement in the handling of each specific problem.

5. *New Forms of Authority*

Do the police need a specific, limited form of authority which they do not now have? If the most intelligent response to a problem, such as a person causing a disturbance in a bar, is to order the person to leave, should the police be authorized to issue such an order, or should they be compelled to arrest the individual in order to stop the disturbance? The same question can be asked about the estranged husband who has returned to his wife's apartment or about the group of teenagers annoying passersby at a street corner. Police are called upon to resolve these common problems, but their authority is questionable unless the behavior constitutes a criminal offense. And even then, it may not be desirable to prosecute the offender. Another type of problem is presented by the intoxicated person who is not sufficiently incapacitated to warrant being taken into protective custody, but who apparently intends to drive his car. Should a police officer have the authority to prevent the person from driving by temporarily confiscating the car keys or, as a last resort, by taking him into protective custody? Or must the officer wait for the individual to get behind the wheel and actually attempt to drive and then make an arrest? Limited specific authority may enable the police to deal more directly and intelligently with a number of comparable situations.

6. *Developing New Community Resources*

Analysis of a problem may lead to the conclusion that assistance is needed from another government agency. But often the problem is not clearly within the province of an existing agency, or the agency may be unaware of the problem or, if aware, without the resources to do anything about it. In such cases, since the problem is likely to be of little concern to the community as a whole, it will probably remain the responsibility of the police, unless they themselves take the initiative, as a sort of community ombudsman, in getting others to address it.

A substantial percentage of all police business involves dealing with persons suffering from mental illness. In the most acute cases, where the individual may cause immediate harm to himself or others, the police are usually authorized to initiate an emergency commitment. Many other cases that do not warrant hospitalization nevertheless require some form of attention. The number of these situations has increased dramatically as the mental health system has begun treating more and more of its patients in the community. If the conduct of these persons, who are being taught to cope with the world around them, creates problems for others or exceeds community tolerance, should they be referred back to a mental health agency? Or, because they are being encouraged to adjust to the reality of the community, should they be arrested if their behavior constitutes a criminal offense? How are the police to distinguish between those who have never received any assistance, and who should therefore be referred to a mental health agency, and those who are in community treatment? Should a community agency establish services for these persons comparable to the crisis-intervention services now offered by specially organized units operating in some communities?

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Such crisis-intervention units are among a number of new resources that have been established in the past few years for dealing with several long-neglected problems: detoxification centers for those incapacitated by alcohol, shelters and counseling for runaways, shelters for battered wives, and support services for the victims of sexual assault. Programs are now being designed to provide a better response to citizen disputes and grievances, another long-neglected problem. Variouslly labeled, these programs set up quasi-judicial forums that are intended to be inexpensive, easily accessible, and geared to the specific needs of their neighborhoods. LEAA has recently funded three such experimental programs, which they call Neighborhood Justice Centers.³² These centers will receive many of their cases from the police.

Thus, the pattern of creating new services that bear a relationship with police operations is now well established, and one would expect that problem-oriented policing will lead to more services in greater variety.

7. Increased Regulation

Can the problem be handled through a tightening of regulatory codes? Where easy access to private premises is a factor, should city building codes be amended to require improved lock systems? To reduce the noise problem, should more soundproofing be required in construction? The incidence of shoplifting is determined, in part, by the number of salespeople employed, the manner in which merchandise is displayed, and the use made of various antishoplifting devices. Should the police be expected to combat shoplifting without regard to the merchandising practices by a given merchant, or should merchants be required by a "merchandising code" to meet some minimum standards before they can turn to the police for assistance?

8. Increased Use of City Ordinances

Does the problem call for some community sanction less drastic than a criminal sanction? Many small communities process through their local courts, as ordinance violations, as many cases of minor misconduct as possible. Of course, this requires that the community have written ordinances, usually patterned after the state statutes, that define such misconduct. Several factors make this form of processing desirable for certain offenses: It is less formal than criminal action; physical detention is not necessary; cases may be disposed of without a court appearance; the judge may select from a wide range of alternative penalties; and the offender is spared the burden of a criminal record. Some jurisdictions now use a system of civil forfeitures in proceeding against persons found to be in possession of marijuana, though the legal status of the procedure is unclear in those states whose statutes define possession as criminal and call for a more severe fine or for imprisonment.

9. Use of Zoning

Much policing involves resolving disputes between those who have competing interests in the use made of a given sidewalk, street, park, or neighborhood. Bigger and more basic conflicts in land use were resolved long ago by zoning, a concept that is now firmly established. Recently, zoning has been used by a number of cities to limit the pornography stores and adult movie houses in a given area. And at least one city has experimented with the opposite approach, creating an adult entertainment zone with the hope of curtailing the spread of such establishments and simplifying the management of attendant problems. Much more experimentation is needed before any judgment can be made as to the value of zoning in such situations.

Implementing the Process

A fully developed process for systematically addressing the problems that make up police business would call for more than the three steps just explored--defining the problem, researching it, and exploring alternatives. I have focused on these three because describing them may be the most effective way of communicating the nature of a problem-oriented approach to improving police service. A number of intervening steps are required to fill out the processes: methods for evaluating the effectiveness of current responses, procedures for choosing from among available alternatives, means of involving the community in the decision making, procedures for obtaining the approval of the municipal officials to whom the police are formally accountable, methods for obtaining any additional funding that may be necessary, adjustments in the organization and staffing of the agency that may be required to implement an agreed-upon change, and methods for evaluating the effectiveness of the change.

How does a police agency make the shift to problem-oriented policing? Ideally, the initiative will come from police administrators. What is needed is not a single decision implementing a specific program or a single memorandum announcing a unique way of running the organization. The concept represents a new way of looking at the process of improving police functioning. It is a way of thinking about the police and their function that, carried out over an extended period, would be reflected in all that the administrator does: in the relationship with personnel, in the priorities he sets in his own work schedule, in what he focuses on in addressing community groups, in the choice of training curriculums, and in the questions raised with local and state legislators. Once introduced, this orientation would affect subordinates, gradually filter through the rest of the organization, and reach other administrators and agencies as well.

An administrator's success will depend heavily, in particular, on the use made of planning staff, for systematic analysis of substantive problems requires developing a capacity within the organization to collect and analyze data and to conduct evaluations of the effectiveness of police operations. Police planners (now employed in significant numbers) will have to move beyond their traditional concern with operating procedures into what might best be characterized as "product research."

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The police administrator who focuses on the substance of policing should be able to count on support from others in key positions in the police field. Colleges with programs especially designed for police personnel may exert considerable leadership through their choice of offerings and through the subject matter of individual courses. In an occupation in which so much deference is paid to the value of a college education, if college instructors reinforce the impression that purely administrative matters are the most important issues in policing, police personnel understandably will not develop their interests beyond this concern.

Likewise, the LEAA, its state and local offspring, and other grant-making organizations have a unique opportunity to draw the attention of operating personnel to the importance of addressing substantive problems. The manner in which these organizations invest their funds sends a strong message to the police about what is thought to be worthwhile.

Effect on the Organization

In the context of this reordering of police priorities, efforts to improve the staffing, management, and procedures of police agencies must continue.

Those who have been strongly committed to improving policy through better administration and organization may be disturbed by any move to subordinate their interests to a broader concern with the end product of policing. However, a problem-oriented approach to police improvement may actually contribute in several important ways to achieving their objectives.

The approach calls for the police to take greater initiative in attempting to deal with problems rather than resign themselves to living with them. It calls for tapping police expertise. It calls for the police to be more aggressive partners with other public agencies. These changes, which would place the police in a much more positive light in the community, would also contribute significantly to improving the working environment within a police agency--an environment that suffers much from the tendency of the police to assume responsibility for problems which are insolvable or ignored by others. And an improved working environment increases, in turn, the potential for recruiting and keeping qualified personnel and for bringing about needed organizational change.

Focusing on problems, because it is a practical and concrete approach, is attractive to both citizens and the police. By contrast, some of the most frequent proposals for improving police operations, because they do not produce immediate and specifically identifiable results, have no such attraction. A problem-oriented approach, with its greater appeal, has the potential for becoming a vehicle through which long-sought organizational change might be more effectively and more rapidly achieved.

Administrative rule making, for example, has gained considerable support from policy makers and some police administrators as a way of structuring police discretion, with the expectation that applying the concept would improve the quality of the decisions made by the police in the field. Yet many police administrators regard administrative rule making as an idea without practical

significance. By contrast, police administrators are usually enthusiastic if invited to explore the problem of car theft or vandalism. And within such exploration, there is the opportunity to demonstrate the value of structuring police discretion in responding to reports of vandalism and car theft. Approached from this practical point of view, the concept of administrative rule making is more likely to be implemented.

Long-advocated changes in the structure and operations of police agencies have been achieved because of a concentrated concern with a given problem. The focus on the domestic disturbance, originally in New York and now elsewhere, introduced the generalist-specialist concept that has enabled many police agencies to make more effective use of their personnel; the problem in controlling narcotics and the high mobility of drug sellers motivated police agencies in many metropolitan areas to pool their resources in special investigative units, thereby achieving in a limited way one of the objectives of those who have urged consolidation of police agencies; and the recent interest in the crime of rape has resulted in widespread backing for the establishment of victim-support programs. Probably the support for any of these changes could not have been generated without the problem-oriented context in which they have been advocated.

An important factor contributing to these successes is that a problem-oriented approach to improvement is less likely to be seen as a direct challenge to the police establishment and the prevailing police value system. As a consequence, rank-and-file personnel do not resist and subvert the resulting changes. Traditional programs to improve the police--labeled as efforts to "change," "upgrade," or "reform" the police or to "achieve minimum standards"--require that police officers openly acknowledge their own deficiencies. Rank-and-file officers are much more likely to support an innovation that is cast in the form of a new response to an old problem--a problem with which they have struggled for many years and which they would like to see handled more effectively. It may be that addressing the quality of the police product will turn out to be the most effective way of achieving the objectives that have for so long been the goal of police reform.

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Notes

The authors extend their thanks to Herman Goldstein for permission to reproduce this seminal article.

Herman Goldstein is Professor, Law School, University of Wisconsin at Madison. [He] is indebted to the University of Wisconsin Extension Department of Law for making the time available to produce this article as part of a larger effort to reexamine the university's role in research and training for the police.

1. Newspaper report from Midlands of England, cited in Patrick Ryan, "Get Rid of the People, and the System Runs Fine," *Smithsonian* (September 1977), 140.
2. The recent study in Kansas City found that the effect of response time on the capacity of the police to deal with crime was negligible, primarily because delays by citizens in reporting crimes make the minutes saved by the police insignificant. See Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, *Response Time Analysis, Executive Summary* (Kansas City, Mo.: 1977).
3. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968); National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, *To Establish Justice, to Insure Domestic Tranquility, Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969); President's Commission on Campus Unrest, *Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970); and National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Police* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).
4. See, for example, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *Report*, 158.
5. George L. Kelling, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles E. Brown, *The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974); and Peter W. Greenwood and others, *The Criminal Investigation Process*, 3 vols. (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1976).
6. For questioning by a police administrator of the findings of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Project, see Edward M. Davis and Lyle Knowles, "A Critique of the Report: An Evaluation of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment," *Police Chief* (June 1975), 22-27. For a review of the Rand Study on detectives, see Daryl F. Gates and Lyle Knowles, "An Evaluation of the Rand Corporation's Analysis and the Criminal Investigation Process," *Police Chief* (July 1976), 20. Each of the two papers is followed by a response from the authors of the original studies. In addition, for the position of the International Association of Chiefs

of Police on the results of the Kansas City project, see "IACP Position Paper on the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment," *Police Chief* (September 1975), 16.

7. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice is sponsoring a replication of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment and is supporting further explorations of the criminal investigation process. See National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, *Program Plan, Fiscal Year 1978* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 12.

8. Admittedly, precise appraisals and comparisons are difficult. For a recent example of an examination by the press of one department that has enjoyed a reputation for good management, see "The LAPD: How Good is It?" *Los Angeles Times* (Dec. 18, 1977).

9. Examples of cities in which police unions recently have fought vigorously to oppose innovations introduced by police administrators are Boston, Massachusetts, and Troy, New York.

10. These programs are reflected in the training opportunities routinely listed in such publications as *Police Chief*, *Criminal Law Reporter*, *Law Enforcement News*, and *Crime Control Digest*, and by the abstracting service of the National Criminal Justice Reference Center.

11. See, for example, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, "Planning Guidelines and Program to Reduce Crime," mimeographed (Washington, D.C.: 1972), vi-xiii. For a discussion of the concept, see Paul K. Wormeli and Steve E. Kolodney, "The Crime-Specific Model: A New Criminal Justice Perspective," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 9 (1972), 54-65.

12. Ronald J. Allen, "The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* (November 1976), 97.

13. Egon Bittner comes close to this point of view when he describes police functioning as applying immediate solutions to an endless array of problems. See Egon Bittner, "Florence Nighingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton," in *The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice*, edited by Herbert Jacob (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage, 1974), 30. James Q. Wilson does also when he describes policing as handling situations. See James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 31.

14. I develop this point in an earlier work. See Herman Goldstein, *Policing a Free Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), 30, 34-35.

15. In the 1977 book I presented a brief summary of these studies. Goldstein, *Policing a Free Society*, 26-28.

The Problem-Oriented Approach

16. For an up-to-date description of the concept of planning and research as it has evolved in police agencies, see O. W. Wilson and Roy C. McLaren, *Police Administration*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 157-81.

17. For examples, see National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, *Police Crime Analysis Unit Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 90-92, 113-21.

18. For a brief description, see Joanne W. Rockwell, "Crime Specific...An Answer?" *Police Chief* (September 1972), 38.

19. The program is described in Eleanor Chelimsky, *High Impact Anti-Crime Program*, Final Report, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 19-38.

20. Chelimsky, *Anti-Crime Program*, 145-50, 418-21.

21. For an excellent example of what is needed, see the typology of vandalism developed by the British sociologist, Stanley Cohen, quoted in Albert M. Williams, Jr., "Vandalism," *Management Information Service Report* (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, May 1976), 1-2. Another excellent example of an effort to break down a problem of concern to the police--in this case, heroin--is found in Mark Harrison Moore, *Buy and Bust: The Effective Regulation of an Illicit Market in Heroin* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1977), 83.

22. See *Bruno v. Codd*, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 974 (1977), finding a cause of action against the New York City Police Department for failing to protect battered wives. On June 26, 1978, the city agreed to a settlement with the plaintiffs in which it committed the police to arrest in all cases in which "there is reasonable cause to believe that a husband has committed a felony against his wife and/or has violated an Order of Protection or Temporary Order of Protection." See Consent Decree, *Bruno against McGuire*, New York State Supreme Court, index #21946/76. (Recognizing the consent decree, the New York Appellate Court, First Department, in July of 1978 (#3020) dismissed an appeal in the case as moot in so far as it involved the police department. From a reading of the court's reversal as to the other parts of the case, however, it appears that it would also have reversed the decision of the lower court in sustaining the action against the police department if there had not been a consent decree.)

23. It was reported that, on a recent three-day holiday weekend in Madison, Wisconsin, police handled slightly more than 1,000 calls of which 118 were loud parties and other types of noise disturbance. See "Over 1,000 Calls Made to Police on Weekend," *Wisconsin State Journal* (Madison, WI: June 1, 1978).

24. See, for example, the detailed accounts of police functioning in Minneapolis, in Joseph M. Livermore, "Policing," *Minnesota Law Review* (March 1971), 649-729. Among the works describing the police officers' varying styles in responding to similar situations are Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior*; Albert

J. Reiss, Jr., *The Police and the Public* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); Jerome H. Skolnick, *Justice without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966); and Egon Bittner, *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices, and Possible Role Models* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970).

25. See, for example, the comments of Marvin Wolfgang in a Congressionally sponsored discussion of federal support for criminal justice research, reported in the U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, *New Directions for Federal Involvement in Crime Control* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977). Wolfgang claims that research in criminology and criminal justice has had little impact on the administration of justice or on major decision makers.

26. For further discussion of this point, see American Bar Association, *The Urban Police Function, Approved Draft* (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1973), 41-42.

27. Many of these programs are summarized in David E. Aaronson et al., *The New Justice: Alternatives to Conventional Criminal Adjudication* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1977); and David E. Aaronson et al., *Alternatives to Conventional Criminal Adjudication: Guidelook for Planners and Practitioners*, Caroline S. Cooper, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1977).

28. The leading work on the subject is Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design* (New York: Macmillan, 1972). See also Westinghouse National Issues Center, *Crime Prevention through Environmental Design: A Special Report* (Washington, D.C.: National League of Cities, 1977).

29. For a summary of a survey designed to assess the effect of this change, see Russell Grindle and Thomas Aceituno, "Innovations in Robbery Control," in *The Prevention and Control of Robbery*, vol. 1, Floyd Feeney and Adrienne Weir, eds. (Davis, Calif.: University of California, 1973), 315-20.

30. In one of the most recent of a growing number of studies of how police spend their time, it was reported that, of the 18,012 calls made to the police serving a community of 24,000 people in a four-month period, 59.98 percent were requests for information. Police responded to 65 percent of the calls they received by providing information by telephone. See J. Robert Lilly, "What Are the Police Now Doing?" *Journal of Police Science and Administration* (January 1978), 56.

31. *Death Notification* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).

32. The concept is described in Daniel McGillis and Joan Mullen, *Neighborhood Justice Centers: An Analysis of Potential Models* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1977). See also R.F. Conner and R. Suretta, *The Citizen Dispute Settlement Program: Resolving Disputes outside the Courts--Orlando, Florida* (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association, 1977).



Police and Communities: the Quiet Revolution

By George L. Kelling

Introduction

A quiet revolution is reshaping American policing.

Police in dozens of communities are returning to foot patrol. In many communities, police are surveying citizens to learn what they believe to be their most serious neighborhood problems. Many police departments are finding alternatives to rapidly responding to the majority of calls for service. Many departments are targeting resources on citizen fear of crime by concentrating on disorder. Organizing citizens' groups has become a priority in many departments. Increasingly, police departments are looking for means to evaluate themselves on their contribution to the quality of neighborhood life, not just crime statistics. Are such activities the business of policing? In a crescendo, police are answering yes.

True, such activities contrast with popular images of police: the "thin blue line" separating plundering villains from peaceful residents and storekeepers, and racing through city streets in high-powered cars with sirens wailing and lights flashing. Yet, in city after city, a new vision of policing is taking hold of the imagination of progressive police and gratified citizens. Note the 1987 report of the Philadelphia Task Force. Dismissing the notion of police as Philadelphia's professional defense against crime, and its residents as passive recipients of police ministrations, the report affirms new police values:

Because the current strategy for policing Philadelphia emphasizes crime control and neglects the Department's need to be accountable to the public and for a partnership with it, the task force recommends: The police commissioner should formulate an explicit mission statement for the Department that will guide planning and operations toward a strategy of "community"

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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or “*problem solving*” policing. Such a statement should be developed in consultation with the citizens of Philadelphia and should reflect their views. (Emphases added.)

These themes—problem solving, community policing, consultation, partnership, accountability—have swept through American policing so swiftly that Harvard University’s Professor Mark H. Moore has noted that “We in academe have to scramble to keep track of developments in policing.” Professor Herman Goldstein of the University of Wisconsin sees police as “having turned a corner” by emphasizing community accountability and problem solving.

The new model of policing

What corner has been turned? What are these changes that are advancing through policing?

Broken windows

In February 1982, James Q. Wilson and I published an article in *Atlantic* known popularly as “Broken Windows.” We made three points.

1. **Neighborhood disorder**—drunks, panhandling, youth gangs, prostitution, and other urban incivilities—creates citizen fear.
2. **Just as unrepaired broken windows** can signal to people that nobody cares about a building and lead to more serious vandalism, untended disorderly behavior can also signal that nobody cares about the community and lead to more serious disorder and crime. Such signals—untended property, disorderly persons, drunks, obstreperous youth, etc.—both create fear in citizens and attract predators.
3. **If police are to deal with disorder to reduce fear and crime**, they must rely on citizens for legitimacy and assistance.

“Broken Windows” gave voice to sentiments felt both by citizens and police. It recognized a major change in the focus of police. Police had believed that they should deal with serious crime, yet were frustrated by lack of success. Citizens conceded to police that crime was a problem, but were more concerned about daily incivilities that disrupted and often destroyed neighborhood social, commercial, and political life. “We were trying to get people to be concerned about crime problems,” says Darrel Stephens, former Chief in Newport News and now Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum, “never understanding that daily living issues had a much greater impact on citizens and commanded their time and attention.”

Many police officials, however, believed the broken windows metaphor went further. For them, it not only suggested changes in the focus of police work (disorder, for example), it also suggested major modifications in

the overall strategy of police departments. What are some of these strategic changes?

“Citizens conceded to police that crime was a problem, but were more concerned about daily incivilities that disrupted and often destroyed neighborhood social, commercial, and political life”

Defense of a community

Police are a neighborhood’s primary defense against disorder and crime, right? This orthodoxy has been the basis of police strategy for a generation. What is the police job? Fighting crime. How do they do this? Patrolling in cars, responding to calls for service, and investigating crimes. What is the role of citizens in all of this? Supporting police by calling them if trouble occurs and by being good witnesses.

But using our metaphor, let us again ask the question of whether police are the primary defense against crime and disorder. Are police the “thin blue line” defending neighborhoods and communities? Considering a specific example might help us answer this question. For example, should police have primary responsibility for controlling a neighborhood youth who, say, is bullying other children?

Of course not. The first line of defense in a neighborhood against a troublesome youth is the youth’s family. Even if the family is failing, our immediate answer would not be to involve police. Extended family—aunts, uncles, grandparents—might become involved. Neighbors and friends (of both the parents and youth) often offer assistance. The youth’s church or school might become involved.

On occasion police will be called: Suppose that the youth is severely bullying other children to the point of injuring them. A bullied child’s parents call the police. Is the bully’s family then relieved of responsibility? Are neighbors? The school? Once police are called, are neighbors relieved of their duty to be vigilant and protect their own or other neighbors’ children? Does calling police relieve teachers of their obligation to be alert and protect children from assault? The answer to all these questions is no. We expect families, neighbors, teachers, and others to be responsible and prudent.

If we believe that community institutions are the first line of defense against disorder and crime, and the source of strength for maintaining the quality of life, what should the strategy of police be? The old view was that they were a community’s professional defense against crime and disorder: Citizens should leave control of crime and maintenance of order to police. The new strategy is that police are to stimulate and buttress a community’s ability to produce attractive neighborhoods and protect them

against predators. Moreover, in communities that are wary of strangers, police serve to help citizens tolerate and protect outsiders who come into their neighborhoods for social or commercial purposes.

But what about neighborhoods in which things have gotten out of hand—where, for example, predators like drug dealers take over and openly and outrageously deal drugs and threaten citizens? Clearly, police must play a leading role defending such communities. Should they do so on their own, however?

Police have tried in the past to control neighborhoods plagued by predators without involving residents. Concerned, for example, about serious street crime, police made youths, especially minority youths, the targets of aggressive field interrogations. The results, in the United States during the 1960's and more recently in England during the early 1980's, were disastrous. Crime was largely unaffected. Youths already hostile to police became even more so. Worst of all, good citizens became estranged from police.

Citizens in neighborhoods plagued by crime and disorder were disaffected because they simply would not have police they neither knew nor authorized whizzing in and out of their neighborhoods "takin' names and kickin' ass." Community relations programs were beside the point. Citizens were in no mood to surrender control of their neighborhoods to remote and officious police who showed them little respect. Police are the first line of defense in a neighborhood? Wrong—citizens are!

Defending communities—from incidents to problems

The strategy of assisting citizens maintain the quality of life in their neighborhoods dramatically improves on the former police strategy. To understand why, one has to understand in some detail how police work has been conducted in the past. Generally, the business of police for the past 30 years has been responding to calls for service.

“Beat officers . . . have known intuitively what researchers . . . have confirmed . . . : fewer than 10 percent of the addresses calling for police service generate over 60 percent of the total calls for service during a given year”

For example, a concerned and frightened citizen calls police about a neighbor husband and wife who are fighting. Police come and intervene. They might separate the couple, urge them to get help, or, if violence has occurred, arrest the perpetrator. But basically, police try to resolve the incident and get back into their patrol cars so they are available for the next call. Beat officers may well know that this household has been the subject of 50 or

100 calls to the police department during the past year. In fact, they have known intuitively what researchers Glenn Pierce in Boston and Lawrence Sherman in Minneapolis have confirmed through research: fewer than 10 percent of the addresses calling for police service generate over 60 percent of the total calls for service during a given year.

Indeed, it is very likely that the domestic dispute described above is nothing new for the disputing couple, the neighbors, or police. More likely than not, citizens have previously called police and they have responded. And, with each call to police, it becomes more likely that there will be another.

This atomistic response to incidents acutely frustrates patrol officers. Herman Goldstein describes this frustration: “Although the public looks at the average officer as a powerful authority figure, the officer very often feels impotent because he or she is dealing with things for which he or she has no solution. Officers believe this makes them look silly in the eyes of the public.” But, given the routine of police work, officers have had no alternative to their typical response: Go to a call, pacify things, and leave to get ready for another call. To deal with the problem of atomistic responses to incidents, Goldstein has proposed what he calls “problem-oriented policing.”

“Stated simply, problem-oriented policing is a method of working with citizens to help them identify and solve problems”

Stated simply, problem-oriented policing is a method of working with citizens to help them identify and solve problems. Darrel Stephens, along with Chief David Couper of Madison, Wisconsin, and Chief Neil Behan of Baltimore County, Maryland, has pioneered in problem-oriented policing. Problems approached via problem-oriented policing include sexual assault and drunk driving in Madison, auto theft, spouse abuse, and burglary in Newport News, and street robbery and burglary in Baltimore County.

Stephens's goal is for “police officers to take the time to stop and think about what they were doing.” Mark Moore echoes Stephens: “In the past there were a small number of guys in the police chief's office who did the thinking and everybody else just carried out their ideas. Problem solving gets thousands of brains working on problems.”

The drive to change

Why are these changes taking place now? There are three reasons:

1. Citizen disenchantment with police services;
2. Research conducted during the 1970's; and,
3. Frustration with the traditional role of the police officer.

1. Disenchantment with police services—At first, it seems too strong to say “disenchantment” when referring to citizens’ attitudes towards police. Certainly citizens admire and respect most police officers. Citizens enjoy contact with police. Moreover, research shows that most citizens do not find the limited capability of police to prevent or solve crimes either surprising or of particular concern. Nevertheless, there is widespread disenchantment with police tactics that continue to keep police officers remote and distant from citizens.

Minority citizens in inner cities continue to be frustrated by police who whisk in and out of their neighborhoods with little sensitivity to community norms and values. Regardless of where one asks, minorities want both the familiarity and accountability that characterize foot patrol. Working- and middle-class communities of all races are demanding increased collaboration with police in the determination of police priorities in their neighborhoods. Community crime control has become a mainstay of their sense of neighborhood security and a means of lobbying for different police services. And many merchants and affluent citizens have felt so vulnerable that they have turned to private security for service and protection. In private sector terms, police are losing to the competition—private security and community crime control.

2. Research—The 1970's research about police effectiveness was another stimulus to change. Research about preventive patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and investigative work—the three mainstays of police tactics—was uniformly discouraging.

Research demonstrated that preventive patrol in automobiles had little effect on crime, citizen levels of fear, or citizen satisfaction with police. Rapid response to calls for service likewise had little impact on arrests, citizen satisfaction with police, or levels of citizen fear. Also, research into criminal investigation effectiveness suggested that detective units were so poorly administered that they had little chance of being effective.

3. Role of the patrol officer —Finally, patrol officers have been frustrated with their traditional role. Despite pieties that patrol has been the backbone of policing, every police executive has known that, at best, patrol has been what officers do until they become detectives or are promoted.

At worst, patrol has been the dumping ground for officers who are incompetent, suffering from alcoholism or other problems, or simply burned out. High status for police practitioners went to detectives. Getting “busted to patrol” has been a constant threat to police managers or detectives who fail to perform by some standard of judgment. (It is doubtful that failing patrol officers ever get threatened with being busted to the detective unit.)

Never mind that patrol officers have the most important mission in police departments: They handle the public's most pressing problems and must make complex decisions almost instantaneously. Moreover, they do this with little supervision or training. Despite this, police administrators treat patrol officers as if they did little to advance the organization's mission. The salaries of patrol officers also reflect their demeaned status. No wonder many officers have grown cynical and have turned to unions for leadership rather than to police executives. “Stupid management made unions,” says Robert Kliesmet, the President of the International Union of Police Associations AFL-CIO.

The basis for new optimism

Given these circumstances, what is the basis of current optimism of police leaders that they have turned a corner? Optimism arises from four factors:

1. Citizen response to the new strategy;
2. Ongoing research on police effectiveness;
3. Past experiences police have had with innovation; and
4. The values of the new generation of police leaders.

1. Citizen response—The overwhelming public response to community and problem-solving policing has been positive, regardless of where it has been instituted. When queried about how he knows community policing works in New York City, Lt. Jerry Simpson responds: “The District Commanders’ phones stop ringing.” Simpson continues: “Commanders’ phones stop ringing because problems have been solved. Even skeptical commanders soon learn that most of their troubles go away with community policing.” Citizens like the cop on the beat and enjoy working with him/her to solve problems. Crisley Wood, Executive Director of the Neighborhood Justice Network in Boston—an agency that has established a network of neighborhood crime control organizations—puts it this way: “The cop on the beat, who meets regularly with citizen groups, is the single most important service that the Boston Police Department can provide.”

“The cop on the beat, who meets regularly with citizen groups, is the single most important service that the Boston Police Department can provide”

Testimonies aside, perhaps the single most compelling evidence of the popularity of community or problem-solving policing is found in Flint, Michigan, where, it will be recalled, citizens have twice voted to increase their taxes to maintain neighborhood foot patrols—the second time by a two-to-one margin.

2. New research on effectiveness—Research conducted during the early and mid-1970's frustrated police executives. It generally showed what did not work. Research conducted during the late 1970's and early 1980's was different. By beginning to demonstrate that new tactics

SECTION V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CLOSING

The preceding tables reveal who has been reached and what they are going to do about it. These tables rate the program's delivery, impact and response. Despite differences in geography, economics, politics and resources, over 300 law enforcement managers wanted to make a difference this year. These managers are informing their superiors, organizing meetings, looking for more information, and spreading this information to a much larger audience.

For five years PMA has disseminated NIJ research information to a much larger audience. PMA has taken this information and brought it to the minds of the police manager. Nearly two thousand have been reached. Close to 600 police departments and agencies across the United States were affected. NIJ's impact as a change agent should now be tested. Has change occurred? Have programs developed? Do they work? What programs have been implemented? Has the individual developed as a manager?

The scope and extent of NIJ's influence on the law enforcement industry and the larger management profession must be realized before any grounded conclusions can be made from this five-year series. Those sites and students who were exposed to this training should be examined to determine conclusively, NIJ's impact on the management and growth of the law enforcement profession. It is strongly recommended that NIJ endorse and support a survey which will assess program impact and analyze fundamental changes which have occurred within departments as a

result of these training seminars. Only then can a true understanding of NIJ's influence on law enforcement middle management be made.

The NIJ dissemination role should expand. The five-year series has provided PMA with the ability to create, revise and strengthen the delivery of the seminar program, thereby enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of NIJ's role in dissemination. The workshops are both homogeneous and heterogeneous and can be tailored to the direct needs of the attending student.

With such experience in the delivery and implementation of this management training program, it is simply cost effective and efficient to supply these workshops as part of a training mandate. Recognizing that the requisite demand for such training has not ceased, NIJ is urged to seriously consider extending the High Performance Police Management Program into the 1990's.

TABLE E

STUDENT PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION RESPONSE RATE

<u>Site</u>	<u>Number in Attendance</u>	<u>Number Responded</u>	<u>Response Rate</u>
CO	47	42	89.4%
AZ	83	79	96%
NC	43	43	100%
GA	47	45	95%
CA	33	29	87.9%
VA	43	41	95.4%

did work, it fueled the move to rejuvenate policing. This research provided police with the following guidance:

Foot patrol can reduce citizen fear of crime, improve the relationship between police and citizens, and increase citizen satisfaction with police. This was discovered in Newark, New Jersey, and Flint. In Flint, foot patrol also reduced crime and calls for service. Moreover, in both cities, it increased officer satisfaction with police work.

The productivity of detectives can be enhanced if patrol officers carefully interview neighborhood residents about criminal events, get the information to detectives, and detectives use it wisely, according to John Eck of PERF.

Citizen fear can be substantially reduced, researcher Tony Pate of the Police Foundation discovered in Newark, by police tactics that emphasize increasing the quantity and improving the quality of citizen-police interaction.

Police anti-fear tactics can also reduce household burglaries, according to research conducted by Mary Ann Wycoff, also of the Police Foundation.

Street-level enforcement of heroin and cocaine laws can reduce serious crime in the area of enforcement, without being displaced to adjacent areas, according to an experiment conducted by Mark Kleiman of Harvard University's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management.

Problem-oriented policing can be used to reduce thefts from cars, problems associated with prostitution, and household burglaries, according to William Spelman and John Eck of PERF.

These positive findings about new police tactics provide police with both the motive and justification for continued efforts to rejuvenate policing.

3. Experience with innovation—The desire to improve policing is not new with this generation of reformers. The 1960's and 1970's had their share of reformers as well. Robert Eichelberger of Dayton innovated with team policing (tactics akin in many ways to problem solving) and public policymaking; Frank Dyson of Dallas with team policing and generalist/specialist patrol officers; Carl Gooden with team policing in Cincinnati; and there were many other innovators.

But innovators of this earlier era were handicapped by a lack of documented successes and failures of implementation. Those who experimented with team policing were not aware that elements of team policing were simply incompatible with preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service. As a result, implementation of team policing followed a discouraging pattern. It would be implemented, officers and citizens would like it, it would have an initial impact on crime, and then business as usual would overwhelm it—the program would simply vanish.

Moreover, the lessons about innovation and excellence that Peters and Waterman brought together in *In Search*

of Excellence were not available to police administrators. The current generation of reformers has an edge: They have availed themselves of the opportunity to learn from the documented successes and failures of the past. Not content with merely studying innovation and management in policing, Houston's Chief Lee Brown is having key personnel spend internships in private sector corporations noted for excellence in management.

4. New breed of police leadership —The new breed of police leadership is unique in the history of American policing. Unlike the tendency in the past for chiefs to be local and inbred, chiefs of this generation are urbane and cosmopolitan.

Chief Lee Brown of Houston received a Ph.D. in criminology from the University of California—Berkeley; Chief Joseph McNamara of San Jose, California, has a Ph.D from Harvard University, and is a published novelist; Hubert Williams, formerly Director of the Newark Police Department and now President of the Police Foundation, is a lawyer and has studied criminology in the Law School at Harvard University; Benjamin Ward, Commissioner of the New York City Police Department, is an attorney and was Commissioner of Corrections in New York State.

These are merely a sample. The point is, members of this generation of police leadership are well educated and of diverse backgrounds. All of those noted above, as well as many others, have sponsored research and experimentation to improve policing.

Problems

We have looked at the benefits of community policing. What is the down side? What are the risks?

These questions led to the creation of the Executive Session on Community Policing in the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Funded by the National Institute of Justice and the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations, the Executive Session has convened police and political elites with a small number of academics around the issue of community policing. Francis X. Hartmann, moderator of the Executive Session, describes the purpose of the meetings: "These persons with a special and important relationship to contemporary policing have evolved into a real working group, which is addressing the gap between the realities and aspirations of American policing. Community policing is a significant effort to fill this gap."

Among the questions the Executive Session has raised are the following:

1. Police are a valuable resource in a community. Does community policing squander that resource by concentrating on the wrong priorities?

2. How will community policing fit into police departments given how they are now organized? and,
3. Will community policing open the door to increased police corruption or other inappropriate behavior by line officers?

Will community policing squander police resources?

This question worries police. They understand that police are a valuable but sparse resource in a community. Hubert Williams, a pioneer in community policing, expresses his concern. "Are police now being put in the role of providing services that are statutorily the responsibilities of some other agencies?" Los Angeles's Chief Gates echoes Williams: "Hubie's (Williams is) right—you can't solve all the problems in the world and shouldn't try." Both worry that if police are spread too thin, by problem-solving activities for example, that they will not be able to properly protect the community from serious crime.

“It is simply wrong to propose abandoning foot patrol in the name of short response time and visibility vis-a-vis patrolling in cars”

This issue is now being heatedly debated in Flint. There, it will be recalled, citizens have passed two bills funding foot patrol—the second by a two-to-one majority. A report commissioned by city government, however, concludes: "The Cost of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program Exceeds the Benefit It Provides the Citizens of Flint," and recommends abandoning the program when funding expires in 1988.

Why, according to the report, should foot patrol be abandoned? So more "effective" police work can be done. What is effective police work? Quick response to calls for service, taking reports, and increased visibility by putting police officers in cars. "It is simply wrong," says Robert Wasserman, noted police tactician and Research Fellow in the Program in Criminal Justice at Harvard,

NCJ 109955

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Points of view or opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice, or of Harvard University.

The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates the activities of the following program Offices and Bureaus: National Institute of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Office for Victims of Crime.

"to propose abandoning foot patrol in the name of short response time and visibility vis-a-vis patrolling in cars. Every shred of evidence is that rapid response and patrolling in cars doesn't reduce crime, increase citizen satisfaction, or reduce fear. Which is the luxury," Wasserman concludes, "a tactic like foot patrol that gives you two, and maybe three, of your goals, or a tactic like riding around in cars going from call to call that gives you none?" Experienced police executives share Wasserman's concerns. Almost without exception, they are attempting to find ways to get out of the morass that myths of the efficacy of rapid response have created for large-city police departments. It was Commissioner Ben Ward of New York City, for example, who put a cap on resources that can be used to respond to calls for service and is attempting to find improved means of responding to calls. Commissioner Francis "Mickey" Roache expresses the deep frustration felt by so many police: "I hate to say this, but in Boston we run from one call to another. We don't accomplish anything. We're just running all over the place. It's absolutely insane."

A politician's response to the recommendation to end Flint's foot patrol program is interesting. Daniel Whitehurst, former Mayor of Fresno, California, reflects: "I find it hard to imagine ending a program that citizens not only find popular but are willing to pay for as well."

"The overwhelming danger," Mark Moore concludes, "is that, in the name of efficiency, police and city officials will be tempted to maintain old patterns. They will think they are doing good, but will be squandering police resources." "Chips" Stewart emphasizes the need to move ahead: "As comfortable as old tactics might feel, police must continue to experiment with methods that have shown promise to improve police effectiveness and efficiency."

“As comfortable as old tactics might feel, police must continue to experiment with methods that have shown promise to improve police effectiveness and efficiency”

Will community policing fit within policing as it is now organized?

Many police and academics believe this to be the most serious problem facing cities implementing community policing. Modern police departments have achieved an impressive capacity to respond quickly to calls for service. This has been accomplished by acquiring and linking elaborate automobile, telephone, radio, and computer technologies, by centralizing control and dispatch of officers, by pressing officers to be "in service" (rather than "out of service" dealing with citizens), and by allocating police in cars throughout the city on the basis of expected calls for service.

Community policing is quite different: it is not incident- or technology-driven; officers operate on a decentralized basis, it emphasizes officers being in regular contact with citizens, and it allocates police on the basis of neighborhoods. The question is, how reconcilable are these two strategies? Some (Lawrence Sherman of the University of Maryland is one example) have taken a strong stance that radical alterations will be required if police are to respond more effectively to community problems. Others (Richard Larson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for example) disagree, believing that community policing is reconcilable with rapid response technology—indeed Professor Larson would emphasize that current computer technology can facilitate community policing.

Will the community policing strategy lead to increased police corruption and misbehavior?

The initial news from Houston, New York, Flint, Newark, Los Angeles, Baltimore County, and other police departments which have experimented with community policing is good. Community policing has not led to increased problems of corruption or misbehavior.

Why is it, however, that policymakers fear that community policing has the potential to increase the incidents of police running amok? The answer? Community policing radically decentralizes police authority; officers must create for themselves the best responses to problems; and, police become intimately involved with citizens.

These ingredients may not sound so troublesome in themselves—after all, many private and public sector organizations radically decentralize authority, encourage creativity, and are characterized by relative intimacy between service providers and consumers. Nevertheless, in police circles such ingredients violate the orthodox means of controlling corruption. For a generation, police have believed that to eliminate corruption it is necessary to centralize authority, limit discretion, and reduce intimacy between police and citizens. They had good reason to: Early policing in the United States had been characterized by financial corruption, failure of police to protect the rights of all citizens, and zealotry.

But just as it is possible to squander police resources in the name of efficiency, it is also possible to squander police resources in the quest for integrity. Centralization, standardization, and remoteness may preclude many opportunities for corruption, but they may also preclude the possibility of good policing. For example, street-level cocaine and heroin enforcement by patrol officers, now known to have crime reduction value, has been banned in cities because of fear of corruption. It is almost as if the purpose of police was to be corruption free, rather than to do essential work. If, as it appears to be, it is necessary to take risks to solve problems, then so be it: police will have to learn to manage risks as well as do managers in other enterprises.

Does this imply softening on the issue of police corruption? Absolutely not. Police and city managers will have to continue to be vigilant: community policing exposes officers to more opportunities for traditional financial corruption; in many neighborhoods police will be faced with demands to protect communities from the incursions of minorities; and, police will be tempted to become overzealous when they see citizens' problems being ignored by other agencies.

These dangers mean, however, that police executives will have to manage through values, rather than merely policies and procedures, and by establishing regular neighborhood and community institution reporting mechanisms, rather than through centralized command and control systems.

Each of these issues—use of police resources, organizational compatibility, and corruption—is complicated. Some will be the subject of debate. Others will require research and experimentation to resolve. But most police chiefs will begin to address these issues in a new way. They will not attempt to resolve them in the ways of the past: in secret, behind closed doors. Their approach will reflect the values of the individual neighborhoods as well as the community as a whole.

Policing is changing dramatically. On the one hand, we wish policing to retain the old values of police integrity, equitable distribution of police resources throughout a community, and police efficiency which characterized the old model of police. But the challenge of contemporary police and city executives is to redefine these concepts in light of the resurgence of neighborhood vitality, consumerism, and more realistic assessments of the institutional capacity of police.

The quiet revolution is beginning to make itself heard: citizens and police are joining together to defend communities.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met six times. During the 3-day meetings, the 30 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

Perspectives on Policing

November 1988

No. 4

A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

The Evolving Strategy of Policing

By George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore

Policing, like all professions, learns from experience. It follows, then, that as modern police executives search for more effective strategies of policing, they will be guided by the lessons of police history. The difficulty is that police history is incoherent, its lessons hard to read. After all, that history was produced by thousands of local departments pursuing their own visions and responding to local conditions. Although that varied experience is potentially a rich source of lessons, departments have left few records that reveal the trends shaping modern policing. Interpretation is necessary.

Methodology

This essay presents an interpretation of police history that may help police executives considering alternative future strategies of policing. Our reading of police history has led us to adopt a particular point of view. We find that a dominant trend guiding today's police executives—a trend that encourages the pursuit of independent, professional autonomy for police departments—is carrying the police away from achieving their maximum potential, especially in effective crime fighting. We are also convinced that this trend in policing is weakening *public* policing relative to *private* security as the primary institution providing security to society. We believe that this has dangerous long-term implications not only for police departments but also for society. We think that this trend is shrinking rather than enlarging police capacity to help create civil communities. Our judgment is that this trend can be reversed only by refocusing police attention from the pursuit of professional autonomy to the establishment of effective problem-solving partnerships with the communities they police.

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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elving into police history made it apparent that some assumptions that now operate as axioms in the field of policing (for example that effectiveness in policing depends on distancing police departments from politics; or that the highest priority of police departments is to deal with serious street crime; or that the best way to deal with street crime through directed patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and skilled retrospective investigations) are not timeless truths, but rather choices made by former police leaders and strategists. To be sure, the choices were often wise and far-seeing as well as appropriate to their times. But the historical perspective shows them to be choices nonetheless, and therefore open to reconsideration in the light of later professional experience and changing environmental circumstances.

We are interpreting the results of our historical study through a framework based on the concept of "corporate strategy."¹ Using this framework, we can describe police organizations in terms of seven interrelated categories:

- The sources from which the police construct the legitimacy and continuing power to act on society.
- The definition of the police function or role in society.
- The organizational design of police departments.
- The relationships the police create with the external environment.
- The nature of police efforts to market or manage the demand for their services.
- The principal activities, programs, and tactics on which police agencies rely to fulfill their mission or achieve operational success.
- The concrete measures the police use to define operational success or failure.

Using this analytic framework, we have found it useful to divide the history of policing into three different eras. These eras are distinguished from one another by the apparent dominance of a particular strategy of policing. The political era, so named because of the close ties between police and politics, dated from the introduction of police into municipalities during the 1840's, continued through the Progressive period, and ended during the early 1900's. The reform era developed in reaction to the political. It took hold during the 1930's, thrived during the 1950's and 1960's, began to erode during the late 1970's. The reform era now seems to be giving way to an era emphasizing community problem solving.

“The reform era now seems to be giving way to an era emphasizing community problem solving.”

By dividing policing into these three eras dominated by a particular strategy of policing, we do not mean to imply that there were clear boundaries between the eras. Nor do we mean that in those eras everyone policed in the same way. Obviously, the real history is far more complex than that. Nonetheless, we believe that there is a certain professional ethos that defines standards of competence, professionalism, and excellence in policing; that at any given time, one set of concepts is more powerful, more widely shared, and better understood than others; and that this ethos changes over time. Sometimes, this professional ethos has been explicitly articulated, and those who have articulated the concepts have been recognized as the leaders of their profession. O.W. Wilson, for example, was a brilliant expositor of the central elements of the reform strategy of policing. Other times, the ethos is implicit—accepted by all as the tacit assumptions that define the business of policing and the proper form for a police department to take. Our task is to help the profession look to the future by representing its past in these terms and trying to understand what the past portends for the future.

The political era

Historians have described the characteristics of early policing in the United States, especially the struggles between various interest groups to govern the police.² Elsewhere, the authors of this paper analyzed a portion of American police history in terms of its organizational strategy.³ The following discussion of elements of the police organizational strategy during the political era expands on that effort.

Editor's note: *This paper, among the many papers discussed at the Kennedy School's Executive Session on Policing, evoked some of the most spirited exchanges among Session participants. The range and substance of those exchanges are captured in a companion Perspectives on Policing, "Debating the Evolution of American Policing."*

Legitimacy and authorization

Early American police were authorized by local municipalities. Unlike their English counterparts, American police departments lacked the powerful, central authority of the crown to establish a legitimate, unifying mandate for their enterprise. Instead, American police derived both their authorization and resources from local political leaders, often ward politicians. They were, of course, guided by the law as to what tasks to undertake and what powers to utilize. But their link to neighborhoods and local politicians was so tight that both Jordan¹ and Fogelson² refer to the early police as adjuncts to local political machines. The relationship was often reciprocal: political machines recruited and maintained police in office and on the beat, while police helped ward political leaders maintain their political offices by encouraging citizens to vote for certain candidates, discouraging them from voting for others, and, at times, by assisting in rigging elections.

The police function

Partly because of their close connection to politicians, police during the political era provided a wide array of services to citizens. Inevitably police departments were involved in crime prevention and control and order maintenance, but they also provided a wide variety of social services. In the late 19th century, municipal police departments ran soup lines; provided temporary lodging for newly arrived immigrant workers in station houses;⁶ and assisted ward leaders in finding work for immigrants, both in police and other forms of work.

Organizational design

Although ostensibly organized as a centralized, quasi-military organization with a unified chain of command, police departments of the political era were nevertheless decentralized. Cities were divided into precincts, and precinct-level managers often, in concert with the ward leaders, ran precincts as small-scale departments—hiring, firing, managing, and assigning personnel as they deemed appropriate. In addition, decentralization combined with primitive communications and transportation to give police officers substantial discretion in handling their individual beats. At best, officer contact with central command was maintained through the call box.

External relationships

During the political era, police departments were intimately connected to the social and political world of the ward. Police officers often were recruited from the same ethnic stock as the dominant political groups in the localities, and continued to live in the neighborhoods they patrolled.

Precinct commanders consulted often with local political representatives about police priorities and progress.

Demand management

Demand for police services came primarily from two sources: ward politicians making demands on the organization and citizens making demands directly on beat officers. Decentralization and political authorization encouraged the first; foot patrol, lack of other means of transportation, and poor communications produced the latter. Basically, the demand for police services was received, interpreted, and responded to at the precinct and street levels.

Principal programs and technologies

The primary tactic of police during the political era was foot patrol. Most police officers walked beats and dealt with crime, disorder, and other problems as they arose, or as they were guided by citizens and precinct superiors. The technological tools available to police were limited. However, when call boxes became available, police administrators used them for supervisory and managerial purposes; and, when early automobiles became available, police used them to transport officers from one beat to another.⁷ The new technology thereby increased the range, but did not change the mode, of patrol officers.

Detective divisions existed but without their current prestige. Operating from a caseload of "persons" rather than offenses, detectives relied on their caseload to inform on other criminals.⁸ The "third degree" was a common means of interviewing criminals to solve crimes. Detectives were often especially valuable to local politicians for gathering information on individuals for political or personal, rather than offense-related, purposes.

“Most police officers walked beats and dealt with crime, disorder, and other problems as they arose . . .”

Measured outcomes

The expected outcomes of police work included crime and riot control, maintenance of order, and relief from many of the other problems of an industrializing society (hunger and temporary homelessness, for example). Consistent with their

political mandate, police emphasized maintaining citizen and political satisfaction with police services as an important goal of police departments.

In sum, the organizational strategy of the political era of policing included the following elements:

- Authorization—primarily political.
- Function—crime control, order maintenance, broad social services.
- Organizational design—decentralized and geographical.
- Relationship to environment—close and personal.
- Demand—managed through links between politicians and precinct commanders, and face-to-face contacts between citizens and foot patrol officers.
- Tactics and technology—foot patrol and rudimentary investigations.
- Outcome—political and citizen satisfaction with social order.

The political strategy of early American policing had strengths. First, police were integrated into neighborhoods and enjoyed the support of citizens—at least the support of the dominant and political interests of an area. Second, and probably as a result of the first, the strategy provided useful services to communities. There is evidence that it helped contain riots. Many citizens believed that police prevented crimes or solved crimes when they occurred.⁹ And the police assisted immigrants in establishing themselves in communities and finding jobs.

“Officers were often required to enforce unpopular laws foisted on immigrant ethnic neighborhoods by crusading reformers . . .”

The political strategy also had weaknesses. First, intimacy with community, closeness to political leaders, and a decentralized organizational structure, with its inability to provide supervision of officers, gave rise to police corruption. Officers were often required to enforce unpopu-

lar laws foisted on immigrant ethnic neighborhoods by crusading reformers (primarily of English and Dutch background) who objected to ethnic values.¹⁰ Because of their intimacy with the community, the officers were vulnerable to being bribed in return for nonenforcement or lax enforcement of laws. Moreover, police closeness to politicians created such forms of political corruption as patronage and police interference in elections.¹¹ Even those few departments that managed to avoid serious financial or political corruption during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Boston for example, succumbed to large-scale corruption during and after Prohibition.¹²

Second, close identification of police with neighborhoods and neighborhood norms often resulted in discrimination against strangers and others who violated those norms, especially minority ethnic and racial groups. Often ruling their beats with the “ends of their nightsticks,” police regularly targeted outsiders and strangers for rousting and “curbstone justice.”¹³

Finally, the lack of organizational control over officers resulting from both decentralization and the political nature of many appointments to police positions caused inefficiencies and disorganization. The image of Keystone Cops—police as clumsy bunglers—was widespread and often descriptive of realities in American policing.

The reform era

Control over police by local politicians, conflict between urban reformers and local ward leaders over the enforcement of laws regulating the morality of urban migrants, and abuses (corruption, for example) that resulted from the intimacy between police and political leaders and citizens produced a continuous struggle for control over police during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.¹⁴ Nineteenth-century attempts by civilians to reform police organizations by applying external pressures largely failed; 20th-century attempts at reform, originating from both internal and external forces, shaped contemporary policing as we knew it through the 1970's.¹⁵

Berkeley's police chief, August Vollmer, first rallied police executives around the idea of reform during the 1920's and early 1930's. Vollmer's vision of policing was the trumpet call: police in the post-flapper generation were to remind American citizens and institutions of the moral vision that had made America great and of their responsibilities to maintain that vision.¹⁶ It was Vollmer's protege, O.W. Wilson, however, who taking guidance from J. Edgar Hoover's shrewd transformation of the corrupt and discredited Bureau of Investigation into the honest

and prestigious Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), became the principal administrative architect of the police reform organizational strategy.¹⁷

Hoover wanted the FBI to represent a new force for law and order, and saw that such an organization could capture a permanent constituency that wanted an agency to take a stand against lawlessness, immorality, and crime. By raising eligibility standards and changing patterns of recruitment and training, Hoover gave the FBI agents stature as upstanding moral crusaders. By committing the organization to attacks on crimes such as kidnapping, bank robbery, and espionage—crimes that attracted wide publicity and required technical sophistication, doggedness, and a national jurisdiction to solve—Hoover established the organization's reputation for professional competence and power. By establishing tight central control over his agents, limiting their use of controversial investigation procedures (such as undercover operations), and keeping them out of narcotics enforcement, Hoover was also able to maintain an unparalleled record of integrity. That, too, fitted the image of a dogged, incorruptible crime-fighting organization. Finally, lest anyone fail to notice the important developments within the Bureau, Hoover developed impressive public relations programs that presented the FBI and its agents in the most favorable light. (For those of us who remember the 1940's, for example, one of the most popular radio phrases was, "The FBI in peace and war"—the introductory line in a radio program that portrayed a vigilant FBI protecting us from foreign enemies as well as villains on the "10 Most Wanted" list, another Hoover/FBI invention.)

“20th-century attempts at reform, originating from both internal and external forces, shaped . . . policing as we knew it through the 1970's.”

Struggling as they were with reputations for corruption, brutality, unfairness, and downright incompetence, municipal police reformers found Hoover's path a compelling one. Instructed by O.W. Wilson's texts on police administration, they began to shape an organizational strategy for urban police analogous to the one pursued by the FBI.

Legitimacy and authorization

Reformers rejected politics as the basis of police legitimacy. In their view, politics and political involvement was the *problem* in American policing. Police reformers therefore allied themselves with Progressives. They moved to end the

close ties between local political leaders and police. In some states, control over police was usurped by state government. Civil service eliminated patronage and ward influences in hiring and firing police officers. In some cities (Los Angeles and Cincinnati, for example), even the position of chief of police became a civil service position to be attained through examination. In others (such as Milwaukee), chiefs were given lifetime tenure by a police commission, to be removed from office only for cause. In yet others (Boston, for example), contracts for chiefs were staggered so as not to coincide with the mayor's tenure. Concern for separation of police from politics did not focus only on chiefs, however. In some cities, such as Philadelphia, it became illegal for patrol officers to live in the beats they patrolled. The purpose of all these changes was to isolate police as completely as possible from political influences.

Law, especially criminal law, and police professionalism were established as the principal bases of police legitimacy. When police were asked why they performed as they did, the most common answer was that they enforced the law. When they chose not to enforce the law—for instance, in a riot when police isolated an area rather than arrested looters—police justification for such action was found in their claim to professional knowledge, skills, and values which uniquely qualified them to make such tactical decisions. Even in riot situations, police rejected the idea that political leaders should make tactical decisions; that was a police responsibility.¹⁸

So persuasive was the argument of reformers to remove political influences from policing, that police departments became one of the most autonomous public organizations in urban government.¹⁹ Under such circumstances, policing a city became a legal and technical matter left to the discretion of professional police executives under the guidance of law. Political influence of any kind on a police department came to be seen as not merely a failure of police leadership but as corruption in policing.

The police function

Using the focus on criminal law as a basic source of police legitimacy, police in the reform era moved to narrow their functioning to crime control and criminal apprehension. Police agencies became *law enforcement* agencies. Their goal was to control crime. Their principal means was the use of criminal law to apprehend and deter offenders. Activities that drew the police into solving other kinds of community problems and relied on other kinds of responses were

identified as "social work," and became the object of criticism. A common line in police circles during the 1950's and 1960's was, "If only we didn't have to do social work, we could really do something about crime." Police retreated from providing emergency medical services as well—ambulance and emergency medical services were transferred to medical, private, or firefighting organizations.²⁰ The 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice ratified this orientation: heretofore, police had been conceptualized as an agency of urban government; the President's Commission reconceptualized them as part of the criminal justice system.

Organizational design

The organization form adopted by police reformers generally reflected the *scientific* or *classical* theory of administration advocated by Frederick W. Taylor during the early 20th century. At least two assumptions attended classical theory. First, workers are inherently uninterested in work and, if left to their own devices, are prone to avoid it. Second, since workers have little or no interest in the substance of their work, the sole common interest between workers and management is found in economic incentives for workers. Thus, both workers and management benefit economically when management arranges work in ways that increase workers' productivity and link productivity to economic rewards.

Two central principles followed from these assumptions: division of labor and unity of control. The former posited that if tasks can be broken into components, workers can become highly skilled in particular components and thus more efficient in carrying out their tasks. The latter posited that the workers' activities are best managed by a *pyramid of control*, with all authority finally resting in one central office.

“... a generation of police officers was raised with the idea that they merely enforced the law ...”

Using this classical theory, police leaders moved to routinize and standardize police work, especially patrol work. Police work became a form of crimefighting in which police enforced the law and arrested criminals if the opportunity presented itself. Attempts were made to limit discretion in patrol work: a generation of police officers was raised with the idea that they merely enforced the law.

If special problems arose, the typical response was to create special units (e.g., vice, juvenile, drugs, tactical) rather than to assign them to patrol. The creation of these special units, under central rather than precinct command, served to further centralize command and control and weaken precinct commanders.²¹

Moreover, police organizations emphasized control over workers through bureaucratic means of control: supervision, limited span of control, flow of instructions downward and information upward in the organization, establishment of elaborate record-keeping systems requiring additional layers of middle managers, and coordination of activities between various production units (e.g., patrol and detectives), which also required additional middle managers.

External relationships

Police leaders in the reform era redefined the nature of a proper relationship between police officers and citizens. Heretofore, police had been intimately linked to citizens. During the era of reform policing, the new model demanded an impartial law enforcer who related to citizens in professionally neutral and distant terms. No better characterization of this model can be found than television's Sergeant Friday, whose response, "Just the facts, ma'am," typified the idea: impersonal and oriented toward crime solving rather than responsive to the emotional crisis of a victim.

The professional model also shaped the police view of the role of citizens in crime control. Police redefined the citizen role during an era when there was heady confidence about the ability of professionals to manage physical and social problems. Physicians would care for health problems, dentists for dental problems, teachers for educational problems, social workers for social adjustment problems, and police for crime problems. The proper role of citizens in crime control was to be relatively passive recipients of professional crime control services. Citizens' actions on their own behalf to defend themselves or their communities came to be seen as inappropriate, smacking of vigilantism. Citizens met their responsibilities when a crime occurred by calling police, deferring to police actions, and being good witnesses if called upon to give evidence. The metaphor that expressed this orientation to the community was that of the police as the "thin blue line." It connotes the existence of dangerous external threats to communities, portrays police as standing between that danger and good citizens, and implies both police heroism and loneliness.

Demand management

Learning from Hoover, police reformers vigorously set out to sell their brand of urban policing.²² They, too, performed on radio talk shows, consulted with media representatives

about how to present police, engaged in public relations campaigns, and in other ways presented this image of police as crime fighters. In a sense, they began with an organizational capacity—anticrime police tactics—and intensively promoted it. This approach was more like selling than marketing. Marketing refers to the process of carefully identifying consumer needs and then developing goods and services that meet those needs. Selling refers to having a stock of products or goods on hand irrespective of need and selling them. The reform strategy had as its starting point a set of police tactics (services) that police promulgated as much for the purpose of establishing internal control of police officers and enhancing the status of urban police as for responding to community needs or market demands.²³ The community "need" for rapid response to calls for service, for instance, was largely the consequence of police selling the service as efficacious in crime control rather than a direct demand from citizens.

“Foot patrol, when demanded by citizens, was rejected as an outmoded, expensive frill.”

Consistent with this attempt to sell particular tactics, police worked to shape and control demand for police services. Foot patrol, when demanded by citizens, was rejected as an outmoded, expensive frill. Social and emergency services were terminated or given to other agencies. Receipt of demand for police services was centralized. No longer were citizens encouraged to go to "their" neighborhood police officers or districts; all calls went to a central communications facility. When 911 systems were installed, police aggressively sold 911 and rapid response to calls for service as effective police service. If citizens continued to use district, or precinct, telephone numbers, some police departments disconnected those telephones or got new telephone numbers.²⁴

Principal programs and technologies

The principal programs and tactics of the reform strategy were preventive patrol by automobile and rapid response to calls for service. Foot patrol, characterized as outmoded and inefficient, was abandoned as rapidly as police administrators could obtain cars.²⁵ The initial tactical reasons for putting police in cars had been to increase the size of the areas police officers could patrol and to take the advantage away from criminals who began to use automobiles. Under reform policing, a new theory about how to make the best tactical use of automobiles appeared.

O.W. Wilson developed the theory of preventive patrol by automobile as an anticrime tactic.²⁶ He theorized that if police drove conspicuously marked cars randomly through city streets and gave special attention to certain "hazards" (bars and schools, for example), a feeling of police omnipresence would be developed. In turn, that sense of omnipresence would both deter criminals and reassure good citizens. Moreover, it was hypothesized that vigilant patrol officers moving rapidly through city streets would happen upon criminals in action and be able to apprehend them.

As telephones and radios became ubiquitous, the availability of cruising police came to be seen as even more valuable: if citizens could be encouraged to call the police via telephone as soon as problems developed, police could respond rapidly to calls and establish control over situations, identify wrong-doers, and make arrests. To this end, 911 systems and computer-aided dispatch were developed throughout the country. Detective units continued, although with some modifications. The "person" approach ended and was replaced by the case approach. In addition, forensic techniques were upgraded and began to replace the old "third degree" or reliance on informants for the solution of crimes. Like other special units, most investigative units were controlled by central headquarters.

Measured outcomes

The primary desired outcomes of the reform strategy were crime control and criminal apprehension.²⁷ To measure achievement of these outcomes, August Vollmer, working through the newly vitalized International Association of Chiefs of Police, developed and implemented a uniform system of crime classification and reporting. Later, the system was taken over and administered by the FBI and the *Uniform Crime Reports* became the primary standard by which police organizations measured their effectiveness. Additionally, individual officers' effectiveness in dealing with crime was judged by the number of arrests they made; other measures of police effectiveness included response time (the time it takes for a police car to arrive at the location of a call for service) and "number of passings" (the number of times a police car passes a given point on a city street). Regardless of all other indicators, however, the primary measure of police effectiveness was the crime rate as measured by the *Uniform Crime Reports*.

In sum, the reform organizational strategy contained the following elements:

- Authorization—law and professionalism.
- Function—crime control.
- Organizational design—centralized, classical.
- Relationship to environment—professionally remote.
- Demand—channeled through central dispatching activities.
- Tactics and technology—preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service.
- Outcome—crime control.

“... officers’ effectiveness in dealing with crime was judged by the number of arrests they made ...”

In retrospect, the reform strategy was impressive. It successfully integrated its strategic elements into a coherent paradigm that was internally consistent and logically appealing. Narrowing police functions to crime fighting made sense. If police could concentrate their efforts on prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals, it followed that they could be more effective than if they dissipated their efforts on other problems. The model of police as impartial, professional law enforcers was attractive because it minimized the discretionary excesses which developed during the political era. Preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service were intuitively appealing tactics, as well as means to control officers and shape and control citizen demands for service. Further, the strategy provided a comprehensive, yet simple, vision of policing around which police leaders could rally.

The metaphor of the thin blue line reinforced their need to create isolated independence and autonomy in terms that were acceptable to the public. The patrol car became the symbol of policing during the 1930’s and 1940’s; when equipped with a radio, it was at the limits of technology. It represented mobility, power, conspicuous presence, control of officers, and professional distance from citizens.

During the late 1960’s and 1970’s, however, the reform strategy ran into difficulty. First, regardless of how police effectiveness in dealing with crime was measured, police failed to substantially improve their record. During the

1960’s, crime began to rise. Despite large increases in the size of police departments and in expenditures for new forms of equipment (911 systems, computer-aided dispatch, etc.), police failed to meet their own or public expectations about their capacity to control crime or prevent its increase. Moreover, research conducted during the 1970’s on preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service suggested that neither was an effective crime control or apprehension tactic.²⁸

Second, fear rose rapidly during this era. The consequences of this fear were dramatic for cities. Citizens abandoned parks, public transportation, neighborhood shopping centers, churches, as well as entire neighborhoods. What puzzled police and researchers was that levels of fear and crime did not always correspond: crime levels were low in some areas, but fear high. Conversely, in other areas levels of crime were high, but fear low. Not until the early 1980’s did researchers discover that fear is more closely correlated with disorder than with crime.²⁹ Ironically, order maintenance was one of those functions that police had been downplaying over the years. They collected no data on it, provided no training to officers in order maintenance activities, and did not reward officers for successfully conducting order maintenance tasks.

Third, despite attempts by police departments to create equitable police allocation systems and to provide impartial policing to all citizens, many minority citizens, especially blacks during the 1960’s and 1970’s, did not perceive their treatment as equitable or adequate. They protested not only police mistreatment, but lack of treatment—inadequate or insufficient services—as well.

“Not until the early 1980’s did researchers discover that fear is more closely correlated with disorder than with crime.”

Fourth, the civil rights and antiwar movements challenged police. This challenge took several forms. The legitimacy of police was questioned: students resisted police, minorities rioted against them, and the public, observing police via live television for the first time, questioned their tactics. Moreover, despite police attempts to upgrade personnel through improved recruitment, training, and supervision, minorities and then women insisted that they had to be adequately represented in policing if police were to be legitimate.

Fifth, some of the myths that undergirded the reform strategy—police officers use little or no discretion and

the primary activity of police is law enforcement—simply proved to be too far from reality to be sustained. Over and over again research showed that use of discretion characterized policing at all levels and that law enforcement comprised but a small portion of police officers' activities.³⁰

Sixth, although the reform ideology could rally police chiefs and executives, it failed to rally line police officers. During the reform era, police executives had moved to professionalize their ranks. Line officers, however, were managed in ways that were antithetical to professionalization. Despite pious testimony from police executives that "patrol is the backbone of policing," police executives behaved in ways that were consistent with classical organizational theory—patrol officers continued to have low status; their work was treated as if it were routinized and standardized; and petty rules governed issues such as hair length and off-duty behavior. Meanwhile, line officers received little guidance in use of discretion and were given few, if any, opportunities to make suggestions about their work. Under such circumstances, the increasing "grumpiness" of officers in many cities is not surprising, nor is the rise of militant unionism.

Seventh, police lost a significant portion of their financial support, which had been increasing or at least constant over the years, as cities found themselves in fiscal difficulties. In city after city, police departments were reduced in size. In some cities, New York for example, financial cutbacks resulted in losses of up to one-third of departmental personnel. Some, noting that crime did not increase more rapidly or arrests decrease during the cutbacks, suggested that New York City had been overpoliced when at maximum strength. For those concerned about levels of disorder and fear in New York City, not to mention other problems, that came as a dismaying conclusion. Yet it emphasizes the erosion of confidence that citizens, politicians, and academicians had in urban police—an erosion that was translated into lack of political and financial support.

Finally, urban police departments began to acquire competition: private security and the community crime control movement. Despite the inherent value of these developments, the fact that businesses, industries, and private citizens began to search for alternative means of protecting their property and persons suggests a decreasing confidence in either the capability or the intent of the police to provide the services that citizens want.

In retrospect, the police reform strategy has characteristics similar to those that Miles and Snow³¹ ascribe to a defensive strategy in the private sector. Some of the characteristics of an organization with a defensive strategy are (with specific characteristics of reform policing added in parentheses):

- Its market is stable and narrow (crime victims).

- Its success is dependent on maintaining dominance in a narrow, chosen market (crime control).
- It tends to ignore developments outside its domain (isolation).
- It tends to establish a single core technology (patrol).
- New technology is used to improve its current product or service rather than to expand its product or service line (use of computers to enhance patrol).
- Its management is centralized (command and control).
- Promotions generally are from within (with the exception of chiefs, virtually all promotions are from within).
- There is a tendency toward a functional structure with high degrees of specialization and formalization.

A defensive strategy is successful for an organization when market conditions remain stable and few competitors enter the field. Such strategies are vulnerable, however, in unstable market conditions and when competitors are aggressive.

“... the reform strategy was unable to adjust to the changing social circumstances of the 1960's and 1970's.”

The reform strategy was a successful strategy for police during the relatively stable period of the 1940's and 1950's. Police were able to sell a relatively narrow service line and maintain dominance in the crime control market. The social changes of the 1960's and 1970's, however, created unstable conditions. Some of the more significant changes included: the civil rights movement; migration of minorities into cities; the changing age of the population (more youths and teenagers); increases in crime and fear; increased oversight of police actions by courts; and the decriminalization and deinstitutionalization movements. Whether or not the private sector defensive strategy properly applies to police, it is clear that the reform strategy was unable to adjust to the changing social circumstances of the 1960's and 1970's.

The community problem-solving era

It was not negative for police during the late 1970's and early 1980's, however. Police began to score victories which they barely noticed. Foot patrol remained popular, and in many cities citizen and political demands for it intensified. In New Jersey, the state funded the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program, which funded foot patrol in cities, often over the opposition of local chiefs of police.³² In Boston, foot patrol was so popular with citizens that when neighborhoods were selected for foot patrol, politicians often made the announcements, especially during election years. Flint, Michigan, became the first city in memory to return to foot patrol on a citywide basis. It proved so popular there that citizens twice voted to increase their taxes to fund foot patrol—most recently by a two-thirds majority. Political and citizen demands for foot patrol continued to expand in cities throughout the United States. Research into foot patrol suggested it was more than just politically popular, it contributed to city life: it reduced fear, increased citizen satisfaction with police, improved police attitudes toward citizens, and increased the morale and job satisfaction of police.³³

Additionally, research conducted during the 1970's suggested that one factor could help police improve their record in dealing with crime: information. If information about crimes and criminals could be obtained from citizens by police, primarily patrol officers, and could be properly managed by police departments, investigative and other units could significantly increase their effect on crime.³⁴

Moreover, research into foot patrol suggested that at least part of the fear reduction potential was linked to the order maintenance activities of foot patrol officers.³⁵ Subsequent work in Houston and Newark indicated that tactics other than foot patrol that, like foot patrol, emphasized increasing the quantity and improving the quality of police-citizen interactions had outcomes similar to those of foot patrol (fear reduction, etc.).³⁶ Meanwhile, many other cities were developing programs, though not evaluated, similar to those in the foot patrol, Flint, and fear reduction experiments.³⁷

The findings of foot patrol and fear reduction experiments, when coupled with the research on the relationship between fear and disorder, created new opportunities for police to understand the increasing concerns of citizens' groups about disorder (gangs, prostitutes, etc.) and to work with citizens to do something about it. Police discovered that when they asked citizens about their priorities, citizens appreciated the inquiry and also provided useful information—often about

problems that beat officers might have been aware of, but about which departments had little or no official data (e.g., disorder). Moreover, given the ambiguities that surround both the definitions of disorder and the authority of police to do something about it, police learned that they had to seek authorization from local citizens to intervene in disorderly situations.³⁸

“ . . . foot patrol and fear reduction experiments [helped] police to understand the increasing concerns of citizens . . . ”

Simultaneously, Goldstein's problem-oriented approach to policing³⁹ was being tested in several communities: Madison, Wisconsin; Baltimore County, Maryland; and Newport News, Virginia. Problem-oriented policing rejects the fragmented approach in which police deal with each incident, whether citizen- or police-initiated, as an isolated event with neither history nor future. Pierce's findings about calls for service illustrate Goldstein's point: 60 percent of the calls for service in any given year in Boston originated from 10 percent of the households calling the police.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Goldstein and his colleagues in Madison, Newport News, and Baltimore County discovered the following: police officers enjoy operating with a holistic approach to their work; they have the capacity to do it successfully; they can work with citizens and other agencies to solve problems; and citizens seem to appreciate working with police—findings similar to those of the foot patrol experiments (Newark and Flint)⁴¹ and the fear reduction experiments (Houston and Newark).⁴²

The problem confronting police, policymakers, and academicians is that these trends and findings seem to contradict many of the tenets that dominated police thinking for a generation. Foot patrol creates new intimacy between citizens and police. Problem solving is hardly the routinized and standardized patrol modality that reformers thought was necessary to maintain control of police and limit their discretion. Indeed, use of discretion is the *sine qua non* of problem-solving policing. Relying on citizen endorsement of order maintenance activities to justify police action acknowledges a continued or new reliance on political authorization for police work in general. And, accepting the quality of urban life as an outcome of good police service emphasizes a wider definition of the police function and the desired effects of police work.

These changes in policing are not merely new police tactics, however. Rather, they represent a new organizational

approach, properly called a community strategy. The elements of that strategy are:

Legitimacy and authorization

There is renewed emphasis on community, or political, authorization for many police tasks, along with law and professionalism. Law continues to be the major legitimating basis of the police function. It defines basic police powers, but it does not fully direct police activities in efforts to maintain order, negotiate conflicts, or solve community problems. It becomes one tool among many others. Neighborhood, or community, support and involvement are required to accomplish those tasks. Professional and bureaucratic authority, especially that which tends to isolate police and insulate them from neighborhood influences, is lessened as citizens contribute more to definitions of problems and identification of solutions. Although in some respects similar to the authorization of policing's political era, community authorization exists in a different political context. The civil service movement, the political centralization that grew out of the Progressive era, and the bureaucratization, professionalization, and unionization of police stand as counterbalances to the possible recurrence of the corrupting influences of ward politics that existed prior to the reform movement.

The police function

As indicated above, the definition of police function broadens in the community strategy. It includes order maintenance, conflict resolution, problem solving through the organization, and provision of services, as well as other activities. Crime control remains an important function, with an important difference, however. The reform strategy attempts to control crime directly through preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service. The community strategy emphasizes crime control *and prevention* as an indirect result of, or an equal partner to, the other activities.

“... police function ... includes order maintenance, conflict resolution, problem solving ... , and provision of services ... ”

Organizational design

Community policing operates from organizational assumptions different from those of reform policing. The idea that workers have no legitimate, substantive interest in their work

is untenable when programs such as those in Flint, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, Baltimore County, Newport News, and others are examined. Consulting with community groups, problem solving, maintaining order, and other such activities are antithetical to the reform ideal of eliminating officer discretion through routinization and standardization of police activities. Moreover, organizational decentralization is inherent in community policing: the involvement of police officers in diagnosing and responding to neighborhood and community problems necessarily pushes operational and tactical decisionmaking to the lower levels of the organization. The creation of neighborhood police stations (storefronts, for example), reopening of precinct stations, and establishment of beat offices (in schools, churches, etc.) are concrete examples of such decentralization.

Decentralization of tactical decisionmaking to precinct or beat level does not imply abdication of executive obligations and functions, however. Developing, articulating, and monitoring organizational strategy remain the responsibility of management. Within this strategy, operational and tactical decisionmaking is decentralized. This implies what may at first appear to be a paradox: while the number of managerial levels may decrease, the number of managers may increase. Sergeants in a decentralized regime, for example, have managerial responsibilities that exceed those they would have in a centralized organization.

At least two other elements attend this decentralization: increased participative management and increased involvement of top police executives in planning and implementation. Chiefs have discovered that programs are easier to conceive and implement if officers themselves are involved in their development through task forces, temporary matrix-like organizational units, and other organizational innovations that tap the wisdom and experience of sergeants and patrol officers. Additionally, police executives have learned that good ideas do not translate themselves into successful programs without extensive involvement of the chief executive and his close agents in every stage of planning and implementation, a lesson learned in the private sector as well.⁴³

One consequence of decentralized decisionmaking, participative planning and management, and executive involvement in planning is that fewer levels of authority are required to administer police organizations. Some police organizations, including the London Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard), have begun to reduce the number of middle-management layers, while others are contemplating doing so. Moreover, as in the private sector, as computerized

information gathering systems reach their potential in police departments, the need for middle managers whose primary function is data collection will be further reduced.

External relationships

Community policing relies on an intimate relationship between police and citizens. This is accomplished in a variety of ways: relatively long-term assignment of officers to beats, programs that emphasize familiarity between citizens and police (police knocking on doors, consultations, crime control meetings for police and citizens, assignment to officers of "caseloads" of households with ongoing problems, problem solving, etc.), revitalization or development of Police Athletic League programs, educational programs in grade and high schools, and other programs. Moreover, police are encouraged to respond to the feelings and fears of citizens that result from a variety of social problems or from victimization.

“Community policing relies on an intimate relationship between police and citizens.”

Further, the police are restructuring their relationship with neighborhood groups and institutions. Earlier, during the reform era, police had claimed a monopolistic responsibility for crime control in cities, communities, and neighborhoods; now they recognize serious competitors in the "industry" of crime control, especially private security and the community crime control movement. Whereas in the past police had dismissed these sources of competition or, as in the case of community crime control, had attempted to coopt the movement for their own purposes,⁴⁴ now police in many cities (Boston, New York, Houston, and Los Angeles, to name a few) are moving to structure working relationships or strategic alliances with neighborhood and community crime control groups. Although there is less evidence of attempts to develop alliances with the private security industry, a recent proposal to the National Institute of Justice envisioned an experimental alliance between the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Police Department and the Wackenhut Corporation in which the two organizations would share responses to calls for service.

Demand management

In the community problem-solving strategy, a major portion of demand is decentralized, with citizens encouraged to bring problems directly to beat officers or precinct offices. Use of 911 is discouraged, except for dire emergencies. Whether tactics include aggressive foot patrol as in Flint or problem solving as in Newport News, the emphasis is on police officers' interacting with citizens to determine the types of problems they are confronting and to devise solutions to those problems. In contrast to reform policing with its selling orientation, this approach is more like marketing: customer preferences are sought, and satisfying customer needs and wants, rather than selling a previously packaged product or service, is emphasized. In the case of police, they gather information about citizens' wants, diagnose the nature of the problem, devise possible solutions, and then determine which segments of the community they can best serve and which can be best served by other agencies and institutions that provide services, including crime control.

Additionally, many cities are involved in the development of demarketing programs.⁴⁵ The most noteworthy example of demarketing is in the area of rapid response to calls for service. Whether through the development of alternatives to calls for service, educational programs designed to discourage citizens from using the 911 system, or, as in a few cities, simply not responding to many calls for service, police actively attempt to demarket a program that had been actively sold earlier. Often demarketing 911 is thought of as a negative process. It need not be so, however. It is an attempt by police to change social, political, and fiscal circumstances to bring consumers' wants in line with police resources and to accumulate evidence about the value of particular police tactics.

“... demarketing 911 ... is an attempt by police to ... bring consumers' wants in line with police resources ...”

Tactics and technology

Community policing tactics include foot patrol, problem solving, information gathering, victim counseling and services, community organizing and consultation, education, walk-and-ride and knock-on-door programs, as well as regular patrol, specialized forms of patrol, and rapid response to emergency calls for service. Emphasis is placed on

information sharing between patrol and detectives to increase the possibility of crime solution and clearance.

Measured outcomes

The measures of success in the community strategy are broad: quality of life in neighborhoods, problem solution, reduction of fear, increased order, citizen satisfaction with police services, as well as crime control. In sum, the elements of the community strategy include:

- Authorization—community support (political), law, professionalism.
- Function—crime control, crime prevention, problem solving.
- Organizational design—decentralized, task forces, matrices.
- Relationship to environment—consultative, police defend values of law and professionalism, but listen to community concerns.
- Demand—channelled through analysis of underlying problems.
- Tactics and technology—foot patrol, problem solving, etc.
- Outcomes—quality of life and citizen satisfaction.

Conclusion

We have argued that there were two stages of policing in the past, political and reform, and that we are now moving into a third, the community era. To carefully examine the dimensions of policing during each of these eras, we have used the concept of organizational strategy. We believe that this concept can be used not only to describe the different styles of policing in the past and the present, but also to sharpen the understanding of police policymakers of the future.

For example, the concept helps explain policing's perplexing experience with team policing during the 1960's and 1970's. Despite the popularity of team policing with officers involved in it and with citizens, it generally did not remain in police departments for very long. It was usually planned and implemented with enthusiasm and maintained for several years. Then, with little fanfare, it would vanish—with everyone associated with it saying regretfully that for some reason it just did not work as a police tactic. However, a close examination of team policing reveals that it was a

strategy that innovators mistakenly approached as a tactic. It had implications for authorization (police turned to neighborhoods for support), organizational design (tactical decisions were made at lower levels of the organization), definition of function (police broadened their service role), relationship to environment (permanent team members responded to the needs of small geographical areas), demand (wants and needs came to team members directly from citizens), tactics (consultation with citizens, etc.), and outcomes (citizen satisfaction, etc.). What becomes clear, though, is that team policing was a competing strategy with different assumptions about every element of police business. It was no wonder that it expired under such circumstances. Team and reform policing were strategically incompatible—one did not fit into the other. A police department could have a small team policing unit or conduct a team policing experiment, but business as usual was reform policing.

Likewise, although foot patrol symbolizes the new strategy for many citizens, it is a mistake to equate the two. Foot patrol is a tactic, a way of delivering police services. In Flint, its inauguration has been accompanied by implementation of most of the elements of a community strategy, which has become business as usual. In most places, foot patrol is not accompanied by the other elements. It is outside the mainstream of "real" policing and often provided only as a sop to citizens and politicians who are demanding the development of different policing styles. This certainly was the case in New Jersey when foot patrol was evaluated by the Police Foundation.⁴⁶ Another example is in Milwaukee, where two police budgets are passed: the first is the police budget; the second, a supplementary budget for modest levels of foot patrol. In both cases, foot patrol is outside the mainstream of police activities and conducted primarily as a result of external pressures placed on departments.

“ . . . team policing . . . was usually planned and implemented with enthusiasm. . . . Then, with little fanfare, it would vanish . . . ”

It is also a mistake to equate problem solving or increased order maintenance activities with the new strategy. Both are tactics. They can be implemented either as part of a new

organizational strategy, as foot patrol was in Flint, or as an 'add-on,' as foot patrol was in most of the cities in New Jersey. Drawing a distinction between organizational additions and a change in strategy is not an academic quibble; it gets to the heart of the current situation in policing. We are arguing that policing is in a period of transition from a reform strategy to what we call a community strategy. The change involves more than making tactical or organizational adjustments and accommodations. Just as policing went through a basic change when it moved from the political to the reform strategy, it is going through a similar change now. If elements of the emerging organizational strategy are identified and the policing institution is guided through the change rather than left blindly thrashing about, we expect that the public will be better served, policymakers and police administrators more effective, and the profession of policing revitalized.

“If . . . policing . . . is guided through the change rather than left blindly thrashing about, . . . the public will be better served . . .”

A final point: the classical theory of organization that continues to dominate police administration in most American cities is alien to most of the elements of the new strategy. The new strategy will not accommodate to the classical theory: the latter denies too much of the real nature of police work, promulgates unsustainable myths about the nature and quality of police supervision, and creates too much cynicism in officers attempting to do creative problem solving. Its assumptions about workers are simply wrong.

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Points of view or opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or of Harvard University.

The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates the activities of the following program Offices and Bureaus: National Institute of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Office for Victims of Crime.

Organizational theory has developed well beyond the stage it was at during the early 1900's, and policing does have organizational options that are consistent with the newly developing organizational strategy. Arguably, policing, which was moribund during the 1970's, is beginning a resurgence. It is overthrowing a strategy that was remarkable in its time, but which could not adjust to the changes of recent decades. Risks attend the new strategy and its implementation. The risks, however, for the community and the profession of policing, are not as great as attempting to maintain a strategy that faltered on its own terms during the 1960's and 1970's.

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

NCJ 114213

**STATE AND LOCAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT:
Issues and Practices**

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March 1, 1987

I. THE LOGIC OF DRUG ABUSE POLICYMAKING

The objective of drug policy is to reduce the harm caused by drug consumption and drug trafficking. That harm takes four major forms:

- o The harm done to users by the drugs they take:
 - Physical
 - Psychological
 - Moral/motivational
- o The harm done by users to others due to drug use:
 - Theft and other crime
 - Accidents
 - Derelictions of duty: parents, citizens, employees
- o The harm done by drug dealing (beyond supplying drugs):
 - Violence
 - Corruption
 - Creation and support of criminal organizations
 - Disorder in public places, fear, and loss of, neighborhood morale
- o The impact of each user on the social environment which helps determine the use patterns of others

These considerations span prevention and treatment as well as enforcement. Any policy or practice can be subjected to the same set of questions:

- o Which harms will it reduce?
- o How and by how much?
- o At what cost?
- o With what side effects?

[References: Kleiman, 1985a; Kleiman, 1987b; Moore, 1977; Moore, 1979.]

II. TARGETS OF ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Drug enforcement resources are directed across a variety of illicit drugs and across a range of levels of drug trafficking. The fundamental drug enforcement policy choice is how to distribute resources over targets.

Illicit drug markets differ in their user populations, the harms they cause, and their vulnerability to enforcement pressure. The charts on pages 3 and 4 summarize some of the relevant facts.

Two factors might reasonably single out a drug, or a dealing organization, as a target:

Drugs sold to juveniles deserve special attention both because juveniles are particularly defenseless and because of the strong link between drug use in early adolescence and lasting drug habits.

Drugs sold in poor neighborhoods deserve special attention because the neighborhoods themselves may be fragile, because the kids in them are likely to be particularly vulnerable, and because low-income drug users are less likely than more affluent drug users to have the resources to bear the costs of their drug abuse themselves. Consequently, some of those costs are likely to be borne publicly (e.g., as publicly-provided drug treatment) or by non-users of drugs (accident and crime victims).

[References: NIDA, 1984b; NNICC, 1986; Reuter, 1984; Kleiman, 1985a; Polich, et al., 1984; Moore, 1977.]

	Heroin	Cocaine	Crack	Marijuana	PCP	Other illicitly manufactured dangerous drugs (Hallucinogens, Barbiturates, Amphetamines)	Dangerous drugs derived from licit channels (Synthetic opiates and opioids [Percodan], tranquilizers [Valium])
Number of users	400,000 - daily 1.5 million - total	500,000 - v. heavy 5,000,000 - use cocaine in any given month 10 million - total	500,000	1,000,000 - more-than-daily 20,000,000 - regular users	200,000 - total concentrated in Mid-Atlantic states	1,250,000 -- 2,500,000 combined	
Age of participant	25-45 (Aging)	25 and up	same as cocaine but heavy kids	12-40 heavy kids (Accumulating population)	15-25	15-40	Varies: includes more 40-and-ups than do other categories
Social status of users	low	mixed (some v. wealthy)	mixed (some v. poor)	everybody	low	low	low
Damage to users (Physical/ psychological damage)	high 25,000 emergency room visits for 500,000 users (50/1,000)	low 25,000 emergency room visits for 5,000,000 users (5/1,000)	high	low 112,500 emergency room visits for 20,000,000 users (6.6/1,000)	high very long-lasting damage from use. High accidents while on drug	125,000 emergency room visits for 2,000,000 users (60/1,000)	
Damage to users (Risk of progression to compulsive use)	high physically addicting	medium tolerance builds slowly, but symptoms of an abstinence syndrome are missing. ---acute dependence syndrome with both---	high dose must be repeated many times per hour and tolerance builds quickly	low	unknown	hallucinogens - low barbiturates - very high amphetamines - like cocaine	opiates & opioids - high tranquilizers - low to medium
Linkages with crime	high daily heroin users commit 100-300 non-drug crimes per year	unknown causal linkage unknown	possibly high expensive habit and heaviest users tend to be young, poor, urban	low	high violent behavior encouraged by PCP use	hallucinogens - low barbiturates - high amphetamines - high	low
Frequency of purchase	daily heroin users usually buy heroin only for their next abuse session	varies users buy a few days supply at one time	daily users tend to take many doses of increasing size within an abuse session of a few hours	varies: mostly infrequent users can buy several days or even weeks worth at one time (1 or 2 month supply)	one purchase one dose	varies	varies
Street vs. indoor transactions	mostly street (specialized dealing locations)	mostly indoor (some specialized dealing locations; restaurants, bars)	mostly street (for rock houses)	mostly indoor	mostly street	varies	varies

	Heroin	Cocaine	Crack	Marijuana	PCP	Other illicitly manufactured dangerous drugs (Hallucinogens, Barbiturates, Amphetamines)	Dangerous drugs derived from licit channels (Synthetic opiates and opioids [Percodan], tranquilizers [Valium])
Source	import	import	domestic manufacture	mixed 50/50	domestic manufacture small-scale	domestic manufacture varies in scale methamphetamine-bikers bathtub chemists	domestic manufacture varies in scale medical personnel pharmacists patients
Retail Sales	8 billion much taken in kind by dealers, runners	12 billion not much taken in kind, most purchased in bulk quantities at bulk prices	Included within cocaine estimates	8 billion		unknown	small compared to heroin, cocaine, crack, marijuana
First Domestic Distributors (revenues of large organizations)	1 billion	1-2 billion	Included within cocaine estimates	1 billion		unknown	small compared to heroin, cocaine, crack, marijuana
Ratio of dealers/users	1/10 50,000 - total dealers	1/20 250,000 - total dealers	Included within cocaine estimates	1/40 500,000 - total dealers		unknown	small compared to heroin, cocaine, crack, marijuana

* Does not include beggars, runners, steerers

III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Choice of Target Drugs

1. Drug use can cause crimes by users in two ways:
 - o the influence of the drug itself can unleash aggression.
 - o the desire for money to buy drugs can motivate income-producing crimes such as drug dealing, prostitution, or theft;
2. Some drugs are particularly prone to lead their users to harm themselves:
 - o By injuring themselves while under the influence;
 - o By progressing to compulsive use;
 - o By sharing needles and thus being exposed to the viruses of AIDS and hepatitis B. (When drug users are also prostitutes, this represents a particularly severe threat to the public health.)
3. The smaller the market for a drug, the more amenable it is to control through enforcement. The mass market drugs--marijuana and cocaine--have so many buyers and sellers that it takes enormous enforcement resources to make either buying or selling risky. By contrast, the major disadvantage of drug prevention education--the risk of causing some recipients of the message to think for the first time about using a given drug--diminishes as the market grows. This suggests a concentration of enforcement efforts on relatively rare drugs such as heroin and PCP and a concentration of education efforts on the mass-market drugs.
4. Drugs whose users buy a day's supply at a time are more vulnerable to enforcement pressure against retail dealers and users than drugs whose users buy less frequently.
5. Drugs dealt on the street can devastate citizen morale. Open drug dealing and drug use is an announcement that the forces of order have lost the battle for control of a neighborhood.
6. The value of drug enforcement can be limited by the ability of users and dealers to substitute one drug for another: e.g., illicitly manufactured methamphetamine for diverted dexadrine, PCP for marijuana.

B. Targeting Market Participants

The fundamental choice here is between enforcement actions directed at the final retail transaction and enforcement actions directed at the process of manufacture, import, and wholesale dealing. These two kinds of enforcement actions have sharply distinct impacts on the drug markets.

Drug users have to pay for drugs. In addition, they must spend time and bear inconvenience and risk to find drug sellers. Both the money price of drugs and the time and trouble required to secure them act to reduce drug consumption. The higher the price, the longer the search, the less the eventual consumption. Thus search time acts as a kind of second "price."

Drug enforcement agents tend to refer to these two aspects of drug supply as "price" and "availability." Some researchers speak of a "money component" and a "non-money" or "search time" component of "effective price."

Money price is largely determined by conditions in the wholesale drug markets, conditions which high-level drug enforcement can influence. Availability, or search time, is largely determined by conditions at the retail level: the number, location, and aggressiveness of retail dealers. These factors are influenced by street-level enforcement.

[References: .Kleiman, 1986b; Moore, 1977, 1973.]

IV. ENFORCEMENT TACTICS

Drugs and dealers are replaceable. There is less value in "removing" drugs from distribution and "immobilizing" trafficking organizations than appears at first glance.

The job of drug enforcement is to raise the price of drugs and reduce their availability (in other words, to increase both the money price and the search time "price" faced by users). This requires imposing costs on drug dealers and making future transactions more difficult. Drug enforcement imposes costs on dealers by arresting them, convicting them, imprisoning them, and seizing drugs and other assets.

In the process, it complicates future transactions in three ways:

- o By making traffickers and users afraid of arrest, conviction, imprisonment, and the loss of drugs and other assets, it makes them more reluctant to try again. Entrepreneurs will require higher profits and employees will demand higher wages; both lead to higher prices.

- o By making drug market participants wary of each other as potential undercover agents, informants, or witnesses, enforcement makes it more difficult for them to do business with each other.
- o By forcing dealers and buyers away from established locations where they can find one another, enforcement decreases their chances of consummating deals quickly.

Arrests at any one level of the trafficking process make life more difficult at the next higher level, because some arrestees will turn informant. This helps spread distrust throughout the market.

What follows is a partial list of enforcement tactics and issues:

A. Encouraging and using citizen reports

Residents of drug-dealing neighborhoods know an enormous amount about who is dealing and where. If they know where to call with information, if they know that they will remain anonymous, and if their information is transmitted quickly to drug enforcement officers, the result can be an amazing flow of high-quality intelligence. (There will also be crank and spite calls, but these aren't hard to ignore.) Some agencies encourage anonymous callers to choose "handles" for themselves. This allows for the development of a history of reliable information from an informant to support warrant applications and for the communication back to the caller of the results of his tip.

B. Surveillance and observation arrests

As Yogi Berra said, "Sometimes you can see a lot by just looking." Open drug dealing is vulnerable to surveillance (in plain clothes, or from hidden vantage points) leading to arrests immediately after sales. This is the key to breaking up street drug markets.

C. Harassing the market

Another set of tactics for disrupting retail drug markets:

- o Parking enforcement in dealing areas
- o Code violations in dealing premises
- o Lighting dark corners favored by dealers and buyers
- o Boarding up abandoned city-owned property

With a little encouragement, narcotics officers can find extremely ingenious ways to make trouble for drug dealers. In Washington, D.C., dealers were storing their drug inventories under parked cars to keep them close at hand

without exposing themselves to arrest for possession. In response, the police borrowed a high-pressure street-washing truck from the Public Works Department and washed the inventories down the sewers.

One risk for the consumer in an illicit drug transaction is that an inert substance, rather than the one advertised, will actually be the one offered. Police officers can heighten users' suspicion of dealers' wares, and so reduce the number of user-dealer transactions, by selling "turkey dope." Police in Washington, D.C. used this tactic to disrupt a street marijuana market. (But note that some states have statutes against selling counterfeit drugs.)

This sort of harassment directed at the market is not to be confused with the discredited practice of random stops and "disorderly conduct" arrests of citizens who happen to be on the wrong street corner. In addition to being Constitutionally unacceptable, that sort of activity destroys the neighborhood support which drug enforcement otherwise enjoys.

D. Questioning of suspected participants

Stopping and questioning persons reasonably suspected--on the basis of prior record or behavior--of being dealers or customers, can be both a useful deterrent and a valuable source of information.

E. Searches of dealing premises

"Indoor" dealing is less vulnerable to enforcement than street dealing, because it is less visible. However, dealing locations cannot be secrets from buyers. There is always a chance to learn where the dealing is going on and to develop probable cause for a search warrant.

Information is available from citizen tips, surveillance, questioning of suspected participants, and interrogation of arrestees. A standard practice, once a location is known, is to send in an informant (frequently a previously arrested user "working off a beef") to make a buy. Since the informant is searched before going in, his possession of drugs as he comes out provides adequate probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. In other cases, as when dealers use abandoned or publicly-owned buildings as dealing locations, search warrants may be unnecessary.

A successful search can force dealers to find a new location, one less known to potential customers. But there are limits to the value of this, and searches should not be regarded as the end-all and be-all of drug enforcement. Particularly when an extended undercover operation is necessary to establish probable cause, the value of the search needs to be weighed against its costs.

F. Undercover operations

The objective of an undercover operation is to induce drug dealers to make transactions before witnesses. For that purpose, agents pose as market participants.

Any undercover operation raises the legal and moral issue of "entrapment;" that is, the claim that agents were creating crime rather than investigating crime. To sustain the defense of entrapment as a legal matter, the defendant needs to show that he was induced to participate in a scheme for which he had no prior "predisposition." (The strongest defense would be when agents used threats of violence to coerce a criminal act.) From the viewpoint of public and jury reaction (and, we would argue, from a moral viewpoint as well) a stronger test applies: Had the defendant been involved in the same kind of deal before? The more an undercover operation reenacts previous crimes, the less sympathy the defendant will get (or deserve).

Undercover operations differ from each other in two ways:

1. Long-term vs. Short-term

A short-term undercover operation leads up to a single transaction, normally, with an immediate seizure and arrest. This is the origin of the term "buy and bust." A long-term undercover operation involves a series of transactions and is designed to penetrate to the top of an organization: "working up the chain."

Long-term undercover operations involve great expenditures of time and money, long waiting, management headaches including real danger of agent burnout and corruption, and occasional spectacular success. For any given investment of time and money, long-term operations tend to produce fewer but higher-quality arrests than short-term operations. Sometimes, the game is worth the candle; sometimes it isn't. Professionally speaking, long-term operations are higher-status activities for agents than simple buy-and-busts; managers should be aware of the incentives involved when they evaluate operational plans.

2. Buying vs. Selling

In conventional undercover investigations, agents pose as drug buyers, retail or wholesale, to make cases against suppliers. Drug market participants, from retail-level dealers to bulk dealers, are well aware that some potential customers are agents or informants. This makes them much more careful about dealing with customers than they are about dealing with suppliers. The drug market consists of buyers seeking sellers.

From one perspective, this relative lack of worry about their suppliers is a luxury which enforcement efforts ought to deny to drug dealers. Just as conventional undercover operations make drug dealers cautious about the people they sell to, reverse undercover (or "sell-and-bust") operations can make them cautious about the people they sell to. That caution will cost them money and opportunity.

From another perspective, agents posing as suppliers have a golden opportunity to attack dealers where their armor is weakest, by posing as drug suppliers. If reverse undercover operations became as common as "straight" undercover operations, productivity would fall as dealers became more wary of new suppliers, but we are a long way from that stage.

Sell-and-bust has two other operational advantages over buy-and-bust.

- o It saves scarce "buy money." The high prices of illicit drugs have virtually priced local agencies out of serious undercover work. They will find it far easier to come up with a few kilos of cocaine than with the equivalent in cash.
- o Under federal law, and under most state laws, funds supplied, or intended to be supplied, in exchange for contraband are subject to forfeiture. This is an opportunity to take money from the traffickers and, in some states, to apply it to future enforcement efforts.

Sell-and-bust operations face two major problems:

- o **Entrapment.** To some, supplying the drugs raises the entrapment issue more directly than supplying the money. This concern, and the concern about judge, jury, and public reactions, have slowed the development of reverse undercover operations. At the federal level, experience has been reassuring; very few cases have been lost. This is partly because typical deals have been for very large quantities; it is hard to believe someone with a quarter of a million dollars to buy a kilo of heroin and with the customers to sell it to has no predisposition to traffic in drugs. This argues against street-level applications of the sell-and-bust strategy.
- o **Leakage.** Nobody wants drugs to "hit the street." This issue can arise in long-term straight undercover operations, where the agent or informant either handles drugs or knows of their movements but the operation is not ripe for arrests and seizures. But the problem appears much greater when the drugs originate with the government. Thus reverse undercover is hard to use in long-term undercover operations, because of pressure to make an arrest and recover the drugs immediately after

the first transaction. On the other hand, an undercover agent posing as a supplier can begin at a much higher level of the trade than can an undercover agent posing as a seller.

This analysis suggests a rule of thumb for undercover operations: buy small, sell big.

G. Electronic surveillance

Wiretapping and bugging are among the most powerful, but also the most expensive, investigative tactics. Monitoring a single interception requires at least four, and more likely eight or twelve, full-time-equivalent enforcement agents while the tap is "live," plus uncounted hours afterwards preparing and indexing transcripts. To this can be added difficult technical problems, the legal headaches of securing a warrant and extensions, and the inevitable exclusion motions at trial.

When electronic surveillance works, however, it really works. Defendants -- usually multiple defendants -- are literally convicted out of their own mouths. Tapes can't be cross-examined, and can be taken into the jury room. The most powerful use of electronic surveillance is in connection with undercover operations; the undercover agent or informant tries to generate incriminating phone calls and conversations.

In some jurisdictions, "consensual monitoring" (recording conversations with the consent of at least one party) are under far less severe legal controls than wiretaps, with no warrants needed and no requirement for labor-intensive "minimization" (non-interception of irrelevant conversations). Where this is the case, it is natural to have most undercover operators "wear a wire."

For most local departments, however, the manpower drain of wiretapping and bugging is too great to allow their frequent use.

H. Historical conspiracy investigations

Large-scale drug dealing leaves tracks, frequently available from closed case files, commercial and public records, or the memories of persons who can be induced to talk. The purpose of historical conspiracy investigation is to find those tracks and assemble cases which, unlike undercover operations and wiretaps, focus on past rather than current activity.

The results can be spectacular, and the cost is low, but the activities are difficult to reconcile with the personal styles of drug enforcement agents, who overwhelmingly prefer "powder" to "paper."

1. Searching the files

Some of the most interesting information available to investigators lies buried in old police files. Properly trained intelligence personnel (often civilians) combing the files sometimes find cases ready-made, or at least attractive targets for further investigation. The New York State Organized Crime Task Force and the New Jersey Police Department Intelligence Division have pioneered the use of these "intelligence analysts." Persuading field agents to supply data and make use of the product can be difficult.

2. Questioning convicted dealers

One underutilized potential source of information is dealers who are currently serving prison sentences. Sometimes, inducements can be offered in the form of sentence reductions. Alternatively, imprisoned dealers can be hauled before grand juries, immunized, and compelled to talk under penalties of contempt.

3. Finding paper evidence

Bank account and credit-card records, Currency Transaction Reports filed with the U.S. Treasury, long-distance telephone records (and even local phone records where calls are metered), corporate and land-sales files, are all sources of information about dealers: their travel and communications, movements of money among them, and their acquisition and use of wealth for which they can show no legitimate source. Here again, the results can be impressive and the investment of resources low; the problem is finding agents or civilian investigators with the right skills and temperament. (Veterans of the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS are possible candidates.)

I. Handling Physical Evidence

The analysis of drug samples and the identification of fingerprints are both essential tools of drug enforcement. Investigators recognize the importance of analyzing samples, but agencies frequently under-budget for laboratory work. Investigators are only slowly coming to recognize the potential for drug enforcement of new techniques of fingerprint lifting and matching.

1. Laboratory capacity

Arrests made on the basis of drug seizures need to be validated by laboratory reports of the content of the seized drugs. High-volume enforcement in the form of "street sweeps" can swamp the capacity of the drug labs. The result is delay, lost cases, and frayed tempers. The problem can be solved by buying more equipment and hiring more

technicians, by using overtime, by keeping better track of what results are needed when, or by "borrowing" lab time from other jurisdictions. The sums involved are not extravagant, but unless drug program managers plan in advance and regard lab capacity shortages as their problem the necessary steps are likely to remain untaken.

2. Finding and using fingerprints

Historically, the usefulness of fingerprinting has been limited by the painstaking and time-consuming process of manual comparison. A latent print from a crime scene was of no use unless a suspect had already been identified. More recently, automated fingerprint classification and retrieval techniques have been developed which allow searches of a latent print against hundreds of thousands of known prints.

This technology could have a major impact on drug-dealing investigations if "lifting" (developing) fingerprints from drug evidence became part of the drug enforcement routine.

Cyanoacrylate glue (commercially sold as Krazy Glue or Superglue) produces fumes which react with fingerprint residues and allow the development of prints from surfaces which yield nothing to the more familiar "dusting" process, including glassine and other substances commonly used in drug packages. This fact ought to substantially ease the process of making cases against drug retailers, in addition to making "cutting room" employees vulnerable for the first time. However, cyanoacrylate fumes are noxious, and fingerprint technicians are consequently reluctant to apply the process to anything less than a murder. Drug packages are almost never fumed. Changing this situation would require installing adequate protective technology (fan hoods, vents, and glove boxes) in police laboratories.

Another, newer and even more powerful fingerprint-lifting technique involves using laser light to develop latent prints.

Drug enforcement practice has barely begun to catch up with the new opportunities held out by changing fingerprint technology.

J. Going after assets

No formalities are required to seize traffickers' drugs; as contraband, they can be taken whenever found and under no circumstances can they be returned.

Other assets -- money and property -- pose more problems. First, it is necessary to find them. Then, one must show that they are the means or the fruits of drug dealing. The details depend on the applicable law; in general, "civil" forfeiture, as under federal law (21 U.S.C. 881) is easier,

faster, and surer than "criminal" forfeiture. Finding assets, other than cash on hand, requires investigation: of bank records, credit cards, auto and land titles, etc. It used to be that drug agents had little interest in carrying out that sort of investigation; that has changed with the passage of state laws that allow the "recycling" of seized funds into enforcement activity.

Under recent federal law, state and local agencies can share in federal forfeitures. Since the federal recycling provisions are weak, the Drug Enforcement Agency and other federal investigators tend to be generous.

[References: Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; Johnson, et al., 1985; Kaplan, 1983; Kleiman, 1986b; Kleiman, Holland, and Hayes, 1984; Manning, 1980; Moore, 1977.]

IV. ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS

How do all these considerations add up to a strategy for allocating drug enforcement resources? What do theory and experience have to tell us about what works?

A. Theoretical Considerations

1. Money Price vs. Effective Price

If, as we have argued, enforcement efforts against high-level dealers primarily effect the money price of a drug, while retail-level enforcement primarily effects availability, or the non-dollar components of effective price, then the choice of techniques will in part reflect a choice between objectives.

What will happen if the money price of a drug increases?

That depends on the drug and the user. The best situation would be a price increase in an already-expensive drug with many users who are only weakly committed to continuing use or many occasional users on the borderline of progressing to heavy chronic use. A substantial price increase will tend to lead to a substantial cutback in consumption. At higher prices, fewer total dollars may be spent, thus putting more money in consumers' pockets and less money in dealers'. The result of high-level enforcement in this situation is less drug abuse and smaller black markets: a very good result indeed.

On the other hand, when a drug is cheap, compared to the typical user's budget -- as marijuana is -- very little may change. He will spend a little more on drugs, a little less on something else, possibly cut back on drug consumption slightly: just the way coffee drinkers react to an increase in the price of coffee. (Economists call this "inelastic demand.") If this is the case, the result will be an

increase in the total revenues of drug-dealing organizations (equal, by definition, to the total expenditures by drug consumers). Worse, tighter enforcement will tend to confer competitive advantage on those dealers most willing and able to use violence and corruption to protect themselves from enforcement. The result, then, of increasing the price of a cheap, inelastically demanded drug will be a small decrease in drug use and an increase in the wealth, power, and nastiness of drug-dealing organizations: not, on balance, an attractive bargain.

Or consider the situation of a different group of users of a different group of drugs, of which the most obvious example is heroin. The drugs are expensive compared to users' budgets; so expensive that the users commit crimes to pay for them. On the other hand, a strongly ingrained habit of drug use -- which may or may not amount to physiological dependency ("addiction") makes users extremely unwilling to cut back on drug consumption. Consider a price increase for a drug such as heroin from the user's perspective. He can respond to a price increase in one or more of four ways: by cutting back on his drug consumption, by cutting back on his other consumption spending, by increasing his money income from licit sources, or by committing more income-producing crimes.

Neither cutting back on non-drug consumption nor increasing licit-source money income is likely to be an important option for the minority of heroin users who account for a very large proportion both of heroin use and of property crime related to heroin use. Heroin consumes so large a fraction of their total consumption spending that cutting back on everything else may not do much good, and the price of a bag is so large a multiple of their hourly wages in the licit market that working more is hardly worthwhile. Thus they are faced with the choice of more criminal activity or less drugs. If enough of them choose more criminal activity, the result of a heroin price increase will be a crime increase. (The one careful statistical study of the relationship between heroin price and property crime seemed to suggest that this was true, but that study is neither recent nor conclusive.) In any case, the story is likely to be more encouraging in the longer run; at higher prices, more heroin users may enter treatment. Still, the case for the social benefits of a heroin price increase is cloudy.

What will happen if the effective price of a drug increases? Now let us assume that the money price of drugs remains unchanged, but that the number of retail dealers shrinks, the remaining dealers become more unwilling to deal with new customers, and the buyer's risk of arrest for drug possession increases. As we have seen, this is a plausible account of the effect of increased retail-level enforcement. The user faces both increased difficulty in purchasing drugs (on average, he will spend more time looking for a dealer

willing to sell) and increased enforcement risk. Some users, faced with this situation, will cut back their drug consumption more than others; some will cut back little if at all.

But whether the cutback is great or small, fewer total dollars will be spent on drugs than before, because the consumption decrease took place without a (money) price increase. Decreased consumption with constant money price must mean fewer total dollars spent on drugs. This is good news from the viewpoint of property crime and from the viewpoint of reducing drug dealers' incomes.

A drug-using thief facing a drug price increase can choose to steal more as a way of dealing with the problem. A drug-using thief facing increased search time and arrest risk in buying drugs has no such option. Stealing more doesn't help; his problem is not the need for more money, but the increased difficulty of turning money into drugs. Indeed, time spent stealing competes with time spent scoring junk.

Thus, while a change in the money price of drugs (the expected result of more vigorous high-level enforcement) reduces drug consumption but may increase property crime, an increase in the non-money price (the expected result of more vigorous retail enforcement) reduces both, and reduces the total revenues of drug dealers.

This gives street-level (retail) enforcement an important advantage over high-level enforcement as a way to control the abuse of any drug dealt more or less openly and purchased daily or almost daily.

2. The importance of relative enforcement pressure

One important predictor of the potential success of an enforcement activity is the relationship between the costs it will impose on dealers (in the form of arrests, time in jail or prison, lost drug inventories, lost money and property) and the total dollar size of the market. One way to think of this is as a kind of "tax rate" for the special "excise tax" drug enforcement imposes on the drug trade. The larger the market, the more arrests, seizures, and years in prison required to effectively impose any given level of "tax."

Approaching drug enforcement from this angle also gives a hint about the relative importance of confiscating drugs, forfeiting assets, and imprisoning dealers. Drugs and other property can all be valued at the market (what the dealer paid for the drugs, not what he hoped to sell them for or their notional "street value"). Cash is easy. But what is the value of a year in jail?

This question has to be answered from the dealer's perspective. What would he pay to stay out of jail for a year? (Put another way, what would you have to pay him to stay in jail for a year, or to take a one-in-three chance of a three-year stretch?) The answer will reflect both his wealth and his earning ability on the outside. One study conjectures that low-level dealers have a "willingness-to-pay" to stay out of prison of about \$50,000 per year.

This sort of calculation starts to put some numbers around the notion of "making a dent in the drug markets." In particular, it may become clear that what sounds like an ambitious enforcement effort in fact amounts to a 2% excise tax. That is a good time to go back to the drawing board.

3. Market Dynamics

Dealers and transactions compete (unwillingly) for enforcement attention. The fewer the participants and the fewer the deals, the more likely any one deal is to lead to an arrest (holding constant the number of enforcement agents).

This can generate snowball effects, for good or ill. If a market grows while the enforcement resources directed at it remain constant, all participants in the market become safer from arrest. This may then lead to further growth in the market, leading to still more safety, and so on. On the other hand, an enforcement increase large enough to shrink the market will then expose the remaining participants to even higher risks, because there are fewer of them to share the heat. This may then lead to further shrinkage, and so on.

This effect is characteristic of drug markets at any level. But in the retail markets there may be a special kind of snowballing. The probability that cruising around will lead to a successful meeting depends, whether one is a buyer looking for a seller or a seller looking for a buyer, on the number of buyers and sellers in the market in a given region. But the number of buyers and sellers itself depends in part on the probability of a successful meeting: the search-time to "score" from the buyer's perspective, the waiting time between customers from the seller's.

Thus a shrinking retail market brought about by increased enforcement means both more risk and less revenue for the dealer, more hassle and less chance of scoring for the user. At some point, the market may virtually disappear.

This helps explain why street drug dealing tends to be locally concentrated. The best place to buy or sell drugs is the place where drugs are currently bought and sold, because the chance of finding a transaction partner is higher and (unless enforcement resources are as concentrated

as dealing itself) the risk of arrest is less. Thus the effects of intense street-level enforcement might outlast the enforcement itself. If enough pressure is put on retail heroin dealing to depress the number of transactions for a while, that shrinkage might begin to snowball as enforcement risks and search times both grew. After some period, a reduced level of enforcement effort would be adequate to maintain the new, lower level of heroin transactions. Any such effect depends on either the absence of alternative nearby markets or on buyers' difficulties in changing buying locations.

The value of breaking up an established street market will be particularly great if it is in an unusually convenient or safe location from the viewpoint of buyers and sellers. If there are only a few "natural" dealing locations in a city, it may be possible to severely limit the extent of the heroin trade by squeezing all of them at once.

[References: Brown and Silverman, 1974; Kaplan, 1983; Kleiman, 1986b, 1985a; Kleiman, Holland, and Hayes, 1984; Moore, 1983; NICC, 1986; Polich, et al., 1984; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986.]

B. Evidence to Date

1. High-level Enforcement

From 1981 to 1986, concentrated efforts against bulk cocaine dealers and leaders of retail cocaine distribution rings coexisted with a 67% decline in the bulk price of cocaine -- from \$60,000/kilo to \$20,000/kilo -- and a 74% decline in the retail price of cocaine -- from \$100/gram of 12.5% purity (\$800/pure gram) to \$70/gram of 33% purity (\$210/pure gram). Since the 1960s, the price of marijuana appears to have fluctuated largely independent of changes in enforcement pressure, unless the recent shift from cheaper and less potent imported marijuana to more expensive and more potent domestic marijuana can be attributed to anti-smuggling efforts.

No systematic effort has been made to measure the effects of state and local drug enforcement on drug prices, nor would published data sources allow such a measurement in any direct way. One bit of negative evidence is the absence of any clear regional differences in the prices of illicit drugs other than those directly attributable to points of import.

2. Retail-level Enforcement

Two recent ventures in street-level drug enforcement-- Operation Pressure Point on the Lower East Side of Manhattan and the Essex County Drug Task Force in Lynn, Massachusetts--appeared to do very well in controlling drug consumption, reducing reported crime, and returning control

of the streets to the citizens. (In Lynn, reported robberies, burglaries, and aggravated assaults all declined more than 30% citywide in the two years after the inception of the task force; in Manhattan, reported crimes went down by comparable amounts in the immediate target area and by lesser amounts in neighboring areas.) In both cases, enforcement concentrated on harassing the street-level heroin and mixed heroin-cocaine markets. New York City used a mixture of plainclothes and uniformed police; Lynn used plainclothes officers almost exclusively. Both efforts relied on, and received, high levels of citizen tips. Their apparent successes came despite so-so prosecutive results.

On the other hand, the results of street-level enforcement were less impressive in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Dealing appears to have declined in some areas, but reported crimes were not reduced. The Lawrence force relied more on searches and less on observation arrests than was the case in Lynn or New York, but it also faced a larger market than Lynn with no more manpower; worse, a nearby town (just across the county line) had a booming heroin and cocaine market and no street-level crackdown. Some participants in the Lawrence operation have drawn the lesson that the enforcement-to-market ratio used in Lynn--roughly one officer per twenty drug customers--is essential to the success of such efforts.

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**RETAIL-LEVEL DRUG CRACKDOWNS
PROGRAM BRIEF**

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice

Bureau of Justice Assistance

September 1987

by

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BJA PROGRAM BRIEF
RETAIL-LEVEL DRUG CRACKDOWNS

I. Introduction

A. The Problem: Non-discreet Drug Markets

Drug problems are of many types, and there are many law enforcement approaches to controlling them. Much drug enforcement has focused on high-level drug dealing, where both sellers and buyers are suppliers, traffickers, and distributors who buy and sell large quantities of illegal substances. Several links down the chain from these high-level drug deals, at the bottom end of every drug supply chain, is the retail market where users purchase drugs for their own consumption.

Retail markets can be characterized as "discreet" or "non-discreet." Discreet retail trade occurs privately in homes or businesses between buyers and sellers who know each other well. Non-discreet drug trade, on the other hand, typically involves transactions in public places between buyers and sellers who may know each other only casually if at all. This makes drugs far more available to novice users in non-discreet markets than in discreet ones. Non-discreet dealing can take place in open-air markets (on the sidewalks, in the streets, in schoolyards) or in fixed off-street locations such as "rock houses" or "peep-holes."

Many different types of drugs sell in non-discreet markets; heroin is the classic example. PCP, "crack" and cocaine powder also trade in non-discreet markets, although cocaine is more widely distributed in discreet markets.

B. High-Level vs. Low-Level Enforcement

High-level drug enforcement targets major drug suppliers, importers, and distributors. Such enforcement normally requires a long-term commitment to "work up the chain" to get to "Mr. Big." Many narcotics detectives -- committed to high-level enforcement -- have learned to scorn the "buy and bust" from a retail dealer or the arrest of a drug user for simple possession or narcotic intoxication.

Amid the commitment to making high-level cases, retail drug dealers and retail buyers enjoy virtual immunity from enforcement in some cities. In this congenial environment, street markets can flourish. There is now theory as well as data to suggest that the de-emphasis on retail enforcement was a mistake, and that retail-level enforcement compares favorably with high-level enforcement as a use of drug enforcement resources.

Retail-level and high-level enforcement methods put pressure on the drug markets in two different ways. High-level enforcement, by restricting drug supplies, increases the price of the drug on the street. Retail-level enforcement, by contrast, restricts contact between retailers and buyers; it adds to the risk and time required for a user to complete a drug purchase instead of increasing money price. Drugs are thus much less available without being much more expensive: retail pressure decreases the number of retail dealers (due to arrests), and also makes those dealers who are still available more suspicious of new buyers (who, in heavily enforced areas, are likely to be undercover police). Thus, one of the effects of retail enforcement pressure is to make non-discreet markets behave more like discreet ones.

The contrast between high-level and retail-level enforcement is especially significant in the light of the high rate of property crime among drug users who buy in street markets. Since high-level enforcement increases the money-price of the drug on the street, addicts can choose not only to decrease consumption but also simply to steal more to support their drug habits. (Hence the old police adage that the drug squad makes work for the burglary squad.) Stealing more, however, does not allow an addict to overcome the difficulty of "scoring" imposed by retail-level enforcement, since his problem is not finding funds but finding a seller. If street-level enforcement succeeds in reducing the volume of drug trade in an area, then property crime in that area should also decline.

C. Dispersed vs. Concentrated Retail-Level Enforcement

Despite the extensive virtues of retail-level enforcement, police and prosecutors often associate retail-level enforcement tactics with an endless series of arrests and convictions which result in little reduction in drug trade. This may be true of general, dispersed attacks against the retail-level trade in a large area; drug markets will resist such diffuse enforcement unless truly overwhelming enforcement resources can be brought to bear. However, evidence

from retail-level programs in Lynn, Massachusetts and the Lower East Side of Manhattan suggests that a particular form of retail-level drug enforcement -- the "crackdown" -- should be distinguished from ordinary retail-level enforcement.

A crackdown is the application of concentrated low-level enforcement to a limited area. In Lynn, for example, police initially focused on the heroin trade occurring in an area of a few square blocks that served as a heroin "bazaar" for the city and surrounding areas.

A critical parameter in crackdowns is the ratio of users and dealers to police in the targetted market. The lower this ratio, the greater the surveillance pressure on each individual marketplace participant. If the initial allocation of police is large enough to make the market contract, the benefits of the crackdown may begin to grow as a snowball rolling downhill. As the number of users in the market declines and the number of police remains constant, each officer has fewer users and dealers to "cover". This raises the risk of apprehension for each participant increases. This additional pressure causes further market shrinkage and thus even greater effective enforcement pressure. Eventually, the entire market may collapse. Such "chain reactions" are set into motion only if the initial pressure on the market is concentrated enough to cause a significant reduction of drug trade.

Routine retail-level enforcement does not employ the concentrated enforcement necessary to set off these chain reactions, and police and prosecutors correctly complain about wasted efforts of routine retail-level enforcement against drug problems. Crackdowns, however, can succeed if they limit their targets in order to reach the initial critical enforcement concentration required to get the snowball started.

D. Potential Benefits From Crackdowns

Potential benefits from instituting crackdowns or transforming routine retail-level enforcement into crackdown operations include:

- o Lower levels of drug consumption.
- o Substantially lower levels of property crime.
- o Lower levels of perceived disorder in drug-dealing areas.
- o Better neighborhood conditions and improved legitimate business environment in drug-dealing areas.
- o Improved police-community relations.
- o Reduced transmission of hepatitis and AIDS (due to decreased frequency of needle-sharing).

II. Program Indications

Not all drug markets will yield to crackdowns. Although each local market has its own special characteristics, the following guidelines can help police departments to predict how effectively retail-level enforcement might control the drug trade in a city.

A. Market Characteristics

Open markets. The more accessible a market, the better target it is for a crackdown. Non-discreet markets, open to the public, are also open to police surveillance and undercover police infiltration. The more public the market, the easier it is for police to gain access. For this reason, outdoor markets generally provide the simplest targets for crackdowns, followed by indoor markets that resemble outdoor markets in serving large numbers of customers who come in "off the street," without necessarily being known beforehand to other market participants.

Immobile markets. Localized, immobile markets usually make better crackdown targets than diffuse markets or markets that can easily move to other parts of the city. Generally, dispersed markets or markets with the potential to disperse are slippery targets, since concentrated enforcement pressure is difficult to maintain over wide areas. Crackdowns which target markets which, for various reasons, are immobile -- for example, a market controlled by one ethnic group, living in one section of the city and with few connections outside of its own area -- are more likely to succeed.

Market displacement. One of the immediate effects of enforcement pressure on a local market is a displacement of the drug trade to nearby communities. Alternative markets in neighboring areas can thus create difficulties for crackdowns. If retail-level enforcement is weak in neighboring areas, and if they can expand to supply more users, these markets will grow as buyers and sellers flee increased enforcement pressures in their local markets. Whenever possible, crackdowns should be applied as other nondiscreet markets bloom in the area, or, best of all, neighboring drug markets should be subjected to simultaneous crackdowns.

Environmental factors. Environmental and architectural features also impact on the success of crackdowns. Parks with heavy foliage and overgrown brush provide more seclusion for drug transactions than parks with wide open spaces. City blocks with many trash-cluttered alleys or abandoned buildings provide similarly effective, though less idyllic, cover.

For indoor markets, it is easier to pinpoint transactions occurring in single-family homes than those which occur in multi-user dwellings. Public internal hallways permit drug dealers and lookouts to easily detect observers. Multiple exits compound the problems enforcement officials face in apartment houses.

B. User Characteristics

Daily buyers. Markets are easiest to disrupt when patrons make frequent transactions. Most marijuana users, for example, could respond to a crackdown by buying in larger quantities at once -- purchasing enough for a month instead of a few days -- and thereby reducing their risk of police apprehension and of crackdown success. Heroin users, by contrast, typically lack the self control and the ready cash to buy heroin in large quantities and spread its consumption over days or weeks. Thus, it is very difficult for heroin users to protect themselves from crackdowns by changing their purchasing behavior.

Out-of-town buyers. Crackdowns produce especially dramatic results in markets with many out-of-town drug buyers. The bother of an unsuccessful trip (one cost that crackdowns impose on buyers) is obviously greater if a long drive is in question rather than a stroll down to the street corner.

III. Program Implementation

A. Manpower requirements

Law enforcement agencies should plan an initial allocation of at least one full-time police officer for every 75 estimated users in the targeted market. More geographically dispersed, more mobile, or better protected markets will require a lower ratio, approaching one full-time officer for every 50 estimated users. (If the crackdown succeeds, the number of users in the market will decline, and initial manpower allocations can be gradually reduced while keeping the market in check.)

Each crackdown officer should be on full-time assignment. Full-time personnel can gain more expertise in recognizing drug transactions, more exposure to the market participants, and more continuous contact with street informants than police who have assignments in addition to the crackdown. The exception to the full-time rule is undercover police operations ("buy and bust" or "sell and bust"), since full-time police officers who do day-to-day drug crackdown enforcement may become too well-known to go undercover. Some departments routinely use recent police academy graduates for retail-level buy-and-busts.

B. Project Duration

It is essential that the crackdown be able to remain at full force for a period of months. Retail dealers who learn of a drug squad crackdown may simply choose to reduce their activity until the enforcement storm blows over. (During Operation Pressure Point I in Manhattan, one drug distributor decided to give all his retail dealers a three-week paid vacation to Puerto Rico, confident that by the time they returned the heat would be off.)

C. Squad Organization

Successful crackdowns have relied on a squad with a high degree of organizational independence under a single commander. Crackdown personnel should share office space, filing cabinets, secretaries and even desks. This increases both unit morale and the level of information sharing.

D. Supervision

A retail-level crackdown puts police in close, everyday contact with the targeted drug market, where dealers are likely to be willing to pay sizable amounts in order to avoid enforcement pressures. Police in a crackdown face many temptations. A higher-than-ordinary ratio of supervisors to officers is advisable, and those supervisors should spend time in the field.

E. Support from Outside Agencies

Support from outside agencies can promote a crackdown operation. The following agencies should be contacted before the crackdown begins:

- o District Attorney's Office. Crackdown officials should discuss strategy with the DA's Office, informing the DA of an expected increase in drug arrests. The DA should be asked both to vigorously prosecute crackdown cases and to assist in deal-making to help police turn arrestees into informants.
- o Courts. Crackdown strategy should be carefully explained to judges and their staff, and they should be warned to expect an increase in drug violation cases.
- o Drug laboratories. The police department and the DA's Office should enlist the support of their drug lab facilities. Since laboratories must confirm substance identity for prosecution to proceed, timely lab work is essential to the crackdown effort and labs are likely to become a choke point unless there is advance planning.
- o Drug treatment centers. Drug treatment centers and other health-care facilities capable of drug treatment should be informed of a potential increase in addicts seeking treatment. In most areas, residential drug-free and methadone maintenance programs have waiting lists and cannot quickly expand. Outpatient counselling and support groups such as Narcotics Anonymous can grow more quickly.
- o Neighborhood Organizations. Citizens hate having open drug markets in their neighborhoods; some crackdowns have originated as responses to community demands to "do something." A flow of information in the form of citizen ties can be enormously helpful to the crackdown effort. On the other hand, the sudden appearance of many officers can cause concern, particularly in minority neighborhoods with histories of shaky police/community relations. A little advance consultation goes a long way.

- o Housing Authority. Drug dealing is frequently a problem in city housing projects, so the city housing authority may want to support drug crackdowns on markets in its buildings. The housing authority can provide an apartment unit to the drug squad for use in observation. Housing authority workers can also record license plate numbers of suspected drug buyers, clean and floodlight junk-strewn areas (which provide cover for hiding drugs, drug paraphernalia, and drug transactions), assist with the eviction of known dealers or tenants who allow their apartments to be used as dealing sites, building doors, close unnecessary internal hallways, put locks on, and make sure that vacant units remain boarded up.

- o Police Department. The crackdown squad must rely upon other branches of the police department. Since the drug squad will make frequent arrests, uniformed patrol can aid in conveyance of the arrestees from the place of arrest to the police station, allowing the drug enforcement manpower to remain on the street. Uniformed patrolmen along with detectives in other branches of the department may have contacts who can provide information on drug dealers. When needed, uniformed patrolmen can also back up the drug squad in executing warranted searches (among the most dangerous of crackdown operations).

F. Other Resources Required

- o The crackdown will require an allocation for buy money, used in informant-buys and undercover police buys. These operations are most important as tactics against indoor dealers.
- o A telephone line to receive calls from anyone with information on drug trade will need to be set up, staffed, and publicized.
- o The crackdown will require funding for the acquisition and operation of surveillance vehicles (usually unmarked vans, cars, and trucks).
- o The crackdown budget should cover the office space and support staff required for the crackdown's organizational headquarters.

IV. Critical Elements

A. Preparations and Planning

Observation Period. A few officers should gather information on local drug markets before crackdown operations begin in earnest. One officer-month is approximately sufficient for gathering information about an open-air heroin market patronized by 400-500 users.

Observers should learn the operating styles of dealers, become acquainted with market participants, note license plates in order to run computer checks to determine the frequency of out-of-town buyers, and check on outstanding arrest warrants for users and dealers. Observers can also aid in estimating the size of drug markets, a crucial concern towards assessing manpower needs for the crackdown.

Beginning observation before the crackdown has significant advantages. Once the crackdown begins, market participants will become more cautious in their activity and more suspicious of outsiders, so information will be more difficult to gather. Accurate information allows for much more effective use of the crackdown force once operations begin.

Training. Enforcement squad members should receive instruction on retail-level crackdown strategy and tactics. The scope of this training will depend upon the experience of team members with police work, particularly with drug enforcement.

Drug hot-line. In addition to the standard 911 emergency line, the police department should establish a separate drug hot-line to receive calls from anyone with information on drugs. This gives callers direct access to the drug unit.

Those answering the line will need to screen incoming calls, distinguishing legitimate calls from nuisance calls. Some callers will call often and become valued informants. If callers want to conceal their names in order to protect themselves, police should ask them to use a code name. The code name will allow police to identify the caller in the future. Publicity for the hot-line number is essential. Flyers, posters, and (free) newspapers and television mentions are all worth considering.

Limiting the target. The crackdown should focus on one or a few areas with major dealing problems. Limiting the target size (number of users in the targeted markets) will allow the police to achieve the necessary concentration ratio of police to users.

The crackdown should also focus on a specific drug. Since several types of drugs may be traded in one market, a crackdown against one specific drug will normally produce arrests for other drugs in addition to the targeted drug. For instance, police will usually arrest street cocaine dealers when they target what is predominantly a retail heroin market. Nevertheless, crackdown units should resist the temptation to follow up on arrests for non-targeted drugs with extensive informant or undercover work, at least until the targeted market has been shrunk.

Planned Supervision. The planning and structure of the crackdown should account for the potential for police corruption in street-level enforcement. Shifts should rotate so that no single patrolman or patrol team has exclusive surveillance over a specified area, and crackdown officers should be closely supervised.

B. Overview of Tactics

Retail-level crackdowns can be divided into two phases, based on whether the bulk of the drug trade is outdoors or indoors. In phase I, where drug trade occurs openly outside, plainclothes and uniformed officers can rapidly interfere with trade by simple surveillance and arrest operations. Since drug trade is the most flagrant in phase I, arrests come quickly. If the crackdown creates adequate pressure on users and retail-dealers, the drug trade will either diminish, move out of the area, or move to indoor trading areas that are safer (for dealers) than outdoor markets.

As the phase I retail-level crackdown pushes the drug trade indoors, phase II of the crackdown begins. Police tactics change to counter market innovations. Since police can proceed against indoor dealers only with a court-ordered search warrant (except in city-owned or abandoned buildings, and since levels of probable cause required for a search warrant far exceed levels of probable cause needed to stop a suspected user or dealer outside on the streets, more time and effort go into each arrest during phase II.

C. Tactical Operations

Simple Surveillance and Arrest. This is the most effective method against open-air trade. From a (usually unmarked) vehicle, from a building that provides a clear view of the market area, or directly on the streets, crackdown personnel can observe transactions, and then search and arrest suspects. In phase I, surveillance detects both retail dealers and purchasers. For indoor markets, surveillance can still lead to user arrests, which are valuable both because they discourage users from buying and because they may lead to the development of informants.

Development of Informants. A vital task in a retail-level drug crackdown is the development of informants. Some informants come forward voluntarily often through the crackdown hot-line. The best informants are arrestees who hope that aiding the police will lead to consideration from prosecutors. Informants can give the police names and locations of dealers and users within the market place. Some informants will also agree to make buys under police surveillance in order to provide evidence against a specific dealer.

Outstanding Warrant Arrests. This method requires even less groundwork than surveillance and arrest, but is too often neglected, in part because few departments score warrant arrests as "felony collars."

Arrest of Users for Public Drug Intoxication (where authorized by statute). Some states allow the police to arrest persons showing clear signs of public drug intoxication. This cleans up the streets, pressures users, decreases the total number of market users (by arresting some of them), and may provide information on the market if arrestees choose to talk.

Market Harassment. An outdoor market can be harassed in a variety of ways, including environmental alteration of the marketplace (cutting shrubbery from parks to expose concealed trading places, lighting dark streets and alleys); overt uniformed police presence in the market area; and the ticketing and towing of illegally parked cars believed to belong to drug buyers and sellers.

Undercover Police Buys. This tactic can be used against both indoor and outdoor dealers. These operations inhibit expansion of the market since dealers will become wary of new customers, for fear that they are undercover police.

D. Additional Operational Options for Crackdowns

Urinalysis Probation. Courts can establish urinalysis testing as a condition of pre-trial release and as a requirement of probation. Urinalysis testing should apply to both drug offenders and property criminals. If the urinalysis test detects drug use, then sanctions should result; participants who demonstrate abstinence can be similarly rewarded (by shorter probation periods, etc.). Since many courts do not incarcerate for simple drug possession, a urinalysis probation offers a viable alternative for sentencing of crackdown arrestees.

Drug Squad Computer System. A computer system can be set up for records of arrestees which can include name, aliases, address, type of drug violation, known associates, auto registration, and many other identifying characteristics. A computer system allows the drug squad to instantaneously access this information. This is an important benefit, especially considering the tendency of drug buyers and sellers to return to the market even after incarceration.

E. Needle Sharing and AIDS

In the face of the potentially disastrous AIDS epidemic, decreasing needle sharing should be an objective of any crackdown effort. Reducing the number of IV drug users and disrupting shooting galleries contributes to this goal. In some circumstances, however, crackdown operations may encourage users to share needles. Arresting drug users for possession of hypodermic needles and syringes will encourage them to reduce their risk of arrest by sharing. Such arrests should be avoided.

Voluntary testing should be provided to intravenous drug users who fear they may have been infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Drug treatment and public health agencies can help with testing and counselling.

Reverse Undercover. In reverse undercover operations, police pose as dealers and arrest buyers. This can be a controversial operation, since it involves the legal question of entrapment. Some courts will not admit evidence acquired through reverse undercover when it concerns retail sales of small quantity. The operation has another drawback: undercover police must maintain a high exposure to market participants while working a reverse undercover; after a short time, the police become too recognizable to be effective in any undercover operation.

Despite these drawbacks, some police departments have used reverse undercover successfully at the retail level. In contrast to undercover police buys, undercover sales do not require buy money and can even bring revenue into the department. The Miami Police have used reverse undercover to arrest retail cocaine buyers. The Washington, D.C. Police sold inert substances to would-be drug buyers, who are penalized by the loss of their cash rather than by arrest.

Reverse undercover operations work best against new users who lack experience in the market. More experienced users often have a reliable dealer and do not buy from strangers. Novice users, however, may not be streetwise enough to detect the undercover police. An operation that selects novices has benefits since drug use, particularly heroin use, is easier to prevent than to reverse.

As the market moves from phase I (open outdoor trading) to phase II (predominantly indoor trading), the two other methods become essential for a crackdown against retail dealers.

Informant Buys. Useful against outdoor dealers, this method is crucial when aiming at indoor trade. An informant agrees to make a controlled buy as evidence against a dealer. The police carefully search the informant before the buy, provide marked buy-money, and then search the informant after the buy to assure that the informant has not concealed some of the purchased drug for personal use. Police can use the evidence from informant buys to request search warrants from the court, allowing them to reach indoor dealers.

Normally, searches do not occur immediately after the buy, in order to protect the informant. Police should photocopy their buy money (to record the serial numbers) in order to attempt to reclaim it when they search a trading-house.

V. Program Experience

Several cities have already attempted retail-level crackdown programs, including:

A. Lynn, Massachusetts

Before initiating its crackdown program, Lynn, Massachusetts had an active open-air heroin isolated in one city neighborhood. Lynn also had the second highest crime rate of all Massachusetts cities and a police department that had fallen by about one-third (from 180 to 120) due to fiscal pressures.

The Lynn Police Department formed a Drug Task Force and initiated a crackdown program. Enforcement was concentrated on the few city blocks which constituted the city's most troublesome heroin market. The crackdown essentially eliminated the Lynn heroin market. Lynn also experienced a rapid decline in property crimes: in the first year of the crackdown, reported robberies were down 16%, and reported burglaries were down 50%. These results persisted even as manpower commitment was eventually reduced.

B. Manhattan (Lower East Side) New York

Known as "Operation Pressure Point I," this Manhattan project began in 1984 and produced immediate and lasting benefits against an immense big-city heroin market. Again, the crackdown was directed against a specific local market, the heroin market in Manhattan's "Alphabet City" on the Lower East Side.

Pressure Point I has not eliminated the heroin market in Alphabet City, but the volume of trade has fallen sharply, and the trade does not occur openly in the streets. The reduction in heroin trade was accompanied by a marked decline in both property crimes and homicides.

C. Lawrence, Massachusetts

The retail-level enforcement effort begun in Lawrence has yielded some benefits, including a reduction of the overt open-air drug market and a decline in out-of-town drug buyers. Lawrence, however, has had little overall reduction in drug trade and no decrease in property crime.

While Lynn's was a concentrated crackdown, Lawrence allocated far fewer resources to its retail-level project in relation to the size of its drug market. (The Lynn and Lawrence drug task forces had identical manpower, but Lawrence's heroin market was approximately five times larger than Lynn's market.) In addition, there was a significant retail market in nearby Lowell which appears to have absorbed some of the trade displaced from Lawrence.

D. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Instead of concentrating resources on one or a few areas with major dealing problems, Philadelphia's "Operation Cold Turkey" chose two "drug corners" from each of the city's twenty-three police precincts. Since enforcement was spread over much of the city and not strategically placed in high-activity drug trading areas, many of the people that the police interrogated and searched had no knowledge of any drug markets and looked upon Cold Turkey as an unjustified intrusion into the lives of ordinary citizens. Of the 1,000 persons stopped and searched by Cold Turkey's 450 officers over four days, only 80 were arrested on narcotics charges, and 150 more for disorderly conduct.

Public protest and a lawsuit brought the operation to an end after only four days. The project produced no measurable results.

E. Other programs

Other jurisdictions whose retail-level programs have not been fully evaluated include:

- o Central Harlem, New York City (Operation Pressure Point II)
- o Miami, Florida
- o Washington, D.C.
- o Seattle, Washington
- o Norfolk, Virginia
- o Sydney, Australia

VI. Potential Funding Sources for Crackdowns

A. Shifting Internal Resources

Most police departments do some routine retail-level drug enforcement -- i.e., they make some arrests for possession or for retail-dealing. Many police departments also have a narcotics squad that concentrates on high-level drug enforcement. Substantial police resources are also devoted to enforcement against property crime, much of which is committed by active drug users.

Thus, most police departments already allocate significant resources to the drug trade and the property crime related to drug use. Against many drug markets, concentrated crackdowns will yield greater benefits than either routine retail-level enforcement or high-level enforcement, and will result in property crime benefits as well. In these cases, it makes sense to shift internal police department resources to provide support for a crackdown.

B. Applying for Outside Aid

Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the Bureau of Justice Assistance makes grants for state and local drug enforcement projects. Four-fifths of the money available is distributed to state criminal justice agencies for allocation to their localities. Each state establishes its own rules for the distribution of those funds. The other one-fifth is subject to national competition, rules of which are published in the Federal Register.

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VIII. Performance Indicators

A. Drug Markets

The simplest indicator of enforcement effectiveness is the disappearance of open drug dealing. When the crowds of buyers and sellers go away, at least a first level of success has been achieved. The before-and-after videotapes from Operation Pressure point are particularly dramatic.

B. Longevity of Crackdown Effects

Crackdowns take advantage of a snowballing effect: the arrest of each buyer and seller increases the risk of apprehension faced by each remaining market participant. This allows for the eventual reduction of enforcement resources without allowing the street market to return. Thus, the development of excess enforcement capacity is one indicator of a successful crackdown operation.

C. Displacement Effects

When the risks of doing business in a certain location outweigh the benefits of the location, drug dealers, as would any businessmen, look for a new location. Faced with increased enforcement, street drug dealers will first attempt to move their operations to better protected indoor locations in the same neighborhood. This takes the drug trade off the street. Dealers may also try to protect themselves from street enforcement by refusing to sell drugs to anyone other than their regular customers, thus decreasing the recruitment of new users. Thus, merely moving an active street market indoors has some important benefits.

Drug dealers may also, of course, attempt to relocate the street market to other neighborhoods or to different cities. Additional crackdowns may be necessary in areas capable of absorbing that trade. This does not always happen, however. For example, in a small city such as Lynn, surrounded by suburban communities one-quarter to one-half its size, drug trade displaced by a crackdown had no "natural" alternative dealing locations. Dealers' attempts to set up shop in the surrounding suburban communities on any large scale attracted too much attention from local police. None of these satellite markets were able to function for more than a few months.

D. Reduction in User Population

Decreasing the number of drug users is an unequivocally positive result of crackdowns. A few ways to measure changes in the user population follow:

- o Drug treatment agencies often maintain statistics on the number of clients they treat, usually in order to provide information to state agencies. This information usually includes the primary drug for which clients are being treated and sometimes even includes client addresses.

The state agency collecting these data should be able to provide police departments with the number of people seeking treatment at local drug treatment agencies or, even better, with the number of people who live in a particular city who have sought drug treatment at any treatment agency in the state. Comparing these figures for periods before and after the crackdown is a good proxy measure of changes in the number of local drug users attempting to "go straight."

- o Counselors at local drug treatment agencies can often provide at least anecdotal evidence of what changes in user behaviors were attributable to crackdown operations. Thus, the police department can begin to establish that the crackdown operation reduced the number of drug users.
- o Users are another source of information about local drug use patterns. They can usually be contacted through treatment agencies. Interviewers will need a few practice interviews to learn how to effectively glean information from these subjects.
- o A few jurisdictions collect and test urine specimens of offenders soon after they have been arrested. The proportion of offenders who test positive for a drug is one measure of the number of drug users in the offender population. This proportion should rise in the first months of a crackdown operation as many drug offenders are arrested. It should then decline below pre-crackdown levels if the crackdown effort is successful in reducing the number of drug users.

E. Effects on Property Crime

Many drug users fund their drug habits by stealing. If crackdown efforts are successful, consumption of the targeted drug will decline without commensurate increase in price. Thus, the total sum spent on drugs, some proportion of which was "earned" by thefts, decreases. One way to identify this effect is compare the number of robberies and burglaries committed during a several month period prior to a crackdown with the number committed during a similar period after the crackdown has commenced.

AMERICA'S UNDERCLASS: WHAT TO DO?

Drugs. Crime. Illegitimacy. Welfare. Failure. All these imprison five million citizens. But some imaginative policies can liberate them.

LISTEN: "He made me scared, so I pulled the trigger. So feel sorry? I doubt it. I didn't want to see him go down like that, but better him than me."

"I'm gonna work 40 hours a week and bring home maybe \$100, \$150, when I can work 15 minutes and come back with \$1,000 tax-free?"

"I ain't working for no minimum wage."

"Man, you go two, three years not working, and hanging around and smoking reefer or drinking, and then you get a job—you can't handle it. You say, 'I don't want to get up in the morning, get pushed and shoved. I'm gonna get on welfare.'"

"Everybody else I knew was having babies, so I just went along."

"It just seems that everybody here is down on their luck."

The voices, reported in the press, are the voices of the underclass, and their message is that the troubles of

this group at the very bottom of the American social ladder need fixing fast. For beyond the misery they occasion in underclass communities—urban knots that threaten to become enclaves of permanent poverty and vice—these are troubles that can reach out and grab the larger society, literally, by the throat. They impose costs not just in crime but also in taxes for welfare, drug programs, police, and prisons, not to mention the loss the economy suffers when an able-bodied population produces little.

For business there's yet another cost: An increasing fraction of the shrinking pool of new labor force entrants between now and the year 2000 will be underclass youth, deficient in the skills companies will need in an ever more knowledge-intensive industrial order. Add also the intangible costs: the sharpened anxiety of urban life, for instance, or the disquieting sense that something is fundamentally wrong in a rich society that allows an

underclass to fester. For all its gloom, though, the plight of this group is not hopeless. The problems are correctable, in ways outlined below.

Who are the underclass? The poor, but numbering around five million, they are a relatively small minority of the 33 million Americans whose incomes fall below the official poverty line. Disproportionately black and Hispanic, they are still a minority among these minorities. What primarily defines them is not so much their ethnicity or race as their behavior—chronic lawlessness, drug use, unwedlock births, nonwork, welfare dependency, and school failure. "Underclass" describes a state of mind and way of life. It is at least as much a social as an economic condition.

After all, the requirements for escaping long-term poverty in America today are straightforward: Finish high school, get any job (even at the minimum wage) and stay in the labor market, get married as an adult, get married, even if it takes more time to try. "These are demanding, and not superhuman, tasks," remarked a recently published report of the Family and Welfare Seminar on the Family and American Welfare Policy, a group of social scientists and former government officials. In a uniquely comprehensive track record of the incomes of a wide array of neighborhoods through the Seventies, the group concluded that just earning a high school diploma helped keep all but 0.5% of adult men and all but 2% of adult women out of poverty.

Even people familiar with the statistics on the behavior that define the underclass feel overwhelmed when they review them. That behavior, says black social psychologist Kenneth Clark described it 25 years ago, comprises a tangle of pathologies that force each other to keep the underclass imprisoned in poverty and dependency. Though free public education is the traditional vehicle of American upward mobility, 40% to 60% of high school students in inner cities drop out before graduation. Though an income from full-time work at the minimum wage is not enough to support a single person above the poverty line, and two incomes can keep a family of four out of poverty, the underclass works hard

In the absence of specifically

BY MYRON MAGNET

PHOTOGRAPHS BY MARY ELLEN MARK

**■ IN GHETTOS
LIKE NEW
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ILLEGITIMATE.**

class numbers on all this, statistics on blacks have to serve as rough guideposts. In the Fifties, black and white men participated in the labor force, either as workers or active job seekers, at the same rate. By the late Seventies black participation was 7.7 percentage points lower than white participation, a difference that statisticians deem huge. Today, only 44% of black men age 16 to 24 are employed, down from 59% a quarter-century ago.

In some areas that's because jobs are scarce or require skills underclass applicants lack. But neither the statistics nor the testimony of underclass youths themselves suggest that these are the prime reasons for such expensive joblessness, though some poverty experts debate this issue ferociously. After all, black participation in the la-

bor force declined most sharply in the economically expansive Sixties, especially in that part of the decade when jobs were most plentiful. And over 70% of the out-of-work inner city black youths whom Harvard economist Richard B. Freeman surveyed in 1980 said they could easily find a job. But they generally disdained the readily available hamburger flipper or check-out clerk jobs as low paid or leading nowhere—even though tens of thousands of recent Asian immigrants have been finding menial jobs their gateway to the American dream. A recent ghetto renovation project in Newark, New Jersey, couldn't attract local workers at \$5 to \$6 an hour and ended up importing union labor from the suburbs.

In underclass communities a man who doesn't work has two principal al-

ternatives. One is hustling—practicing ranging from the shady, like hawk base-metal jewelry as silver, to the illicit but supposedly victimless, like pimping or selling drugs on the street. The other is hard-core crime, whose explosion in the Sixties and Seventies gave early evidence of the underclass problem. Robbery and rape rates nearly quadrupled between 1963 and 1980; burglary and assault rates roughly tripled; the murder rate more than doubled. The result is that a 12-year-old American boy has an 89% chance of becoming a victim of violent crime in his lifetime, and an urban household has a 93% chance of being burgled sometime during the next 20 years.

HOWEVER bad the danger of robbery for middle-class whites, poor blacks get robbed four times as often and the leading cause of death among young black men is murder. No wonder fear pervades underclass areas, deterring the law-abiding from working the late shift or attending night school.

As for the matrimonial part of the formula for escaping poverty—the breakdown of the black family that Daniel Patrick Moynihan deplored two decades ago has sharply worsened for the underclass. In 1960 three-quarters of young black men reported themselves as never having been married; that's true of 93% today. But they nevertheless go on making babies. While one black child in almost six was born illegitimate in 1950, every second one was illegitimate in 1980, and today in ghettos like New York's Central Harlem, around 80% of all black babies are illegitimate. Worse, two of every five of those illegitimate babies have teenage mothers, scarcely able to take care of themselves, much less raise a child.

Half of all poor families are headed by women. By definition these families provide the clientele for the largest welfare program, Aid to Families With Dependent Children, started during the New Deal to help widows and orphans but now swollen to include families lacking male heads because of divorce or illegitimacy. True, most people who go on AFDC get off fairly soon. But the long-termers—the 10% to 15% who stay on the rolls eight



Expectant mother, 16, with her 13-month-old son, in Houston.



Members of an extended family in a Chicago apartment, early afternoon

years or more—account for over half the people on AFDC and consume more than half of all welfare payments.

The great paradox is that the underclass is a byproduct of two decades of extensive black success. Once civil rights laws and the War on Poverty expanded housing and job opportunities for blacks, middle-class and solid working-class inner city minorities fled their ghettos, leaving the unsuccessful behind. Economically diverse communities turned almost overnight into homogeneous enclaves of poverty.

The stranded suffered in their isolation. Their culture became one-dimensional, demoralized, with few hard-working role models to show that striving in school and getting up in the morning to go to work are normal activities that often produce success. No respectable contingent remained

to assert working-class and middle-class values authoritatively, keeping at least some underclass behavior in check with a good example or a sharp word. No large group of workers remained to alert youngsters to job openings and help them apply; says University of Chicago sociologist William Julius Wilson, who is black. Basic community institutions—schools, churches, stores, recreation centers—lost the support of the stable families that kept them viable, Wilson says. Crime and vandalism further hastened business flight, reducing employment and leaving little but the culture of failure, unemployment, hustling, drugs, and welfare. All these things reinforced each other, the pathological became the norm, and individual deviants solidified into an underclass.

What is to be done? Turning the welfare system inside out is the most

important first step. The current national welfare reform push, though it could end up changing only the jargon rather than the reality, so far seems to promise genuine improvement. For if the welfare system doesn't *cause* the underclass problem, it surely is one of the conditions that permits it to exist, as political scientist Charles Murray of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research showed in a pioneering book, *Losing Ground*.

MURRAY argues that welfare, because of the reworking of benefits and regulations in the Sixties, gives the poor "incentives to fail." Since 1970, AFDC—together with food stamps, Medicaid, and other benefits—has provided most women with more purchasing power than a mini-

IF THE WELFARE SYSTEM DOESN'T CAUSE THE UNDERCLASS PROBLEM, IT SURELY PERMITS IT TO EXIST.

REPORTER ASSOCIATE *Darienne L. Dennis*

IF AN INCOME IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF HAVING A BABY, WHY SHOULD UNDERCLASS WOMEN WORRY ABOUT GETTING PREGNANT?

mum-wage job. If an income is the consequence of having a baby, why should women worry about getting pregnant? Once in the welfare trap, why should they prefer an entry-level job to having another baby—especially since welfare so crushes self-esteem and initiative that those wedded to it can't see any alternative to their admittedly unsatisfactory existence? Why should they get married, since living together unmarried allows their boyfriends to work without affecting their welfare benefits and keeps control of the purse strings in their hands? A welfare mother's child "provides her with the economic insurance that a husband used to represent," says Murray. Leaving aside the breakdown of the work ethic and the development of a culture of poverty among the underclass, he says, the system itself encourages the non-marriage, illegitimate births, and non-work central to underclass pathology.

Among today's crop of welfare reformers, the almost universal solution is to replace AFDC with a workfare system. The best blueprint for such a system, sketched in a much discussed *New Republic* article by journalist Mickey Kaus, reasonably requires junking AFDC altogether. In its place, Kaus would offer anyone who wanted

it, male or female, a government job cleaning offices, repairing school playgrounds, and the like—not excluding jobs currently limited to members of government employee unions. The pay would be less than the minimum wage to encourage quick movement to private sector employment. The immediate goal is to avoid giving out checks and then trying to make recipients "work them off," a system open to endless abuse. The larger point is to end the option of an indolent life on welfare, to remove the inequity of giving someone who does nothing as much as the lowest-paid worker makes, and to break entirely with a system that, for all its benevolent intentions, has produced—according to the treacherous Law of Unintended Consequences—more evil than good.

BUT THAT'S not the workfare we're likely to get. The havoc it would inflict on current welfare recipients is enough to make lawmakers blanch. Still, among workfare systems that legislators are likely to swallow, some can be made to work, albeit gradually rather than all at once. To choose among them, just ask how well they'll reduce dependency and

nonwork. Says black economist W Williams of George Mason University: "When we set out to help, we always ask, 'What is the effect my help on this person will have on his helping self?' We have ignored that question."

Proposed solutions will fall somewhere between two existing programs—California's new GAIN, an effective end of the scale, and Massachusetts's Employment and Training Choices, nicknamed ET, at the dub end. The first of GAIN's many virtues is compulsion. To get your check, theoretically *must* be in a workfare or in county-provided training in state junior college or high school adult-education system. You'll learn reading and writing, job search and interview skills, and a trade that matches your aptitude and the labor needs of your community. If you can't find a job after all this training, the county will give you work matching your skills until you find your own job. You won't take the training seriously, then you'll have to take work unreluctantly. You'll be trained in a variety of the leaf-raking variety. If you won't comply at all, your grant will be progressively reduced. So the system has teeth, however blunt.

All laudable. But GAIN has flaws. The system isn't quite closed enough, despite being the toughest of existing workfare programs. Mothers with children under six—45% of the caseload—are exempt: You can even get GAIN by just having another baby. What's more, you don't have to take a job that pays less than the value of your welfare package, which includes Medicaid along with child care and transportation allowances while you are in training or a workfare job. Many people just coming off welfare will have trouble finding the \$13,000-a-year jobs that can equal this deal. As for the county-provided workfare jobs—to satisfy the government employee unions, most of them are in nonprofit organizations like YMCA and day-care centers. Not enough are in state agencies where, arguably, there's more real work instead of make-work. Any of these defects could stymie GAIN. So could the impulse of caseworkers to expand the various exemptions written into the program, out of misplaced kindness or fear that



In front of a house in the inner city of Washington, D.C.

■ HOW A SOCIETY TREATS INDIVIDUALS ON THE PERIPHERY ALSO AFFECTS THE PEOPLE IN THE MAINSTREAM. IT DEFINES THE SOCIETY'S VALUES FOR EVERYONE.



Young men in the central area of Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes

reduced caseloads might mean fewer social workers. And the program won't work unless California businesses prove willing to hire GAIN grads.

So far, though, people are complying and penalties are infrequent. California welfare officials think they see faint signs that the program is already pushing people to get off the rolls. So while it is too soon to know, GAIN could be on its way to effecting a gradual solution to the welfare component of the underclass problem, a solution that will take more than one welfare generation to accomplish.

GAIN DOES more than move people into the job market. It begins to change the norm for existing and potential welfare clients, which will change all the more decisively if GAIN gathers momentum. It announces that while society helps the unfortunate, it also expects them to get back on their feet and not vegetate—especially when these days most mothers of even very young children go to work. Says New

York University political scientist Lawrence M. Mead, whose *Beyond Entitlement* is one of the landmarks of the welfare reform debate: "One thing we should do that we haven't been doing is set standards. We talk politically only about rights, but obligations are just as important." The public has always expected people to earn a living and support their children; Mead thinks it's time the government did the same.

And not only because it is simple justice to welfare clients to treat them as citizens rather than as inferiors from whom normal behavior can't be expected. After all, how a society treats individuals on the periphery affects not only those people but also the people in the mainstream. It defines the society's values for everyone. It shows what the community requires from everyone. Exempting this class of able-bodied people from the common obligations and compromising the idea of equal treatment by the state weakens the larger society. It calls into question the sense of obligation for everybody, making all rules seem less than absolute and so easier

to bend or break. And it devalues achievement of those who fulfill their obligations. Says Harvard economist Glenn C. Loury, who is black: "You can't have the reward system such that people who are doing the right thing are told that they are chumps."

Most of all, exempting the welfare class from the common responsibilities of citizenship devalues the effort of the respectable poor. Back in the Sixties, policymakers decided that long-term poor were victims, that poverty not the result of their own actions but of a system that was arrayed against them. For blacks, with the added burden of discrimination, that was doubly true. To hold a chronic poor person in any way responsible for his condition—and ultimately for his actions—was "blaming the victim," in the jargon of the time, thus cruelly inappropriate. Those views not only changed welfare programs in ways that fostered the explosive growth of the underclass; they also tended to strip the life of each person of its moral significance. Says Loury: "When we told all poor peo-

■ "WHEN WE TOLD ALL POOR PEOPLE THAT YOUR POVERTY WAS SOMEONE ELSE'S FAULT, WE TOOK SOMETHING AWAY FROM THE POOR WHO WERE DOING THE RIGHT THING."

that your poverty was someone else's fault and there was nothing you could do wrong, we took something away from the poor who were doing the right thing, because they are now no different from the poor who are doing wrong." That made it all the harder for the working poor to bring up their children to be as straight as they are.

The reason ET, by contrast with GAIN, is unlikely to make inroads on the underclass problem is that it is all rights and no obligations. It leaves welfare class norms intact. Really not a workfare program at all, despite its billing, ET provides the same training smorgasbord that GAIN lays out, along with child care and Medicaid for months after you've found a job. But there are no government workfare jobs, and all that's compulsory about ET is filling out a form to register.

Though there's no way of knowing


for sure, many poverty experts feel all but certain that most of the 30,000 people ET exultantly claims to have placed in jobs were hardly underclass but rather those who land on welfare after a divorce, say, and quickly pull themselves together to find a job without something like ET—or the child care and so on that Massachusetts taxpayers now provide them.

Sometimes it is hard to share Massachusetts welfare officials' exultation. Take the case of one graduate recently exhibited as an example of ET's success. Margarita Mejias quit her \$4-an-hour job in a Holyoke shoe factory in 1984 because she saw she could do better on welfare, with Medicaid and food stamps for herself and her child. After living at state expense for two years, she moved off the rolls when ET helped her find an \$11,500-a-year job. That the toiling \$4-an-hour shoemakers of Hol-

yoke should be taxed to let a prove able-bodied worker take a vacation and then get babysitting services while training and looking for a job at leisure is an outrage. That ET sends the right signals to society strains credulity.

FOR LEGISLATORS eyeing workfare solutions, here are three politically feasible suggestions for improving on California's model. First, put a time limit on training so mothers can't be perpetual students. Second, require participation of a mothers whose children are over three, or even over two. This will require nearly two-thirds of current AFDC clients to be in the program providing the critical mass that will make work seem the normal thing rather than the exception.

Finally, don't allow the system to





Manhattan chronic drug user who isn't sure where her baby lives now

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set up clients who are under 18 in their own apartments, as often happens now. If they don't want to stay at home with their mothers, provide them group shelters with rules and child-rearing classes. Underclass teens have babies for a host of reasons, of which ignorance of birth control appears to be only a minor one. A 16-year-old girl in a Washington ghetto told reporter Leon Dash in an interview for a *Washington Post* series on pregnancies among young blacks: "When girls get pregnant, it's either because they want something to hold on to, because of circumstances at home, or because they don't really have anyone to go to. And some of them do it because they resent their parents. None of that is an accident. Every teenage girl knows about birth control pills. Even when they 12, they know what it is." States should not give girls the option of having babies to flee their parents and establish themselves as independent adults with their own welfare checks.

Workfare strives to make able-bodied mothers, rather than the state, responsible for the support of their children. Wisconsin tries to make the fathers responsible too. Armed with a new law, the state courts now try aggressively to determine paternity, an

easier task than one might think. "In the overwhelming majority of cases, the mothers know who the father is," says Irwin Garfinkel of the Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty. "This myth about promiscuity is a myth—and a racist myth." The courts then assess child-support payments—17% of the father's income for one child—and the state attaches his paycheck to assure compliance. If he has no income now, the state attaches it whenever he starts having one. The support payment goes directly to AFDC. Says Garfinkel: "We should be getting the message across to young men that if you play the game, you gotta pay."

YOUNG underclass men also need to get that message about crime. Because most of them aren't on welfare—a program primarily for women and children—society has no carrot to use to direct their behavior, as it does with underclass women. Nor have any voluntary programs notably succeeded in helping them into the mainstream. But to influence the most destructive feature of their behavior, society does have a stick—which it hasn't used very well. Crime has soared largely because few

criminals have been made to pay alty. In the Sixties, when crime ebbed, the number of state and federal prisoners fell. In the mid-Seventies, the average youthful offender in the Chicago area was arrested more than 13 times before being sent to reformatory school. Today, fewer than a third of those convicted of a serious crime against persons or property go to prison, and of the many who walk free with only probation, 65% get picked up for similar crimes within three years.

In addition to jailing criminals, other measures included, and building programs when necessary, communities need to reassert the sense of public order in inner cities. In Cleveland, a group of civic leaders has formed a Task Force on Violent Crime for this purpose. By vigorously publicizing Ohio's eight-year mandatory sentence for using a gun to commit a crime, the group has helped lower the armed robbery rate by 30% in three years in high-crime areas, especially in housing projects, the group has helped establish mini-police stations, which have pushed down the crime rates.

Economists have a vision of man as a rational calculator, scurrying among available options maximizing gain, even when hither and yon by this incentive that disincentive. This way of thinking, to be sure, has a real usefulness in grappling with the underclass problem. Where incentives for failure exist, welfare and the unwillingness to punish criminals are the two luminous cases in point—then of course the community has to change the calculus. But the kind of solution most people want for the underclass problem is larger than this vision. The ultimate goal isn't a brigade of hamburger peddlers and nursing home attendants obediently going through the motions of the sullenness of Moscow street sweepers. It is to release underclass people from their imprisonment in a shrunken and self-defeating version of humanity and to restore them to the community—to the commonplace conditions and activities and aspirations that generations have deemed the source of much of life's meaning and dignity. It does that requires not a new calculus, something like a cultural revolution.

What can be done for the underclass in this respect is meager

SUBJECT MATTER THAT COULD TEACH CHILDREN ANYTHING LARGER AND FINER THAN THE LITTLE THEY ALREADY KNEW WENT OVERBOARD IN FAVOR OF A SPECIOUS "RELEVANCE."

children are another matter. Education can rescue them en masse. Not easily—the goal after all is to nurture citizens, not just raise reading scores—but it can be done.

The earlier the effort begins, the better, preferably with Head Start-like day care. One of the many welfare shibboleths is that institutional day care isn't good for AFDC kids, depriving them of much better nurturing from their mothers. The truth is that many underclass children, already deprived of a father, also suffer bad mothering from harried, ignorant, isolated, impoverished women, often still teenagers. That's partly why underclass children are so frequently injured, burned, unimmunized; why their mothers so routinely hit them; why four out of five families reported for child abuse are welfare families. That's why so many arrive in school unable to understand cause and effect, to label and classify, to see how things are the same or different, to ask a question and trust that an adult will answer helpfully, not push it aside.

For irrefutably eloquent testimony

that a well-run developmental day care program can tackle these deficiencies, look at what the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation achieved with the celebrated early education project it began for underclass 3- and 4-year-olds in Ypsilanti, Michigan, in 1962. It randomly divided the children into a group of 58 who went through the two-year program and a control group of 65 who didn't. It then followed every child in both groups for the 19 years since the project ended. The numbers speak for themselves: Two-thirds of the program kids finished high school, compared to half the control group. Thereafter, nearly twice as many went on to college or job training, and by age 19 they were dramatically more law-abiding and self-supporting than the control group kids, who were twice as likely to have illegitimate children and be on welfare.

It makes sense to proliferate programs like this, and states that require workfare for mothers with children over 3 should use those programs as the day-care component. Though the programs are costly, the High/Scope

Foundation calculates that every dollar it spent on its target group saved society \$7 in subsequent welfare, criminal taxes, unemployment compensation, and remediation. These programs won't work unless they have skilled staffs and rich curricula, according to High/Scope President David P. Weikart. "Otherwise we will have wasted the money," he says, "and we should've built prisons instead."

UNDERCLASS children are still salvageable by the time they get to the public schools, but the schools save few of them. After conducting so many minorities into the American mainstream, why have the schools failed with the group? Unfortunately, just as the underclass problem began to inundate inner city schools, the same revamping spirit that was about to create the welfare mess was also depriving schools of the tools they needed to cope. There was a bad idea that came down the pike then, the first place it fell was in an American school," says Secretary of Education William J. Bennett.

Order and authority gave way to disruption and fear, as judges decided that school discipline was proper, their business and education experts preached that orderly schools were like prisons and authoritative principals like wardens. Standards—serviceable if usually not distinguished—disintegrated as differences in test scores and promotion rates were deemed indicative only of discrimination. When pupils needed a clear statement of right and wrong, the larger culture was saying that everything was relative, so let it all hang out. When they desperately needed to be socialized into the mainstream, mainstream values were branded racist, elitist, and oppressive. Subject matter that could teach children anything larger and finer than the little they already knew went overboard in favor of a specious "relevance." As people with political instead of educational agendas took over school boards, teachers lost interest and grew sullen. Civility, reading scores, basic skills, and the ability to imagine the varieties of human achievement deteriorated together.

Returning the schools to comp



Homeless man with hepatitis at a shelter in Miami



Choir at the Calvary Missionary Baptist Church, Houston

WHAT THESE KIDS NEEDED—WHAT UNDERCLASS KIDS NEED MOST—WAS TO BE RESTORED TO FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE LARGER COMMUNITY.

tence means reversing all this by keeping the heat on educators and school boards. Education Secretary Bennett, who has incited controversy by turning his office into a pulpit, exemplifies the appropriate kind of pressure. He holds up examples of inner city schools that do work. As he describes it, the formula for success starts with an independent, high-powered principal and dedicated teachers who stick to educational basics, set high standards for achievement and conduct, articulate what's right and wrong, nurture character, try to involve parents in their children's education, and believe and preach that all children can learn. Won't all this send inner city kids racing for the door? Thankfully, no. Bennett reports of schools he has visited: "The higher the standards, the lower the dropout rate."

State governors, too, have brought effective pressure, for instance by pushing through teacher competence testing and pay scales based on teacher performance or allowing qualified applicants who haven't taken education courses to be hired for teaching jobs. Local groups—from the Allegheny Conference, an assemblage of many of Pittsburgh's business and civic leaders, to a commission set up by the Chamber of Commerce in Savannah—

have begun to work closely with school boards and superintendents to monitor and upgrade their schools, for example by giving grants to teachers and principals for innovative projects.

A BOOMING local economy increases the leverage of such groups. It has allowed Boston business leaders to deliver on their part of a 1982 deal made with all the city's high schools, 70% of whose pupils are poor and minority. Get your act together, the business leaders told the schools; if you improve your attendance and test scores, get more students to graduate and more grads to go on to college or full-time jobs, then we will give your graduates priority for our entry-level jobs. The schools adopted annual improvement plans, toughened promotion and graduation standards, went after truants, and delivered on all counts except for cutting dropouts. Last year Boston's big corporations hired nearly a third of the graduating class at an average wage of \$5.40 an hour.

Remember the story of the impulsive millionaire, Eugene M. Lang? Looking down from the podium of his old grammar school in East Harlem at the 61

black and Hispanic graduates he was dressing in 1981, the technology entrepreneur realized how hollow they may be finding his exhortation to have dream and to go to college to achieve. Fat chance, they must be thinking. So the spur of the moment he said: "If you want to go to college, you can go, because I promise you if you do I will give you the necessary scholarship support." Stunned silence; then pandemonium. This June, more than half of them will be getting their high school diplomas, and most of the rest will graduate by December. Around two-thirds will go to college, some to top schools—in a neighborhood where the high school dropout rate is 75% and almost nobody goes to college.

But note: So far Lang hasn't spent a dime of the promised scholarship money. Money isn't primarily what accomplished this success. What these kids needed—what underclass kids need most—was to be restored to full membership in the larger community. "It's important that they grow up to realize that they are not perpetual wards of the pariah," Lang says, "but that the resources of the total community are legitimately theirs to take advantage of and contribute to and be a part of. It's a question of outlook, of self-expectations, of knowing alternatives that are available to them."

Lang's real contribution to these kids was to get involved in their lives. He made time for them and their parents to visit his office. He took them to restaurants, the opera, the theater. He advised them, explaining what it takes to become a success like him. He hired a full-time social worker to watch over them during the week, plan activities, iron out problems with schools, and keep them together as a mutually supportive peer group who increasingly came to feel special. "These kids have a substitute—not an ideal substitute—for what every reasonably affluent middle-class child has," he says. "I'm to these kids the same person that I'm to my own children."

Hearing about his program, a men's clothing manufacturer offered to give each of Lang's boys a suit. The youngsters get nothing that they can't earn," Lang explained, but went on to say he'd be glad to have four suits given as prizes to his most outstanding

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boys. At a reunion of all the kids, the four winners arrived in the suits they had chosen. "I looked for the bright colors, the signs of youth," says Lang, "and here these four boys came in, each wearing blue or charcoal pin-stripes, as though they were walking out of the training program at Morgan Stanley. I can't tell you how good I felt, because one could see what had happened inside these youngsters. Just that one thing alone to me was a silent justification of the program."

Lang has enlisted tycoons in 11 cities to take sixth-grade classes under their wings. In Detroit and Boston, black executives and professionals visit schools trying to imbue underclass youth with the goals, values, and character strength necessary to succeed. Companies including AT&T and the Chase Manhattan Bank sponsor experimental job training programs.

Not that it takes a millionaire or a corporation to give underclass kids what they need. Marva Collins does it at Westside Preparatory School, her Chicago private school for 244 mostly poor black children, a quarter of them from the notorious Cabrini-Green housing project. She teaches them everything from manners to mythology, Latin, and Shakespeare. She inculcates

the lesson that if you don't work, you don't eat. "You can't decide at age 40, after having come out of prison and a drug program, that you want to be President," she tells them. "You have to plan for it, work toward it." Her 3-year-olds read at first-grade level, and all—100%—of her graduates go to college.

Kimi Gray does it on a bigger scale at the 464-unit Kenilworth-Parkside housing project in Washington. Fed up with dirt, crime, no heat, no hot water, Gray got herself elected head of the project's residents' council in 1972 as a 25-year-old welfare mother with five kids. She and her council immediately organized tenants into committees, started cleanup brigades, and appointed safety officers to keep front doors locked and hall lights on. Whereas Kenilworth residents once had displayed their feelings about the police by turning over their cars, Gray and her supporters fostered cooperation and got residents and officers to view themselves as allies against criminals. After she persuaded tenants not to buy stolen goods, housebreaking plummeted, since you can only lug a hot TV so far. When drug pushers infested the neighborhood, she organized tenant marches to drive them out and told resident pushers and addicts that if

they didn't quit in 30 days she'd have them evicted. "Crime is down 85% to 90% since we started," says Gray.

SHE encouraged residents to take over the neighborhood PTA. Gradually their children's test scores rose, and since 1975, 582 of them have gone to college. She threatened to take some residents to court for neglecting their children. "If a white social worker said that, he'd be called racist," says Cicero Wilson, author of an American Enterprise Institute study of Gray's accomplishments. "If your neighbor says it, you can't hide behind the same slogans."

Gray took over management of the entire project in 1982, arming her efforts with economic power. She gave residents jobs, raised money to start small businesses like a screen repair shop, and used rent receipts to organize an employment agency to get tenants jobs outside the projects. After living on \$4,000 a year in welfare payments, residents found themselves earning a \$7,000 annual salary by working for Gray, perhaps supplemented by the \$4,000 wage of their teenage child whom Gray had encouraged to work at McDonald's. "That's how people get out of poverty," says Cicero Wilson. Nearly 85% of Kenilworth families were on welfare in 1972; only 20% are today. Some of the project's households earn over \$30,000 a year. "It works," says Wilson, "if people are required by their peers to be better."

Some poverty experts argue that the underclass problem is getting worse. Though the evidence is inconclusive, it doesn't seem that substantially more people are falling into the underclass, nor that its poverty is becoming more grinding, for food stamps and Medicaid have made poverty a shade less grim than it was. But every day, the underclass becomes more concentrated and isolated, its pathologies deepening. However, with a fast-strengthening consensus on welfare reform, a nationwide clamor to improve the schools, and impending labor shortages that make expanding and upgrading the work force crucial, this is also the moment when the beginning of a solution seems in reach. □



Sweethearts in the South Bronx

VICE OFFICERS WALK THIN LINE BETWEEN CRIME AND THE LAW

In Drug World, Integrity Easily Eroded

By John Mintz
and Victoria Churchville
Washington Post Staff Writers

The FBI investigation of alleged corruption among some D.C. narcotics officers represents a dubious coming of age for a department that has been known for decades as relatively free of taint.

Current and former D.C. police officials, as well as law enforcement experts throughout the country, say that it was only a matter of time before the District would become caught up in the same net that has led to corruption in dozens of law enforcement agencies nationwide: drugs.

D.C. Police Chief Maurice T. Turner, Jr. has said that the explosive growth in the sale and use of drugs here in the last two decades has made it the department's top priority. Nearly one-fourth of the District's 3,880 officers are involved somehow in narcotics enforcement.

Police experts provide a simple formula: The more drugs, the more potential for police corruption.

"With the increase in drugs, you're talking about an amount of money most policemen don't normally see in 10 years, and a greater opportunity and temptation," said Robert W. Klotz, a retired deputy D.C. police chief who is a consultant on law enforcement corruption.

The allegations under investigation in the District—that detectives kept drugs and money seized in raids, leaked information about a big raid to dealers and generally became too cozy with some alleged dealers—closely resemble the facts outline in several prosecutions of rouse narcotics squads around the nation, from New York to Chicago to Miami.

Indeed, the consensus among law enforcement officials is that narcotics work is the most corruptible of all because of the huge

amounts of money involved, the relative discretion with which vice investigators work and the close relationships they often have with their drug informants. Another lesson, they say, is that improprieties in narcotics units seem to flourish in an atmosphere of loose supervision.

"It's a slippery slope," said Patrick Murphy, who was D.C.'s public safety chief in 1967 and 1968. "In many respects, management is the issue. All over the country right now, there are sergeants, lieutenants and agents sending narcotics squads out on the street and saying a little prayer."

"It's a risky business," said Murphy, who is considered one of law enforcement's leading fighters of corruption for his work as New York City police chief in the 1970s.

"You're talking about a . . . minefield. Being a vice officer is like being in Vietnam," said Fulwood Jr., the D.C. police department's second-in-command as assistant chief for field operations. "It is one of the most stressful assignments you can have . . . You can't imagine the [informant] cutthroats out there that you need in a complex narcotics investigation."

In the midst of the local probe, top D.C. police officials are reviewing aspects of the department's narcotics enforcement: its management, organizational structure and selection and training of vice officers and commanders.

"We've got some systems that are faulty and need refining," Fulwood said. "Management has to develop a system to supervise [narcotics officers], to give them clear directions and also to maintain the physical and mental health of the people that are assigned to vice."

Some current and former local law enforcement officials said that supervision of D.C. vice officers sometimes is less than strict.

"My sense is in vice work, the individual police officer is given a lot more leeway than in any other area," said W. Randolph Teslik, who until last year was head of the grand jury section of the U.S. attorney's office and had extensive dealings with D.C. police.

Because narcotics work depends on an officer's initiative, many detectives generally are supervised only by their sergeants, if at all, Teslik said, adding that some officials do not provide the identities of their informants even to superiors. While detectives in robbery, for instance, keep written records of investigations in progress, narcotics officer rarely do, Teslik said.

"The nature of the work is that a lot of it is independent," Fulwood said. "I don't know that even with all the best guidelines in the world it would be foolproof."

James P. Shugart, a retired D.C. deputy chief who until June commanded the 4th District, the main target of the FBI probe, agreed.

"An officer assigned to vice walks a very thin line between being a police officer and being part of the criminal element, and I think we put him in jeopardy by giving him that assignment," Shugart said at a recent news conference. Choosing between good police work or corruption "is up to the individual investigator," he said.

Without commenting on the specifics of the D.C. case, 12 police officials and law enforcement specialists interviewed for this story said the 4th District allegations sound strikingly like those raised in numerous other jurisdictions. The experts say nar-

cotics officers' vulnerability to corruption often stems from the special "police culture" of vice squads.

They say that corruption is often spawned by the especially virulent frustration shared by narcotics officers. It seems that no matter how hard the vice officers work, the drug problem continues. They give as an example the D.C. police's drug crackdown, Operation Clean Sweep, which has resulted in more than 12,700 drug-related arrests for various drug offenses in one year.

"The feeling is, 'We're fighting this thing that never goes away,'" said Jim Fyfe, a law enforcement studies professor at American University and a former New York City police officer. "It creates a tremendous amount of cynicism" watching drug pushers go back to the streets soon after the officer finishes the paper work, Fyfe said. "You feel like you're hitting your head against a wall."

The frustration of being a police officer in a world awash in drugs was obvious in the case of Brian O'Regan, a New York City officer in a poor Brooklyn neighborhood. One of 11 plainclothes officers in his precinct charged with such crimes as burglarizing pushers' apartments and selling drugs to dealers. O'Regan admitted his crimes last year to a New York magazine reporter, and explained why he did what he did.

"It was you finally getting back at all the slaps you took," O'Regan said. "It was getting back at [the criminals], back at people you couldn't hit . . . It's funny how you can be good for your whole life, for so long, and then . . ." A few days after the interview, on the morning he was supposed to turn himself in to authorities to face 82 criminal counts, O'Regan shot and killed himself in a motel room.

The tale of O'Regan and his colleagues illustrates how officers' dilemmas can deepen as they become familiar with drug dealers and users, said police experts. So-called victimless crimes such as narcotics, prostitution and gambling by their nature require officers to mix frequently with criminals because it often is the

only way to obtain information. Most other police work--such as investigating hit-and-run accidents or rapes--places officers more frequently in contact with the victims.

Narcotics investigators often get informants by pressuring drug dealers or users they have arrested, police say. And detectives often end up using information from a drug gang to go after a competitor.

"You have to deal with the lowest scum of the earth," said one veteran D.C. detective. "You have to go down into the gutter with your informant . . . To a vice cop, they're his bread and butter."

"It's a generally nasty environment," said Carl Klockers, a University of Delaware police affairs expert. "It's an environment of deceit and duplicity you wade in. It's extremely difficult to keep your sights straight . . . You go native. You believe the whole world is filled by drug addicts, snitches and people of questionable virtue."

Detective Ron Robertson, a 17-year veteran of the D.C. narcotics unit, said a drug investigator has to keep his wits about him in dealing with informants. "A vice man starts getting himself in trouble when he starts developing a little rapport with a reliable source," Robertson said. "You should always remember that he's a source and it's strictly business between you."

The upside-down world of handling informants is a preoccupation for Robert Leuci, a former New York City narcotics investigator. In 1972, he acknowledged robbing drug dealers of drugs and money and giving drugs to informants. He then became a federal informant and helped indict numerous colleagues.

Leuci, who was not prosecuted in return for his cooperation, was the subject of the book and movie "Prince of the City" and now lectures to police departments nationwide, including the District's. He says he often sees investigators nodding in agreement as he delivers his lecture title "Morality and Integrity Erosion."

"There hasn't been a cop born who's changed an informant," Leuci said in an interview. "It's the

informant who changes the cop. They've been at it all their lives."

"Most cops have an ego and a macho" about their ability to control their informants, Leuci said. Often the relationship consists of elaborate mental games, he said, with a detective boasting to colleagues about how well connected his informant is and a snitch manipulating his police contact to his own advantage.

Inevitably, if they operate as equals, the street hustler will win, if only because the hustler has more money, Leuci said. He recalled times when he would get out of his beat-up car and into the El Dorado of an informant, who might have \$5,000 in his pocket. "I'd barely have enough for a frankfurter. An he'd say 'Here's \$50, get yourself some lunch.'"

Having so much money readily available--either from the drug dealers or from the department's undercover purchase fund--can be tempting.

According to a confidential police department memo and to sources, the purchase price for information varied widely, and sometimes approaches several thousand dollars. D.C. police officials are considering establishing new guidelines for use of the department's "confidential fund," used in undercover drug purchases and to pay informants.

Because so many informants are drug addicts themselves, giving money to them can lead to officers ignoring the snitches' drug use, officers say.

"Informants want money real quick and you're how they get it," a D.C. vice detective said. "They want their money quick so they can buy junk. But I don't give a damn what he does after he leaves my car."

Fulwood echoed that thought, saying that locking up an informant for a minor offense could endanger a larger investigation.

While police administrators agree that informants sometimes need to be paid, many express uneasiness at the practice of winking at snitches' improprieties. That often leads to a morally corrosive atmosphere, they said. "Once the

rationalization process starts, where does it stop?" said

Academics who study police corruption have identified a series of steps downward, from the seemingly harmless cutting of bureaucratic corners to the most coldblooded criminality. It is not known whether the pattern has developed in this way in the District.

Sometimes the first step is putting false information on search warrants, as it has been alleged in the 4th District case. That allegation prompted federal prosecutors last month to drop nearly 400 drug cases made by 4th District officers from January 1986 through last August because the prosecutors fear the officers lied under oath to a judge to obtain search warrants.

During his years as a prosecutor, Teslik said, he and his colleagues suspected a lot of perjury from D.C. narcotics investigators.

Teslik said one longtime reputed practice was for D.C. drug investigators to line up everyone in an area noted for drug activity, then take their drugs and throw them away. The practice is improper for many reasons, most prominent among them that the officers usually lacked the required probable cause to believe a crime had been committed.

"They were following a law of the streets, showing [the dealers] who's boss," Teslik said. Such officers were "the crusaders" who "didn't believe they should be subject to the same constraints as other officers," he said. Prosecutors "felt some of them were very dangerous. It was immaterial to them if they trampled on somebody's rights."

The next step, police officials say, may be taking money or drugs from one dealer and giving them to another, an informant. The officer becomes almost judge and jury himself deciding which criminals should be prosecuted and which protected.

Soon the officers may rationalize using seized money to buy themselves new surveillance equipment or a new undercover car—all in the name of better police work. These steps sometimes lead to the

most serious kind of corruption, such as stealing drugs, money and weapons from drug dealers. But some officers rationalize even those acts as a kink of frontier justice that gets around what they see as silly rules that hem them in.

The 1981 film "Prince of the City"—which closely followed the real-life events in the New York case and which has been shown in training seminars to drug investigators around the country—showed a corrupt officer confessing to prosecutors. "I don't understand why you people don't understand the system," he said. "You want a conviction but you got these stupid search and seizure laws . . . You want the big dealer out of business? The only way I know to push him out of business is to steal his cash."

However far the corrupt officer may go, his colleagues most likely are noticing at least some of it, and that's where some of the worst problems lie, experts said. Under most departmental rules, failure to report improper behavior is an offense in itself. And many officers are reluctant to violate the informal police code forbidding informing on colleagues.

"You become implicated in that web," criminologist Klockers said. "It's like a plague."

Top D.C. police officials have a number of ideas to combat corruption, such as drug testing and financial disclosure requirements for some narcotics officers.

Fulwood also said the force must try to lower the tension among narcotics officers by such techniques as stress management courses.

"You're operating in a life-and-death environment," Fulwood said. "It's not something where you can make mistakes."

Perspectives on Policing



June 1988

No. 3

A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Policing and the Fear of Crime

By Mark H. Moore and Robert C. Trojanowicz

When crimes occur—when a ghetto teenager is shot to death in a gang war, when an elderly woman is mugged for her social security check, when a nurse is raped in a hospital parking lot, when one driver is punched by another in a dispute over a parking place, when a black family's new home is vandalized—society's attention is naturally focused on the victims and their material losses. Their wounds, bruises, lost property, and inconvenience can be seen, touched, and counted. These are the concrete signs of criminal victimization.

Behind the immediate, concrete losses of crime victims, however, is a different, more abstract crime problem—that of fear. For victims, fear is often the largest and most enduring legacy of their victimization. The raped nurse will feel vulnerable long after her cuts and bruises heal. The harassed black family suffers far more from the fear of neighborhood hostility than the inconvenience of repairing their property.

For the rest of us—the not-recently, or not-yet victimized—fear becomes a contagious agent spreading the injuriousness of criminal victimization. The gang member's death makes parents despair of their children's future. The mugging of the elderly woman teaches elderly residents to fear the streets and the teenagers who roam them. The fight over the parking place confirms the general fear of strangers. The harassment of the black family makes other minorities reluctant to claim their rights. In these ways, fear extends the damage of criminal victimization.

Of course, fear is not totally unproductive. It prompts caution among citizens and thereby reduces criminal opportunities. Too, it motivates citizens to shoulder some of the burdens of crime control by buying locks and dogs, thereby adding to general deterrence. And fear kindles enthusiasm for publicly supported crime control measures. Thus, reasonable fears, channeled in constructive directions, prepare society to deal with crime. It is only when fear is unreasonable, or generates

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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counterproductive responses, that it becomes a social problem.

This paper explores fear as a problem to be addressed by the police. It examines current levels and recent trends in the fear of crime; analyzes how fear is linked to criminal victimization; considers the extent to which fear is a distinct problem that invites separate control strategies; and assesses the positive and negative social consequences of fear. It then turns to what is known about the efficacy of police strategies for managing fear; i.e., for reducing fear when it is irrational and destructive, and for channeling fear along constructive paths when it is reasonable and helpful in controlling crime.

The fear of crime

Society does not yet systematically collect data on fear. Consequently, our map of fear—its levels, trends, and social location—is sketchy. Nonetheless, its main features are easily identified.

First, fear is widespread. The broadest impact was registered by "The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime" released in 1980. Two-fifths of Americans surveyed reported that they were "highly fearful" they would become victims of violent crime.¹ Similar results were reported by the Harris poll of 1975, which found that 55 percent of all adults said they felt "uneasy" walking their own streets.² The Gallup poll of 1977 found that about 45 percent of the population (61 percent of the women and 28 percent of the men) were afraid to walk alone at night.³ An eight-city victimization survey published in 1977 found that 45 percent of all respondents limited their activities because of fear of crime.⁴ A statewide study in Michigan reported that 66 percent of respondents avoided certain places because of fear of crime.⁵ Interviews with a random sample of Texans in 1978 found that more than half said that they feared becoming a serious crime victim within a year.⁶

Second, fear of crime increased from the late 1960's to the mid-1970's, then began decreasing during the mid-1970's. According to the 1968 Gallup poll, 44 percent of the women and 16 percent of the men said that they were afraid to walk alone at night. In 1977, when a similar question was asked, 61 percent of the women and 28 percent of the men reported they were afraid to walk alone at night—an increase of 17 percent for women and 12 percent for men.⁷ In 1975, a Harris poll found that 55 percent of all adults felt "uneasy" walking their own streets. In 1985, this number had fallen to 32 percent—a significant decline.⁸

Third, fear is not evenly distributed across the population. Predictably, those who feel themselves most vulnerable are also the most fearful. Looking at the distribution of fear across age and sex categories, the greatest levels of fear are reported by elderly women. The next most frightened group seems to be all other women. The least afraid are young men.

Looking at race, class, and residence variables, blacks are more afraid of crime than whites, the poor more afraid than the middle class or wealthy, and inner-city dwellers more afraid than suburbanites.⁹

Indeed, while the current national trend may show a decline in fear, anecdotal evidence suggests that this trend has not yet reached America's ghettos. There, fear has become a condition of life. Claude Brown describes Harlem's problem in 1985:

... In any Harlem building, ... every door has at least three locks on it. Nobody opens a door without first finding out who's there. In the early evening, ... you see people ... lingering outside nice apartment houses, peeking in the lobbies. They seem to be casing the joint. They are actually trying to figure out who is in the lobby of *their* building. "Is this someone waiting to mug me? Should I risk going in, or should I wait for someone else to come?"

If you live in Harlem, USA, you don't park your automobile two blocks from your apartment house because that gives potential muggers an opportunity to get a fix on you. You'd better find a parking space within a block of your house, because if you have to walk two blocks you're not going to make it. ...

In Harlem, elderly people walking their dogs in the morning cross the street when they see some young people coming. ... And what those elderly men and women have in the paper bags they're carrying is not just a pooper scooper—it's a gun. And if those youngsters cross the street, somebody's going to get hurt.¹⁰

These findings suggest that one of the most important privileges one acquires as one gains wealth and status in American society is the opportunity to leave the fear of crime behind. The unjust irony is that "criminals walk city streets, while fear virtually imprisons groups like women and the elderly in their homes."¹¹ James K. Stewart, Director of the National Institute of Justice, traces the important long-run consequence of this uneven distribution of fear for the economic development of our cities: if the inner-city populations are afraid of crime, then commerce and investment essentially disappear, and with them, the chance for upward social mobility.¹² If Hobbes is correct in asserting that the most fundamental purpose of civil government is to establish order and protect citizens from the fear of criminal attack that made life "nasty, brutish and short" in the "state of nature," then the current level and distribution of fear indicate an important governmental failure.¹³

The causes of fear

In the past, fear was viewed as primarily caused by criminal victimization. Hence, the principal strategy for controlling crime was reducing criminal victimization. More recently, we have learned that while fear of crime is associated with criminal victimization, the relationship is less close than originally assumed.¹⁴

The association between victimization and fear is seen most closely in the aggregate patterns across time and space. Those who live in areas with high crime rates are more afraid and take more preventive action than people living in areas where the risk of victimization is lower.¹⁵ The trends in levels of fear seem to mirror (perhaps with a lag) trends in levels of crime.

Yet, the groups that are most fearful are not necessarily those with the highest victimization rates; indeed, the order is exactly reversed. Elderly women, who are most afraid, are the least frequently victimized. Young men, who are least afraid, are most often victimized.¹⁶ Even more surprisingly, past victimization has only a small impact on levels of fear; people who have heard about others' victimizations are almost as fearful as those who have actually been victimized.¹⁷ And when citizens are asked about the things that frighten them, there is little talk about "real crimes" such as robbery, rape, and murder. More often there is talk about other signs of physical decay and social disorganization such as "junk and trash in vacant lots, boarded-up buildings, stripped and abandoned cars, bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, street prostitution, panhandling, public drinking, verbal harassment of women, open gambling and drug use, and other incivilities."¹⁸

In accounting for levels of fear in communities, Wesley Skogan divides the contributing causes into five broad categories: (1) actual criminal victimization; (2) second-hand information about criminal victimization distributed through social networks; (3) physical deterioration and social disorder; (4) the characteristics of the built environment (i.e., the physical composition of the housing stock); and (5) group conflict.¹⁹ He finds the strongest effects on fear arising from physical deterioration, social disorder, and group conflict.²⁰ The impact of the built environment is hard to detect once one has subtracted the effects of other variables influencing levels of fear. A review article by Charles Murray also found little evidence of a separate effect of the built environment on fear. The only exception to this general conclusion is evidence indicating that improved street lighting can sometimes produce significant fear reductions.²¹

The important implication of these research results is that fear might be attacked by strategies other than those that directly reduce criminal victimization. Fear might be reduced even without changes in levels of victimization by using the communications within social networks to provide accurate information about risks of criminal victimization and advice about constructive responses to the risk of crime; by eliminating the external signs of physical decay and social disorder; and by more effectively regulating group conflict between young and old, whites and minority groups, rich and poor. The more intriguing possibility, however, is that if fear could be rationalized and constructively channeled, not only would fear and its adverse consequences be ameliorated, but also real levels of victimization reduced. In this sense, the conventional understanding of this problem would be reversed: instead of controlling victimization to control fear, we would manage fear to reduce victimization. To understand this possibility, we must explore the consequences of

fear—not only as ends in themselves, but also as means for helping society deal with crime.

The economic and societal consequences of fear: costs and benefits

Fear is a more or less rational response to crime. It produces social consequences through two different mechanisms. First, people are uncomfortable emotionally. Instead of luxuriating in the peace and safety of their homes, they feel vulnerable and isolated. Instead of enjoying the camaraderie of trips to school, grocery stores, and work, they feel anxious and afraid. Since these are less happy conditions than feeling secure, fear produces an immediate loss in personal well-being.

Second, fear motivates people to invest time and money in defensive measures to reduce their vulnerability. They stay indoors more than they would wish, avoid certain places, buy extra locks, and ask for special protection to make bank deposits. Since this time, effort, and money could presumably be spent on other things that make people happier, such expenditures must also be counted as personal costs which, in turn, become social costs as they are aggregated.

These are far from trivial issues. The fact that two-fifths of the population is afraid and that the Nation continues to nominate crime as one of its greatest concerns means that society is living less securely and happily than is desirable. And if 45 percent of the population restricts its daily behavior to minimize vulnerability, and the Nation spends more than \$20 billion on private security protection, then private expenditures on reducing fear constitute a significant component of the national economy.²² All this is in addition to the \$40 billion that society spends publicly on crime control efforts.²³ In short, fear of crime claims a noticeable share of the Nation's welfare and resources.

Fear has a further effect. Individual responses to fear aggregate in a way that erodes the overall quality of community life and, paradoxically, the overall capacity of society to deal with crime.²⁴ This occurs when the defensive reactions of individuals essentially compromise community life, or when they exacerbate the disparities between rich and poor by relying too much on private rather than public security.

Skogan has described in detail the mechanisms that erode community life:

Fear . . . can work in conjunction with other factors to stimulate more rapid neighborhood decline. Together, the spread of fear and other local problems provide a form of positive feedback that can further increase levels of crime. These feedback processes include (1) physical and psychological withdrawal from community life; (2) a weakening of the informal social control processes that inhibit crime and disorder; (3) a decline in the organizational life and mobilization capacity of

the neighborhood; (4) deteriorating business conditions; (5) the importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance; and (6) further dramatic changes in the composition of the population. At the end lies a stage characterized by demographic collapse.²⁵

Even if fear does not destroy neighborhood life, it can damage it by prompting responses which protect some citizens at the expense of others, thereby leading to greater social disparities between rich and poor, resourceful and dependent, well-organized and anomic communities. For example, when individuals retreat behind closed doors and shuttered windows, they make their own homes safer. But they make the streets more dangerous, for there are fewer people watching and intervening on the streets. Or, when individuals invest in burglar alarms or private security guards rather than spending more on public police forces, they may make themselves safer, but leave others worse off because crime is deflected onto others.

Similarly, neighborhood patrols can make residents feel safe. But they may threaten and injure other law-abiding citizens who want to use the public thoroughfares. Private security guards sometimes bring guns and violence to situations that would otherwise be more peaceably settled. Private efforts may transform our cities from communities now linked to one another through transportation, commerce, and recreation, to collections of isolated armed camps, shocking not only for their apparent indifference to one another, but also ultimately for their failure to control crime and reduce fear. In fact, such constant reminders of potential threats may actually increase fear.

Whether fear produces these results or not depends a great deal on how citizens respond to their fears. If they adopt defensive, individualistic solutions, then the risks of neighborhood collapse and injustice are increased. If they adopt constructive, community-based responses, then the community will be strengthened not only in terms of its ability to defend itself, but also as an image of civilized society. Societies built on communal crime control efforts have more order, justice, and freedom than those based on individualistic responses. Indeed, it is for these reasons that social control and the administration of justice became public rather than private functions.

Police strategies for reducing fear

If it is true that fear is a problem in its own right, then it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of police strategies not only in terms of their capacity to control crime, but also in terms of their capacity to reduce fear. And if fear is affected by more factors than just criminal victimization, then there might be some special police strategies other than controlling victimization that could be effective in controlling the fear of crime.

Over the last 30 years, the dominant police strategy has emphasized three operational components: motorized patrol,

rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation of crimes.²⁶ The principal aim has been to solve crimes and capture criminals rather than reduce fear. The assumption has been that if victimization could be reduced, fear would decrease as well. Insofar as fear was considered a separate problem, police strategists assumed that motorized patrol and rapid response would provide a reassuring police omnipresence.²⁷

To the extent that the police thought about managing citizens' individual responses to crime, they visualized a relationship in which citizens detected crime and mobilized the police to deal with it—not one in which the citizens played an important crime control role. The police advised shopkeepers and citizens about self-defense. They created 911 telephone systems to insure that citizens could reach them easily. And they encouraged citizens to mark their property to aid the police in recovering stolen property. But their primary objective was to make themselves society's principal response to crime. Everything else was seen as auxiliary.

As near monopolists in supplying enhanced security and crime control, police managers and union leaders were ambivalent about the issue of fear. On the one hand, as those responsible for security, they felt some obligation to enhance security and reduce fear. That was by far the predominant view. On the other hand, if citizens were afraid of crime and the police were the solution, the police department would benefit in the fight for scarce municipal funds. This fact has tempted some police executives and some unions to emphasize the risks of crime.²⁸

The strategy that emphasized motorized patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation of crimes was not designed to reduce fear other than by a reduction in crime. Indeed, insofar as the principal objective of this strategy was to reduce crime, and insofar as citizens were viewed as operational auxiliaries of the police, the police could increase citizens' vigilance by warning of the risks of crime. Nevertheless, to the extent that reduced fear was considered an important objective, it was assumed that the presence and availability of police through motorized patrols and response to calls would achieve that objective.

The anticipated effects of this strategy on levels of fear have not materialized. There have been some occasions, of course, when effective police action against a serial murderer or rapist has reassured a terrorized community. Under ordinary circumstances, however, success of the police in calming fears has been hard to show. The Kansas City experiment showed that citizens were unaware of the level of patrol that occurred in their area. Consequently, they were neither reassured by increased patrolling nor frightened by reduced levels of patrol.²⁹ Subsequent work on response times revealed that fast responses did not necessarily reassure victims. Before victims even called the police, they often sought assistance and comfort from friends or relatives. Once they called, their satisfaction was related more to their expectations of when the police would arrive than to actual response time. Response time alone was not a significant

factor in citizen satisfaction.³⁰ Thus, the dominant strategy of policing has not performed particularly well in reducing or channeling citizens' fears.

In contrast to the Kansas City study of *motorized* patrol, two field experiments have now shown that citizens are aware of increases or decreases in levels of *foot* patrol, and that increased foot patrol reduces citizens' fears. After reviewing surveys of citizens' assessments of crime problems in neighborhoods that had enhanced, constant, or reduced levels of foot patrol, the authors of *The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment* concluded:

... persons living in areas where foot patrol was created perceived a notable decrease in the severity of crime-related problems.³¹

And:

Consistently, residents in beats where foot patrol was added see the severity of crime problems diminishing in their neighborhoods at levels greater than the other two [kinds of] areas.³²

Similarly, a foot patrol experiment in Flint, Michigan, found the following:

Almost 70 percent of the citizens interviewed during the final year of the study felt safer because of the Foot Patrol Program. Moreover, many qualified their response by saying that they felt especially safe when the foot patrol officer was well known and highly visible.³³

Whether foot patrol can work in less dense cities, and whether it is worth the cost, remain arguable questions. But the experimental evidence clearly supports the hypothesis that fear is reduced among citizens exposed to foot patrol.

Even more significantly, complex experiments in Newark and Houston with a varied mix of fear reduction programs showed that at least some programs could successfully reduce citizens' fears. In Houston, the principal program elements included:

- (1) a police community newsletter designed to give accurate crime information to citizens;
- (2) a community organizing response team designed to build a community organization in an area where none had existed;
- (3) a citizen contact program that kept the same officer patrolling in a particular area of the city and directed him to make individual contacts with citizens in the area;
- (4) a program directing officers to re-contact victims of crime in the days following their victimization to reassure them of the police presence; and
- (5) establishing a police community contact center staffed by two patrol officers, a civilian coordinator, and three police aids, within which a school program aimed at reducing truancy and a park program designed to reduce vandalism and increase use of a local park were discussed, designed, and operated.³⁴

In Newark, some program elements were similar, but some were unique. Newark's programs included the following:

- (1) a police community newsletter;
- (2) a coordinated community policing program that included a directed police citizen contact program, a neighborhood community police center, neighborhood cleanup activities, and intensified law enforcement and order maintenance;
- (3) a program to reduce the signs of crime that included: a) a directed patrol task force committed to foot patrol, radar checks on busy roads, bus checks to enforce city ordinances on buses, and enforcement of disorderly conduct laws; and b) a neighborhood cleanup effort that used police auspices to pressure city service agencies to clean up neighborhoods, and to establish a community work program for juveniles that made their labor available for cleanup details.³⁵

Evaluations of these different program elements revealed that programs "designed to increase the quantity and improve the quality of contacts between citizens and police" were generally successful in reducing citizens' fears.³⁶ This meant that the Houston Citizen Contact Patrol, the Houston Community Organizing Response Team, the Houston Police Community Station, and the Newark Coordinated Community Policing Program were all successful in reducing fear.

Other approaches which encouraged close contact, such as newsletters, the victim re-contact program, and the signs-of-crime program, did not produce clear evidence of fear reduction in these experiments. The reasons that these programs did not work, however, may have been specific to the particular situations rather than inherent in the programs themselves. The victim re-contact program ran into severe operating problems in transmitting information about victimization from the reporting officers to the beat patrol officers responsible for the re-contacts. As a result, the contacts came far too long after the victimization. Newsletters might be valuable if they were published and distributed in the context of ongoing conversations with the community about crime problems. And efforts to eliminate the signs of crime through order maintenance and neighborhood cleanup might succeed if the programs were aimed at problems identified by the community. So, the initial failures of these particular program elements need not condemn them forever.

The one clear implication of both the foot patrol and fear reduction experiments is that closer contact between citizens and police officers reduces fear. As James Q. Wilson concludes in his foreword to the summary report of the fear reduction experiment:

In Houston, . . . opening a neighborhood police station, contacting the citizens about their problems, and stimulating the formation of neighborhood organizations where none had existed can help reduce the fear of crime and even reduce the actual level of victimization.³⁷

In Newark, many of the same steps—including opening a storefront police office and directing the police to make con-

tacts with the citizens in their homes—also had beneficial effects.

The success of these police tactics in reducing fear, along with the observation that fear is a separate and important problem, suggests a new area in which police can make a substantial contribution to the quality of life in the Nation's cities. However, it seems likely that programs like those tried in Flint, Newark, and Houston will not be tried elsewhere unless mayors and police administrators begin to take fear seriously as a separate problem. Such programs are expensive and take patrol resources and managerial attention away from the traditional functions of patrol and retrospective investigation of crimes. Unless their effects are valued, they will disappear as expensive luxuries.

On the other hand, mayors and police executives could view fear as a problem in its own right and as something that inhibits rather than aids effective crime control by forcing people off the streets and narrowing their sense of control and responsibility. If that were the case, not only would these special tactics become important, but the overall strategy of the department might change. That idea has led to wider and more sustained attacks on fear in Baltimore County and Newport News.

In Baltimore County, a substantial portion of the police department was committed to the Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit—a program designed to improve the quantity and quality of contacts between citizens and the police and to work on problems of concern to citizens.³⁸ A major objective was to reduce fear. The effort succeeded. Measured levels of fear dropped an average of 10 percent for the various projects during a 6 month period.³⁹ In Newport News, the entire department shifted to a style of policing that emphasized problem-solving over traditional reactive methods.⁴⁰ This approach, like COPE, took citizens' fears and concerns seriously, as well as serious crime and calls for service.

NCJ 111459

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The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates the activities of the following program Offices and Bureaus: National Institute of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Office for Victims of Crime.

These examples illustrate the security-enhancing potential of problem-solving and community approaches to policing. By incorporating fear reduction as an important objective of policing, by changing the activities of the police to include more frequent, more sustained contacts with citizens, and by consultation and joint planning, police departments seem to be able not only to reduce fear, but to transform it into something that helps to build strong social institutions. That is the promise of these approaches.

Conclusion

Fear of crime is an important problem in its own right. Although levels of fear are related to levels of criminal victimization, fear is influenced by other factors, such as a general sense of vulnerability, signs of physical and social decay, and inter-group conflict. Consequently, there is both a reason for fear and an opportunity to work directly on that fear, rather than indirectly through attempts to reduce criminal victimization.

The current police strategy, which relies on motorized patrol, rapid responses to calls for service, and retrospective investigations of crime, seems to produce little reassurance to frightened citizens, except in unusual circumstances when the police arrest a violent offender in the middle of a crime spree. Moreover, a focus on controlling crime rather than increasing security (analogous to the medical profession's focus on curing disease rather than promoting health) leads the police to miss opportunities to take steps that would reduce fear independently of reducing crime. Consequently, the current strategy of policing does not result in reduced fear. Nor does it leave much room for fear reduction programs in the police department.

This is unfortunate, because some fear reduction programs have succeeded in reducing citizens' fears. Two field experiments showed that foot patrol can reduce fear and promote security. Programs which enhance the quantity and quality of police contacts with citizens through neighborhood police stations and through required regular contacts between citizens and police have been successful in reducing fear in Houston and Newark.

The success of these particular programs points to the potential of a more general change in the strategy of policing that (1) would make fear reduction an important objective and (2) would concentrate on improving the quantity and quality of contacts between citizens and police at all levels of the department. The success of these approaches has been demonstrated in Baltimore County and Newport News.

Based on this discussion, it is apparent that a shift in strategy would probably be successful in reducing fear, and that that would be an important accomplishment. What is more speculative (but quite plausible) is that community policing would also be successful in channeling the remaining fear along constructive rather than destructive paths. Criminal victimization would be reduced, and the overall quality of community life enhanced beyond the mere reduction in fear.

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met six times. During the 3-day meetings, the 30 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.



Crime and Policing

By Mark H. Moore, Robert C. Trojanowicz, and George L. Kelling

The core mission of the police is to control crime. No one disputes this. Indeed, professional crime fighting enjoys wide public support as the basic strategy of policing precisely because it embodies a deep commitment to this objective. In contrast, other proposed strategies such as problem-solving or community policing appear on the surface to blur this focus.¹ If these strategies were to leave the community more vulnerable to criminal victimization, they would be undesirable alternatives. In judging the value of alternative police strategies in controlling crime, however, one should not be misled by rhetoric or mere expressed commitment to the goal; one must keep one's eye on demonstrated effectiveness in achieving the goal.

Professional crime-fighting now relies predominantly on three tactics: (1) motorized patrol; (2) rapid response to calls for service; and (3) retrospective investigation of crimes.² Over the past few decades, police responsiveness has been enhanced by connecting police to citizens by telephones, radios, and cars, and by matching police officer schedules and locations to anticipated calls for service.³ The police focus on serious crime has also been sharpened by screening calls for service, targeting patrol, and developing forensic technology (e.g., automated fingerprint systems, computerized criminal record files, etc.).⁴

Although these tactics have scored their successes, they have been criticized within and outside policing for being reactive rather than proactive. They have also been criticized for failing to prevent crime.⁵

Reactive tactics have some virtues, of course. The police go where crimes have occurred and when citizens have summoned them; otherwise, they do not intrude. The police keep their distance from the community, and thereby retain their impartiality. They do not develop the sorts of relationships with citizens that could bias their responses to crime incidents. These are virtues insofar as they protect citizens from an overly intrusive, too familiar police.

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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Moreover, the reactive tactics do have preventive effects—at least in theory. The prospect of the police arriving at a crime in progress as a result of a call or a chance observation is thought to deter crimes.⁶ The successful prosecution of offenders (made possible by retrospective investigation) is also thought to deter offenders.⁷ And even if it does not deter, a successfully prosecuted investigation incapacitates criminals who might otherwise go on to commit other crimes.⁸

“Reactive tactics do have preventive effects — at least in theory . . .”

Finally, many police forces have developed proactive tactics to deal with crime problems that could not be handled through conventional reactive methods. In drug dealing, organized crime, and vice enforcement, for example, where no immediate victims exist to mobilize the police, the police have developed special units which rely on informants, covert surveillance, and undercover investigations rather than responses to calls for service.⁹ In the area of juvenile offenses where society's stake in preventing crimes seems particularly great, the police have created athletic leagues, formed partnerships with schools to deal with drug abuse and truancy, and so on.¹⁰ It is not strictly accurate, then, to characterize modern policing as entirely reactive.

Still, the criticism of the police as being too reactive has some force. It is possible that the police could do more to control serious crime than they now achieve. Perhaps research will yield technological breakthroughs that will dramatically improve the productivity of police investigation. For now, however, the greatest potential for improved crime control may not lie in the continued enhancement of response times, patrol tactics, and investigative techniques. Rather, improved crime control can be achieved by (1) diagnosing and managing problems in the community that produce serious crimes; (2) fostering closer relations with the community to facilitate crime solving; and (3) building self-defense capabilities within the community itself. Among the results may be increased apprehension of criminals. To the extent that problem-solving or community strategies of policing direct attention to and prepare the police to exploit local knowledge and capacity to control crime, they will be useful to the future of policing. To explore these possibilities, this paper examines what is known about serious crime: what it is, where and how it occurs, and natural points of intervention. Current and proposed police tactics are then examined in light of what is known about their effectiveness in fighting serious crime.

Serious crime

To individual citizens, a serious crime is an offense that happened to *them*. That is why police departments throughout the country are burdened with calls requesting responses to offenses that the police regard as minor. While there are

reasons to take such calls seriously, there is also the social and administrative necessity to weigh the relative gravity of the offenses. Otherwise, there is no principle for apportioning society's indignation and determination to punish; nor is there any basis for rationing police responses. The concept of serious crime, then, is necessarily a *social* judgment—not an individual one. Moreover, it is a *value* judgment—not simply a technical issue. The question of what constitutes serious crime is resolved formally by the criminal code. But the criminal code often fails to give precise guidance to police administrators who must decide which crimes to emphasize. They need some concept that distinguishes the offenses that properly outrage the citizenry and require extended police attention from the many lesser offenses that pose less urgent threats to society.

Like many things that require social value judgments, the issue of what constitutes serious crime is badly neglected.¹¹ Rather than face a confusing public debate, society relies on convention, or administrative expertise, or some combination of the two, to set standards. Yet, if we are to assess and improve police practice in dealing with serious crime, it is necessary to devote some thought to the question of what constitutes serious crime.

“To individual citizens, a serious crime is an offense that happened to them. That is why police departments . . . are burdened with calls requesting responses to offenses that the police regard as minor.”

Defining serious crime

The usual view of serious crime emphasizes three characteristics of offenses. The most important is physical violence or violation. Death, bloody wounds, crippling injuries, even cuts and bruises increase the severity of a crime.¹² Sexual violation also has a special urgency.¹³ Crime victims often suffer property losses as well as pain and violation. Economic losses count in reckoning the seriousness of an offense. Still, society generally considers physical attacks—sexual and nonsexual—as far more serious than attacks on property.¹⁴

A second feature of serious crime concerns the size of the victim's losses. A robbery resulting in a murder or a permanent, disfiguring injury is considered worse than one that produces only cuts, bruises, and fears. An armored car heist netting millions is considered more serious than a purse-snatching yielding the price of a junkie's next fix.

Third, the perceived seriousness of an offense is influenced by the relationship between offenders and victims. Commonly, crimes against strangers are viewed as more serious than crimes committed in the context of ongoing relationships.¹⁵ The reason is partly that the threat to society from indiscriminate predators is more far-reaching than the threat

from offenders who limit their targets to spouses, lovers, and friends. Moreover, society judges the evil intent of the offender to be more evident in crimes against strangers. In these crimes, there are no chronic grievances or provocations in the background to raise the issue of who attacked whom first and in what way. The crime is an out-and-out attack, not a mere dispute.¹⁶

These characteristics—violence, significant losses to victims, predatory strangers—capture much of what is important to societal and police images of serious crime. The intuitive appeal of these criteria is reflected in the categories of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. Murder, rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and auto theft (most presumably committed by strangers) are prominently reported as Part I Offenses. This key, national account of crime not only reflects, but anchors society's view of serious crime as predatory street crime.

“ Society judges the evil intent of the offender to be more evident in crimes against strangers. ”

While this notion has the sanction of intuitive appeal, convention, and measurement, it also contains subtle biases which, once pointed out, might cause society and the police to adjust their traditional views. First, the accepted image of crime seems to downplay the importance of crime committed in the context of ongoing relationships. From the perspective of the general citizenry, such offenses seem less important because they do not pose a *general* threat to society. From the perspective of the police (and other criminal justice officials), such crimes are less clear-cut because the existence of the prior relationship muddies the distinction between offender and victim and increases the likelihood that a case will be dropped when the antagonists resolve the dispute that produced the offense.

From the victim's point of view, however, the fact of a relationship to the offender dramatically intensifies the seriousness of the offense. A special terror arises when one is locked into an abusive relationship with a spouse or lover. A date that turns into a rape poisons a victim's psyche much more than an attack by a stranger. And, as Boston Police Commissioner Mickey Roache found when he was heading a unit dealing with interracial violence in Boston, serious interracial intimidation and violence did not appear in crime reports as robberies or burglaries. Rather, the serious crimes appeared as vandalism. What made the vandalism terrifying was that it was directed at the same address night after night.

Second, the view of serious crime as predatory violence tends to obscure the importance of fear as a separate, pernicious aspect of the crime problem. To a degree, the issue of fear is incorporated in the conventional view of serious crime. Indeed, fear is what elevates predatory street crimes above crimes that occur within personal relationships. What the conventional view misses, however, is the empiri-

cal fact that minor offenses and incivilities trigger citizens' fears more than actual crime victimization. Rowdy youth, abandoned cars, and graffiti frighten people, force them to restrict their movements, and motivate them to buy guns, locks and dogs. To the extent that the conventional view of serious crime deflects attention from fear and the offenses that stimulate fear, it may obscure an important opportunity for the police to contribute to the solution of the serious crime problem.

Third, defining serious crime in terms of the absolute magnitude of material losses to victims (without reference to the victim's capacity to absorb the loss, or the implications of the losses for people other than the victim) introduces the potential for injustice and ineffectiveness in targeting police attention. In the conventional view, a jewel theft at a swank hotel attracts more attention than the mugging of an elderly woman for her Social Security check. Yet it is clear that the stolen Social Security check represents a larger portion of the elderly woman's wealth than the losses to the hotel's well-insured customers. The robbery of a federally insured bank would attract more attention than the robbery of an inner-city convenience store. But the robbery of the ghetto store could end the entrepreneurial career of the owner, drive the store from the area, and, with the store's departure, deprive the neighborhood of one of its few social underpinnings.

Fourth, to the extent that the conventional view of crime emphasizes the reality of individual criminal victimization, it underplays crimes that have symbolic significance. The current emphasis on child sexual abuse, for example, is important in part because it sustains a broad social commitment to the general care and protection of children. The current emphasis on domestic assault, among other things, helps to sustain a normative movement that is changing the status of women in marriages. The interest in white-collar economic crimes and political corruption can be explained by the desire to set higher standards for the conduct of those in powerful positions. The social response to these offenses is important because it strengthens, or redefines, broad social norms.

“ The view of crime as predatory . . . misses the terror of the abused spouse or molested child, the wide social consequences of driving merchants out of business, the rot that drug dealing brings . . . , and the polarizing effects of fear. ”

In sum, the view of crime as predatory, economically significant violence stresses the substantial losses associated with street offenses. It obscures the losses to society that result from offenses that poison relationships, transform neighborhoods into isolated camps, and undermine important social institutions. It misses the terror of the abused spouse or

molested child, the wide social consequences of driving merchants out of business, the rot that drug dealing brings to an urban community, and the polarizing effects of fear. An alternative view of serious crime would be one that acknowledged violence as a key component of serious crime but added the issues of safety within relationships, the importance of fear, and the extent to which offenses collapse individual lives and social institutions as well as inflict individual losses. This enlarged conception rests on the assumption that the police can and should defend more social terrain than the streets. Their challenge is to preserve justice and order within the institutions of the community.

Levels, trends, and social location of serious crime

It is no simple matter to represent the current levels, recent trends, and social location of serious crime. Still, several important observations can be made.

First, in any year, a noticeable fraction of American households is touched by serious crime. In 1986, 5 percent of American households experienced the violence associated with a rape, robbery, or assault. Almost 8 percent of households were touched by at least one serious crime: rape, robbery, aggravated assault, or burglary.¹⁷ When considering the likelihood that a household will be victimized sometime in the next 5 years, these figures increase dramatically, for a household faces these risks *each year*. Thus, most American households have first- or second-hand experience with serious crime.

Second, from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's, the United States experienced a dramatic increase in the level of serious crime. In fact, the level of serious crime reached historic highs. Since the mid-seventies, the level of serious crime has remained approximately constant, or declined slightly.¹⁸

“Criminal victimization is disproportionately concentrated among minority and poor populations in the United States.”

Third, criminal victimization is disproportionately concentrated among minority and poor populations in the United States. Homicide is the leading cause of death for young minority males living in metropolitan areas.¹⁹ Black households are victimized by violent crimes such as robbery, rape, and aggravated assault at one and a half times the frequency of white families. The poor are victimized at one and a half times the rate of the wealthy.²⁰ These numbers probably underestimate the real differences in the losses—material and psychological—experienced by rich and poor victims, since those who are black and poor have fewer resources to deal with the losses associated with victimization.

Precipitating causes of serious crime

In searching for ways to prevent or control serious crime, the police look for precipitating causes. While it may be useful to examine what some call the root causes of crime (e.g., social injustice, unequal economic opportunity, poor schooling, weak family structures, or mental illness), such things are relatively unimportant from a police perspective since the police exercise little influence over them.²¹ The police operate on the surface of social life. They must handle incidents, situations, and people as they are now—not societies or people as they might have been. For these reasons, the immediately precipitating causes of serious crime are far more important to the police than are broader questions about the root causes of crime. Four precipitating causes of crime seem relevant to policing: (1) dangerous people; (2) criminogenic situations; (3) alcohol and drug use; and (4) frustrating relationships.

“The police . . . must handle incidents, situations, and people as they are now — not societies or people as they might have been.”

One way the police view serious crime is to see the precipitating cause in the character of the offender. A crime occurs when a predatory offender finds a victim. One could reduce such events by teaching potential victims to avoid situations and behaviors that make them vulnerable. And, to some degree, the police do this. But the far more common and attractive path for controlling predatory crime is to identify and apprehend the predators. Thus, dangerous offenders can be seen as a precipitating cause of serious crime and an important focus of police attention.²²

Recent research on criminal careers provides a firm empirical basis for this view.²³ Interviews with convicted criminals conducted by the Rand Corporation indicate that some criminal offenders committed crimes very frequently and sustained this activity over a long career.²⁴ Moreover, these violent predators accounted for a substantial amount of the serious crime.²⁵ Now, an investigation of the root causes of such patterns of offending might disclose strong influences of social disadvantage and psychological maltreatment in shaping the personalities of such offenders. Moreover, the influence of these factors might reasonably mitigate their guilt. One might also hold out some hope for their future rehabilitation (through the natural process of aging if nothing else). So, the criminal proclivities of violent predators need not be viewed as either inevitable or unchangeable. From the vantage point of the police, however, the presence of such offenders in the community can reasonably be viewed as an important precipitating cause of crime. Controlling such offenders through incapacitation or close surveillance thus becomes an important crime control strategy.

Having noted the role of dangerous offenders in producing serious crime, it is worth emphasizing that such offenders

account for only a portion of the total amount of serious crime—far more than their share, but still only about half of all serious crime.²⁶ The necessary conclusion is that a significant portion of the serious crime problem cannot be attributed to determined attacks by career criminals or to predatory offenders. These crimes arise from quite different causes.

Some of these crimes might be produced by situational effects. Darkness and congestion around a subway exit may create an attractive location for muggings. An after-hours bar may host more than its share of fights. A rock house from which crack is being sold may become a magnet for violence. Closing time in a popular disco may produce fights among teenagers leaving the scene. In sum, there are some places, times, and activities that bring people together in ways that increase the likelihood of serious crime.

The fact that this occurs is knowable to police. By analyzing calls for service, they can observe that there are repeated calls made from certain places and at certain times.²⁷ These "hot spots" become important targets of police attention.²⁸ For example, patrol units might be dispatched just to sit and observe at the appropriate times. There may also be other solutions including permanent changes in the criminogenic situations. For example, the subway area could be lighted; the attention of a neighborhood watch group could be directed to the trouble spot; the after-hours bar could be put out of business; aggressive street-level enforcement could be directed against the rock house; or transportation could be arranged for the kids leaving the disco so the crowd thins out more quickly.²⁹

Crimes are also significantly related to alcohol or drug abuse.³⁰ It is now quite clear that: (1) a surprisingly high percentage of those arrested for serious crimes are drug or alcohol users;³¹ (2) many offenders have drunk alcohol or taken drugs prior to committing crimes;³² and (3) victims as well as offenders are often intoxicated or under the influence of drugs.³³ What is unclear is exactly how alcohol and drugs produce their criminogenic effect. Four hypotheses have been advanced to explain this phenomenon.³⁴

“ Intoxicated people make particularly good victims. ”

The first is that physiological effects stimulate or license the person to commit crimes. The theory of stimulation may be appropriate to methamphetamines or PCP, which sometimes seem to produce violent reactions among consumers. The theory of licensing or disinhibition seems more appropriate in the case of alcohol where the release of inhibitions is arguably the mechanism that permits offenses to occur.³⁵

Second, dependence or addiction forces users to spend more money on purchasing drugs, and they turn to crime in a desperate effort to maintain their habits. This is a powerful

theory in the case of heroin (under conditions of prohibition), and perhaps for cocaine. It is far less powerful for alcohol or marijuana.

Third, drug use gradually demoralizes people by putting them on the wrong side of the law, bringing them into contact with criminals, and gradually weakening their commitment to the obligations of a civil society. Again, this seems more appropriate for those who become deeply involved with drugs and alcohol over a long period of time, and therefore relies more on the dependence-producing attributes of drugs rather than on the immediate intoxicating effects.

Fourth, intoxicated people make particularly good victims. In some cases, intoxication makes people vulnerable to victimization.³⁶ In other cases, it causes victims to provoke their attackers.³⁷ In either case, a serious crime can result.

Whichever theory, or theories, is correct, the close association among drugs, alcohol, and serious crime suggests that the amount of serious crime might be decreased by reducing levels of alcohol and drug use, or by identifying those offenders who use drugs intensively and reducing their consumption.³⁸

“ Many serious crimes — including murders, robberies, rapes, and burglaries — are disputes and grievances among people rather than criminal attacks. ”

Finally, the fact that many serious offenses occur in the context of ongoing relationships suggests that some relationships may be criminogenic. Relationships can cause crime because they create expectations. If the expectations are not met, the resulting disappointment produces anger. Anger may lead to vengeance and retaliation. In such cycles, the question of who caused the ultimate crime becomes confused. Usually, the offender is the one least damaged after the fight. A court may conclude that the crime stemmed from the evil intentions of the person identified as the offender. But this may not be the best way to view the problem from the vantage point of crime control or crime prevention.

It might be more suitable to see the crimes as emerging from a set of relationships that are frustrating and provocative. The proper response might be to work on the relationship through mediation, restructuring, or dissolution. Indeed, this is often the challenge confronting the police when they encounter spouse abuse, child abuse, and other sorts of intrafamily violence. In such situations, arrests may be appropriate and effective in deterring future crime and in restructuring the relationship.³⁹ There are many other crimes which emerge from less obvious relationships: the personal relationships of

neighbors and friends; the economic relations of landlord and tenant or employer and employee; or transient relations that last just long enough to provoke a quarrel or seed a grudge. Seen this way, many serious crimes—including murders, robberies, rapes, and burglaries—are disputes and grievances among people rather than criminal attacks.

Controlling serious crime

Currently the police fight serious crime by developing a capacity to intercept it—to be in the right place at the right time so that the crime is thwarted, or to arrive so quickly after the fact that the offender is caught. Reactive crime fighting is intuitively appealing to both the police and those to whom the police are accountable. It is unclear, however, whether the reactive response really works. Over the last two decades, confidence in the reactive approach has been eroded by the accumulation of empirical evidence suggesting that these tactics are of only limited effectiveness. It is not that the approach fails to control crime. (It would be foolish to imagine that levels of serious crime would stay the same if police patrols and investigations were halted.) Rather, the limits of the reactive strategy are now becoming apparent. Further gains in police effectiveness in dealing with serious crime must come from different approaches. Key research findings suggesting the limitations of the reactive approach are these.

First, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study found that levels of serious crime were not significantly influenced by doubling the number of cars patrolling the streets.⁴⁰ This cast doubt on the potential for reducing serious crime simply by increasing the level of preventive patrol.

Second, a study of the effectiveness of rapid response to calls for service (also in Kansas City) found that the probability of making an arrest for most serious crimes was unaffected by the speed with which the police responded. The crucial factor was not the speed of the police response, but the speed with which citizens raised the alarm. If citizens did not notice the crime, or did not call the police quickly, no amount of speed in the police response helped much.⁴¹

“ If citizens did not notice the crime, or did not call the police quickly, no amount of speed in the police response helped much. ”

Third, studies of the investigative process revealed that the key factor in determining whether a crime was solved was the quality of the information contributed to the investigation by victims and witnesses about the identity of the offender.⁴² If they could not be helpful, forensic wizardry generally was not up to solving the crime.

It is important to understand that these weaknesses appeared in precisely those areas of crime control where the reactive strategy should have been particularly strong: i.e., in dealing with crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, and burglary. These crimes could be expected to produce alarms; they also were interceptable and solvable by a vigilant police force waiting to be mobilized by outraged citizens.

There are, of course, many other kinds of serious crimes for which the reactive police strategy is much more obviously inappropriate.⁴³ It cannot, for example, deal with consensual crimes such as drug dealing behind closed doors. Nor can it deal with crimes such as extortion and loan sharking where the victims are too afraid to report the crimes. A reactive strategy cannot deal with sophisticated white collar crimes or political corruption where the losses associated with the crimes are so widely distributed that people do not notice that they have been victimized. Finally, a reactive strategy cannot deal even with traditional street crimes in those parts of cities where confidence in the police has eroded to such a degree that the citizens no longer call when they are victimized.

“ Confronted by high levels of crime and limited budgets, the police felt a growing need for initiative and thoughtfulness in tackling serious crime. ”

Although these findings and intrinsic limitations of the reactive strategy have not unseated the intuitive appeal of and wide experience with the reactive crime fighting strategy, they have added to a growing sense of frustration within police departments. Confronted by high levels of crime and limited budgets, the police felt a growing need for initiative and thoughtfulness in tackling serious crime. Working within the logic of their current approaches, but reaching for additional degrees of effectiveness, during the 1970's the police developed new proactive tactics.

Developments in proactive crime fighting

To deal with serious street crime, the police developed the tactic of directed patrol. Sometimes these patrols were aimed at locations that seemed particularly vulnerable to crimes, such as branch banks, convenience stores, and crowded bars. Other times, the patrols were focused on individuals who, on the basis of past record or recent information, were thought to be particularly active offenders.⁴⁴

The police sought to attack street robberies and muggings through anticrime squads that sent decoys into the streets to prompt active muggers into committing a crime in the full view of the police. The police also sought to control home robberies and burglaries through sting operations involving undercover officers who operate as fences to identify and gather evidence against the offenders.

Finally, the police sought to enhance the effective impact of their enforcement efforts by increasing the quality of the cases they made. Quality Investigation Programs⁴⁵ and Integrated Criminal Apprehension Programs⁴⁶ were adopted by many departments to increase the likelihood that arrests would be followed by convictions and long prison sentences.

For the most part, each of these innovations produced its successes. The perpetrator-oriented patrols, sting operations, and quality investigation efforts were a little more successful than the location-oriented directed patrols and the undercover operations directed against street robbery. Nonetheless, the police did demonstrate that concentrated efforts could increase arrests; clearances, and convictions. These efforts did not show that these programs alone—without the support of courts and corrections and the involvement of the community—could reduce aggregate levels of serious crime in the cities in which they were tried.

Moreover, insofar as each program took a more aggressive and proactive approach to crime, it also troubled those who were concerned that the police not become too intrusive. Perpetrator-oriented patrols, for example, raised the question of whether it was appropriate to target offenders rather than offenses, and if so, on what evidentiary basis.⁴⁷ The use of undercover tactics to deal with both robbery and burglary raised important questions about entrapment.⁴⁸ And the emphasis on producing convictions from arrests prompted worries that the police might be motivated to manufacture as well as simply record and preserve evidence. Arguably, these civil liberties concerns were inappropriate at a time when the police seemed unable to deal with high crime rates. The fact that these concerns arose, however, indicated that the police were, in fact, using their authority more intensively than they had when they were relying principally on reactive strategies. Such concerns must be reckoned a cost of the new efforts.

The police also made substantial investments in their ability to deal with those crimes that could not be handled through routine patrol or investigative operations, either because the crimes were too complicated to handle with ordinary arrest and investigative methods, or because the routine operations would not disclose the crime. In terms of dealing with especially demanding crimes, like hostage takings or well-armed offenders, the police developed Special Weapons and Arrest Teams. They also enhanced their capacities to deal with riots and demonstrations. And at the other end of the spectrum, the police developed special procedures for dealing with deranged and disordered offenders who often looked violent (and sometimes were) but mostly were simply mentally disturbed.

To deal with crimes that were not always revealed through the ordinary procedures of complaints by victims and witnesses, the police developed special units skilled in investigating the sensitive areas of child sexual abuse, rape, and domestic assault. They also created special investigative units to deal with high-level drug dealing, organized crime, arson, and sophisticated frauds. These units often relied on special intelligence files as well as special investigative

procedures, such as the recruitment of informants, electronic wiretaps, and sustained undercover investigations. These programs also scored their successes and enhanced the ability of the police to deal with serious crime.

Missed opportunities in crime fighting?

These innovations demonstrated the resourcefulness and creativity of the police as they faced the challenge of high crime rates with limited financial resources, diminished authority, and constrained managerial prerogatives. With the benefit of hindsight, however, some crucial oversights are apparent.

“ Long before it was demonstrated that the success of rapid response . . . depended on the willingness of victims and witnesses to report crimes . . . , the police had mounted campaigns mobilizing citizens to support their local police. ”

First, there was little appreciation of the crucial role that better information from the community could play in strengthening police performance.⁴⁹ It was not that the police were unaware of their dependency on citizens for information: Long before it was demonstrated that the success of rapid response to crime calls and retrospective investigation depended on the willingness of victims and witnesses to report crimes and aid in their solution, the police had mounted campaigns mobilizing citizens to support their local police.

The real problem was that the police did not adequately consider what was needed to attract that support. They thought that their interest and ready availability would be sufficient. They did not understand that citizens felt vulnerable to retaliation by offenders in the community and needed a closer connection with the police if they were going to help them solve the crime. Nor did the police understand that a partnership with the community could be constructed only from the material of daily encounters with the public; in particular, by taking seriously the public's concern with less serious offenses. In short, while the police knew that they were dependent on the community for information about crime, they never asked the public what was needed to obtain help beyond setting up 911 systems.

Second, the police rarely looked behind an offense to its precipitating causes. Nor did they think about crime prevention in terms of managing the precipitating causes. They knew, of course, that much crime was being produced by dangerous offenders, criminogenic situations, alcohol and drug abuse, and aggravating relationships. But they were

ambivalent about acting on that knowledge. They tended to limit their responsibilities to applying the law to incidents to which they were summoned; they did not think in terms of applying instruments of civil law or the capacities of other city agencies to work on the proximate causes of crime. Criminal investigations emphasized legal evidence of guilt or innocence—not the question of precipitating causes.

There were many reasons to maintain this narrow focus on law enforcement. To a degree, it protected police organizations from criticisms that they were lawless and out of control. The police could explain that they merely enforced the laws and that they exercised no discretion beyond this basic function. The narrow focus on law enforcement also protected the organization from failure in its basic crime control mission. If the police role was limited to applying the criminal law to offenses rather than to the more challenging goal of actually preventing and controlling crime, the police could succeed even if crime were not controlled. They could blame the other parts of the criminal justice system for their failures to deter and incapacitate the offenders whom the police had arrested. Finally, the narrow focus was consistent with the training and aspirations of the police themselves. Arresting people and using authority was real police work; mediating disputes, mobilizing communities, and badgering other city agencies for improved services was social work.

“ Arresting people and using authority was real police work; mediating disputes, mobilizing communities, and badgering other city agencies for improved services was social work. ”

Whatever the reasons, the police remained reluctant to develop the internal capabilities needed to make their anecdotal impressions of precipitating causes systematic and powerful. Crime analysis sections merely kept statistics or characterized the location of crime; they did not identify dangerous offenders or trouble spots and avoided examining the role of alcohol and drugs in the serious crime problem. Nor did they propose alternative methods for dealing with crime problems. From the perspective of the police, it was far better to stay at the surface of social life and respond to crimes as they occurred rather than to intervene more widely and actively to manage the immediate conditions that were producing crimes.

Third, the police never fully exploited the self-defense capacities of the community itself. They did offer advice to merchants and citizen groups about how they could protect themselves from criminal victimization. And they helped organize neighborhood watch groups. But the main efforts went into helping the communities become more effective operational auxiliaries to the police departments. Citizens were encouraged to mark their property not only because it helped the police solve the crime, should the item be stolen, but also because it allowed the police to return the property

to the owners. Crime watch groups were instructed to call the police rather than to intervene themselves. This was consistent with the desires of the police to maintain their monopoly on both expertise and operational capability in dealing with crime. They did not really want any growth in private security—whether it took the form of volunteer associations such as the Guardian Angels or commercial operations such as Burns Security Guards. Because of that interest, police commitment to building a community's self-defense capacities was always ambivalent. And, because they were ambivalent, the police did not think through the question of whether and how such efforts could actually help them control serious crime.

Problem-solving and community approaches to crime control

In the 1980's, police departments throughout the country have begun to explore the crime-fighting effectiveness of tactics that build on previous approaches, but seek to extend them by looking behind offenses to the precipitating causes of crimes, building closer relations with the community, and seeking to enhance the self-defense capacities of the communities themselves. These efforts are guided mostly by a theory of what might work and some illustrative examples. The theory is that the effectiveness of existing tactics can be enhanced if the police increase the quantity and quality of their contacts with citizens (both individuals and neighborhood groups), and include in their responses to crime problems thoughtful analyses of the precipitating causes of the offenses. The expectation is that this will both enhance the direct effectiveness of the police department and also enable the police department to leverage the resources of citizen groups and other public agencies to control crime.

Some examples, drawn from recent experiences, suggest the ways in which these new approaches can lead to enhanced crime control.

Enhanced police presence. From its inception, patrol has sought to prevent crime through the presence, or potential presence, of a conspicuous officer. Patrolling in cars is only one way to communicate police presence, however. Activities such as foot patrol, visiting citizens in their homes, and attending group meetings also increase the awareness of police to which all citizens respond—those intent on crime as well as those not. This presence both deters potential offenders from committing crimes and affords officers the opportunities to note criminal acts in progress.

Example: A youth walking down a street in a small business section of town sees an unlocked automobile with the key in the ignition. He is tempted to steal it. Glancing around, he notes a police officer a short distance away walking down the street. The youth decides not to enter the car for fear of being caught by the officer.

Example: An officer, through crime analysis, becomes aware of a pattern of burglaries in a neighborhood. Increasing her patrol in alleyways, she notes a youth attempting to enter the back window of a residence. She makes an arrest.

“ In England . . . , when an anticrime unit is sent in to deal with a serious crime problem, as often as not it consists of foot patrol. ”

Although the success of foot patrol tactics in controlling crime is counter-intuitive to those accustomed to patrol by automobile, confidence in this approach is common in England. There, when an anticrime unit is sent in to deal with a serious crime problem, as often as not it consists of foot patrol. The approach is successful because foot patrol officers have access to areas unavailable to officers in cars: walkways and areas between houses, for example. Unpublished work by Glenn Pierce suggests that some crimes, such as burglary, tend to be patterned within limited geographical and chronological space. If this is true, when combined with what is known about how burglars enter homes and businesses, properly targeted foot patrol might be the strongest potential anticrime tactic to deal with such crimes.

Better surveillance and deterrence of dangerous offenders. From the outset, police have sought to control crime through close surveillance of those who have committed crimes in the past. The problem has been to accurately identify those offenders. Police officers who work closely with a neighborhood are in a position to learn who behaves in criminal or delinquent ways within the community. By stationing themselves in particular locations, officers can surveil known troublemakers and forestall criminal behavior.

Example: Police investigation of a rash of robberies committed by juveniles involved house-to-house interviews of the neighborhood. In these interviews, photographs of suspects were shown to residents. While no information about the crimes was produced, the word rapidly spread through the neighborhood that the police were keeping close tabs on specific individuals. The robberies stopped without an arrest.

It is also legally and procedurally possible to consider assigning neighborhood police officers to the surveillance of probationers and parolees. Such surveillance would be more immediate and regular than that now provided by probation or parole officers. Aware that neighborhood police officers had easier access to information about their activities, people who were in the community on a conditional basis might be deterred from committing illegal acts.

Example: Paroled sexual offenders in a conservative state regularly move to a community known for its relatively open values. A plan is worked out between local police and the state correctional agency. Upon parole, all sexual offenders returning to this community are interviewed by the chief of patrol and the neighborhood officer policing the area in which the parolee is to live. An offender known for attacks on teenage girls returns to the community. Regular contacts between the officer and parolee are scheduled to enable the police officer to oversee the parolee's behavior while in the community. The police officer discovers that the parolee is

now working in the local fast food restaurant—a workplace which regularly hires teenage girls. The officer, in conjunction with the parole officer, requires that the parolee find a different job, one in which young girls are not always present.

Increased access to information. Community policing emphasizes the development of close communication between citizens and police. This communication helps police gather information for both *preventing* and *solving* crime.

Example: In an area frequented by many street people, a street person approaches a neighborhood police officer to inform him that a stranger from another neighborhood is attempting to recruit assistance to commit a street robbery. The street person describes the newcomer to the police officer. Shortly afterwards while patrolling, the officer notices a person on the street who matches the description. The officer approaches the person, questions him, tells him that he (the officer) is aware of what he is planning, and instructs him to leave the area.

“ Use of information gathered by patrol officers is one of the most important ways in which police can improve their ability . . . ”

Example: Shortly after leaving her church a woman is mugged on the street. She appears to be seriously injured as a result of being knocked to the ground. Police and medics are called. The neighborhood officer responds by foot. She is approached by several children and their parents. The children were playing in an open space in the public housing project across the street from the church and saw the youth mug the woman. They know the youth and where he lives. Accompanied by a neighborhood entourage, including the parents and children who identified the youth, the officer proceeds to the apartment and makes the arrest.

Familiarity with the social and physical characteristics of their beats also helps neighborhood police officers to understand linkages between various pieces of information gathered from their own observations and from other disparate sources.

Example: Parents have complained to a neighborhood police officer about an increase of drug availability in their neighborhood. Several parents have found drugs in their children's possession. In addition, the officer has noticed many youths congregating around an entrance to a second-story apartment over several stores. The officer contacts the drug unit and informs them of his suspicion that drugs are being sold to children from that apartment. The drug unit arranges an undercover “buy” and then “busts” the dealers.

Work by Pate,⁵⁰ Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia,⁵¹ Eck,⁵² and Skogan and Antunes⁵³ suggests that use of information

gathered by patrol officers is one of the most important ways in which police can improve their ability to apprehend offenders. In 1982, Baltimore County, Maryland initiated a Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement unit (COPE), designed to bring the police into closer contact with the citizens and reduce their fears. A 1985 study showed that not only had COPE reduced fear, but also it had apparently produced a 12 percent reduction in the level of reported crime.⁵⁴

Early intervention to prevent the escalation of disorder into crime. In a widely read article, Kelling and Wilson argue that there is an important causal link between minor instances of disorder and the occurrence of serious crime.⁵⁵ Disorderly behavior—youths congregating, drunks lying down, prostitutes aggressively soliciting—left untended, can escalate into serious crime. The implication is that intervention by police to stop uncivil behavior keeps it from escalating.

“ An important part of community policing is providing anticrime consultation to citizens, businesses, and other community institutions. ”

Example: Youths panhandle in a subway station. Citizens give money both out of charitable motives and because they are fearful. Youths, emboldened by citizen fear, intimidate and, finally, threaten and mug subway users. Intervention by police to end panhandling by youths reduces threatening and mugging of citizens.

Although this argument has intuitive appeal, little direct empirical evidence exists about exploiting its anticrime potential.

Crime prevention activities. An important part of community policing is providing anticrime consultation to citizens, businesses, and other community institutions. The recommendations range from home target hardening (locks, strengthened doors, etc.) to street and building design.

Example: Residents of a neighborhood have been troubled by daytime burglaries. In addition to planning a police response, police consult with homeowners about ways in which they can make their homes more secure from burglars. Suggestions include moving shrubs away from doorways, strengthening locks, securing windows, and taking other burglary prevention precautions.

A 1973 evaluation of Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program, which used this approach, found a significant reduction in burglaries.⁵⁶

Shoring up community institutions. Institutions of neighborhood social control include families, churches, schools, local businesses, and neighborhood and community organizations.

In many communities, the corrosive effects of social disorganization have seriously weakened such organizations. Police, working with such institutions and organizations, can reinforce their normative strength in a community.

Example: Drug dealing is a serious problem in an inner-city neighborhood. Drug dealers not only have dealt drugs freely, but also have intimidated residents to the extent that they are afraid to complain to police. A local church decides that the problem is so serious that an organized effort must be made to attack the problem. Church officials contact the police and ask them to work closely with the neighborhood group. Citizens demonstrate against drug dealing, getting both police protection and great publicity. Citywide and local political leaders, as well as other public and private agencies, become concerned about the problem and develop a concerted effort to reduce drug dealing and intimidation. Sustained street-level enforcement ends drug dealing in that location.

Example: Using up-to-date technology, police are able to identify the patterns of a burglary ring which is moving through a neighborhood. Police contact the local neighborhood anticrime group and inform its members of the patterns so that they can be alert and watch their own and each others' homes.

Example: A woman who lives in public housing has been troubled by attempts of local gangs to recruit her youngest son. Up to now, his older brother has been able to protect him. Now, however, the older brother is going into the service. Approached by the mother, the neighborhood police officer now keeps an eye out for the youngster on the way to and from school as well as on the playground.

Example: A local school is plagued by dropouts who continually hang around the school intimidating both students and teachers. Crime has increased in and around the school. The principal decides to crack down on the problem. The neighborhood police officer becomes involved in the efforts. He teaches a course in youth and the law, increases his surveillance of the grounds, consults with the teachers about handling problems, and invokes other agencies to become involved with the youths who have dropped out of school.

Although promising, it is unclear what impact the strengthening of community institutions has on serious crime. It is an attractive idea, however.

Problem solving. Police have historically viewed calls for service and criminal events as individual incidents. Many such incidents are part of a chronic problem amenable to diagnosis and preventive intervention by either police or other agencies.

Example: Police and citizens note an increase in daytime burglaries in a particular neighborhood. This neighborhood has also been characterized by high rates of truancy. Suspecting that many burglaries are committed by truants, police, citizens, and school officials plan a carefully integrated anti-truancy campaign. Daytime burglaries drop.

Problem solving appears to be a promising approach to deter crime. When, in 1985, the Newport News Police Department turned to problem-oriented policing as an approach to dealing with crime, it was successful in dealing with three stubborn crime problems that had beset the community: a series of prostitution-related robberies; a rash of burglaries in a housing project; and larcenies from vehicles parked in downtown areas. In each case, the problem was solved not simply by solving the crimes and arresting offenders, nor by increasing levels of patrol (though both were done), but also by operating on the immediate conditions that were giving rise to the offenses.⁵⁷

“Police have historically viewed calls for service and criminal events as individual incidents. Many such incidents are part of a chronic problem amenable to diagnosis and preventive intervention . . . ”

These ideas, examples, and results lend plausibility to the notion that problem-solving or community policing can enhance the crime control capabilities of professional crime fighting. They do not prove the case, however.

A strategic view of crime fighting

While police executives can produce increased levels of arrest and local reductions in crime through the creation of special programs, they are frustrated because they do not know how to produce reductions in citywide levels of crime. The main reason for this might be that their main force is not engaged in a serious crime-fighting effort even though it seems that it is. After all, it would be unreasonable to imagine that any single small program, typically engaging less than 5 percent of the force, could have much impact on aggregate levels of crime. The important question is what is the remaining 95 percent of the force doing? For the most part, the answer is that they are deployed in patrol cars, responding to calls for service and investigating crimes after they have occurred. These tactics have only limited effectiveness.

What remains unanswered is the consequence of shifting a whole department to a radically different style of policing. Moreover, the answer is hard to determine, since the period of transition would be quite awkward. In the short run, were officers taken from patrol and detective units to do problem-oriented or community policing, it is almost certain that response times would lengthen—at least until the problem-solving efforts reduced the demands for service by eliminating the precipitating problem that was producing the calls for service.⁵⁸ And even though an increase in response times does not necessarily indicate a real loss in crime-fighting effectiveness, it would be perceived as such because the public

and the police have learned to equate rapid response to crime calls with crime control effectiveness.

What is tempting, of course, is to avoid choosing among these strategies, and to adopt the strengths of these various approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. This would be reflected in decisions to establish special units to do problem-solving or community policing within existing organizations whose traditions and main forces remained committed to reactive patrol and retrospective investigation.

But it may not be this easy. Indeed, experience demonstrates that it is not. Previous initiatives with team policing or split-force policing succeeded in building capacities for both styles of policing within the same department, but tended to foster eventual competition and conflict.⁵⁹ The problem-solving and community policing aspects have usually eventually yielded to administrative demands to keep response times low, or to officers' desires to avoid the demanding engagement with the community. The reason seems to be partly a matter of resources—there has never been enough manpower to maximize performance in both domains at once. But it also seems to be a matter of administrative style and structure. Problem-solving and community policing both require a greater degree of decentralization than does the current policing strategy. They depend more on the initiative of the officers. And they reach out for a close rather than a distant relationship with the community. These are all quite different than the administrative emphases of the current strategy which prescribe centralization, control, and distance from the community.

“Problem-solving and community policing . . . reach out for a close rather than a distant relationship with the community. ”

So while logic and evidence suggest the crime control potential of adding problem-solving and community policing to the concept of rapid response and retrospective investigation, it is hard to add these functions without increasing the resources and significantly changing the administrative style of a police organization. That is hard for a police chief to decide to do without convincing evidence that it would work. The only things that make such a move easy to contemplate are: (1) a deep sense that the current strategy and tactics have reached their limits; (2) the plausibility of the idea that increased effectiveness lies in working on proximate causes and mobilizing communities; and (3) the little bit of evidence we have that the alternative approach works. A few departments, such as Houston, Newport News, Baltimore County, and Philadelphia, have committed themselves to these alternative approaches. If they succeed over the next 3 to 5 years in reducing serious crime as well as in attracting citizen support, then the field will know that it has a better strategy of policing available than is now being used.

Notes

1. For descriptions of these alternative strategies, see Robert C. Trojanowicz, "Community Policing vs. 'High Tech' Policing: What's in a Name?" (Unpublished paper, Michigan State University, April 1987); Herman Goldstein, *The Urban Police Function* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1977); John Eck and William Spelman, "Solving Problems: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News" (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, January 1987).
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NCJ 111460

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met six times. During the 3-day meetings, the 30 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

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High Performance Programming: A Framework for Transforming Organizations

by
LINDA NELSON
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The High Performance Programming (HPP) model illustrates concepts that assist in transforming an organization into a high-performing system. The structure of the model provides a nested framework for diagnosing current levels of performance and for understanding the potentials for performance at the highest levels. Specific methods are outlined for creating the conditions which elicit high performance from individuals, teams, and organizations.

The term *programming* is used to highlight the proposition that an organization's present performance level is a function of past implicit or explicit "operating instructions" to the system. Similarly, future performance will depend on how the organization's culture is being programmed now. This critical issue is the key to unlocking the performance potential of an organization. Specifically, an organization's future performance is a direct result of its culture and the operative frame of reference supplied by that culture.

This concept is reflected in the series of four frames that make up the body of the HPP model, shown in Figure 1. Each of these four frames portrays a distinct operating frame of reference. With the exception of the *reactive* frame, these frames are nested to reflect one of the basic concepts of the model—each larger frame builds upon and provides an enhanced cultural context for the frame or frames within it. The *proactive* frame of reference is an extension and an enhancement of the *responsive* frame. Likewise, the *high performing* frame of reference is an expansion beyond the *proactive* frame and includes both the *proactive* and *responsive* frames.




Figure 1. The Framework of the High Performance Programming Model.

Background

Frames of reference allow us to examine the difference between organizational change efforts that merely resort and relabel the organization's sub-elements and functions, and change efforts that truly transform the organization. No matter how dramatic a change effort looks on paper, or how solid the reasoning behind it, actual improved performance happens only if there is also a parallel change in the frames of reference of the people in the organization.

For example, the implementation of "matrix management" in an organization we observed was intended to improve its responsiveness, but the change actually produced an information traffic jam that amounted to "gridlock." All eight layers of management, still caught up in old habits of thought, continued to insist that everything go through old channels. Their impoverished frames of reference neutralized the intended outcomes of the matrix strategy.

A second and related issue illuminated by the HPP model is how an organization's culture either allows or hinders its adaptation to accelerating change in its internal and external environment. In today's fast-paced and complex society, change

is no longer a choice; it is a given. Research on the functioning of systems suggests that complexity itself is the driving force behind the increasing rate of change: the more complex a given system is, the faster its rate of change, which creates more complexity (Prigogine, 1980). Even though change is a given, its direction may take different forms. A system facing increasing complexity will either evolve toward a more connected and integrated form or drift into an increasingly fragmented state. Organizations, when viewed as systems, can be observed over time to move into higher and more productive states or to devolve into lower, less-organized, and less-effective states.

The following summary describes the organizational characteristics that accelerate disorganization and the techniques and strategies that can move an organization through the *responsive*, *proactive*, and *high performing* levels of the HPP model. Our intention is to provide leaders and managers (particularly those with executive responsibilities) with new ways of thinking coherently about what they can do to influence the future of their organizations—not merely to ensure their viability and success in a changing world, but to set them on a course for excellence.

We begin with an examination of organizations in which decay and disorganization have already begun.

The Reactive Organization

The *reactive* state is not the state in which organizations begin. It is the state in which survival itself may be in question. In talking to members of these organizations, one notices an absence of shared purpose or sense of accomplishment. Not only will one get different responses about what's important, one also will be left with the distinct impression that nobody cares much, either. The reactive frame is the state of disintegration into which an organization devolves when its leaders fail to keep the organization focused on its purpose.

The culture of the reactive organization can be described using the eleven dimensions in Figure 2.

The central purpose in a reactive organization has lost its vitality and no longer provides a foundation, leaving a vacuum in which disintegration and disorganization begin to take their toll. Shared purpose and clear goals act as an organization's steering mechanism: without well-focused goals, the enterprise and its members are adrift. Given no focus on the future, people become fixated on the past—a past that no longer exists.

The lack of shared purpose has a telling effect on the structure of the organization. In spite of its neatly aligned appearance on paper, the structure is really a fragmented collection of separate elements, often working at cross purposes and competing for resources and territory. Managers in such reactive cultures lay intricate paper trails, hoping to appear dedicated to detail and thorough in their endless search for problems and faults. This breeds a defensive atmosphere throughout the organization that results in a self-centered perspective on the part of the organization's members, who protect themselves by "looking out for number one."

The purpose of planning is similarly debased. Instead of planning the future direction of the organization, managers carry out huge paperwork drills designed




Figure 2. The Culture of the Reactive Organization.

to defend the status quo. Rather than being pulled by a vision of future achievements, the organization is driven by the fear of not being able to justify its continued existence.

People caught in a reactive organization seem strikingly similar to persons suffering from paranoia. They have little enthusiasm for anything but survival, and they are chronically cynical, pessimistic, and distrustful. They are trapped in what psychologists call a "negative reinforcement environment," in which the avoidance of painful consequences reinforces behavior. This distortion in the organization's reward system causes individuals to become obsessed with stay out of trouble; sticking one's neck out is viewed as tantamount to getting it cut off.

Symptoms of a punitive environment are when managers behave as if taking care of problems means finding someone to blame, when change takes place primarily through punitive and corrective means, and when communication takes the form of a force-feed system of directives rolling down through the fragmented hierarchy—complimented by paperwork fighting its way back up.

Another lethal symptom of reactive cultures is the unwillingness of subordinates to tell their bosses bad news unless it no longer can be hidden. The bosses, for their part, rarely praise their people for good work, thinking and saying, "That's what they get paid for."

One of the primary reasons for confusion and lack of clarity in reactive organizations is the prevailing norm against the asking of questions by subordinates of their bosses. Not only are supervisors never asked questions that might challenge the merit or wisdom of their decisions, they are rarely even asked questions for clarity.

The leadership style observed in reactive organizations is usually immature and frequently abusive. We have seen many a "nice guy" revert to this "leader-as-obedience-trainer" style upon entering a reactive organization. Though this might not be their preferred style, it is the style that appears to them to work, at least in the short term.

As many supervisors and managers have discovered, getting work done in reactive organizations takes a lot of kicking and shoving. People become withdrawn and insensitive in painful environments in order to survive. Many managers have been co-opted by these environments and develop a "punishing-dictatorial" style just to get the attention of subordinates, who have become immune to all but the most direct and demanding sorts of instructions.

Members of reactive organizations are also among the least willing to risk change because of the terrifying potential that the "rules of the game" will change—rules that have been learned through hard experience. Thus, these low-risk and painful organizational climates are actually perpetuated by the very persons suffering the most from them. They at least know what *not* to do, and the unknown only invites trouble and threatens one's ability to predict.

Building the Responsive Organization

To move the culture out of a reactive state and into a *responsive* one requires a carefully balanced approach that involves both patience and leadership. Change must occur in the frame of reference of individual members and in the organization as a whole. Leaders must clarify the organization's goals and purposes and build a bond of mutual trust between the leaders and the led. A well-established set of techniques designed to revitalize and re-energize the organization by renewing its focus on goals and internal cohesion is shown in Figure 3.

The most important revitalizing step is to re-focus the organization on clearly defined goals that build a sense of shared purpose among the organization's members. The goals can extend across a year or can be targeted on major projects. They should be specific enough to clarify the outputs that are to be produced, by whom, and by when.




Figure 3. The Responsive Frame of Reference.

Goal-setting and action-planning sessions are the most effective means of gaining the understanding and commitment of those who will be accountable for carrying out necessary tasks. Those people must participate in developing the goals and the plans designed to achieve them. The whole process goes down the proverbial drain when managers form goals and plans in isolation and then merely pass them along to their subordinates. Goal-setting and action-planning sessions in which both managers and subordinates contribute are the best builders of shared purpose, understanding, and commitment. They provide a basis for building the trust and clarity that are critical to motivating the individual and instilling *esprit-de-corps*.

Once goals and plans are established, slippages and unexpected problems can be identified *before* they become crises. Good problem-solving strategies are available to promote effective participation and better solutions. As with goal-setting and action-planning, improved understanding and follow-through are achieved when the team members responsible for carrying out the solutions participate in the problem-solving process. This process, used so effectively by Japanese managers in their quality circle programs, not only has the advantage of training personnel to solve problems but also helps them to be on the constant lookout for potential problems.

It is up to the leader to carry out these processes competently and in a manner that is responsive to people's needs. We suggest leaders follow the guidelines provided by the Situational Leadership model when moving their organization from a reactive to a responsive state. Developed by Hersey and Blanchard (1982), this

model emphasizes that leaders must adapt their style to fit the maturity level (knowledge and experience) of the follower. While the new employee needs direction and structure, the more experienced employee requires less "telling" and more "selling" behavior by the leader. Mature followers work better in a participative mode with the leader. Those who are most highly experienced and qualified can accept delegated responsibilities. Movement toward a responsive state, in summary, has to begin with a leader who is responsive to the needs of adults to be treated as adults.

The Resulting Responsive Culture

Provided that the above set of management and leadership practices are carried out, the responsive organizational culture will reflect the characteristics shown in Figure 4. Team members are focused on producing outputs in the present through activities planned to achieve near-term goals. Management keeps team efforts coordinated and responsive to changing needs and conditions. Since members help develop the goals and plans of action, they know what output leaders expect and what activities are to be performed. They work as cohesive teams, able to adapt as they identify and solve problems. This environment fosters a team perspective rather than a self-centered one and results in team members looking out for each other and for the good of the organization.

The boss is a leader and coach who motivates group members by rewarding high performance through positive feedback, awards, and pay increases based on merit. The boss keeps the team efforts coordinated and focused on the goals through planning, evaluating progress, and promoting team cohesion.

While the responsive state is productive and beneficial, and it certainly is far superior to the reactive state, it is also the operational level of a larger cultural frame of reference that is *proactive* as well as responsive.

To maintain high levels of responsiveness and adaptability, the organization needs a more expansive frame of reference that supplies the guiding philosophy and vision around which individuals, teams, and departments become an aligned and attuned whole. This larger context is the *proactive* frame.

Strategies for Developing the Proactive Organization

A *proactive* frame of reference requires looking to the future and taking the initiative. It is a frame of reference from which the future is seen as a choice to be made rather than a given with which to cope. It incorporates a way of looking at the world in which the future is viewed as something to be chosen, worked for, and realized (Beer, 1975).

The first critical factor in moving beyond the responsive frame of reference lies within the value system of the organization. The chosen future must be a widely shared vision that is attuned with the values of members of the organization and which serves as an attractive and compelling force for them. The power of NASA's original mission statement, "A man on the moon by the end of the decade," is an excellent example of the motivational force supplied by an attractive, compelling vision of the future.




Figure 4. The Culture of the Responsive Organization.

Second, the vision must communicate that the organization values people highly. People do not put forth personal effort beyond being responsive unless they feel the organization is "theirs" and that it values them personally and professionally. The success of Japanese management in producing high-quality products is largely due to the message conveyed to the workforce that management genuinely values and wants their ideas.

Third, the future vision must reflect a commitment to human values which give people a deep sense of personal meaning and satisfaction. High purpose, to be achieved, must be based on higher order values. It is this point that companies

which focus solely on the bottom line fail to take into account. High purpose cannot be counted or quantified because it addresses emotional qualities rather than material ends.

Strongly held values and the norms of behavior that flow from them serve an often overlooked role. Values are normative beliefs held by individuals as to what is good and desirable. They provide standards which influence people in their choice of actions. The clearer and more widely shared the organization's value system, the more it provides direction for individual behavior, and the less need there is for formal policies and rules and regulations. Thus, an enormous amount of energy that might otherwise be tied up in developing, perpetuating, and enforcing official rules—which can eventually immobilize an organization—is released to work on attaining the desired future state.

Although a widely shared set of organizational values is necessary to propel the organization into the proactive frame, the values selected are critical. Certain types of values are needed. For example, values that reinforce one's sense of interdependence with the environment are important in developing a commitment to producing results valued by the larger cultural system, e.g., the customer. The Matsushita Corporation, one of the most successful companies in the world, rose from a one-person bicycle shop to an \$11 billion industrial giant with a corporate philosophy aimed at producing results valued by the larger system. The underlying foundation of Matsushita's management genius lay in the deeply held conviction that Matsushita must contribute to improving the standard of living in the larger society.

Figure 5 shows the types of strategies that foster proactive organizational cultures. These include establishing values-based and results-oriented mission statements and developing the long-range plans to accomplish them. To maintain progress and to ensure that future results are achieved, decision-makers need to establish performance-feedback systems to keep themselves informed on significant changes and performance trends. This does not mean that executives should bury themselves in endless briefings and reports, but that they should identify a few critical performance indices and manage them intensively.

Clearly stated and widely shared organizational values are the cohesive glue that holds the culture together. These values, embedded in the corporate philosophy and manifested every day in how it operates, determine whether the organization will exist mechanically, adding to or subtracting from its collection of functions, or live organically, developing a sense of community in which work teams are knitted together to form the larger cultural fabric. It is the leader's role to shape and mold the values that provide positive meaning and value to the members' lives.

This style of values-based leadership can be called *transformational*. Transformational leaders engage their followers at the values level as opposed to merely activating them at the material level. Transformational leaders relate to the full person of each of their followers by looking for ways of developing their potentials and satisfying their higher needs (Burns, 1978).

Genuine transformation leadership demands a resolute commitment to fundamental ethics and integrity, demonstrated through congruent behavior. Transformational leaders understand that true development can only take place as a func-




Figure 5. The Proactive Frame of Reference.

tion of the co-development of themselves and others. Thus, values for the transformational leader are the basis for developing the human potential of the organization as a whole.

The Resulting Proactive Culture

The results of these management strategies are presented in Figure 6, along the same 11 dimensions previously used. Future-oriented, firmly rooted in a values based philosophy, the organization is pointed toward long-term results and strategies for achieving them. Change is planned for and used by leaders to keep the organization clearly focused on its purpose. Communication is also focused on the future and on how the current state affects future plans.

Management ensures the alignment and integration of suborganization objectives within a total whole. Members are motivated by the opportunity to make a contribution toward achieving a future they value, and to work as cohesive teams aligned with and attuned to the larger perspective of the organization.

The role of leadership in proactive organizations is to keep the organization focused on its purpose and well-tuned. Leaders must think strategically and act systemically. Their style is critical to producing and sustaining the proactive, innovative culture of the organization; to promote its future orientation, they must welcome risks as opportunities for further growth and development. This requires leaders who are able to develop an atmosphere of trust and mutual support with their followers so that potential problems can be identified before they become crises. Reciprocal loyalty and mutual respect are the hallmarks of the leadership climate created by leaders in proactive organizations.




Figure 6. The Culture of the Proactive Organization.

META-STRATEGIES FOR PROGRAMMING THE HIGH- PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

The more progressive perspective afforded by the proactive frame of reference is nevertheless still insufficient to generate truly *high-performing* organizations. The phenomenon of corporate excellence is characterized by a high level of energy that unleashes human spirit and results in markedly improved productivity.

To generate these highest levels of performance, leaders need to operate from a frame of reference which sustains and enhances the proactive level of performance. They also shape the cultural conditions inside the organization that breed the high spirit seen in high-performing systems.

Our observations of high-performing organizations have led us to many of the same conclusions reached by others who have written on this subject. Vaill (1982) pointed out that sometimes the energy level in such organizations is so high that their activities seem frenetic and confusing to the outside observer. Yet, to the members of the high-performing organization, these activities seem quite natural and not at all incoherent. (Vaill also pointed out that sometimes the reverse is true: calm appearances may mask the commitment felt by members of a high-performing system).

The leaders of high-performing organizations may not all have the same way of eliciting high performance from their people. But they all seem to have found a way to manage the flow of energy in their team or organization. They "see" energy patterns and the human spirit these energy patterns release; they attend to these indicators with a dedication that equals and usually exceeds their dedication to the more ordinary indicators of performance such as profit.

Although not all leaders of high-performing organizations use the same words to describe how they elicit the spirit and unleash the energy of their people, those who become acquainted with our work invariably report that the HPP model helps them make sense of and think coherently about what they already do with their intuitive grasp of "what's right." Invariably they become interested in understanding themselves and the possible reasons for their success. This fact—their immediate interest in their own potential as leaders—has provided us with a major clue about the nature of high-performing leaders and high-performing organizations. They have an almost insatiable curiosity about their own potentials and actively seek out those challenges that they believe will activate these potentials.

Figure 7 shows the elements that constitute the enhanced frame of reference required for high performance. As noted, the frame of reference in high-performing organizations must be oriented on scanning for potentials—for what might be possible. It is from this understanding of the organization's potential that leaders and managers make choices about the organization's mission and purpose.

The high-performing organization's choices about strategy are based on an underlying philosophy and folklore that give meaning to the organization's long-range plans. The task becomes one of strategically navigating the organization along an established path in the long-range plans. Likewise, the performance management system that is required for a proactive organization finds extra meaning in a high-performing organization, because it includes designing the plans for the organization's evolution within which its actual performance can be more-effectively monitored.

Another key feature of the high-performing frame of reference is the emphasis on developing metasystems as well as formal systems. Metasystems, such as quality circles, executive boards, and excellence networks, serve to shape the cultural milieu throughout the high-performing organization's structure.




Figure 7. The High Performing Frame of Reference.

The kind of leadership required to achieve and sustain organizational high performance is what we suggest be called "holistic," because high-performing leaders appreciate the larger roles played by their organizations as instruments of change in adjacent and higher systems in the environment. They look not only into their own organizations to help develop their potentials and that of their people, but to the outside as well. They see their own organizations as contributing actors in the general drama of human development, and they use their organizations to make contributions to the human communities and the culture in which they reside.

The Resulting High-Performance Culture

Figure 8 shows the shifts that occur along the same 11 dimensions previously used to describe these nested frames. In high-performing systems, the focus is on achieving high standards of excellence by identifying new potentials, seeking out new avenues of opportunity, and activating the human spirit. To do this, leaders must have a frame of reference that extends beyond identifying the results to be achieved. They must look for ways of achieving the rich potentials in the future. This enhanced frame of reference expands the operative time frame to one that bridges and flows across time.




Figure 8. The Culture of the High Performing Organization.

Leaders operating in this state of "flow" are able to sustain for themselves (and communicate to their members) an appreciation of the rich legacies, proud traditions, and positive legends that are the valued roots of the organization's past—and sustain and communicate an in-depth knowledge of the present state—and sustain and communicate a high-resolution vision of the future they want to create.

This extended time sense allows managers to plan a smooth, continuing evolution of the organization toward an even more promising future. They view change in the organization not as a threat to the survival of the status quo but as a natural process that allows new dreams and offers new opportunities.

The planning process in a high-performing organization is a tool for conscious evolution rather than something done once a year in a frantic way to get something

down on paper. The change mode is "programmed," meaning the requisite conditions for high energy, creativity, and innovation are consciously built into the organization's operating values and cultural norms.

Management in high-performing organizations focuses on the strategic navigation of the total organization. The breakthroughs announced daily in the new world of electronic communication now permit forms of human structures to be designed as key tools for the long-term navigation of complex organizations. Networks which are focused on the pursuit of high performance and human excellence can be "electrified" by linking network members together with a common electronic mail and computer conferencing system. When these internal "excellence networks" also include senior executives and other leaders in the organization, the ideas for action generated by the network have a direct connection into the decision-making mechanisms that exist at multiple levels in the organization.

Metasystems such as networks already exist in all organizations. Sometimes we call them "old boy networks," "interest groups," "constituencies," or "infrastructures." High-performing leaders are beginning to realize that the advantages of quality circles can be amplified—that the principles of design and operation that enable quality circles to serve an organization's purpose can be implemented on a much larger scale. Interest groups, constituencies, infrastructures, and other metasystems can be developed and linked by computer to form a distributed "think tank" for new ideas, for keeping members informed of breakthroughs in their fields of specialization, for scanning for trends and future opportunities in the organization's field of operation, and for advising decision-making boards.

As suggested so vividly by Marilyn Ferguson (1980), while bureaucracies are always much less than the sum of their parts, the synergistic effects activated by the rich information flow natural to networks makes them many times more efficient than the formal human structures through which they weave.

The perspective of leaders operating in the high-performing frame of reference includes the culture of the organization. As well as developing strong, cohesive teams and integrated organizations, high-performing leaders look for ways to consciously strengthen their organization by building a strong corporate culture. They understand the uses of ceremony and ritual in creating and perpetuating the positive folklore, legends, and myths that give each member of the organization a strong and proud heritage to maintain and reinforce. This attentiveness to the culture of the organization enables the leaders to act in ways that fortify the efforts of individuals to pursue their own actualization within the organization, rather than seeking individual fulfillment only in outside activities.

The focus of development in the high-performing frame of reference is on continuing transformation and renewal. This is accomplished through communication which links the positive heritage of the organization with its potential for excellence in the future. Not only do leaders in high-performing organizations have the unique ability to think far into the future and to keep their organization aligned around a great vision, they have the parallel ability and courage to give their people the freedom to pursue it. These leaders *lead* through their ability and willingness to *empower* their followers, to push power down into the hands of people so that they have the energy and freedom to seek adventure, creativity, and in-

novation. Most importantly, they lead by virtue of caring deeply for their followers, which produces the mutual bond of strong emotional commitment and reciprocal loyalty that are the wellsprings of spirited performance.




Figure 9. Nested Frames of Reference for Programming High Performance.

CONCLUSIONS

Given that we are already well into a new age of rapid change and transformation, higher-order models such as this one (Figure 9) are vital. Organizations that approach the challenges ahead with impoverished ways of thinking will be caught at the "shear line" of conflicting paradigms. They can anticipate increasing difficulties as the pace of change continues to accelerate and as their habits of thought fall further and further behind the realities of an increasingly complex world.

We find that the overall picture is bright. We see a new generation of leaders emerging during this age of transformation. With their enhanced cognitive models of what must be done to achieve excellence in human systems, these leaders have the capacity to shape the manner in which their organizations deal with the turbulent times. They and their organizations are at the threshold of great opportunity, for these new leaders also possess the quality of spirit that they know to be the source of excellence and high performance in all human activity. They have the capacity to infect others with this high spirit and high purpose, and in doing so, to release the high levels of human energy required for extraordinary human achievement.

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HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

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DEVELOPING A POLICING STYLE FOR
NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING:

EXECUTIVE SESSION #1
THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is a direct result of a tremendous amount of collaboration among numerous people within and outside the Houston Police Department. Their collective goal was to develop a policing style, for the Houston Police Department, which is reflective of the philosophy of neighborhood oriented policing.

Among those people, Mary Ann Wycoff, of the Police Foundation, provided invaluable assistance in coordinating the attendance of the guest speakers for each of the Executive Sessions. Her presence and contributions throughout all of the Executive Sessions were quite thought provoking and extremely beneficial. Appreciation is extended to Mr. Hubert Williams, President of the Police Foundation, who was responsible for approving the financial support in order to conduct the Executive Sessions.

Finally, this report could not have been provided without the contributions from all of the members of the Executive Session. Without their dedication and willingness to participate in this endeavor, the mission of developing a new policing style for the Houston Police Department would not have been accomplished.

DEVELOPING A POLICING STYLE FOR
NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING

ABSTRACT

In preparing for the opening and occupation of the Westside Command Station in the Spring of 1987, Chief Lee P. Brown initiated the first in a series of six Executive Session meetings on October 1, 1986. The purpose of these meetings was to allow the participants an opportunity to freely discuss ideas, facts, experiences, and values that would help describe the style of policing to be adopted by the Westside Command Station personnel, and, eventually, all personnel within the department.

A total of 29 personnel were asked to participate in these sessions. Under the sponsorship of the Police Foundation, the membership was able to invite guest speakers to their sessions to discuss a variety of programs and experiences that were beneficial to the task placed before them.

This report contains the descriptions, thoughts, and ideas developed by the membership as a result of participating in the six Executive Session meetings. The membership was able to describe what they felt should be the department's philosophy with respect to providing services throughout the city of Houston. This philosophy, entitled, Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) was defined by the membership and set forth as the ideal from which a policing style for the department could be developed.

Toward that end, the membership described the roles of the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators which they thought were commensurate with the concept of NOP. A considerable amount of time was spent examining research trends and implications within the profession during the last 10 to 15 years with particular attention being paid to the relevance to programs administered within the Houston Police Department during the last three to four years. A proposed process model was developed as a vehicle for transforming the concept of NOP into a sustainable, reality-based policing style. The report concludes by describing the framework within the department that has been established to support the philosophy of NOP and the ensuing policing style.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Members of the Houston Police Department began the conceptual development work on the Command Station during 1979. Initially, efforts were taken to examine a number of options regarding the status of the existing substations. The first option was to consider improving the physical attributes of the existing substations. Second, the prospect of building more substations was discussed. Finally, it was decided to pursue the prospect of building several large police facilities known as Command Stations. The reason for constructing a series of command stations was to provide facilities which would house all of the necessary personnel and equipment needed to provide efficient and comprehensive neighborhood police services on a decentralized basis throughout the city of Houston. Unlike the traditional substations which can not house support functions under the same roof, each command station building is to contain jail facilities, municipal court facilities, and the necessary police facilities (records, identification, computer support, operation and investigative functions among others).

Given the physical capacity of the building, a preliminary report outlining the feasibility of decentralizing police functions was forwarded to the Command staff in March, 1980. This report was rapidly followed-up with a more comprehensive study designed to examine a number of service delivery issues and related support service concerns in order to determine the most efficient means of utilizing the facility to provide effective service to the neighborhood residents.

In response to this study, a number of task force committees were formed under the guidance of the Planning and Research Division. These committees were instructed to study the various organizational components which would be

affected by altering operational strategies as a result of decentralization to the command station facility. The work of these committees was completed during July, 1981.

In mid 1982, efforts were taken to examine the feasibility of actually implementing, on an experimental basis, the work of the Field Deployment Task Force. The task force members were recommending, as a model program, the implementation of the Directed Area Responsibility Team (D.A.R.T.) Program. The D.A.R.T. Program represented a variation of the team policing concept used predominantly throughout the country during the 1970's. The D.A.R.T. Program, however, was not a duplication of any one of those programs. It included elements of some successful team policing programs, but was primarily constructed in accordance with the perceptions of what would meet the needs of Houstonians and the capabilities of the department's resources.

From 1983 through 1984 the D.A.R.T. Program was implemented within a single district and evaluated (and is still in effect today). The evaluation report entitled, An Evaluation of the Houston Police Department's D.A.R.T. Program, did reveal a number of significant findings that had a direct bearing on the department's ability to alter its method of delivering services to the neighborhoods.

In October, 1985, the Westside Command Station Steering Committee was formed within the department. Their primary responsibility was to review and update the preliminary task force reports of July, 1981, as well as examine the assessment report on the D.A.R.T. Program. The steering committee subdivided the work and assigned the responsibility to five subcommittees: Geographic Considerations, Staffing Considerations, Operational Considerations, Criminal Investigations, and Operational Support Service Considerations. Their

findings were completed in February/March, 1986 and submitted to Chief Brown in a document known as the Planning Recommendations for the Westside Command Station.

By August, 1986, steps were being taken to establish the Westside Transition Team. Their primary responsibility was to review the Steering Committee's work, make necessary operational and administrative adjustments as deemed appropriate, and begin to coordinate the implementation of the actual transition stages in order to occupy the Command Station. A portion of this responsibility centered upon the need to develop a plan which would articulate the policing style utilized by the beat officers. In order to describe the policing style it became necessary to begin examining how services would be delivered under the concept of Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP). A series of Executive Session meetings were scheduled, in an effort to accomplish this particular task.

On October 1, 1986, Police Chief Lee P. Brown convened the first of six Executive Session meetings. A total of 28 classified personnel representing all ranks were selected to participate with the Chief of Police in these meetings. Additionally, a number of civilian, resource personnel were asked to attend the sessions (please see Appendix A). The purpose of conducting the Executive Sessions was to allow the participants an opportunity to freely discuss ideas, facts, experiences, and values that would help describe the style of policing to be adopted by the Westside Command Station personnel and, eventually, all personnel within the police department.

This report contains the collective thoughts, concerns, and feelings from the panel members that were obtained during the course of the six Executive Session meetings. The information represents the membership's ability to

describe a proposed policing style which would perpetuate the concept of NOP. The material contained within this report, consequently, represents a philosophical framework from which operational plans for the Westside command station, and eventually the entire city, can be developed and implemented.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Houston Police Department is committed to providing services throughout the city in manner that is responsive to neighborhood concerns. This commitment is clearly evident in the Department's mission statement which reads as follows:

The mission of the Houston Police Department is to enhance the quality of life in the City of Houston by working cooperatively with the public and within the framework of the United States Constitution to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide for a safe environment

It is the responsibility of all members of the department to conduct their business in a manner that is consistent with this mission. To assist in this effort, the department has established a set of values.

Collectively, these values represent a set of beliefs that govern the development of policies and procedures as well as affect the attitudes displayed by the members of the department. The values also incorporate a number of expectations held by the citizens of Houston. Foremost among these expectations is the desire and willingness to have the citizenry and members of the department work together to improve the quality of neighborhood life.

The commitment to developing and maintaining this relationship is quite evident in three of the ten department value statements:

- **The Houston Police Department will involve the community in all policing activities which directly impact the quality of community life;**
- **The Houston Police Department believes that it must structure service delivery in a way that will reinforce the strengths of the city's neighborhoods; and**
- **The Houston Police Department believes that the public should have input into the development of policies which directly impact the quality of neighborhood life.**

If these values are to be meaningful, efforts must be made to administer an operational philosophy which is conducive to supporting an environment which will facilitate the development of a cooperative relationship between the public and the police. It is the opinion of the Executive Session membership that the concept of NOP should represent that operational philosophy for the department.

NOP constitutes a major philosophical departure from traditional means of providing police services. This departure is best exemplified by a different way of thinking about how police services are delivered. Indeed, the essence of NOP is in thinking about new and innovative ways of providing services to the public through increased communication with community members, ascertaining citizens' concerns, and getting citizens more involved in addressing and resolving problems that are of mutual concern to both the police and the public.

This requires police personnel and members of the community to learn how to work together. An interactive working relationship must be developed that stems from a commitment from an individual(s), from neighborhood groups, and/or the community as a whole if deemed necessary. It becomes the collective responsibility of both the police and the citizens to identify the issues in need of resolution. This can not be accomplished without assistance from the neighborhood residents.

Participation from the neighborhood residents is paramount to the successful implementation of the NOP philosophy for two reasons. First, community input is valuable to the department in that it offers a different perspective from that of police personnel as to what the local neighborhood concerns and problems are. It will not suffice to believe that only the police

are in a position to determine neighborhood needs. History has demonstrated repeatedly that the police do not know everything nor can they be everywhere at once.

Second, the police and the community work much better together when they know and understand one another. The essence of meaningful understanding, consequently, is learning how to effectively communicate. As so aptly noted by one of the panel members,:

"The better we communicate, the more we communicate; the better we understand what problems are in the neighborhoods, the better we understand the community we are responsible to, and, the better the community understands us".

For too long a period of time, the ability to develop this mutual understanding has been inhibited by the officers' desire to hide behind a shroud of professionalism that is characterized by anonymity. Officers must discard the desire to remain aloof from the public. The syndrome of noninvolvement must be overcome. The concept of professionalism must be redefined in a manner that stimulates a commitment to communicate and interact on behalf of the officers and the neighborhood residents. The desire and willingness to work together with the public should become an inherent feeling within all officers.

Consequently, the concept of NOP should become the police department's culture. The department should become a part of the community and not separate or a part from the community. All department personnel should be an active and integral part of the neighborhood they serve. This should be demonstrated in their attitudes and behavior, especially by the beat officers working in the neighborhoods. The officers' attitudes should also reflect this philosophy. No where could this be more important than by beginning to have the residents

learn who the officers are that provide services within their respective neighborhoods.

To perpetuate this feeling of working with one another, officers must realize that every contact they have is a community relations contact. Whether the situation dictates itself to be a detrimental or positive experience for the citizen, the behavior of the officer is what is often remembered. The officers must understand this and understand the implications of their corresponding behavior. According to one panel member, experience has demonstrated that:

"it is not how good you are, it's how good those people out there think you are that is important. Officers may think they are the best at what they do, however, if the people, the citizens, the community, the civic groups do not think they are the best or do not think they are doing the job they should be doing, the officers have not accomplished anything positive".

This change in orientation between the police and the public is a gradual one that must be reciprocal. While the department is willing to provide as much support as possible to assist the neighborhood beat officers in working with citizen groups, the department expects that the citizens will also be willing to make a similar commitment.

At present, the department's resources are strained because of fiscal cutbacks and a freeze on hiring additional personnel. Plus, the department will not compromise its responsibility in continuing to respond to and handle emergency calls for service, a fundamental activity of the patrol function that can not be delegated. The department, however, welcomes the opportunity to develop new policing strategies in working more closely with the public at the neighborhood level.

DEFINING NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING

Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) is a philosophy which seeks to define and describe a policing style to guide and direct the delivery of police services throughout the City of Houston. As a philosophy, NOP seeks to incorporate the department's values into a responsive policing style which is dependant upon the quality of the day to day interactions between the police and the public.

The key to defining NOP appears to reside in the ability to recognize the need to establish a relationship between the beat officers and the citizens that work and live within each of the officers' respective beats. It is the nature of this relationship between the officers and the citizens that defines its quality. It is through these relationships, either established in handling calls for service or in meeting with citizens when not on call, that the officers can begin to identify and begin to think about the most salient service delivery needs in each of their respective beats.

The concept of NOP, consequently, can best be initially defined as follows:

Neighborhood oriented policing is an interactive process between police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns.

The NOP concept will help clarify responsibilities for both parties as they attempt to identify and resolve problems in the neighborhood beats. NOP, therefore, must involve continuous planning participation, program involvement, evaluation, and adjustments by both the officers patrolling the beats and the citizens living in their respective neighborhoods.

The role of the beat officer will be enhanced as a result of increased interaction with the citizens. Beat officers will be actively involved in the decision making process regarding the identification, prioritizations, and selection of resolutions for problems or concerns. Additionally, because of the officers' interaction with the citizens, they will be in an excellent position to determine what resources, if any could be obtained from them in combating neighborhood concerns. Since the beat officers should be most familiar with the citizens who work and reside within their beats, the officers, if given the appropriate direction and support, are in an ideal position to implement programs and other initiatives to improve the quality of life within the neighborhoods.

As noted by several of the panel members' comments, the purpose of NOP is multifaceted. Among the more prominent features are the need:

- To establish trust and harmony between the neighborhood residents and the beat officer(s);
- To exchange information which will strengthen rapport and enhance neighborhood safety;
- To address the problem of crime and reduce the level of fear associated with the criminal activity;
- To help identify and resolve neighborhood problems;
- To clarify responsibilities on behalf of the citizens and the officers; and
- To help define service needs.

Each of these features is noted or implied in the initial definition. It should also be realized these features represent a sampling of the standards by which success should be measured. This is not to suggest the definition is complete, for it lacks an operational perspective.

Toward this end, a number of traditional operational assumptions may be challenged as we begin to examine the process of more completely describing and implementing the NOP concept. For example, NOP implies a concern for reexamining how the traditional, total service delivery concept is defined. Furthermore, the focus of NOP appears to suggest an altering of the orientation or perspective of the patrol officers. The officers should be encouraged to expand their responsibilities in concert with the needs of the neighborhood. Among other things, this suggests the development of different performance indicators in order to stimulate and reinforce among all patrol officers a sense of neighborhood ownership so eminently displayed by the department's storefront officers. These assumptions are seldom found within the traditional police service concept.

The traditional event/call oriented, random, preventive patrol concept emphasizes mobility, impersonal relationships, and the lack of a need to establish a more meaningful interaction with the citizenry. Traditional patrol work has accentuated random, preventive patrol and assumes that high mobile police visibility has a marked deterrent effect on the commission of crime. Officers are not expected to look beyond an incident in an attempt to define and resolve a particular type of problem. Once dispatched to handle calls, the patrol officers are encouraged to return to service as quickly as possible to resume random, preventive patrol. Rapid responses, handling numerous calls, and making arrests are the primary means of measuring productivity.

As the panel membership sought to identify the various conceptual elements associated with the NOP philosophy (Please see Appendix B), suggestions were made to consider reexamining how these elements would effect the department's operational commitments. Panel members were concerned about the need to

rethink how NOP would affect the department. Specific concerns focused upon attempting to determine the affects NOP would have on role expectations of department personnel and implementing various strategy considerations.

ROLE EXPECTATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF NOP

NOP is not a new concept to the profession of policing. Theoretically, the desire to work with the public has been a long standing goal of numerous departments throughout the country. In some instances, departments have developed and administered programs which emphasize the need to work closely with the public. Some of these programs were successful (i.e., Flint, Michigan Foot Patrol Program) while others were not. Experience has demonstrated that part of the success factor is based upon the ability of department's officers to accept change, especially as it affected traditional role expectations.

It would behoove administrators to realize that the process of change is a complex one. One must understand that by altering a department's philosophy, numerous variables will be simultaneously affected. Among them is the need to recognize how the process of change will affect: which strategies will be considered and actually implemented, what skills will be used by the personnel to implement the strategies, how the strategies and skills will define a management style for the department, and how the shared values expressed by the officers will define the department's beliefs and desires to work with the community. Collectively, these variables have a direct effect on the acceptability of the change process by department personnel.

A large portion of the officers' reluctance to accept change is based upon the fear of the unknown. Officers do not like to change their ways once they are comfortable in performing their established duties. What needs to be realized under the concept of NOP is that proposed changes are designed to perpetuate the officers' positive worth to the community. Therefore, in the

context of the Houston Police Department, the dynamic process of change should be interpreted and experienced as a gradual shift in emphasis from one positive operational role to another.

In adopting NOP as an operational philosophy, a shift in emphasis in the role of the patrol officer will occur. This shift in emphasis will, in general, deemphasize the role of the officer as being primarily "an enforcer" in the neighborhood beats. The more desired perception is for the officer to be viewed as someone that can provide help and assistance, someone that cares about people and shares their concern for safety, someone that expresses compassion through empathizing and sympathizing with victims of crime, and someone that can organize community groups, inspire and motivate community groups, and facilitate and coordinate the collective efforts and endeavors of others.

This desired perception of the role of the patrol officer may be difficult to realize. The evolution of bureaucratic and militaristic organizational structures in policing since the turn of the century has served to support and perpetuate traditional definitions of the police officer's role as solely being that of a "crime fighter." This notion, arising out of the 1930s, was instrumental in creating and reinforcing "time-hardened assumptions" regarding the effectiveness of random, preventive patrol in deterring crime and in the development of patrol management systems predicated on the basis of achieving rapid police response to all calls for service. Because of the emphasis to have patrol officers handle their calls as quickly as possible and return to service to continue performing preventive patrol to suppress crime, little attention was directed toward the service needs of the citizens, including the needs of the citizens that had become victims of crime. The "effectiveness" of

this "call oriented system" was measured by "crunching numbers" (i.e., counting the number of calls handled and the number of arrests made). Hence, a quantitative preoccupation with numbers dominated concern over the quality and types of the services delivered.

The organizational culture of municipal policing has, in general, continued to condition police officers to think of themselves primarily as "crime fighters." Traditionally, police departments have attempted to identify and recruit individuals into policing that have displayed bravado. Organizational incentives have also been designed to favor self conceptions of machismo; conceptions that are reinforced through pop art (e.g., detective novels, "police stories," "Dirty Harry" movies, etc.). Many, if not most, of the approximately 500,000 law enforcement officers in policing in America today have strong opinions about what constitutes "real police work." Because NOP is almost completely antithetical to traditional ways of thinking about police work, attempts to change these opinions may be met with resistance by some officers.

Resistance can also be expected throughout all of the managerial levels within the organization. By operationalizing the concept of NOP, traditional and autocratic management styles will be challenged. A different, more responsive, attitude and managerial style will be required to stimulate, accommodate, and perpetuate desired behavioral changes which will occur as a result of redefining the officers' role. This new form of management must encourage a willingness within all managers to transform new concepts into attainable goals and objectives. Those goals and objectives must, in turn, be articulated within the organization and must be transformed into actions which are consistent with the service demands expressed by the citizenry.

To ensure these actions are consistent with expressed service needs, NOP solicits organizational input from the "bottom up" as opposed to the traditional direction of "top down" so evidently displayed in most bureaucratic organizations. As so poignantly noted among the department's values:

The Houston Police Department will seek the input of employees into matters which impact employee job satisfaction and effectiveness.

Effective management must include the active participation of the officers in policy development, procedure and strategy design, program formulation, and implementation. Since upper management personnel are removed from the officers' working environment, they can not be expected to dictate service responses without first obtaining feedback from the officers as to what the neighborhood expectations and commitments are.

Even then, there are no convenient solutions, no eloquent equations, or no magical formulas that upper management can employ to provide NOP services. The types of calls, types of citizens, and the types of issues and problems that officers encounter will vary from one neighborhood to the next and, to a great extent, vary by time of day (e.g., across shifts). Consequently, this will require managerial resiliency and flexibility. By providing this flexibility managers must also realize a certain amount of "risk taking" will need to be allowed. It must be remembered that one can learn equally as much if not more from failures as from successes.

What upper management can do to facilitate the acceptance and implementation of the NOP concept is provide their subordinates with a process that encourages the officers to become involved in developing new and innovative ways to improve the quality of policing in the neighborhood

Top management can provide the patrol officers and their supervisors with an opportunity to design a "custom patrol plan" that is tailored to the needs of the neighborhood beats and is sensitive to citizen concerns across all shifts.

First line supervisors and middle managers must realize their responsibility should be one of encouraging the officers to become involved in this process. A major portion of their role should be designed to support the officers attempts to identify citizen concerns, assist in mobilizing appropriate resources (or removing the impediments) to address those concerns, and assess the effects of the assistance provided.

Upper management can also provide the right types of incentives to encourage officers to expand their roles and assume additional responsibilities. As these roles change, it will require a concomitant change in the officers' behavior. Research in the social science field has indicated that if behavior is to change, one's attitude must change first. Understandably, management can not dictate attitudes; but management can provide the necessary support to facilitate the acceptance of an alternative style of policing such as NOP. If the officers accept such a policing style, it will be primarily due to their belief that such an approach is an effective means of delivering services to the community.

Finally, upper management can attempt to provide, despite the presence of tight fiscal constraints, the types of resources required to effectively implement, assess, and sustain the NOP process. Supervisors and subordinates cannot be held responsible for performing a function or fulfilling an expectation when they are too ill-equipped to reasonably succeed.

Although NOP seeks to expand the role of the patrol officers to allow them more latitude in developing new ways to police their beats, it does not relax

their compliance with the department's standards of professional conduct. And while the image of the patrol officer as being dedicated full time "to fighting crime and evil" is expected to change, it does not mean the department will reduce its commitment in attempts to prevent crime and interdict criminal perpetrators. It is anticipated that developing closer ties with the citizens in Houston will enhance the department's ability to prevent crime as well as identify and arrest persons engaged in the commission of crime.

RESEARCH TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

Following the advent of the 1970s, municipal policing began to experience accelerated change. This change was initially influenced by protest demonstrations against the government's military actions in Vietnam and the incivility that occurred across the country in the mid- to late 1960s. It was later perpetuated by a plethora of research findings regarding police operations that emanated out of the 1970s. The impetus for this research was directly linked to police actions in handling anti-war demonstrations, their attempts to control incivility, and a search for more effective methods to combat crime. Although the findings from this research generated more questions than answers, it seriously challenged the veracity of time-hardened assumptions underlying management of the patrol, dispatch, and investigative functions.

Beginning with a review of pertinent research that addressed the patrol function, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment provided the most dramatic attack on conventional wisdom regarding the deterrent effects of random patrol in preventing crime. In its efforts to develop a participatory management system, the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department had established task forces at each of its four patrol divisions (a task force had also been established in the department's Special Operations Division). These task forces consisted of patrol officers and first line supervisors. The task forces were charged with responsibility to generate new and innovative ideas to improve policing. The establishment of these task forces was based on the chief's belief that the ability to make competent planning decisions existed at all levels within the department. Because police officers were often most

directly affected by change, management thought that they should have an active voice in planning and implementing change. Recommendations from these task forces were sent up through the chain of command to be reviewed for consideration.

The impetus for the preventive patrol experiment came from within the department in 1971. The South Patrol Task Force had identified five problem areas to impact through patrol efforts (e.g., residential burglaries, juvenile delinquents, etc.). But in considering strategies to impact these problems task force members could not agree on the value of preventive patrol as a strategy to address some of the problems identified. The South Patrol Task Force therefore generated a position paper that questioned the effectiveness of random, preventive patrol. Intrigued by the thought, the department sought funds and technical assistance from the Police Foundation to design a methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of this traditional patrol procedure.

The 15 beats that comprised the South Patrol Division were randomly divided into three groups, proactive, reactive, and control, to test the deterrent effects police visibility had in preventing crime. Officers assigned to "reactive beats" were not permitted to enter their beats unless officially dispatched to handle a call (or in hot pursuit of another vehicle). Conversely, officers assigned to "proactive beats" were expected to perform "aggressive patrol work," i.e., increased car checks, pedestrian ("ped") checks, etc. Additionally, there was supposed to be approximately two to three times the level of police visibility in the proactive beats. Officers from the reactive areas were encouraged to enter the proactive areas and engage in routine patrol. Finally, officers assigned to the "control beats" were expected to conduct business as usual; to drive systematically unsystematically

throughout their beats until interrupted by a dispatched call for service. Once the call was handled, the officers were to return to performing random, preventive patrol.

Data were collected for about a year to assess the effectiveness of preventive patrol. Analysis of this data revealed that there were no statistically significant differences in crime rates among the three different types of patrol procedures evaluated. The study therefore concluded that random patrol was not an effective deterrent in preventing crime.

While researchers and police practitioners were at a loss to suggest an alternative to random patrol, the data also revealed that approximately 60 percent of the patrol officers' time was not committed to handling calls for service. Effort was initiated to identify ways to make this uncommitted time more productive.

Perhaps the major managerial lesson learned from the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment was the extent to which departments could "experiment" in trying alternative policing strategies. If traditional, preventive patrol is not effective in deterring crime, flexibility to try other options can be explored. Patrol officers can be directed to perform activities other than random patrolling without causing local increases in the crime rate or generating dissatisfaction among citizens.

As if the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department didn't arouse enough attention among police administrators by questioning the sanctity of preventive patrol, another effort initiated by this agency (in response to a request from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice) sought to assess the value of rapid police response. Since the advent of the radio patrol car, rapid police response had long been an accepted procedure in

municipal policing. And the need to reduce response time had served as justification to bolster officer strength and to provide for large expenditures on equipment. While it was not unreasonable to assume that rapid police response would produce more arrests, more witnesses, fewer serious injuries, and more satisfied citizens, little empirical data existed that supported such assumptions.

The Response Time Analysis Study was designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of issues and assumptions regarding the value of police response to a variety of crime and noncrime, emergency and nonemergency, incidents. Specifically, two objectives were established for study: analysis of the relationships between citizen reporting delays, dispatch, and police travel times to the outcomes of on-scene criminal apprehensions, witness availability, citizen satisfaction, and the frequency of citizen injuries in connection with crime and noncrime incidents; and identification of problems (involuntary delays) and patterns (voluntary delays) in reporting crime or requesting police assistance.

To facilitate measurement of response time, the concept was operationalized on a continuum that consisted of three intervals. The first was the time taken by citizens to report incidents or request police assistance. The second was the time taken to locate, nominate, and dispatch units to handle the calls. The last was the time taken for the police to respond to the dispatched locations. The data collection process was divided into three components analogous to the three response time intervals. Civilian observers accompanied police officers to record travel times. Research analysts extracted time information from recordings of taped conversations between complainants and intake operators/dispatchers to measure dispatch

times. And interviewers collected reporting times from victims and other citizens who had reported incidents to the police.

As with the preventive patrol experiment, data collection lasted approximately one year. Analysis of data produced some startling conclusions. These included the following:

- A large proportion of Part I, i.e., "serious crime" (according to definitions provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting criteria), are not susceptible to the impact of rapid police response, because almost two thirds (62.3%) of the Part I crime sample analyzed indicated that these crimes were detected after they occurred ("discovery crimes");
- Prompt reporting can increase the chance of making on-scene arrests for all types of Part I crimes in which a citizen saw, heard, or became involved at any point during the commission of an offense ("involvement crimes"). For the proportion of these crimes (37.7%), however, the time taken to report the incident largely predetermines the effect police response time will have on desired outcomes;

Explanations for reporting delays are primarily associated with citizen apathy and voluntary actions taken (e.g., telephoning other persons for advice, waiting or observing the situation, investigating the incident scene themselves, contacting their employer, a supervisor, or a security guard, etc.) in arriving at a decision to notify the police. Problems encountered with either public or police communications systems (e.g., being "cut off," being inadvertently transferred to another number, not being able to access a public pay phone, etc.) accounted for reporting delays in less than one out of five (16.5%) involvement crimes;

- Although rapid police response based on the need to assist an injured victim has been overshadowed by an emphasis toward making an on-scene arrest, there were more cases in which persons sustained injuries of sufficient seriousness as to require hospitalization (5.4%) than in the number of "response-related arrests" resulting from rapid reporting, dispatching, and officer response (3.7%); and
- Neither dispatch nor travel times were found to be associated with citizen satisfaction with police response time. Rather, citizen satisfaction with response time

was dependent on whether citizens perceived response time to be faster or slower than they expected.

A major but unpopular implication from this study indicated that an infusion of additional patrol officers to reduce police response time would have negligible impact on crime outcomes, because of the time taken by citizens to report involvement crimes and the relatively small number of involvement vis-a-vis discovery crimes. This implication also tended to negate justification for technological innovations such as automated vehicle locations systems designed to reduce police response time. Moreover, it also refuted claims to lower police response time that were made by American Telephone and Telegraph in marketing their 911 telecommunications system. The study found that the time required to phone the police was of minuscule significance compared to the time citizens took in reaching a decision to call. The time required to dial the police department's "crime alert" number took approximately nine seconds, although a substantial proportion of callers simply dialed "0" for operator. The average time taken to report Part I crimes was almost four hours, while the median time, that point above which and below which 50 percent of the cases lie, was about five and a half minutes.

A second implication from this study suggested the need for departments to develop formal call screening procedures to accurately discriminate between emergency and nonemergency calls. And given findings regarding citizen satisfaction with police response time it was further suggested that "call stacking" procedures be developed so that calls could be prioritized with varying queue delays thereby insuring that the most urgent calls received the most expeditious dispatching. As a result of these implications, further research was later funded to develop and evaluate differential police response

(DPR) strategies.

Finally, noting the relatively low response-related, on-scene arrest rate (3.7%) and the inclination toward "over response" by officers to "hot calls," it was suggested that interception strategies be developed to apprehend suspects in flight following the commission of robberies. Over response by officers endangers their lives and invites serious and disabling injuries. It also places innocent citizens in peril and is costly to repair or replace damaged equipment that results from over response. Of course, unit(s) will be dispatched to the scene of a crime to possibly render first aid, complete a report, locate witnesses, and collect physical evidence. But, according to this recommendation, officers not dispatched that travel away from the scene to a predetermined "perimeter point" (for those crimes reported in close proximity to the time of occurrence) stand a better chance of intercepting suspects than do officers that drive directly to the location of where the crime occurred.

Because of the "sensitivity of the findings," the Response Time Analysis study was replicated in four other cities by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF): Hartford, Connecticut; Jacksonville, Florida; Peoria, Illinois; and San Diego, California. All of the findings reported by the original study were substantiated in the subsequent replications.

The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department's Directed Patrol study stemmed from the Police Foundations's Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. As previously mentioned, once the preventive patrol experiment had been completed police administrators and researchers were at a loss to suggest alternative strategies to replace conventional, preventive patrol. Again, findings from the preventive patrol experiment indicated that preventive patrol was not effective in deterring crime. And, as already mentioned, the study

disclosed that approximately 60 percent of the patrol officers' time was uncommitted. The Directed Patrol study was therefore designed to structure, i.e., direct, this uncommitted time. The project was implemented in the East Patrol Division.

At the outset of the project, several support mechanisms were established. A crime analysis position was created for a certified officer to gather crime data for each of the beats. This data was used by field sergeants to intensify patrol efforts to high crime locations within the beats rather than having the officers perform random patrol all over their beats. Civilian clerks were hired to staff the desk at the division headquarters to handle "walk-in" and "mail-in" reports. In addition, a "tele-serve" function was established so that the civilian clerks could take some offense reports over the phone rather than having officers dispatched to complete "insurance reports."

A list of activities for patrol officers to perform while formerly conducting routine patrol was generated by the project staff. This list included tasks designed to bring the officers into closer communication with the public. Most of the tasks were oriented toward crime prevention activities to impact residential burglaries and commercial robberies. For example, officers would stop by and visit with citizens and help them serialize articles of personal property sought by residential burglars for quick sale. The officers also placed "height strips" and surveillance cameras in convenience stores. Officers engaged in these activities were considered to be on "directed patrol" and unavailable for dispatch except for emergencies.

The managerial implications derived from this study demonstrated that uncommitted patrol time could be structured for activities perhaps more meaningful than simply performing preventive patrol. It also demonstrated the

function of crime analysis in providing the types of data needed to support some forms of directed patrol activities. Given the emphasis the program placed on crime prevention, it also helped establish rapport between the police and the public. And finally, having obtained preliminary results from the Response Time Analysis study, the study demonstrated that alternative response strategies could be developed and implemented, thereby diverting calls that had previously required mobile responses by a police officers.

The San Diego Police Department also conducted several significant research efforts during the 1970s. These included an evaluation of one versus two officer patrol cars, an experiment to assess the relationship between the completion of "field interrogations" of suspicious persons and criminal deterrence, and, most germane to this paper, a Community Oriented Policing (COP) project.

At the time the COP study was initiated in 1973, the San Diego Police Department had a poor relationship with their community. It also had a chief who was held in low esteem by the public. Officer attrition had reached approximately 25 percent, and the department was in desperate need of communications equipment. Because of concern regarding corruption, commanders kept police officers on the move; moving them to new beats and shifts every three weeks.

Patrol officers were expected to complete a specific number of field interrogations and write a certain number of traffic citations each day. Clever officers found where the "easy pickings" were and got these requirements out of the way in the first 45 minutes of their tours of duty. There was little meaningful accountability since the officers and sergeants moved too quickly from one beat and shift to another to learn anything about their

districts; much less assume any responsible for the crime that occurred in their districts.

For the most part, the COP program was planned and implemented from the bottom up. The head of the police union, an organization with considerable clout within the department, was assigned to the Patrol Planning Unit. Officers in the Patrol Planning Unit designed the program that emphasized the officers in becoming very knowledgeable about their beats. This knowledge was to be obtained through officer "beat profiling" activities. Beat profiling required that the officers learn about the topographical, demographic, and call histories of their beats. Also stressed was the development of "tailored patrol" strategies to impact the types of crime and address citizen concerns that had been communicated to the officers.

The Patrol Planning Unit randomly selected 24 officers to participate in the study. They were given 60 hours of training and assigned to permanent beats on fixed shifts in the North Patrol Division. The officers were required to contact citizens to identify citizen concerns and find out what the citizens expected regarding police service delivery. The officers were also encouraged to subscribe to neighborhood newsletters and attend community meetings. In short, the officers were made responsible and held accountable for the problems identified in their beats.

Based on initial results, the program was an unqualified success. The officers liked it, as did the citizens. Officers participating in the experiment concluded that random patrol was not as important as they had once thought it was. They also indicated that getting to know the citizens in their beats and developing stronger ties with the community was more important than they had previously thought it was. Many officers developed creative solutions

to complex problems, and they might have been even more creative had there been cooperation among the officers in adjacent beats. In spite of this shortcoming, all of the objectives of the program were accomplished.

For political reasons, the San Diego Police Department jumped on the success of the program and attempted to expand it too quickly throughout the entire department. They failed to change the old accountability requirements of measuring the officers' performance based on ticket quotas and other forms of "bean counting." They failed to include the middle managers, i.e., shift lieutenants, into the planning and implementation process. They failed to adequately train the sergeants, and they cut time from the officers' training program. There was little staff support to perpetuate the success that had been initially achieved, and the program was a complete washout within three months.

Many lessons were learned from this study. One of the more important lessons included the benefits derived from having the officers develop closer ties with citizens in their beats. Through getting to know the citizens, the officers obtained valuable information about persons responsible for perpetrating crimes in their beats. They also obtained realistic expectations regarding citizen needs as recipients of police services. For the adept patrol officer, a different perspective of the citizen emerges. Citizens constitute a potential resource that can be mobilized to assist officers in problem identification and problem resolution.

Another lesson learned from this project involved a rethinking about shift (and beat) rotation. Although perhaps elementary, it is of absolute necessity to have officers assigned to permanent shifts and beats if they are expected to engage in activities other than simply reacting to calls for service. Having

officers periodically rotate among the shifts impedes their ability to identify problems. It also discourages creative solutions to impact the problems, because the officers end up rotating away from the problems. Thus, a sense of responsibility to identify and resolve problems is lost. Likewise, management can not hold the officers accountable to deal with problems if the officers are frequently rotated from one shift to another.

Finally, the COP program demonstrated the critical role shift lieutenants and sergeants play in program planning and implementation. Exclusion of supervisory involvement in training and program expansion ultimately lead to the demise of COP in San Diego. It is unfortunate that the San Diego Police Department never received the credit they deserved for conceptualizing the COP program. Presently, almost 11 or 12 years later, there are approximately 220 municipal police departments out of around 11,600 that are engaged in "community oriented policing."

A program less community oriented and more enforcement oriented came out of the New Haven, Connecticut, Police Department in the mid 1970s. Called the Directed-Deterrent Patrol study, the major objective was to assess the effectiveness of utilizing crime analysis information for "directed runs" to suppress (i.e., deter) crime. Each patrol officer received a "D-Run" book that was compiled by crime analysts. These books were issued every 28 days and consisted entirely of statistical aggregations of data. The D-Run books contained very explicit instructions regarding the D-Runs. Every so often, a dispatcher would send out a car, usually the beat unit, to do a D-Run (e.g., "Adam 11, execute D-Run 32 immediately."). The D-Runs generally lasted between 15 and 45 minutes. They were timed so communications personnel knew exactly where the officers were supposed to be at any given time.

Based on final analysis of the results, the Directed-Deterrent Patrol study was moderately successful. Somewhat surprisingly (based on the fact that the D-Run books contained relatively stale data), burglaries, pursesnatchings, and thefts from autos, all "targeted crimes," were substantially reduced. But the program was eventually scraped, because the patrol officers hated it so much. Given the rigidity of executing D-Runs, the officers were left with the impression (albeit accurate) that police managers thought of them as being hopelessly stupid and incapable of thinking on their own. Loss of discretion in executing D-Runs tended to reinforce the officers' perceptions of management toward them.

Several operational implications were gleaned from this effort. Perhaps most important, patrol officers do not like to be treated like robots. They shouldn't be told what to do by crime analysts, either civilian or sworn. The function of crime analysis is to collect, analyze, and generate data; not to tell patrol officers (or street supervisors) how the information is to be used. Letting patrol officers suggest tactical actions to address crime patterns builds confidence and enriches job satisfaction. And the officers are much more enthusiastic about making their plan work than they are in implementing someone else's ideas.

Crime analysis information must be current in relationship to day to day criminal incidents. Field supervisors and police officers do not want to receive "history reports" from crime analysts that indicate what happened weeks or even months ago. They want to know of any significant events that occurred on the previous shift(s) and what might "go down" on their shift. In general, crime patterns only last about two to three weeks. Hence, officers in New Haven might have been patrolling the wrong area, because the data contained in

the D-Run books were already 28 days old when issued.

A different approach in dealing with directed patrol came from the Wilmington, Delaware, Police Department. Entitled the Wilmington Split-Force Patrol Experiment, the Wilmington Police Department developed a patrol program that consisted of three components. First, the patrol force was divided into two groups; "basic" and "structured." The basic group consisted of 65 percent of the patrol force, while the structured group represented the remaining 35 percent of the patrol officers. The "basic officers" responded to routine calls for service and took "mundane reports," but did not do any patrolling. The "structured officers" performed both random and directed patrol and only answered "in-progress crime" and other noncrime emergency calls for service.

Second, the dispatchers "stacked" nonemergency and low priority calls, took some types of crime reports over the phone, and asked victims and other complainants to come to police headquarters to have reports completed.

Finally, the beats were rearranged and the shifts altered to fit the needs of the basic group, based on an analysis of call for service workload data. The city's beat structure, therefore, changed by time of day (shift). Because of the beat variability, no roll calls were held for the basic officers. They simply reported to duty at different times and worked "staggered shifts."

Results from this study were mixed but somewhat favorable in relationship to the objectives tested. Placing calls in queue (call stacking delays) did not effect (reduce) citizen satisfaction, i.e., the public accepted response delays and telephone reporting procedures. And 65 percent of the patrol officers were able to handle 96 percent of the overall workload. Perhaps because the basic patrol officers were conducting more perfunctory preliminary investigations, the detectives were less successful in clearing crimes. They

screening cases for possible assignment. But in the context of the times during the mid- to late 1970s solvability factors were novel and in national vogue. The initial MCI prototype, if limited in comparison to today's standards, did, however, provide a conceptual clarity and a structural framework for organizing some of the investigative functions that had gone undocumented theretofore. By analytically dividing the overall investigative process into a series of discrete, albeit logically interdependent functions, the MCI model (at least) suggested a more formal method to establish objectives and thus monitor investigative performance through accounting for the outcome and disposition of cases. In so doing, it suggested the importance of establishing positive liaisons between the police and the prosecutors to review changes in the filing of charges and in tracking cases through the courts.

Perhaps of tantamount importance to the model itself, efforts to implement MCI revealed the weight tradition carries in thwarting organizational change. An important component of MCI included expanding the responsibilities of patrol officers in the investigative process. This change from tradition required patrol officers to perform more comprehensive initial investigations, i.e., to conduct neighborhood canvasses, detect and collect physical evidence, interview witnesses, interrogate suspects, etc. It also included latitude to seek "early case closures" through following leads obtained during the initial investigation that resulted in the apprehension of suspects or, in having exhausted all leads or in failing to obtain any meaningful evidence, to inform victims that further investigation was unlikely, rather than telling them that they would be contacted by a detective. In general, however, detectives were reluctant to relinquish this work, not to mention the thought of having patrol officers become involved in tactical activities, e.g., physical and electronic

surveillances, stakeouts, decoy operations, etc.

Aside from management initiatives to identify "performance anchors" and develop methods to better account for detectives' time and activities, expanding the role of patrol officers to become more involved in some forms of criminal investigations tended to threaten detectives. Many detectives perceived that a loss of work traditionally performed only by them would mean fewer detectives needed to pursue criminal investigations. Although this rationale is not illogical -- as mentioned elsewhere, several police departments did reduce their investigative strength -- detectives that are apprehensive about the ramifications of change can not realistically be expected to enthusiastically embrace MCI and the changes that go along with this program.

While a reluctance to accommodate the organizational changes required to implement MCI has been mentioned as the primary reason for MCI's failure to deliver more than it promised, closer inspection of the MCI model reveals some inherent deficiencies with the (initial) model itself. In its generic form, MCI displayed a propensity to address broad generalities in suggesting ways to improve investigative efficiency rather than in providing substantive detail in suggesting exactly how particular functions were to be performed. In-depth thought had not addressed differences in investigative routines among the various types of investigations performed, e.g., burglary, theft, homicide, robbery, rape, motor vehicle theft, arson, aggravated assault, etc. And little, if any, consideration was given to the rationale and criteria used in case assignment, an oversight observed but not articulated by experienced investigators.

Collectively pooling all the implications from the research conducted

during the 1970s lead to the following conclusions:

- The use of random, preventive patrol should be dismissed, and the use of preprogrammed, goal-oriented patrol strategies (e.g., directed patrol, etc.) should be increased. Quite simply, preventive patrol doesn't prevent crime, and random patrol produces random results.
- The addition of more officers to reduce police response time to all calls for service can not be justified as a means to increased on-scene criminal apprehensions. Only about ten to 15 percent of dispatched calls for service constitute bona fide emergencies. Citizens reporting delays tend to negate the potential impact rapid police response would have to many types of calls in which a desired outcome could be achieved.
- Effective management of the patrol function is dependent upon intelligent management of the dispatch function. Logical and interdependent linkages exist between management of the dispatch function, management of the patrol function, and management of criminal investigations. All too often, the patrol function is "managed" by the dispatchers. The development of differential police response (i.e., call diversion) strategies and call prioritization and queuing procedures is critical in managing incoming calls for service and thus the patrol officers' time. Given the important but limited role patrol officers have in criminal investigations through conducting preliminary investigations, sufficient time needs to be available for the officers to perform quality and comprehensive initial investigations.
- The development of crime and operational analysis procedures is vital in managing the patrol and investigative functions. Implementation of directed patrol activities is dependent upon the timely and accurate crime analysis information.
- As a viable resource, the use of patrol officers in activities other than performing routine patrol and "running calls" has been underutilized. Meaningful incentives needed to attract and retain good officers in patrol must be developed by police managers. Police officers need enhanced status and enriched job responsibilities. They need to become more involved in providing direction and insight into managing the patrol function.
- A strong emphasis is needed to involve the community in policing. Traditional methods used by the police to

"combat crime" and render various types of services have not always been effective. Initiatives must be taken by the police to identify citizen expectations regarding service delivery and to work with citizens in addressing and resolving problems of mutual concern. Management must recognize that, as with the patrol officers, citizens also represent an untapped resource that can provide valuable assistance in helping the police perform their work.

- To facilitate the development of stronger ties with the community, policies that require the frequent rotation of officers across shifts must be seriously examined. Frequent shift rotations impede the officers' ability to become acquainted with citizens that live and work in their beats.
- Attention also needs to be devoted to assessing or reassessing the purpose and function of beat structures. Rather than being traditionally defined as "patrol areas" (initially developed to equalize work load), emphasis needs to be given to reconfiguring beats around neighborhoods. Ideally, these neighborhoods would be relatively homogeneous after having considered demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. More homogeneous "neighborhood beats" would make it easier for the officers to become familiar with the values of citizens that reside in these beats. Rather than having to deal with an extensive amount of cultural diversity among various different groups of people, the officers would be better prepared to identify problems and solicit solutions from residents to impact these problems.
- Officers assigned to the patrol function must become more actively involved in criminal investigations. The quality of the initial investigation is critical in determining whether a case may be solved or receive subsequent investigative attention. Appropriate training and equipment must be provided to facilitate competent and comprehensive initial/preliminary investigations. And patrol officers should be permitted to perform some follow up investigations and obtain early case closures if sufficient time is available.
- Case management systems must be developed and implemented to fit the needs of the various investigative functions. These systems must include sound case screening mechanisms, logical criteria in the assignment of cases, methods to efficiently manage ongoing investigations, and procedures to monitor and track the filing of charges and prosecutorial dispositions of cases. Systematic procedures also need to be developed to account for cases as either being open or closed, and uniform terminology

needs to be developed to accurately account for case clearances. Finally, appropriate procedures need to be developed that professionally informs victims (for some types of cases) that, given the absence of leads, continued investigation can no longer be justified.

In having now reviewed some of the pertinent literature informing police operations and in having assessed the implications from this research that was conducted during the 1970s, it is not surprising that the findings from these studies made many police administrators nervous. Occasionally, these findings appeared in local newspapers, having been released through the wire services. Many chiefs were caught off guard when confronted by mayors and city managers who demanded explanations and wanted to discuss the political and policy implications of the findings. Of interest is the fact that the findings, in general, did not tell police administrators what it was they were doing that did work; only what didn't.

Of no small consequence, it became exceedingly difficult for chiefs of police to defend the traditional rationale that had been used for budgetary increases for additional officers and more equipment. And the economic milieu of the 1970s with recession, inflation, fuel shortages, and "prop 13s" provided credence to elected officials who, in light of the research findings, sought justification to chop police budgets.

Many chiefs of police did not survive the momentum for change that began to build during the past decade. But for most of those that did they brought a different philosophy of municipal policing into the 1980s. Influenced by the events of the 1960s and the research of the 1970s, this philosophy contained an expression of values regarding human life, personal dignity, and individual rights. It also contained a change in emphasis that diminished the perception of police officers from being primarily "enforcement oriented" to becoming more

receptive and open in working with the public to prevent crime and identify and suggest solutions for crime and noncrime citizen concerns.

Not surprisingly, many of the innovative programs and a good deal of the research that has been funded during the 1980s has reflected the philosophy of this new breed of police chiefs. Whereas the decade of the 1970s was replete with the names of departments that had been extensively involved in research initiatives, Kansas City, Missouri, San Diego, California, Rochester, New York, a new set of names would emerge out of the 1980s. These would include Madison, Wisconsin, Flint, Michigan, Newport News, Virginia, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, to name just a few.

The 1980s started with a major study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). To test the utility of a comprehensive police response system for managing incoming calls for service, NIJ designed the Differential Police Response (DPR) Field Test Program in October of 1980. In having initially searched for a number of agencies to participate in the project, three cities were finally selected as sites to test the program under controlled, experimental conditions. These cities included: Garden Grove, California; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Toledo, Ohio.

The DPR experiment had evolved from an earlier Differential Police Response Strategies project, also supported by NIJ, that had as its mission the development of a model to manage incoming calls for service. The Birmingham, Alabama, Police Department was selected as the site for model development. Knowledgeable about preliminary findings from the Kansas City Response Time Analysis Study, a group of police practitioners and researchers began work to devise the model. Through a series of meetings, such a model was eventually developed and its implications discussed.

The model involved a two-dimensional schematic that included a set of priority codes for the following categories: major personal injury; major property damage; potential personal injury; potential property damage; minor personal injury; minor property damage; other minor crime; and other minor noncrime calls. Under each of these headings were other categories that sought to classify reporting delays, e.g., "in-progress, proximate, and cold."

The response alternatives developed for this model included "sworn mobile," "nonsworn mobile," and "nonmobile." Adjacent to each of these headings were subcategories that identified the appropriate type of mobile response. These included "immediate," "expedite," "routine," and "appointment." Alternative response strategies developed for the nonmobile responses included: "telephone," "walk-in," "mail-in," "referral," and "no response."

Theoretically, the rationale underlying the model appeared to make sound managerial sense. But the model was never formally evaluated until the DPR experiment was implemented.

There were two primary objectives of the DPR test: 1) to increase the efficiency of the management of calls for service; and 2) to maintain or improve citizen satisfaction with police service. To evaluate the first objective, a set of subordinate objectives were identified. These included the following:

- To reduce the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile response;
- To increase the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by a telephone reporting unit by delayed mobile responses or by other alternative response strategies;
- To decrease the amount of time patrol units spent answering calls for service and increase the amount of

time available for crime prevention or other activities;
and

- To increase the availability of patrol units to respond rapidly to emergency calls.

The second objective addressed the need to determine how many and what types of calls could be handled by alternative response strategies without adversely affecting citizen satisfaction. It was assumed that if calls were carefully screened, if citizens were informed of potential delays, and if alternative strategies were appropriate and timely, citizen satisfaction would not decrease. Hence, the second objective contained the following subordinate objectives:

- To explain to citizens during their initial contact with the intake operators the method and reason for the type of police response suggested to service their calls; and
- To provide satisfactory responses to citizens for resolving their calls for service.

To prepare the departments to implement the program and the experimental conditions, uniform procedures had to be developed to classify and prioritize calls, establish alternative response strategies, and effectively screen and process incoming calls. An extensive amount of training was required at each site to ready personnel for the test implementation. Alternative response strategies included the implementation of a telephone report unit (called either a Telephone Report Unit [TRU] or an Expeditor Unit) to take reports over the phone, a procedure to delay mobile police responses from 30 to 60 minutes, a procedure to refer calls to other agencies, e.g., the Humane Society, public works, animal control, etc., and a method to handle "scheduled walk-in reporting," and "mail-in reporting."

After all most two years of time needed to plan for implementation and then collect data following implementation, a few of the key conclusions from

this project are presented below:

- Police departments can achieve a sizeable reduction in the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile dispatch without sacrificing citizen satisfaction. The DPR experiment demonstrated that up to 47 percent of all calls could have received alternative response treatments.
- Citizens showed a high willingness to accept response alternatives to the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit for nonemergency calls.
- Citizen surveys revealed that 75 percent of persons calling the police were willing to accept delays of up to an hour in police response time to nonemergency calls for service.
- Citizen satisfaction with the initial conversations with intake operators was very high. Satisfaction with call takers among citizens in the experimental groups receiving mobile responses exceeded 95 percent at all three sites; for those receiving delayed mobile responses, satisfaction with call takers ranged from 92 percent in Garden Grove to 97 percent in Toledo. Citizens receiving telephone reporting response alternatives expresses satisfaction levels in excess of 95 percent (ranging from 95.8% in Toledo to 97.3% in Garden Grove).
- Citizen satisfaction with mobile responses averaged 95.4 percent among the three sites tested. Citizen satisfaction with delayed mobile responses averaged 94.4 percent for participating cities. And an average of 94.2 percent of the citizens surveyed expressed satisfaction with telephone reporting procedures.
- Alternative response strategies are less costly than traditional mobile responses, and productivity levels are much higher for personnel using response alternatives. In Toledo, for example, the number of calls that could be handled by a four-person telephone reporting unit would require ten officers to be mobilized for immediate responses.
- According to the test sites participating in this experiment, the advantages of civilianizing call intake operators and police dispatchers far outweigh the disadvantages. Civilians can be hired and trained at lower costs, have higher retention rates, and are better educated.

- The use of civilian evidence technicians to handle initial calls for certain property crimes can be an attractive alternative for police departments. Evidence technicians in Greensboro were able to process 18 percent of all nonmobile responses.
- Travel time to emergency calls was not significantly reduced as a result of DPR experimental conditions (not a surprising finding given previous mention of results from the Kansas City Response Time Analysis study), however, the new call classification systems did enable patrol officers to respond quickly when needed for bona fide emergency situations.
- The use of mail-in reporting procedures was not found to be an effective response alternative. "Call-back" procedures, where the call taker telephones the offending party back and warns them of impending action, can be an efficient response for certain types of calls, e.g., barking dogs, loud noise, etc.

Given the historicity of research in policing, it is rare, and usually controversial, when empirical findings are presented from experimental research about a certain aspect of police operations. But, unlike the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, the findings from the DPR experiment generally confirmed what had already been learned (or assumed) from previous efforts to implement methods to more effectively manage the dispatch function. Thus, this study provided credence to departments that had already implemented intake and call screening procedures, the development of priority response codes, and the establishment of alternative response mechanisms that allowed for some types of calls to be diverted away from having to mobilize field units to respond to calls.

As with the DPR experiment, two other studies funded by NIJ that primarily focused on improving internal police operations received national attention during the mid 1980s: The Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department's Repeat Offender Project (ROP); and the Police Executive Research Forum's (PERF) study of burglary and robbery investigations.

Formulated in May of 1982, the impetus for the development of the ROP program was based on the assumption that a vast majority of criminal acts are perpetrated by a relatively small number of repeat, career criminals. The mission of the ROP program was, therefore, to identify, arrest, and successfully prosecute recidivists. Suspects "targeted" for ROP surveillance were believed to be committing five or more Part I offenses weekly.

The ROP program offered a unique opportunity to assess the problems and effectiveness of a proactive police unit specifically formed to carry out a selective apprehension strategy. To measure the unit's effectiveness, the design of a controlled experiment sought to determine whether repeat offenders identified by ROP officers were more likely to be arrested by ROP than they were in the absence of ROP activities. A comparative component examined prior arrest histories and current case dispositions of a sample of persons arrested by 40 ROP and 169 non-ROP officers, as well as arrest productivity rates for both groups of officers.

Analysis of data produced the following findings:

- ROP substantially increased the likelihood of arrest of the persons it targeted;
- Targeted persons arrested by ROP officers had longer and more serious prior arrest histories than a sample of those arrested by non-ROP officers;
- ROP arrestees were more likely to be prosecuted and convicted on felony charges, and more likely to be incarcerated than non-ROP comparison arrestees; and
- ROP officers made only half as many total arrests as non-ROP comparison officers, but made slightly more "serious" arrests.

The study by PERF to examine criminal investigations of robbery and burglary cases was conducted in three police agencies: the DeKalb County

Department of Public Safety (Georgia); the St. Petersburg, Florida, Police Department; and the Wichita, Kansas, Police Department. Burglary and robbery cases were selected for this project for several reasons; they are relatively common, they are "serious crimes" (according to F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reporting criteria), and they consume a large amount of police resources.

This study was primarily designed to determine the importance of preliminary and follow up investigations in solving robbery and burglary crimes. To address this issue, several questions were asked. These included the following:

- How much time does a "typical" investigation take to conduct?
- What actions are performed during an investigation?
- What information is obtained during investigations?
- What are the sources of information gained during investigations, and how often do such sources provide information?
- What is the relative importance of the role patrol officers and detectives play in conducting investigations?
- What actions taken or information gained by investigators contribute to the arrest of suspects?

In seeking to answer these questions, the study took about two years to complete and involved analysis of investigative data from more than 320 robbery cases and 3,360 burglary cases in the three participating jurisdictions. The findings from this effort revealed that detectives and patrol officers contribute equally to the solution of both types of crimes examined. But the investigation of such cases rarely consumes more than four hours, spread over as many days, and three-quarters of the investigations are suspended within two days for lack of leads. In the remainder of cases, the follow up work

performed by detectives is a major factor in determining whether suspects will be identified and arrested. However, both detectives and patrol officers rely too heavily on victims, who seldom provide information that leads to an arrest. And detectives and patrol officers make too little use of other sources of information most likely to lead to arrest, i.e., witnesses, informants, peers, and police records. The single conclusion derived from this research is that sound management is required to ensure that investigations are effective and that resources are not wasted.

Up to this point, most of the research presented has focused on assessing or improving management of internal police operations. As indicated earlier, however, a change in orientation has taken place in policing that tends to focus more on external resources, i.e., the citizens, in working with and assisting the police. Many of the traditional approaches tried to combat or reduce crime have achieved only marginal success. Perhaps through establishing rapport and a better working relationship with citizens the police, over time, will find innovative solutions to remedy persistent problems.

In April of 1979, Herman Goldstein, a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, published an article that presented a different way of thinking about the police mission. Rather than run from call to call without having time to identify any underlying problems associated with these calls, much less address them, Dr. Goldstein suggested an alternative approach; "problem-oriented policing." This approach necessitates moving away from a reactive, "incident/event-orientation" and moving toward ways to identify, define, and impact problems that continue to drain police resources. Dr. Goldstein indicates that problem resolution constitutes the "real, substantive business" of policing.

Although this type of thinking is not incompatible with progressive police thought, attempting to operationalize it through traditional police management structures poses a significant challenge. But two police departments have accepted this challenge; the Madison, Wisconsin, Police Department and the Newport News, Virginia, Police Department.

While work completed in the Madison Police Department has yet to be published, work that documents the problem-oriented approach in Newport News is in the process of being published.

Also in 1979, work began in Flint, Michigan, to develop a "foot-beat" program. Seed money to develop the program was provided through a private source. The program involved the selection of a number of patrol officers to develop a close working relationship with citizens that lived in the officers' beats. The term "foot-beat officer" is actually a misnomer, because the officers in Flint who are involved in this program are not supposed to spend any time walking beats, unless there is a specific purpose of this activity. Their role is primarily to act as community mobilizers, facilitators, and coordinators in identifying and addressing crime and noncrime problems that are brought to their attention. In general, they tend to work out of an office, donated by citizen groups, located in their beats. While some vehicles are available, many of these offices rely on unconventional sources of transportation such as motor scooters and bicycles.

Of particular interest to other law enforcement administrators, the foot-beat program has been funded by a separate four-mill property tax increase. When this funding support was first presented to voters in a special election held in August of 1982, the measure passed by about 53 percent. In 1985, another election was held to determine what the tax payers wanted the

program continued. This time the measure passed by 68 percent. Recent polls conducted during the fall of 1986 indicate that citizen satisfaction with the program continues to grow. The latest survey reveals a general citizen satisfaction level of 75 percent. This poll also revealed a satisfaction level among Black citizens to be 80 percent.

The Minneapolis, Minnesota, Police Department took part in a Domestic Violence Experiment. Conducted from early 1981 through mid 1982, this was the first scientifically controlled test of the effects of arrest for any crime.

The purpose of the experiment was to address an intense debate about how police should respond to cases of domestic violence (misdemeanors). This debate involved three different viewpoints: 1) The traditional police approach of doing as little as possible, on the premise that offenders will not be punished by the courts even if they are arrested, and that the problems are basically not solvable; 2) The clinical psychologists' recommendations that police activity mediate or arbitrate disputes underlying the violence, restoring peace but not making any arrests; and 3) The approach recommended by many women's group of treating the violence as a criminal offense subject to arrest.

If the purpose of police response to domestic violence calls is to reduced the likelihood of that violence recurring, the question is which of these approaches is more effective than the others? In response to this question, experimental findings revealed that arrest was the most effective of the three standard methods police use to reduce domestic violence. The other methods, attempting to counsel both parties or sending assailants away from their homes for several hours, were found to be considerably less effective in deterring future violence in the cases examined.

The Houston Police Department collaborated with the Newark, New Jersey, Police Department on a project designed to reduce the fear of crime among citizens. Funded through NIJ, this program sought to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:

- Reduce the level of perceived neighborhood crime and disorder;
- Reduce the fear of and concern about crime;
- Improve satisfaction with police service; and
- Increase satisfaction with the neighborhood as a place to live.

Houston and Newark were selected as examples of two different types of cities -- similar, however, in that their police departments were able to design and manage complex experimental programs. Task forces were assembled in each city to determine which programs would best address local needs.

In both cities, the programs tested included the following:

- A local police community newsletter containing crime prevention advice, information about successful efforts to thwart crimes, neighborhood news, and, in some cases, local recorded crime data.
- A police-community multi-service center, where residents could go to report crimes, hold meetings, and obtain information.
- Contacts made by police officers with neighborhood residents to determine and address what the public considered to be local problems.

In Houston only, the programs included the following:

- Telephone contacts with victims of crime in an attempt to provide assistance and demonstrate concern; and
- An effort by police officers to create a neighborhood organization.

In Newark only, the programs included the following:

- A program to reduce the "signs of crime" -- social

disorder and physical deterioration; and

- A coordinated effort to provide information, increase the quantity and quality of police-citizen contacts, and reduce the social and physical signs of crime.

Results indicated that of all the programs tried, the most successful involved neighborhood police centers, door-to-door contacts, and community organizing by police. Inspection of the findings disclosed that these efforts had two characteristics in common: 1) They provided time for police to have frequent discussions with citizens who were encouraged to express their concerns about their neighborhoods; and 2) They relied upon the initiative and innovativeness of individual officers to develop and implement programs responsive to the concerns of the public.

As can be seen from a brief review of the work that has been completed or is currently ongoing, the research of the 1980s continues to build from what was found during the previous decade. And future research will certainly follow what is presently being learned about policing today. While additional research will continue to explore programs that involve the police with the public, more work is needed in criminal investigations, department organizational structures, and police management systems.

STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

During the course of each Executive Session meeting, a number of individual presentations were made. The presentations were designed to expose the panel members to a variety of different programs which had been implemented within the department and/or throughout the nation. The reason for exposing the panel members to this information was to provide them with an opportunity to consider using any one of them (or combination) as a vehicle to operationalize the concept of NOP. It was anticipated that any one of the programs could become a part of the policing style utilized by all officers within the department.

It is of interest in passing to note that programs developed within the Houston Police Department incorporated relevant findings from a lot of the research conducted during the 1970s in policing. But, for the most part, the department's efforts went further than the "enforcement-oriented" projects of the 1970s by including built-in linkages with representatives from the community. For example, the department's Directed Area Responsibility Team program not only included crime analysis and directed patrol components, it also included a series of activities to increase communications with the citizens.

This portion of the report, therefore, serves to identify those programs and associated strategies that were presented to and discussed by the panel membership during the six sessions. Each of the programs will be briefly described below.

The Oasis Technique

The OASIS technique is a comprehensive approach that includes a systematic analysis of the problems contributing to the formation of the neighborhood slum and neighborhood decay; coalition building and collaboration between local government service agencies, the private sector, the local residents; and development of an experienced plan for action and implementation. The technique identifies the strengths and weaknesses of a target neighborhood in order to focus services and attention on that area to reverse the trend of neighborhood deterioration. Once some improvement in the area and the housing occurs, and committed and helpful residents have been identified, an "oasis" can be created in the neighborhood resulting in an initial step towards safe and decent housing. These improved areas are then supposed to produce a ripple effect resulting in a revitalization of the neighborhood over time. Once the private sector sees the promise of the area, investment funds may be forthcoming.

A major feature of the Oasis technique is to make more effective and efficient use of existing resources so that visible results are produced in a relatively short time period.

The uniqueness of the Oasis technique is that it implements urban renewal in such a way that the character, social, and economic pattern of the area is preserved. This is in contrast to urban renewal which concentrates on removal of residents and replacement of structures.

The Oasis technique consists of seven steps. On a collective basis, these steps represent strategy considerations for the executive session membership. They are as follows:

- 1) Orienting and Organizing the Facilitators and Implementors: As a key component, this group generally consists of top representatives from the public and private sector, including the city administrator's office, public housing, police, public works, elected officials, business persons, and community leaders. These facilitators will eventually be charged with the responsibility of implementing the neighborhood plan;
- 2) Collecting the Data: the methodology of collecting data includes collecting and analyzing historical records and available data (census, crime, housing, employment, etc.), direct observation of the conditions in the target area, interviewing residents, and other steps to compile a physical, economic, and social profile of the target area. Some of the key data elements include the following:
 - history of physical maintenance, code violations, and antisocial behavior at the residences;
 - identification of private owners and landlords;
 - identification of "good" residents and "bad" residents in target areas; and
 - identification of social structures in target areas.
- 3) Evaluating the Data: the evaluation step helps the participants understand the interrelationships in the data as they attempt to identify target areas offering the most opportunity for success;
- 4) Presenting the Data: this enables the decision-makers to make more efficient choices regarding revitalization expenditures and strategies. It also provides an effective means of demonstrating to interested parties that certain policy choices are appropriate;
- 5) Preparation of the Plan: the plan identifies the commitment of resources. Among the determining factors is the identification of the oases, which residents will receive housing improvements, and the level of involvement from government agencies, including the police;
- 6) Conducting Implementation Training: as a result of the plan being adopted, new or different services will be required to be performed. The training serves to prepare personnel to deliver those services; and
- 7) Implementing the Oasis Neighborhood Plan: as a result of the services being delivered, actual physical and/or social changes in the target area will materialize.

The Oasis technique relies heavily on the involvement of the police for its success. Should a decision be made to adopt the Oasis technique certain recommendations are made as to the role the police serve with respect to the project. These recommendations include the following:

- 1) Police should focus on crimes involving order maintenance that directly impacts the quality of life of individuals who live in low income neighborhoods (drugs, prostitution, gambling, drinking in public, disorderly conduct, junked cars, etc.);
- 2) Police departments supporting an oasis effort must be willing to allocate a dedicated squad of patrol officers. This squad should be headed by a sergeant whose sole responsibility is supervision of the oasis unit. While the size of the unit can vary, the squad should not exceed eight patrol officers and one sergeant. A liaison officer between the Oasis squad and the office of the Chief of Police is also needed;
- 3) The Oasis squad should have flexible working schedules in order that the criminal element will not be able to predict when the Oasis squad will be on the street;
- 4) It is beneficial to assign detectives to the Oasis squad on an as needed basis in order to assist with follow-up investigations; and
- 5) The officers selected as Oasis squad members should be open-minded, and squad personnel should be ethnically mixed.

There are no specific recommendations describing particular policing techniques. Officers are expected to be involved in a wide range of activities, inclusive of: walk and talk activities, developing confidential informants, undercover and surveillance activities, raids, serving warrants, and participation in community meetings.

The Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART) Program

The DART Program was designed to provide the department with a process of altering its methods of delivering police services to the community. Substantively, the program sought to expand the role of the officer through the process of decentralizing basic police responsibilities. By enlarging the officers' role and providing increased managerial flexibility, the department attempted to commit itself to the effective management of patrol operations.

The program consisted of five major strategy classifications. Included within each classification were numerous strategies which were administered during the experimentation period. A brief description of each of the strategies is provided below.

I. Deployment Strategies

- 1) Beat Integrity - the assignment of officers to specific beats where they remain during their tour of duty, providing the requested services;
- 2) One-officer Units - the increased deployment of one-officer units beyond the normal ratio of one and two officer units. In conjunction with beat integrity, the strategies were designed to increase visibility and reduce response time to emergency calls;
- 3) Tactical Assignments - consisted of a series of events whereby the officers attempted to identify neighborhood problems and then provide a response in the form of using formal methods such as Tactical Action Plans or informal methods such as saturation patrols, covert surveillance, sting operations, and so forth;
- 4) Designated Report Units - establishing a single unit, per shift, to be responsible for writing offense reports within the district, which occur during duty hours;

II. Team Interaction Strategies

- 5) Information Sharing - methods used to stimulate information exchange between officers, inclusive of using a blackboard or clip boards for leaving messages, increased number of meetings, interacting with investigative sergeants, sharing of workcard information etc.;
- 6) Investigative Sergeants - the decentralizing of the investigative function involving the crimes of robbery, burglary, larcenies, and vehicle thefts. Investigative sergeants were reassigned to the Field Operations Command from the Investigative Operations Command, which allowed them to become generalists in addition to working more closely with the patrol officers;

III. Job Diversification Strategies

- 7) Patrol Officer Follow-up Investigations - expansion of the officers' role allowing them to spend time with the investigative sergeants working on criminal investigations;
- 8) Supportive Response Team - the establishment of a covert, plainclothes tactical squad of officers whose responsibility was to combat neighborhood vice and narcotic operations
- 9) Structured Patrol - the assignment of officers during their uncommitted patrol time to resolve neighborhood problems through the use of a variety of tactical and deployment responses. The strategy was dependant upon the access to crime analysis information and the diligence of the officers in discovering neighborhood problems;
- 10) Participatory Management - establishing opportunities for personnel within each rank to provide input into decisions that either directly or indirectly affected their work;
- 11) Assistant Squad Leader - designating an officer to assume some of his supervisors responsibilities during his scheduled absence;

IV. Knowledge Gaining/Sharing Strategies

- 12) Beat Profiling - establishment of a process whereby officers collect information about their beat which would assist them in providing appropriate types of services;
- 13) Crime Analysis - establishment of a process of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information designed to decrease crime and noncrime activity;

V. Community Interaction Strategies

- 14) Community Contacts - when possible, officers were encouraged to interact with the citizens in their beat in order to exchange information. The purpose of the exchanges was to facilitate a better understanding of each others expectations, and, with respect to the officer, be able to respond to any particular needs expressed by the citizen;
- 15) Neighborhood Meetings - requiring beat officers to attend neighborhood meetings conducted by civic clubs in order to expose the officers to the residents within their beat and allow them the opportunity to respond to any questions offered regarding the activities occurring in and around their neighborhood;
- 16) Police Community Relations Officer - officers were reassigned from the Community Services Division in order to facilitate interaction between the citizen and the beat officer. This consisted of coordinating the flow of information which would educate the citizen about safety and crime prevention techniques, responding to special requests from civic groups, schools, or individuals;
- 17) Crime Prevention/Security Surveys - allowing officers to participate in crime prevention presentations and administering security surveys to private residences and businesses within their respective beats. Officers identified potential problems as well as solutions to those problems for all interested parties.

As the needs of Houstonians changed over time, the department responded by designing and administering a program capable of coping with the demands of an everchanging environment. DART served as a mechanism which provided the

department with an opportunity to become flexible in addressing the challenges of the future.

The Positive Interaction Program (PIP)

The purpose of the PIP is to facilitate an exchange of information between beat officers and neighborhood residents using as a forum community exchange meetings. The program contains a variety of program goals, among them are:

- 1) Building more meaningful communication linkages between the public and members of the department;
- 2) Creating a more knowledgeable understanding of the law by the citizen;
- 3) Providing an opportunity for both the officers and the citizens to develop a better understanding of each others expectations and responsibilities;
- 4) Exposing the citizens to the profession of policing;
- 5) Providing a forum to exchange ideas and suggestions relative to the concerns and services that are pertinent to the beat in question; and
- 6) Demonstrating to the citizens the members of the department do care about the quality of life within their neighborhoods.

Monthly meetings are held bringing together members of the police department with representatives of various civic groups located within the division's jurisdiction. The citizen participants are responsible for transmitting information obtained from the meeting (e.g., newsletters) back to their respective civic groups. They also act as a conduit to express the concerns of their civic groups to the police officers in attendance. Other ancillary duties include notification of membership to attend meetings and providing refreshments for the meeting.

The responsibility of department personnel is to schedule the meetings, share information with the attendees, (i.e., crime analysis reports) and to discuss the ramifications of actions administered within the area. Probably one of the most important functions the department assumes is ensuring the participation of the beat officers. This allows the citizens an opportunity to discuss local concerns with the individuals responsible for policing their neighborhoods. It also provides a forum for the police officers to demonstrate their awareness of neighborhood concerns as well as availing themselves to any new information which they were previously unaware of.

The program seeks to strengthen community ties by uniting the citizens and the officers. As mutual admiration and respect grow for one another, cooperative efforts begin to form in response to the unique concerns and problems in their neighborhoods. This in turn enhances a sense of trust and caring of the officers on behalf of the citizens. If the citizens realize the officers care about the quality of life in their neighborhoods, then they will be more apt to participate in its preservation. :

The Fear Reduction Program

Research conducted by the National Institute of Justice revealed that fear of crime is a major problem in our society. Yet, other research evidence indicates that the level of fear appears to be far out of proportion to the objective risks of crime. The incongruity of the research findings is based upon the fact that fear may be derived from a concern about the "signs of crime" (e.g., vandalism, loitering, public drinking or gambling). Other factors, including impersonal relationships between the police and the citizens and the lack of information about crime and crime prevention techniques, may

create a sense of powerlessness, leading to higher levels of fear.

Law abiding citizens and merchants eventually opt to relinquish their neighborhoods to those who would prey upon them. Eventually, it has been suggested, this withdrawal process produces an exodus by those who can afford to move to other, apparently safer, areas. If such migration occurs, the fear-inflicted areas then provide abandoned homes and shops that could become breeding grounds for vandalism, drug use, and other forms of disorder.

No research exists which provides systematic evidence that such a cycle exists, or, if it does, what can be done to interrupt the cycle. The Fear Reduction Program, consequently, represents an attempt to empirically determine how the police can effectively address the problems of fear, disorder, the quality of police service, neighborhood satisfaction, and, ultimately, crime itself.

The program consisted of administering a total of five strategies. Each of the strategies is briefly described below:

- 1) Police-Community Newsletter: represented an attempt by the department to disseminate information to community groups and individuals in the form of a newsletter. Two versions of the newsletter were published. The first version contained information about the department, crime prevention tips, stories about police and citizen's working together to prevent crimes; and "good news" stories about crimes that had been prevented or solved in the neighborhood. Additionally, a regular column by the Chief of Police was included.

The second version contained similar information as the first, except a map of the neighborhood and a list of crimes that had occurred since the previous newsletter were included. The crime information included the type of crime committed, the date of occurrence, the street and block number in which it happened, and whether it occurred during the daylight, evening, or nighttime hours;

- 2) Community Organizing Response Team: spearheaded by a group of patrol officers, attempts were made to create a community organization where none had previously existed. The purpose was to create a sense of community in the area, and to identify a group of residents who would work regularly with the police to define and solve neighborhood problems.

Door to door surveys of a neighborhood were conducted by officers in an attempt to identify problems warranting police attention, and whether they, or any area resident they knew, might be willing to host small meetings of neighbors and police in their homes.

Meetings were held, problems and concerns discussed, and arrangements were made to have representatives meet with the district captain each month to discuss problems and devise potential solutions involving both the police and the citizens;

- 3) Citizen Contact Patrol: the purpose of this strategy was to enable beat officers to become more familiar with residents and employees working in their area. During their tour of duty, the officers were encouraged to make proactive contacts at residences and businesses.

During these contacts the officer would explain the purpose of the contact, and inquire as to the identification of any neighborhood problems the police should know about. The officer left a business card upon the conclusion of their interview in case the citizen wished to recontact the officer regarding additional information concerning their neighborhood;

- 4) Police Community Station: this strategy was designed to reduce the physical and psychological distance between the officer and the neighborhood residents. A small office was established in the neighborhood, staffed by police personnel and civilians.

The officers were not responsible for handling calls for service in the area (although they could respond if they wished): When possible they did patrol the neighborhood in and around the community station. Their primary responsibility, however, was to design and implement storefront programs. Furthermore, they were to avail themselves to citizens who visited the storefront seeking assistance and/or information; and

- 5) Recontacting Victims: the purpose of this strategy was to assist crime victims and demonstrate the police cared about their plight. A team of officers were assigned the responsibility of reviewing case reports in search of

relevant information about the victim and the crime. Upon contacting the victim, the officers would ask the victim if they had any problems which the police might be able to help, and whether they had any further information about their case they could give the police.

If problems were identified, the officer would refer the person to the proper agency for assistance. If the victim needed information for insurance purposes, the officer would attempt to supply it. The officers also mailed a crime prevention package to the victims if they so desired.

It was the contention of the task force members that these strategies could possibly reduce the fear of crime in the respective neighborhoods as well as produce other desired favorable effects. This feeling was based upon the belief that legitimate commitments were going to be made to interact with the citizenry using a variety of different strategies. Since the officers helped develop these strategies, had seen their success in other departments, and were going to be personally involved in the application of them, their desire and willingness to see the strategies succeed strongly influenced their initial opinion.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

The Houston Police Department has developed and implemented, during the course of the last five years, a number of significant community oriented programs as was identified in the previous section of this report. In implementing each of these programs, the department sought to determine what they could learn about the nature of the relationship between the officers and the citizens. In each instance, this relationship was affected by the purpose and frequency of the interaction experienced by both parties.

Given that the City of Houston can best be characterized as a large urban area containing a multitude of unique challenges, it becomes the responsibility of the police department to determine what its role is in addressing those challenges. The concept of NOP appears to represent a logical method of tackling those challenges. In the development of this concept, however, it requires a commitment on behalf of department personnel to design a policing style which incorporates the lessons learned from previous program experimentation efforts.

This portion of the report identifies the lessons learned from the department's experimental programs. Since the purpose of this paper is to describe salient characteristics of a policing style for the department, there will be no attempt to suggest which programs should be incorporated within the NOP concept. Furthermore, there will be no attempt at this time to describe relationships between a particular program(s) and the department's prospective policing style.

The Oasis Technique

From the department's standpoint, the success of the Oasis technique is dependant upon two primary factors: 1) the actual commitment by agencies other than the police department and 2) the involvement of the patrol officer in the Oasis technique process. Of the two factors, the second is more conducive to control by department officials.

The process by which the Oasis technique becomes operational, consists of seven steps: (please see page 55 for a more detailed description)

- 1) Orienting and organizing the facilitators and implementors;
- 2) Collecting the data;
- 3) Evaluating the data;
- 4) Presenting the data;
- 5) Preparation of the plan;
- 6) Conducting implementation training; and
- 7) Implementing the Oasis neighborhood plan.

The Oasis technique, therefore, suggests a means of examining how one should go about performing his job.

As indicated by various panel members: ". . . we need to quit trying to create more programs; we have enough programs . . . what we've got to do is make all of the police officers that we have, community based police officers." The implication is that the Oasis technique represents a method which will cause this change to occur. Again, in referencing panel member comments: "You get the officers at the grass roots level, involved in the plan, they interact with the facilitators, plan what's going on, and participate and are responsible for implementation. They know what's going to happen (and) why its going to happen".

Although the Oasis technique ascribes to the use of a squad of officers, it appears that once the residents gain control of their own neighborhood, the

squad can be disbanded and responsibility turned over to the beat officers. This may or may not be consistent with previous discussions regarding the role of the beat officers under the concept of NOP.

The Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART) Program

The DART Program can best be described as a process which simultaneously incorporated the decentralizing of basic police services with a concomitant expansion of the roles of the officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. In association with the role expansion was a commensurate increase in supervisory and managerial flexibility. The focal point of the program centered upon the implementation of 17 different strategies, grouped under 5 different operational categories.

The findings gleaned from the Evaluation Report are provided below:

1) Deployment Strategies:

- Beat Integrity - need more cooperation from the Dispatch Division with respect to assigning calls to the beat units; officers are in need of constant encouragement to remain in their beats; and officers must be given the flexibility to police their beat in accordance with the needs of the residents they serve;
- One-officer Units - strategy is heavily dependant upon a "system of deployment" which includes the ability to control radio traffic, accessing information through the mobile digital computers, maintaining visual assurances (from other units) during patrols, and sharing crime data and activities verbally during roll calls and shift changes; response times were reduced; "wolfpacking occurred"; and vehicle availability was a must;
- Tactical Assignments - strategy is dependant upon timely and reliable crime analysis information; identifying tactical assignments became difficult; standardized administrative procedures guiding the implementation of the strategy were non existent; more comprehensive preparatory training is needed; officers

need to be given credit on the workcard for the performing tactical assignments; and

- Designated Report Units - total failure due to the complex coordination of administrative responsibilities; recommend it not be used unless following suggestions were incorporated: training for dispatchers in screening and recording the report calls, an increase in the report unit's responsibility to compensate for those times when the unit is not needed for reports, and deployment of strategy should be consistent for those beats/districts fielding a large number of report calls. Reference was made to resurrect the Calls for Service Management Program as a more effective method of handling these types of calls.

Officer visibility can be increased utilizing existing resources. Response times decreased as a direct result of these specific deployment practices. Officers did not like beat integrity and are concerned about their safety. Tactical assignments need stronger crime analysis support and resistance was experienced for the designated report unit.

2) Team Interaction Strategies:

- Information Sharing - rapport between the officers and the investigative sergeants was effective; communication among the officers between shifts was sporadic and
- Investigative Sergeants - a clearer understanding of the investigative sergeant's role within the overall operational context was needed; this includes establishing coordination linkages with the centralized divisions; data collection procedures must be established immediately to measure the quantity and quality of the work conducted; inadequate support equipment and furniture also attributed to an initial decline in enthusiasm for the strategy.

Officers are reluctant to share information unless there is a conduit, such as a localized crime analysis unit. Investigative sergeants and patrol officers can work together as long as the job task expectations are satisfactorily attained by both parties. This will lead to writing more

comprehensive initial investigation reports and thereby expedite case closure.

3) Job Diversification Strategies:

- Patrol Officer Follow-up Investigations - officers were not properly informed as to the purpose of the strategy; a systematic method of assigning cases should be considered to avoid charges of favoritism being alleged; on-the-job training should be improved; officer participation should not just be limited to "leg work" or menial tasks;
- Supportive Response Team - strategy led to a prompt resolution of neighborhood vice and narcotic problems; stricter controls need to be established to govern the amount and type of activities the team should be involved with; conflict occurred with structured patrol operations thus causing coordination problems to occur for the beat officers' supervisor;
- Structured Patrol - initially, confusion over the meaning of the concept occurred, but was eventually clarified; the success of the strategy is dependant upon the collection and analysis of information; this proved to be an obstacle as the crime analysis strategy was not as effective as initially envisioned; a means of scheduling structured patrol activities needs to be developed;
- Participatory Management - a clear and concise operational definition of the concept was needed; more opportunities for meetings needed to become available; a clear understanding of one's role in the concept is needed; and
- Assistant Squad Leader - a worthwhile concept if a clear definition of the scope of the leader's authority can be developed; selection criteria needs to be uniform; a method of evaluating performance should be devised; this strategy would be more effective if used in conjunction with a squad concept for the officers.

Officers are fully capable of resolving problems within their beat if given the chance, and knowing they would be held fully accountable for their actions. The expansion of the officers' role led to increased productivity

and improved supervisory relationships. The sergeants became more responsible for managing the affairs of their officers in light of the expansion of their officers' job responsibilities. Uncommitted patrol time was reduced.

4) Knowledge Gaining/Sharing Strategies:

- Beat Profiling - the theory of beat profiling was supported by the officers' supervisors; the scope of information collected should be limited to its operational significance; because the information collected was not deemed to be practical for operational purposes, the strategy was seen as an inefficient use of the officers' time and
- Crime Analysis - strategy was strongly supported by the rank and file, however, because of the lack of equipment and office space, the strategy was a minimal success.

Information support is an essential element if one is to effectively manage patrol operations. Furthermore, the utility of the crime analysis information is only as good as it is perceived by the officers; therefore, the information must be timely, reliable, and informative. Additionally, crime analysis personnel must be easily accessible by the patrol officers requiring their services. If this occurs, the officers become quite appreciative of the information and find it beneficial to the performance of their job.

5) Community Interaction Strategies:

- Community Contacts - supervisory support of the strategy was apparent; extreme difficulty in defining what type of activity represented a community contact; community personnel should be more informed about the strategy at community meetings or through newsletters;
- Neighborhood Meetings - strategy was responsible for establishing a closer relationship between the patrol officers and the citizens attending the meetings; coordination problems for the meetings existed but were eventually resolved; hidden agendas need to be removed; the use of a community feedback form was a plus;

- Police Community Relations Officer - a very useful strategy as a definitive need existed; prior to the expiration of the experimental time period, the strategy was adopted by all of the FOC patrol divisions; and
- Crime Prevention/Security Surveys - beneficial strategy within the community; need to develop a more effective method of delivering the service; more officers may need to be trained as to how to perform the strategy; standard operating procedures need to be developed; procedures should include a recognition of who should perform the strategy, this infers training commitments.

Community support for department operations helps facilitate strategy success. Officers and citizens can learn to respect each others' perspective if given the chance to meet and discuss issues which are conducive to a successful resolution. Interaction between the officers and the citizens enhances the level of satisfaction toward the department, given the nature of the encounter is nonadversarial

The DART experience should be viewed as a process in transition. It is apparent personnel resources can be more effectively redeployed if the equipment is available. There is considerable value in securing information from the public and from one another within the department. The officers can perform more responsibilities if given the opportunity, under appropriate supervision, and with the necessary operational support. Experience has demonstrated that portions of the program, can be expanded as this has already occurred throughout the other divisions within the Field Operations Command.

What is urged, however, is not an overreliance on just replicating the strategies. Efforts should be directed toward analyzing how the patrol officer became more involved in providing a wider range of services heretofore unperformed. This seems to be more closely associated with the requirements demanded by the NOP concept.

The Positive Interaction Program (PIP)

The PIP sought to improve the relationship between the neighborhood residents and members of the Southeast Division. This was obtained by establishing a forum for civic group leaders to meet once a month with the division patrol captain and a number of patrol officers and/or supervisors. The meetings provided a forum for the participants to exchange information and ideas governing activities observed and/or performed in their respective neighborhoods. The civic group leaders would then transmit the information obtained from the meeting back to the members of their particular civic group.

The cohesive relationship that formed between the officers and the citizens led to many successes ranging from interacting with other governmental agencies to combat localized neighborhood concerns to performing special activities such as food drives and sharing information from various newsletters.

The PIP sought to establish cooperative responsibilities on behalf of department personnel as well as the citizens. This led to the citizens becoming more informed about the law enforcement profession and the demands placed upon the officers. The officers also became more responsive to the needs of the citizens as they saw them as supportive friends and not just an entity requesting a particular type of service.

Suggestions for expansion also provide insight into the success of the program. Membership drives are encouraged to involve more citizens thereby expanding the network of communication flow from the officers. The use of neighborhood volunteers to work in the department is strongly encouraged as a means to develop a more meaningful understanding by the citizens of the department's commitment to the effective delivery of services. "Ride alongs" were also encouraged as an educational tool for the concerned citizen.

Finally, a citywide committee of representatives from all the PIPs would be useful in exchanging information and ideas throughout the entire city as opposed to a certain portion of the city.

The Fear Reduction Program

A total of five different strategies were implemented during the course of the program. The strategies consisted of distributing newsletters, creating a community organizing response team (CORT), deploying a citizen contact patrol activity, establishing a community station (storefront), and recontacting victims of a crime. The results of implementing these strategies has been extracted from, Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report, authored by the members of the Police Foundation.

The significant findings for each of the strategies are as follows:

- 1) Police-Community Newsletter: people appreciated receiving the newsletter, but there were no significant effects on any of the program's desired outcomes;
- 2) Community Organizing Response Team: the strategy was associated with a significant reduction in the level of perceived social disorder in the area and with a significant improvement in the evaluation of police service. There were also significant reductions in the levels of perceived personal and property crime in the area. One unanticipated effect was a perceived police aggressiveness among program area residents;
- 3) Citizen Contact Patrol: the strategy was associated with significant reductions in levels of perceived social disorder in the area, increased satisfaction with the neighborhood, and reduced property victimization.

One aspect of the evaluation revealed significant reductions in the fear of personal victimization as well as reductions in levels of perceived personal and property crime and police aggressiveness in the area. A significant improvement in evaluations of police service was also indicated;

- 4) Police Community Station: the strategy was associated with significant reductions in fear of personal victimization and in the level of perceived personal crime in the area.

One aspect of the evaluation indicated significant reductions in levels of perceived social disorder and perceived property crime in the area. The analysis also found that area residents took significantly fewer defensive actions to protect themselves from crime; and

- 5) Recontacting Victims: the only significant effect was that victims who were recontacted perceived more personal crime in the area than did victims who were not recontacted. In particular, Hispanic and Asian victims who were recontacted demonstrated significantly higher levels of fear of crime and of perceived area crime. Such persons were significantly more likely to report taking defensive steps to protect themselves from crime.

Although the program did not achieve all of the desired outcomes it had originally hoped, there were several implications for the practitioner to consider. Based on the fact the strategies involving citizens had the most desirable impacts, and were easier and less costly to operate, the following suggestions can be offered:

- Every available opportunity should be taken to increase the quantity and improve the quality of contacts between police officers and the citizens they serve. This would involve a dedication of "out-of-service" time, which officers usually use for nondirected patrol, to making contacts with citizens;
- During the course of police-citizen contacts, officers should attempt to determine what problems are of greatest concern to the residents of particular neighborhoods, what they believe are the causes of those problems, and what they think can be done about them;
- Stringent efforts should be made to reach out to all types of people, not just those who are easiest to reach or who initiate contacts with the police;
- Programs should be developed to address the problems identified by the citizens, not those assumed to exist by the police themselves;
- Every effort should be made to involve citizens in addressing the problems they have identified;

- A continuous process should be established to determine when some problems have been alleviated and others have arisen;
- Officers selected for assignments such as these should be clearly informed as to what the purpose of the program is - and that their efforts, at least at the beginning, may appear unorthodox and frustrating;
- Personnel involved in these programs will need respect, trust, and considerable latitude to determine the nature of the problems they should address and how best to do so;
- Those officers who are most creative, enthusiastic, and self-motivated will perform best. (The surest way to "bury" a program is to use it as a way to "bury" an unproductive officer.);
- Because these community-oriented programs are unlike usual police operations, special efforts should be taken to provide recognition and rewards to officers who perform them well;
- Supervisors should be selected who provide enough oversight to demonstrate concern, but not so much that individual officer initiative is stifled;
- A great deal of tolerance will be necessary, particularly at the early stages, to allow officers and their supervisor room to experiment and, occasionally, to fail;
- Training is crucial, and can best be provided by those who have proven their ability to conduct such programs;
- Any department considering the programs discussed in this report should examine those programs directly. No report . . . can effectively substitute for firsthand experience, including the excitement of their successes and the disappointment of their failures; and
- Finally, successful implementation of such strategies requires more than just a mechanical execution of steps such as these. In the end, a sincere commitment to problem-solving with the community must infuse the organization and its members.

These suggestions should aid the practitioner in his efforts to enlist the assistance of the public in preventing and reducing criminal activity within his community.

Collectively, the programs, strategies, and activities described in this report were, for the most part, appendages to the management function within the Field Operations Command. But management within the Field Operations Command recognized the need to incorporate these initiatives into the mainstream of the management structure. It was therefore suggested that an administrative process be developed to tie new programs and initiatives into the existing management system. Unlike the implementation of the D.A.R.T. Program that initially had to limp along pretty much on its own, the development of a more formal process to capture lessons learned from previous efforts was required to facilitate and direct implementation of other initiatives.

In short, the Command recognized that a set of concepts was simply not sufficient to initiate and administer program activities. The concepts needed to be related to the Command's goals and objectives and presented in the context of an administrative framework that addressed the process issues. These issues include questions regarding what is proposed to be done, what resources are needed and are available to achieve program objectives, how will the programmatic activities be accomplished, and what are the role expectations regarding responsibilities to insure that the appropriate ranks are held accountable. It is with these questions in mind that the ensuing section of this report was developed.

A PROCESS MODEL FOR DEVELOPING NOP

Overview

As noted previously in this report, the definition of Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) is as follows:

NOP is an interactive process between police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns.

A crucial component of the NOP definition is establishing an interactive relationship between the beat officers and the neighborhood residents. This type of relationship is important in that it perpetuates a sense of responsibility, a sense of caring and willingness, and a sense of commitment on behalf of both parties in order to make the neighborhoods a safer place to live, work, and play. This desire to establish stronger bonds of trust and honesty must also occur among and between department personnel if the concept of NOP is expected to be successful.

In most instances, the amount of exposure between department personnel and the public results when officers respond to calls for service. These meetings, more often than not, are not conducive to open, interactive forms of conversation. They are usually quite specific with a focus on attempting to respond to or resolve a particular concern voiced by the citizen. There are times, however, when officers and citizens can meet under more relaxing conditions. In most instances, this would involve directing officer activities during their uncommitted patrol time.

During the officers' uncommitted patrol time, supervisors, managers, and administrators alike must be willing to provide the officers with an opportunity to pursue the enhancement of their beats and the development of their relationship with the citizens. The officers, however, must realize that the activities emanating from these opportunities will have to be performed in accordance with department parameters. Conversely, management must realize that officers are capable of devising methods of working with the citizens and that supervisory responsibility should focus on the desire to stimulate the willingness and dedication of the officer to become actively involved in identifying and responding to neighborhood concerns.

The officers and their supervisors will need to work together in determining what action needs to be taken, when it should be performed, and how it should be performed. There may be times when this causes disagreements to occur between the officers and the supervisors. When this occurs, the supervisors must be willing to sit down with their officers and discuss viable alternatives to their initial sets of recommendations. There may be instances when the officer's decision is appropriate and there may be times when the supervisor has to make the final decision. What is important, however, is the realization that the officers and their supervisors must begin to feel they are working with another and not against one another.

The attitude that police officers must be guided and directed at every turn must be discarded. Police officers are more than just programmatical robots; they are creative, dedicated, and conscientious individuals who are capable of delivering police services in a manner that is consistent with neighborhood expectations.

This is not to suggest that no semblance of control is needed to guide the officers' actions. What is needed is a better sense of when to exercise that control so as not to inhibit their ability to develop a feeling of ownership and pride in their work. This can best be accomplished by opening up lines of communication between the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators.

The content of these exchanges should not necessarily be devoted to barking out instructions, requesting justifications for actions taken, or handing out occasional "pats on the back." Although these actions are necessary at times, more of an emphasis needs to be placed on the need to challenge the individual's sense of accomplishment. Officers, supervisors, and managers alike need to be asked questions which prompt them to think about the types of activities they have performed, why those activities were administered, what problems, if any, were experienced on behalf of the individuals involved, how the activities coincided with any previously designed plans, what adjustments will need to be made, and so forth. The point is, department personnel must be challenged to plan, organize, and assess their daily contributions in relationship to the needs and expectations of the residents living within their beats and the responsibilities of the police department.

The NOP Process

Given this initial orientation, it is imperative the beat officers realize the NOP process focuses on creating an environment from which they would be able to develop meaningful information exchanges with the neighborhood residents. The purpose of these exchanges is to provide the officers with additional insight beyond their own experiences as to what types of services

need to be delivered within the neighborhoods. Consideration, therefore, should be given toward identifying how the officers would acquire data which would help them formulate a set of reliable neighborhood expectations.

The collection of information by the officers could incorporate the use of internal and external sources. Internal sources would include obtaining information from complainants, self-initiated activities, crime analysis reports, operational analysis reports, experiences from their sergeants, lieutenant, and/or captain, and so forth. External sources of information could be obtained through proactive citizen contacts, interviews with business proprietors, citizen surveys, civic group meetings, church gatherings, and so on. Collectively, this information would broaden the officer's understanding of the concerns of the neighborhood. Comparisons with present service delivery methods could then be made by the officer. It would become the officers' responsibility to compare neighborhood concerns with present types of services delivered within the officers' respective beats.

As the officers begin to think about the service needs they have been able to identify, some attention needs to be given to verifying the accuracy of the information they have been exposed to. Officers may discover that certain neighborhood sources have identified concerns that have been totally unnoticed by department personnel and vice versa. In either case, efforts should be made to cross check the reliability of the information. For example, if the officer was told about a burglary problem in a neighborhood, and the problem had previously been unknown to him, he could check with the crime analysis personnel to determine if they have detected such a problem. This form of verification will allow officers to eventually prioritize the neighborhood needs.

Generally, the officers' experience will be a primary factor in justifying how the neighborhood needs are prioritized. Other considerations may be dependant upon whether the need is of a criminal or noncriminal nature. It may also be dependant upon the officers' perceived sense of resource availability given the size of the problem. Another justification criterion could be the acknowledgment of impact considerations by the officers. The impact concerns would more clearly describe what would happen if the neighborhood need(s) was not addressed by the department.

At this juncture, the officers would begin to assess the need to commit resources on a short or long term basis. A commitment to either time frame would clarify what the officers could realistically hope to accomplish within their respective beats.

The officers should also be expected to identify appropriate evaluation criteria which would coincide with the various courses of action they are considering. By identifying performance criteria, the officers are more apt to be cognizant of the commitments they need to make if they expect to deliver quality service. They are also more likely to want their efforts to succeed since they had a substantial amount of involvement in the identification stages.

This process of interacting with the public to acquire relevant information, verifying its accuracy, prioritizing the information, assessing resource availability, and identifying performance criteria, should become a mental mind set within each of the patrol officers. This should not be construed to mean that the officers be required to document this series of activities. A more appropriate purpose is to ensure that the officers be able

to clearly envision what they feel should be done to service neighborhood needs.

It is expected that the officers will want to begin servicing those needs as soon as possible. The service would obviously require an articulation of tasks, activities, strategies, and/or programs in need of implementation in order to resolve the neighborhood concerns. The officers, however, would also have to realize that whatever action is taken, it must be performed in conjunction with the delivery of normal, daily responsibilities such as responding to calls for service, making arrests, and writing reports. It would become the responsibility of the supervisors, managers, and administrators to determine how all of these responsibilities could be blended together to form a deliberate commitment to providing comprehensive service to the officers' respective neighborhoods.

Consequently, it becomes the responsibility of the sergeant to discuss the service needs identified by the officers. Depending upon the nature of the discussion, the sergeants may opt to discuss with the officers the rationale they used to formulate their position. Hopefully, as a result of the sergeants' self-initiative to become aware of the neighborhood needs and problems, there will be some consensus with the officers' viewpoint. If discrepancies or differences of opinion do not exist, the sergeant could authorize the officers to pursue their recommended course of action.

There may be instances, however, where the recommendations warrant the commitment of substantial resources. Additionally, the recommendations for one beat may be similar to those in another. In either instance, the sergeants may decide to reassess the officers' recommendations and make minor adjustments, devise an alternative course of action, or decide to consult with their

lieutenant to determine the proper course of action to follow.

An important aspect of the sergeants' role, consequently, is the recognition that they will be receiving a number of recommendations from the officers working the different beats under their direct supervision. It will be the sergeant's responsibility to coordinate and supervise the implementation of the accepted recommendations. This task will not be an easy one to accomplish as the sergeants must still recognize the need to continue supervising the delivery of basic services within the neighborhoods (e.g. calls for service, arrests, and reports).

The sergeants must realize that as the officers assume more responsibility, the job of coordinating the implementation of the activities becomes more difficult. In order for the sergeants to efficiently account for their officers' actions, managerial methods will need to be developed and deployed. Only then can the sergeant be in a position to effectively monitor the progress of the officers' actions.

Once the officers' actions have been administered and assessed, it becomes the responsibility of the sergeant to provide feedback to the officers. The officers may feel their actions were successful from the standpoint of removing the problem; however, the sergeant's observations may provide added insight with respect to citizen feedback (e.g., via civic groups), how efficiently department resources were utilized and coordinated, or, share the concerns from other officers who assisted in the delivery of the service.

Irrespective of whether the sergeants decide to authorize immediate implementation in response to a given set of requests, it will still be their responsibility to apprise their lieutenants of what is occurring within their districts. This means, especially in the case of recommendations requiring

long term attention, that the sergeants be able to sit down and discuss with their lieutenants what the overall course of activity is for their area of responsibility. It becomes the responsibility of the lieutenant to begin coordinating the recommendations received from all of his sergeants. In most cases, this will mean reviewing the activity conducted or recommended from more than one district.

As managers and coordinators, the lieutenants are ultimately responsible for conveying to the division captain what is happening on their shifts across the districts, within the beats. By meeting with their sergeants on a regular basis, the lieutenants can ascertain the compatibility of their sergeants' recommendations with any thoughts they or the captain may have. This is very important given the possibility of there being other specific requests to use resources that have limited availability.

In similar fashion to that of the sergeants, the lieutenants must also recognize the need to coordinate a multitude of potentially different and similar requests. The scope of the lieutenants' responsibility, however, is even broader than those of the sergeants since they must oversee the administration of shift activities. Whereas the sergeants are responsible for examining the recommendations from all of the beats, the lieutenants have the added burden of examining the recommendations for all of the respective districts. Such an examination may also include the need to reverify the quality of information collected, the accuracy of the analysis, the availability of resources, and the compatibility of the recommendations given the identified concern or problem within the different neighborhoods in question. In some cases, this will cause the lieutenants to reprioritize the recommendations.

The reprioritization could be justified on the basis of many factors. Among them could be the nature, frequency, and severity of the problem identified, the availability of resources, or its relationship to concerns of the department's administration or those of city council. In other words, the lieutenants may have to assume a very delicate role in coordinating the needs of numerous independent entities, all of whom may have legitimate concerns.

Once the lieutenants have formulated their recommendations, they should arrange a meeting with the division captain. The captain's ultimate responsibility is to approve or disapprove the plans brought forth by each of the shift lieutenants. As was the case before him, the captains are entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the merits of the recommendations from all of the shifts. The same type of constraints put forth before the shift lieutenants are of equal concern, if not more, to the captains.

Upon approving any of the recommendations it is imperative the captain be apprised of any progress that is made. In order for the captains to assess the relative merits of any effort, they must be aware of the evaluation criteria. Once the progress is reported back to the captains, they will be in a position to match the officers' performance with the performance criteria associated with the activities, strategies, or programs administered. As the captains review the progress of the endeavor, they will be able to determine the relative success of the officer(s) and proceed to report those findings up through the chain of command to the chief of police.

In summary, this portion of the report sought to identify several steps which could be useful in describing how the concept of NOP could be operationalized. In retrospect, each of the aforementioned stages has a varying degree of applicability as one progresses up the chain of command. The

various roles, procedures, and responses mentioned are part of an evolutionary change process associated with operationalizing the concept of NOP. One can not expect the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators to adjust rapidly. Progress must be gradual but deliberate, it must be coordinated, and above all, it must be stimulated by a strong commitment to satisfy both the demands of the neighborhood residents and the desires of department personnel.

To reiterate, conceptually, the process described throughout this portion of the report includes the following elements:

- 1) Formulation of expectations - the officers must be given the opportunity to develop a realistic set of expectations for their respective beats;
- 2) Data collection and verification - officers must be allowed to interact with neighborhood residents in order to determine what their concerns are. They should also have access to department statistics which identify work demands within their beats;
- 3) Analysis and discussion - a mutual responsibility of the officers and sergeants; the purpose of interacting is to identify and verify severity, frequency, and location of crime and noncrime activities within neighborhoods and business areas in need of attention by the police;
- 4) Service commitments - primarily the responsibility of the sergeant to determine if the service should be delivered by the officers. The decision must take into consideration the department's ability to allow the officers to perform certain tasks, activities, strategies, or programs. Concomitantly, an assessment of resource availability and appropriate accountability measures should also be made;

Although initial recommendations come from the officers, the sergeants and lieutenants must begin determining how they can combine and/or coordinate the commitment of existing resources; as one progresses up the chain of command, the magnitude of the coordination increases and thus becomes more difficult to administer;

All officers must realize that if appropriate resources are not available from within the department, the decision to implement their recommendations may be denied. The

officers, however, should be encouraged to rethink another means of resolving the identified problems or delivering the needed services;

- 5) Implementation - the decision to implement can emanate from any level depending upon the nature of the request. This step basically represents the process of performing, supervising, and managing the actions taken by the officers in response to the citizens' concerns.

Simple requests may be handled directly by the officer or after a quick consultation with the sergeant. More complex demands may require input and confirmation from the lieutenant and/or captain;

Confirmation to implement may be based upon the captain's ability to secure a commitment on behalf of local neighborhood groups to supply certain types of resources or other types of assistance;

The commitment to implement can also be affected by unexpected service demands which can legitimately interrupt officer activity and thereby redirect the officers' attention to another concern. This would result in the officers reinstating their actions at a later time;

- 6) Feedback and Adjustment - generally a responsibility of all participants. The success of the endeavor is dependent upon the identification of evaluation criteria from which reliable data can be collected and assessed in relationship to the preestablished command objectives.

Process Requirements

The implementation of any new process should require the recognition and acceptance of adjustments to the present method of operation. As noted previously, the transition associated with adopting the NOP philosophy affects each and every rank within the department. Among the more prominent changes in need of consideration are the following:

- 1) The development and incorporation of a patrol management plan which assists in operationalizing the NOP concept;
- 2) The development of information gathering strategies which are designed to unite the officers with the neighborhood residents in an attempt to identify local concerns and/or

problems; these strategies must contain criteria which identify for the officer, how different types of information can be collected from different sources; and

3) A recognition of the fact that interaction on behalf of the officers and the citizens, other officers, and/or their supervisors requires time. Not only is cooperation from the dispatch personnel important, but supervisors should consider devising methods of allowing their officers to conduct meetings during their duty hours. Examples of how this could occur include:

- Considering the use of split roll call sessions, whereby time is devoted to having the sergeant meet with his respective beat groups;
- Establishing district group meetings consisting of representatives from each beat group and a sergeant to act as a resource person and document the minutes of the meetings. The meetings could be held on a bimonthly basis with a rotating membership so all beat officers would be involved in the interaction process;
- Providing time for the officers to collect data from their internal and external sources without interruption to handle calls for service. This could be accomplished by reassigning a beat officer to perform this function over the span of a couple of days and then rotating it to the next beat officer; and
- Allowing the officers time to meet and discuss their method of analysis of the data they collected. This would allow them to develop more meaningful and effective recommendations governing their respective plans.

The incorporation of these changes and others serve only to place the beat officer in a more advantageous position to acquire data, analyze it, and react to it in a responsive and efficient manner. The benefits to be gained from this transition are innumerable. The efforts expended by the department to facilitate and support this change will surely have a direct bearing on how successful the concept of NOP can be operationalized.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR NOP

NOP is a concept which seeks to define and describe a philosophy which guides and directs the delivery of police services throughout the city of Houston. As a philosophy, NOP attempts to incorporate the department's values into a responsive policing style which is dependant upon quality day to day interactions between the police and the public. Quality daily interactions are based upon the success of being able to establish a desire and willingness within the officers to work together with the public. This feeling should become inherent within all officers up to the point that it becomes a representation of the department's culture. By adopting this philosophy as the department's culture and transforming it into operational reality, a firm foundation will have been set from which the quality of life within all neighborhoods throughout the city of Houston can be improved.

This basic description of NOP served as the impetus for the Executive Session membership to identify a variety of aspects which would assist the officers, supervisors, and managers in describing how they could best operationalize the philosophy of NOP. As the Executive Session membership began to grapple with the task of incorporating the NOP philosophy within the day to day attitudes and behaviors displayed by the officers, two critical aspects of the definition garnered their attention. The first aspect focused upon the phrase:

"an interactive process between the police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats. . ."

This phrase suggests that department personnel need to rethink what the nature of their relationship with the public should be. Traditionally, there was little, if any, reciprocity between the officers and the public in sharing

responsibilities for the delivery of police services. Under the concept of NOP, police personnel and members of the community must learn how to work together.

The nature of this relationship, therefore, requires both parties to actively communicate with one another. By virtue of communicating with one another, both the police and the community assume the responsibility of identifying issues in need of resolution. As these issues are identified, it will invariably cause the officers to think about new and innovative methods of providing services. This is not to suggest that traditional service delivery methods are no longer valid.

What is apt to occur is the identification of issues which require different types of commitments or methods of delivering services. Herein lies the second key aspect of the NOP definition:

" . . . assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns."

This implies that the role of the citizen becomes a more active one whereby they seek to assist the officers in resolving identified neighborhood concerns.

No longer should the public assume the police can single-handedly identify all of their neighborhood problems. Furthermore, the public must assume the posture of not only informing the police of their concerns, but they must also be in a position to assume some responsibility for helping the police address these concerns. The extent of this involvement on behalf of the public will vary depending upon the types of concerns needing attention and the ability of the police to respond, given the magnitude of their overall responsibilities.

This shift in orientation toward the public, by the police, will change the role of the beat officer. Although there will still be a need to recognize the value of enforcement activities, the desired perception is for the officer to be viewed as someone that can provide different forms of help and assistance. It requires the officers to demonstrate an attitude of caring about the safety and well being of the citizens, someone who is not afraid to express compassion through empathizing and sympathizing with victims of crime. It also requires officers to be able to organize community groups, inspire and motivate community groups into action, and facilitate and coordinate the collective efforts and endeavors of others.

As so poignantly discussed by the Executive Session membership, this shift in emphasis cannot occur without a commensurate shift in the attitude and behavior by the supervisors and managers. Some resistance is expected as the philosophy of NOP challenges the overreliance on using autocratic management styles. A different more responsive attitude and managerial style will be required to stimulate, accommodate, and perpetuate the desired behavioral changes which will occur as a result of redefining the officers' role.

This new form of management must encourage a willingness within all managers to transform new concepts into attainable goals and objectives. These goals and objectives must, in turn, be articulated within the organization and must be transformed into actions which are consistent with the service demands expressed by the citizenry. Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the administration to create an environment which will facilitate and support the development and implementation of a policing style under the NOP concept.

In discussing how such an environment can be created within the department, the membership began to examine a number of programs that had been or still are

being administered throughout the country. Based upon an analysis of these programs, it became apparent that the success of creating such an environment was primarily attributed to the ability to effectively manage police operations. Based upon a review of the research trends and implications, it became clear to the membership that in order to effectively manage police operations several department commitments had to be made.

Chief among these commitments was the need to recognize the relationship between managing the calls for service workload and the ability to manage patrol and investigative operations. The membership was quick to concede, however, that significant strides could not be made in strengthening these functional relationships unless changes were made within accompanying support operations.

One of those changes involved a massive reconfiguration of all police beat boundaries. As a forerunner to the development of the NOP concept, the new beat boundaries were aligned in accordance with neighborhood affinities. Concomitantly, efforts were also taken to conduct a work demands analysis study which identified prospective manpower allocation levels based partly upon the work load handled by the line officers. From this data a patrol schedule plan was developed which served as a guideline in identifying scheduling assignments for the beat officers. Collectively, this information provided the administration with a glimpse of resource needs in relationship to the documented work demands within the department.

As these changes were being made, other experiments were being administered to determine what type of program would best serve as the foundation from which the line operations at the command station could be based. The most notable programs and strategies discussed within this report were the D.A.R.T. Program,

Fear Reduction Program, the Oasis Technique, and the Positive Interaction Program. Each of these programs sought to alter the traditional roles of the officers, supervisors, and managers. More importantly though, was the fact that these programs introduced into the arena of police operations a responsibility on behalf of the public to mutually participate in the performance of certain duties with the police officers.

Prior to the inception of the D.A.R.T. Program, the role of the public in police operations had not been envisioned as a significant one. As a result of implementing the Community Contact strategies, however, the officers began to develop an appreciation for the citizens' concerns as did the citizens become more knowledgeable of what the officers could and could not do. Coupled with the experiences from other programs (e.g., PIP and Fear Reduction) and strategies implemented throughout the department; officers, supervisors, and managers began to realize that interacting with the community could lead to obtaining information which could be of value to police operations.

In responding to this realization, further developments transpired within the department which focused upon analyzing and responding to community input. An extensive crime analysis system, for example, has been developed. This system contains centralized and decentralized components. Through this system, personnel can assess the relevancy of information as it relates to resolving neighborhood problems, intercepting criminal perpetrators, and preventing crime. The Police/Citizen Cooperative Agreement project has also been completed and is presently being reviewed by department personnel. The purpose of this endeavor is to formalize, to some extent, a commitment on behalf of the department and neighborhood civic groups as to the responsibilities each will share in addressing local neighborhood concerns.

In relation to this project, attempts are also being made to further develop and expand the use of the Houstonians on Watch Program. When coupled with the Positive Interaction Program, the citizens will become actively involved in working with the police in improving the quality of life in their neighborhoods.

Equally as important is the commitment to establish a teleserve program which, as a call management tool, will assist in providing the beat officers with more time to work in the neighborhoods. The Victimization Program along with a number of the D.A.R.T. Program strategies are being institutionalized within the Field Operations Command. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the development of a new performance evaluation system which will allow one the opportunity to assess performance activities associated with NOP.

It is quite apparent that a number of changes have been and still are in the process of being made within the department. In discussing these changes and related issues during the Executive Sessions, a number of questions arose. Probably the most perplexing, yet vitally critical question, centered upon how the acquisition, analysis, and reaction to information obtained from the public would effect the ability to efficiently manage patrol operations. It became clear to the membership that a process needed to be developed which would define how the cooperative relationship between the public and officers would be developed. Through the implementation of this process, it was perceived that significant steps could be taken to improve the quality of life within the neighborhoods. It was at this juncture the membership felt their responsibility ended. It had clearly become their feeling that operational personnel should assume the responsibility for developing this process.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, the Executive Session meetings accomplished several tasks.

Among them, the membership:

- 1) Clearly articulated what the philosophy of the department was as it related to the concept of NOP;
- 2) Defined the concept of NOP. The definition was firmly associated with the department's mission and values. It also clearly established the need to develop, implement, and maintain the process of having the beat officers interact with the community;
- 3) Described role expectations associated with the concept. This included identifying certain traditional policing assumptions that would be challenged by the NOP concept;
- 4) Reviewed findings from programs administered throughout the country as well as within the department in order to determine what would represent an appropriate operational foundation from which to base the NOP concept; and
- 5) Discussed the ramifications of operationalizing the concept of NOP. It became quite apparent that any adjustment in operations, to support the concept of NOP, would require input from the personnel affected by the new process.

Collectively, the material contained within this report represents the membership's attempt to describe the characteristics of the policing style to be adopted by all department personnel, especially the beat officers working in the neighborhoods. In the minds of the membership, it is the acceptance of this policing style by the beat officer that is crucial to the success of the philosophy. If the officers are allowed to develop a sense of accomplishment in servicing their respective neighborhoods, then the desire, willingness, and motivation to support NOP will become commonplace.

It becomes the responsibility of personnel outside the scope of the Executive Session membership to determine how this sense of ownership and pride can be developed as a part of the officers' policing style. There are other,

equally demanding issues contained within this report that are also in need of attention by operation personnel. For example, what type of management structure is needed to sustain NOP, can supervisors and managers support NOP given their present types of responsibilities, how will NOP effect department policies and procedures, what types of implications does NOP have for the department, and so forth. Failure to recognize and address these issues and others could result in the inability to sustain the NOP philosophy.

In closing, the occupation of the Westside Command Station represents a turning point in time in the history of the Houston Police Department where all of the discussions, experiments, and expectations are transformed into an operational format that epitomizes the philosophy of neighborhood oriented policing. This transformation process contains a multitude of different commitments which have already been made or are in the process of being made within the department. All of these accomplishments represent years of dedication and commitment, not to mention the thousands of man-hours spent in preparing for the occupation of the Command Station.

It now becomes the responsibility of field operations personnel to continue the transformation process by examining the material contained within this report, to discuss its operational implications, and to use it as a guide in developing a plan which seeks to convert the concept of NOP into a viable and realistic policing style for the Westside Command Station, and eventually, the City of Houston as a whole.

APPENDIX A

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Panel Participants and Resource Persons

CHAIRMAN:

Lee Brown

PANEL COORDINATOR:

Tim Oettmeier Field Operations Command

PARTICIPANTS:

George Alderete	Southwest Patrol Division/Beechnut Substation
John Bales	Field Operations Command
Artie Contreras	Northeast Patrol Division
Ed Davis	South Central Patrol Division/ D.A.R.T.
Ruben Davis, Jr.	West Patrol Division/Command Station Operations
Jerry DeFoor	Office of Planning and Research
Dorothy Edwards	Internal Affairs Division
Rudy Garza	Southeast Patrol Division/Magnolia Park Substation
Chris Gillespie	Inspections Division
Ralph Gonzales	West Patrol Division/Command Station Operations (Crime Analysis)
Jerry Jones	South Central Patrol Division
Robin Kirk	North Shepherd Patrol Division/ Northline Park Community Center
Tom Koby	Burglary and Theft Division
Steve Lyons	West Patrol Division/Command Station Operations
Gary Matthews	South Central Patrol Division/ D.A.R.T.

PARTICIPANTS (Continued):

Paul Michna	Major Investigations Bureau
Tommy Mitchell	Support Services Command
Sam Nuchia	West Patrol Bureau
Martin Reiner	Police Advisory Committee
John Roberson, Jr.	Southwest Patrol Division/Police Storefront
John Snelson	West Patrol Division/Command Station Operations
Dennis Storemski	Investigative Operations Command
Gene Thaler	Southeast Patrol Division
Victor Trevino, Jr.	Northeast Patrol Division/Lee Road (Wesley House Community Center)
David Walker	Southeast Patrol Division/Park Place Substation
Betsy Watson	Auto Theft Division
Frank Yorek	Professional Standards Command

RESOURCE PERSONS:

Bill Bieck	Houston Police Department
Bob Bowers	Houston Police Department
Herman Goldstein	University of Wisconsin
George Kelling	Harvard University
Jack Seitzinger	Houston Police Department
Mary Ann Wycoff	Police Foundation

APPENDIX B

EXECUTIVE SESSION - POLICING STYLE
NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING DEFINITION ELEMENTS

Definition Elements:

- 1) Focus upon the expectations and/or perceptions of what is desired in terms of service delivery from the police and the public;
- 2) Effectiveness is based upon the need to have the officers involved as well as the citizens;
- 3) Efforts should be made to determine what the public wants in terms of service delivery;
- 4) Alter the role of the officer;
- 5) Develop a sense of trust between the officers and the citizens;
- 6) Improve the officers' attitude by instilling a willingness to provide the service;
- 7) Responsibilities must be well defined and communicated to the officers;
- 8) Allow for operational flexibility to match resources to community needs;
- 9) Develop a means of learning how to stimulate community involvement;
- 10) Key is the initial contact of the citizen by the officer; we must make a conscious effort to approach people;
- 11) Officers must be willing to accept responsibility;
- 12) Control rumors regarding the perception of what is occurring within the neighborhood;
- 13) Be accessible to the public with a willingness to share information;
- 14) We should shoulder the responsibility for getting the community involved;
- 15) Beat officers should be responsible for providing community service functions;
- 16) Must have good communications and be responsive to the communications;
- 17) Style is dependent upon intentions;
- 18) A sense of responsibility is needed;

Definition Elements (continued):

- 19) Motivation is based upon being given responsibility;
- 20) Motivation comes from working with people who care about them;
- 21) Must be aware of the change, monitor responses through feedback and evaluations;
- 22) Coordinate the delivery of services with a perspective for the whole;
- 23) Refrain from using special squads when no longer needed;
- 24) Learn how to use the information (crime analysis) we receive;
- 25) Be sensitive to the different needs of ethnic groups;
- 26) Learn to utilize the information we obtain from the public
- 27) Officers must mature faster to overcome problems associated with youth and aggressiveness;
- 28) Recognize fiscal limitations;
- 29) Recognize the issue of job satisfaction for the officers;
- 30) Assist in helping the citizens determine their role with respect to addressing problems or requesting service.

CRIME CONTROL REPORTS

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Chairman

Lawrence W. Sherr
President

Number 4

Repeat Calls To Police In Minneapolis

by Lawrence W. Sherman

University of Maryland and Crime Control Institute

with

Alva Emerson
Duane Goodmanson
David Martens
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Minneapolis Police Department

and

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Crime Control Institute

This report was conducted under
Grant #86-IJ-CX-0037 from the
National Institute of Justice.
Points of view or opinions expressed
in this document do not necessarily
represent the official position of
the U.S. Department of Justice.

February, 1987

A301

Five percent of the estimated 172,000 addresses and intersections in Minneapolis were the subject of 64% of 321,174 calls to police between December 15, 1985 and December 15, 1986. Sixty percent of the addresses and intersections produced no calls to police at all. Of the 40% with any calls, the majority (52%) had only one call, while 84% had less than five. The top 5% of locations with any calls produced 48.8% of the calls.

This highly skewed concentration of all police calls in relatively few locations raises substantial questions about current police strategies, and suggests the need for focusing police resources on the chronic repeat call locations. This report is the first step in a research and development effort to create such a strategy, under National Institute of Justice funding of a collaborative project of the Crime Control Institute and the Minneapolis Police Department.

I. 911 Runs The Police Department

Much of the work sponsored by the National Institute of Justice since 1982 has attempted to develop a variety of new strategies for accomplishing police objectives. Prompted in part by Professor Herman Goldstein's landmark proposal for "problem-oriented policing" (Goldstein, 1979), NIJ's work has created and tested strategies focusing resources on specific, high priority police targets. Implicit in these new strategies is a strong critique of the prevailing "dial-a-cop" system of allocating most police resources on the basis of the phone calls police receive.

With the recent growth of 911 systems and the steady increase in the number of calls to police, a virtual coup d'etat has taken over American policing. Gradually, with little public notice, police managers have lost control over how police spend their time. The usurper is the telephone, and a common policy that requires all calls to be answered rapidly.

In the words of one police chief, "911 runs the police department." This means that for all the orders headquarters may make, most police effort is directed simply on the basis of telephoned citizen requests for immediate service, almost all of which are now received in many cities at the emergency "911" number. This system is neither rational nor fair.


The dial-a-cop system is irrational because it prevents police from setting priorities and controlling crime more effectively. By letting each citizen decide whether a matter is appropriate for police work, we make it impossible for police to decide which matters deserve the most attention. In some cities, homicides literally go uninvestigated while police cars respond rapidly to help people locked out of their cars.

Of all the calls to police in the city of Minneapolis last year, for example, 5 percent were for car lockouts, 4 percent were for noise complaints, 1 percent were for picking up already captured shoplifters, and 25 percent were for domestic and other arguments which generally had no violence (see Table 1). Meanwhile, scarce police resources permitted only limited efforts against narcotics pushers, repeat offenders, and serious domestic violence.

Dial-a-cop is also irrational because, as National Institute of Justice-sponsored research has shown, rapid response by police makes little contribution to the apprehension of criminals or the prevention of victim injury, in the overwhelming majority of calls (Spelman and Brown, 1981). Other NIJ research shows that the calling public is generally happy to wait for a police response, or to receive no police car dispatched at all, as long as the telephone operators politely and accurately explain to the callers exactly what is going to happen (McEwen, et al, 1984).

The dial-a-cop system also allocates resources unfairly across the problems which generate calls. Because all calls must be answered quickly, very little time can

DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE CALLS
BY ALL ADDRESSES IN MINNEAPOLIS
IN PERCENT, 1986*



be spent on each call. The chronic locations are not given extra attention to try to reduce their heavy demands on police. Each call at the chronic locations receives the same limited attention that a call to a once-in-five years location receives. Dial-a-cop goes on putting out the fire, but it never takes away the matches.

Recognizing these problems, the National Institute of Justice has funded tests of a variety of police efforts to focus resources proactively (Reiss, 1971)--not waiting for telephone calls for direction--on high priority police problems: repeat offenders (Martin and Sherman, 1986), unjustified community fear of crime (Pate, Wycoff, Skogan and Sherman, 1986), and area patterns of street crime (Spelman and Eck, 1986). We now add to the list of these proactively policed, high priority targets the chronic repeat call locations that generate the majority of police patrol dispatches.

The purpose of this report is to demonstrate the concentration of police work at a small number of locations, and the justification for assigning extra resources to those locations as a way of reducing total calls to police. While it is true that much of that concentration may simply reflect concentrations of people using or living at those locations, that does not alter the logic of police identifying and focusing their efforts on those locations. Whether extra resources can succeed in reducing repeat calls will be the subject of a later report on the Minneapolis RECAP (repeat call address policing) experiment.

Research Methods

In order to develop the RECAP alternative to the dial-a-cop system, the Crime Control Institute obtained National Institute of Justice support for two tasks. One task was analyzing the patterns and concentrations of repeat calls. The other task was selecting, training and evaluating the effectiveness of a small RECAP unit of police officers devoting full time to proactive policing of the most chronic locations in the city.

The analysis was intended to identify those locations as the targets for the unit's efforts. But it also serves to demonstrate the need for the unit, which would have been abandoned if the analysis showed little concentration of calls.


The analysis proved to be far more difficult than anticipated. Most police departments will experience similar or greater difficulties in undertaking the same analysis. The problem is that a full year of call data is needed to develop a reasonably complete picture of the distribution of repeat calls. But such a large data base seems to be beyond the current capacity of most big-city police departments.

We have not surveyed this issue systematically, but we can offer some examples to illustrate the problem. The minimum requirement for this kind of analysis is that police call records must be computerized. In some big cities like Milwaukee, this is still not the case (although it is changing rapidly). Even among the computerized dispatch systems, few if any have sufficient data storage capacity for analyzing a full year of calls.

The subject address and call nature code data punched into the computer--as distinct from a tape-recording of the words exchanged between the caller and the police telephone operator--is generally removed from the computer and recorded on tape as soon as the computer's capacity is reached. In Minneapolis, the data are removed to tape about every seven days, depending on the volume of calls. In Colorado Springs, with an advanced computer-aided-dispatch system, the storage capacity is reportedly three months.

In order to identify the most active Minneapolis addresses over the course of a year, a new data base had to be constructed specifically for that purpose. Such an extensive task was not something the Minneapolis city government computer program

DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE CALLS
 BY ADDRESSES RESPONDED TO
 IN MINNEAPOLIS, IN PERCENT, 1986*



*December 15, 1985 - December 15, 1986

had time to do. Nor, with a high hourly use cost, was it economical for the Crime Control Institute to use the city's mainframe computer. Both of these problems were handled, at the city's recommendation, by the Crime Control Institute's buying a microcomputer and retaining a programming firm familiar with the city's dispatch system.

The Unadjusted Data Base. The analysis proceeded by our agreeing on a few data "fields" in the computerized "record" of each call that would be transferred from the weekly tapes into the microcomputer data base. The fields included street name, address, floor number, apartment number, nature code of call, date and time of call, and officer's disposition (which would tell whether a report was filed from the call). The total information taken from each record was 80 "bytes". With an estimate of 300,000 calls, we purchased a microcomputer that could handle at least 24 million bytes. We then used a tape drive attached to the micro to read those fields off of each weekly dispatch tape and into the hard disk data file.

The original plan had been to define addresses down to the level of apartment, but the programmers advised us that the complications involved in creating that definition would be enormous and very expensive. Thus "address" in the data base is no more specific than the building address, and the data base is thus biased towards addresses with large resident or user populations.

The data base was limited to calls to police, thus excluding fire department and ambulance calls. It also excluded administrative calls recorded in the system, such as police officers notifying the dispatcher that they are "out to lunch." We asked that calls be excluded if there was no police car dispatched. Finally, we directed that the address in question would always be an address where the problem was located, not the address from which the call came (if that was a different address).


Both of the last two definitions were difficult to impose, given the nature of police dispatching systems. The address employed in the data base was generally the address to which a police car was dispatched, but there was no way to insure that the problem had actually occurred at that address. Thus the "unadjusted" number one call location in the city is the Hennepin County Medical Center, because police respond there to take a crime report whenever medical staff notify police (as required by law) that a crime victim has arrived in the emergency room. The crime, of course, happened elsewhere, but the dispatch computer does not record the address of occurrence.

The address in the data base is only "generally" the address to which a car is dispatched because some of the included calls--we do not know how many, but believe it to be relatively few--did not produce a police car being dispatched at all. There was an exclusion made of one code indication showing that the call was screened out, or handled by the telephone operator. But other non-dispatched calls slipped in because they had a "closed" disposition at the time they were received.

The "closed" disposition means that the purpose of the call is to create a record of an event rather than to request police service. When an off-duty police officer working as a retail security officer apprehends a shoplifter, for example, he can fill out all the paper work to charge and release the suspect right at the scene. But he must still call the police operator to receive a case number for the arrest report. Such a call is listed as a closed call under the "event" disposition field, as distinct from the "officer" disposition field, on each call record.

At the time the data base fields were selected, we were not aware of this distinction. It only emerged as we analyzed the preliminary report from the last six months of 1986. We had omitted it in trying to conserve on computer storage space, since including it would have taken close to a million bytes. But when we discovered how crucial it was to determining whether cars were actually dispatched, we decided to rebuild the data base from scratch. That effort will begin shortly, and will provide the basis for the final evaluation of the RECAP units effectiveness. A30

NUMBER OF ADDRESSES RESPONDED TO BY
NUMBER OF POLICE CALLS
PER ADDRESS IN MINNEAPOLIS, 1986*



*December 15, 1985 - December 15, 1986

at reducing calls to which police are actually dispatched.

The data base as described to this point will be defined as the "unadjusted" data base, which included 321,174 calls. The following exclusions describe how the "adjusted" data base was constructed for the purposes of identifying the most active addresses in the city.

The Adjusted Data Base. In order to limit the target list more closely to addresses where problems actually occurred, the RECAP commander (Emerson) and officers (Goodmans, Martens, Revor, and Rumpza) went through a printout of the top 2,000 addresses in the last six months (approximately) of 1986. The time period was selected merely on the grounds of moving speedily, at a time when the data base was only half built. They tried to eliminate all addresses, such as all hospitals, city hall, police precinct stations, the St. Joseph's Shelter for lost, abandoned and abused children, and the courthouse, which were clearly not the locations of the problems but rather the locations to which police were dispatched to take a report. (Unfortunately, two small hospitals slipped through, but were deleted from the target list described below.)

They also decided, after a three day planning retreat with Crime Control Institute staff and extensive debate for a week thereafter, to eliminate intersections. The problem with intersections from the standpoint of proactive police work is that there is very little chance of finding a stable group of people who generate or deal with the problems. Recurrent traffic accidents at bad intersections are already being mapped by another unit, so the remaining problems of muggings, fights, car lockouts, etc. could not be dealt with conveniently by a small unit.

For similar reasons, the RECAP unit also decided to eliminate parks and schools (which also have their own special police units), and the one block area downtown in which an enormous amount of vice consumption is concentrated: pornography stores, movies, and the most active bar in the city for calls to police. The city council was debating the future of that block heavily at the time, and even considered condemn it and tearing it down. When this analysis found that the twelve addresses and four intersections of the "E" block, as it is known, were the subject of 3,230 police calls in the unadjusted data base--more than one percent--the finding was the subject of a detailed story in the Minneapolis Star and Tribune (January 15, 1987).

The fact that .001 percent of the addresses and intersections produced one percent of the calls, or 1,000 times more calls than would be expected by an equal distribution is a striking part of the overall concentrations reported here. But it also suggests a problem so major that it was prudent for the RECAP unit to exclude it from its work.

The final categorical exclusion was the check cashing establishments, which generate many calls for arrests of felonious bad-check passers. These arrests have a high conviction rate, and the RECAP officers did not want to discourage the arrests. One such establishment, however, slipped by into the adjusted data base reported here.

In addition to these categorical exclusions, the officers dealt with two other issues. One issue, which will affect any police department attempting to identify repeat call locations, is the fact that police telephone operators enter the same address in different ways on different occasions. A good example comes from the most active bar on the "E" block, Moby Dick's, which is entered in at least these different ways:

- o 620 Hennepin Ave.
- o 620 Hennepin Ave--Moby's
- o 620 Hennepin Ave--Moby Dick's
- o 620 Hennepin Ave--Moby's Bar

These different listings made the address appear to have fewer calls than it actually had, because the true total was split among the different ways of labeling the address.

Other buildings may have entrances and addresses on different streets, or have similar variations in the description of the premises following the address. We had asked the programmer to suppress those descriptions in the analysis, but it was not possible to combine the multiple listings without far more complex programming. Thus both the unadjusted and adjusted data bases show less concentration of calls than actually exists.

The problem was somewhat reduced for the top 2,000 addresses. The RECAP officers read the address listings for the full year data set. They instructed the programmer to merge the remaining addresses that were presented under multiple labels, to the extent that they were able to detect them.

In addition, less than twenty addresses were deleted for reasons related to the evaluation research design, which will be described in later reports.

Commercial and Residential Addresses. The preliminary inspection of the top 2,000 addresses showed that they were predominantly commercial addresses. In order to insure that the RECAP experiment would have enough residential addresses to explore the full range of police problems, we decided to stratify the study sample. The officers went through the top 2,000 locations, using the reverse telephone directory to supplement their formidable knowledge of city addresses, and labeled each location as residential or commercial.

Once the designations and all the exclusions were complete, the programmers rank-ordered the commercial and residential addresses in separate lists. The top 250 addresses in each category were then identified as the project targets. It is this final, adjusted list which is the basis for the data presented in Tables 2 and 3. For the purposes of the experimental phase of the unit, only half of each list will be assigned to RECAP. The other, randomly selected half of each list will be left alone as a control group against which to compare the frequency of calls at the experimental locations.

III. Letting Calls Set Priorities

Table 1 presents the overall distribution of calls by nature code in the unadjusted data base of 321,174 calls. The distribution is a regrouping of 114 separate nature codes into six more general categories. The categories are guided by the prior literature on the nature of police work (e.g., Wilson, 1968; Goldstein, 1977). The results show what police work becomes when police priorities are determined by the calls that come in.

There is no question that police are needed to deal with angry conflicts that can erupt, or have already erupted, into violence. It is hard to criticize the fact that one third of all calls fall into this category. It is also hard to argue that police should not attend to calls about actual or potential property crime, which comprise 29% of calls, or traffic control at 19%, or even some of the service calls, at 13%.

It is possible to argue that police should not be providing a free car lockout service (5% of calls), when private locksmiths could do the same on a fee-for-service basis, a plan that is under much discussion in Minneapolis. But there are few such categories of calls that police could reasonably abandon altogether. The problem is not one of need, but one of balance.

The fact that only two percent of all calls concern the most serious crimes, stranger to stranger crimes against persons, suggests that the balance does not

Table 1

Nature of Calls to Police in Minneapolis, All Addresses, 1986*

<u>Category</u>	(Unadjusted Data) <u>Number</u>	<u>Percent**</u>
<u>1. Conflict Management</u>	<u>104,354</u>	<u>32.5%</u>
Domestics	24,948	7.8%
Other disturbances	55,568	17.3%
Noise	12,204	3.8%
Assault	11,634	3.6%
<u>2. Property Crime-Related</u>	<u>91,055</u>	<u>28.4%</u>
Theft	35,741	11.1%
Burglary-related	33,384	10.4%
Vandalism	11,197	3.5%
Alarms	10,733	3.3%
<u>3. Traffic Problems</u>	<u>59,630</u>	<u>18.6%</u>
Traffic Enforcement	27,992	8.7%
Property damage accident	10,296	3.2%
Parking	8,007	2.5%
All other traffic	13,335	4.2%
<u>4. Service</u>	<u>42,473</u>	<u>13.2%</u>
Lockouts	17,389	5.4%
Medical Aid	9,008	2.8%
Emergencies	6,986	2.0%
Assistance	6,308	2.0%
Persons lost/found	1,578	0.1%
Fires	1,204	0.4%
<u>5. Miscellaneous</u>	<u>17,591</u>	<u>5.4%</u>
Arrests and Bookings	5,059	1.6%
Other	12,532	4.0%
<u>6. Stranger to Stranger</u>		
<u>Crime Against Persons</u>	<u>6,071</u>	<u>1.9%</u>
Robbery	4,219	1.3%
Criminal Sexual Conduct	1,852	0.6%
<u>Total</u>	<u>321,174</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

* Actual Period covered 12/15/85-12/15/86

** Percentages do not total 100% due to rounding

Table 2

Nature of Police Calls to Most Active 250 Commercial Addresses
And Most Active 250 Residential Addresses In Minneapolis, 1986*
 (Adjusted Data)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Commercial</u>		<u>Residential</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent**</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent**</u>
<u>1. Conflict Management</u>	<u>6,357</u>	<u>32%</u>	<u>11,427</u>	<u>59%</u>
Domestics	462	0%	3,703	19%
Other Disturbances	4,919	25%	5,560	29%
Assault	919	5%	1,254	6%
Noise	57	-	910	5%
<u>2. Property Crime-Related</u>	<u>7,857</u>	<u>40%</u>	<u>3,640</u>	<u>19%</u>
Theft	5,757	29%	1,583	8%
Burglary	940	5%	1,432	7%
Vandalism	425	2%	587	3%
Alarms	735	4%	68	-
<u>3. Traffic-Related</u>	<u>985</u>	<u>5%</u>	<u>519</u>	<u>3%</u>
Traffic Enforcement	131	1%	131	1%
Property Damage Crash	130	1%	130	1%
Parking	251	1%	251	1%
<u>4. Service-Related</u>	<u>3,006</u>	<u>15%</u>	<u>2,584</u>	<u>13%</u>
Lockouts	1,993	10%	706	4%
Medical Aid	700	4%	1,025	5%
Emergencies	435	2%	940	5%
Assistance	486	2%	640	3%
Persons Lost/Found	88	-	206	1%
Fires				
<u>5. Miscellaneous</u>	<u>756</u>	<u>4%</u>	<u>882</u>	<u>4%</u>
Arrests and Bookings	304	2%	460	2%
Other				
<u>6. Stranger to Stranger</u> <u> Crime Against Persons</u>	<u>722</u>	<u>3%</u>	<u>548</u>	<u>2%</u>
Robbery	616	3%	371	2%
Criminal Sexual Conduct	106	1%	177	1%
<u>Total</u>	<u>19,564</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>19,462</u>	<u>100%</u>

*Actual period covered, 12/15/85-12/15/86

**Percentages do not total 100% due to rounding

match citizen priorities. The Minneapolis police do expend other resources on street crime besides patrol car responses to citizen calls. But the total resources dedicated to stranger crime are probably minimal in comparison to the high priority many citizens would place on such offenses.

Bittner (1980) has defended the picture of police work presented in Table 1 by defining policing as the intervention in "situations-about-which-somebody-must-do-something-now." That is no doubt the common theme that runs through all of these calls. But it is arguable that police work can and should be more than just immediate responses. A good analogy is found in medicine, which is increasingly moving away from just treating the sick towards the preventive maintenance of health.

The analogy to public health is even more compelling, with the recent growth of proactive efforts to identify carriers of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) to stop them from spreading the disease. Far more lives may be saved by such efforts than by doctors treating sore throats and the flu. Similarly, far more lives may be saved by focusing police resources on serious crime problems than by simply waiting for calls on minor crime problems to come in.

Whatever the merits of the priorities reflected in this distribution of calls in the unadjusted data base, it is important to note how it differs from the nature of calls about the top 250 commercial and residential locations in the adjusted data base. As Table 2 shows, both commercial and residential addresses are relatively free of traffic problems. But commercial addresses have proportionally more property crime calls than addresses in general, and residential addresses have proportionally twice as many conflict management calls as addresses in general.

Solving the problems that produce the high concentrations of repeat calls at these locations will not necessarily reduce street crime, but they may free up other police resources to concentrate on such crimes.

IV. The Chronic Call Locations

And the concentrations are substantial indeed. Each of the locations in the two adjusted lists of most active addresses generates an average of about 80 calls per year, slightly less than two a week. Each list of 250, with only one tenth of one percent of the city's addresses, produces six percent of the calls in the city. These addresses are thus sixty times more likely to produce a call to police on any given day than the average address in the city.

The concentrations are even more clearly demonstrated by the data from the unadjusted list. Figure 1 presents the same data as Table 3, showing the steep decline in the total percentage of calls produced by addresses ranked below the top five percent of addresses in call frequency, which produce sixty-four percent of the calls. The second five percent of addresses produce only 13 percent of the calls, the third five percent of addresses only seven percent of the calls, and so on.

Figure 2 and Table 4 show a similar distribution among the forty percent of addresses and intersections that had any calls at all, with almost forty-nine percent of the calls concentrated in the top five percent of those addresses.

Figure 3 and Table 5 show the distribution of addresses with calls by the number of such calls at each address. The majority of those addresses had only one call, and 85% had less than five. Thus the concentration of most calls in the few most active addresses is clearly intense.

These statistical concentrations raise the obvious question: what kinds of locations are consuming the lion's share of police patrol responses? The answer is not just low rent apartments or tough bars, although they are well represented. The lists also include major commercial locations, which attract large numbers of people for

TABLE 3 - DISTRIBUTION OF CALLS TO POLICE BY ALL LOCATIONS IN MINNEAPOLIS, 1986*
(Unadjusted Data Base)

Percentile of all addresses	Number of Calls	Raw Percent of Calls	Cumulative Percent of Calls (figures may not total 100 due to rounding)
5	205721	64.04	64.04
10	41382	12.88	76.92
15	22392	6.97	83.89
20	16519	5.14	89.03
25	8601	2.68	91.71
30	8601	2.68	94.39
35	8601	2.68	97.07
40	8601	2.68	99.75
45	839	0.26	100.01
50	0	0.00	
55	0	0.00	
60	0	0.00	
65	0	0.00	
70	0	0.00	
75	0	0.00	
80	0	0.00	
85	0	0.00	
90	0	0.00	
95	0	0.00	
100	0	0.00	

*Dec. 15, 1985 - Dec. 15, 1986

TABLE 4 - DISTRIBUTION OF CALLS TO POLICE BY LOCATIONS GENERATING POLICE CALLS
 IN MINNEAPOLIS, 1986*
 (Unadjusted Data Base)

Percentile of all addresses	Number of Calls	Raw Percent of Calls	Cumulative Percent of Calls (figures may not total 100 due to rounding)
5	156076	48.58	48.58
10	40040	12.46	61.04
15	24142	7.51	68.55
20	17106	5.32	73.87
25	13216	4.11	77.98
30	10449	3.25	81.23
35	8456	2.63	83.86
40	6966	2.17	86.03
45	6966	2.17	88.20
50	5845	1.82	90.02
55	3483	1.08	91.10
60	3483	1.08	92.18
65	3483	1.08	93.26
70	3483	1.08	94.34
75	3483	1.08	95.42
80	3483	1.08	96.50
85	3483	1.08	97.58
90	3483	1.08	98.66
95	3483	1.08	99.74
100	3352	1.04	100.78

*Dec. 15, 1985 - Dec. 15, 1986

TABLE 5
 NUMBER OF LOCATIONS RESPONDED TO BY NUMBER OF POLICE CALLS
 PER ADDRESS IN MINNEAPOLIS, 1986*
 (Unadjusted Data Base)

Number of Calls	Number of Locations
1	35926
2	11329
3	5691
4	3511
5	2304
6	1680
7	1253
8	964
9	817
10	655
11	508
12	417
13	358
14	302
15	301
16	260
17	203
18	225
19	175
20	162
> 20	2606

*Dec. 15, 1985 - Dec. 15, 1986

many hours of the day.

Table 6 lists in rank order the top fifty addresses, both commercial and residential in the adjusted list, showing the frequency of calls and the generic type of location at each address. An analysis of these locations shows that 21 are apartment buildings of which four are public housing projects. Twelve are retail or grocery stores, and the grocery stores are generally open 24 hours a day. Five are bars, three are 24-hour convenience stores with the same national company, three are hotels, one is a fast food hamburger chain (not McDonald's), and five others are of varied character.

It is fairer to say that these addresses usually attract trouble rather than cause it. The role of the late-night hours, when many people are intoxicated and more vulnerable to committing or being victimized by crime, appears to be substantial. Yet the profits from all-night operations are also reportedly substantial, and a strong incentive for businesses to stay open.

It is also interesting to note the role of big business in these demands for local police service. While many of the locations are owned by local small businesses especially the apartments, six of the top ten are operated by Fortune 500 companies.

User Fees? Whether they simply attract trouble along with large numbers of customers by offering the public a needed service, or in the case of certain bars, cause trouble by serving intoxicated customers, these addresses do place major demands upon the police. Whether they pay disproportionately larger taxes than other police users is unclear. If not, then one implication might be to create a system of user fees for calling the police, restricted to commercial addresses--just as garbage collection is charged to commercial, but not residential, addresses in many cities.

V. The RECAP Strategy

A less extreme approach is simply focusing police resources on the chronic user locations, in order to reduce their use. The goal of such a strategy should not be merely to reduce calls to police, and certainly not to discourage people from making calls in emergencies. The goal should be solving or reducing the problems generating the repeat calls.

One way to accomplish that goal might be to assign a small unit of officers to spend full time on proactive police work at these locations. These officers would not answer radio calls, but would work flexible hours to accomplish the following tasks at the high volume locations identified through the computer-generated analysis described in this report:

- Description of the nature and use of the premises
- Diagnosis of the problems generating the calls
- Planning of police or user action for reducing those problems
- Implementing the action plan
- Following up on repeat call rates to measure success

The description can generally be done on the basis of existing officer knowledge or merely driving by the location. The diagnosis should be based upon a review of a computer printout of the nature, days and time of the calls at the location, as well as the narratives in the crime and arrest reports previously filed for those locations. The diagnosis may also include personal contact with owners, managers, users or residents of the locations.

The planning could be done after discussion with colleagues or supervisors, and possibly after consultation with other community resources, such as social service agencies. The action plan can then be implemented by the RECAP officers, other police units, social welfare organizations, or persons on the premises. The important

TABLE 6
 Top 50 Addresses in Minneapolis
 By Nature of Location and Number of Calls, 1986*
 (Adjusted Data Base)

Rank	Nature of Location	Number of Calls
1	Large discount store	810
2	Large department store	686
3	24-hour national convenience store and bar	607
4	Apartments - public housing	479
5	Large discount store	471
6	Large discount store	449
7	Homeless Center - former hotel	379
8	Transportation center	343
9	Large department store	319
10	Downtown business mall	251
11	Bar	244
12	Large department store	242
13	High-priced hotel	240
14	Bar	237
15	Apartments	233
16	Bar	222
17	Community Center	209
18	Apartments	208
19	Apartments	207
20	Apartments	195
21	Grocery store - 24 hour	195
22	Medium-priced hotel	193
23	Supermarket	192
24	Apartments	190
25	Supermarket	190
26	Small apartment	187
27	24-hour national convenience store	183
28	Apartments - high rise	181
29	Apartments	177
30	Apartments	175
31	Apartments	168
32	Halfway house	163
33	Bar	158
34	Apartments	156
35	Apartments	156
36	Low-priced hotel	152
37	Apartments	149
38	Apartments - public housing	149
39	Apartments - public housing	148
40	Bar and 24-hour restaurant	147
41	Social Service Center	147
42	Fast food restaurant	146
43	24-hour national convenience store	145
44	Grocery store - 24-hour	145
45	Liquor store	143
46	Apartments	142
47	Apartments	142
48	Apartments	142
49	Apartments	142
50	Apartments - public housing	136

TOTAL CALLS 11870

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point of departure from conventional police work is the followup: the RECAP officers' efforts to insure that the action plan was indeed implemented, and their monitoring of weekly computer reports on subsequent calls at the addresses they have worked upon. These reports, ideally, will take the form of a trend line showing how many calls were dispatched each week, with a vertical line through the trend showing the date the action plan was implemented.

This RECAP strategy is now underway in Minneapolis with four handpicked volunteer officers and one sergeant commanding them. These officers are among the most experienced, hardest working and creative officers in the department. Two are college graduates in social science, and they average over fifteen years of patrol experience. They were intentionally chosen for their excellence, as they would be in normal operational circumstances.

Whether even such a high quality team can implement the complex strategy described here remains to be seen. If it is implemented properly, the experimental design being employed will give a fairly clear answer to the question of whether such a unit can reduce repeat calls at these chronic locations.

The ultimate success of such a strategy may depend as much upon the tactics used as upon the strategy itself. Negative results would not necessarily disprove the value of the strategy. But it would show that the methods used by the Minneapolis RECAP team failed to deal with the problems producing the calls, and raise serious doubt about whether any tactics could have made a difference.

The Minneapolis RECAP team is well aware that, perhaps for the first time in the history of the department, there is a "bottom line", profit or loss statement that they will show at the end of the experiment. With approximately 400 patrol officers handling 321,000 calls a year, each officer on patrol will handle roughly 800 calls per year, or about four per day worked. In order to justify their removal from patrol to RECAP, the officers must reduce calls by five times 800, or 4,000 calls, on an annualized basis. Anything more than that will be considered "profit"; anything less will be considered a "loss".

An annualized reduction of 4,000 calls amounts to about 20% fewer calls at the target addresses than in the previous year. Such a goal is not easy to attain, but neither does it seem unrealistic. Given the high quality of the group, there is good reason for optimism.

That optimism is supported by their record in the first six weeks of operation, in which they accomplished the following:

- o Developed information leading to the largest heroin seizure in recent years in Minneapolis, at one of the targeted addresses.
- o Received approval of a new plan for eliminating 1100 police car dispatches a year for "no-pay" incidents at gas stations, which merely require giving the company the name and address of the registered owner of the vehicle for collection by mail.
- o Obtained agreement by the number one call location to book its own shoplifters by hiring an off-duty police officer, rather than calling for a police car.
- o Prompted one manager to rip out a faulty alarm system that had produced repeated false alarm calls.

If the initial level of productivity can be sustained, then the RECAP theory will at least be given a very fair test.

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**National Institute
of Justice**

Research in Brief

January 1987

Problem-Oriented Policing

William Spelman and John E. Eck

At 1:32 a.m. a man we will call Fred Snyder dials 911 from a downtown corner phone booth. The dispatcher notes his location and calls the nearest patrol unit. Officer Knox arrives 4 minutes later.

Snyder says he was beaten and robbed 20 minutes before but didn't see the robber. Under persistent questioning Snyder admits he was with a prosti-

tute, picked up in a bar. Later, in a hotel room, he discovered the prostitute was actually a man, who then beat Snyder and took his wallet.

Snyder wants to let the whole matter drop. He refuses medical treatment for his injuries. Knox finishes his report and lets Snyder go home. Later that day Knox's report reaches Detec-

tive Alexander's desk. She knows from experience the case will go nowhere, but she calls Snyder at work.

Snyder confirms the report but refuses to cooperate further. Knox and Alexander go on to other cases. Months later, reviewing crime statistics, the city council deplores the difficulty of attracting businesses or people downtown.

From the Director

Many calls to police are repeated requests for help. They have a history and a future—sometimes tragic. Rather than treat the call as a 30-minute event and go on to the next incident, police need to intervene in the cycle and try to eliminate the source of the problem.

A wealth of research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice has led to an approach that does just that.

The problem-solving approach to policing described in this *Research in Brief* represents a significant evolutionary step in helping law enforcement work smarter not harder. Rather than approaching calls for help or service as separate, individual events to be processed by traditional methods, problem-oriented policing emphasizes analyzing groups of incidents and deriving solutions that draw upon a wide variety of public and private resources.

Careful followup and assessment of police performance in dealing with the problem completes the systematic process.

But problem-oriented policing is as much a philosophy of policing as a set of techniques and procedures. The approach can be applied to whatever type of problem is consuming police time and resources.

While many problems are likely to be crime-oriented, disorderly behavior, situations that contribute to neighborhood deterioration, and other incidents that contribute to fear and insecurity in urban neighborhoods are also targets for the problem-solving approach.

In devising research to test the idea, the National Institute wanted to move crime analysis beyond pin-maps. We were fortunate to find a receptive collaborator in Darrel Stephens, then Chief of Police in Newport News, Virginia.

The National Institute is indebted to the Newport News Police Department for serving as a laboratory for testing problem-oriented policing. The results achieved in solving problems and reducing target crimes are encouraging.

Problem-oriented policing integrates knowledge from past research on police operations that has converged on two main themes: increased operational effectiveness and closer involvement

with the community. The evolution of ideas will go on.

Under the Institute's sponsorship, the Police Executive Research Forum will implement problem-oriented policing in three other cities. The test will enable us to learn whether the results are the same under different management styles and in dealing with different local problems. This is how national research benefits local communities—by providing tested new options they can consider.

The full potential of problem-oriented policing still must be assessed. For now, the approach offers promise. It doesn't cost a fortune but can be developed within the resources of most police departments.

Problem-oriented policing suggests that police can realize a new dimension of effectiveness. By coordinating a wide range of information, police administrators are in a unique leadership position in their communities, helping to improve the quality of life for the citizens they serve.

James K. Stewart
Director
National Institute of Justice

The problem-oriented approach

Midnight-watch patrol officers are tired of taking calls like Snyder's. They and their sergeant, James Hogan, decide to reduce prostitution-related robberies, and Officer James Boswell volunteers to lead the effort.

First, Boswell interviews the 28 prostitutes who work the downtown area to learn how they solicit, what happens when they get caught, and why they are not deterred.

They work downtown bars, they tell him, because customers are easy to find and police patrols don't spot them soliciting. Arrests, the prostitutes tell Boswell, are just an inconvenience: Judges routinely sentence them to probation, and probation conditions are not enforced.

Based on what he has learned from the interviews and his previous experience, Boswell devises a response. He works with the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and local barowners to move the prostitutes into the street. At police request, the Commonwealth's Attorney agrees to ask the judges to put stiffer conditions on probation: Convicted prostitutes would be given a map of the city and told to stay out of the downtown area or go to jail for 3 months.

Boswell then works with the vice unit to make sure that downtown prostitutes are arrested and convicted, and that patrol officers know which prostitutes are on probation. Probation violators are sent to jail, and within weeks all

but a few of the prostitutes have left downtown.

Then Boswell talks to the prostitutes' customers, most of whom don't know that almost half the prostitutes working the street are actually men, posing as women. He intervenes in street transactions, formally introducing the customers to their male dates. The Navy sets up talks for him with incoming sailors to tell them about the male prostitutes and the associated safety and health risks.

In 3 months, the number of prostitutes working downtown drops from 28 to 6 and robbery rates are cut in half. After 18 months neither robbery nor prostitution show signs of returning to their earlier levels.

Reacting to incidents reported by citizens—as this hypothetical example illustrates—is the standard method for delivering police services today. But there is growing recognition that standard "incident-driven" policing methods do not have a substantial impact on many of the problems that citizens want police to help solve. Equally important, enforcing the law is but one of many ways that police can cope with citizens' problems.

This *Research in Brief* describes an alternative approach to policing. Called problem-oriented policing, it grew out of an awareness of the limitations of standard practices described in the opening vignette.

Police officers, detectives, and their supervisors can use the problem-oriented approach to identify, analyze, and respond, on a routine basis, to the underlying circumstances that create the incidents that prompt citizens to call the police.

Although alternative methods of handling problems have long been available, the police have made relatively little use of them. Or they

have been used only sporadically, more often by a special unit or an informal group of innovative officers.

Problem-oriented policing is the outgrowth of 20 years of research into police operations that converged on three main themes: *increased effectiveness* by attacking underlying problems that give rise to incidents that consume patrol and detective time; *reliance on the expertise and creativity of line officers* to study problems carefully and develop innovative solutions; and *closer involvement with the public* to make sure that the police are addressing the needs of citizens. The strategy consists of four parts.

1. *Scanning*. Instead of relying upon broad, law-related concepts—robbery, burglary, for example—officers are encouraged to group individual related incidents that come to their attention as "problems" and define these problems in more precise and therefore useful terms. For example, an incident that typically would be classified simply as a "robbery" might be seen as part of a pattern of prostitution-related robberies committed by transvestites in center-city hotels.

2. *Analysis*. Officers working on a well-defined "problem" then collect

information from a variety of public and private sources—not just police data. They use the information to illuminate the underlying nature of the problem, suggesting its causes and a variety of options for its resolution.

3. *Response*. Working with citizens, businesses, and public and private agencies, officers tailor a program of action suitable to the characteristics of the problem. Solutions may go beyond traditional criminal justice system remedies to include other community agencies or organizations.

4. *Assessment*. Finally, the officers evaluate the impact of these efforts to see if the problems were actually solved or alleviated.

To test the value of this approach, the National Institute of Justice sponsored the Problem-Oriented Policing Project, conducted by the Newport News (Virginia) Police Department and the Police Executive Research Forum. Results of the project are encouraging:

- Downtown robberies were reduced by 39 percent (see boxed account above).

- Burglaries in an apartment complex were reduced 35 percent.

Points of view or opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

• Thefts from parked vehicles outside a manufacturing plant dropped 53 percent.

This *Research in Brief* describes the research that led to problem-oriented policing, the approach used in Newport News, and some of the problems officers there solved. It shows that police can link a detailed understanding of specific local problems and a commitment to using a wide array of community resources in solving them. By so doing, they increase the effectiveness of their operations.

The present system

Under incident-driven policing, police departments typically deliver service by

- reacting to individual events reported by citizens;
- gathering information from victims, witnesses, and offenders;
- invoking the criminal justice process; and
- using aggregate crime statistics to evaluate performance.

Each department operates solely in this reactive fashion, but all do it to some extent almost all the time. The way that Newport News tackled prostitution-related robbery (see box) illustrates how problem-oriented policing minimizes the limitations of traditional concepts and conduct of police work.

The focus on underlying causes—*problems*—is not new. Many police officers do it from time to time. The new approach, however, requires *all* officers to implement problem-solving techniques on a routine basis.

Problem-oriented policing pushes beyond the limits of the usual police methods. The keystone of the approach is the “crime-analysis model.”

This checklist includes many of the usual factors familiar to police investigators—actors, locations, motives. But it goes further, prompting officers to ask far more questions than usual and in a more logical sequence. The results give a more comprehensive picture of a problem.

The process also requires officers to collect information from a wide variety of sources beyond the police department and enlist support from

public and private organizations and groups—initially to describe the problem and later to fashion solutions that meet public needs as well as those of the criminal justice system.

The research basis

Problem-oriented policing has as its foundation five areas of research conducted during the past two decades.

Discretion. In the 1960's, researchers pointed out the great discretion police officers exercise and concerns about the effects of discretion on the equity and efficiency of police service delivery. Although some discretion appeared necessary, research suggested that police could prevent abuses by structuring discretion. Through guidelines and policies, police agencies guided their officers on the best means of handling sensitive incidents.¹

But where should the policies come from? In 1979 Herman Goldstein described what he called the “problem-oriented approach” as a means of developing such guidelines for a more effective and efficient method of policing.²

Problem studies. A number of studies over the past 20 years aimed at developing a deeper understanding of the nature and causes of crime and disorder problems in order to lead to better police responses.

Research of the late 1960's and early 1970's focused on burglary, robbery, and other street crimes.³ In the later 1970's and 1980's, research turned to other problems not earlier considered

1. Gerald M. Caplan, “Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies,” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 36 (1971): 500–514; Kenneth Culp Davis, “Approach to Legal Control of the Police,” *Texas Law Review* 52 (1974): 715; Herman Goldstein, *Policing a Free Society* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1977): 93–130.

2. Herman Goldstein, “Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach,” *Crime and Delinquency* 25 (1979): 236–258.

3. Thomas Reppetto, *Residential Crimes* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1974); Harry A. Scott, *Patterns of Burglary*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973); Floyd Feeney and Adrienne Weir, *Prevention and Control of Robbery*, summary volume (Davis: University of California, 1974); Andre Normandeau, *Crimes of Robbery*, unpublished diss. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1968).

central to police work: domestic violence, drunk driving, mental illness, and the fear of crime, for example.⁴

Researchers and practitioners learned through these studies that they would have to collect more information to understand problems, and involve other organizations if responses were to be effective. Police needed to consider seriously many issues besides crime alone.

Management. Meanwhile the characteristics of American police officers were changing. More were getting college degrees and thinking of themselves as professionals. Like industrial workers, officers began to demand a greater role in decisionmaking.

Many police managers, recognizing that job satisfaction and participation in decisions influence job performance, made better use of officers' skills and talents. Managers made the work more interesting through job enrichment, and they made working conditions more flexible.⁵ Many departments established task forces, quality circles, or management-by-objectives programs.⁶

4. Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard A. Berk, “Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault,” *American Sociological Review* 49 (1984): 261–272; Fred Heinzelmann et al., *Jailing Drunk Drivers: Impact on the Criminal Justice System* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1984); Gerard R. Murphy, *Special Care: Improving the Police Response to the Mentally Disabled* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1986); Antony M. Pate et al., *Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1966).

5. The best example was the Managing Criminal Investigations program, which gave patrol officers authority to conduct many of their own follow-up investigations. Ilene Greenberg and Robert Wasserman, *Managing Criminal Investigations* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1979). More generally, see James Q. Wilson, “Future Policeman,” in *Issues in Police Patrol* ed. Thomas J. Sweeney and William Ellingsworth (Kansas City, Missouri: Kansas City Police Department, 1973) 207–221.

6. G.F. Carvalho, “Installing Management by Objectives: A New Perspective on Organizational Change” in *Police Administration: Selected Readings* ed. William J. Bopp (Boston: Holbrook, 1975); Michael D. Norman, “Quality Circles: A Program To Improve Employee Attitudes and the Quality of Police Services,” *The Police Chief* (November 1984): 48–49. For a more radical proposal, see John E. Angell, “Toward an Alternative to the Classic Police Organizational Arrangements: A Democratic Model,” *Criminology* 19 (1971): 186–206; Henry P. Hatry and John M. Greiner, *Improving the Use of Quality Circles in Police Departments and Improving the Use of Management by Objectives in Police Departments*, The Urban Institute (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, both forthcoming).

Community relations. The riots of the 1960's made police aware of their strained relations with minority communities. Community relations units, stringent restrictions on shooting, and civilian review boards attempted to reduce dissatisfaction with police among minorities.⁷

By the mid-1970's, departments provided storefront police stations and foot patrols to improve public attitudes through increased personal contact between the police and citizens.⁸ As the police began to recognize how vital citizen action is to crime control, some agencies began to work closely with citizens to reduce crime and fear.⁹

Effectiveness. An important impetus toward problem-oriented policing came finally when research on preventive patrol, response time, and investigations showed that merely reacting to incidents had, at best, limited effects on crime and public satisfaction.¹⁰ Rapid response and lengthy followup investigations were not needed for many incidents, suggesting that police managers could deploy their officers more flexibly without reducing effectiveness.

Experiments in flexible deployment such as split force, investigative case screening, and differential response to calls confirmed that time could be


freed for other activities.¹¹ Managers turned to crime analysis to use this time, focusing on groups of events rather than isolated incidents. By identifying crime-prone locations, crime analysis hoped to use patrol and detective time more effectively.¹² Although crime analysis was restricted to crime problems, traditional police data sources, and criminal justice responses, it marked the first attempt at problem-oriented policing.

Designing problem-oriented policing

Some departments had previously applied problem-solving approaches in special units or projects.¹³ None before Newport News had taken a problem-solving approach agency-wide. The National Institute of Justice and Police Chief Darrel Stephens required that the experimental approach follow four basic principles:

- **Participation.** Officers of all ranks, from all units, should be able to use the procedures as part of their daily routine.
- **Information.** The system must encourage use of a broad range of information not limited to conventional police data.

The problem-solving process



- **Response.** The system should encourage a broad range of solutions not limited to the criminal justice process.
- **Reproducibility.** The system must be one that any large police agency could apply.

The Newport News Police Department named 12 members, from all ranks and units, to a task force to design the process. Having no experience with routine problem solving, the task force decided to test the process it was designing on two persistent problems: burglaries from an apartment complex and thefts from vehicles. All subsequent problems, including the prostitution-related robbery problem described on page 2, were handled by patrol officers, detectives, and supervisors on their normal assignments.

As stated above, the process has four stages. Officers identify problems during the *scanning* stage, collect and analyze information during the *analysis* stage, work with other agencies and the public to develop and implement solutions in the *response* stage, and evaluate their effectiveness in the *assessment* stage. The results of assessment may be used to revise the response, collect more data, or even redefine the problem.

7. Lee P. Brown and Hubert Locke, "Police and the Community" in *Progress in Policing: Essays on Change* ed. Richard A. Staufenberger (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1980): 85-102.

8. Storefronts and foot patrols were important elements in many team policing schemes. See, for example, Lawrence W. Sherman, Catherine H. Milton, and Thomas V. Kelly, *Team Policing: Seven Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1973).

9. See, especially, Lawrence H. Holland, "Police and the Community: The Detroit Minuteman Experience," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 54 (February 1985): 1-6; Police Foundation, *Newark Foot Patrol Experiment* (Washington, D.C.: 1981); Robert C. Trojanowicz, *Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, n.d.); Antony Pate et al., *Reducing Fear of Crime*.

10. George L. Kelling et al., *Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Technical Report* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974); William Spelman and Dale K. Brown, *Calling the Police: Citizen Reporting of Serious Crime* (reprint: Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); John E. Eck, *Solving Crimes: The Investigation of Burglary and Robbery* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1982).

11. James M. Tien, James W. Simon, and Richard C. Larsen, *Alternative Approach in Police Patrol. The Wilmington Split-Force Experiment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978); John E. Eck, *Managing Case Assignments: The Burglary Investigation Decision Model Replication* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1979); J. Thomas McEwen, Edward F. Connors, and Marcia I. Cohen, *Evaluation of the Differential Police Response Field Test* (Alexandria, Virginia: Research Management Associates, 1984).

12. G. Hobart Reinier, M.R. Greenlee, and M.H. Gibbons, *Crime Analysis in Support of Patrol*. National Evaluation Program Phase I Report (Washington, D.C.: University City Science Center, 1984).

13. Among the most notable examples: John P. Bales and Timothy N. Oettmeier, "Houston's DART Program—A Transition to the Future," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 54 (December 1985): 13-17; William DeJong, "Project DARE, Teaching Kids To Say 'No' to Drugs and Alcohol," *NIJ Reports* 196 (March 1986): 2-5 (Los Angeles Police Department); Philip B. Taft, Jr., *Fighting Fear. The Baltimore County C.O.P.E. Program* (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 1986). The New York City Police Department's Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) is by far the largest problem-oriented unit implemented to date. More information on CPOP is available from the New York City Police or the Vera Institute of Justice.

The heart of the process is the analysis stage. The task force designed a problem analysis model, breaking the events that constitute a problem into three components—actors, incidents, and responses—with a checklist of issues that officers should consider when they study a problem.

All sergeants and higher ranks were trained in the model, the use of the systematic process, and the research background. The training also emphasized encouraging officer initiative in uncovering problems, collecting information, and developing responses. Officers throughout the department then began to apply the process.

Problem-oriented policing at work

By June 1986, some two dozen problems had been identified and were in various stages of analysis, response, and assessment. Some problems affected citizens throughout the city; others were confined to neighborhoods. Some problems related to crime, others to the order maintenance, regulatory, or service roles of the police.

In addition to the prostitution-related robberies, Newport News selected apartment burglaries and thefts from parked vehicles as test problems.

Burglaries in the New Briarfield Apartments. Built as temporary housing for shipyard workers in 1942, the 450 wood-frame units called the New Briarfield Apartments remained

Some problems being considered by Newport News Police

Citywide

- Assaults on police officers
- Thefts of gasoline from self-service filling stations
- Domestic violence
- Drunk driving
- Repeat runaway youths

In neighborhoods

- Commercial burglaries, Jefferson Avenue business district
- Heroin dealing, 32d and Chestnut
- Residential burglaries, New Briarfield Apartments
- Residential burglaries, Glenn Gardens Apartments
- Thefts from automobiles, downtown parking area
- Dirt bikes, Newmarket Creek
- Rowdy youths, Peninsula Skating Rink
- Rowdy youths, Marshall Avenue 7-Eleven
- Robbery and prostitution, Washington Avenue
- Vacant buildings, central business area
- Larcenies, Beaumont Gardens Apartments
- Unlicensed drinking places, Aqua Vista Apartments
- Disorders and larcenies, Village Square Shopping Center

in use during the postwar housing shortage—and into the present.

By 1984, New Briarfield was known as the worst housing in the city. It also had the highest crime rate: burglars hit 23 percent of the occupied units each year. The task force assigned Detective Tony Duke of the Crime Analysis Unit to study the problem.

Duke had patrol and auxiliary officers survey a random one-third sample of the household in January 1985. The residents confirmed that burglary was a serious problem, but they were equally upset by the physical deterioration of the complex. Duke then

interviewed employees of other city departments and found that the burglaries were related in part to the general deterioration of the housing.

The Fire Department called New Briarfield a firetrap. Public Works worried about flooding; the complex had no storm sewers. Standing water rotted the floors, noted the Department of Codes Compliance. Cracks around doors and windows made it easier for burglars to force their way in. Vacant units, unfit to rent, sheltered burglars and drug addicts.

Officer Barry Haddix, responsible for patrolling the area, decided to clean

The problem analysis model

Actors

- Victims
 - Lifestyle
 - Security measures taken
 - Victimization history
- Offenders
 - Identity and physical description
 - Lifestyle, education, employment history
 - Criminal history
- Third parties
 - Personal data
 - Connection to victimization

Incidents

- Sequence of events
 - Events preceding act
 - Event itself
 - Events following criminal act
- Physical contact
 - Time
 - Location
 - Access control and surveillance
- Social context
 - Likelihood and probable actions of witnesses
 - Apparent attitude of residents toward neighborhood

Responses

- Community
 - Neighborhood affected by problem
 - City as a whole
 - People outside the city
- Institutional
 - Criminal justice agencies
 - Other public agencies
 - Mass media
 - Business sector

up the grounds. Working with the apartment manager and city agencies, he arranged to have trash and abandoned appliances removed, abandoned cars towed, potholes filled, and streets swept.

Detective Duke meanwhile learned that the complex owners were in default on a loan and that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was about to foreclose. Duke wrote a report describing the crime problem, the tenants' discouragement, and the views of other city agencies.

Police Chief Stephens used the report to enlist other departments in a joint recommendation to the city manager: Help the tenants find better housing and demolish New Briarfield. The city manager approved. In June 1986, he proposed replacing Briarfield with a new 220-unit complex, a middle school, and a small shopping center. Negotiations are underway with HUD.


The long-range solution will take time to implement. For now, the police force assigned Officer Vernon Lyons full-time to organize the neighborhood residents. Since January 1986 the New Briarfield Community Association has been persuading residents to take better care of the neighborhood and lobbying the resident manager and city agencies to keep the complex properly maintained.

Visibly better living conditions have resulted—and the burglary rate has dropped by 35 percent.


Thefts from vehicles in shipyard parking lots. Newport News Shipbuilding employs 36,000 people. Most drive to work and park in nearby lots. In 1984, thefts from these cars amounted to \$180,000 in losses, not counting vehicle damage—a total that accounted for 10 percent of all serious, reported crime.

Police were frustrated. They answered many calls but made few arrests. The task force chose Officer Paul Swartz to analyze the issues.


Personal robberies: An average reduction of 39 percent in downtown area



Household burglaries: An average reduction of 35 percent in New Briarfield



Larcenies from autos: An average reduction of 53 percent in downtown area



In these three graphs, all time series have been exponentially smoothed to account for short-term fluctuations, long-term trends, and seasonal variations. Estimated crime reductions due to police action are statistically significant at the .01 level or lower.

He tracked current cases and reviewed offense and arrest records for the previous 3 years. He interviewed patrol officers and detectives who knew the area, and talked with shipyard security officers. This led to identification of theft-prone lots—and of a small group of frequent offenders who might be committing most of the thefts.

As a result, one person was arrested in the act of breaking into a car, and Swartz interviewed the offender after he was convicted, promising that nothing he said would bring extra punishment. Swartz learned that drugs were a prime target of the thieves, who looked for “muscle” cars, rock-and-roll bumper stickers, or other hints that the car owner used marijuana or cocaine.

The information led to more arrests and convictions, further interviews, and still further arrests.

The police department is still developing a long-term solution, working with parking lot owners and shipyard workers to develop a prevention program. In the interim, however, the arrest, conviction, and incarceration of the most frequent offenders has reduced thefts by 53 percent since April 1985.

New information, new responses

One reason for these successes has been the police use of information from a wider variety of sources. A survey of residents is an example, like interviews with thieves and prostitutes, but so are literature reviews, interviews with runaways and their parents, business surveys, photographing of problem sites, and searches of tax and title records.

The responses to prostitution-related robberies and parking-lot thefts are standard tactics, but in these cases the involvement of people outside the criminal justice system was important. The resources used are as diverse as the problems themselves.

Problem-oriented policing helps ensure that police respond to a wide variety of problems affecting the quality of life, not just crime. It lets line officers use their experience and knowledge to improve the communities they serve.

The Newport News Police Department—and other departments that adopt and refine this approach—will continue to respond to specific criminal events. But they will go beyond this step, preventing future incidents by solving the problems that would otherwise lead to crime and disorder.

The problem-oriented police department thus will be able to take the initiative in working with other agencies on community problems when those problems touch on police responsibilities. Such a department can make more efficient use of its resources when, for example, it reduces the number of prostitutes and thus needs fewer officers to patrol downtown.

This police force will be more responsive to citizen needs, enjoying better community relations when citizens see the police demonstrating concern for their day-to-day needs.

The result will be a more effective response to crime and other troubling conditions in our cities.

A more complete report on the Newport News project soon will be published by the National Institute of Justice. In the meantime, those seeking additional information may contact the Project Director: John Eck, Senior Research Associate, Police Executive Research Forum, 2301 M Street NW., Washington, DC 20006. William Spelman, also a Senior Research Associate at PERF, is Assistant Project Director.



November 1988

No. 9

A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Implementing Community Policing

By Malcolm K. Sparrow

A simple lesson, well understood by truck drivers, helps to frame the problem for this paper: greater momentum means less maneuverability. The professional truck driver does not drive his 50-ton trailer-truck the same way that he drives his sports car. He avoids braking sharply. He treats corners with far greater respect. And he generally does not expect the same instant response from the trailer, with its load, that he enjoys in his car. The driver's failure to understand the implications and responsibilities of driving such a massive vehicle inevitably produces tragedy; if the driver tries to turn too sharply, the cab loses traction as the trailer's momentum overturns or jackknifes the vehicle.

Police organizations also have considerable momentum. Having a strong personal commitment to the values with which they have "grown up," police officers will find any hint of proposed change in the police culture extremely threatening. Moreover, those values are reflected in many apparently technical aspects of their jobs—systems for dispatching patrols, patrol officers constantly striving to be available for the next call, incident-logging criteria, etc. The chief executive who simply announces that community policing is now the order of the day, without a carefully designed plan for bringing about that change, stands in danger both of "losing traction" and of throwing his entire force into confusion.

The concept of community policing envisages a police department striving for an absence of crime and disorder and concerned with, and sensitive to, the quality of life in the community. It perceives the community as an agent and partner in promoting security rather than as a passive audience. This is in contrast to the traditional concept of policing that measures its successes chiefly through response

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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times, the number of calls handled, and detection rates for serious crime. A fuller comparison between traditional and community policing models is given in the appendix in a question-and-answer format.

The task here is to focus attention upon some of the difficulties inherent in a change of policing style, rather than to defend or advocate community policing. So we will address some general problems of institutional change, albeit within the context of a discussion of policing styles.

Those who accept the desirability of introducing community policing confront a host of difficult issues: What structural changes are necessary, if any? How do we get the people on the beat to behave differently? Can the people we have now be forced into the new mold, or do we need to recruit a new kind of person? What should we tell the public, and when? How fast can we bring about this change? Do we have enough external support?

These are the problems of implementation. The aim of this paper is to assist in their resolution. You will find here, however, no particular prescription—no organizational chart, no list of objectives, no sample press releases. Such a prescription could not satisfy any but the most particular of circumstances. The intent here is to explore some general concepts in organizational behavior, to uncover particular obstacles to desired change that might be found within police departments, and then to find the most effective means for overcoming the obstacles.

Dangers of underestimating the task: changing a culture

Even the superficial review of community policing in the appendix indicates the magnitude of the task facing a chief executive. Implementing community policing is not a simple policy change that can be effected by issuing a directive through the normal channels. It is not a mere restructuring of the force to provide the same service more efficiently. Nor is it a cosmetic decoration designed to impress the public and promote greater cooperation.

For the police it is an entirely different way of life. It is a new way for police officers to see themselves and to understand their role in society. The task facing the police chief is nothing less than to change the fundamental culture of the organization. This is especially difficult because of the unusual strength of police cultures and their great resistance to change.

The unusual strength of the police culture is largely attributable to two factors. First, the stressful and apparently dangerous nature of the police role produces collegiate bonds of considerable strength, as officers feel themselves

besieged in an essentially hostile world. Second, the long hours and the rotating shifts kill most prospects for a normal (wider) social life; thus, the majority of an officer's social life is confined to his or her own professional circle.

“... a huge ship can ... be turned by a small rudder. It just takes time ...”

Altering an organizational philosophy is bound to take considerable time. Another analogy may be helpful: the greater the momentum of a ship, the longer it takes to turn. One comforting observation is that a huge ship can nevertheless be turned by a small rudder. It just takes time, and it requires the rudder to be set steadfastly for the turn throughout the whole turning period.

It is worth pointing out, also, that there will be constant turbulence around a rudder when it is turning the ship—and no turbulence at all when it is not. This analogy teaches us something if the office of the chief executive is seen as the rudder responsible for turning the whole organization. The lessons are simple. First, the bigger the organization the longer it will take to change. Second, throughout the period of change the office of the chief executive is going to be surrounded by turbulence, like it or not. It will require personal leadership of considerable strength and perseverance.

Rendering susceptible to change

A chief executive may be fortunate enough to inherit an organization that is already susceptible to change. For instance, he may arrive shortly after some major corruption scandal or during a period when external confidence in the police department is at rock bottom. In such a case the chief executive is fortunate, in that leadership is required and expected of him. His organization is poised to respond quickly to his leadership on the grounds that the new chief, or his new policies, may represent the best or only hopes of rescue.

A chief executive who inherits a smoothly running bureaucracy, complacent in the status quo, has a tougher job. The values and aspirations of the traditional policing style will be embodied in the bureaucratic mechanisms—all of which superficially appear to be functioning well. The need for change is less apparent.

The task of the chief executive, in such a situation, is to expose the defects that exist within the present system. That will involve challenging the fundamental assumptions of the organization, its aspirations and objectives, the effectiveness

of the department's current technologies, and even its view of itself. The difficulty for the chief is that raising such questions, and questioning well-entrenched police practices, may look and feel destructive rather than constructive. Managers within the department will feel uneasy and insecure, as they see principles and assertions for which they have stood for many years being subject to unaccustomed scrutiny.

The process of generating a questioning, curious, and ultimately innovative spirit within the department seems to necessarily involve this awkward stage. It looks like an attempt by the chief to deliberately upset his organization. The ensuing uncertainty will have a detrimental effect upon morale within the department, and the chief has to pay particular attention to that problem. Police officers do not like uncertainty within their own organization; they already face enough of that on the streets.

The remedy lies in the personal commitment of the chief and his senior managers. Morale improves once it is clear that the change in direction and style is taking root rather than a fleeting fancy, that the chief's policies have some longevity, and that what initially appeared to be destructive cynicism about police accomplishments is, in fact, a healthy, progressive, and forgiving openmindedness.

“Morale improves once it is clear that the change in direction and style is taking root rather than a fleeting fancy . . .”

The chief executive is also going to require outside help in changing the organization. For instance, the chief may be able to make a public commitment to a new kind of policing long before he can convince his organization to adopt it. He may be able to create a public consensus that many of the serious policing problems of the day are direct results of the fact that the new kind of policing was not practiced in the past. He may be able to educate the public, or the mayor, about the shortcomings of existing practices even before his staff is prepared to face up to them.

He may identify pressure groups that he can use to his advantage by eliciting from them public enunciation of particular concerns. He may be able to foster and empower the work of commissions, committees, or inquiries that help to make his organization vulnerable to change. He can then approach his own organization backed by a public mandate—and police of all ranks will, in due course, face questions from the public itself that make life very uncomfortable for them if they cling to old values.

The chief may even accentuate his staff's vulnerability to external pressures by removing the protection provided by a public information officer and insisting that the news media be handled by subordinate officers. In so doing the chief would have to accept that some mistakes will inevitably be made by officers inexperienced in media affairs. High-level tolerance of those early errors will be critical to middle management's acceptance of the new openness. They will need to feel that they are working within a supportive, challenging, coaching environment—not that they are being needlessly exposed to personal risk.

Two kinds of imbalance

Two different types of imbalance within the organization may help render it susceptible to change: “directed imbalance” and “experimental imbalance.”

Directed imbalance: Return for a moment to physical analogies, and consider the process of turning a corner on a bicycle. Without thinking, the rider prepares for the turn by leaning over to the appropriate side. Small children learning to ride a bicycle quickly discover the perils of not leaning enough, or too much, for the desired turn. The characteristics of the imbalance, in this instance, are that it is necessary and that it only makes sense in the context of the anticipated change in direction. It is, nevertheless, imbalance—because the machine will fall over if the turn is not subsequently made. Inevitable disaster follows, conversely, from making the turn without the preparatory leaning.

Directed imbalances within a police organization will be those imbalances that are created in anticipation of the proposed change in orientation. They will be the changes that make sense only under the assumption that the whole project will be implemented, and that it will radically alter organizational priorities.

Examples of such directed imbalance would be the movement of the most talented and promising personnel into the newly defined jobs; making it clear that the route to promotion lies within such jobs; disbanding those squads that embody and add weight to the traditional values; recategorizing the crime statistics according to their effect on the community; redesigning the staff evaluation system to take account of contributions to the nature and quality of community life; providing inservice training in problem-solving skills for veteran officers and managers; altering the nature of the training given to new recruits to include problem-solving skills; establishing new communication channels with other public services; and contracting for annual community surveys for a period of years.

Experimental imbalance: This differs from directed imbalance in its incorporation of trial and error—lots of trials and a tolerance of error. The benefits of running many different experiments in different parts of the organization are more numerous than they might, at first sight, appear. There is the obvious result of obtaining experimental data, to be used in planning for the future. There is also the effect of creating a greater willingness to challenge old assumptions and hence a greater susceptibility to change, at a time when the organization needs to change most rapidly.

“The resourcefulness of police officers . . . can at last be put to the service of the department.”

There is also the effect of involving lots of officers in a closer and more personal way. It does not matter so much what it is that they are involved in—it is more important that they feel involved, and that they feel they are subject to the attention of headquarters. They will then be much more disposed to try to understand what the values of headquarters really are.

Also, officers will see lots of apparently crazy ideas being tried and may, in time, realize that they have some ideas of their own that are slightly less crazy. Perhaps for the first time they will be willing to put their ideas forward, knowing that they will not be summarily dismissed. The resourcefulness of police officers, so long apparent in their unofficial behavior, can at last be put to the service of the department. Creativity blossoms in an experimental environment that is tolerant of unusual ideas.

Managing through values

Existing police structures tend to be mechanistic and highly centralized. Headquarters is the brain that does the thinking for the whole organization. Headquarters, having thought, disseminates rules and regulations in order to control practice throughout the organization. Headquarters must issue a phenomenal volume of policy, as it seeks to cover every new and possible situation. A new problem, new legislation, or new idea eventually produces a new wave of instructions sent out to divisions from headquarters.

The 1984 publication in Britain of the “Attorney General’s New Guidelines on Prosecution and Cautioning Practice” provides a useful example. The purpose of the guidelines was to introduce the idea that prosecutions should be

undertaken when, and only when, prosecution best serves the public interest. As such, the guidelines represent a broadening of police discretion. In the past, police were authorized to caution only juveniles and senior citizens. Under the new guidelines offenders of any age may be cautioned in appropriate circumstances. Unfortunately, the order was issued in some county forces through some 30 pages of detailed, case-by-case, instructions distributed from headquarters. The mass of instructions virtually obscured the fact that broader discretion was being granted.

Police officers have long been accustomed to doing their jobs “by the book.” Detailed instruction manuals, sometimes running into hundreds, even thousands, of pages have been designed to prescribe action in every eventuality. Police officers feel that they are not required to exercise judgment so much as to know what they are supposed to do in a particular situation. There is little incentive and little time to think, or to have ideas. There is little creativity and very little problem solving. Most of the day is taken up just trying not to make mistakes. And it is the voluminous instruction manuals which define what is, and what is not, a mistake. Consequently heavy reliance is placed upon the prescriptions of the manuals during disciplinary investigations and hearings.

How does the traditional management process feel from the receiving (operational) end? Something like this: “It all comes from headquarters; it is all imposed; it is all what somebody else has thought up—probably somebody who has time to sit and think these things up.” New ideas are never conceived, evaluated, and implemented in the same place, so they are seldom “owned” or pursued enthusiastically by those in contact with the community.

Why is this state of affairs a hindrance to the ideals of community policing? Because it allows for no sensitivity either on a district level (i.e., to the special needs of the community) or on an individual level (i.e., to the particular considerations of one case). It operates on the assumption that wealthy suburban districts need to be policed in much the same way as public housing apartments. While patrol officers may be asked to behave sensitively to the needs of the community and to the individuals with whom they deal, there is little organizational support for such behavior.

“There is . . . little time to think, or to have ideas. . . . Most of the day is taken up just trying not to make mistakes.”

Of course, there remains a need for some standing orders, some prepared contingency plans, and some set procedures. But such instructions can come to be regarded as a resource,

rather than as constraining directives. In the past, instruction manuals have been used as much to allocate blame retrospectively after some error has come to light, as to facilitate the difficult work of patrol officers. Many departments, in implementing community policing (which normally involves a less militaristic and more participatory management style), have deemphasized their instruction manuals.

The instruction manual of the West Midlands Police Force, in England, had grown to 4 volumes, each one over 3 inches thick, totaling more than 2,000 pages of instructions. In June 1987, under the direction of Chief Constable Geoffrey Dear, they scrapped it. They replaced it with a single-page "Policy Statement" which gave 11 brief "commandments." These commandments spoke more about initiative and "reasonableness of action" than about rules or regulations. All officers were issued pocket-size laminated copies of this policy statement so that, at any time, they could remind themselves of the basic tenets of their department.

The old manual had contained some useful information that could not be found elsewhere. This was extracted, condensed, and preserved in a new, smaller, "advice manual." It was only one-third the size of the old manual and, significantly, was distributed with an explicit promise that it would never be used in the course of disciplinary investigations or hearings. The ground-level officers were able to accept it as a valuable resource, whereas they had regarded the old manual as a constant threat, omniscient but unfeeling.

The Chief Constable had set up a small team to be responsible for introducing the new policy statement and advice manual. One year after the first distribution of these two documents to the force, the feelings of that team were that the ground-level officers accepted the change and appreciated it, but that some of the mid-level managers found the implied management style harder to accept and were reluctant to discard their old manuals.¹

Another trend in the management of policing is for procedures "set in stone" to be played down in favor of accumulated experience. There are growing repositories of professional experience, either in the form of available discussion forums for officers trying new techniques, or in the form of case studies where innovations and their results are described.² One difficulty here is that police officers have to be persuaded that it is helpful, rather than harmful, to record their failures as well as their successes—and for that they will need a lot of reassurance.

Senior managers have begun to emphasize the ideals, ethics, and motivations that underlie the new image of policing, as opposed to the correctness or incorrectness of procedures. Disciplinary inquiries, therefore, come to rest less firmly on the cold facts of an officer's conduct and more upon his intentions, his motivations, and the reasonableness and acceptability of his judgment in the particular situation.

The relationship between headquarters and district commands may also need to change. The role of headquarters will be to preach the values and state the principles and broad objectives, and then allow the districts a great deal of discretion in deciding on particular programs suited to their geographical area. Similarly, management within any one division or district should be, as far as possible, through values and principles rather than rules and regulations; individual officers can then be encouraged to use their own judgment in specific cases.

“ [A] police force . . . of 3,000 . . . has nine layers of ranks. . . . [The] Roman Catholic Church . . . does a fairly good job of disseminating values with only five layers. ”

The nature of the rank structure itself can be a principal obstacle to the effective communication of new values throughout the organization, primarily because it consists of many thin layers. A typical British police force (say of 3,000 officers) has nine layers of ranks. The larger Metropolitan forces have even more. In the larger American forces, the number of ranks can vary from 9 to 13 depending on the size of the department. This is in contrast to the worldwide Roman Catholic Church (with over 600 million members), which does a fairly good job of disseminating values with only five layers. We know from physics that many thin layers is the best formula for effective insulation; for instance, we are told that the best protection from cold weather is to wear lots of thin layers of clothing, rather than a few thick ones.

Certainly such a deep rank structure provides a very effective natural barrier, insulating the chief officer from his patrol force. It makes it possible for the police chief to believe that all his officers are busily implementing the ideas which, last month, he asked his deputy to ask his assistants to implement—while, in fact, the sergeant is telling his officers that the latest missive from those cookies at headquarters "who have forgotten what this job is all about" shouldn't actually affect them at all.

During a period of organizational reorientation the communication between the chief and the rank and file needs to be more effective than that—and so will need to be more direct. The insulating effects of the rank structure will need to be overcome, if there is to be any hope of the rank and file understanding what their chief officers are trying to get them to think about. It means that the chief must talk to the

officers, and must do so at length. Some chiefs have found it valuable to publish their own value statements and give all patrol officers personal copies. Alternatively, the chief may choose to call meetings and address the officers himself.

This is not proposed as a permanent state of affairs, as clearly the rank structure has its own value and is not to be lightly discarded. During the period of accelerated change, however, the communication between the top and the bottom of the organization has to be unusually effective. Hence, it is necessary to ensure that the message is not filtered, doctored, or suppressed (either by accident or as an act of deliberate sabotage) by intermediate ranks during such times.

The likelihood of a change in policy and style surviving, in the long term, probably depends as much on its acceptance by middle management as on anything else. The middle managers, therefore, have to be coached and reeducated; they have to be given the opportunity and incentive for critical self-examination and the chance to participate in the reappraisal of the organization. Some chiefs have invested heavily in management retraining, seminars, and retreats, taking great care to show their personal commitment to those enterprises.

Territorial responsibility

One of the most obvious structural changes that has normally accompanied a move toward community policing is the assignment of officers to beats. It is important to understand how such a move fits into the general scheme of things. At first sight it appears that patrol officers who drive cars on shift work have territorial responsibility; for 8 hours a day they each cover an area. In fact, there are two senses in which that particular area is not the officer's professional territory. First, officers know that they may be dispatched to another area at any time, should the need arise. Second, they are not responsible for anything that occurs in their area when they are off duty. The boundaries of their professional territories are more clearly defined by the time periods when

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Points of view or opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or of Harvard University.

The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates the activities of the following program. Offices and Bureaus: National Institute of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Office for Victims of Crime.

they are on duty than by a geographical area. The fact that a professional territory spans a period of time rather than an area clearly has the effect of forcing the officer's concern to be largely focused on incidents rather than on the long-term problems of which the incidents may be symptoms. The patrol officers are bound to remain reactive rather than proactive. Long-term problems remain outside their responsibility.

“... beat officers know ... the opportunity and obligation to have an impact ...”

In contrast, when patrol officers are given an area and told “this is yours, and nobody else's,” their professional territory immediately becomes geographical. The 24-hour demand on police resources requires that some calls in their area will be dealt with by other personnel. But the beat officers know that they have principal responsibility for a street or streets. They have the opportunity and obligation to have an impact on difficult problems. The more committed beat officers demand to know what happened on their beat while they were off duty; they tend to make unsolicited followup visits, and struggle to find causes of incidents that would otherwise be regarded as haphazard.

It is fairly easy to see how the chief officer, district commanders, and individual beat officers can have a clear territorial responsibility. What about the remainder in middle management? There is a danger that community contact and concern will be the preserve of the highest and lowest ranks of the service, with the middle ranks living a cozy internal life of administration.

Middle-ranking officers can continue to be a barrier to the dissemination of the new values unless they too are made to live by them. This is perhaps best accomplished by making each rank correspond to some level of aggregation of beats or of community concerns. Thus middle managers should interact as fully with the community as the most senior and most junior officers. They thereby become a meaningful resource for the patrol officers rather than just one more level of supervision. They then can provide contextual frameworks, at successively higher levels, to assist subordinates in the understanding and resolution of particular community problems.

Resistance and sabotage

The most robust resistance to any change in values within an organization will come from those parts that stand to benefit most by the perpetuation of the old set of values.

In introducing the ideals of community policing, the chief should anticipate substantial resistance from particular areas, the first of which is the detective branch.

The idea that crime investigation is the single most important function of the police makes the criminal investigation division the single most important unit within the organization; it gives a detective higher status than a patrol officer. Should we expect the detective branch to applaud an absence of crime? It seems that their values are sometimes shaped to prefer an abundance of crime, provided it is all solved. It seems that special attention may have to be given to dismantling the detectives' view of what is, and what is not, important. Certainly the detective branch typically views the introduction of community policing as a matter for the patrol officers—"our job is still to solve crime."

Detectives' perception of their job will remain "my job is to solve crime" until they are removed from the group that reinforces that perception. Their goals will remain the same until their professional territory is redefined. Their professional territories, if the detectives are to adopt and understand the ideals of community policing, should be defined segments of the community.

The detectives may, or may not, share their segments with uniformed officers; they may, or may not, retain the title of detective. Such considerations will depend, to an extent, on the particular constraints imposed by union power. But they have to be incorporated into the community policing system. They have to be encouraged to work closely within neighborhood policing units. Thus the valuable intelligence that detectives gain through crime investigation can be fed back into the patrol operation. Also, the detectives are made to feel that crime prevention is their principal obligation, and not the preserve either of the patrol force or of a dedicated, but peripheral, unit.

“... chief officers may have the authority... but they are frequently frustrated by administrators...”

The essential change, whatever the prevailing circumstances, is that the detectives' professional territory has to be extended some considerable distance beyond the instances of reported crime. The detectives may end up looking more like "district investigators" than members of an elite, and separate, unit.

A second area of resistance will probably be the bureaucratic administration. It will include many key personnel who have been able to do their jobs comfortably and mechanically for

many years. Such jobs will include the purchase of equipment and supplies, the recruiting and training of staff, and, perhaps most importantly, the preparation and administration of annual budgets. The chief officers may have the authority to allocate police resources as they think best, but they are frequently frustrated by administrators who find some bureaucratic reason for not releasing funds for particular purposes, or by the creation of other bureaucratic obstacles.

A fundamental reappraisal of organizational priorities is likely to "upset the apple cart" in these areas in a manner that bureaucrats will find difficult to tolerate. Such staff members need to be converted. The practical implication is that such personnel must be included in the audience when the new organizational values are being loudly proclaimed. If they are left out at the beginning, they may well become a significant stumbling block at some later stage.

Conclusion

One final cautionary note: the principal task facing police leaders in changing the orientation of their organizations has been identified as the task of communicating new values. In order to stand a chance of communicating values effectively, you need to believe in them yourself, and to be part of a community that believes in them, too.

Notes

1. The Metropolitan Police Department (London) is in the process of making a similar change, moving away from a comprehensive instruction manual and toward clear, brief statements of the principles for action.
2. Much of this work stemmed from initiatives funded by the National Institute of Justice, the Police Executive Research Forum, the Police Foundation, and concerned philanthropic foundations.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

NCJ 114217

Appendix

Traditional vs. community policing: Questions and answers

	<u>Traditional</u>	<u>Community policing</u>
<i>Question: Who are the police?</i>	A government agency principally responsible for law enforcement.	Police are the public and the public are the police: the police officers are those who are paid to give full-time attention to the duties of every citizen.
<i>Question: What is the relationship of the police force to other public service departments?</i>	Priorities often conflict.	The police are one department among many responsible for improving the quality of life.
<i>Question: What is the role of the police?</i>	Focusing on solving crimes.	A broader problem-solving approach.
<i>Question: How is police efficiency measured?</i>	By detection and arrest rates.	By the absence of crime and disorder.
<i>Question: What are the highest priorities?</i>	Crimes that are high value (e.g., bank robberies) and those involving violence.	Whatever problems disturb the community most.
<i>Question: What, specifically, do police deal with?</i>	Incidents.	Citizens' problems and concerns.
<i>Question: What determines the effectiveness of police?</i>	Response times.	Public cooperation.

Appendix (continued)

Traditional vs. community policing: Questions and answers

	<u>Traditional</u>	<u>Community policing</u>
<i>Question: What view do police take of service calls?</i>	Deal with them only if there is no real police work to do.	Vital function and great opportunity.
<i>Question: What is police professionalism?</i>	Swift effective response to serious crime.	Keeping close to the community.
<i>Question: What kind of intelligence is most important?</i>	Crime intelligence (study of particular crimes or series of crimes).	Criminal intelligence (information about the activities of individuals or groups).
<i>Question: What is the essential nature of police accountability?</i>	Highly centralized; governed by rules, regulations, and policy directives; accountable to the law.	Emphasis on local accountability to community needs.
<i>Question: What is the role of headquarters?</i>	To provide the necessary rules and policy directives.	To preach organizational values.
<i>Question: What is the role of the press liaison department?</i>	To keep the "heat" off operational officers so they can get on with the job.	To coordinate an essential channel of communication with the community.
<i>Question: How do the police regard prosecutions?</i>	As an important goal.	As one tool among many.

The police and neighborhood safety

BROKEN WINDOWS


BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING

IN THE MID-1970S, THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ANNOUNCED a "Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program," designed to improve the quality of community life in twenty-eight cities. As part of that program, the state provided money to help cities take police officers out of their patrol cars and assign them to walking beats. The governor and other state officials were enthusiastic about using foot patrol as a way of cutting crime, but many police chiefs were skeptical. Foot patrol, in their eyes, had been pretty much discredited. It reduced the mobility of the police, who thus had difficulty responding to citizen calls for service, and it weakened headquarters control over patrol officers.

Many police officers also disliked foot patrol, but for different reasons: it was hard work, it kept them outside on cold, rainy nights, and it reduced their chances for making a "good pinch." In some departments, assigning officers to foot patrol had been used as a form of punishment. And academic experts on policing doubted that foot patrol would have any impact on crime rates: it was, in the opinion of most, little more than a sop to public opinion. But since the state was paying for it, the local authorities were willing to go along.

Five years after the program started, the Police Foundation, in Washington, D.C., published an evaluation of the foot-patrol project. Based on its analysis of a carefully controlled experiment carried out chiefly in Newark, the foundation concluded, to the surprise of hardly anyone, that foot patrol had not reduced crime rates. But residents of the foot-patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more secure than persons in other areas, tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home with the doors locked, for example). Moreover, citizens in the foot-patrol areas had a more favorable opinion of the police than did those living elsewhere. And officers walking beats had higher morale, greater job satisfaction, and a more favorable attitude toward citizens in their neighborhoods than did officers assigned to patrol cars.


These findings may be taken as evidence that the skept-



tics were right—foot patrol has no effect on crime; it merely fools the citizens into thinking that they are safer. But in our view, and in the view of the authors of the Police Foundation study (of whom Kelling was one), the citizens of Newark were not fooled at all. They knew what the foot-patrol officers were doing, they knew it was different from what motorized officers do, and they knew that having officers walk beats did in fact make their neighborhoods safer.

But how can a neighborhood be "safer" when the crime rate has not gone down—in fact, may have gone up? Finding the answer requires first that we understand what most often frightens people in public places. Many citizens, of course, are primarily frightened by crime, especially crime involving a sudden, violent attack by a stranger. This risk is very real, in Newark as in many large cities. But we tend to overlook or forget another source of fear—

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the fear of being bothered by disorderly people. Not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.

What foot-patrol officers did was to elevate, to the extent they could, the level of public order in these neighborhoods. Though the neighborhoods were predominantly black and the foot patrolmen were mostly white, this "order-maintenance" function of the police was performed to the general satisfaction of both parties.

One of us (Kelling) spent many hours walking with Newark foot-patrol officers to see how they defined "order" and what they did to maintain it. One beat was typical: a busy but dilapidated area in the heart of Newark, with many abandoned buildings, marginal shops (several of which prominently displayed knives and straight-edged razors in their windows), one large department store, and, most important, a train station and several major bus stops. Though the area was run-down, its streets were filled with people, because it was a major transportation center. The good order of this area was important not only to those who lived and worked there but also to many others, who had to move through it on their way home, to supermarkets, or to factories.

The people on the street were primarily black; the officer who walked the street was white. The people were

made up of "regulars" and "strangers." Regulars included both "decent folk" and some drunks and derelicts who were always there but who "knew their place." Strangers were, well, strangers, and viewed suspiciously, sometimes apprehensively. The officer—call him Kelly—knew who the regulars were, and they knew him. As he saw his job, he was to keep an eye on strangers, and make certain that the disreputable regulars observed some informal but widely understood rules. Drunks and addicts could sit on the stoops, but could not lie down. People could drink on side streets, but not at the main intersection. Bottles had to be in paper bags. Talking to, bothering, or begging from people waiting at the bus stop was strictly forbidden. If a dispute erupted between a businessman and a customer, the businessman was assumed to be right, especially if the customer was a stranger. If a stranger loitered, Kelly would ask him if he had any means of support and what his business was; if he gave unsatisfactory answers, he was sent on his way. Persons who broke the informal rules, especially those who bothered people waiting at bus stops, were arrested for vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to keep quiet.

These rules were defined and enforced in collaboration with the "regulars" on the street. Another neighborhood might have different rules, but these, everybody understood, were the rules for *this* neighborhood. If someone violated them, the regulars not only turned to Kelly for

help but also ridiculed the violator. Sometimes what Kelly did could be described as "enforcing the law," but just as often it involved taking informal or extralegal steps to help protect what the neighborhood had decided was the appropriate level of public order. Some of the things he did probably would not withstand a legal challenge.

A determined skeptic might acknowledge that a skilled foot-patrol officer can maintain order but still insist that this sort of "order" has little to do with the real sources of community fear—that is, with violent crime. To a degree, that is true. But two things must be borne in mind. First, outside observers should not assume that they know how much of the anxiety now endemic in many big-city neighborhoods stems from a fear of "real" crime and how much from a sense that the street is disorderly, a source of distasteful, worrisome encounters. The people of Newark, to judge from their behavior and their remarks to interviewers, apparently assign a high value to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police help them maintain that order.

SECOND, AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL, DISORDER AND crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepai~~red~~, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepai~~red~~ broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing. (It has always been fun.)

Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, reported in 1969 on some experiments testing the broken-window theory. He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The first to arrive were a family—father, mother, and young son—who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began—windows were smashed, parts torn off, upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were well-dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable whites.

Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider

themselves law-abiding. Because of the nature of community life in the Bronx—its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are stolen or broken, the past experience of "no one caring"—vandalism begins much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers—the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility—are lowered by actions that seem to signal that "no one cares."

We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable






table and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers.

At this point it is not inevitable that serious crime will flourish or violent attacks on strangers will occur. But many residents will think that crime, especially violent crime, is on the rise, and they will modify their behavior accordingly. They will use the streets less often, and when on the streets will stay apart from their fellows, moving

with averted eyes, silent lips, and hurried steps. "Don't get involved." For some residents, this growing atomization will matter little, because the neighborhood is not their "home" but "the place where they live." Their interests are elsewhere; they are cosmopolitans. But it will matter greatly to other people, whose lives derive meaning and satisfaction from local attachments rather than worldly involvement; for them, the neighborhood will cease to exist except for a few reliable friends whom they arrange to meet.

Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped. That the drunks will be robbed by boys who do it as a lark, and the prostitutes' customers will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhaps violently. That muggings will occur.

Among those who often find it difficult to move away from this are the elderly. Surveys of citizens suggest that the elderly are much less likely to be the victims of crime than younger persons, and some have inferred from this that the well-known fear of crime voiced by the elderly is an exaggeration: perhaps we ought not to design special programs to protect older persons; perhaps we should even try to talk them out of their mistaken fears. This argument misses the point. The prospect of a confrontation with an obstreperous teenager or a drunken panhandler can be as fear-inducing for defenseless persons as the prospect of meeting an actual robber: indeed, to a defenseless person, the two kinds of confrontation are often indistinguishable. Moreover, the lower rate at which the elderly are victimized is a measure of the steps they have already taken—chiefly, staying behind locked doors—to minimize the risks they face. Young men are more frequently attacked than older women, not because they are easier or more lucrative targets but because they are on the streets more.

Nor is the connection between disorderliness and fear made only by the elderly. Susan Estrich, of the Harvard Law School, has recently gathered together a number of surveys on the sources of public fear. One, done in Portland, Oregon indicated that three fourths of the adults interviewed cross to the other side of a street when they see a gang of teenagers; another survey in Baltimore discovered that nearly half would cross the street to avoid even a single strange youth. When an interviewer asked people in a housing project where the most dangerous spot was, they mentioned a place where young persons gathered to drink and play music, despite the fact that not a single crime had occurred there. In Boston public housing projects, the greatest fear was expressed by persons living in the buildings where disorderliness and incivility, not crime, were the greatest. Knowing this helps one understand the significance of such otherwise harmless displays

as subway graffiti. As Nathan Glazer has written, the proliferation of graffiti, even when not obscene, confronts the subway rider with the "inescapable knowledge that the environment he must endure for an hour or more a day is uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and that anyone can invade it to do whatever damage and mischief the mind suggests."

In response to fear, people avoid one another, weakening controls. Sometimes they call the police. Patrol cars arrive, an occasional arrest occurs, but crime continues and disorder is not abated. Citizens complain to the police chief, but he explains that his department is low on personnel and that the courts do not punish petty or first-time offenders. To the residents, the police who arrive in squad cars are either ineffective or uncaring; to the police, the residents are animals who deserve each other. The citizens may soon stop calling the police, because "they can't do anything."


The process we call urban decay has occurred for centuries in every city. But what is happening today is different in at least two important respects. First, in the period before, say, World War II, city dwellers—because of money costs, transportation difficulties, familial and church connections—could rarely move away from neighborhood problems. When movement did occur, it tended to be along public-transit routes. Now mobility has become exceptionally easy for all but the poorest or those who are blocked by racial prejudice. Earlier crime waves had a kind of built-in self-correcting mechanism: the determination of a neighborhood or community to reassert control over its turf. Areas in Chicago, New York, and Boston would experience crime and gang wars, and then normalcy would return, as the families for whom no alternative residences were possible reclaimed their authority over the streets.

Second, the police in this earlier period assisted in that reassertion of authority by acting, sometimes violently, on behalf of the community. Young toughs were roughed up, people were arrested "on suspicion" or for vagrancy, and prostitutes and petty thieves were routed. "Rights" were something enjoyed by decent folk, and perhaps also by the serious professional criminal, who avoided violence and could afford a lawyer.

This pattern of policing was not an aberration or the result of occasional excess. From the earliest days of the nation, the police function was seen primarily as that of a night watchman: to maintain order against the chief threats to order—fire, wild animals, and disreputable behavior. Solving crimes was viewed not as a police responsibility but as a private one. In the March, 1969, Atlantic, one of us (Wilson) wrote a brief account of how the police role had slowly changed from maintaining order to fighting crimes. The change began with the creation of private detectives (often ex-criminals), who worked on a contingency-fee basis for individuals who had suffered losses. In time, the detectives were absorbed into municipal police

agencies and paid a regular salary; simultaneously, the responsibility for prosecuting thieves was shifted from the aggrieved private citizen to the professional prosecutor. This process was not complete in most places until the twentieth century.

In the 1960s, when urban riots were a major problem, social scientists began to explore carefully the order-maintenance function of the police, and to suggest ways of improving it—not to make streets safer (its original function) but to reduce the incidence of mass violence. Order-maintenance became, to a degree, coterminous with "community relations." But, as the crime wave that began in the early 1960s continued without abatement throughout the decade and into the 1970s, attention shifted to the role of the police as crime-fighters. Studies of police behavior ceased, by and large, to be accounts of the order-maintenance function and became, instead, efforts to propose and test ways whereby the police could solve more crimes, make more arrests, and gather better evidence. If these things could be done, social scientists assumed, citizens would be less fearful.



A GREAT DEAL WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING THIS transition, as both police chiefs and outside experts emphasized the crime-fighting function in their plans, in the allocation of resources, and in deployment of personnel. The police may well have become better crime-fighters as a result. And doubtless they remained aware of their responsibility for order. But the link between order-maintenance and crime-prevention, so obvious to earlier generations, was forgotten.

That link is similar to the process whereby one broken window becomes many. The citizen who fears the ill-smelling drunk, the rowdy teenager, or the importuning beggar is not merely expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to a bit of folk wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization—namely, that serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.

Some police administrators concede that this process occurs, but argue that motorized-patrol officers can deal with it as effectively as foot-patrol officers. We are not so sure. In theory, an officer in a squad car can observe as much as an officer on foot; in theory, the former can talk to as many people as the latter. But the reality of police-citizen encounters is powerfully altered by the automobile. An officer on foot cannot separate himself from the street people; if he is approached, only his uniform and his personality can help him manage whatever is about to happen. And he can never be certain what that will be—a request for directions, a plea for help, an angry denunciation, a teasing remark, a confused babble, a threatening gesture.

In a car, an officer is more likely to deal with street people by rolling down the window and looking at them. The door and the window exclude the approaching citizen; they are a barrier. Some officers take advantage of this barrier, perhaps unconsciously, by acting differently if in the car than they would on foot. We have seen this countless times. The police car pulls up to a corner where teenagers are gathered. The window is rolled down. The officer stares at the youths. They stare back. The officer says to one, "C'mere." He saunters over, conveying to his friends by his elaborately casual style the idea that he is not intimidated by authority. "What's your name?" "Chuck." "Chuck who?" "Chuck Jones." "What'ya doing, Chuck?" "Nothin'." "Got a P.O. [parole officer]?" "Nah." "Sure?" "Yeah." "Stay out of trouble, Chuckie." Meanwhile, the other boys laugh and exchange comments among themselves, probably at the officer's expense. The officer stares

harder. He cannot be certain what is being said, nor can he join in and, by displaying his own skill at street banter, prove that he cannot be "put down." In the process, the officer has learned almost nothing, and the boys have decided the officer is an alien force who can safely be disregarded, even mocked.

Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer. Such exchanges give them a sense of importance, provide them with the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the authorities what is worrying them (whereby they gain a modest but significant sense of having "done something" about the problem). You approach a person on foot more easily, and talk to him more readily, than you do a person in a car. Moreover, you can more easily retain some anonymity if you draw an officer aside for a private chat. Suppose you want to pass on a tip about who is stealing handbags, or who offered to sell you a stolen TV. In the inner city, the culprit, in all likelihood, lives nearby. To walk up to a marked patrol car and lean in the window is to convey a visible signal that you are a "fink."

* The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control. On the other hand, to reinforce those natural forces the police must accommodate them. And therein lies the problem.

SHOULD POLICE ACTIVITY ON THE STREET BE SHAPED, in important ways, by the standards of the neighborhood rather than by the rules of the state? Over the past two decades, the shift of police from order-maintenance to law-enforcement has brought them increasingly under the influence of legal restrictions, provoked by media complaints and enforced by court decisions and departmental orders. As a consequence, the order-maintenance functions of the police are now governed by rules developed to control police relations with suspected criminals. This is, we think, an entirely new development. For centuries, the role of the police as watchmen was judged primarily not in terms of its compliance with appropriate procedures but rather in terms of its attaining a desired objective. The objective was order, an inherently ambiguous term but a condition that people in a given community recognized when they saw it. The means were the same as those the community itself would employ, if its members were sufficiently determined, courageous, and authoritative. Detecting and apprehending criminals, by contrast, was a means to an end, not an end in itself; a judicial determination of guilt or innocence was the hoped-for result of the law-enforcement mode. From the first, the police were expected to follow rules defining that process, though states differed in how stringent the rules should be. The criminal-apprehension process was always understood to involve individual rights, the violation of which was unac-

ceptable because it meant that the violating officer would be acting as a judge and jury—and that was not his job. Guilt or innocence was to be determined by universal standards under special procedures.

Ordinarily, no judge or jury ever sees the persons caught up in a dispute over the appropriate level of neighborhood order. That is true not only because most cases are handled informally on the street, but also because no universal standards are available to settle arguments over disorder, and thus a judge may not be any wiser or more effective than a police officer. Until quite recently in many states, and even today in some places, the police make arrests on such charges as "suspicious person" or "vagrancy" or "public drunkenness"—charges with scarcely any legal meaning. These charges exist not because society wants judges to punish vagrants or drunks but because it wants an officer to have the legal tools to remove undesirable persons from a neighborhood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets have failed.

Once we begin to think of all aspects of police work as involving the application of universal rules under special procedures, we inevitably ask what constitutes an "undesirable person" and why we should "criminalize" vagrancy or drunkenness. A strong and commendable desire to see that people are treated fairly makes us worry about allowing the police to rout persons who are undesirable by some vague or parochial standard. A growing and not-so-commendable utilitarianism leads us to doubt that any behavior that does not "hurt" another person should be made illegal. And thus many of us who watch over the police are reluctant to allow them to perform, in the only way they can, a function that every neighborhood desperately wants them to perform.

This wish to "decriminalize" disreputable behavior that "harms no one"—and thus remove the ultimate sanction the police can employ to maintain neighborhood order—is, we think, a mistake. Arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seems unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants may destroy an entire community. A particular rule that seems to make sense in the individual case makes no sense when it is made a universal rule and applied to all cases. It makes no sense because it fails to take into account the connection between one broken window left untended and a thousand broken windows. Of course, agencies other than the police could attend to the problems posed by drunks or the mentally ill, but in most communities—especially where the "deinstitutionalization" movement has been strong—they do not.

The concern about equity is more serious. We might agree that certain behavior makes one person more undesirable than another, but how do we ensure that age or skin color or national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that

the police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry?

We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question. We are not confident that there is a satisfactory answer, except to hope that by their selection, training, and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the outer limit of their discretionary authority. That limit, roughly, is this—the police exist to help regulate behavior, not to maintain the racial or ethnic purity of a neighborhood.

Consider the case of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, one of the largest public-housing projects in the country. It is home for nearly 20,000 people, all black, and extends over ninety-two acres along South State Street. It was named after a distinguished black who had been, during the 1940s, chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority. Not long after it opened, in 1962, relations between project residents and the police deteriorated badly. The citizens felt that the police were insensitive or brutal; the police, in turn, complained of unprovoked attacks on them. Some Chicago officers tell of times when they were afraid to enter the Homes. Crime rates soared.

Today, the atmosphere has changed. Police-citizen relations have improved—apparently, both sides learned something from the earlier experience. Recently, a boy stole a purse and ran off. Several young persons who saw the theft voluntarily passed along to the police information on the identity and residence of the thief, and they did this publicly, with friends and neighbors looking on. But problems persist, chief among them the presence of youth gangs that terrorize residents and recruit members in the project. The people expect the police to "do something" about this, and the police are determined to do just that.

But do what? Though the police can obviously make arrests whenever a gang member breaks the law, a gang can form, recruit, and congregate without breaking the law. And only a tiny fraction of gang-related crimes can be solved by an arrest; thus, if an arrest is the only recourse for the police, the residents' fears will go unassuaged. The police will soon feel helpless, and the residents will again believe that the police "do nothing." What the police in fact do is to chase known gang members out of the project. In the words of one officer, "We kick ass." Project residents both know and approve of this. The tacit police-citizen alliance in the project is reinforced by the police view that the cops and the gangs are the two rival sources of power in the area, and that the gangs are not going to win.

None of this is easily reconciled with any conception of due process or fair treatment. Since both residents and gang members are black, race is not a factor. But it could be. Suppose a white project confronted a black gang, or vice versa. We would be apprehensive about the police taking sides. But the substantive problem remains the same: how can the police strengthen the informal social-control mechanisms of natural communities in order to minimize fear in public places? Law enforcement, per se, is no an-

swer. A gang can weaken or destroy a community by standing about in a menacing fashion and speaking rudely to passersby without breaking the law.

WE HAVE DIFFICULTY THINKING ABOUT SUCH MATTERS, not simply because the ethical and legal issues are so complex but because we have become accustomed to thinking of the law in essentially individualistic terms. The law defines *my* rights, punishes *his* behavior, and is applied by *that* officer because of *this* harm. We assume, in thinking this way, that what is good for the individual will be good for the community, and what doesn't matter when it happens to one person won't matter if it happens to many. Ordinarily, those are plausible assumptions. But in cases where behavior that is tolerable to one person is intolerable to many others, the reactions of the others—fear, withdrawal, flight—may ultimately make matters worse for everyone, including the individual who first professed his indifference.

It may be their greater sensitivity to communal as opposed to individual needs that helps explain why the residents of small communities are more satisfied with their police than are the residents of similar neighborhoods in big cities. Elinor Ostrom and her co-workers at Indiana University compared the perception of police services in two poor, all-black Illinois towns—Phoenix and East Chicago Heights—with those of three comparable all-black neighborhoods in Chicago. The level of criminal victimization and the quality of police-community relations appeared to be about the same in the towns and the Chicago neighborhoods. But the citizens living in their own villages were much more likely than those living in the Chicago neighborhoods to say that they do not stay at home for fear of crime, to agree that the local police have “the right to take any action necessary” to deal with problems, and to agree that the police “look out for the needs of the average citizen.” It is possible that the residents and the police of the small towns saw themselves as engaged in a collaborative effort to maintain a certain standard of communal life, whereas those of the big city felt themselves to be simply requesting and supplying particular services on an individual basis.

If this is true, how should a wise police chief deploy his meager forces? The first answer is that nobody knows for certain, and the most prudent course of action would be to try further variations on the Newark experiment, to see more precisely what works in what kinds of neighborhoods. The second answer is also a hedge—many aspects of order-maintenance in neighborhoods can probably best be handled in ways that involve the police minimally, if at all. A busy, bustling shopping center and a quiet, well-tended suburb may need almost no visible police presence. In both cases, the ratio of respectable to disreputable people is ordinarily so high as to make informal social control effective.

Even in areas that are in jeopardy from disorderly elements, citizen action without substantial police involvement may be sufficient. Meetings between teenagers who like to hang out on a particular corner and adults who want to use that corner might well lead to an amicable agreement on a set of rules about how many people can be allowed to congregate, where, and when.

Where no understanding is possible—or if possible, not observed—citizen patrols may be a sufficient response. There are two traditions of communal involvement in maintaining order. One, that of the “community watchmen,” is as old as the first settlement of the New World. Until well into the nineteenth century, volunteer watchmen, not policemen, patrolled their communities to keep order. They did so, by and large, without taking the law into their own hands—without, that is, punishing persons or using force. Their presence deterred disorder or alerted the community to disorder that could not be deterred. There are hundreds of such efforts today in communities all across the nation. Perhaps the best known is that of the Guardian Angels, a group of unarmed young persons in distinctive berets and T-shirts, who first came to public attention when they began patrolling the New York City subways but who claim now to have chapters in more than thirty American cities. Unfortunately, we have little information about the effect of these groups on crime. It is possible, however, that whatever their effect on crime, citizens find their presence reassuring, and that they thus contribute to maintaining a sense of order and civility.

The second tradition is that of the “vigilante.” Rarely a feature of the settled communities of the East, it was primarily to be found in those frontier towns that grew up in advance of the reach of government. More than 350 vigilante groups are known to have existed; their distinctive feature was that their members did take the law into their own hands, by acting as judge, jury, and often executioner as well as policeman. Today, the vigilante movement is conspicuous by its rarity, despite the great fear expressed by citizens that the older cities are becoming “urban frontiers.” But some community-watchmen groups have skirted the line, and others may cross it in the future. An ambiguous case, reported in *The Wall Street Journal*, involved a citizens' patrol in the Silver Lake area of Belleville, New Jersey. A leader told the reporter, “We look for outsiders.” If a few teenagers from outside the neighborhood enter it, “we ask them their business,” he said. “If they say they're going down the street to see Mrs. Jones, fine, we let them pass. But then we follow them down the block to make sure they're really going to see Mrs. Jones.”

THOUGH CITIZENS CAN DO A GREAT DEAL, THE POLICE are plainly the key to order-maintenance. For one thing, many communities, such as the Robert Taylor Homes, cannot do the job by themselves. For another, no citizen in a neighborhood, even an organized one, is like-

ly to feel the sense of responsibility that wearing a badge confers. Psychologists have done many studies on why people fail to go to the aid of persons being attacked or seeking help, and they have learned that the cause is not "apathy" or "selfishness" but the absence of some plausible grounds for feeling that one must personally accept responsibility. Ironically, avoiding responsibility is easier when a lot of people are standing about. On streets and in public places, where order is so important, many people are likely to be "around," a fact that reduces the chance of any one person acting as the agent of the community. The police officer's uniform singles him out as a person who must accept responsibility if asked. In addition, officers, more easily than their fellow citizens, can be expected to distinguish between what is necessary to protect the safety of the street and what merely protects its ethnic purity.

But the police forces of America are losing, not gaining, members. Some cities have suffered substantial cuts in the number of officers available for duty. These cuts are not likely to be reversed in the near future. Therefore, each department must assign its existing officers with great care. Some neighborhoods are so demoralized and crime-ridden as to make foot patrol useless; the best the police can do with limited resources is respond to the enormous number of calls for service. Other neighborhoods are so stable and serene as to make foot patrol unnecessary. The key is to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point—where the public order is deteriorating but not unreclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must quickly be fixed if all are not to be shattered.

Most police departments do not have ways of systematically identifying such areas and assigning officers to them. Officers are assigned on the basis of crime rates (meaning that marginally threatened areas are often stripped so that police can investigate crimes in areas where the situation is hopeless) or on the basis of calls for service (despite the fact that most citizens do not call the police when they are merely frightened or annoyed). To allocate patrol wisely, the department must look at the neighborhoods and decide, from first-hand evidence, where an additional officer will make the greatest difference in promoting a sense of safety.

One way to stretch limited police resources is being tried in some public-housing projects. Tenant organizations hire off-duty police officers for patrol work in their buildings. The costs are not high (at least not per resident), the off-


cer likes the additional income, and the residents feel safer. Such arrangements are probably more successful than hiring private watchmen, and the Newark experiment helps us understand why. A private security guard may deter crime or misconduct by his presence, and he may go to the aid of persons needing help, but he may well not intervene—that is, control or drive away—someone challenging community standards. Being a sworn officer—a "real cop"—seems to give one the confidence, the sense of duty, and the aura of authority necessary to perform this difficult task.

Patrol officers might be encouraged to go to and from duty stations on public transportation and, while on the bus or subway car, enforce rules about smoking, drinking, disorderly conduct, and the like. The enforcement need involve nothing more than ejecting the offender (the offense, after all, is not one with which a booking officer or a judge wishes to be bothered). Perhaps the random but relentless maintenance of standards on buses would lead to conditions on buses that approximate the level of civility we now take for granted on airplanes.

But the most important requirement is to think that to maintain order in precarious situations is a vital job. The police know this is one of their functions, and they also believe, correctly, that it cannot be done to the exclusion of criminal investigation and responding to calls. We may have encouraged them to suppose, however, on the basis of our oft-repeated concerns about serious, violent crime, that they will be judged exclusively on their capacity as crime-fighters. To the extent that this is the case, police administrators will continue to concentrate police personnel in the highest-crime areas (though not necessarily in the areas most vulnerable to criminal invasion), emphasize their training in the law and criminal apprehension (and not their training in managing street life), and join too quickly in campaigns to decriminalize "harmless" behavior (though public drunkenness, street prostitution, and pornographic displays can destroy a community more quickly than any team of professional burglars).

Above all, we must return to our long-abandoned view that the police ought to protect communities as well as individuals. Our crime statistics and victimization surveys measure individual losses, but they do not measure communal losses. Just as physicians now recognize the importance of fostering health rather than simply treating illness, so the police—and the rest of us—ought to recognize the importance of maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows. □

SPO concept



Sometimes "fixing broken windows" does more to reduce crime than conventional "incident-oriented" policing

MAKING NEIGHBORHOODS SAFE



BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING

NEW BRIARFIELD APARTMENTS IS AN OLD, RUN-down collection of wooden buildings constructed in 1942 as temporary housing for shipyard workers in Newport News, Virginia. By the mid-1980s it was widely regarded as the worst housing project in the city. Many of its vacant units provided hiding places for drug users. It had the highest burglary rate in Newport News; nearly a quarter of its apartments were broken into at least once a year.

For decades the police had wearily answered calls for assistance and had investigated crimes in New Briarfield. Not much came of this police attentiveness—the buildings went on deteriorating, the burglaries went on occurring, the residents went on living in terror. Then, in 1984, Detective Tony Duke, assigned to a newly created police task force, decided to interview the residents of New



Briarfield about their problems. Not surprisingly, he found that they were worried about the burglaries—but they were just as concerned about the physical deterioration of the project. Rather than investigating only the burglaries, Duke spent some of his time investigating the *buildings*. Soon he learned that many city agencies—the fire department, the public-works department, the housing department—regarded New Briarfield as a major headache. He also discovered that its owners were in default on a federal loan and that foreclosure was imminent.

The report he wrote to Darrel Stephens, then the police chief, led Stephens to recommend to the city manager that New Briarfield be demolished and its tenants relocated. The city manager agreed. Meanwhile, Barry Haddix, the patrol officer assigned to the area, began working with members of other city agencies to fix up the project, pend-



ILLUSTRATIONS BY ROSALIND IVENS

FEBRUARY 1989






ing its eventual replacement. Trash was carted away, abandoned cars were removed, potholes were filled in, the streets were swept. According to a study recently done by John E. Eck and William Spelman, of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the burglary rate dropped by 35 percent after Duke and Haddix began their work.

Stephens, now the executive director of PERF, tells the story of the New Briarfield project as an example of "problem-oriented policing," a concept developed by Professor Herman Goldstein, of the University of Wisconsin Law School, and sometimes also called community-oriented policing. The conventional police strategy is "incident-oriented"—a citizen calls to report an incident, such as a burglary, and the police respond by recording information relevant to the crime and then trying to solve it. Obviously, when a crime occurs, the victim is entitled to a rapid, effective police response. But if responding to incidents is all that the police do, the community problems that cause or explain many of these incidents will never be addressed, and so the incidents will continue and their number will perhaps increase.

This will happen for two reasons. One is that a lot of serious crime is adventitious, not the result of inexorable social forces or personal failings. A rash of burglaries may occur because drug users have found a back alley or an abandoned building in which to hang out. In their spare time, and in order to get money to buy drugs, they steal

from their neighbors. If the back alleys are cleaned up and the abandoned buildings torn down, the drug users will go away. They may even use fewer drugs, because they will have difficulty finding convenient dealers and soft burglary targets. By the same token, a neglected neighborhood may become the turf of a youth gang, whose members commit more crimes together in a group than they would if they were acting alone. If the gang is broken up, former members will still commit some crimes but probably not as many as before.

Most crime in most neighborhoods is local: the offenders live near their victims. Because of this, one should not assume that changing the environmental conditions conducive to crime in one area will displace the crime to other areas. For example, when the New York City police commissioner, Ben Ward, ordered Operation Pressure Point, a crackdown on drug dealing on the Lower East Side, dealing and the criminality associated with it were reduced in that neighborhood and apparently did not immediately reappear in other, contiguous neighborhoods. Suburban customers of the local drug dealers were frightened away by the sight of dozens of police officers on the streets where these customers had once shopped openly for drugs. They could not—at least not right away—find another neighborhood in which to buy drugs as easily as they once had on the Lower East Side. At the same time, the local population included some people who were willing to



aid and abet the drug dealers. When the police presence made drug dealing unattractive, the dealers could not—again, at least not for the time being—find another neighborhood that provided an equivalent social infrastructure.

The second reason that incident-oriented police work fails to discourage neighborhood crime is that law-abiding citizens who are afraid to go out onto streets filled with graffiti, winos, and loitering youths yield control of these streets to people who are not frightened by these signs of urban decay. Those not frightened turn out to be the same people who created the problem in the first place. Law-abiding citizens, already fearful, see things occurring that make them even more fearful. A vicious cycle begins of fear-induced behavior increasing the sources of that fear.

A Los Angeles police sergeant put it this way: "When people in this district see that a gang has spray-painted its initials on all the stop signs, they decide that the gang, not the people or the police, controls the streets. When they discover that the Department of Transportation needs three months to replace the stop signs, they decide that the city isn't as powerful as the gang. These people want us to help them take back the streets." Painting gang symbols on a stop sign or a storefront is not, by itself, a serious crime. As an incident, it is trivial. But as the symptom of a problem, it is very serious.



IN AN EARLIER ARTICLE IN *THE ATLANTIC* (MARCH, 1982) we called this the problem of "broken windows": If the first broken window in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken. Soon the building will have no windows. Likewise, when disorderly behavior—say, rude remarks by loitering youths—is left unchallenged, the signal given is that no one cares. The disorder escalates, possibly to serious crime.

The sort of police work practiced in Newport News is an effort to fix the broken windows. Similar projects are under way in cities all over America. This pattern constitutes the beginnings of the most significant redefinition of police work in the past half century. For example:

- When a gunfight occurred at Garden Village, a low-income housing project near Baltimore, the Baltimore County police responded by investigating both the shooting and the housing project. Chief Cornelius Behan directed the officers in his Community Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit to find out what could be done to

alleviate the fears of the project residents and the tensions that led to the shooting. COPE officers worked with members of other agencies to upgrade street lighting in the area, trim shrubbery, install door locks, repair the roads and alleys, and get money to build a playground. With police guidance, the tenants organized. At the same time, high-visibility patrols were started and gang members were questioned. When both a suspect in the shooting and a particularly troublesome parole violator were arrested, gang tensions eased. Crime rates dropped. In bringing about this change, the police dealt with eleven different public agencies.

- When local merchants in a New York City neighborhood complained to the police about homeless persons who created a mess on the streets and whose presence frightened away customers, the officer who responded did not roust the vagrants but instead suggested that the merchants hire them to clean the streets in front of their stores every morning. The merchants agreed, and now the streets are clean all day and the customers find the stores more attractive.

- When people in a Los Angeles neighborhood complained to the police about graffiti on walls and gang symbols on stop signs, officers assigned to the Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire station did more than just try to catch the gang youths who were wielding the spray cans; they also organized citizens' groups and Boy Scouts to paint over the graffiti as fast as they were put up.

- When residents of a Houston neighborhood became fearful about crime in their area, the police not only redoubled their efforts to solve the burglaries and thefts but also assigned some officers to talk with the citizens in their homes. During a nine-month period the officers visited more than a third of all the dwelling units in the area, introduced themselves, asked about any neighborhood problems, and left their business cards. When Antony Pate and Mary Ann Wycoff, researchers at the Police Foundation, evaluated the project, they found that the people in this area, unlike others living in a similar area where no citizen-contact project occurred, felt that social disorder had decreased and that the neighborhood had become a better place to live. Moreover, and quite unexpectedly, the amount of property crime was noticeably reduced.

These are all examples of community-oriented policing, whose current popularity among police chiefs is as great as the ambiguity of the idea. In a sense, the police have always been community-oriented. Every police officer knows that most crimes don't get solved if victims and witnesses do not cooperate. One way to encourage that cooperation is to cultivate the good will of both victims and witnesses. Similarly, police-citizen tensions, over racial incidents or allegations of brutality or hostility, can often be allayed, and sometimes prevented, if police officers stay in close touch with community groups. Accordingly, most departments have at least one community-relations officer,

who arranges meetings between officers and citizens' groups in church basements and other neutral locales.

But these commonplace features of police work are additions, and rarely alter the traditional work of most patrol officers and detectives: responding to radio calls about specific incidents. The focus on incidents works against a focus on problems. If Detective Tony Duke had focused only on incidents in New Briarfield, he would still be investigating burglaries in that housing project; meanwhile, the community-relations officer would be telling outraged residents that the police were doing all they could and urging people to call in any useful leads. If a tenant at one of those meetings had complained about stopped-up drains, rotting floorboards, and abandoned refrigerators, the community-relations officer would have patiently explained that these were not "police matters."

And of course, they are not. They are the responsibility of the landlord, the tenants themselves, and city agencies other than the police. But landlords are sometimes indifferent, tenants rarely have the resources to make needed repairs, and other city agencies do not have a twenty-four-hour emergency service. Like it or not, the police are about the only city agency that makes house calls around the clock. And like it or not, the public defines broadly what it thinks of as public order, and holds the police responsible for maintaining order.

Community-oriented policing means changing the daily work of the police to include investigating problems as well as incidents. It means defining as a problem whatever a significant body of public opinion regards as a threat to community order. It means working with the good guys, and not just against the bad guys.

The link between incidents and problems can sometimes be measured. The police know from experience what research by Glenn Pierce, in Boston, and Lawrence Sherman, in Minneapolis, has established: fewer than 10 percent of the addresses from which the police receive calls account for more than 60 percent of those calls. Many of the calls involve domestic disputes. If each call is treated as a separate incident with neither a history nor a future, then each dispute will be handled by police officers anxious to pacify the complainants and get back on patrol as quickly as possible. All too often, however, the disputants move beyond shouting insults or throwing crockery at each other. A knife or a gun may be produced, and somebody may die.

A very large proportion of all killings occur in these domestic settings. A study of domestic homicides in Kansas City showed that in eight out of ten cases the police had been called to the incident address at least once before; in half the cases they had been called *five times* or more. The police are familiar with this pattern, and they have learned

best to respond to it. An experiment in Minneapolis, conducted by the Police Foundation, showed that men who were arrested after assaulting their spouses were much less likely to commit new assaults than those who were merely pacified or asked to leave the house for a few

hours. Research is now under way in other cities to test this finding. Arrest may prove always to be the best disposition, or we may learn that some kind of intervention by a social agency also helps. What is indisputable is that a domestic fight—like many other events to which the police respond—is less an "incident" than a problem likely to have serious, long-term consequences.

Another such problem, familiar to New Yorkers, is graffiti on subway cars. What to some aesthetes is folk art is to most people a sign that an important public place is no longer under public control. If graffiti painters can attack cars with impunity, then muggers may feel they can attack the people in those cars with equal impunity. When we first wrote in these pages about the problem of broken windows, we dwelt on the graffiti problem as an example of a minor crime creating a major crisis.

The police seemed powerless to do much about it. They could arrest youths with cans of spray paint, but for every one arrested ten more went undetected, and of those arrested, few were punished. The New York Transit Authority, led by its chairman, Robert Kiley, and its president, David Gunn, decided that graffiti-free cars were a major management goal. New, easier-to-clean cars were bought. More important, key people in the Authority were held accountable for cleaning the cars and keeping them clean. Whereas in the early 1980s two out of every three cars were covered with graffiti, today fewer than one in six is. The Transit Police have played their part by arresting those who paint the cars, but they have been more successful at keeping cars from being defaced in the first place than they were at chasing people who were spraying already defaced ones.



WHILE THE PHRASE "COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING" comes easily to the lips of police administrators, redefining the police mission is more difficult. To help the police become accustomed to fixing broken windows as well as arresting window-breakers requires doing things that are very hard for many administrators to do.

Authority over at least some patrol officers must be decentralized, so that they have a good deal of freedom to manage their time (including their paid overtime). This implies freeing them at least partly from the tyranny of the radio call. It means giving them a broad range of responsibilities: to find and understand the problems that create disorder and crime, and to deal with other public and private agencies that can help cope with these problems. It

means assigning them to a neighborhood and leaving them there for an extended period of time. It means backing them up with department support and resources.

The reason these are not easy things for police chiefs to do is not simply that chiefs are slaves to tradition, though some impatient advocates of community-oriented policing like to say so. Consider for a moment how all these changes might sound to an experienced and intelligent police executive who must defend his department against media criticisms of officer misconduct, political pressure to cut budgets, and interest-group demands for more police protection everywhere. With decentralized authority, no one will know precisely how patrol officers spend their time. Moreover, decentralized authority means that patrol officers will spend time on things like schmoozing with citizens, instead of on quantifiable tasks like issuing tickets, making arrests, and clearing cases.

Making the community-oriented officers generalists means letting them deal with other city agencies, a responsibility for which few officers are well trained and which cuts across sensitive questions of turf and public expectations.

If officers are left in a neighborhood, some of them may start taking money from the dope dealers and after-hours joints. To prevent that, officers are frequently moved

around. Moreover, the best people are usually kept in the detective squad that handles the really big cases. Few police executives want their best people settling into a neighborhood, walking around the bus stops and shopping malls.

The enthusiasts for community-oriented policing have answers for all these concerns, but sometimes in their zeal they forget that they are contending with more than mere bureaucratic foot-dragging—that the problems are real and require thoughtful solutions. Many police executives get in trouble not because the crime rate goes up but because cops are accused of graft, brutality, laziness, incivility, or indifference.

In short, police management is driven more by the constraints on the job than by the goals of the job. You cannot cope with those constraints without understanding them. This may be why some of the biggest changes toward community-oriented policing have occurred in cities where a new chief has come in from the outside with a mandate to shake up a moribund department. Lee Brown brought a community orientation to the Houston Police Department under precisely those circumstances—the reputation of the department was so bad that almost any change would have been regarded as an improvement.

What can we say to the worried police chief who is al-

ready running a pretty good department? Start with corruption: For decades police executives and reformers have believed that in order to prevent corruption, you have to centralize control over personnel and discourage intimacy between police officers and citizens. Maybe. But the price one pays for this is very high. For example, many neighborhoods are being destroyed by drug dealers, who hang out on every street corner. The best way to sweep them off the streets is to have patrol officers arrest them for selling drugs and intimidate their customers by parking police cars right next to suspected drug outlets. But some police chiefs forbid their patrol officers to work drug cases, for fear they will be corrupted. When the citizens in these cities see police cars drive past scenes of open drug dealing, they assume the police have been paid off. Efforts to prevent corruption have produced the appearance of corruption.


Police Commissioner Ben Ward, in New York, decided that the price of this kind of anti-corruption strategy was too high. His Operation Pressure Point put scores of police officers on the streets to break up the drug-dealing bazaar. Police corruption is no laughing matter, especially in New York, but some chiefs now believe that it will have to be fought in ways that do not require police officers to avoid contact with people.

Consider the problem of getting police resources and managing political pressures: resources can be justified with statistics, but statistics often become ends in themselves. One police captain we interviewed said that his department was preoccupied with "stacking widgets and counting beans." He asked his superior for permission to take officers out of radio cars and have them work on community problems. The superior agreed but warned that he would be watching to see what happened to "the stats." In the short run the stats—for example, calls answered, average response time—were likely to get worse, but if community problems were solved, they would get better as citizens had fewer incidents to report. The captain worried, however, that he would not be given enough time to achieve this and that the bean counters would cut off his program.

A better way to justify getting resources from the city is to stimulate popular demand for resources devoted to problem-solving. Properly handled, community-oriented policing does generate support for the department. When Newark police officers, under orders from Hubert Williams, then the police director, began stopping city buses and boarding them to enforce city ordinances against smoking, drinking, gambling, and playing loud music, the bus patrons often applauded. When Los Angeles police officers supervised the hauling away of abandoned cars, onlookers applauded. Later, when some of the officers had their time available for problem-solving work cut back, several hundred citizens attended a meeting to complain.

In Flint, Michigan, patrol officers were taken out of their cars and assigned to foot beats. Robert Trojanowicz,

a professor at Michigan State University, analyzed the results and found big increases in citizen satisfaction and officer morale, and even a significant drop in crime (an earlier foot-patrol project in Newark had produced equivalent reductions in fear but no reductions in crime). Citizen support was not confined to statements made to pollsters, however. Voters in referenda twice approved tax increases to maintain the foot-patrol system, the second time by a two-to-one margin. New Briarfield tenants unquestionably found satisfaction in the role the police played in getting temporary improvements made on their housing project and getting a commitment for its ultimate replacement. Indeed, when a department experiments with a community-oriented project in one precinct, people in other precincts usually want one too.



POLITICIANS, LIKE POLICE CHIEFS, HEAR THESE VIEWS and respond. But they hear other views as well. One widespread political mandate is to keep the tax rate down. Many police departments are already stretched thin by sharp reductions in spending that occurred in the lean years of the 1970s. Putting *one* additional patrol car on the streets around the clock can cost a quarter of a million dollars or more a year.

Change may seem easier when resources are abundant. Ben Ward could start Operation Pressure Point because he had at his disposal a large number of new officers who could be thrown into a crackdown on street-level drug dealing. Things look a bit different in Los Angeles, where no big increases in personnel are on the horizon. As a result, only eight officers are assigned to the problem-solving Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire district—an economically and ethnically diverse area of nearly 300,000 residents.

But change does not necessarily require more resources, and the availability of new resources is no guarantee that change will be attempted. One temptation is to try to sell the public on the need for more policemen and decide later how to use them. Usually when that script is followed, either the public turns down the spending increase or the extra personnel are dumped into what one LAPD captain calls the "black hole" of existing commitments, leaving no trace and producing no effects.

What may have an effect is how the police are deployed and managed. An experiment jointly conducted by the Washington, D.C., Police Department and the Police Foundation showed that if a few experienced officers con-

concentrate on known repeat offenders, the number of serious offenders taken off the streets grows substantially. The Flint and Newark experiences suggest that foot patrols in certain kinds of communities (but not all) can reduce fear. In Houston problem-oriented tactics seem clearly to have heightened a sense of citizen security.

The problem of interagency cooperation may, in the long run, be the most difficult of all. The police can bring problems to the attention of other city agencies, but the system is not always organized to respond. In his book *Neighborhood Services*, John Mudd calls it the "rat problem": "If a rat is found in an apartment, it is a housing inspection responsibility; if it runs into a restaurant, the health department has jurisdiction; if it goes outside and dies in an alley, public works takes over." A police officer who takes public complaints about rats seriously will go crazy trying to figure out what agency in the city has responsibility for rat control and then inducing it to kill the rats.

Matters are almost as bad if the public is complaining about abandoned houses or school-age children who are not in school. The housing department may prefer to concentrate on enforcing the housing code rather than go through the costly and time-consuming process of getting an abandoned house torn down. The school department may have expelled the truant children for making life miserable for the teachers and the other students; the last thing it wants is for the police to tell the school to take the kids back.

All city and county agencies have their own priorities and face their own pressures. Forcing them to cooperate by knocking heads together at the top rarely works; what department heads promise the mayor they will do may bear little relationship to what their rank-and-file employees actually do. From his experiences in New York City government Mudd discovered that if you want agencies to cooperate in solving neighborhood problems, you have to get the neighborhood-level supervisors from each agency together in a "district cabinet" that meets regularly and addresses common concerns. This is not an easy task (for one thing, police district lines often do not match the district boundaries of the school, housing, traffic, and public-works departments), but where it has been tried it has made solving the "rat problem" a lot easier. For example, Mudd reports, such interagency issues as park safety and refuse-laden vacant lots got handled more effectively when the field supervisors met to talk about them than when memos went up the chain of command of one agency and then down the chain of command of another.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF Neighborhood Watch programs may help reduce crime, but we cannot be certain. In particular, we do not know what kinds of communities are most likely to benefit from such programs. A Police Foundation study in Minneapolis found that getting effective community orga-

nizations started in the most troubled neighborhood very difficult. The costs and benefits of having patrol officers and sergeants influence the delivery of services from other city agencies has never been fully assessed. No amount of wresting control of a neighborhood from a street gang has yet been proved effective.

And even if these questions are answered, a police department may still have difficulty accommodating two very different working cultures: the patrol officers and detectives who handle major crimes (murders, rapes, and robberies) and the cops who work on community problems and the seemingly minor incidents they generate. In every department we visited, some of the incident-oriented officers spoke disparagingly of the problem-oriented officers as "social workers," and some of the latter responded by calling the former "ghetto blasters." If a community-service officer seems to get too close to the community, he or she may be accused of "going native." The tension between the two cultures is heightened by the fact that in many departments becoming a detective is regarded as a major promotion, and detectives are often selected from among those officers who have the best record in making major arrests—in other words, from the ranks of the incident-oriented. But this pattern need not be permanent. Promotion tracks can be changed so that a patrol officer especially one working on community problems, is no longer regarded as somebody who "hasn't made detective." Moreover, some police executives now believe that splitting the patrol force into two units—one oriented toward incidents, the other to problems—is unwise. They are now searching for ways to give all patrol officers the time and resources for problem-solving activities.

Because of the gaps in our knowledge about both the results and the difficulties of community-oriented policing, no chief should be urged to accept, uncritically, the community-oriented model. But the traditional model of police professionalism—devoting resources to quick radio-car response to calls about specific crime incidents—makes little sense at a time when the principal threats to public order and safety come from *collective*, not individual, sources, and from *problems*, not incidents: from well-organized gangs and drug traffickers, from uncared-for legions of the homeless, from boisterous teenagers taking advantage of their newfound freedom and affluence in congested urban settings.

Even if community-oriented policing does not produce the dramatic gains that some of its more ardent advocates expect, it has indisputably produced one that the officers who have been involved in it immediately acknowledge: it has changed their perceptions of the community. Officer Robin Kirk, of the Houston Police Department, had to be talked into becoming part of a neighborhood fear-reduction project. Once in it, he was converted. In his words, "Traditionally, police officers after about three years get to thinking that everybody's a loser. That's the only people you're dealing with. In community policing you're dealing with the good citizens, helping them solve problems." □

Operation Pressure Point: The Disruption of Street-Level Drug Trade on New York's Lower East Side

by *L. Zimmer**

INTRODUCTION

By the early 1980's open drug dealing on some city streets had become a fact of urban life (Beschner and Brower, 1985; Hanson, 1985), but on New York's Lower East Side the commerce had become so conspicuous that the area had gained a local reputation as "a drug supermarket" and a national reputation as "the most open heroin market in the nation." Police videotapes of some blocks showed long lines of double-parked cars, hundreds of people milling around, waiting to purchase heroin and cocaine, sellers shouting out the "brand names" and prices of their drugs, and others openly advertising "works" – hypodermic needles – guaranteed clean for two or three dollars. Enterprising young men and women sometimes searched the crowd, looking for novice customers who might be willing to pay a small fee to have someone else "score" for them. When long lines formed behind dealers, waiting buyers at the end of the line were sometimes offered "express service," upon payment of a "service charge." On some blocks, vendors set up their carts, selling hot dogs and sodas to the crowd; portable radios competed with the shouting. The unaware might, for a moment, have mistaken the scene for a block party or street festival.

This paper describes and analyzes the efforts of the New York City Police Department to disrupt this blatant street-level drug trafficking through an innovative plan called Operation Pressure Point (OPP). Data for this analysis were obtained through an examination of police reports and documents, as an observer on patrol with OPP forces, and in interviews with community members, drug users, drug treatment personnel, police administrators, and rank-and-file officers from the Lower East Side.

Published by
The Center for Research in Crime and Justice
New York University School of Law
40 Washington Square South
New York, N.Y. 10012

Director: James B. Jacobs

Copies may be obtained from the Center.

Expansion of Street-Level Drug Trade on the Lower East Side

The Lower East Side of Manhattan has had a long history as a "port of entry" neighborhood, housing the steady stream of immigrants coming into this country during the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was once the location of numerous poor, but fairly stable, ethnic communities. By the 1980s, however, the area had undergone several decades of decay and decline, as the housing stock continued to deteriorate and second and third generation Americans moved to more middle class communities. As the local population declined, businesses left the area and entire blocks of old tenements were destroyed, burned out, or simply abandoned, providing an ideal location for expansion of a drug trade that had been there for a long time. Empty buildings were turned into drug warehouses, storefront selling operations, and shooting galleries. Empty streets meant that there would be few people to complain about the increased trafficking in drugs.

At the same time that the drug traffic was expanding on the Lower East Side, police attention to such transactions was declining, primarily because of budget cutbacks and an overall decline in police personnel (Smith, 1984). Between 1976 and 1984 there was a 29 percent decrease in uniformed officers in New York City as a whole, from approximately 24,000 to about 17,000. The Lower East Side precincts² fared even worse, going from 733 officers to 492 – a decrease of 33 percent.³ During this same period, the overall crime rate rose substantially,⁴ and in an effort to deploy personnel in response to serious crime, the police gave citizen complaints of drug dealing on the streets a low priority, not only on the Lower East Side but elsewhere in the city as well.⁵ The Narcotics Division, which concerns itself only with drug enforcement, also lost personnel during this period and, after 1970, began to focus most of its resources on long-term investigations of the high-level distribution system rather than street-level sales (Belenko, 1981). After 1970, a year in which the New York City police made over 50,000 drug-related arrests, the number of arrests declined sharply, averaging, for the years 1973 and 1980, between 17,000 and 18,000 (Belenko, 1981). With this waning risk of arrest and prosecution, street-level dealers were able to enlarge their operations, and expanded drug dealing undermined police effectiveness still further. Patrol forces made occasional one-day "sweeps" through the area, making large numbers of arrests, but even then any individual's chance of arrest remained small and drug traffic would be only briefly interrupted.

The inability of the police to enforce the law made the Lower East Side particularly attractive to drug buyers. As in other poor, urban neighborhoods where heroin use had become prevalent after World War II, there was already a substantial population of drug users (Chen et al., 1964; Waldorf, 1973; Johnson and Lipton, 1984). In the 1970s, as the area lost population and began

Side, attracted by low rents, or even the "opportunity" to live drug-free in one of the growing number of abandoned apartment buildings. This resident user population offered a ready market for the drug sellers, and provided the supply of street-level workers necessary for expansion of the drug trade.

The Lower East Side also became an attractive market for drug consumers who lived outside the area. The neighborhood had a reputation for particularly high quality drugs, with higher potency than those available elsewhere in the city (Goldstein et al., 1984). Small time dealers could buy drugs on the Lower East Side and resell them at a profit in another district. Individual drug users from other parts of the city and from neighboring states also came to the Lower East Side because it was easily accessible and anonymous. Numerous bridges and tunnels connect Lower Manhattan with Brooklyn, Long Island, Staten Island, and New Jersey, making it easy to enter and exit. And because of its ethnic mix, the Lower East Side may have been particularly attractive to out-of-town white buyers who were reluctant to frequent the open drug markets in predominantly black areas like Harlem.

For a variety of reasons, then, the Lower East Side was, by the early 1980s, ripe for a rapid expansion of the drug trade. Dealers became more and more blatant, gradually spreading into occupied as well as abandoned blocks, and the area's reputation for being a buyer's paradise – offering little threat of arrest and no need for an established connection – rapidly grew. The situation was clearly beyond the capacity of the regular precinct forces to solve, and even the permanent assignment of several Special Narcotic Enforcement Units (SNEUs) to the Lower East Side precincts in 1982 was "too little, too late." Many officers no doubt felt the frustration and resignation voiced by one who had spent nearly thirty years policing the Lower East Side:

There was nothing we could do. There were some blocks in the precinct that I avoided as much as possible because it was embarrassing to be a police officer and see the law broken in front of your eyes and know there was nothing you could do.⁶

The people involved in the drug scene appreciated the impotence of the police. A drug user who occasionally worked on the streets reported:

There was nothing the police could do. There were more of us than there were of them and for every seller they arrested, there were ten people waiting to take his place on the street. The police were more of a nuisance than anything. I'd think "like, why do they bother coming out here at all?"

Many people in the community had also given up hope that their streets could be recaptured. One long-time resident said:

I had finally stopped complaining to the police. Every time I called, they said they'd send a car, but I'd seldom see one. Many of my neighbors had moved out, but I had no place to go. There was no choice but to live with it, day after day and stay indoors as much as possible.


At the same time, however, a number of citizen groups and special task forces formed on the Lower East Side and refused to accept the situation as hopeless. In 1983, one such group began to hold monthly candlelight vigils on some of the most drug-infested streetcorners; they also organized several protest marches, including one that culminated at the mayor's residence. Eventually, the media was aroused, and New York newspapers and local television stations featured a series of exposes. The *New York Daily News*, for example, ran a cover story entitled "Is This Any Place for Children?" with a picture of day care workers and children walking past junkies.⁷ Several local politicians, who had for years been fielding the complaints of Lower East Side residents, also voiced outrage, although some residents cynically attributed the politicians' response to pressure being generated by real estate interests as certain Lower East Side blocks, after decades of decline, were beginning to show the early signs of gentrification.⁸

Early in 1984, the Police Department responded to these various community and political pressures by launching operation Pressure Point (OPP), a massive police initiative involving the deployment of over 240 additional officers into some sections of the Lower East Side (see Figure 1) with the sole goal of disrupting the street-level drug trade. OPP was the brainchild of the new police commissioner, Benjamin Ward, who came into office particularly concerned about the problem of illegal drugs and committed to implementing a community-oriented approach to certain crime problems.⁹ OPP fit well with Ward's agenda and gave him a highly visible and newsworthy project with which to begin his administration.

The Operation

OPP forces moved into the Lower East Side with strength and confidence, quickly establishing an imposing police presence in the community. The team was made up primarily of uniformed patrol officers, many just out of the police academy, who swept through the streets, mostly on foot, dispersing the crowds, giving out parking tickets, conducting searches, and making arrests. Extra officers assigned from the Housing Police and the Transit Police conducted similar operations on the grounds of the public housing projects and in the subway stations. In the first few weeks, mounted police rode through and cleared the parks, and the canine unit was used to empty out the abandoned buildings which had been turned into drug warehouses and shooting galleries. The

FIGURE 1 .
MANHATTAN



Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) came in to conduct hidden surveillance operations and "buy and bust" arrests. Police helicopters sometimes hovered overhead, watching the rooftops for possible counterattacks against the police.

Operation Pressure Point substantially increased the risk of arrest for the drug buyers and sellers who previously had been almost immune. In the first month, the police made over 2,000 drug-related arrests, an average of about 67 per day. After five months, the arrest total rose to 7,000 and after seventeen months, to almost 14,000. Operation Pressure Point also sought severe sentences for those apprehended. The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York agreed to process all arrests made one day each week through the federal court system, where penalties for drug offenses are more severe than those of New York State and where judges have a reputation for being tougher than state court judges. The federal courts did, in fact, hand out substantially harsher penalties.¹⁰ Although it is difficult to quantify the contribution of these sentences to OPP's success, the police believe the rumors of "federal day" produced a notable decrease in the volume of drug traffic.

The Police department also raised the cost of Pressure Point arrests by eliminating the Desk Appearance Ticket (DAT) system that ordinarily allows many persons charged with misdemeanors to be immediately released from custody merely with notice of their court appearance date. A DAT arrest imposes no immediate cost on the offender and may result in no punishment if the offender fails to appear.¹¹ The elimination of DATs subjected all Pressure Point arrestees to the full arrest, booking, and arraignment process so that in the first few months of mass arrests and backed-up courts, arrestees often had to spend several days in jail before being released after arraignment. Every Pressure Point arrest thus represented not only a first stage in the criminal process, but also an "immediate intervention" (Goldstein, 1977); every arrestee was subjected to some sanction, including those against whom drug charges were later dropped and even those few who were acquitted.

Even when unable to make arrests, OPP forces tried to discourage involvement in the drug trade by acting as what Sagarin and McNamara (1972) call a "judicial punitive body." This is a euphemism for harassing suspicious people in "known drug areas" by stopping them, questioning them, perhaps searching them, and telling them to "move on."¹² From the police perspective, the advantage of this type of intervention is that it does not take officers off the street. The cost to the suspect is substantially less than with an arrest but a greater number of interventions per officer becomes possible.¹³

This harassment strategy became especially useful to the OPP patrol force as the months wore on, not only because manpower was somewhat reduced,¹⁴ but also because street selling became less blatant and less frequent in response

to the earlier efforts. In the early days of Pressure Point, arrests were guaranteed, but buyers and sellers quickly altered their behavior in response to the police threat; thus, the original police tactics became less productive. Buyers, for example, tried to decrease the possibility of arrest by spending less time on the street.

Buying drugs used to be an all-day affair. You'd hang around, shooting the breeze, maybe picking up a little work [in one of the street operations]. Now, I get my drugs and get out of the area as quickly as possible. Nobody 'shoots up' on the block anymore; it's just too dangerous.

Drug sellers also adapted to the police presence by varying the location and time of sales,¹⁵ selling in larger quantities,¹⁶ and employing more helpers. "Steers" began to walk the streets, notifying known buyers of the time and location of the next sale; more "lookouts" appeared, sending warning signals when the police drew near. Sellers appeared on the street for only short periods of time, distributing drugs to buyers who had already paid their money to a second worker. As the whole drug operation adjusted itself to decrease the buyers' and sellers' risk of detection and arrest, Pressure Point patrol officers turned more and more to monitoring the street population, harassing anyone who appeared to be involved in the drug trade, and encouraging the very changes in drug trafficking that made it more difficult for them to make arrests.

The demise of the blatant "drug supermarket" increased the usefulness of undercover surveillance operations aimed at drug sellers who, because they make only brief appearances on the street, are often able to avoid both arrests and harassment by the patrol force. On a surveillance operation, one officer concealed in an observation post, will use binoculars to watch drug transactions taking place and radio a description of buyers (and often where they have put the drugs) to officers waiting in cars just outside the observation area. Several buyers may be arrested as they leave the purchase area before the police move in to arrest the seller. This type of operation can be very effective, but it is difficult to organize because it requires considerable manpower, knowledge of possible sale locations, the cooperation of someone in the community to provide the lookout post, and adequate advance planning. It is also necessary to coordinate with the patrol force to make sure that its members do not disrupt a sale before it takes place. Even then, surveillance operations are not foolproof, and may fail to catch the sophisticated dealer who can decrease the chance of detection by employing lookouts to patrol the surrounding blocks, watch for police cars, and report back, perhaps by walkie-talkie.

Recognizing the limitations of a pure law enforcement strategy for fighting a problem as entrenched as the Lower East Side drug trade, the Police Department supplemented it with community-based programs designed to strengthen

neighborhoods and encourage resident support of the police effort. As part of the Neighborhood Involvement Program, OPP officials met with a number of church and community groups, developing programs to encourage residents to report drug sales on their blocks; this led to the establishment of a special hotline, allowing callers to bypass the centralized reporting system and telephone anonymous tips directly to the Pressure Point office. The program not only sought to improve enforcement (by providing the police with valuable information), but also to involve Lower East Side citizens more directly in the fight against drugs.

The Police Department's Community Affairs Division also became more active on the Lower East Side, adding extra officers to each of the Pressure Point precincts and allowing them to expand their work with local community groups, encouraging the formation of block associations and planning outdoor activities to utilize and "recapture" the public spaces "liberated" by the police. In two of the three Lower East Side precincts, Community Patrol Officer Programs were created, and specially selected officers began to work with residents, business people, and community groups to solve the specific problems of individual blocks and neighborhoods, whether related to drugs or not. Police officials also sought the cooperation of other city agencies, encouraging them to demolish city-owned abandoned buildings being used in the drug trade, improve garbage pickup, sweep the streets, and tow away abandoned cars. By promoting general improvements on the Lower East Side, the police hoped to make the streets more attractive to residents and, thereby, less available to drug traffickers.

Impact of OPP on the Drug Trade and Drug-related Crime on the Lower East Side

The package of law enforcement and community-oriented strategies making up Operation Pressure Point has led not only to changes in how drugs are marketed on the Lower East Side, but also to a noticeable decrease in the volume of drug traffic itself. The exact reason for this decrease can only be guessed. One hypothesis is that OPP reduced demand for drugs, because users were deterred by the police presence. There is no evidence of Pressure Point's putting any additional pressure on New York City's drug treatment facilities¹⁷ but James Q. Wilson (1985) and Mark Moore (1977) both suggest that relatively new (and still unaddicted) drug users are most deterred by raising the costs of "copping." Bruce Johnson's (1984) research suggests that even chronic heroin users vary their daily intake considerably and occasionally are abstinent for day long periods. Thus, at least some portion of the reduced volume might be due to a reduction in the number of people seeking drugs on any given day.

A second possible explanation for the reduced volume of drug buyers on the Lower East Side after OPP is that some portion of the drug traffic moved to

other locations. In fact, within a few months of implementation, OPP was expanded to include some neighboring blocks which had not previously been high-drug areas and the police department created two additional, although smaller, operations (Pressure Point II and Pressure Point III), to attack drug traffic in other parts of the city. Some drug operations reportedly moved out of Manhattan altogether, relocating to other New York City boroughs, New Jersey, and Long Island. Established drug markets in Harlem may also have expanded their operations.¹⁸

The police take the view that they have been very successful in ridding the Lower East Side of "out-of-town" buyers, although their own statistics do not strongly support this claim. In the first five months of Pressure Point, 14.2 percent of arrestees resided outside of New York City; in the following year, the percentage of non-New Yorkers dropped to 11.6, hardly an overwhelming change. However, a visual survey of the drug traffic today, compared with police videotapes of pre-OPP, does reveal a difference in clientele; pre-OPP, many of the buyers were white, and appeared to be middle class - men with briefcases, wearing business suits, and women with babies in back-pack carriers. Today, white faces are scarce; in fact, police on patrol in high-drug areas on the Lower East Side automatically view any white person with suspicion. If white, middle class drug users are still buying their drugs on the Lower East Side they are, at least, not doing it on the streets. Cars with New Jersey license plates, which were double parked along some blocks, are now rarely seen.

If OPP forced some drug operations to move to new locations, this was probably more a result of police pressure on buyers than on sellers. Drug sellers are accustomed to the possibility of arrest, accepting it as a built-in cost of doing business (Luksetich and White, 1982), and even the threat of extraordinarily severe punishments may not deter them. When New York State, for example, increased penalties under the "Rockefeller Drug Laws," it did not reduce the number of drug dealers or the supply of drugs available in the state (U.S. Department of Justice, 1978). In any event, the sentences imposed on drug sellers arrested during the first month of OPP and subsequently convicted were not severe.¹⁹ Of 716 felony sale arrests analyzed by the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, the large majority were settled in Criminal Court with guilty pleas to misdemeanors; only 131 defendants (less than one-fifth) were convicted on felony charges and only 87 persons were sentenced to prison or jail, almost half of them (40 people) for one year or less. Some larger sentences were given out,²⁰ but these data suggest that, in general, the cost of selling drugs (at least in the first month of OPP) may not have been high enough to turn a substantial number of people away from the business. In addition, those who were deterred by the threat of imprisonment (or incapacitated by actual imprisonment) were, in all likelihood, easily replaced. Street-level dealers are a fluid group, made up of drug users who sell to support their own use and local adolescents, anxious to

earn money. Many work the streets only sporadically and are, as one local user/part-time dealer put it, "a dime a dozen." The arrest of even a large number of street dealers might not force a drug operation to move its location. In fact, perhaps the only thing that could force a drug operation to move is a reduction in buyers. If OPP made buyers afraid to buy drugs on the Lower East Side, then at least some number of drug dealers might have been motivated to relocate to areas where buyers feel safer.

The increased threat of arrest under OPP might be expected to have more impact on drug buyers than on sellers and, to some extent, buyers were the main targets of this operation. Nearly half of all arrests have been for misdemeanor possession; another nearly 10 percent for loitering for the purpose of buying drugs. Conviction on these charges does not lead to severe punishment, especially when compared with the sentences meted out for drug sales. Almost half of those arrested on misdemeanor charges were released quickly, with no imprisonment at all; of those who did receive jail time, the large majority (64.8 percent) received a sentence of "time served." Only 3.2 percent received jail terms of over 90 days.²¹ While these dispositions may seem mild, they are perhaps sufficient to deter some drug purchasers, particularly occasional users with legitimate employment and reputations that would be hurt by arrest alone. The police were hoping, in fact, that some buyers would be deterred by traffic summonses and have given out more than \$2,000 in the Pressure Point area. By harassing drug users — subjecting them not only to arrest and detention, but also to parking tickets, towed cars, and other "transaction costs," the police were hoping especially to discourage "out-of-towners" from buying drugs on the Lower East Side. The decreased volume of the drug traffic and the obvious changes in clientele suggest that some of these buyers *did* find new markets; in some cases, markets may have moved to them.

Drug users indigenous to the Lower East Side have been understandably more resistant than outsiders to OPP and have more easily adapted to the changes in street dealing which it created. One Lower East Side drug user explained how "scoring" became more complicated and time consuming:

For the first time in a long time, I had to start worrying about where I was going to get my stuff. Before Pressure Point, it was there any time you wanted it, day or night. Suddenly, I had to make phone calls to get information; then sometimes, you'd go to the spot and no one would be there. Eventually, you'd get your drugs but it might take all day. And right away, you'd start worrying about tomorrow.

To minimize the chance of arrest, local buyers began to stay off the streets as much as possible, but still recognized that buying was riskier than before:

With Pressure Point, the police would arrest you just for being on the streets. One day I got work transporting drugs to someone; I was carrying a couple of bundles and was scared shitless being on the street. Later that day, when I was perfectly clean, I got busted for loitering just because I was walking in a "known drug area." Everyone I know got arrested during Pressure Point.

Other local users turned to the "inside operations" which are available to outsiders:

I have a lot of connections in the area and have worked with many of the distributors, so when the police came on strong I avoided the street and started getting my stuff from this guy who works out of an apartment in the projects. He doesn't let you in if he doesn't know you.

Some Lower East Side users may have traveled outside the Pressure Point area to buy their drugs, but this user's attitude may be more typical:

I'm not going to travel all over the city — riding the trains — just to buy drugs. There's always a risk. Hell, I was arrested probably a dozen times before Pressure Point; it's all part of using drugs.

Not all drug users, then, are deterred from buying by the increased threat of arrest by OPP. By and large; out-of-town buyers have been pushed out, but local buyers remain; the drug trade has not disappeared, but it has been reduced and made less blatant.

Along with the decrease in drug trafficking on the Lower East Side, there has been a decrease in drug-related property crimes of robbery and burglary. Within two months of Pressure Point's inception, a police department news release claimed a 52.1 percent decrease in robbery and a 35 percent decrease in burglary.²² Data gathered over the six month period from January 1 to June 1984 show a slightly lower decrease, although still substantial. Table I compares the robbery and burglary rates for the Pressure Point area with other areas of the city for 1983 (pre-OPP) and 1984. Since the whole City of New York experienced a decrease in robbery and burglary during this period, the entire decrease in the Pressure Point area cannot be attributed to the operation itself. However, the decrease in crime on the Lower East Side is considerably larger than for the city as a whole, and the area immediately surrounding the OPP area also experienced a more substantial decrease in crime than the remainder of the city.

Although these data regarding the impact of OPP on property crime are interesting, we do not know how much crime was actually deterred and how

much was displaced to other parts of the city (and even beyond) where some of the drug traffic evidently relocated. These other areas might be experiencing some of the crime that, without OPP, would have been committed on the Lower East Side. For the Lower East Side, however, OPP has meant not only less drug traffic, but less drug-related crime.

TABLE I

Robberies and Burglaries in OPP area and other areas of New York City*

ROBBERIES			
	Jan-Jun 1983	Jan-Jun 1984	% Change
OPP Area	67	37	- 44.3
3 OPP Precincts (minus OPP Area)	800	629	- 21.4
Borough of Manhattan South (minus OPP area)	5,301	5,089	- 4.0
New York City**	42,022	39,771	- 5.4
BURGLARIES			
	Jan-Jun 1983	Jan-Jun 1984	% Change
OPP Area	519	319	- 38.5
3 OPP Precincts (minus OPP Area)	1,214	1,031	- 15.1
Borough of Manhattan South (minus OPP area)	7,243	7,376	+ 1.8
New York City**	72,372	64,962	-10.2

*Data Supplied by New York City Police Department

**Figures not available for Jan-Jun period; Figures for entire year were divided in half to obtain 6-month estimate.

Impact of OPP on the Community²¹

A recent *New York Times* article, focusing on the Lower East Side, reports that "thanks to Operation Pressure Point, art galleries are replacing shooting galleries."²² Even a police operation on the scale of OPP could not by itself produce such a transformation, but the *Times* is correct in recognizing the change. In some sections of the Lower East Side, property values have started to climb, new shops and restaurants (and art galleries) have opened up, and entire blocks of apartment buildings have been renovated and occupied. OPP did not create these changes, but it has facilitated the process of gentrification which began on the Lower East Side in the early 1980s, largely in response to the increased demand for residential property in Manhattan.²³ Not all neighborhoods in the Lower East Side are part of this gentrification process; in particular, the sections bordering Chinatown and those along the East River (see Figure 1) have changed very little and are still occupied, primarily, by poor and working class minorities, many of whom live in city-owned housing projects. Just as gentrification of the Lower East Side has not been uniform across all neighborhoods, neither has the impact of OPP. The operation has been more successful in reducing drug traffic in neighborhoods already in the process of change before OPP began and least successful in the areas that are largely untouched by gentrification.

In the first few weeks of OPP, the police successfully "liberated" the most drug-infested streets and parks all over the Lower East Side; the drug traffic did not disappear, but the volume decreased quickly and substantially. Many drug sellers, perhaps hoping that OPP would be nothing more than a temporary interruption, stayed off the streets, waiting for law enforcement to return to "normal" so that they could resume operations. It was only with the realization that OPP would continue indefinitely that drug sellers began to reemerge, developing the new marketing strategies that would decrease their risk of arrest. What they also quickly discovered was that some neighborhoods (specifically, those in the process of change and improvement) presented more risk than others. Consequently, as the drug trade began to reassert itself, it became more and more concentrated in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods of the Lower East Side.

Poor, run-down neighborhoods hold some advantages for street-level drug dealers. For one thing, there is often a transient population on the streets and in the local parks, making it difficult for the police to identify persons involved in the drug trade. Buyers and sellers often live in the neighborhood themselves and are similar to other residents in terms of class, race, ethnicity, and general appearance, again making them indistinguishable to the police. And even residents uninvolved in the drug trade may be reluctant to report them, either out of loyalty or fear of retaliation.²⁴ Consequently, as the methods of selling have become less obvious, the police have become much less effective in these

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neighborhoods. OPP officers patrolling on foot and by car, constantly monitor the street population, conducting searches and sometimes making arrests, but very seldom witness a drug sale. Their presence undoubtedly does have some deterrent effect, keeping some (particularly white) buyers out of the area and preventing sellers from returning to pre-OPP ways of doing business.

It is hard to imagine what the OPP team could do to have more impact in these neighborhoods. Undercover and surveillance operations might be more effective, but a 1985 departmental policy aimed at preventing corruption prohibits officers on the regular patrol force (the large majority of Pressure Point officers) from working out of uniform. This means that all drug-related undercover operations must be handled by the Narcotics Division, a unit with limited resources. The Narcotics Division does assist the regular OPP force on the Lower East Side;²⁷ if expanded, it could provide more assistance, but at a high cost. Most of the patrol officers assigned to Pressure Point are fairly inexperienced (with many straight out of the police academy), allowing a massive police presence at relatively low cost. In fact, OPP might not have been created at all, and certainly not in its present form, were it not for the post 1934 expansion of the NYPD. The operation continues to rely on a steady supply of new officers to fill its ranks and it would require reorganization of departmental resources to substitute a highly trained and experienced undercover force for the current patrol force. It seems likely that OPP will remain primarily a patrol operation and that further progress against the drug trade - especially in run-down areas of the Lower East Side - will be minimal.

In contrast to its failure to clear the drug traffic out of these areas, OPP has substantially reduced (and perhaps even eliminated) the street drug trade in the more gentrified neighborhoods; here, the initial liberation of the streets and parks was not followed by a gradual reemergence of drug buyers and sellers. It may be simply that the police paid more attention to these areas in the early days of Pressure Point, but they deny any bias in coverage, and observations during the second year of OPP bear out that police patrols were heaviest in the poor areas where most of the drug traffic had become concentrated.

The success of OPP in neighborhoods that were becoming gentrified can probably be best explained in the same way as its failure in poorer neighborhoods, by the make-up of the community itself. Once cleared off the streets in the first few weeks of Pressure Point, drug buyers and sellers quickly became the "outsiders," their presence apparent to OPP personnel and residents, many of whom were eager to report them to the police. The resident population in these neighborhoods had been gradually transformed, becoming increasingly middle class and white, though this change was not as readily apparent when the drug dealers and other "undesirables" occupied the streets and
By clearing out these groups, OPP allowed the resident population to

"claim" the public areas, both formally (through organized neighborhood events) and informally (through their increased willingness to be on the streets).²⁸ Research by Stephanie Greenberg and others (1985) suggests that residents themselves can reduce crime and other undesirable behavior through informal social control of their neighborhoods, including the use of public space, surveillance of strangers, and actual intervention against inappropriate conduct. Such informal control is most likely to occur in communities with general agreement concerning social norms, an agreement which perhaps began to emerge in these gentrifying neighborhoods as the police cleared the "street population" away for the first time since the area had begun to change. A new group (once themselves the intruders into a run-down, sparsely populated neighborhood) began to establish new standards of acceptable conduct and to assist the police in enforcing them. Operation Pressure Point thus facilitated a general change that had already begun and, by making these neighborhoods even more desirable than before, increased the chance of further gentrification, making a return of the drug traffic even more unlikely.

Dilemmas for the Police

Operation Pressure Point has been a tremendous success for the New York City Police Department. In spite of very little advance planning,²⁹ the whole operation was carried out with few procedural problems. Both the Transit Police and Housing Authority Police were extremely cooperative. Coverage by the local media was uniformly favorable,³⁰ and the response of people in the community has been very positive. Community reaction has naturally been most favorable in neighborhoods where the impact has been greatest, but, even in areas with remaining drug traffic, residents appreciate the reduction in volume and the less obtrusive methods of dealing. The dilemma that the police now face is to find some way eventually to withdraw the commitment of extra forces to the Lower East Side.

Operation Pressure Point may have already accomplished all it can - a drastic improvement in some neighborhoods, a more modest improvement in others, but an overall reduction in drug trafficking and drug-related crime on the Lower East Side. Without substantial change in the operation itself (such as the addition of personnel or an intensification of undercover tactics), not much more progress is feasible. The early success occurred primarily because the drug traffic had become so blatant; now that buyers and sellers have adjusted to the police presence, law enforcement has become more difficult. At the same time, however, the current level of police presence may be necessary to maintain current gains, especially in areas where the drug traffic has reemerged most strongly. Without Pressure Point in these areas, open drug dealing could expand again

quickly, though probably not returning to pre-OPP levels as out-of-town buyers have had time to find markets elsewhere. Still, there is a sense that the drug market is seething, just under the surface, ready to explode if the police break the stalemate by withdrawing from the Lower East Side. Although OPP was not designed as a permanent addition to the police force on the Lower East Side, there may never be a good time for the police to withdraw. The police department has assured residents that Pressure Point will remain as long as it is needed but at some point of diminishing returns the police might have to reevaluate that promise, especially in light of other crime problems elsewhere in the city.

The police department probably could not withdraw OPP from the Lower East Side without incurring a negative response from the residents who now generally praise it. OPP has raised community expectations with regard to what the police can accomplish; the drug problem which was once viewed by many residents as intractable is now viewed as solvable. Community residents recognize and value the current improvements, but believe that further success can be achieved with slightly more police effort. Residents living in the poorer neighborhoods would like to see the kind of changes that have occurred in gentrifying areas; they do not understand why progress has been halted and will not respond favorably if the operation is phased out before meeting their expectations.

Citizen expectations for the police have increased outside the Lower East Side as well and, as the media has reported on the success of OPP, citizen groups in other parts of the city have pressured the police for additional law enforcement in their communities. Commissioner Ward has found that "everyone wants their own Pressure Point." The Police Department has responded to some of their requests, setting up special operations to confront particular crime problems, often drug related in other neighborhoods." A real challenge for the police, in New York as elsewhere, is to find innovative ways to tackle these problems without unrealistically raising citizen expectations. After a decade of pessimism about the ability of the police to have any effect on crime or the quality of life in our cities, OPP shows that the police can make a difference. Yet it also shows that there are limits to what can be accomplished, especially when the police tackle problems as enormous as the drug trade. Any restoration of citizen faith in the police seems a positive accomplishment, but not if expectations rise beyond what the police can produce. Leaving OPP intact, with little hope of further progress, denies other neighborhoods, with other crime problems, valuable police resources, but a withdrawal of OPP will leave citizens living in the high drug areas of the Lower East Side disillusioned and resentful.

If innovations like OPP are to avoid this dilemma and be of long term value to the police (and to police-community relations), they should begin with a

realistic assessment of what can be accomplished and some plan for program phase-out as it becomes necessary to rotate police resources in response to various crime problems. Skolnick and Bayley (1986) warn that citizens and the media may expect too much from innovative police strategies and, when disappointed with the results, urge their abandonment. Operation Pressure Point illustrates the opposite problem: how rave reviews can increase the expectations of citizens and lead them to demand expansion of innovative programs beyond what police resources can bear. In the long run, the positive publicity created by OPP may have been too much of a good thing, making it difficult for the police to claim success in the face of expanding expectations, and difficult for them to leave without appearing to admit defeat.

Conclusion

Operation Pressure Point speaks well for the ability of the police to develop innovative strategies to fight the pervasive "criminal situations" which plague specific urban neighborhoods. After nearly two decades of a police focus on fighting serious crime through quick response time and preventive patrol, police scholars have urged creation of proactive, community-based programs to supplement this basically reactive system (Goldstein, 1979; Wilson, 1985; Clarke, 1983; Engstad and Evans, 1980; Farmer, 1984). Operation Pressure Point is such a program, developed to meet a unique crime problem in a unique community, and other police departments might learn much from it. However, it is not at all clear that all drug-infested communities would benefit equally from an operation like Pressure Point. Mark Kleiman (1986) reports that a similar operation in Harlem had very little impact on the open drug market there, and he points out, on the basis of his examination of several anti-drug operations in different communities, that a substantial commitment of resources is necessary, but not sufficient for success. OPP worked better on the Lower East Side than elsewhere probably because the Lower East Side itself was already in the early stages of gentrification; similar operations may be much less effective in poverty-ridden areas with multiple problems. Operation Pressure Point is not the answer to street-level drug trade in the cities. But at the same time, OPP does illustrate what the police are capable of accomplishing when they design policing strategies to meet community-specific crime problems and are given sufficient resources to carry them out.

NOTES

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1. In January 1984, the *Los Angeles Times* ran a front page picture and story of customers lining up to buy drugs on New York's Lower East Side which they named "the most open heroin market in the nation." *Los Angeles Times*, January 8, 1984, p.1.
 2. There are three regular precincts on the Lower East Side: the 5th, the 7th, and the 9th. The Pressure Point area included sections from all three of these precincts but did not fully encompass any of them.
 3. These statistics are based on data provided by the New York City Police Department.
 4. In 1974, the police reported approximately 525,000 index crimes; in 1980, 720,000; and in 1984, 600,000. Throughout this period there were several increases and decreases, but at no point did the amount of reported crime decline to 1974 levels. (Data obtained from New York City Police Department.)
 5. Drug arrests were given a low priority in other cities as well. According to Herbert Jacob (1984), narcotic arrests peaked in the early 1970s. After this time, serious crime made up a growing proportion of all arrests.
 6. All unattributed quotations are taken from interviews conducted by the author.
 7. "Is This Any Place for Children?" by Murray Weissel, *New York Daily News*, July 31, 1983, p.1.
 8. See *New York Tribune*, April 30, 1984, p.1, for comments to this effect by some Lower East Side residents. This is also the position taken by Jagna Sharff (1985). She claims that the drug traffic, which initially served to "push out" much of the older, immigrant population was by 1984 "the last obstacle to gentrification" and invasion by the "yuppies." Her position is that drug dealing was tolerated by the police when the neighborhood was in decline - pre-gentrification - but became the object of police attention once property values began to increase. Beecher et al. (1981) and Farmer (1984) point out that official responses to crime are almost always "political," in that they respond to some interests over others and are particularly influenced by business interests in the community.
 9. In meetings with the community, the police receive more complaints of "street conditions" - loud music, rowdy youth, derelicts, street vendors, prostitutes, and the like - than they do of serious crime. Citizens want

and expect the police to take care of these problems and Commissioner Ward decided to give them a much higher priority than his predecessors. He has been particularly influenced by the work of Wilson and Kelling (1982) who argue that paying attention to low level crime and control of the streets in deteriorating neighborhoods may also have an impact on serious crime.

10. There are some problems in directly comparing federal and state court dispositions because charges are not identical and time periods are not coterminous. But even a rough comparison of outcomes suggests much tougher treatment by the federal system. In federal court, almost 80 percent of convicted felons were sentenced to imprisonment, with fewer than 10 percent of those serving less than one year. In state court, 66 percent of those convicted on felony charges went to jail, and almost half of them were given a year or less. At the indictment stage, the disparities are even greater. In the federal system, 126 felony indictments resulted from 161 felony arrests. In state court, fewer than one-fifth (131 out of 716) of felony arrests resulted in a felony indictment. Federal statistics are from the United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York.
11. When a person issued a DAT fails to show up for the court appearance, the court will issue an arrest warrant, but the warrants division of the police department has been understaffed and unable to "track down" most defaulted DATs. Often the police will catch defaulted DATs when they are arrested again; at that time, they will not qualify for another DAT and will have to remain locked up until appearing in court to face the accumulated charges.
12. These are very similar to the police tactics which Symanski (1981) reports are widely used against prostitution. Because the police would be able to make only a few arrests each night, they can more effectively control prostitution through "harassment" than by "arrest."
13. The constitutionality of such tactics is questionable, and there have been some complaints by Lower East Side residents.
14. After one year, Pressure Point forces were reduced slightly from approximately 240 to 200 officers. At times, the force was reduced further as officers regularly assigned to OPP were temporarily assigned to other tasks (parades, sporting events, concerts, etc.) Skolnick and Bayley (1985) warn that for innovative strategies to be effective, the integrity of the deployment must be maintained and the tendency to "pull" officers for other assignments avoided.
15. The night hours between 2 and 6 a.m. became especially popular because OPP forces were at their lowest. Because much of the population was

asleep at this time, citizen complaints were uncommon and sales could occur without much threat of arrest.

16. Drug users reported that some sellers responded to OPP by refusing to sell "single bags" (\$10 or \$20 worth) and requiring buyers to buy in bundles of ten. Drug buyers would then have to pool their money, send one person to make the buy, and then distribute the packets among themselves. This change increased the risk to buyers (because it required them to congregate on the street and make these arrangements), but decreased the risk to sellers by allowing them to distribute the same amount of drugs in a shorter period of time.
17. Data gathered by the New York State Substance Abuse Services shows no increase in the Methadone Maintenance population during this period. This may be because most methadone clinics have a waiting list for entry into the program, but there was also no change in the number of people on the waiting lists.
18. One Lower East Side police officer who lived in Harlem reported a noticeable increase in the volume of drug trade there and claimed to have seen some well-known "street people" from the Lower East Side in Harlem for the first time after OPP began.
19. These data come from the Criminal Justice Agency *Follow-up Report on Criminal Court Outcomes*. The agency has only analyzed court outcomes for those arrested during the first month of Pressure Point; there is, at this point, no way of knowing if the courts became more or less lenient as time went by. These data also fail to include the court outcomes of defendants who had their cases heard in federal court.
20. Of the remaining 47 convicted felons receiving jail time, 14 received a sentence of 1-3 years, 26 got 2-4 years and 7 were given longer sentences; the most severe was 6-15 years, given to one person.
21. See *Follow-up Report on Criminal Court and Supreme Court Outcomes*, Tables 3 and 4. These tables include data from all arrestees who pled guilty in the criminal court.
22. City of New York, Police Department News Release No. 17, March 30, 1984.
23. Not included in this section is an examination of how OPP affected the drug users who are also a part of the community. Some of the users interviewed were pleased with the results of OPP because they felt the situation had got out of hand and were especially glad to see out-of-town buyers off the street. Paul Goldstein (1985) reports that buying drugs became more dangerous after OPP when many selling operations moved indoors.

- Some reports report a decrease in the quality of drugs and an increase in price.
24. "The Fortunes of the Lower East Side are Rising," by William Greer, *New York Times*, August 4, 1986, p.6E.
 25. According to Robert Ponte (1985), a shortage of both office and residential space in Manhattan has led to an increase in property values all over the City and the rapid development of areas that, just a few years ago, were abandoned to the poor. One area of prime development has been just south of midtown Manhattan, a primarily commercial area that borders the Lower East Side.
 26. This seemed to be a particular problem in the Public Housing Projects where even citizens who dislike the drug trade are often personally connected to those involved; they want the drug trade gone, but not their friends and relatives arrested. Some residents also expressed fear of retaliation and were reluctant to give even anonymous tips to the police. In some communities, money from the drug trade eventually circulates within the community itself, again making residents reluctant to assist the police.
 27. The Police Department will not release information about undercover operations, so it is impossible to compare the number of undercover operations in the early and later stages of OPP. However, OPP patrol supervisors claim that they now receive much less backup from the undercover units.
 28. Several researchers have shown this link between resident use of the streets and crime. When crime (or fear of crime) increases in a neighborhood, residents tend to stay off the streets as much as possible, weakening informal social controls, and perhaps causing an even greater increase in crime (Wilson, 1985; Conklin, 1975; DuBow et al., 1979). Jane Jacobs (1961) strongly recommends policies that encourage resident use of public areas as a strategy for fighting crime.
 29. OPP was not based on a carefully developed "master plan." It was put into motion within a month of Commissioner Ward's appointment after he gathered together several people with knowledge of the Lower East Side problem. Many operational decisions got made on an "as need" basis.
 30. The only exception I could uncover was an interview with Dr. Robert Newman who admonished the police department for not providing advance warning and not seeking input from the local drug treatment establishment before beginning the operation (CBS News, March 11, 1984).
 31. For example, Operation Closedown, implemented in April 1984 to close down "smoke shops" in Brooklyn; the Padlock Enforcement Program, begun in September 1984 to close down businesses with repeated violations of Alcohol, Narcotics, Gambling, Prostitution, and Auto Crime laws.

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
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EST. 1980

**Police Management Association
Professional Conference**

**HIGH PERFORMANCE
POLICE MANAGEMENT**

A Workbook

February, 1989

This handbook was prepared for the Police Management Association with grant assistance from the National Institute of Justice, whose Director is the Hon. James K. Stewart, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
1001 22nd Street N.W. Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20037 (202) 833-1460



EST. 1980

Police Management Association
Professional Conference

HIGH PERFORMANCE
POLICE MANAGEMENT

A Workbook

Prepared By
Dr. Phyllis McDonald
Robert Wasserman

February, 1989

This handbook was prepared for the Police Management Association with grant assistance from the National Institute of Justice, whose Director is the Hon. James K. Stewart, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

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Acknowledgements

This Handbook was prepared by Phyllis P. McDonald and Robert Wasserman. Guidance in the development of the PMA Professional Conference Program has been provided by Jonathon Budd, NIJ, Ms. E. Roberta Lesh, PMA Executive Director, and members of the Board of Directors of PMA.

Much of the material contained in this text builds upon the prior work and publications of the National Institute of Justice. Of particular importance have been the NIJ texts produced from 1973-1989 on such topics as "Differential Police Response," and "Managing Patrol Operations."

Updated information has been gleaned from other sources. These updates include information derived from recently published NIJ documents such as "Patrol Deployment" by Levine and McEwen (1985), "Synthesizing and Extending the Results of Police Patrol" by Spelman and Eck (1987), as well as the draft papers from the Program in Criminal Justice at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Other information and data contained in the Handbook is based on the unpublished research and study of the authors who, offer different executive training programs in advanced criminal justice practices.

We trust that this HANDBOOK and the materials used at the PMA Professional Conference will aid in the development of the next generation of senior police and law enforcement executives in the United States and abroad. This is the specific mission and goal of the Police Management Association.

Phyllis McDonald
Robert Wasserman

ABOUT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

The National Institute of Justice is a research branch of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Institute's mission is to develop knowledge about crime, its causes and control. Priority is given to policy-relevant research that can yield approaches and information that State and local agencies can use in preventing and reducing crime. The decisions made by criminal justice practitioners and policymakers affect millions of citizens, and crime affects almost all our public institutions and the private sector as well. Targeting resources, assuring their effective allocation, and developing new means of cooperation between the public and private sector are some of the emerging issues in law enforcement and criminal justice that research can help illuminate.

Carrying out the mandate assigned by Congress in the Justice Assistance Act of 1984, the National Institute of Justice:

- o Sponsors research and development to improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and related civil aspects, with a balanced program of basic and applied research.
- o Evaluates the effectiveness of justice improvement programs and identifies programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated.
- o Tests and demonstrates new and improved approaches to strengthen the justice system, and recommends actions that can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments and private organizations and individuals to achieve this goal.
- o Disseminates information from research, demonstrations, evaluations, and special programs to Federal State, and local governments, and serves as an international clearinghouse of justice information.
- o Trains criminal justice practitioners in research and evaluation findings, and assists practitioners and researchers through fellowships and special seminars.

Authority for administering the Institute and awarding grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements is vested in the NIJ Director. In establishing its research agenda, the Institute is guided by the priorities of the Attorney General and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of police, courts, and corrections practitioners as well as the private sector to identify the most critical problems and to plan research that can help solve them.

James K. Stewart
Director

ABOUT THE POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

Formed at a Constitutional Convention in 1980 and incorporated in the District of Columbia, the Police Management Association (PMA) is a nonprofit, educational, and professional membership organization representing the international law enforcement community. Principles which guide the PMA are that:

1. continual research, experimentation, and exchange of ideas through public discussion and debate are paths for development of a professional body of knowledge about policing;
2. substantial and purposeful academic study is a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding, and adding to the body of knowledge of professional police management;
3. maintenance of the highest standards of ethics and integrity is imperative to the improvement of policing;
4. the police must, within the limits of the law, be responsible and accountable to citizens as the ultimate source of police authority;
5. the principles embodied in the Constitution are the foundation of policing; and
6. it is necessary to inform and educate the public on police issues.

Four categories of membership are represented, which include sworn police practitioners ranging in rank from sergeant to agency chief executive, as well as nonsworn police managers, planners and academicians who specialize in police service. This structure ensures that representation is fair and equitable when voting on issues or electing the 16-person Board, which is comprised of four members in each rank category. Although represented predominately by members from the United States, eight other countries are represented in the membership. Corporate and Associate (police officers and criminal justice students) memberships in PMA are accepted; however, such memberships are accorded no voting privileges.

PMA serves as a forum for the exchange of ideas and information-sharing among its members and in the law enforcement community as a whole. It serves also as a vehicle through which views of police managers can educate the public and influence public policy in both police and criminal justice issues. To further these goals, PMA publishes a bi-monthly newsletter and conducts both regional and an annual meeting, as well as training seminars.

Now being funded for the fifth year by the National Institute of Justice, PMA's Professional Conferences are designed to offer a proven and cost-effective means of disseminating results of NIJ-sponsored research to middle managers and police executives throughout the United States.

For further information on the Police Management Association, please contact Ms. E. Roberta Lesh, Executive Director, at 1001 22nd Street, N.W. Suite 200, Washington, DC 20037. Telephone: (202) 833-1460.

About This Seminar

and this

Source Book

High Performance Police Management brings together a series of training events laying the foundation for understanding the developing concepts in current day police management. The events reflect current issues being dealt with by the nation's best police executives.

The seminar is designed to move quickly. Rather than rely solely on lectures and student questioning, the seminar uses a series of "events," many of which replicate strategies used successfully in the television and radio media. Thus, there will be a talk-show format questioning via telephone of experts, presentation of creative video tapes and television news show items and a replicated assessment center technique used widely in modern-day promotional examinations.

The participants--you--- must assume major responsibility for making this seminar successful. There are two requirements each participant must follow. First, each participant will be expected to complete the reading material designated to be read each day. Second, during the talk-show format sessions (there are two of them), participants must only ask questions of the telephone guests when the seminar facilitator points to them, to avoid having everyone speaking at once.

The assigned readings are all contained in this Source Book, and have been selected because they represent the best available statements on program or strategy issues that have been published. Many of these readings are recently published, but several represent classic statements of police policy and function.

At the end of the seminar, there will be a "test" that will be group graded just prior to the seminar conclusion. This "test" has been designed along the lines of multiple choice promotional examinations, so that participants will have the opportunity to practice using the information they have gained in the seminar.

Welcome to High Performance Police Management! Its where the action is in the 1980's and 1990's.

Seminar Facilitators

Albert J. Sweeney is presently in his nineteenth year of law enforcement serving as a lieutenant in the Boston Police Department. He has served in a number of positions throughout his career, including assignment as a police academy instructor, commanding officer of training and education, liaison officer with the Mayor, commander of the mounted unit, and various other assignments. In 1981, he took a leave of absence to conduct supervisory and management training seminars for cities such as Minneapolis and Atlanta. In 1983, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Police of the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority Police Department. He returned to the Boston Police Department in 1985 to head up the newly developed Bureau of Professional Standards, where he served as a Superintendent. Lieutenant Sweeney holds a B.A. in Psychology from the University of Massachusetts (Boston) and an M.S. in Public Administration from Northeastern University. He has previously hosted a weekly public service television segment on policing on Boston's Channel 2.

Dr. Phyllis McDonald is the Manager of the National Law Enforcement Policy Center at the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). She previously served with the Dayton, Ohio Police Department where she was a Major, responsible for management of the department's internal affairs, planning, inspections, personnel and training units. Dr. McDonald was formerly Deputy Project Director of the National Institute of Justice's Executive Training Program, Director of Organizational Development for the Metropolitan Police Department (Washington, D.C.) and Director of Training for the Montgomery County (Maryland) Police Department. She has taught in numerous programs in police management and operations. She is a member of the Board of Directors of the Police Management Association.

H. Jerome Miron is an independent consultant for TMG, The Miron Group, an organization specializing in professional services to corporations, governments and school systems. He is a former Chief of Staff/Undersheriff of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Largo, Florida. Prior to this position, Mr. Miron the Director of Research and Special Projects with the National Sheriff's Association (NSA), where he served as the Director of the NSA Victim Assistance Program, a multi-year project supported by the Office for Victims of Crime of the U.S. Department of Justice. He has also been the Assistant Director of the Police Foundation, Washington, D.C., where he was responsible for the management of research studies relating to law enforcement management and operations. Mr. Miron was a seven-year member of the senior staff of the University Research Corporation, serving as the Director of the Police Technical Assistance Program. He has been directly responsible for the research, design, development and delivery of more than 200 national executive

seminars for law enforcement on such topics as Cutback Management, patrol operations, managing criminal investigations, Differential Police Response and Victim Assistance Programs. Mr. Miron is the author of dozens of texts and publications. He has been a college and university professor and is a graduate of American and European universities.

Dr. Craig Fraser is Director of the Training Education and Accreditation Division for the Massachusetts Metropolitan Police Department as well as an adjunct faculty member in Boston University's Urban Affairs and Criminal Justice program. Prior to moving to Boston, Dr. Fraser worked for the URSA Institute where he put together NIJ's conference on Policing: State-of-the Art and conducted a major resource allocation study for the Santa Ana, California police department. Dr. Fraser worked for the Winston-Salem, North Carolina police department for four years as Director of the Management Information Division with responsibility for planning, crime analysis, budget, personnel and computer systems. He is the author of a training course on resource allocation for the State of North Carolina. Dr. Fraser began his career with the Police Foundation and is a contributing author to the Kansas City Preventive Patrol study. He has taught in numerous programs in police management, planning and analysis.

HIGH PERFORMANCE POLICE MANAGEMENT

DAY I

SESSION 1: 12:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

Setting The Stage To Changing And Improving Your Police Organization

12:30 PM

Introduction to Program

- o The Program Anchors
- o Self-Assessment Exercise

A sharp focus on why high performance management is a key ingredient to police manager survival; a self-assessment exercise for participants to assess their own sense of planning for and implementing change.

12:45 PM

The Individual Manager: Key to Effective Policing

- o Who We Are: Introductions
- o Why We're Here

Introduction of participants and their experiences, perspectives and expected program outcomes; review of why the program has been developed; the role of the National Institute of Justice and the Police Management Association; the biographies of the instructors; the objectives of the program.

1:15 PM

Good Management: What it Means

- o How This Event is Organized
- o Lecturette on Policing in the 1980's and 1990's

How the seminar is organized; introduction to the subject of management from the perspective of the composition of the class.

1:30 PM

High Performance Police Leadership

- o Introduction to the Concepts
- o Taking Your Management Temperature
- o SuperPolice: The Video
- o Managing Creativity: The Impact of Style

An introduction to the concepts of High Performance Police Leadership; completion of the

High Performance Management self-assessment instrument; presentation of the video tape of the Career Criminal Program of the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., and a review of management style as it impacts program design and implementation efforts.

Reading Material

Nelson, Linda and Frank L. Burns, High Performance Programming: A Framework for Transforming Organizations.

4:15 PM Presentation for Tomorrow
Review of recommended reading materials to prepare for Day II exercises.

4:30 PM Conclusion

DAY II

SESSION 2: 8:00 AM - 12:00 PM:

The War on Drugs -- Can We Win?

8:00 AM Remembering The Best
A review of the critical points of the first day of the seminar.

8:15 AM What Are Others Doing With Drug Enforcement?
o Street Interdiction
o Discussion
After watching a video tape of the Boston Drug Control Unit, the discussion will focus on the management techniques; the issues associated with highly visible street level enforcement programs; the dangers of drug raids, and the role of the media.

10:00 AM Drug Enforcement: Characteristics of Successful Programs
A brief lecturette on the primary issues and obstacles in planning and implementing effective Drug Enforcement programs.

10:45 AM

DRUG Talk: Day Line Interviews

Simulation of a live talk show; actual telephone interviews with three experts on drug enforcement strategy; guests will include some of the following: Chief Reuben Greenberg, Charleston, South Carolina; Lt. Joseph Lisi, New York City, New York; Deputy Chief Hal Robbins, St. Petersburg, Florida; Paul Cascarano, National Institute of Justice.

11:20 AM

Clandestine Labs - The New Nightmare for Police Managers

- o A video tape on clandestine labs
- o a brief discussion on the actions mid-level managers need to take now to protect their officers

SESSION 3: 1:00 PM - 4:30 PM:

Drug Enforcement and Community Oriented Policing -- The New Concepts

1:00 PM

Can You Do Some Planning Of Drug Enforcement Programs?

- o The Problem Situation
- o A Small Group Exercise - Program Shopping

Operation Pressure Point
Operation Clean Sweep
Career Criminal Programs
Asset Forfeiture
School Education Programs
The DUF Program

Engaging in a Problem Solving Exercise as a means of thinking about the strategy options for drug enforcement efforts and creation of a program inventory list from the results of the exercise. For each inventory option, history of the program, impact in test sites, police manager perspectives of program value, implementation issues and problems, and how additional information can be obtained.

Reading Materials

An Invitation to Project DARE: Drug Abuse Resistance Education: Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, June, 1988.

Attorney General Announces NIJ Drug Use Forecasting System;
Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute
of Justice; edited by Francis X. Hartmann, November, 1988.

Mintz, John and Victoria Churchville, "Vice Officers Walk Thin
Line Between Crime and Law;" Washington: The Washington
Post, 1987.

Kleiman, Mark A.R. and Christopher E. Petula, State and Local
Drug Law Enforcement: Issues and Practices; Unpublished
Manuscript.

Kleiman, Mark A.R., Retail-Level Drug Crackdowns; Washington:
Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1987.

Dickson, Clarence, Drug Stings in Miami; Washington: FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, January, 1988.

Gay, William G. with Robert A. Bowers, Targeting Law Enforcement
Resources: The Career Criminal Focus; Washington, National
Institute of Justice, 1985.

Zimmer, L., Operation Pressure Point: The Disruption of Street-
Level Drug Trade on New York's Lower East Side; New York:
Center for Research in Crime and Justice, NYU School of Law,
1987.

2:30 PM

Community Oriented Policing: What's New

- o Community-Oriented Policing: The Concepts
- o Neighborhood-Oriented Policing
- o Problem-Oriented Policing

Presentation of the key elements of these three
programs; charting the differences between them
and examples of application of the program
elements in selected cities.

Reading Materials

Glazer, Nathan, "On Subway Graffiti in New York;" The Public
Interest.

Goldstein, Herman, "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented
Approach;" Crime and Delinquency, 24 (1979)

Kelling, George L., Police and Communities: The Quiet
Revolution; Cambridge: Harvard University, Kennedy School
of Government, 1988.

Magnet, Myron, America's Underclass: What To Do? New York: Fortune, 11 May, 1987.

Oettmeier, T.N. and W.H. Bieck, Developing a Policing Style for Neighborhood Oriented Policing; Houston: Houston Police Department, 1987.

Sherman, Lawrence W., "Repeat Calls to Police In Minneapolis;" Washington: Crime Control Reports, February 1987.

Spelman, William and John E. Eck, Problem-Oriented Policing; Washington: National Institute of Justice, 1987.

Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows" in The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1982.

Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling, "Making Neighborhoods Safe" in The Atlantic Monthly, February, 1989.

- 4:10 PM Analyzing a Community-Oriented Policing Approach
- o A video tape - Houston's Fear Reduction Program
 - o Overview of Day Three
 - o Review of Reading Assignments

DAY III

SESSION 4: 8:00 AM - 12:00 PM:

Community Oriented Policing - What Can It Do For Us?

8:00 AM Remembering The Best

A review of the critical points of the second day of the seminar

8:15 AM How Do We Get There?

- o Resource Allocation
- o Beat Design
- o New Wave Thinking About Police Planning

A brief lecturette on the kinds of changes which mid-level managers must make in their approach to resource allocation, beat designs, measuring impact and managing calls for service in order to implement community-oriented police programs.

9:00 AM

Can We Do It?

- o Problem Solving Exercise
- o Debriefing

This small group exercise will give participants an opportunity to think through the changes their department will need to re-orient its approach to the community and to review their calls for service to determine if a change is needed.

Reading Materials

Kelling, George L. and Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing; Washington: National Institute of Justice, November, 1988.

"Debating the Evolution of American Policing;" edited transcript by Francis X. Hartmann, Washington: National Institute of Justice, November, 1988.

Moore, Mark H., et. al., Crime and Policing; Washington: National Institute of Justice, June, 1988.

Moore, Mark H., et. al., Policing and the Fear of Crime; Washington: National Institute of Justice, June, 1988.

Sparrow, Malcolm K., Implementing Community Policing; Washington: National Institute of Justice, November, 1988.

10:30 AM

Ask The Experts!

Telephone discussion with mid-level managers and chiefs who have been leaders in their departments and law enforcement in moving towards a community-oriented police service: Houston, Texas; Baltimore, Maryland; Alexandria, Virginia; Madison, Wisconsin; and others.

11:15 AM

What Else Is Coming? A Look At Future Challenges for Mid-Level Managers

- o Computers & Law Enforcement
 - White Collar Crime
 - Their Use in Investigations
 - Their Use by the Criminals

- o Policy Dilemmas
 - Hot Pursuit
 - Weapons
 - Financial Asset/Forfeiture Seizure
- o Your ideas and Sci Fi Predictions!

11:45 AM

Whadda Ya Know?

A self-administered promotional test focusing on the key elements of the program; self-grading; discussion of correct answers; evaluation of the program and resources provided; review of how to use the software sample provided.

12:00 N

Conclusion

DAY I
SETTING THE STAGE TO CHANGING AND IMPROVING YOUR POLICE
ORGANIZATION

Introduction to Program

Program Anchors Self-Assessment Exercise

This session provides the grounding for the seminar. Beginning with a brief overview of some important principles of bad and good management, the participant is provided with a basic understanding of the conceptual basis of High Performance Management.

Following this very brief overview event, the participant will complete a self-assessment form in which they will be asked about their own management style. The assessment is actually an inventory of management styles, and will be an important tool for personal discovery later in the seminar.

As with all sessions, this session moves quickly. Time frames will be carefully respected, so all points of the training are covered.

WORKSHEET: Who Are We? What Causes Our Headaches?

Where are you from?

How big is the city?

What is the name of your agency?

How many people work there?

What do you do?

What is it about your job that makes you feel good?

What are the things that happen in your job that cause you to reach for the Excedrin?

What would you like to change in your department?

Why?

The Individual Manager:
Key to Effective Policing
Who We are: Introductions
Why We're Here

The greatest strength of the seminar is the experience of the participants who come from a variety of backgrounds and communities. In this session, we will spend some time getting to know who we are; our own experiences, the characteristics of our communities and our police agencies, as well as what we expect to get out of the seminar.

The format of the introductions will be Phil Donahue or Oprah Winfrey style; that is, a seminar facilitator will roam the room, interviewing participants and following up on the answers they give to the questions: who are you, what do you think is happening in American policing today, what makes an effective manager, what is your police agency like and what problems does your community face?

Following these introductions, the seminar facilitators will review their own backgrounds and perspectives on the field. These comments will be followed by a description of the role of the National Institute of Justice and the Police Management Association in producing the seminar.

Good Management: What It Means

How This Event is Organized
Policing in the 1980's and 90's

This session moves on to the substance of policing in our current age. Beginning with an overview of how the seminar is organized, the topics covered and the happenings which are scheduled for the following three days, the participants will understand the seminar sequence. The events scheduled are reflective of current and past media events as a means of increasing participant interest in the subject matter. The events move quickly.

Policing in the 1980's and 90's focuses on police management. Even with all the textbooks on police management, the exposure to a number of significant happenings in police research and the involvement of a new generation of police leadership, change in police management is slow. This session reviews why change is slow, and explores the dynamics of the change process. Seeking to answer the question: Why does it take so long for police managers to adopt modern concepts? the session identifies several important characteristics of resistance to change in most American police agencies.

This session is a lecturette; no more than 15 minutes of talk and no chance for questions. The groundwork for later discussion is being set down.

High Performance Police Leadership

Introduction to the Concepts
Taking Your Management Temperature

SuperPolice: The Video

Managing Creativity: The Impact of Style

This session provides an introduction to High Performance Police Management. The elements of the high performance model are presented, with examples of corporations and police departments achieving high levels on the performance scale are provided. A method for assessing where a police agency stands on the scale is presented.

Following the presentation, a self-assessment instrument will be completed permitting participants to determine where their own police agency stands on the scale, and by identifying organizational strengths and weaknesses. Participants will also have the opportunity to assess where their own unit stands in relationship to the overall police department.

Toward the end of the session, a video tape of the career criminal program of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department will be viewed. A following discussion will focus on the elements of the high performance model referenced in the tape. Finally, participants will discuss ways of moving their own organizations or units toward higher places on the high performance management matrix.

Reading:

Nelson, Linda and Frank L. Burns, High Performance Programming: A Framework for Transforming Organizations.

HIGH PERFORMING

PROACTIVE

RESPONSIVE

Self Rating Form

The High Performance Programming Model

For each of the elements of the High Performance Programming Model described by Nelson and Burns in their article, select the developmental stage your unit is in and the development stage for yourself. Make notes after each choice on examples or organizational behaviors or actions that support your choice.

TIME FRAME:

Past Present Future Flow

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comment on Your Choices:

FOCUS:

Diffused Output Results Excellence

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

PLANNING:

Justification Activity Strategy Evolution

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

CHANGE MODE:

Punitive

Adaptive

Planned

Programmed

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

MANAGEMENT:

Fix Blame

Coordination

Alignment

Navigation

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

STRUCTURE:

Fragmented

Hierarchy

Matrix

Networks

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

PERSPECTIVE:

Self

Team

Organization

Culture

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

MOTIVATION:

Avoid Pain Rewards Contribution Actualization

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

DEVELOPMENT:

Survival Cohesion Attunement Transformation

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

COMMUNICATION:

Force Feed Feedback Feed Forward Feed Through

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

LEADERSHIP:

Enforcing Coaching Purposing Empowering

Yourself _____

Your unit _____

Comments on Your Choices:

WORKSHEET: Impact of Authority Figure On Subordinates

Think of an authority figure, who, in your past has made you feel bad about yourself (teacher, coach, parent, supervisor).

Describe how that person made you feel.

List the characteristics of this person.

Now think of an authority figure in your past who made you feel great about yourself.

Describe how that person made you feel.

List the characteristics of that person.

WORKSHEET:

How Will You Change?

This worksheet is designed to allow you to think through the steps you need to take in your unit and/or your department to create an organization that is great to work in.

I. Reactive to Responsive:

What actions will you take to establish trust with your officers?

What action would you like to see taken in your department to establish trust?

II. Responsive to Proactive:

What actions will you take to move your unit from responsive to proactive?

What actions would you like your department to take to move from responsive to proactive?

WORKSHEET: The Sky's The Limit!

How will you get your unit to become high performing?

What will your department need to do to get to high performing?

WORKSHEET: APPLYING THE HIGH PERFORMANCE MODEL TO POLICING

For each of the characteristics below that describes a mythical police agency, explain what the agency needs to be in order to become High Performing.

1. This police agency has not changed its beats in ten years.
2. This police agency attempts to answer all of its calls within two minutes.
3. The only physical fitness program in this police agency is a required physical examination at entry level.
4. This police agency assigns officers equally to all districts, for each shift.
5. This police agency does not have a policy which requires patrol commanders to interact with the community.
6. This police agency did away with motor cycles ten years ago.
7. This police agency manages employees through strict downward communication.
8. This police agency responds the same uniform way to all crimes investigated.
9. The primary task of the crime analysis section of this police agency is to record Part I and Part II crimes.
10. It is the policy of this police agency to arrest any person under 18 years of age found on the street after 10:00 p.m.

WORKSHEET: APPLYING THE HIGH PERFORMANCE MODEL TO POLICE MANAGEMENT

For each of the items below describe how the reactive police chief will respond and then describe how the High Performing chief of police will respond.

1. A lieutenant requests that he be allowed to attend a training session on how to be an effective chief of police.

Reactive Chief's Response: _____

High Performing Chief's Response: _____

2. At a meeting last night on crime prevention, the Mayor asked that the police Captain who presented, give a similar presentation to the City Council.

Reactive Chief's Response: _____

High Performing Chief's Response: _____

3. A newly promoted sergeant asked what the objectives for the department for the next fiscal year would be.

Reactive Chief's Response: _____

High Performing Chief's Response: _____

4. A lieutenant reports to the chief that the homicide that occurred last night was unusual and suggests that a special task force be set up that my include a computer specialist, and other unusual professionals.

Reactive Chief's Response: _____

High Performing Chief's Response: _____

5. A sergeant, meeting the chief in the hall says: "Hey Chief, I was at this conference last week and learned a new technique for analyzing calls for service."

Reactive Chief's Response: _____

High Performing Chief's Response: _____

6. The Chief receives a complaint from the Mayor who says:
"Mrs. Jones called last night to say that there were twelve
officers at the same 7-11 and none patrolling my street,
three blocks away."

Reactive Chief's Response: _____

High Performing Chief's Response: _____

7. A newly appointed captain approaches the chief and says
that she would like to take a new course she just heard
advertised on how to use you intuition to improve your
management style.

Reactive Chief's Response: _____

High Performing Chief's Response: _____

8. A citizen approaches the chief and asks if the chief will
help a group of citizens set up a citizens' patrol group
since the drug sales are occurring on the street in their
neighborhood.

Reactive Chief's Response: _____

High Performing Chief's Response: _____

9. Which of these two chiefs is likely to stay in his/her job
longer? Why?

Reactive

High Performing

Why:

QUALITIES WANTED IN A JOB

1. To work with people who treat me with respect.
2. Interesting work.
3. Recognition for good work.
4. A chance to develop my skills.
5. To work for people who listen if you have ideas on how to do your job better.
6. A chance to think for myself.
7. To work for efficient managers.
8. A job that is not too easy.
9. Seeing the end results of my work.
10. To feel well-informed about what is going on.

Public Agenda Foundation
in Reinventing the Corporation
Naisbitt and Auberdene

THINGS TO REMEMBER

1. The best and the brightest people will gravitate toward organizations that foster personal growth.
2. The manager's new role -- coach, teacher, mentor.
3. The best people want ownership -- psychic and literal -- in a company; the best companies are providing it.
4. We are moving from authoritarian management to a networking, people-style of management.
5. Quality will be paramount in an organization.
6. Large corporations are emulating the positive and productive qualities of small business.

Reinventing the Corporation
Naisbitt and Auberdene

TEN QUESTIONS EMPLOYEES WILL ASK YOU ABOUT A JOB

1. Is this a police department where I will experience personal growth?
2. Does your department reward performance and initiative?
3. What is the vision and mission of this police department?
4. How is this department structured? What kinds of networking occurs in the organization?
5. Where does this police department stand on wellness, health and fitness?
6. Is this department flexible about job arrangements?
7. How successful have women and minorities been on this police department?
8. Is this department involved with programs involving the University?
9. Is this police department thinking about life-long training and education?
10. Is this a place department where people are having fun?

modified from Reinventing the Corporation,
Naisbitt and Aberdene

THE WORK FORCE: KEY CHARACTERISTICS

PRE-WW II	"TV BABIES"	"COMPUTER BABIES"
----- PREFERRED WORK ENVIRONMENT -----		
power hierarchy: work your way up the ladder of success	quality circles and teams; partic- ipatory management	autonomy; individual works alone, least amount of supervision
----- GOAL -----		
get the job done because it is good for the company; good for the nation	get meaningful ex- perience from doing the job; personal growth	get the job done so individual can use his own leisure time more satisfactorily
----- WORK MEDIUM -----		
assembly line; human labor	mainframe computers	personal (desktop) computers
----- TIME VALUES -----		
9 to 5; overtime	9 to 5; flextime begins	flextime, flexplace
----- INFORMATION AND ENCULTURATION MEDIA -----		
radio in the living room; newsreels at movie theater	television news; rock and roll; transistor radios	walkman; vcr's; music videos
----- CONSUMPTION -----		
brand-name buying; few choices avail- able; few demanded	more choices available	more choices demanded

"Tomorrow's Work Force: New Values in the Workplace, R. Eden
Deutsch, "The Futurist" Magazine, 12/85

MANAGERIAL SKILLS

OLD AGE SKILLS

- : set goals and establish policies and procedures
- : organize, motivate and control people
- : analyze situations and formulate strategic and operating plans
- : respond to change through new strategies and reorganizations
- : implement change by issuing new policies and procedures
- : get results and produce respectable growth, profitability, and return on investment

NEW AGE SKILLS

- # creative insight: asking the right questions
- # sensitivity: doing unto others
- # vision: creating the future
- # versatility: anticipating change
- # focus: implementing change
- # patience: living in the long term

creating excellence
hickman & silva

CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS

1. **THEY IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS CHANGE AGENTS.** Their professional and personal image was to make a difference and transform the organization that they had assumed responsibility for.
2. **THEY ARE COURAGEOUS INDIVIDUALS.** Courage is not stupidity. These are prudent risk takers, individuals who take a stand.
3. **THEY BELIEVE IN PEOPLE.** These transformational leaders are not dictators. They are powerful yet sensitive of other people, and ultimately they work toward the empowerment of others.
4. **THEY ARE VALUE-DRIVEN.** Each one of our transformational leaders was able to articulate a set of core values and exhibited behavior that was quite congruent with their value positions.
5. **THEY ARE LIFE-LONG LEARNERS.** All of our transformational leaders were able to talk about mistakes they had made...As a group, our protagonists show an amazing appetite for continuous self-learning and development.
6. **THEY HAVE THE ABILITY TO DEAL WITH COMPLEXITY, AMBIGUITY AND UNCERTAINTY.** Each of our transformational leaders was able to cope with and frame problems in a complex, changing world. All of these protagonists were not only capable of dealing with the cultural and political side of the organization, but they were very capable in dealing with the technical side...They are entranced by the world of ideas.
7. **THEY ARE VISIONARIES.** Our transformational leaders were able to dream, able to translate those dreams and images so that other people could share them.

The Transformational Leader, Tichy and Devanna, 1986

DAY II

A.M.: The War on Drugs -- Can We Win?

P.M.: Drug Enforcement and Community Oriented Policing: New Concepts

Street Interdiction - Drug Enforcement

A Panel Discussion

The Boston Video
(Do You Really Wanna Be On Television)

Panel Discussion of Impacts

This session begins with participants viewing a television broadcast about the operations of the Boston Police Department's Drug Control Unit. This broadcast, produced by local Boston public television, show the Drug Control Unit in actual street operations. The film has generated substantial controversy in Boston.

Following the television presentation, participants will engage a panel of their peers who react to what they have viewed in the television program. Key questions to be addressed by the panel members will include questions about the strategies used by the unit, the probable impact of the strategies on drug control efforts and the impact of the media on the public's perception of the Boston Police Department's effectiveness.



Using the following worksheet, participants should note their reactions to the Boston video. Take careful note of how you think the public would react to the situations on the tape.

Following the video, using the Nelson/Burns Table on the following page, rank the police unit according to the criteria in the Nelson/Burns article.

Reading Material: The following article will be discussed in light of the material contained in the Boston video tape.

Mintz, John and Victoria Churchville, "Vice Officer Walk Thin Line Between Crime and Law;" Washington: The Washington Post, 1987.

REACTION: RATE THE BOSTON DRUG CONTROL UNIT ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING DIMENSIONS. CIRCLE THE DESCRIPTION THAT APPLIES.




Characteristics of Successful Drug Enforcement Programs

This session provides a review of the issues involved in developing a drug enforcement policy and program for a police agency. The issues include management, community relations, media relations, inter-agency coordination and audit and control mechanisms.

Following this discussion of issues, participants will be provided with a current inventory of drug enforcement and strategies that have been successfully implemented in police jurisdictions across the country. The inventory includes Operation Pressure Point, Operation Clean Sweep, Career Criminal Programs, Asset Forfeiture Programs, School Education Programs and the Drug Use Forecasting programs (DUF).

The key issues reviewed in this session focus on answering the question: What makes strategic programs work? How does the manager get involvement and commitment from operating personnel? These and related questions will be answered in this session.

Magnitude of Drug Problem: A Comparison



The National Drug Problem *

- One in 10 Americans used an illicit drug in the past 30 days.
- One in 5 used an illicit drug in the past year.
- One in 6 high school seniors used illicit drugs in the past year.
- One in 18 high school seniors used crack cocaine.

* As reported by DEA Administrator Jack Lawn, Feb 1989.

DRUGS: THE NATIONAL CRISIS

Productivity Loss

- 65% of people entering work force for the first time experienced illicit drug abuse.
- 42% of these experienced illegal drug use in the past year.

DRUGS: THE NATIONAL CRISIS

Productivity Loss

- Drug abuse costs businesses \$60 billion per year.
- \$35 billion of this is lost productivity due to absentism, work place accidents, rising medical costs, and thefts.

Drug Talk: Day Line Interviews

Using the format of "Night Line," this session provides the participants with the opportunity to hear from experts in the field talk about their own drug enforcement program efforts. Beginning with a video taped statement by three experts in drug enforcement programs, a live talk show format will provide participants with the opportunity to ask questions of the experts via a live telephone hook-up.

The seminar facilitator will serve as the moderator of the session. Participants will indicate their desire to ask a question by raising their hand; the facilitator will bring the microphone to them, at the appropriate time, and they will ask their question. The telephone guest will then answer the question. Following that answer, other guests may add information, if they so desire.

The actual expert participants will be announced at the beginning of the session, after actual connections have been arranged for the day.

Problem Solving - Small Group

A Case Study of Management

The problem solving group has been selected because it provides a unique perspective on problem solving. The objective of the Day II exercise is to develop a consensus for action, the action being a recommendation to the patrol commander about how to best deal with a typical urban policing problem. The assessors will be evaluating the members of the group on both the substance of their recommendations as well as the quality of participation in reaching a group decision.

Each participant should carefully read the following case study after class the first evening. Being prepared to discuss this case study at the beginning of the second day is important to the success of the enterprise.

Reading Materials: To prepare for the session on Day II, participants should read the following:

Dickson, Clarence, Drug Stings in Miami; Washington: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, January, 1988.

Gay, William G. with Robert A. Bowers, Targeting Law Enforcement Resources: The Career Criminal Focus; Washington: National Institute of Justice, 1985.

Kleiman, Mark A.R. and Christopher E. Petula, State and Local Drug Law Enforcement: Issues and Practices; Unpublished Manuscript.

Kleiman, Mark A.R., Retail-Level Drug Crackdowns; Washington: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1987.

Mintz, John and Victoria Churchville, "Vice Officers Walk Thin Line Between Crime and Law"; Washington: The Washington Post, 1987.

Zimmer, L., Operation Pressure Point: The Disruption of Street-Level Drug Trade on New York's Lower East Side; Center for Research in Crime and Justice, NYU School of Law, 1987.

CASE STUDY: PROBLEM SOLVING

You are a commander in a mid-sized city police department. The population of the city is 180,000. The size of your department is 500 sworn and 130 civilians. Your city is divided into five districts; each district has been assigned an average of 49 patrol officers, with the exception of the downtown district which has 21 officers assigned to traffic and foot patrol and the remaining 28 to patrol generally. You are a district commander in this department.

The most recent quarterly crime report shows the following changes in crime in your city:

Residential Burglary	+28.1%
Commercial Burglary	- 1.2%
Auto Theft	+24.9%
Vandalism	+ 5.0%
Theft from Auto	+19.8%
Armed Robbery	+22.4%
Commercial Armed Robbery	+29.8%
Purse Grabbing	-18.1%
Residential Arson	+50.8%
Commercial Arson	+26.0%

In addition, the chief and the mayor have been receiving increasing numbers of complaints from citizens: In one district, with public housing and low rent apartments, citizens have complained that they do not feel safe on the street and are no longer able to allow their children to play on the streets. One woman complained that a man in her apartment building pushed her inside her apartment and told her to stay out of the way. Citizens who live in a medium to low residential area are complaining that there are streams of people going in and out of certain houses and people walking in the neighborhood or driving through are being stopped and asked if they want to buy drugs. Parents are complaining that they have heard stories of kids coming to school with large amounts of cash and these same and these same parents are fearful for the influence on their won children. Another small neighborhood of low-middle class homes, blue collar workers are complaining that there is a couple of blocks bordering their neighborhood with abandoned buildings which have been subject to arson more recently.

The chief is irate and has directed the patrol commander to take some action. The patrol commander has now come to you --the district commanders--with an appeal for some really creative programs to change this situation.

What ideas do you have? How will you approach the problem? How will you plan and implement your program ideas?

You will now attend a meeting of your peers to decide what you are going to present to the patrol commander.

WORKSHEET: Problem Solving - Small Group - Role Analysis

Review how your small group interacts and answer the following questions.

1. How many leaders emerged in the group?

2. How did you know that these individuals, or single person, were performing as leaders? What were their behaviors and activities that distinguished them from others?

3. How many ideas or programs were designed? List them.

4. Were the program ideas realistic? Would they work in your unit or department? Why or why not.

5. Were there individuals who did not participate in the discussions? Why do you think they behaved that way?

6. Did any one individual attempt to organize the work more than others? Did any one individual keep track of time for the group?

7. Did you notice any particularly good ideas that were lost because of lack of organization?

8. How did they group analyze the problem presented to them? What kinds of techniques did they use?

UNDERSTANDING YOUR LEADERSHIP ACTIONS

Questionnaire


Each of the following items describes a leadership action. In the space next to each item write 5 if you always behave that way, 4 if you frequently behave that way, 3 if you occasionally behave that way, 2 if you seldom behave that way and 1 if you never behave that way.

When I am a member of a group:

1. I offer facts and give my opinions, ideas, feelings, and information in order to help the group discussion.
2. I warmly encourage all members of the group to participate. I am open to their ideas. I let them know I value their contributions to the group.
3. I ask for facts, information, opinions, ideas, and feelings from the other group members in order to help the group discussion.
4. I help communicate among group members by using good communications skills. I make sure that each group member understands what the others say.
5. I give direction to the group by planning how to go on with the group work and by calling attention to the tasks that need to be done. I assign responsibilities to different group members.
6. I tell jokes and suggest interesting ways of doing the work in order to reduce tension in the group and increase the fun we have working together.
7. I pull together related ideas or suggestions made by group members and restate and summarize the major points discussed by the group.
8. I observe the way the group is working and use my observations to help discuss how the group can work together better.
9. I give the group energy. I encourage group members to work hard to achieve our goals.
10. I promote the open discussion of conflicts among group members in order to resolve disagreements and increase group cohesiveness. I mediate conflicts among members when they seem unable to resolve them directly.
11. I ask others to summarize what the group has been discussing in order to ensure that they understand group decisions and comprehend the material being discussed by the group.
12. I express support, acceptance, and liking for other members of the group and give the group appropriate praise when another member has taken a constructive action in the group.

To obtain a total score for TASK actions and MAINTENANCE actions, write the score for each item in the appropriate column and then add the columns.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| ___ 1. information & opinion giver | ___ 2. encourager of participation |
| ___ 3. information & opinion seeker | ___ 4. communication facilitator |
| ___ 5. direction & role definer | ___ 6. tension reliever |
| ___ 7. summarizer | ___ 8. process observer |
| ___ 9. energizer | ___ 10. interpersonal problem solver |
| ___ 11. comprehension checker | ___ 12. supporter & praiser |
| ___ Total for Task Actions | ___ Total for Maintenance Actions |



(6,6) Only a minimum effort is given to getting the required work done. There is general non-involvement with group members...

(6,30) High value is placed on keeping good relationships within the group. Thoughtful attention is given to the needs of other members...However, he or she may never help the group get any work accomplished.

(18,18) The task and maintenance needs of the group are balanced. The person with this score continually makes compromises between task needs and maintenance needs. Though a great compromiser, this person does not look for or find ways to creatively integrate task and maintenance activities for optimal productivity.

(30,30) When everyone plans and makes decisions together, all the members become committed to getting the task done as they build relationships of trust and respect. A high value is placed on sound; creative decisions that result in understanding and agreement. Ideas and opinions are sought and listened to, even when they differ from one's own. The group as a whole defines the task and works to get it done. The creative combining of both task and maintenance needs is encouraged.

Joining Together: Group Theory and Group Skills, 3rd Edition,

CLANDESTINE LABS

*REFERENCE NOTES FOR MODULE I LESSON 1
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY ENFORCEMENT/SEMINAR/
TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

PART I:

BACK-GROUND:

Drug abuse is the number one social problem in the United States.

- (A) Rank among the top cause of death for young Americans.
- (B) Estimated cost of drug abuse in the United States is 1.5 billion dollars.
- (C) Cost to industry \$47 to \$49 billion dollars, from loss of efficiency and productivity, accidents, absenteeism, thievery and medical compensation.

II. PROBLEM:

We face a growing number of Clandestine Laboratories operating in the United States.

SEIZURE MADE DURING 1987 BY (DEA).

- (A) 1987 - Six-hundred and eighty two (682) laboratories were seized in the United States and thirty-four percent (34%) over 1986.
- (B) Approximately twelve-hundred (1,200) laboratories were seized by law enforcement agencies, federal, state and local police.

"DRUG ABUSE" - It has been stated that approximately twenty percent (20%) of all drugs abused in the United States are produced in the United States.

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC EFFECT.

The more pressure put on sources, the more we can anticipate increased Clandestine Laboratory activity in the United States.

HOSPITAL EMERGENCIES:

Methamphetamine abuse continued to increase during 1987.

A number of Methamphetamine related hospital emergencies increased thirty percent (30%) from 1986 to 1987 and is at its highest level since 1980.

CLANDESTINE LABORATORIES REMAIN THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE FOR METHAMPHETAMINE:

States where most Clandestine Laboratories appear to be operating are:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Southern and Northern California. | 5. Florida. |
| 2. Eastern Texas. | 6. Pennsylvania. |
| 3. Oregon and Washington. | 7. New Jersey |
| 4. New Mexico. | |

Clandestine Laboratories were also seized in other states, but many have not been included in these statistics.

COORDINATION WITH DEA/BJA/NSA.

We intend to develop and implement an extensive awareness program with:

- A. Participants' handbooks.
- B. Oriented monographs.

NSA/BJA PROPOSES TO HAVE FIFTEEN (15) SEMINARS.

PART III.

PURPOSE:

TO INCREASE AWARENESS:

- A. Dangers of Clandestine Laboratory to the community as well as Police Officers.
- B. Drug abuse impact in the community.
- C. Need for safety training and equipment.
- D. Coordination between enforcement, chemists and prosecutors.
- E. Dangers in handling of hazardous materials found in a Clandestine Laboratory.
- F. Agency responsibility as it relates to health and safety, not only to police officers, but to communities under the EPA laws, OSHA laws and Transportation laws, which regulate the handling transportation and disposal of hazardous materials.
- G. Responsibility and cost for disposal of hazardous materials upon seizure of Clandestine Laboratory agencies becomes "generator", and is responsible for safe disposal of all hazardous materials found in the laboratory.

VI. ELECTED OFFICIALS:

(A) Show the need for Resources.

(1) Equipment and Training.

PROSECUTORS:

(A) The need for close cooperation with law enforcement at an early stage in Clandestine Laboratory Investigations.

CHEMISTS:

(A) To advise law enforcement as to type and capacity of laboratory. Help make decisions as to when and how laboratory should be secured.

EMERGENCY TEAMS:

Should be on standby in case of accident, explosion or fire. Clandestine Laboratory may be operating next door. They have been found in rural areas, residential neighborhoods, farms, mountain cabins, house trailers and recreational vehicles. These are time bombs waiting to explode.

X. GOAL/OBJECTIVE:

To provide law enforcement officials, prosecutors, state and local government elected officials, chemists and government regulatory agency personnel with the necessary information and the opportunity to learn the protocols and methodologies necessary to safely investigate seize and dismantle a Clandestine Laboratory.

FUTURE POLICE ISSUES:


This Session will consist of a discussion of those issues that law enforcement will face in the near future.

FUTURE POLICE ISSUES




POLICE ROLE:
Professional
Caretakers

FUTURE POLICE ISSUES



FUTURE POLICE ISSUES


SOCIO-ECONOMIC



THE NEW
AMERICAN
POVERTY

THE NEW
AMERICAN
UNDERCLASS

FUTURE POLICE ISSUES



The quality of a democracy
is determined by its police.

Community-Oriented Policing: What's New

Neighborhood-Oriented Policing Problem-Oriented Policing Community-Oriented Policing

This session provides an overview of three programmatic concepts closed linked, and an important part of the developing orientation in American policing during the late 1980's. The initial presentation provides a historical basis for the new policing approach and an overview of the neighborhood-oriented policing programs that have evolved during the first half of the 1980's. Program elements, examples of how the programs worked in selected cities and lessons learned from the programs are presented.

The second part of the session will provide an overview of problem-oriented. A description of the differences between this style of policing and neighborhood-oriented policing will be provided. Examples of program implementation will be provided.

Finally, the session will review the work on community-oriented policing. A description of program elements and the linkages to both neighborhood-oriented and problem-oriented policing will be provided. The participant will know from this presentation how to identify the key elements of each of these policing orientations.

Glazer, Nathan "On Subway Graffiti in New York;" The Public Interest.

Goldstein, Herman, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach; Crime and Delinquency, 25 (1979).

Kelling, George L., Police and Communities: the Quiet Revolution; Cambridge: Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, 1988.

Oettmeier, T.N. and W.H. Bieck, Developing a Policing Style for Neighborhood Oriented Policing; Houston: Houston Police Department, 1987.

Sherman, Lawrence W., "Repeat Calls To Police in Minneapolis"; Washington, : Crime Control Reports, February, 1987.

Spelman, William and John E. Eck, Problem-Oriented Policing;
Washington: National Institute of Justice, 1987.

Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows;" in The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1982.

Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling, "Making Neighborhoods Safe", The Atlantic Monthly, February, 1989.

COMMUNITY POLICING

---PROBLEM SOLVING ORIENTATION

---DECENTRALIZED NEIGHBORHOODS

---EMPOWER OFFICERS

"NEW ROLES FOR SUPERVISORS"

---VALUE DRIVEN

RULES - REGS - POLICIES

---SHARE RESPONSIBILITY WITH COMMUNITY

THEY DO - WE DO

---ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT TO SERVICE

QUALITY OF LIFE ISSUES

COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING

UNDERLYING ISSUES

- FEAR
- REPEAT CALLS/INCIDENTS
- STRUCTURE

INCIDENTAL INTELLIGENCE

FEAR = CRIME

"INCIVILITIES"

Values of Community Policing

- Community policing is committed to a partnership with the community toward problem-solving; dealing with crime, disorder and the quality of life of neighborhoods.
- Under community policing, police service delivery is decentralized to the neighborhood level.
- The highest commitment of the community policing organization is to treatment of all citizens with respect and understanding. Community policing respects the skills of positive social interaction rather than simply technical application of procedures to situations, whether dealing with crime, disorder or other problem-solving.
- The community-oriented police department makes the highest commitment to collaborative problem-solving, bringing neighborhoods into substantive discussions with police personnel to identify ways of dealing with neighborhood problems.
- The community-oriented police department recognizes that constructive action by police and community is always better than action by the police alone.
- The community-oriented police department views the community and the law as the source of the department's authority.
- The community-oriented policing agency is committed to furthering democratic values. Every action of the agency reflects the importance of protecting constitutional rights and ensuring basic personal freedoms of all citizens.

CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF POLICING

1880-1920 Political/Corruption Era

1920-1960 Professional/Reform Era

1960s Transition Era

1970-Now Community Oriented Era

KEY EVENTS FORCING CHANGE

1920s-1930s:

- Corruption
- Political influence on police

Reaction:

Professional Crime Fighter/Reform

1920s-1930s (continued)

- Isolated from community
- Technology
- Tight controls on discretion
- Strict Civil Service
hiring procedures
- Citizens viewed as
information providers

KEY EVENTS FORCING CHANGE

1960s-1970s:

- Racial unrest/Riots
- High crime
- Violence
- Explosion of police myths

Reaction: Research, education,
community-oriented policing,
differential police response,
problem-oriented policing

KEY EVENTS FORCING CHANGE

1980s:

- "Broken windows" concept
- Respect for community
negotiate priorities
- Response time not always critical
- 85% - Calls for service

1980s (continued)

- Attitude change towards workers and citizens
- Problem solving not incident responding
- Directed -- not random -- patrol




Communicating About Fear Reduction

This session presents the Houston Police Department's Fear Reduction Video Tape. This video tape reviews the department's Fear Reduction Program undertaken during 1984 and 1985 with National Institute of Justice research assistance.

Following the viewing of the video tape, participants will address several concerns arising from the fear reduction experiments and the video tape, including the program development strategy, techniques for involvement of line personnel, empowerment of employees and integration of the lessons learned into normal department procedures.

On the following page is a ranking table from the Nelson/Burns High Performance Management article. Rank the Houston fear reduction program as it reflects on the police department, using the criteria on the table.

ASSESS HOUSTON'S FEAR REDUCTION PROGRAM. RATE THE FEAR REDUCTION PROGRAM ON EACH OF THE DIMENSIONS BELOW.



DAY III

Community Oriented Policing -- What It Can Do For Us

Community Oriented Policing: Changes in Management Demanded

This session will focus on the issues that mid-level managers must face if they are to utilize a community-oriented policing approach. There are several areas of management which will demand a new look AND a change in our old views.

This session will address response to calls for service, beat boundaries, beat integrity, new factors in workload analysis and new, more flexible organizational structures and approaches to planning.

**WE NOW KNOW THAT THESE
BELIEFS ARE WRONG!**

1. Repeat Calls For Service:

1978 NU plotted CFS

**50% of calls were to addresses
w/ 12 previous calls for service**


We simply respond

and respond

and respond....

2. Citizen satisfaction is not a result of immediate response!

Expected Arrival vs Actual Arrival



Add 1 beat! Where?

3. Beat Design

We forgot community
& neighborhood..

BELIEFS

1. RAPID RESPONSE

Driving Force = 911 Calls

Out of Sector Time

2. Equal Workload: 1 off responds

to equal # of calls

3. Number of Beats = # of Officers

4. Boundaries of beats are almost always streets


5. Change beats when workload changes

Rules That Are Developing:

1. Rapid response is important for only 10% of calls.
Differential Police Response
2. Beats must reflect neighborhoods.
3. Assign officers to beats.
4. Streets should never be boundaries.
5. Don't change beats -- add or subtract officers.

STAFFING FACTOR

5 On -- 2 Off Work Schedule



WORKSHEET: Analyzing Our Community

Please respond to the questions below. You may not have exact data, but answer according to your impressions of what is occurring in your agency.

1. List below those problems of which you are aware that pertain to the communications function:
 - a. Call Receipt:
 - b. Call Dispatch:

2. List below those problems of which you are aware that pertain to workload and the patrol function:
 - a. Officers' Complaints:
 - b. Supervisors' Complaints:
 - c. Citizens' Complaints:
 - d. Commanders' Complaints:

3. List below those problems of which you are aware that pertain to the workload of the detective function:
 - a. Detectives' Complaints:
 - b. Supervisors' Complaints:
 - c. Citizens' and Commanders' Complaints:

**Major Steps In A
Differential Police Response Program**

- o **Call for Service Analysis**
Analyze the call for service workload of the department. Determine the generic types of calls that are being responded to. Listen to tapes of calls to determine strengths and weaknesses of current call processing.
- o **Development of a Classification Scheme**
Develop a set of Call Classifiers (characteristics of calls that determine the proper call response). Test alternative schemes.
- o **I.D. Call Alternatives**
Identify current call alternatives being used. From the analysis above, determine areas in which new alternatives can make a difference. Research the possibility of using those alternatives. Develop use guidelines with input from impacted units and agencies.
- o **Establish a Policy for Community and Patrol Force**
Develop a call classification and response policy. Provide for response over-ride. Develop a patrol allocation system and directed patrol program guidelines. Test system. Train personnel.

New vs Old:

A Changing Police Service

Tied To The Old

- o Rapid Response to all calls
- o Beats defined by main thoroughfares
- o Assignment of officers varies according to needs of police
- o Rotating schedules based on departments' needs
- o one departmental policy - one man or two man cars
- o Police react to calls for service
- o Police tell community what the community needs

Break Free With The New

- o Different Response to different types of calls
- o Beats defined by natural neighborhoods
- o Same officer assigned to same beat area
- o Scheduling according to call frequency
- o mixed car assignment based types and frequency of calls
- o Police manage calls for service
- o Police ask neighborhoods what the neighborhood need

Small Group Problem Solving

In this session, small groups will review a case study based on neighborhood and patrol problems. The group will focus its work on designing a police strategy to respond to the demands of the troubled neighborhood. Strategies may include:

- o Community & Neighborhood Oriented Approach
- o Problem Oriented Strategy Development
- o Managing work and call loads
- o Crime Prevention Techniques
- o Organization and Structural Redesign
- o Developing a total departmental philosophy

Overview of the Department. The City of Durwood is an urban center with a population of approximately 220,000. Situated in Lyme County, it is the urban center of this modern area just south of a major metropolitan area. While Lyme County is noted for its rapid growth and large middle-class population, Durwood has an urban core area heavily populated by middle to lower income residents.

The Chief has asked you to give him a preliminary recommendation of how to allocate personnel to better achieve community oriented policing. He wants officers to spend an average of 50% of their time in calls for service response, an average of 30% of their time in self-initiated activities including conducting follow-up investigations of crimes that were committed earlier, and 20% in community oriented problem solving activities.

Patrol officers are distributed over the city in teams. There are four team areas with two teams assigned for each of the three daily shifts. Therefore, at any given time there are eight teams on duty and over the course of a day, 24 teams will spend time on the patrol function. Each team is composed of a Sergeant and a number of patrol officers varying from 3 on midnight teams to 4 on day teams and 6 on evening shift teams.

Currently, 112 officers (not including supervisors) are assigned to the mobile patrol function. Twenty-four (24) are assigned to the midnight shift, thirty-two (32) are assigned to the day shift, forty-eight (48) are assigned to the evening shift, and eight (8) were assigned to the power shift.

The Department is approximately 48 sworn officers below its authorized level. This is due to "natural" attrition, an unusually high number of recent disciplinary dismissals, and difficulty in finding acceptable recruits to train as police officers. The personnel shortage in the patrol function is exacerbated by the Department's recent practice of creating special units and staffing them immediately with manpower from the patrol function. The Department has 590 authorized positions, 390 sworn and 200 civilian.

Durwood P.D. Authorized Personnel Staffing

	Sworn (Vacant)	Civilian
Chiefs Office	4	2
Investigations	74 (5)	22
Field Operations		
Community Services/Foot Patrol	33	13
Tactical Response Anti-Drug Unit	16	0
Team Policing	<u>197</u> (41)	<u>10</u>
	246	23
Technical Support	12	117
Field Support		
Traffic	38 (1)	28
Canine Unit	5	0
Other	<u>11</u> (1)	<u>8</u>
	54	36
Department Total	<u>390</u> (48)	<u>200</u>

In Durwood, the number of calls for service begins dropping after midnight until around 6 a.m., then begins to increase through the day generally peaking about 9 or 10 p.m. Call frequencies are somewhat higher on weekends - Friday, Saturday, and Sunday - than on weekdays. The highest average call frequency is between 10 and 11 p.m. on Friday nights, the lowest average frequency is between 4 and 5 a.m. on Wednesday mornings. Although the percent of crime related calls for service time varies from a peak of 50.5% Tuesday morning between 7 and 8 a.m. to a low of 18.2% Monday morning between 5 and 6 a.m., the overall average is 35.9%.

Patrol officers work five days a week and are on duty each day for 8.5 hours although they are paid for eight hours of work a day (not including any overtime worked). For the day shift and for the evening shift, half of the teams report an hour earlier than the other teams in order to provide an overlap to shift change time. An additional shift, called the power shift, operates from 7 p.m. to 3:30 a.m. to provide extra officers during the peak of the workload. Shift times are:

Day,	even teams: 0700-1530	odd teams: 0800-1630	
Evening,	even teams: 1500-2330	odd teams: 1600-0030	
Midnight,	2300-0730	power shift: 1900-0330	

Tables 1,2, and 3 show the average amount of available patrol time expended by calls for service, officer initiated activity,

and by the two combined. Already factored into the tables is the average number of patrol person hours expected to be available for each hour for each day of the week. Time lost due to officers' unpaid meal breaks, the patrol time lost during shift change, and the absentee rates (19% - midnight shift, 16% -day shift, 15% for evening and power shifts) are all reflected in the tables.

Overall, 85.6% of the average expected personnel time is consumed by combined call for service time and officer observed activity. A striking feature of this figure is that a number of the percentages represent averages over 100%. This means that all of the average expected patrol officer time is consumed and that, in order for the work to be performed, sergeants, officers working overtime, and officers in other units such as traffic, foot patrol, canine, and reserves must be routinely used.

There has been growing concern that call stacking, or the backlogging of calls, has been increasing. The perception of patrol officers and sergeants is that there are not sufficient cars in service during the peak periods and some higher priority calls are not being responded to as quickly as they should be. A corollary problem is the perception that there are not enough units to provide back-up for those calls requiring back-up for officer safety. Consequently patrol sergeants, who are to supervise their teams and only rarely provide back-up, perceive that they now frequently provide back-up because there are no other available units.

Another consequence is that during some shifts, occasionally, there are no officers available for a team and only a sergeant on duty. Another perception is that often when the evening shift begins work, there is a large backlog of calls and the entire shift is spent going from call to call in order to deal with the backlog as well as the new work generated during the evening.

PERCENT AVAILABLE TIME CONSUMED BY CALLS FOR SERVICE AND OFFICER INITIATED ACTIVITY

TIME	MON	TUES	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
0000	89.5%	106.7%	103.3%	94.1%	95.9%	82.2%	86.3%
0100	81.3%	95.7%	93.1%	93.3%	85.7%	78.7%	80.4%
0200	74.0%	92.5%	84.9%	87.2%	74.5%	77.3%	83.2%
0300	94.2%	108.5%	103.9%	110.4%	91.7%	96.5%	107.3%
0400	72.6%	85.8%	82.3%	93.4%	80.4%	83.5%	83.7%
0500	69.9%	87.6%	87.7%	96.1%	82.5%	73.1%	73.8%
0600	74.1%	95.5%	93.4%	94.7%	76.8%	66.8%	67.9%
0700	74.1	58.7%	56.9%	74.3%	72.1%	78.7%	78.1%
0800	56.0%	47.7%	50.8%	73.7%	59.5%	48.4%	55.3%
0900	73.8%	63.9%	72.6%	98.6%	85.6%	68.7%	73.3%
1000	81.8%	74.7%	81.9%	107.0%	94.8%	77.0%	87.7%
1100	100.0%	93.2%	105.7%	130.7%	115.1%	98.9%	105.4%
1200	100.1%	96.1%	110.0%	138.6%	121.1%	105.3%	112.8%
1300	102.1%	95.8%	111.2%	139.1%	122.1%	105.2%	112.6%
1400	97.8%	93.8%	106.1%	132.3%	119.4%	93.5%	110.4%
1500	68.8%	62.7%	64.7%	66.9%	68.5%	59.4%	70.0%
1600	64.1%	60.9%	59.1%	55.7%	60.1%	57.1%	58.9%
1700	83.1%	78.8%	73.9%	70.5%	76.7%	74.2%	72.5%
1800	91.3%	89.7%	81.0%	78.8%	93.0%	83.7%	81.3%
1900	96.7%	98.9%	84.8%	82.0%	89.4%	86.1%	81.5%
2000	102.1%	103.4%	88.9%	87.7%	97.2%	93.8%	92.9%
2100	100.0%	101.8%	89.1%	87.0%	98.3%	94.6%	93.1%
2200	93.8%	89.5%	81.9%	81.4%	97.2%	93.7%	86.7%
2300	64.7%	61/4%	59.7%	55.7%	60.4%	58.9%	58.1%

WORKSHEET

Community Problems and Their Impact on Police
Units

Directions: Review the work of your own police unit and answer the following questions as they impact your work as the manager of your unit.

1. In what capacities do citizens interact with your unit and/or subordinates?

2. Has the nature of those individual citizens changed over the past several years? If yes, describe the nature of that change.

3. Have you had to change your procedures or "way of doing business" as a result of those changes? If yes, describe.

4. What kinds of supervisory or management changes have occurred?

5. How have your officers reacted to the changes, or to the citizens generally, if there has been no changes?

6. How do your officers feel about calls, tasks and events that are not truly crime fighting? If there are frustrations, how do you deal with these frustrations?

INDICATORS OF POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN DELIVERY OF POLICE SERVICES

INDICATOR	PROBLEM
Number of calls for service (3-5 year comparison)	Demand for police services rising while numbers of officers available is remaining the same, decreasing or not increasing proportionately.
Number of sworn positions (same time span as above)	
Number of sworn positions Population of jurisdiction	An increase in population with same or decreasing numbers of sworn positions: may indicate a change in the quality of police service.
Average income of population (5 year comparison)	An significant decline in avg. income <u>may</u> produce additional policing problems.
Number of times per day communications needs to stack calls (pattern should be reviewed for peak hours per day or peak days for week).	If stacking of calls is frequent and/or increasing there is a good chance that there are periods when an officer is not available for a critical emergency call.
Reasons for stacking: Does stacking occur because no cars are available <u>or</u> is radio or air time saturated?	If calls are being stacked for either of these two reasons the net result is the same, i.e., cars cannot answer critical emergency calls rapidly.
Analysis of calls for service: Total number of calls for service (5 year comparison)	If the highest percentage of calls are not emergency or critical in nature and response time to emergency call is not satisfactory, this may indicate a need for alternative means to handle calls.
Number of calls involving life threatening situations	
Number of calls which are not "emergency" in nature	
Number of times an officer is on administrative run.	
Response time to emergency calls (time computed from receipt of call until officer arrives on scene).	

Liability suits for negligence

Any liability suit resulting from non-responsiveness of the police will result from an emergency in which police were not available. This is a critical indicator of a force deployed in a way which does not provide sufficient coverage for emergencies.

Expressions of dissatisfaction of police services by citizens (Editorials, surveys, letters of complaint to city administration, etc.)

While there are many factors which contribute to the expression of dissatisfaction of police services by citizens one important one may be the result of lack of responsiveness on the part of police to emergency situations citizens may be given false expectations by the dispatcher of how quickly police will arrive on the scene

From audiotape of call intake transmission: A call receipt clerk who is rude, harried abrupt and generally obtaining minimal information for the responding officer.

This is an indicator that the communications division could be better organized to gain significant improvement in the treatment of citizens as well as responding officers.

From audiotape of dispatcher transmission to responding officer: Minimal information regarding the nature of the call; stacking and some calls not being answered at all.

These are indicators of the needs for reorganization of the communications division as well as a need for redistricting and realignment of resources for more equitable workload.

Number of repeat calls to same address

Repeat calls suggest that the police response is not being effective in solving the real problem.

Excerpted from: IMPLEMENTING DIFFERENTIAL POLICE RESPONSE: COMMANDER'S TRAINING

Authors: Sally Jones, Stanley Knee, James Luman, Robert Wasserman and Phyllis McDonald

Published By: The URSA Institute, Bethesda, Maryland under the auspices of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

UNDERSTANDING YOUR LEADERSHIP ACTIONS

Questionnaire


Each of the following items describes a leadership action. In the space next to each item write 5 if you always behave that way, 4 if you frequently behave that way, 3 if you occasionally behave that way, 2 if you seldom behave that way and 1 if you never behave that way.

When I am a member of a group:

- ___ 1. I offer facts and give my opinions, ideas, feelings, and information in order to help the group discussion.
- ___ 2. I warmly encourage all members of the group to participate. I am open to their ideas. I let them know I value their contributions to the group.
- ___ 3. I ask for facts, information, opinions, ideas, and feelings from the other group members in order to help the group discussion.
- ___ 4. I help communicate among group members by using good communications skills. I make sure that each group member understands what the others say.
- ___ 5. I give direction to the group by planning how to go on with the group work and by calling attention to the tasks that need to be done. I assign responsibilities to different group members.
- ___ 6. I tell jokes and suggest interesting ways of doing the work in order to reduce tension in the group and increase the fun we have working together.
- ___ 7. I pull together related ideas or suggestions made by group members and restate and summarize the major points discussed by the group.
- ___ 8. I observe the way the group is working and use my observations to help discuss how the group can work together better.
- ___ 9. I give the group energy. I encourage group members to work hard to achieve our goals.
- ___ 10. I promote the open discussion of conflicts among group members in order to resolve disagreements and increase group cohesiveness. I mediate conflicts among members when they seem unable to resolve them directly.
- ___ 11. I ask others to summarize what the group has been discussing in order to ensure that they understand group decisions and comprehend the material being discussed by the group.
- ___ 12. I express support, acceptance, and liking for other members of the group and give the group appropriate praise when another member has taken a constructive action in the group.

To obtain a total score for TASK actions and MAINTENANCE actions, write the score for each item in the appropriate column and then add the columns.

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| __ 1. information & opinion giver | __ 2. encourager of participation |
| __ 3. information & opinion seeker | __ 4. communication facilitator |
| __ 5. direction & role definer | __ 6. tension reliever |
| __ 7. summarizer | __ 8. process observer |
| __ 9. energizer | __ 10. interpersonal problem solver |
| __ 11. comprehension checker | __ 12. supporter & praiser |
| ___ Total for Task Actions | ___ Total for Maintenance Actions |



(6,6) Only a minimum effort is given to getting the required work done. There is general non-involvement with group members...

(6,30) High value is placed on keeping good relationships within the group. Thoughtful attention is given to the needs of other members...However, he or she may never help the group get any work accomplished.

(18,18) The task and maintenance needs of the group are balanced. The person with this score continually makes compromises between task needs and maintenance needs. Though a great compromiser, this person does not look for or find ways to creatively integrate task and maintenance activities for optimal productivity.

(30,30) When everyone plans and makes decisions together, all the members become committed to getting the task done as they build relationships of trust and respect. A high value is placed on sound, creative decisions that result in understanding and agreement. Ideas and opinions are sought and listened to, even when they differ from one's own. The group as a whole defines the task and works to get it done. The creative combining of both task and maintenance needs is encouraged.

Joining Together: Group Theory and Group Skills, 3rd Edition,

Ask The Experts!

This session provides the opportunity for participants to ask questions of experts on community-oriented policing. Three experts will be linked telephonically. The seminar facilitators will moderate the discussion.

Each of the participating experts have either managed a successful community-oriented or neighborhood-oriented policing program or have been deeply involved in program development and conceptualization activities.

What Else Is Coming?

A Look At Future Challenges For Mid-Level Managers

In this session, mid-level managers will have a few moments to stop time and consider the types of challenges that lie before them. Computer applications yield extensive white collar crime and ways and means to automate criminal investigations. Unfortunately, modern criminals are also computer literate and use the technology for record keeping and other crime-related purposes.

A change in policies on the part of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has implications for local law enforcement in two major areas: Asset and forfeiture seizures and clandestine labs. How will local police handle these two highly technical areas so aptly handled by DEA in the past?

What are the new and recurring liability issues facing law enforcement? And what of your own imaginations? What do you see coming?

Resources - Future Challenges

Subject:

Resource:

Drug Enforcement

Edward Connors
Institute for Law & Justice
1018 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
1-800-533-DRUG

Asset/Forfeiture Seizure

Richard Ward
Bureau of Justice Assistance
633 Indiana Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20531
(202) 272-6838

Computers

Clifford Karchmer,
Police Executive Research
Forum (PERF)
2300 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 466-7820

Policies & Procedures

Jonathon Budd
National Institute of Justice
633 Indiana Ave., N.W.
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Clandestine Labs

Dr. Phyllis McDonald
National Law Enforcement
Policy Center
International Association
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General Training

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John Doyle
National Sheriff's Association
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Whadda Ya Know?

This session ends the seminar. Participants will be asked to engage in a sample examination that tests their understanding of the material covered. The format of the "test" will be that of a promotional examination, much like that experienced in Session 13.

Following the taking of the "test," the scoring of the "test," and discussion of the correct answers, participants will be asked to complete an evaluation instrument detailing their perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the seminar.

WADDA YA KNOW?

1. Which of the following describes the proactive frame of reference?
 - A. Encourages its members to engage in personal and professional growth activities and is concerned with the past, present, and future.
 - B. Has established goals and objectives and is organized in teams.
 - C. Encourages the individual to focus on his/her own needs and to seek satisfaction through the avoidance of blame.
 - D. Looks to the future and communicates shared values and elicits a deep personal commitment.

2. In order to move from the "reactive" into the "responsive" an organization must:
 - A. Set goals, plan actions, build teams.
 - B. Seek protection, attempt to survive, and seek out individuals who cause problems.
 - C. Set a mission, establish long range plans, manage performance.
 - D. Identify potentials, manage evolution, be concerned with community needs.

3. Check the items below which would most likely be characteristic of the High Performing Chief:
 - A. Reviews beat designs periodically.
 - B. Assigns officers to districts equally.
 - C. Is willing to "reach out" to the community to gain their perspective on police problems.
 - D. Manages his/her employees through strict and frequent downward communications.
 - E. Has a health program which requires a physical exam for promotion exams only.

4. Project DARE is characterized by which of the following:
 - A. A "flying squad" of new recruits to pursue vandals.
 - B. A vigilante team of citizens to patrol neighborhoods with heavy drug traffic.

- C. Full-time police officers on full-time duty assigned to schools to train elementary and junior high students to say "NO" to drugs.
 - D. A select group of brave police officers especially trained to conduct high risk drug operations.
5. Which of the following is not a street interdiction program:
- A. Repeat Offender Project.
 - B. Operation Pressure Point.
 - C. A SWAT Team.
 - D. A Hostage Negotiation Team.
6. The most significant indicator of a successful retail level crackdown program is which of the following:
- A. Amounts of cocaine being confiscated.
 - B. Dollar amount of property seized.
 - C. Disappearance of open drug dealing.
 - D. Dealers refusing to sell drugs to anyone except their regular customers.
7. Absentee rates are an important factor in identifying work schedules. The absentee rate is determined by calculating from existing data the probability of absenteeism for each day of the week. Which of the following are most important to be achieved by determining absentee rates:
- A. Ensuring that overtime is equally distributed among all personnel.
 - B. Providing day off/leave/vacation opportunities during desirable weekend periods for all employees.
 - C. Scheduling of supervisors so the right number of sergeants are available to supervise personnel actually working.
 - D. All of the above.
8. The analysis of Repeat Offenders Programs has indicated that these tactics can impact various offense patterns. Of the research findings listed below, which has not been found in Repeat Offender Program research?
- A. Proactive investigative strategies appear to have greater potential than post-arrest investigations.
 - B. Less use must be made of informants and more of victims and witnesses.

- C. Using proactive investigations, dangerous offenders can be identified sooner and removed from society much more quickly than is done using traditional apprehension strategies.
 - D. None of the above (all are true).
9. Research into repeat calls for service was a prime instigator of which of the following program concepts:
- A. Repeat Offender Project.
 - B. Problem-Oriented Policing.
 - C. Street Interdiction Programs.
 - D. Community Oriented Policing.
10. Which of the following police values is most important to the Department wishing to organize around the concept of community oriented policing:
- A. The Department is concerned with the welfare of all its employees, both sworn and non-sworn.
 - B. The Department will have a well developed set of policies and procedures.
 - C. The Department will involve neighborhoods in all police activities which directly impact quality of life.
 - D. The Department will pursue the protection of all civil liberties and the Constitution.
11. Foot Patrol programs have been proven through research to be most successful at:
- A. Distributing work load more equitably.
 - B. Improving response time to calls.
 - C. Reducing the level of fear in the patrol area.
 - D. Improving officer morale because the foot patrol officer is able to solve more community problems.
12. Police policy is an important means to provide guidance to employees. Policy provides a statement of the rationale for police action, and often sets forth the values to be adopted by employees in using their discretion. Policy and rules, however, are different. Which of the following statements is not accurate in explaining the difference between policy and rules?
- A. Policy sets forth the objectives to be achieved in applying discretion.

- B. Rules are never absolute, being applied only in light of a policy statement.
- C. The policy statement, and procedures are all different, and must be separately considered when dealing with an overall policy.
- D. A violation of a procedure is a less serious matter than a violation of a rule.
- E. Rules set forth the absolute limits of discretion, as outlined in a policy statement.



EST. 1980

HIGH PERFORMANCE POLICE MANAGEMENT
PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCE

EVALUATION FORM

NAME: _____

RANK: _____

DEPARTMENT: _____

CITY POPULATION: _____

Your responses to the following questions will help us to improve the quality and delivery of this workshop. Read each item carefully, circle the rating which most accurately reflects your assessment, and please provide any comments, suggestions or recommendations you wish.

I. TOPICAL SESSIONS: Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspectives:

- CLARITY Was the information clearly presented?
- INFORMATIVE Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your agency's needs?
- RELEVANCY Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency?
- PRESENTER
- DELIVERY Style and Expertise

(5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor)

1. High Performance Management Model and Police Issues

Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
Informative	5	4	3	2	1
Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
Presenter Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

2. Drug Enforcement Programs and Issues

Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
Informative	5	4	3	2	1
Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
Presenter Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

(5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor)

3. Resource Allocation Issues

Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
Informative	5	4	3	2	1
Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
Presenter Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

4. Community Oriented Policing

Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
Informative	5	4	3	2	1
Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
Presenter Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

II. WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Please indicate your level of satisfaction with the activities and processes of this workshop listed below:

(5=very satisfied; 4=satisfied; 3=neutral; 2=dissatisfied; 1=very dissatisfied)

LECTURES/PRESENTATIONS

Time Allotted	5	4	3	2	1
Opportunity for questions	5	4	3	2	1
Relevancy of visual aids	5	4	3	2	1
Use of text in Handbook	5	4	3	2	1

WORKSHOP FLOW

Sequence of sessions	5	4	3	2	1
Session Transition	5	4	3	2	1

INDIVIDUAL WORK

Utility of individual work	5	4	3	2	1
Time allotted for individual work	5	4	3	2	2

MATERIALS

Participant Workbook	5	4	3	2	1
Sourcebook	5	4	3	2	1
Visual Aids	5	4	3	2	1
Handouts	5	4	3	2	1

III. IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was the total workshop to you?

Very Informative 5 4 3 2 1 Uninformative

How useful was the total workshop to you?

Very Useful 5 4 3 2 1 Useless

How relevant was the information in this workshop to your agency?

Very Relevant 5 4 3 2 1 Irrelevant

IV. FOLLOWUP

As a result of the training, will you implement all or any portion of the topics discussed? If so, please check one or more below.

Inform chief executive

Discuss with staff

Organize meeting to discuss ways to implement in your particular section/division

Request more written material on specifics to implement

Other --Please Specify Below:

V. OVERALL RESPONSE

What is your overall reaction to the workshop? Circle one:

- 5 ONE OF THE BEST
- 4 GOOD, VALUABLE
- 3 AVERAGE, FAIR
- 2 NOT VERY GOOD
- 1 POOR, NOT USEFUL


VI. COMMENTS

What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your department?

In your opinion, what could we do that would help us improve the professional conferences that we deliver to police managers?

Additional Comments



EST. 1980

has participated in
HIGH PERFORMANCE POLICE MANAGEMENT

Sponsored by:

**POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE**

Hosted by:

Fayetteville Police Department
June 14-16, 1989

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Executive Session #1

The Houston Police Department

DEVELOPING A POLICING STYLE FOR
NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING

Funded with a grant from the Police Foundation, Washington, D.C.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Executive Session produced the framework for Neighborhood Oriented Policing, which in turn provided the foundation for all future Executive Sessions and for the future of the Houston Police Department.

Ultimately, this book would not have been published without the active participation of the Executive Session guest speakers and members of the Houston Police Department. The Police Foundation's Mary Ann Wycoff deserves special mention. In addition to her incisive, thought-provoking contributions to each discussion, she provided invaluable assistance in coordinating the attendance of guest speakers for each of the Executive Sessions. These speakers were: Mr. John Eck, Police Executive Research Forum; Dr. Herman Goldstein, University of Wisconsin at Madison; and Dr. George Kelling, Harvard University.

Appreciation is extended to Mr. Hubert Williams, President of the Police Foundation, who was responsible for approving the financial support in order to conduct the Executive Sessions. The Police Foundation's contributions to modern policing are too numerous to mention. But by making possible the Houston Executive Sessions, the foundation illustrates, once again, its deep commitment to the improvement of policing in America.

We believe the product of this Executive Session -- this report -- will contribute substantially to the evolution of community policing throughout the United States.

ABSTRACT

In preparing for the opening and occupation of the Westside Command Station in the Spring of 1987, Chief Lee P. Brown initiated the first in a series of six Executive Session meetings on October 1, 1986. The purpose of these meetings was to allow the participants an opportunity to freely discuss ideas, facts, experiences, and values that would help describe the style of policing to be adopted by the Westside Command Station personnel, and, eventually, all personnel within the department.

A total of 29 personnel were asked to participate in these sessions. Under the sponsorship of the Police Foundation, the membership was able to invite guest speakers to their sessions to discuss a variety of programs and experiences that were beneficial to the task placed before them.

This report contains the descriptions, thoughts, and ideas developed by the membership as a result of participating in the six Executive Session meetings. The membership was able to describe what they felt should be the department's philosophy with respect to providing services throughout the City of Houston. This philosophy, entitled, Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) was defined by the membership and set forth as the ideal from which a policing style for the department could be developed.

Toward that end, the membership described the roles of the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators which they thought were commensurate with the concept of NOP. A considerable amount of time was spent examining research trends and implications within the profession during the last 10 to 15 years with particular attention being paid to the relevance of programs administered within the Houston Police Department during the last three to four years. A proposed process model was developed as a vehicle for transforming the concept of NOP into a sustainable, reality-based policing style. The report concludes by describing the framework within the department that has been established to support the philosophy of NOP and the ensuing policing style.

Chapter 1

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Members of the Houston Police Department began the conceptual development work on the Command Station during 1979. Initially, efforts were taken to examine a number of options regarding the status of the existing substations. The first option was to consider improving the physical attributes of the existing substations. Second, the prospect of building more substations was discussed. Finally, it was decided to pursue the prospect of building several large police facilities known as Command Stations. The reason for constructing a series of command stations was to provide facilities which would house all of the necessary personnel and equipment needed to provide efficient and comprehensive neighborhood police services on a decentralized basis throughout the city of Houston. Unlike the traditional substations which cannot house support functions under the same roof, each command station building is to contain jail facilities, municipal court facilities, and the necessary police facilities (records, identification, computer support, operation and investigative functions among others).

Given the physical capacity of the building, a preliminary report outlining the feasibility of decentralizing police functions was forwarded to the Command staff in March 1980. This report was rapidly followed-up with a more comprehensive study designed to examine a number of service delivery issues and related support service concerns in order to determine the most efficient means of utilizing the facility to provide effective service to the neighborhood residents.

In response to this study, a number of task force committees were formed under the guidance of the Planning and Research Division. These committees were instructed to study the various organizational components which would be affected by altering operational strategies as a result of decentralization to the command station facility. The work of these committees was completed during July, 1981.

In mid 1982, efforts were taken to examine the feasibility of actually implementing, on an experimental basis, the work of the Field Deployment Task Force. The task force members were recommending, as a model

program, the implementation of the Directed Area Responsibility Team (D.A.R.T.) Program. The D.A.R.T. Program represented a variation of the team policing concept used predominantly throughout the country during the 1970s. The D.A.R.T. Program, however, was not a duplication of any one of those programs. It included elements of some successful team policing programs, but was primarily constructed in accordance with the perceptions of what would meet the needs of Houstonians and the capabilities of the department's resources.

From 1983 through 1984 the D.A.R.T. Program was implemented within a single district and evaluated (and is still in effect today). The evaluation report, An Evaluation of the Houston Police Department's D.A.R.T. Program, did reveal a number of significant findings that had a direct bearing on the department's ability to alter its method of delivering services to the neighborhoods.

In October, 1985, the Westside Command Station Steering Committee was formed within the department. Their primary responsibility was to review and update the preliminary task force reports of July, 1981, as well as examine the assessment report on the D.A.R.T. Program. The steering committee subdivided the work and assigned the responsibility to five subcommittees: Geographic Considerations, Staffing Considerations, Operational Considerations, Criminal Investigations, and Operational Support Service Considerations. Their findings were completed in February/March, 1986 and submitted to Chief Brown in a document known as the Planning Recommendations for the Westside Command Station.

By August, 1986, steps were being taken to establish the Westside Transition Team. Their primary responsibility was to review the Steering Committee's work, make necessary operational and administrative adjustments as deemed appropriate, and begin to coordinate the implementation of the actual transition stages in order to occupy the Command Station. A portion of this responsibility centered upon the need to develop a plan which would articulate the policing style utilized by the beat officers. In order to describe the policing style it became necessary to begin examining how services would be delivered under the

concept of Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP). A series of Executive Session meetings were scheduled, in an effort to accomplish this particular task.

On October 1, 1986, Police Chief Brown convened the first of six Executive Session meetings. A total of 28 classified personnel representing all ranks were selected to participate with the Chief of Police in these meetings. Additionally, a number of civilian resource personnel were asked to attend the sessions (please see Appendix A, p.44). The purpose of conducting the Executive Sessions was to allow the participants an opportunity to freely discuss ideas, facts, experiences, and values that would help describe the style of policing to be adopted by the Westside Command Station personnel and, eventually, all personnel within the police department.

This report contains the collective thoughts, concerns, and feelings from the panel members that were obtained during the course of the six Executive Session meetings. The information represents the membership's ability to describe a proposed policing style which would perpetuate the concept of NOP. Consequently, the material contained within this report represents a philosophical framework from which operational plans for the Westside command station, and eventually the entire city, can be developed and implemented.

Chapter 2

PHILOSOPHY of the HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Houston Police Department is committed to providing services throughout the city in manner that is responsive to neighborhood concerns. This commitment is clearly evident in the Department's mission statement which reads as follows:

The mission of the Houston Police Department is to enhance the quality of life in the City of Houston by working cooperatively with the public and within the framework of the United States Constitution to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide for a safe environment.

It is the responsibility of all members of the department to conduct their business in a manner that is consistent with this mission. To assist in this effort, the department has established a set of values.

Collectively, these values represent a set of beliefs that govern the development of policies and procedures as well as affect the attitudes displayed by the members of the department. The values also incorporate a number of expectations held by the citizens of Houston. Foremost among these expectations is the desire and willingness to have the citizenry and members of the department work together to improve the quality of neighborhood life.

The commitment to developing and maintaining this relationship is quite evident in three of the ten department value statements:

- **The Houston Police Department will involve the community in all policing activities which directly impact the quality of community life;**
- **The Houston Police Department believes that it must structure service delivery in a way that will reinforce the strengths of the city's neighborhoods; and**

- **The Houston Police Department believes that the public should have input into the development of policies which directly impact the quality of neighborhood life.**

If these values are to be meaningful, efforts must be made to administer an operational philosophy which is conducive to supporting an environment which will facilitate the development of a cooperative relationship between the public and the police. It is the opinion of the Executive Session membership that the concept of Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) should represent that operational philosophy for the department.

NOP constitutes a major philosophical departure from traditional means of providing police services. This departure is best exemplified by a different way of thinking about how police services are delivered. Indeed, the essence of NOP is in thinking about new and innovative ways of providing services to the public through increased communication with community members, ascertaining citizens' concerns, and getting citizens more involved in addressing and resolving problems that are of mutual concern to both the police and the public.

This requires police personnel and members of the community to learn how to work together. An interactive working relationship must be developed that stems from a commitment from an individual(s), from neighborhood groups, and/or the community as a whole if deemed necessary. It becomes the collective responsibility of both the police and the citizens to identify the issues in need of resolution. This cannot be accomplished without assistance from the neighborhood residents.

Participation from the neighborhood residents is paramount to the successful implementation of the NOP philosophy for two reasons. First, community input is valuable to the department in that it offers a different perspective from that of police personnel as to what the local neighborhood concerns and problems are. It will not suffice to believe that only the police are in a position to determine neighborhood needs. History has demonstrated

repeatedly that the police do not know everything nor can they be everywhere at once.

Second, the police and the community work much better together when they know and understand one another. The essence of meaningful understanding, consequently, is learning how to effectively communicate. As so aptly noted by one of the panel members,:

"The better we communicate, the more we communicate; the better we understand what problems are in the neighborhoods, the better we understand the community we are responsible to, and, the better the community understands us."

For too long a period of time, the ability to develop this mutual understanding has been inhibited by the officers' desire to hide behind a shroud of professionalism that is characterized by anonymity. Officers must discard the desire to remain aloof from the public. The syndrome of noninvolvement must be overcome. The concept of professionalism must be redefined in a manner that stimulates a commitment to communicate and interact on behalf of the officers and the neighborhood residents. The desire and willingness to work together with the public should become an inherent feeling within all officers.

Consequently, the concept of NOP should become the police department's culture. The department should become a part of the community and not separate or apart from the community. All department personnel should be an active and integral part of the neighborhood they serve. This should be demonstrated in their attitudes and behavior, especially by the beat officers working in the neighborhoods. The officers' attitudes should also reflect this philosophy. No where could this be more important than by beginning to have the residents learn who the officers are that provide services within their respective neighborhoods.

To perpetuate this feeling of working with one another, officers must realize that every contact they have is a community relations contact. Whether the situation dictates a detrimental or positive experience for the citizen, the behavior of the officer is what is often remembered. The officers must understand this and understand the implications of their corresponding behavior. According to one panel member, experience has demonstrated that:

"...it is not how good you are, it's how good those people out there think you are that is important. Officers may think they are the best at what they do, however, if the people,

the citizens, the community, the civic groups do not think they are the best or do not think they are doing the job they should be doing, the officers have not accomplished anything positive."

This change in orientation between the police and the public is a gradual one that must be reciprocal. While the department is willing to provide as much support as possible to assist the neighborhood beat officers in working with citizen groups, the department expects that the citizens will also be willing to make a similar commitment.

At present, the department's resources are strained because of fiscal cutbacks and a freeze on hiring additional personnel. Plus, the department will not compromise its responsibility in continuing to respond to and handle emergency calls for service—a fundamental activity of the patrol function that can not be delegated. The department, however, welcomes the opportunity to develop new policing strategies in working more closely with the public at the neighborhood level.

Chapter 3

DEFINING NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING

Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) is a concept which seeks to define and describe a philosophy which guides and directs the delivery of police services throughout the City of Houston. As a philosophy, NOP seeks to incorporate the department's values into a responsive policing style which is dependant upon quality of the day to day interactions between the police and the public.

The key to defining NOP appears to reside in the ability to recognize the need to establish rapport between the beat officers and the citizens that work and live within each of the officers' respective beats. It is the nature of this rapport between the officers and the citizens that defines the quality of their relationship. It is through these relationships, either established in handling calls for service or in meeting with citizens when not on call, that the officers can begin to identify and begin to think about the most salient service delivery needs in each of their respective beats.

The concept of NOP, consequently, can best be initially defined as follows:

Neighborhood oriented policing is an interactive process between police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns.

The NOP concept will help clarify responsibilities for both parties as they attempt to identify and resolve problems in the neighborhood beats. NOP, therefore, must involve continuous planning, program involvement, evaluation, and adjustments by both the officers patrolling the beats and the citizens living in their respective neighborhoods.

The role of the beat officer will be enhanced as a result of increased interaction with the citizens. Beat officers, for example, will be actively involved in the

decision making process regarding the identification, prioritizations, and selection of resolutions for identified problems or concerns. Additionally, because of the officers' interaction with the citizens, they will be in an excellent position to determine what resources, if any could be obtained from them in combating neighborhood concerns. Since the beat officers should be most familiar with the citizens who work and reside within their beats, the officers, if given the appropriate direction and support, are in an ideal position to implement programs and other initiatives to improve the quality of life within the neighborhoods.

As noted by several of the panel members' comments, the purpose of NOP is multifaceted. Among the more prominent features are the needs to:

- **Establish trust and harmony between the neighborhood residents and the beat officers(s);**
- **Exchange information which will strengthen rapport and enhance neighborhood safety;**
- **Address the problem of crime and reduce the level of fear associated with the criminal activity;**
- **Help identify and resolve neighborhood problems;**
- **Clarify responsibilities on behalf of the citizens and the officers; and**
- **Help define service needs.**

Each of these features is noted or implied in the initial definition. It should also be realized these features represent a sampling of the standards by which success should be measured. This is not to suggest the definition is complete, for it lacks an operational perspective.

Toward this end, a number of traditional opera-

tional assumptions may be challenged as we begin to examine the process of more completely describing and implementing the NOP concept. For example, NOP implies a concern for reexamining how the traditional, total service delivery concept is defined. Furthermore, the focus of NOP appears to suggest an altering of the orientation or perspective of the patrol officers. The officers should be encouraged to expand their responsibilities in concert with the needs of the neighborhood. Among other things, this suggests the development of different performance indicators in order to stimulate and reinforce among all patrol officers a sense of neighborhood ownership so eminently displayed by the department's storefront officers. These assumptions are seldom found within the traditional police service concept.

The traditional event/call oriented, random, preventive patrol concept emphasizes mobility, impersonal relationships, and the lack of a need to establish a more meaningful interaction with the citizenry. Traditional patrol work has accentuated random, preventive patrol and assumes that high mobile police visibility has a marked deterrent effect on the commission of crime. Officers are not expected to look beyond an incident in an attempt to define and resolve a particular type of problem. Once dispatched to handle calls, the patrol officers are encouraged to return to service as quickly as possible to resume random, preventive patrol. Rapid responses, handling numerous calls, and making arrests are the primary means of measuring productivity.

As the panel membership sought to identify the various conceptual elements associated with the NOP philosophy (please see Appendix B, p.46), suggestions were made to consider reexamining how these elements would effect the department's operational commitments. Panel members were concerned about the need to rethink how NOP would affect the department. Specific concerns focused upon attempting to determine the affects NOP would have on role expectations of department personnel and implementing various strategy considerations.

Chapter 4

ROLE EXPECTATIONS and the CONCEPT of NOP

NOP is not a new concept to the profession of policing. Theoretically, the desire to work with the public has been a long standing goal of numerous departments throughout the country. In some instances, departments have developed and administered programs which emphasize the need to work closely with the public. Some of these programs were successful (i.e., Flint, Michigan Foot Patrol Program) while others were not. Experience has demonstrated that part of the success factor is based upon the ability of department's officers to accept change, especially as it affected traditional role expectations.

It would behoove administrators, consequently, to realize that the process of change is a complex one. One must understand that by altering a department's philosophy, numerous variables will be simultaneously affected. Among them is the need to recognize how the process of change will affect: which strategies will be considered and actually implemented; what skills will be used by the personnel to implement the strategies; how the strategies and skills will help to define a management style for the department; and how the shared values expressed by the officers will define the department's beliefs and desires to work with the community. Collectively, these variables have a direct effect on the acceptability of the change process by department personnel.

A large portion of the officers' reluctance to accept change is based upon the fear of the unknown. Officers do not like to change their ways once they are comfortable in performing their established duties. What needs to be realized under the concept of NOP is that proposed changes are designed to perpetuate the officers' positive worth to the community. Therefore, in the context of the Houston Police Department, the dynamic process of change should be interpreted and experienced as a gradual shift in emphasis from one positive operational role to another.

In adopting NOP as an operational philosophy, a shift in emphasis in the role of the patrol officer will occur. This shift in emphasis will, in general, deemphasize the role of the officer as being primarily "an enforcer" in the neighborhood beats. The more desired perception is for

the officer to be viewed as someone that can provide help and assistance, someone that cares about people and shares their concern for safety, someone that expresses compassion through empathizing and sympathizing with victims of crime, and someone that can organize community groups, inspire and motivate community groups, and facilitate and coordinate the collective efforts and endeavors of others.

This desired perception of the role of the patrol officer may be difficult to realize. The evolution of bureaucratic and militaristic organizational structures in policing since the turn of the century has served to support and perpetuate traditional definitions of the police officer's role as solely being that of a "crime fighter."

This notion, arising out of the 1930s, was instrumental in creating and reinforcing "time-hardened assumptions" regarding the effectiveness of random, preventive patrol in deterring crime and in the development of patrol management systems predicated on the basis of achieving rapid police response to all calls for service. Because of the emphasis to have patrol officers handle their calls as quickly as possible and return to service to continue performing preventive patrol to suppress crime, little attention was directed toward the service needs of the citizens, including the needs of the citizens that had become victims of crime. The "effectiveness" of this "call oriented system" was measured by "crunching numbers" (i.e., counting the number of calls handled and the number of arrests made). Hence, a quantitative preoccupation with numbers dominated concern over the quality and types of the services delivered.

The organizational culture of municipal policing has, in general, continued to condition police officers to think of themselves primarily as "crime fighters." Traditionally, police departments have attempted to identify and recruit individuals into policing that have displayed bravado. Organizational incentives have also been designed to favor self conceptions of machismo; conceptions that are reinforced through pop art (e.g., detective novels, "police stories," "Dirty Harry" movies, etc.). Many, if not most, of the approximately 500,000 law enforcement

officers in policing in America today have strong opinions about what constitutes "real police work." Because NOP is almost completely antithetical to traditional ways of thinking about police work, attempts to change these opinions may be met with resistance by some officers.

Resistance can also be expected throughout all of the managerial levels within the organization. By operationalizing the concept of NOP, traditional and autocratic management styles will be challenged. A different, more responsive, attitude and managerial style will be required to stimulate, accommodate, and perpetuate desired behavioral changes which will occur as a result of redefining the officers' role. This new form of management must encourage a willingness within all managers to transform new concepts into attainable goals and objectives. Those goals and objectives must, in turn, be articulated within the organization and must be transformed into actions which are consistent with the service demands expressed by the citizenry.

To ensure these actions are consistent with expressed service needs, NOP solicits organizational input from the "bottom up" as opposed to the traditional direction of "top down" so evidently displayed in most bureaucratic organizations. As so poignantly noted among the department's values:

The Houston Police Department will seek the input of employees into matters which impact employee job satisfaction and effectiveness.

Effective management must include the active participation of the officers in policy development, procedure and strategy design, program formulation, and implementation. Since upper management personnel are removed from the officers' working environment, they can not be expected to dictate service responses without first obtaining feedback from the officers as to what the neighborhood expectations and commitments are.

Even then, there are no convenient solutions, no eloquent equations, or no magical formulas that upper management can employ to provide NOP services. The types of calls, types of citizens, and the types of issues and problems that officers encounter will vary from one neighborhood to the next and, to a great extent, vary by time of day (e.g., across shifts). Consequently, this will require managerial resiliency and flexibility. By providing this flexibility managers must also realize a certain amount of "risk taking" will need to be allowed. It must be remembered that one can learn equally as much if not more from failures as from successes.

What upper management can do to facilitate the acceptance and implementation of the NOP concept is provide their subordinates with a process that encourages the officers to become involved in developing new and innovative ways to improve the quality of policing in the neighborhood beats. Top management can provide the patrol officers and their supervisors with an opportunity to design a "custom patrol plan" that is tailored to the needs of the neighborhood beats and is sensitive to citizen concerns across all shifts.

First line supervisors and middle managers must realize their responsibility should be one of encouraging the officers to become involved in this process. A major portion of their role should be designed to support the officers' attempts to identify citizen concerns, assist in mobilizing appropriate resources (or removing the impediments) to address those concerns, and assess the effects of the assistance provided.

Upper management can also provide the right types of incentives to encourage officers to expand their roles and assume additional responsibilities. As these roles change, it will require a concomitant change in the officers' behavior. Research in the social science field has indicated that if behavior is to change, one's attitude must change first. Understandably, management cannot dictate attitudes; but management can provide the necessary support to facilitate the acceptance of an alternative style of policing such as NOP. If the officers accept such a policing style, it will be primarily due to their belief that such an approach is an effective means of delivering services to the community.

Finally, upper management can attempt to provide, despite the presence of tight fiscal constraints, the types of resources required to effectively implement, assess, and sustain the NOP process. Supervisors and subordinates cannot be held responsible for performing a function or fulfilling an expectation when they are too ill-equipped to reasonably succeed.

Although NOP seeks to expand the role of the patrol officers to allow them more latitude in developing new ways to police their beats, it does not relax their compliance with the department's standards of professional conduct. And while the image of the patrol officer as being dedicated full time "to fighting crime and evil" is expected to change, it does not mean the department will reduce its commitment in attempts to prevent crime and interdict criminal perpetrators. It is anticipated that developing closer ties with the citizens in Houston will enhance the department's ability to prevent crime as well as identify and arrest persons engaged in the commission of crime.

Chapter 5

RESEARCH TRENDS and IMPLICATIONS

Following the advent of the 1970s, municipal policing began to experience accelerated change. This change was initially influenced by protest demonstrations against the government's military actions in Vietnam and the incivility that occurred across the country in the mid- to late 1960s. It was later perpetuated by a plethora of research findings regarding police operations that emanated out of the 1970s. The impetus for this research was directly linked to police actions in handling anti-war demonstrations, their attempts to control incivility, and a search for more effective methods to combat crime. Although the findings from this research generated more questions than answers, it seriously challenged the veracity of time-hardened assumptions underlying management of the patrol, dispatch, and investigative functions.

Beginning with a review of pertinent research that addressed the patrol function, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment provided the most dramatic attack on conventional wisdom regarding the deterrent effects of random patrol in preventing crime. In its efforts to develop a participatory management system, the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department had established task forces at each of its four patrol divisions (a task force had also been established in the department's Special Operations Division). These task forces consisted of patrol officers and first line supervisors. The task forces were charged with the responsibility to generate new and innovative ideas to improve policing. The establishment of these task forces was based on the chief's belief that the ability to make competent planning decisions existed at all levels within the department. Because police officers were often most directly affected by change, management thought that they should have an active voice in planning and implementing change. Recommendations from these task forces were sent up through the chain of command to be reviewed for consideration.

The impetus for the preventive patrol experiment came from within the department in 1971. The South Patrol Task Force had identified five problem areas to impact through patrol efforts (e.g., residential burglaries, juvenile delinquents, etc.). But in considering strategies to

impact these problems, task force members could not agree on the value of preventive patrol as a strategy to address some of the problems identified. The South Patrol Task Force therefore generated a position paper that questioned the effectiveness of random, preventive patrol. Intrigued by the thought, the department sought funds and technical assistance from the Police Foundation to design a methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of this traditional patrol procedure.

The 15 beats that comprised the South Patrol Division were randomly divided into three groups (proactive, reactive, and control) to test the deterrent effects police visibility had in preventing crime. Officers assigned to "reactive beats" were not permitted to enter their beats unless officially dispatched to handle a call (or in hot pursuit of another vehicle). Conversely, officers assigned to "proactive beats" were expected to perform "aggressive patrol work," i.e., increased car checks, pedestrian ("ped") checks, etc. Additionally, there was supposed to be approximately two to three times the level of police visibility in the proactive beats. Officers from the reactive areas were encouraged to enter the proactive areas and engage in routine patrol. Finally, officers assigned to the "control beats" were expected to conduct business as usual; to drive systematically unsystematically throughout their beats until interrupted by a dispatched call for service. Once the call was handled, the officers were to return to performing random, preventive patrol.

Data were collected for about a year to assess the effectiveness of preventive patrol. Analysis of this data revealed that there were no statistically significant differences in crime rates among the three different types of patrol procedures evaluated. The study therefore concluded that random patrol was not an effective deterrent in preventing crime.

While researchers and police practitioners were at a loss to suggest an alternative to random patrol, the data also revealed that approximately 60 percent of the patrol officers' time was not committed to handling calls for service. Effort was initiated to identify ways to make this uncommitted time more productive.

Perhaps the major managerial lesson learned from the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment was the extent to which departments could "experiment" in trying alternative policing strategies. If traditional, preventive patrol is not effective in deterring crime, flexibility to try other options can be explored. Patrol officers can be directed to perform activities other than random patrolling without causing local increases in the crime rate or generating dissatisfaction among citizens.

As if the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department didn't arouse enough attention among police administrators by questioning the sanctity of preventive patrol, another effort initiated by this agency (in response to a request from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice) sought to assess the value of rapid police response. Since the advent of the radio patrol car, rapid police response had long been an accepted procedure in municipal policing. And the need to reduce response time had served as justification to bolster officer strength and to provide for large expenditures on equipment. While it was not unreasonable to assume that rapid police response would produce more arrests, more witnesses, fewer serious injuries, and more satisfied citizens, little empirical data existed that supported such assumptions.

The Response Time Analysis Study was designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of issues and assumptions regarding the value of police response to a variety of crime and noncrime, emergency and nonemergency, incidents. Specifically, two objectives were established for study: (1) analysis of the relationships between citizen reporting delays, dispatch, and police travel times to the outcomes of on-scene criminal apprehensions, witness availability, citizen satisfaction, and the frequency of citizen injuries in connection with crime and noncrime incidents; and (2) identification of problems (involuntary delays) and patterns (voluntary delays) in reporting crime or requesting police assistance.

To facilitate measurement of response time, the concept was operationalized on a continuum that consisted of three intervals. The first was the time taken by citizens to report incidents or request police assistance. The second was the time taken to locate, nominate, and dispatch units to handle the calls. The third and last was the time taken for the police to respond to the dispatched locations. The data collection process was divided into three components analogous to the three response time intervals. Civilian observers accompanied police officers to record travel times. Research analysts extracted time information from recordings of taped conversations between complainants and intake operators/dispatchers to measure dispatch times. And interviewers collected reporting times from victims and other citizens who had reported incidents to the police.

As with the preventive patrol experiment, data collection lasted approximately one year. Analysis of data produced some startling conclusions, including the following:

- A large proportion of Part I, i.e., "serious crime" (according to definitions provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting criteria), are not susceptible to the impact of rapid police response, because almost two thirds (62.3%) of the Part I crime sample analyzed indicated that these crimes were detected after they occurred ("discovery crimes");
- Prompt reporting can increase the chance of making on-scene arrests for all types of Part I crimes in which a citizen saw, heard, or became involved at any point during the commission of an offense ("involvement crimes"). For the proportion of these crimes (37.7%), however, the time taken to report the incident largely predetermines the effect police response time will have on desired outcomes;
- Explanations for reporting delays are primarily associated with citizen apathy and voluntary actions taken (e.g., telephoning other persons for advice, waiting or observing the situation, investigating the incident scene themselves, contacting their employer, a supervisor, or a security guard, etc.) in arriving at a decision to notify the police. Problems encountered with either public or police communications systems (e.g., being "cut off," being inadvertently transferred to another number, not being able to access a public pay phone, etc.) accounted for reporting delays in less than one out of five (16.5%) involvement crimes;
- Although rapid police response based on the need to assist an injured victim has been overshadowed by an emphasis toward making an on-scene arrest, there were more cases in which persons sustained injuries of sufficient seriousness as to require hospitalization (5.4%) than in the number of "response-related arrests" resulting from rapid reporting, dispatching, and officer response (3.7%); and
- Neither dispatch nor travel times were found to be associated with citizen satisfaction with

police response time. Rather, citizen satisfaction with response time was dependent on whether citizens perceived response time to be faster or slower than they expected.

A major but unpopular implication from this study indicated that an infusion of additional patrol officers to reduce police response time would have negligible impact on crime outcomes, because of the time taken by citizens to report involvement crimes and the relatively small number of involvement vis-a-vis discovery crimes. This implication also tended to negate justification for technological innovations such as automated vehicle locations systems designed to reduce police response time.

Moreover, it also refuted claims to lower police response time that were made by American Telephone and Telegraph in marketing their 911 telecommunications system. The study found that the time required to phone the police was of minuscule significance compared to the time citizens took in reaching a decision to call. The time required to dial the police department's "crime alert" number took approximately nine seconds, although a substantial proportion of callers simply dialed "0" for operator. The average time taken to report Part I crimes was almost four hours, while the median time, that point above which and below which 50 percent of the cases lie, was about five and a half minutes.

A second implication from this study suggested the need for departments to develop formal call screening procedures to accurately discriminate between emergency and nonemergency calls. And given findings regarding citizen satisfaction with police response time it was further suggested that "call stacking" procedures be developed so that calls could be prioritized with varying queue delays thereby insuring that the most urgent calls received the most expeditious dispatching. As a result of these implications, further research was later funded to develop and evaluate differential police response (DPR) strategies.

Finally, noting the relatively low response-related, on-scene arrest rate (3.7%) and the inclination toward "over response" by officers to "hot calls," it was suggested that interception strategies be developed to apprehend suspects in flight following the commission of robberies. Over response by officers endangers their lives and invites serious and disabling injuries. It also places innocent citizens in peril and is costly to repair or replace damaged equipment that results from over response. Of course, unit(s) will be dispatched to the scene of a crime to possibly render first aid, complete a report, locate witnesses, and collect physical evidence. But, according to this recommendation, officers not dispatched that travel away from the scene to a predetermined "perimeter point"

(for those crimes reported in close proximity to the time of occurrence) stand a better chance of intercepting suspects than do officers that drive directly to the location of where the crime occurred.

Because of the "sensitivity of the findings," the Response Time Analysis study was replicated in four other cities by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF): Hartford, Connecticut; Jacksonville, Florida; Peoria, Illinois; and San Diego, California. All of the findings reported by the original study were substantiated in the subsequent replications.

The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department's Directed Patrol study stemmed from the Police Foundation's Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. As previously mentioned, once the preventive patrol experiment had been completed police administrators and researchers were at a loss to suggest alternative strategies to replace conventional, preventive patrol. Again, findings from the preventive patrol experiment indicated that preventive patrol was not effective in deterring crime. And, as already mentioned, the study disclosed that approximately 60 percent of the patrol officers' time was uncommitted. The Directed Patrol study was therefore designed to structure, i.e., direct, this uncommitted time. The project was implemented in the East Patrol Division.

At the outset of the project, several support mechanisms were established. A crime analysis position was created for a certified officer to gather crime data for each of the beats. This data was used by field sergeants to intensify patrol efforts to high crime locations within the beats rather than having the officers perform random patrol all over their beats. Civilian clerks were hired to staff the desk at the division headquarters to handle "walk-in" and "mail-in" reports. In addition, a "tele-serve" function was established so that the civilian clerks could take some offense reports over the phone rather than having officers dispatched to complete "insurance reports."

A list of activities for patrol officers to perform while formerly conducting routine patrol was generated by the project staff. This list included tasks designed to bring the officers into closer communication with the public. Most of the tasks were oriented toward crime prevention activities to impact residential burglaries and commercial robberies. For example, officers would stop by and visit with citizens and help them serialize articles of personal property sought by residential burglars for quick sale. The officers also placed "height strips" and surveillance cameras in convenience stores. Officers engaged in these activities were considered to be on "directed patrol" and unavailable for dispatch except for emergencies.

The managerial implications derived from this

study demonstrated that uncommitted patrol time could be structured for activities perhaps more meaningful than simply performing preventive patrol. It also demonstrated the function of crime analysis in providing the types of data needed to support some forms of directed patrol activities. Given the emphasis the program placed on crime prevention, it also helped establish rapport between the police and the public. And finally, having obtained preliminary results from the Response Time Analysis study, the study demonstrated that alternative response strategies could be developed and implemented, thereby diverting calls that had previously required mobile responses by a police officer.

The San Diego Police Department also conducted several significant research efforts during the 1970s. These included an evaluation of one versus two officer patrol cars, an experiment to assess the relationship between the completion of "field interrogations" of suspicious persons and criminal deterrence, and, most germane to this report, a Community Oriented Policing (COP) project.

At the time the COP study was initiated in 1973, the San Diego Police Department had a poor relationship with their community. It also had a chief who was held in low esteem by the public. Officer attrition had reached approximately 25 percent, and the department was in desperate need of communications equipment. Because of concern regarding corruption, commanders kept police officers on the move—moving them to new beats and shifts every three weeks.

Patrol officers were expected to complete a specific number of field interrogations and write a certain number of traffic citations each day. Clever officers found where the "easy pickings" were and got these requirements out of the way in the first 45 minutes of their tours of duty. There was little meaningful accountability since the officers and sergeants moved too quickly from one beat and shift to another to learn anything about their districts; much less assume any responsibility for the crime that occurred in their districts.

For the most part, the COP program was planned and implemented from the bottom up. The head of the police union, an organization with considerable clout within the department, was assigned to the Patrol Planning Unit. Officers in the Patrol Planning Unit designed the program that emphasized the officers in becoming very knowledgeable about their beats. This knowledge was to be obtained through officer "beat profiling" activities. Beat profiling required that the officers learn about the topographical, demographic, and call histories of their beats. Also stressed was the development of "tailored patrol" strategies to impact the types of crime and address

citizen concerns that had been communicated to the officers.

The Patrol Planning Unit randomly selected 24 officers to participate in the study. They were given 60 hours of training and assigned to permanent beats on fixed shifts in the North Patrol Division. The officers were required to contact citizens to identify citizen concerns and find out what the citizens expected regarding police service delivery. The officers were also encouraged to subscribe to neighborhood newsletters and attend community meetings. In short, the officers were made responsible and held accountable for the problems identified in their beats.

Based on initial results, the program was an unqualified success. The officers liked it, as did the citizens. Officers participating in the experiment concluded that random patrol was not as important as they had once thought it was. They also indicated that getting to know the citizens in their beats and developing stronger ties with the community was more important than they had previously thought it was. Many officers developed creative solutions to complex problems, and they might have been even more creative had there been cooperation among the officers in adjacent beats. In spite of this shortcoming, all of the objectives of the program were accomplished.

For political reasons, the San Diego Police Department jumped on the success of the program and attempted to expand it too quickly throughout the entire department. They failed to change the old accountability requirements of measuring the officers' performance based on ticket quotas and other forms of "bean counting." They failed to include the middle managers, i.e., shift lieutenants, into the planning and implementation process. They failed to adequately train the sergeants, and they cut time from the officers' training program. There was little staff support to perpetuate the success that had been initially achieved, and the program was a complete washout within three months.

Many lessons were learned from this study. One of the more important lessons included the benefits derived from having the officers develop closer ties with citizens in their beats. Through getting to know the citizens, the officers obtained valuable information about persons responsible for perpetrating crimes in their beats. They also obtained realistic expectations regarding citizen needs as recipients of police services. For the adept patrol officer, a different perspective of the citizen emerges. Citizens constitute a potential resource that can be mobilized to assist officers in problem identification and problem resolution.

Another lesson learned from this project involved a rethinking about shift (and beat) rotation. Although perhaps elementary, it is of absolute necessity to have

officers assigned to permanent shifts and beats if they are expected to engage in activities other than simply reacting to calls for service. Having officers periodically rotate among the shifts impedes their ability to identify problems. It also discourages creative solutions to impact the problems, because the officers end up rotating away from the problems. Thus, a sense of responsibility to identify and resolve problems is lost. Likewise, management can not hold the officers accountable to deal with problems if the officers are frequently rotated from one shift to another.

Finally, the COP program demonstrated the critical role shift lieutenants and sergeants play in program planning and implementation. Exclusion of supervisory involvement in training and program expansion ultimately lead to the demise of COP in San Diego. It is unfortunate that the San Diego Police Department never received the credit they deserved for conceptualizing the COP program. Presently, almost 11 or 12 years later, there are approximately 220 municipal police departments out of around 11,600 that are engaged in "community oriented policing."

A program less community oriented and more enforcement oriented came out of the New Haven, Connecticut, Police Department in the mid 1970s. Called the Directed-Deterrent Patrol study, the major objective was to assess the effectiveness of utilizing crime analysis information for "directed runs" to suppress (i.e., deter) crime. Each patrol officer received a "D-Run" book that was compiled by crime analysts. These books were issued every 28 days and consisted entirely of statistical aggregations of data. The D-Run books contained very explicit instructions regarding the D-Runs. Every so often, a dispatcher would send out a car, usually the beat unit, to do a D-Run (e.g., "Adam 11, execute D-Run 32 immediately."). The D-Runs generally lasted between 15 and 45 minutes. They were timed so communications personnel knew exactly where the officers were supposed to be at any given time.

Based on final analysis of the results, the Directed-Deterrent Patrol study was moderately successful. Somewhat surprisingly (based on the fact that the D-Run books contained relatively stale data), burglaries, purses-natchings, and thefts from autos (all "targeted crimes") were substantially reduced. But the program was eventually scrapped, because the patrol officers hated it so much. Given the rigidity of executing D-Runs, the officers were left with the impression (albeit accurate) that police managers thought of them as being hopelessly stupid and incapable of thinking on their own. Loss of discretion in executing D-Runs tended to reinforce the officers' perceptions of management toward them.

Several operational implications were gleaned from this effort. Perhaps most important, patrol officers do not like to be treated like robots. They shouldn't be told what to do by crime analysts, either civilian or sworn. The function of crime analysis is to collect, analyze, and generate data; not to tell patrol officers (or street supervisors) how the information is to be used. Letting patrol officers suggest tactical actions to address crime patterns builds confidence and enriches job satisfaction. And the officers are much more enthusiastic about making their plan work than they are in implementing someone else's ideas.

Crime analysis information must be current in relationship to day-to-day criminal incidents. Field supervisors and police officers do not want to receive "history reports" from crime analysts that indicate what happened weeks or even months ago. They want to know of any significant events that occurred on the previous shift(s) and what might "go down" on their shift. In general, crime patterns only last about two to three weeks. Hence, officers in New Haven might have been patrolling the wrong area, because the data contained in the D-Run books were already 28 days old when issued.

A different approach in dealing with directed patrol came from the Wilmington, Delaware, Police Department. Entitled the Wilmington Split-Force Patrol Experiment, the Wilmington Police Department developed a patrol program that consisted of three components. First, the patrol force was divided into two groups; "basic" and "structured." The basic group consisted of 65 percent of the patrol force, while the structured group represented the remaining 35 percent of the patrol officers. The "basic officers" responded to routine calls for service and took "mundane reports," but did not do any patrolling. The "structured officers" performed both random and directed patrol and only answered "in-progress crime" and other noncrime emergency calls for service.

Second, the dispatchers "stacked" nonemergency and low priority calls, took some types of crime reports over the phone, and asked victims and other complainants to come to police headquarters to have reports completed.

Third, the beats were rearranged and the shifts altered to fit the needs of the basic group, based on an analysis of call for service workload data. The city's beat structure, therefore, changed by time of day (shift). Because of the beat variability, no roll calls were held for the basic officers. They simply reported to duty at different times and worked "staggered shifts."

Results from this study were mixed but somewhat favorable in relationship to the objectives tested. Placing calls in queue (call stacking delays) did not effect (reduce) citizen satisfaction, i.e., the public accepted re-

sponse delays and telephone reporting procedures. And 65 percent of the patrol officers were able to handle 96 percent of the overall workload. Perhaps because the basic patrol officers were conducting more perfunctory preliminary investigations, the detectives were less successful in clearing crimes. They became "ticked off" at the basic officers.

The officers involved in this study detested it. The "dynamic shift and beat plans" were termed confusing. Participants suggested that the officers assigned to the basic group were probably unhappy in having to do so much work, while the officers in the structured group were probably bored stiff. The structured group thought that their work was too mechanical, and the basic officers expressed dissatisfaction in having to move around so frequently. They indicated that they did not have any "turf" of their own with commensurate responsibility to police "their areas." The project implicitly telegraphed to all the officers that they were simply too "dumb" to do more than one thing at a time.

While most of the research done in policing during the 1970s dealt with patrol issues, another study that also achieved national notoriety addressed criminal investigations. Conducted by the Rand Corporation, this study sought to identify the work actually performed by detectives, although in contrast to the other studies already discussed, the "methodology" used by the Rand researchers lacked scientific rigor. Researchers at Rand collected survey information from a number of police departments and selected a few sites for intensive observation. Based on analysis of data collected, the findings revealed that the work performed by detectives stood in sharp contrast to perceptions of detectives as portrayed through popular media. Rand cited an almost complete lack of administrative control in managing criminal investigations. They indicated that departments could substantially cut their detective forces without suffering a significant decline in clearances. They indicated that more than half of all cases obtained by detectives received little more than superficial investigative attention. And they found that 90 percent of clearances resulted, not from the sagacity of "super sleuths," but from information obtained by patrol officers.

Although publication of these findings infuriated detectives, it did serve to provoke serious inspection of the criminal investigations process. This process was analyzed by first looking at what patrol officers did as part of their on-scene, preliminary investigations. Next, the initial handling and internal routing of cases received in investigative divisions was analyzed. Finally, the manner in which cases were submitted for criminal prosecution and then tracked through the courts to determine ultimate dispositions was assessed.

A response to remedy the "investigative ineffi-

ciencies" outlined in the Rand reports resulted in the development of a national program to help law enforcement agencies more effectively manage criminal investigations. Sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), work began in the summer of 1976 to design an 18-month "field test" to implement the program—Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI). By December of 1976, five agencies had been selected to "test" the MCI model, although implementation didn't actually begin until the spring of 1977. The agencies selected included: Birmingham, Alabama; Montgomery County, Maryland; Rochester, New York; Santa Monica, California; and St. Paul, Minnesota.

During the fall of 1976, work also began on designing a training program on managing criminal investigations. This program was to be delivered to ten "regional workshops" across the country. Also funded through NILECJ, these sessions were eventually expanded to include an additional ten "department specific" sites for agencies requiring technical assistance in implementing procedures to more effectively manage their criminal investigations. Altogether, the 20 training presentations began during the latter part of 1976 and continued through the last quarter of 1978.

During the spring of 1978, LEAA held a series of "briefings" to consider the possibility of expanding MCI to other cities. Discussions at these meetings addressed the scope and objectives of MCI, preliminary results of program accomplishments from the five pilot agencies already funded through NILECJ, and the development of evaluation criteria to be used in monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of a new MCI initiative.

By late winter of 1978, program guidelines had been completed for this new initiative and were included in an "incentive grant" program that was distributed nationally by LEAA in early 1979. During the spring of 1979, LEAA asked representatives from a technical assistance contractor, University Research Corporation, a firm that had been instrumental in the original development of the MCI prototype, to develop a training program for prospective recipients of grant awards. Once developed and approved by LEAA, the program was presented at a "preaward training conference" in August of 1979. Following the training, agencies interested in participating in the new MCI program had approximately 80 days to complete and submit proposals to LEAA for funding consideration. The following year 15 cities from across the country were awarded grants to participate in this program. These grants included a 24-month timetable for program implementation.

Given the demise of LEAA in 1982, however, the full impact of LEAA's (including NILECJ's) MCI pro-

gram was never thoroughly evaluated, although an evaluation report was published by the Urban Institute in 1979 regarding the five MCI test sites originally funded through NILECJ. Perhaps with the possible exception of some police departments in California and Florida, states that had adopted the programmatic components of another LEAA national initiative that evolved during the mid 1970s, the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP), the overall impetus generated by LEAA during the mid- and late 1970s to improve management of criminal investigations gradually succumbed to spotty and infrequent MCI implementations among law enforcement agencies.

Results published during the late 1970s about the "success" of MCI program implementations that appeared in the Urban Institute's evaluation report and a variety of other "prescriptive packages," "program implementation guides," and MCI "test site manuals" were, in general, inconclusive. Overall, while some departments did experience positive results in certain programmatic areas, no single agency achieved "complete success" in implementing all of the programmatic components of MCI.

Analysis of findings from "test site literature" that specifically pertained to the case screening function revealed mixed results. All five of the MCI field test sites (funded through NILECJ) did reduce their investigative case loads through establishing more formalized case screening procedures. But only two of these agencies, Birmingham and Santa Monica, were able to reassign detectives to other in their departments after having achieved reductions in their overall investigative work loads (mention of these findings is not to suggest that a reduction in investigative personnel is or should be a goal of MCI). Additionally, data available for analysis indicated that the MCI test sites did not realize increases for arrests, case clearances, and convictions.

In retrospect, it appears that too much credence may have been given to the use of solvability factors as the primary, if not only, criterion in screening cases for possible assignment. But in the context of the times during the mid- to late 1970s solvability factors were novel and in national vogue. The initial MCI prototype, if limited in comparison to today's standards, did, however, provide a conceptual clarity and a structural framework for organizing some of the investigative functions that had gone undocumented theretofore. By analytically dividing the overall investigative process into a series of discrete, albeit logically interdependent functions, the MCI model (at least) suggested a more formal method to establish objectives and thus monitor investigative performance through accounting for the outcome and disposition of cases. In so doing, it suggested the importance of establishing positive

liaisons between the police and the prosecutors to review changes in the filing of charges and in tracking cases through the courts.

Perhaps of tantamount importance to the model itself, efforts to implement MCI revealed the weight tradition carries in thwarting organizational change. An important component of MCI included expanding the responsibilities of patrol officers in the investigative process. This change from tradition required patrol officers to perform more comprehensive initial investigations, i.e., to conduct neighborhood canvasses, detect and collect physical evidence, interview witnesses, interrogate suspects, etc. It also included latitude to seek "early case closures" through following leads obtained during the initial investigation that resulted in the apprehension of suspects or, in having exhausted all leads or in failing to obtain any meaningful evidence, to inform victims that further investigation was unlikely, rather than telling them that they would be contacted by a detective. In general, however, detectives were reluctant to relinquish this work, not to mention the thought of having patrol officers become involved in tactical activities, e.g., physical and electronic surveillances, stakeouts, decoy operations, etc.

Aside from management initiatives to identify "performance anchors" and develop methods to better account for detectives' time and activities, expanding the role of patrol officers to become more involved in some forms of criminal investigations tended to threaten detectives. Many detectives perceived that a loss of work traditionally performed only by them would mean fewer detectives needed to pursue criminal investigations. Although this rationale is not illogical—as mentioned elsewhere, several police departments did reduce their investigative strength—detectives that are apprehensive about the ramifications of change cannot realistically be expected to enthusiastically embrace MCI and the changes that go along with this program.

While a reluctance to accommodate the organizational changes required to implement MCI has been mentioned as the primary reason for MCI's failure to deliver more than it promised, closer inspection of the MCI model reveals some inherent deficiencies with the (initial) model itself. In its generic form, MCI displayed a propensity to address broad generalities in suggesting ways to improve investigative efficiency rather than in providing substantive detail in suggesting exactly how particular functions were to be performed. In-depth thought had not addressed differences in investigative routines among the various types of investigations performed, e.g., burglary, theft, homicide, robbery, rape, motor vehicle theft, arson, aggravated assault, etc. And little, if any, consideration was given to the rationale and criteria used in case assign-

ment, an oversight observed but not articulated by experienced investigators.

Collectively pooling all the implications from the research conducted during the 1970s lead to the following conclusions:

- The use of random, preventive patrol should be dismissed, and the use of preprogrammed, goal-oriented patrol strategies (e.g., directed patrol, etc.) should be increased. Quite simply, preventive patrol doesn't prevent crime, and random patrol produces random results.
- The addition of more officers to reduce police response time to all calls for service cannot be justified as a means to increased on-scene criminal apprehensions. Only about ten to 15 percent of dispatched calls for service constitute bona fide emergencies. Citizens reporting delays tend to negate the potential impact rapid police response would have to many types of calls in which a desired outcome could be achieved.
- Effective management of the patrol function is dependent upon intelligent management of the dispatch function. Logical and interdependent linkages exist between management of the dispatch function, management of the patrol function, and management of criminal investigations. All too often, the patrol function is "managed" by the dispatchers. The development of differential police response (i.e., call diversion) strategies and call prioritization and queueing procedures is critical in managing incoming calls for service and thus the patrol officers' time. Given the important but limited role patrol officers have in criminal investigations through conducting preliminary investigations, sufficient time needs to be available for the officers to perform quality and comprehensive initial investigations.
- The development of crime and operational analysis procedures is vital in managing the patrol and investigative functions. Implementation of directed patrol activities is dependent upon the timely and accurate crime analysis information.
- As a viable resource, the use of patrol officers in activities other than performing routine patrol and "running calls" has been underutilized. Meaningful incentives needed to attract and retain good officers in patrol must be developed by police managers. Police officers need enhanced status and enriched job responsibilities. They need to become more involved in providing direction and insight into managing the patrol function.
- A strong emphasis is needed to involve the community in policing. Traditional methods used by the police to "combat crime" and render various types of services have not always been effective. Initiatives must be taken by the police to identify citizen expectations regarding service delivery and to work with citizens in addressing and resolving problems of mutual concern. Management must recognize that, as with the patrol officers, citizens also represent an untapped resource that can provide valuable assistance in helping the police perform their work.
- To facilitate the development of stronger ties with the community, policies that require the frequent rotation of officers across shifts must be seriously examined. Frequent shift rotations impede the officers' ability to become acquainted with citizens that live and work in their beats.
- Attention also needs to be devoted to assessing or reassessing the purpose and function of beat structures. Rather than being traditionally defined as "patrol areas" (initially developed to equalize work load), emphasis needs to be given to reconfiguring beats around neighborhoods. Ideally, these neighborhoods would be relatively homogeneous after having considered demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. More homogeneous "neighborhood beats" would make it easier for the officers to become familiar with the values of citizens that reside in these beats. Rather than having to deal with an extensive amount of cultural diversity among various different groups of people, the officers would be better prepared to identify problems and solicit solutions from residents to impact these problems.
- Officers assigned to the patrol function must become more actively involved in criminal in-

vestigations. The quality of the initial investigation is critical in determining whether a case may be solved or receive subsequent investigative attention. Appropriate training and equipment must be provided to facilitate competent and comprehensive initial/preliminary investigations. And patrol officers should be permitted to perform some follow up investigations and obtain early case closures if sufficient time is available.

- Case management systems must be developed and implemented to fit the needs of the various investigative functions. These systems must include sound case screening mechanisms, logical criteria in the assignment of cases, methods to efficiently manage ongoing investigations, and procedures to monitor and track the filing of charges and prosecutorial dispositions of cases. Systematic procedures also need to be developed to account for cases as either being open or closed, and uniform terminology needs to be developed to accurately account for case clearances. Finally, appropriate procedures need to be developed that professionally informs victims (for some types of cases) that, given the absence of leads, continued investigation can no longer be justified.

In having now reviewed some of the pertinent literature informing police operations and in having assessed the implications from this research that was conducted during the 1970s, it is not surprising that the findings from these studies made many police administrators nervous. Occasionally, these findings appeared in local newspapers, having been released through the wire services. Many chiefs were caught off guard when confronted by mayors and city managers who demanded explanations and wanted to discuss the political and policy implications of the findings. Of interest is the fact that the findings, in general, did not tell police administrators what it was they were doing that did work; only what didn't.

Of no small consequence, it became exceedingly difficult for chiefs of police to defend the traditional rationale that had been used for budgetary increases for additional officers and more equipment. And the economic milieu of the 1970s with recession, inflation, fuel shortages, and "prop 13s" provided credence to elected officials who, in light of the research findings, sought justification to chop police budgets.

Many chiefs of police did not survive the momentum for change that began to build during the past decade.

But for most of those that did they brought a different philosophy of municipal policing into the 1980s. Influenced by the events of the 1960s and the research of the 1970s, this philosophy contained an expression of values regarding human life, personal dignity, and individual rights. It also contained a change in emphasis that diminished the perception of police officers from being primarily "enforcement oriented" to becoming more receptive and open in working with the public to prevent crime and identify and suggest solutions for crime and noncrime citizen concerns.

Not surprisingly, many of the innovative programs and a good deal of the research that has been funded during the 1980s has reflected the philosophy of this new breed of police chiefs. Whereas the decade of the 1970s was replete with the names of departments that had been extensively involved in research initiatives—Kansas City, Missouri; San Diego, California; Rochester, New York—a new set of names would emerge out of the 1980s. These would include Madison, Wisconsin; Flint, Michigan; Newport News, Virginia; and Minneapolis, Minnesota, to name just a few.

The 1980s started with a major study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). To test the utility of a comprehensive police response system for managing incoming calls for service, NIJ designed the Differential Police Response (DPR) Field Test Program in October of 1980. In having initially searched for a number of agencies to participate in the project, three cities were finally selected as sites to test the program under controlled, experimental conditions. These cities included: Garden Grove, California; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Toledo, Ohio.

The DPR experiment had evolved from an earlier Differential Police Response Strategies project, also supported by NIJ, that had as its mission the development of a model to manage incoming calls for service. The Birmingham, Alabama Police Department was selected as the site for model development. Knowledgeable about preliminary findings from the Kansas City Response Time Analysis Study, a group of police practitioners and researchers began work to devise the model. Through a series of meetings, such a model was eventually developed and its implications discussed.

The model involved a two-dimensional schematic that included a set of priority codes for the following categories: major personal injury; major property damage; potential personal injury; potential property damage; minor personal injury; minor property damage; other minor crime; and other minor noncrime calls. Under each of these headings were other categories that sought to classify reporting delays, e.g., "in-progress, proximate, and cold."

The response alternatives developed for this model included "sworn mobile," "nonsworn mobile," and "nonmobile." Adjacent to each of these headings were subcategories that identified the appropriate type of mobile response. These included "immediate," "expedite," "routine," and "appointment." Alternative response strategies developed for the nonmobile responses included: "telephone," "walk-in," "mail-in," "referral," and "no response."

Theoretically, the rationale underlying the model appeared to make sound managerial sense. But the model was never formally evaluated until the DPR experiment was implemented.

There were two primary objectives of the DPR test: 1) to increase the efficiency of the management of calls for service; and 2) to maintain or improve citizen satisfaction with police service. To evaluate the first objective, a set of subordinate objectives were identified. These included the following:

- To reduce the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile response;
- To increase the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by a telephone reporting unit by delayed mobile responses or by other alternative response strategies;
- To decrease the amount of time patrol units spent answering calls for service and increase the amount of time available for crime prevention or other activities; and
- To increase the availability of patrol units to respond rapidly to emergency calls.

The second objective addressed the need to determine how many and what types of calls could be handled by alternative response strategies without adversely affecting citizen satisfaction. It was assumed that if calls were carefully screened, if citizens were informed of potential delays, and if alternative strategies were appropriate and timely, citizen satisfaction would not decrease. Hence, the second objective contained the following subordinate objectives:

- To explain to citizens during their initial contact with the intake operators the method and reason for the type of police response suggested to service their calls; and

- To provide satisfactory responses to citizens for resolving their calls for service.

To prepare the departments to implement the program and the experimental conditions, uniform procedures had to be developed to classify and prioritize calls, establish alternative response strategies, and effectively screen and process incoming calls. An extensive amount of training was required at each site to ready personnel for the test implementation. Alternative response strategies included the implementation of a telephone report unit (called either a Telephone Report Unit [TRU] or an Expeditor Unit) to take reports over the phone, a procedure to delay mobile police responses from 30 to 60 minutes, a procedure to refer calls to other agencies, e.g., the Humane Society, public works, animal control, etc., and a method to handle "scheduled walk-in reporting," and "mail-in reporting."

After almost two years needed to plan for implementation and then to collect data following implementation, a few of the key conclusions from this project emerged and are presented below:

- Police departments can achieve a sizeable reduction in the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile dispatch without sacrificing citizen satisfaction. The DPR experiment demonstrated that up to 47 percent of all calls could have received alternative response treatments.
- Citizens showed a high willingness to accept response alternatives to the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit for nonemergency calls.
- Citizen surveys revealed that 75 percent of persons calling the police were willing to accept delays of up to an hour in police response time to nonemergency calls for service.
- Citizen satisfaction with the initial conversations with intake operators was very high. Satisfaction with call takers among citizens in the experimental groups receiving mobile responses exceeded 95 percent at all three sites; for those receiving delayed mobile responses, satisfaction with call takers ranged from 92 percent in Garden Grove to 97 percent in Toledo. Citizens receiving telephone reporting response alternatives expressed satisfaction levels in excess of 95 percent (ranging from 95.8% in Toledo to 97.3% in Garden Grove).

- Citizen satisfaction with mobile responses averaged 95.4 percent among the three sites tested. Citizen satisfaction with delayed mobile responses averaged 94.4 percent for participating cities. And an average of 94.2 percent of the citizens surveyed expressed satisfaction with telephone reporting procedures.

- Alternative response strategies are less costly than traditional mobile responses, and productivity levels are much higher for personnel using response alternatives. In Toledo, for example, the number of calls that could be handled by a four-person telephone reporting unit would require ten officers to be mobilized for immediate responses.

- According to the test sites participating in this experiment, the advantages of civilianizing call intake operators and police dispatchers far outweigh the disadvantages. Civilians can be hired and trained at lower costs, have higher retention rates, and are better educated.

- The use of civilian evidence technicians to handle initial calls for certain property crimes can be an attractive alternative for police departments. Evidence technicians in Greensboro were able to process 18 percent of all nonmobile responses.

- Travel time to emergency calls was not significantly reduced as a result of DPR experimental conditions (not a surprising finding given previous mention of results from the Kansas City Response Time Analysis study), however, the new call classification systems did enable patrol officers to respond quickly when needed for bona fide emergency situations.

- The use of mail-in reporting procedures was not found to be an effective response alternative. "Call-back" procedures, where the call taker telephones the offending party back and warns them of impending action, can be an efficient response for certain types of calls, e.g., barking dogs, loud noise, etc.

Given the historicity of research in policing, it is rare, and usually controversial, when empirical findings are presented from experimental research about a certain aspect of police operations. But, unlike the Kansas City

Preventive Patrol Experiment, the findings from the DPR experiment generally confirmed what had already been learned (or assumed) from previous efforts to implement methods to more effectively manage the dispatch function. Thus, this study provided credence to departments that had already implemented intake and call screening procedures, the development of priority response codes, and the establishment of alternative response mechanisms that allowed for some types of calls to be diverted away from having to mobilize field units to respond to calls.

As with the DPR experiment, two other studies funded by NIJ that primarily focused on improving internal police operations received national attention during the mid 1980s: The Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department's Repeat Offender Project (ROP); and the Police Executive Research Forum's (PERF) study of burglary and robbery investigations.

Formulated in May of 1982, the impetus for the development of the ROP program was based on the assumption that a vast majority of criminal acts are perpetrated by a relatively small number of repeat, career criminals. The mission of the ROP program was, therefore, to identify, arrest, and successfully prosecute recidivists. Suspects "targeted" for ROP surveillance were believed to be committing five or more Part I offenses weekly.

The ROP program offered a unique opportunity to assess the problems and effectiveness of a proactive police unit specifically formed to carry out a selective apprehension strategy. To measure the unit's effectiveness, the design of a controlled experiment sought to determine whether repeat offenders identified by ROP officers were more likely to be arrested by ROP than they were in the absence of ROP activities. A comparative component examined prior arrest histories and current case dispositions of a sample of persons arrested by 40 ROP and 169 non-ROP officers, as well as arrest productivity rates for both groups of officers.

Analysis of data produced the following findings:

- ROP substantially increased the likelihood of arrest of the persons it targeted;

- Targeted persons arrested by ROP officers had longer and more serious prior arrest histories than a sample of those arrested by non-ROP officers;

- ROP arrestees were more likely to be prosecuted and convicted on felony charges, and more likely to be incarcerated than non-ROP comparison arrestees; and

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- ROP officers made only half as many total arrests as non-ROP comparison officers, but made slightly more "serious" arrests.

The study by PERF to examine criminal investigations of robbery and burglary cases was conducted in three police agencies: the DeKalb County Department of Public Safety (Georgia); the St. Petersburg, Florida, Police Department; and the Wichita, Kansas, Police Department. Burglary and robbery cases were selected for this project for several reasons—they are relatively common, they are "serious crimes" (according to F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reporting criteria), and they consume a large amount of police resources.

This study was primarily designed to determine the importance of preliminary and follow up investigations in solving robbery and burglary crimes. To address this issue, several questions were asked. These included the following:

- How much time does a "typical" investigation take to conduct?
- What actions are performed during an investigation?
- What information is obtained during investigations?
- What are the sources of information gained during investigations, and how often do such sources provide information?
- What is the relative importance of the role patrol officers and detectives play in conducting investigations?
- What actions taken or information gained by investigators contribute to the arrest of suspects?

In seeking to answer these questions, the study took about two years to complete and involved analysis of investigative data from more than 320 robbery cases and 3,360 burglary cases in the three participating jurisdictions. The findings from this effort revealed that detectives and patrol officers contribute equally to the solution of both types of crimes examined. But the investigation of such cases rarely consumes more than four hours, spread over as many days, and three-quarters of the investigations are suspended within two days for lack of leads. In the remainder of cases, the follow up work performed by detectives is a major factor in determining whether sus-

pects will be identified and arrested. However, both detectives and patrol officers rely too heavily on victims, who seldom provide information that leads to an arrest. And detectives and patrol officers make too little use of other sources of information most likely to lead to arrest, i.e., witnesses, informants, peers, and police records. The single conclusion derived from this research is that sound management is required to ensure that investigations are effective and that resources are not wasted.

Up to this point, most of the research presented has focused on assessing or improving management of internal police operations. As indicated earlier, however, a change in orientation has taken place in policing that tends to focus more on external resources, i.e., the citizens, in working with and assisting the police. Many of the traditional approaches tried to combat or reduce crime have achieved only marginal success. Perhaps through establishing rapport and a better working relationship with citizens the police, over time, will find innovative solutions to remedy persistent problems.

In April of 1979, Herman Goldstein, a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, published an article that presented a different way of thinking about the police mission. Rather than run from call to call without having time to identify any underlying problems associated with these calls, much less address them, Dr. Goldstein suggested an alternative approach—"problem-oriented policing." This approach necessitates moving away from a reactive, "incident/event-orientation" and moving toward ways to identify, define, and impact problems that continue to drain police resources. Dr. Goldstein indicates that problem resolution constitutes the "real, substantive business" of policing.

Although this type of thinking is not incompatible with progressive police thought, attempting to operationalize it through traditional police management structures poses a significant challenge. But two police departments have accepted this challenge: the Madison, Wisconsin Police Department and the Newport News, Virginia Police Department.

While work completed in the Madison Police Department has yet to be published, work that documents the problem-oriented approach in Newport News is in the process of being published.

Also in 1979, work began in Flint, Michigan to develop a "foot-beat" program. Seed money to develop the program was provided through a private source. The program involved the selection of a number of patrol officers to develop a close working relationship with citizens that lived in the officers' beats. The term "foot-beat officer" is actually a misnomer, because the officers in Flint who are involved in this program are not supposed to

spend any time walking beats, unless there is a specific purpose of this activity. Their role is primarily to act as community mobilizers, facilitators, and coordinators in identifying and addressing crime and noncrime problems that are brought to their attention. In general, they tend to work out of an office, donated by citizen groups, located in their beats. While some vehicles are available, many of these officers rely on unconventional sources of transportation such as motor scooters and bicycles.

Of particular interest to other law enforcement administrators, the foot-beat program has been funded by a separate four-mill property tax increase. When this funding support was first presented to voters in a special election held in August of 1982, the measure passed by about 53 percent. In 1985, another election was held to determine if the tax payers wanted the program continued. This time the measure passed by 68 percent. Recent polls conducted during the fall of 1986 indicate that citizen satisfaction with the program continues to grow. The latest survey reveals a general citizen satisfaction level of 75 percent. This poll also revealed a satisfaction level among Black citizens to be 80 percent.

The Minneapolis, Minnesota Police Department took part in a Domestic Violence Experiment. Conducted from early 1981 through mid 1982, this was the first scientifically controlled test of the effects of arrest for any crime.

The purpose of the experiment was to address an intense debate about how police should respond to cases of domestic violence (misdemeanors). This debate involved three different viewpoints: (1) The traditional police approach of doing as little as possible, on the premise that offenders will not be punished by the courts even if they are arrested, and that the problems are basically not solvable; (2) The clinical psychologists' recommendations that police activity mediate or arbitrate disputes underlying the violence, restoring peace but not making any arrests; and (3) The approach recommended by many women's groups of treating the violence as a criminal offense subject to arrest.

If the purpose of police response to domestic violence calls is to reduce the likelihood of that violence recurring, the question is which of these approaches is more effective than the others? In response to this question, experimental findings revealed that arrest was the most effective of the three standard methods police use to reduce domestic violence. The other methods, attempting to counsel both parties or sending assailants away from their homes for several hours, were found to be considerably less effective in deterring future violence in the cases examined.

The Houston Police Department collaborated with the Newark, New Jersey, Police Department on a project designed to reduce the fear of crime among citizens. Funded through NIJ, this program sought to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:

- Reduce the level of perceived neighborhood crime and disorder;
- Reduce the fear of and concern about crime;
- Improve satisfaction with police service; and
- Increase satisfaction with the neighborhood as a place to live.

Houston and Newark were selected as examples of two different types of cities—similar, however, in that their police departments were able to design and manage complex experimental programs. Task forces were assembled in each city to determine which programs would best address local needs.

In both cities, the programs tested included the following:

- A local police community newsletter containing crime prevention advice, information about successful efforts to thwart crimes, neighborhood news, and, in some cases, local recorded crime data.
- A police-community multi-service center, where residents could go to report crimes, hold meetings, and obtain information.
- Contacts made by police officers with neighborhood residents to determine and address what the public considered to be local problems.

In Houston only, the programs included the following:

- Telephone contacts with victims of crime in an attempt to provide assistance and demonstrate concern; and
- An effort by police officers to create a neighborhood organization.

In Newark only, the programs included the following:

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- A program to reduce the "signs of crime"-- social disorder and physical deterioration; and
 - A coordinated effort to provide information, increase the quantity and quality of police-citizen contacts, and reduce the social and physical signs of crime.

Results indicated that of all the programs tried, the most successful involved neighborhood police centers, door-to-door contacts, and community organizing by police. Inspection of the findings disclosed that these efforts had two characteristics in common: 1) They provided time for police to have frequent discussions with citizens who were encouraged to express their concerns about their neighborhoods; and 2) They relied upon the initiative and innovativeness of individual officers to develop and implement programs responsive to the concerns of the public.

As can be seen from a brief review of the work that has been completed or is currently ongoing, the research of the 1980s continues to build from what was found during the previous decade. And future research will certainly follow what is presently being learned about policing today. While additional research will continue to explore programs that involve the police with the public, more work is needed in criminal investigations, department organizational structures, and police management systems.

Chapter 6

STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

During the course of each Executive Session meeting, a number of individual presentations were made. The presentations were designed to expose the panel members to a variety of different programs which had been implemented within the department and/or throughout the nation. The reason for exposing the panel members to this information was to provide them with an opportunity to consider using any one of them (or combination) as a vehicle to operationalize the concept of NOP. It was anticipated that any one of the programs could become a part of the policing style utilized by all officers within the department.

It is of interest in passing to note that programs developed within the Houston Police Department incorporated relevant findings from a lot of the research conducted during the 1970s in policing. But, for the most part, the department's efforts went further than the "enforcement-oriented" projects of the 1970s by including built-in linkages with representatives from the community. For example, the department's Directed Area Responsibility Team program not only included crime analysis and directed patrol components, it also included a series of activities to increase communications with the citizens.

This portion of the report, therefore, serves to identify those programs and associated strategies that were presented to and discussed by the panel membership during the six session meetings. Each of the programs will be briefly described below.

The Oasis Technique

The Oasis technique is a comprehensive approach that includes a systematic analysis of the problems contributing to the formation of the neighborhood slum and neighborhood decay; coalition building and collaboration between local government service agencies, the private sector, the local residents; and development of an experienced plan for action and implementation. The technique identifies the strengths and weaknesses of a target neighborhood in order to focus services and atten-

tion on that area to reverse the trend of neighborhood deterioration. Once some improvement in the area and the housing occurs, and committed and helpful residents have been identified, an "oasis" can be created in the neighborhood resulting in an initial step towards safe and decent housing. These improved areas are then supposed to produce a ripple effect resulting in a revitalization of the neighborhood over time. Once the private sector sees the promise of the area, investment funds may be forthcoming.

A major feature of the Oasis technique is to make more effective and efficient use of existing resources so that visible results are produced in a relatively short time period.

The uniqueness of the Oasis technique is that it implements urban renewal in such a way that the character, social, and economic pattern of the area is preserved. This is in contrast to urban renewal which concentrates on removal of residents and replacement of structures.

The Oasis technique consists of seven steps. On a collective basis, these steps represent strategy considerations for the executive session membership. They are as follows:

1) Orienting and Organizing the Facilitators and Implementors: As a key component, this group generally consists of top representatives from the public and private sector, including the city administrator's office, public housing, police, public works, elected officials, business persons, and community leaders. These facilitators will eventually be charged with the responsibility of implementing the neighborhood plan;

2) Collecting the Data: the methodology of collecting data includes collecting and analyzing historical records and available data (census, crime, housing, employment, etc.), direct observation of the conditions in the target area, interviewing residents, and other steps to compile a physical, economic, and social profile of the

target area. Some of the key data elements include the following:

- history of physical maintenance, code violations, and antisocial behavior at the residences;
- identification of private owners and landlords;
- identification of "good" residents and "bad" residents in target areas; and
- identification of social structures in target areas.

3) Evaluating the Data: the evaluation step helps the participants understand the interrelationships in the data as they attempt to identify target areas offering the most opportunity for success;

4) Presenting the Data: this enables the decision-makers to make more efficient choices regarding revitalization expenditures and strategies. It also provides an effective means of demonstrating to interested parties that certain policy choices are appropriate;

5) Preparation of the Plan: the plan identifies the commitment of resources. Among the determining factors is the identification of the oasis, which residents will receive housing improvements, and the level of involvement from government agencies, including the police;

6) Conducting Implementation Training: as a result of the plan being adopted, new or different services will be required to be performed. The training serves to prepare personnel to deliver those services; and

7) Implementing the Oasis Neighborhood Plan: as a result of the services being delivered, actual physical and/or social changes in the target area will materialize.

The Oasis technique relies heavily on the involvement of the police for its success. Should a decision be made to adopt the Oasis technique certain recommendations are made as to the role the police serve with respect to the project. These recommendations include the following:

- 1) Police should focus on crimes involving order maintenance that directly impacts the quality of

life of individuals who live in low income neighborhoods (drugs, prostitution, gambling, drinking in public, disorderly conduct, junked cars, etc.);

- 2) Police departments supporting an oasis effort must be willing to allocate a dedicated squad of patrol officers. This squad should be headed by a sergeant whose sole responsibility is supervision of the oasis unit. While the size of the unit can vary, the squad should not exceed eight patrol officers and one sergeant. A liaison officer between the Oasis squad and the office of the Chief of Police is also needed;

- 3) The Oasis squad should have flexible working schedules so that the criminal element will not be able to predict when the Oasis squad will be on the street;

- 4) It is beneficial to assign detectives to the Oasis squad on an as needed basis in order to assist with follow-up investigations; and

- 5) The officers selected as Oasis squad members should be open-minded, and squad personnel should be ethnically mixed.

There are no specific recommendations describing particular policing techniques. Officers are expected to be involved in a wide range of activities, including: walk and talk initiatives, developing confidential informants, undercover and surveillance efforts, raids, serving warrants, and participation in community meetings.

The Directed Area Responsibility Team (D.A.R.T.) Program

The D.A.R.T. Program was designed to provide the department with a process of altering its methods of delivering police services to the community. Substantively, the program sought to expand the role of the officer through the process of decentralizing basic police responsibilities. By enlarging the officers' role and providing increased managerial flexibility, the department attempted to commit itself to the effective management of patrol operations.

The program consisted of five major strategy classifications. Included within each classification were numerous strategies which were administered during the experimentation period. A brief description of each of

the strategies is provided below.

I. Deployment Strategies

- 1) Beat Integrity - the assignment of officers to specific beats where they remain during their tour of duty, providing the requested services;
- 2) One-officer Units - the increased deployment of one-officer units beyond the normal ratio of one and two officer units. In conjunction with beat integrity, the strategies were designed to increase visibility and reduce response time to emergency calls;
- 3) Tactical Assignments - consisted of a series of events whereby the officers attempted to identify neighborhood problems and then provide a response in the form of using formal methods such as Tactical Action Plans or informal methods such as saturation patrols, covert surveillance, sting operations, and so forth;
- 4) Designated Report Units - establishing a single unit, per shift, to be responsible for writing offense reports within the district, which occur during duty hours;

II. Team Interaction Strategies

- 5) Information Sharing - methods used to stimulate information exchange between officers, inclusive of using a blackboard or clip boards for leaving messages, increased number of meetings, interacting with investigative sergeants, sharing of workcard information etc.;
- 6) Investigative Sergeants - the decentralizing of the investigative function involving the crimes of robbery, burglary, larcenies, and vehicle thefts. Investigative sergeants were reassigned to the Field Operations Command from the Investigative Operations Command, which allowed them to become generalists in addition to working more closely with the patrol officers;

III. Job Diversification Strategies

- 7) Patrol Officer Follow-up Investigations - expansion of the officers' role allowing them to

spend time with the investigative sergeants working on criminal investigations;

- 8) Supportive Response Team - the establishment of a covert, plainclothes tactical squad of officers whose responsibility was to combat neighborhood vice and narcotic operations;

- 9) Structured Patrol - the assignment of officers during their uncommitted patrol time to resolve neighborhood problems through the use of a variety of tactical and deployment responses. The strategy was dependant upon the access to crime analysis information and the diligence of the officers in discovering neighborhood problems;

- 10) Participatory Management - establishing opportunities for personnel within each rank to provide input into decisions that either directly or indirectly affected their work;

- 11) Assistant Squad Leader - designating an officer to assume some of his supervisor's responsibilities during his scheduled absence;

IV. Knowledge Gaining/Sharing Strategies

- 12) Beat Profiling - establishment of a process whereby officers collect information about their beat which would assist them in providing appropriate types of services;

- 13) Crime Analysis - establishment of a process of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information designed to decrease crime and non-crime activity;

V. Community Interaction Strategies

- 14) Community Contacts - when possible, officers were encouraged to interact with the citizens in their beat in order to exchange information. The purpose of the exchanges was to facilitate a better understanding of each others' expectations, and, with respect to the officer, be able to respond to any particular needs expressed by the citizen;

15) Neighborhood Meetings - requiring beat officers to attend neighborhood meetings conducted by civic clubs in order to expose the officers to the residents within their beat and allow them the opportunity to respond to any questions offered regarding the activities occurring in and around their neighborhood;

16) Police Community Relations Officer - officers were reassigned from the Community Services Division in order to facilitate interaction between the citizen and the beat officer. This consisted of coordinating the flow of information which would educate the citizen about safety and crime prevention techniques, responding to special requests from civic groups, schools, or individuals; and

17) Crime Prevention/Security Surveys - allowing officers to participate in crime prevention presentations and administering security surveys to private residences and businesses within their respective beats. Officers identified potential problems as well as solutions to those problems for all interested parties.

As the needs of Houstonians changed over time, the department responded by designing and administering a program capable of coping with the demands of an everchanging environment. DART served as a mechanism which provided the department with an opportunity to become flexible in addressing the challenges of the future.

The Positive Interaction Program (PIP)

The purpose of the PIP is to facilitate an exchange of information between beat officers and neighborhood residents using as a forum community exchange meetings. The program contains a variety of program goals, among them are:

- 1) Building more meaningful communication linkages between the public and members of the department;
- 2) Creating a more knowledgeable understanding of the law by the citizen;
- 3) Providing an opportunity for both the officers and the citizens to develop a better

understanding of each others' expectations and responsibilities;

- 4) Exposing the citizens to the profession of policing;
- 5) Providing a forum to exchange ideas and suggestions relative to the concerns and services that are pertinent to the beat in question; and
- 6) Demonstrating to the citizens that members of the department do care about the quality of life within their neighborhoods.

Monthly meetings are held bringing together members of the police department with representatives of various civic groups located within the division's jurisdiction. The citizen participants are responsible for transmitting information obtained from the meeting (e.g., newsletters) back to their respective civic groups. They also act as a conduit to express the concerns of their civic groups to the police officers in attendance. Other ancillary duties include notification of membership to attend meetings and providing refreshments for the meeting.

The responsibility of department personnel is to schedule the meetings, share information with the attendees, (i.e., crime analysis reports) and to discuss the ramifications of actions administered within the area. Probably one of the most important functions the department assumes is ensuring the participation of the beat officers. This allows the citizens an opportunity to discuss local concerns with the individuals responsible for policing their neighborhoods. It also provides a forum for the police officers to demonstrate their awareness of neighborhood concerns as well as availing themselves to any new information of which they were previously unaware.

The program seeks to strengthen community ties by uniting the citizens and the officers. As mutual admiration and respect grow for one another, cooperative efforts begin to form in response to the unique concerns and problems in their neighborhoods. This in turn enhances a sense of trust and caring of the officers on behalf of the citizens. If the citizens realize the officers care about the quality of life in their neighborhoods, then they will be more apt to participate in its preservation.

The Fear Reduction Program

Research conducted by the National Institute of Justice revealed that fear of crime is a major problem in our

society. Yet, other research evidence indicates that the level of fear appears to be far out of proportion to the objective risks of crime. The incongruity of the research findings is based upon the fact that fear may be derived from a concern about the "signs of crime" (e.g., vandalism, loitering, public drinking or gambling). Other factors, including impersonal relationships between the police and the citizens and the lack of information about crime and crime prevention techniques, may create a sense of powerlessness, leading to higher levels of fear.

Law abiding citizens and merchants eventually opt to relinquish their neighborhoods to those who would prey upon them. Eventually, it has been suggested, this withdrawal process produces an exodus by those who can afford to move to other, apparently safer, areas. If such migration occurs, the fear-inflicted areas then provide abandoned homes and shops that could become breeding grounds for vandalism, drug use, and other forms of disorder.

No research exists which provides systematic evidence that such a cycle exists, or, if it does, what can be done to interrupt the cycle. The Fear Reduction Program, consequently, represents an attempt to empirically determine how the police can effectively address the problems of fear, disorder, the quality of police service, neighborhood satisfaction, and, ultimately, crime itself.

The program consisted of administering a total of five strategies. Each of the strategies is briefly described below:

1) Police-Community Newsletter: represented an attempt by the department to disseminate information to community groups and individuals in the form of a newsletter. Two versions of the newsletter were published. The first version contained information about the department, crime prevention tips, stories about police and citizen's working together to prevent crimes; and "good news" stories about crimes that had been prevented or solved in the neighborhood. Additionally, a regular column by the Chief of Police was included.

The second version contained similar information as the first, except a map of the neighborhood and a list of crimes that had occurred since the previous newsletter were included. The crime information included the type of crime committed, the date of occurrence, the street and block number in which it happened, and whether it occurred during the daylight, evening, or nighttime hours;

2) Community Organizing Response Team: spearheaded by a group of patrol officers, attempts were made to create a community organization where none had previously existed. The purpose was to create a sense of community in the area, and to identify a group of residents who would work regularly with the police to define and solve neighborhood problems.

Door to door surveys of a neighborhood were conducted by officers in an attempt to identify problems warranting police attention, and whether they, or any area resident they knew, might be willing to host small meetings of neighbors and police in their homes.

Meetings were held, problems and concerns discussed, and arrangements were made to have representatives meet with the district captain each month to discuss problems and devise potential solutions involving both the police and the citizens;

3) Citizen Contact Patrol: the purpose of this strategy was to enable beat officers to become more familiar with residents and employees working in their area. During their tour of duty, the officers were encouraged to make proactive contacts at residences and businesses.

During these contacts the officer would explain the purpose of the contact, and inquire as to the identification of any neighborhood problems the police should know about. The officer left a business card upon the conclusion of their interview in case the citizen wished to recontact the officer regarding additional information concerning their neighborhood;

4) Police Community Station: this strategy was designed to reduce the physical and psychological distance between the officer and the neighborhood residents. A small office was established in the neighborhood, staffed by police personnel and civilians.

The officers were not responsible for handling calls for service in the area (although they could respond if they wished). When possible they did patrol the neighborhood in and around the community station. Their primary responsibility, however, was to design and implement storefront programs. Furthermore, they were to avail themselves to citizens who visited the storefront seeking assistance and/or information; and

5) Recontacting Victims: the purpose of this strategy was to assist crime victims and demonstrate the police cared about their plight. A team of officers were assigned responsibility of reviewing case reports in search of relevant information about the victim and the crime. Upon contacting the victim, the officers would ask the victim if they had any problems which the police might be able to help, and whether they had any further information about their case they could give the police.

If problems were identified, the officer would refer the person to the proper agency for assistance. If the victim needed information for insurance purposes, the officer would attempt to supply it. The officers also mailed a crime prevention package to the victims if they so desired.

It was the contention of the task force members that these strategies could possibly reduce the fear of crime in the respective neighborhoods as well as produce other desired favorable effects. This feeling was based upon the belief that legitimate commitments were going to be made to interact with the citizenry using a variety of different strategies. Since the officers helped develop these strategies, had seen their success in other departments, and were going to be personally involved in the application of them, their desire and willingness to see the strategies succeed strongly influenced their initial opinion.

Chapter 7

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

The Houston Police Department has developed and implemented, during the course of the last five years, a number of significant community oriented programs as identified in the previous section of this report. In implementing each of these programs, the department sought to determine what they could learn about the nature of the relationship between officers and citizens. In each instance, this relationship was affected by the purpose and frequency of the interaction experienced by both parties.

Given that the City of Houston can best be characterized as a large urban area containing a multitude of unique challenges, it becomes the responsibility of the police department to determine what its role is in addressing those challenges. The concept of NOP appears to represent a logical method of tackling those challenges. In the development of this concept, however, it requires a commitment on behalf of department personnel to design a policing style which incorporates the lessons learned from previous program experimentation efforts.

This portion of the report identifies the lessons learned from the department's experimental programs. Since the purpose of this report is to describe salient characteristics of a policing style for the department, there will be no attempt to suggest which programs should be incorporated within the NOP concept. Furthermore, there will be no attempt at this time to describe relationship between a particular program(s) and the department's prospective policing style.

The Oasis Technique

From the department's standpoint, the success of the Oasis technique was dependent upon two primary factors: (1) the actual commitment by agencies other than the police department; and (2) the involvement of the patrol officer in the Oasis technique process. Of the two factors, the second is more conducive to control by department officials.

The process by which the Oasis technique becomes operational, consists of seven steps (please see page 23 for a more detailed description):

- 1) Orienting and organizing the facilitators and implementors;
- 2) Collecting the data;
- 3) Evaluating the data;
- 4) Presenting the data;
- 5) Preparing the plan;
- 6) Conducting implementation training; and
- 7) Implementing the Oasis neighborhood plan.

The Oasis technique, therefore, suggests a means of examining how one should go about performing his job.

As indicated by various panel members: "... we need to quit trying to create more programs; we have enough programs . . . what we've got to do is make all of the police officers that we have, community based police officers." The implication is that the Oasis technique represents a method which will cause this change to occur. Again, in referencing panel member comments: "You get the officers at the grass roots level, involved in the plan, they interact with the facilitators, plan what's going on, and participate and are responsible for implementation. They know what's going to happen (and) why its going to happen".

Although the Oasis technique ascribes to the use of a squad of officers, it appears that once the residents gain control of their own neighborhood, the squad can be disbanded and responsibility turned over to the beat officers. This may or may not be consistent with previous discussions regarding the role of the beat officers under the concept of NOP.

The Directed Area Responsibility Team (D.A.R.T.) Program

The D.A.R.T. Program can best be described as a process which simultaneously incorporated the decentralizing of basic police services with a concomitant expansion of the roles of the officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. In association with the role expansion was a com-

mensurate increase in supervisory and managerial flexibility. The focal point of the program centered upon the implementation of 17 different strategies, grouped under 5 different operational categories.

The findings gleaned from the Evaluation Report are provided below:

I. Deployment Strategies:

1) Beat Integrity - need more cooperation from the Dispatch Division with respect to assigning calls to the beat units; officers are in need of constant encouragement to remain in their beats; and officers must be given the flexibility to police their beat in accordance with the needs of the residents they serve;

2) One-officer Units - strategy is heavily dependent upon a "system of deployment" which includes the ability to control radio traffic, accessing information through the mobile digital computers, maintaining visual assurances (from other units) during patrols, and sharing crime data and activities verbally during roll calls and shift changes; response times were reduced; "wolfpacking occurred"; and vehicle availability was a must;

3) Tactical Assignments - strategy is dependent upon timely and reliable crime analysis information; identifying tactical assignments became difficult; standardized administrative procedures guiding the implementation of the strategy were non-existent; more comprehensive preparatory training is needed; officers need to be given credit on the workcard for the performing tactical assignments; and

4) Designated Report Units - total failure due to the complex coordination of administrative responsibilities; recommend it not be used unless following suggestions were incorporated: training for dispatchers in screening and recording the report calls, an increase in the report unit's responsibility to compensate for those times when the unit is not needed for reports, and deployment of strategy should be consistent for those beats/districts fielding a large number of report calls. Reference was made to resurrect the Calls for Service Management Program as a more effective method of handling these types of calls.

Officer visibility can be increased utilizing existing resources. Response times decreased as a direct result of these specific deployment practices. Officers did not like beat integrity and were concerned about their safety. Tactical assignments need stronger crime analysis support and resistance was experienced for the designated report unit.

II. Team Interaction Strategies:

5) Information Sharing - rapport between the officers and the investigative sergeants was effective; communication among the officers between shifts was sporadic; and

6) Investigative Sergeants - a clearer understanding of the investigative sergeant's role within the overall operational context was needed; this included establishing coordination linkages with the centralized divisions; data collection procedures must be established immediately to measure the quantity and quality of the work conducted; inadequate support equipment and furniture also attributed to an initial decline in enthusiasm for the strategy.

Officers are reluctant to share information unless there was a conduit, such as a localized crime analysis unit. Investigative sergeants and patrol officers can work together as long as the job task expectations are satisfactorily attained by both parties. This will lead to writing more comprehensive initial investigation reports and thereby expedite case closure.

III. Job Diversification Strategies:

7) Patrol Officer Follow-up Investigations - officers were not properly informed as to the purpose of the strategy; a systematic method of assigning cases should be considered to avoid charges of favoritism being alleged; on-the-job training should be improved; officer participation should not just be limited to "leg work" or menial tasks;

8) Supportive Response Team - strategy led to a prompt resolution of neighborhood vice and narcotic problems; stricter controls need to be established to govern the amount and type of activities the team should be involved with; conflict occurred with structured patrol operations thus causing coordination problems to occur for the

beat officers' supervisor;

9) Structured Patrol - initially, confusion over the meaning of the concept occurred, but was eventually clarified; the success of the strategy is dependent upon the collection and analysis of information; this proved to be an obstacle as the crime analysis strategy was not as effective as initially envisioned; a means of scheduling structured patrol activities needs to be developed;

10) Participatory Management - a clear and concise operational definition of the concept was needed; more opportunities for meetings needed to become available; a more clear understanding of one's role in the concept is needed; and

11) Assistant Squad Leader - a worthwhile concept if a clear definition of the scope of the leader's authority can be developed; selection criteria needs to be uniform; a method of evaluating performance should be devised; this strategy would be more effective if used in conjunction with a squad concept for the officers.

Officers are fully capable of resolving problems within their beat if given the chance, and knowing they would be held fully accountable for their actions. The expansion of the officers' role led to increased productivity and improved supervisory relationships. The sergeants became more responsible for managing the affairs of their officers in light of the expansion of their officers' job responsibilities. Uncommitted patrol time was reduced.

IV. Knowledge Gaining/Sharing Strategies:

12) Beat Profiling - the theory of beat profiling was supported by the officers' supervisors; the scope of information collected should be limited to its operational significance; because the information collected was not deemed to be practical for operational purposes, the strategy was seen as an inefficient use of the officers' time; and

13) Crime Analysis - strategy was strongly supported by the rank and file, however, because of the lack of equipment and office space, the strategy was minimally successful.

Information support is an essential element if one is to effectively manage patrol operations. Furthermore, the utility of the crime analysis information is only as good

as it is perceived by the officers; therefore, the information must be timely, reliable, and informative. Additionally, crime analysis personnel must be easily accessible by the patrol officers requiring their services. If this occurs, the officers become quite appreciative of the information and find it beneficial to the performance of their job.

V. Community Interaction Strategies:

14) Community Contacts - supervisory support of the strategy was apparent; extreme difficulty in defining what type of activity represented a community contact; community personnel should be more informed about the strategy at community meetings or through newsletters;

15) Neighborhood Meetings - strategy was responsible for establishing a closer relationship between the patrol officers and the citizens attending the meetings; coordination problems for the meetings existed but were eventually resolved; hidden agendas need to be removed; the use of a community feedback form was a plus;

16) Police Community Relations Officer - a very useful strategy as a definitive need existed; prior to the expiration of the experimental time period, the strategy was adopted by all of the FOC patrol divisions; and

17) Crime Prevention/Security Surveys - beneficial strategy within the community; need to develop a more effective method of delivering the service; more officers may need to be trained as to how to perform the strategy; standard operating procedures need to be developed; procedures should include a recognition of who should perform the strategy, this infers training commitments.

Community support for department operations helps facilitate strategy success. Officers and citizens can learn to respect each others' perspective if given the chance to meet and discuss issues which are conducive to a successful resolution. Interaction between the officers and the citizens enhances the level of satisfaction toward the department, given the nature of the encounter is nonadversarial

The DART experience should be viewed as a process in transition. It is apparent personnel resources can be more effectively redeployed if the equipment is available. There is considerable value in securing infor-

mation from the public and from one another within the department. The officers can perform more responsibilities if given the opportunity, under appropriate supervision, and with the necessary operational support. Experience has demonstrated that portions of the program can be expanded as this has already occurred throughout the other divisions within the Field Operations Command.

What is urged, however, is not an overreliance on just replicating the strategies. Efforts should be directed toward analyzing how the patrol officer became more involved in providing a wider range of services heretofore unperformed. This seems to be more closely associated with the requirements demanded by the NOP concept.

The Positive Interaction Program (PIP)

The PIP sought to improve the relationship between the neighborhood residents and members of the Southeast Patrol Division. This was obtained by establishing a forum for civic group leaders to meet once a month with the division patrol captain and a number of patrol officers and/or supervisors. The meetings provided a forum for the participants to exchange information and ideas governing activities observed and/or performed in their respective neighborhoods. The civic group leaders would then transmit the information obtained from the meeting back to the members of their particular civic group.

The cohesive relationship that formed between the officers and the citizens led to many successes ranging from interacting with other governmental agencies to combatting localized neighborhood concerns to performing special activities such as food drives and sharing information from various newsletters.

The PIP sought to establish cooperative responsibilities on behalf of department personnel as well as the citizens. This led to the citizens becoming more informed about the law enforcement profession and the demands placed upon the officers. The officers also became more responsive to the needs of the citizens as they saw them as supportive friends and not just independent entities requesting particular types of service.

Suggestions for expansion also provide insight into the success of the program. Membership drives are encouraged to involve more citizens thereby expanding the network of communication flow from the officers. The use of neighborhood volunteers to work in the department is strongly encouraged as a means to develop a more meaningful understanding by the citizens of the department's commitment to the effective delivery of services. "Ride alongs" were also encouraged as an educational tool for the concerned citizen. Finally, a citywide committee

of representatives from all the PIPs would be useful in exchanging information and ideas throughout the entire city as opposed to a certain portion of the city.

The Fear Reduction Program

A total of five different strategies were implemented during the course of the program. The strategies consisted of distributing newsletters, creating a community organizing response team (CORT), deploying a citizen contact patrol activity, establishing a community station (storefront), and recontacting victims of a crime. The results of implementing these strategies has been extracted from, Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report, authored by the members of the Police Foundation.

The significant findings for each of the strategies are as follows:

- 1) Police-Community Newsletter: people appreciated receiving the newsletter, but there were no significant effects on any of the program's desired outcomes;
- 2) Community Organizing Response Team: the strategy was associated with a significant reduction in the level of perceived social disorder in the area and with a significant improvement in the evaluation of police service. There were also significant reductions in the levels of perceived personal and property crime in the area. One unanticipated effect was a perceived police aggressiveness among program area residents; and
- 3) Citizen Contact Patrol: the strategy was associated with significant reductions in levels of perceived social disorder in the area, increased satisfaction with the neighborhood, and reduced property victimization.

One aspect of the evaluation revealed significant reductions in the fear of personal victimization as well as reductions in levels of perceived personal and property crime and police aggressiveness in the area. A significant improvement in evaluations of police service was also indicated;

- 4) Police Community Station: the strategy was associated with significant reductions in fear of personal victimization and in the level of perceived personal crime in the area.

One aspect of the evaluation indicated significant reductions in levels of perceived social disorder and perceived property crime in the area. The analysis also found that area residents took significantly fewer defensive actions to protect themselves from crime; and

5) Recontacting Victims: the only significant effect was that victims who were recontacted perceived more personal crime in the area than did victims who were not recontacted. In particular, Hispanic and Asian victims who were recontacted demonstrated significantly higher levels of fear of crime and of perceived area crime. Such persons were significantly more likely to report taking defensive steps to protect themselves from crime.

Although the program did not achieve all of the desired outcomes as was originally hoped, there were several implications for the practitioner to consider. Based on the fact the strategies involving citizens had the most desirable impacts, and were easier and less costly to operate, the following suggestions can be offered:

- Every available opportunity should be taken to increase the quantity and improve the quality of contacts between police officers and the citizens they serve. This would involve a dedication of "out-of-service" time, which officers usually use for nondirected patrol, to making contacts with citizens;
- During the course of police-citizen contacts, officers should attempt to determine what problems are of greatest concern to the residents of particular neighborhoods, what they believe are the causes of those problems, and what they think can be done about them;
- Stringent efforts should be made to reach out to all types of people, not just those who are easiest to reach or who initiate contacts with the police;
- Programs should be developed to address the problems identified by the citizens, not those assumed to exist by the police themselves;
- Every effort should be made to involve citizens in addressing the problems they have identified;
- A continuous process should be established to determine when some problems have been alleviated and others have arisen;
- Officers selected for assignments such as these should be clearly informed as to what the purpose of the program is - and that their efforts, at least at the beginning, may appear unorthodox and frustrating;
- Personnel involved in these programs will need respect, trust, and considerable latitude to determine the nature of the problems they should address and how best to do so;
- Those officers who are most creative, enthusiastic, and self-motivated will perform best. (The surest way to "bury" a program is to use it as a way to "bury" an unproductive officer.);
- Because these community-oriented programs are unlike usual police operations, special efforts should be taken to provide recognition and rewards to officers who perform them well;
- Supervisors should be selected who provide enough oversight to demonstrate concern, but not so much that individual officer initiative is stifled;
- A great deal of tolerance will be necessary, particularly at the early stages, to allow officers and their supervisor room to experiment and, occasionally, to fail;
- Training is crucial, and can best be provided by those who have proven their ability to conduct such programs;
- Any department considering the programs discussed in this report should examine those programs directly. No report . . . can effectively substitute for firsthand experience, including the excitement of their successes and the disappointment of their failures; and
- Finally, successful implementation of such strategies requires more than just a mechanical execution of steps such as these. In the end, a sincere commitment to problem-solving with the community must infuse the organization and its members.

These suggestions should aid the practitioner in his efforts to enlist the assistance of the public in preventing and reducing criminal activity within his community.

Collectively, the programs, strategies, and activities described in this report were, for the most part, appendages to the management function within the Field Operations Command. But management within the Field Operations Command recognized the need to incorporate these initiatives into the mainstream of the management structure. It was therefore suggested that an administrative process be developed to tie new programs and initiatives into the existing management system. Unlike the implementation of the D.A.R.T. Program that initially had to limp along pretty much on its own, the development of a more formal process to capture lessons learned from previous efforts was required to facilitate and direct implementation of other initiatives.

In short, the Command recognized that a set of concepts was simply not sufficient to initiate and administer program activities. The concepts needed to be related to the Command's goals and objectives and presented in the context of an administrative framework that addressed the process issues. These issues include questions regarding what is proposed to be done, what resources are needed and are available to achieve program objectives, how will the programmatic activities be accomplished, and what are the role expectations regarding responsibilities to insure that the appropriate ranks are held accountable. It is with these questions in mind that the ensuing section of this report was developed.

Chapter 8

A PROCESS MODEL for DEVELOPING NOP

Overview

As noted previously in this report, the definition of Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) is as follows:

NOP is an interactive process between police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns.

A crucial component of the NOP definition is establishing an interactive relationship between the beat officers and the neighborhood residents. This type of relationship is important in that it perpetuates a sense of responsibility, a sense of caring and willingness, and a sense of commitment on behalf of both parties in order to make the neighborhoods a safer place to live, work, and play. This desire to establish stronger bonds of trust and honesty must also occur among and between department personnel if the concept of NOP is expected to be successful.

In most instances, the amount of exposure between department personnel and the public results when officers respond to calls for service. These meetings, more often than not, are not conducive to open, interactive forms of conversation. They are usually quite specific with a focus on attempting to respond to or resolve a particular concern voiced by the citizen. There are times, however, when officers and citizens can meet under more relaxing conditions. In most instances, this would involve directing officer activities during their uncommitted patrol time.

During the officers' uncommitted patrol time, supervisors, managers, and administrators alike must be willing to provide the officers with an opportunity to pursue the enhancement of their beats and the development of their relationship with the citizens. The officers, however, must realize that the activities emanating from

these opportunities will have to be performed in accordance with department parameters. Conversely, management must realize that officers are capable of devising methods of working with the citizens and that supervisory responsibility should focus on the desire to stimulate the willingness and dedication of the officer to become actively involved in identifying and responding to neighborhood concerns.

The officers and their supervisors will need to work together in determining what action needs to be taken, when it should be performed, and how it should be performed. There may be times when this causes disagreements to occur between the officers and the supervisors. When this occurs, the supervisors must be willing to sit down with their officers and discuss viable alternatives to their initial sets of recommendations. There may be instances when the officer's decision is appropriate and there may be times when the supervisor has to make the final decision. What is important, however, is the realization that the officers and their supervisors must begin to feel they are working with another and not against one another.

The attitude that police officers must be guided and directed at every turn must be discarded. Police officers are more than just grammatical robots; they are creative, dedicated, and conscientious individuals who are capable of delivering police services in a manner that is consistent with neighborhood expectations.

This is not to suggest that no semblance of control is needed to guide the officers' actions. What is needed is a better sense of when to exercise that control so as not to inhibit their ability to develop a feeling of ownership and pride in their work. This can best be accomplished by opening up lines of communication between the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators.

The content of these exchanges should not necessarily be devoted to barking out instructions, requesting justifications for actions taken, or handing out occasional "pats on the back." Although these actions are necessary at times, more of an emphasis needs to be placed on the

need to challenge the individual's sense of accomplishment. Officers, supervisors, and managers alike need to be asked questions which prompt them to think about the types of activities they have performed, why those activities were administered, what problems, if any, were experienced on behalf of the individuals involved, how the activities coincided with any previously designed plans, what adjustments will need to be made, and so forth. The point is, department personnel must be challenged to plan, organize, and assess their daily contributions in relationship to the needs and expectations of the residents living within their beats and the responsibilities of the police department.

The NOP Process

Given this initial orientation, it is imperative the beat officers realize the NOP process focuses on creating an environment from which they would be able to develop meaningful information exchanges with the neighborhood residents. The purpose of these exchanges is to provide the officers with additional insight beyond their own experiences as to what types of services need to be delivered within the neighborhoods. Consideration, therefore, should be given toward identifying how the officers would acquire data which would help them formulate a set of reliable neighborhood expectations.

The collection of information by the officers could incorporate the use of internal and external sources. Internal sources would include obtaining information from complainants, self-initiated activities, crime analysis reports, operational analysis reports, experiences from their sergeants, lieutenant, and/or captain, and so forth. External sources of information could be obtained through proactive citizen contacts, interviews with business proprietors, citizen surveys, civic group meetings, church gatherings, and so on. Collectively, this information would broaden the officer's understanding of the concerns within the neighborhood. Comparisons with present service delivery methods could then be made by the officer. It would become the officers' responsibility to compare neighborhood concerns with present types of services delivered within their respective beats.

As the officers begin to think about the service needs they have been able to identify, some attention needs to be given to verifying the accuracy of the information they have been exposed to. Officers may discover that certain neighborhood sources have identified concerns that have been totally unnoticed by department personnel and vice versa. In either case, efforts should be made to cross check the reliability of the information. For example,

if the officer was told about a burglary problem in a neighborhood, and the problem had previously been unknown to him, he could check with the crime analysis personnel to determine if they have detected such a problem. This form of verification will allow officers to eventually prioritize the neighborhood needs.

Generally, the officers' experience will be a primary factor in justifying how the neighborhood needs are prioritized. Other considerations may be dependent upon whether the need is of a criminal or noncriminal nature. It may also be dependent upon the officers' perceived sense of resource availability given the size of the problem. Another justification criterion could be the acknowledgment of impact considerations by the officers. The impact concerns would more clearly describe what would happen if the neighborhood need(s) was not addressed by the department.

At this juncture, the officers would begin to assess the need to commit resources on a short or long term basis. A commitment to either time frame would clarify what the officers could realistically hope to accomplish within their respective beats.

The officers should also be expected to identify appropriate evaluation criteria which would coincide with the various courses of action they are considering. By identifying performance criteria, the officers are more apt to be cognizant of the commitments they need to make if they expect to deliver quality service. They are also more likely to want their efforts to succeed since they had a substantial amount of involvement in the identification stages.

This process of interacting with the public to acquire relevant information, verifying its accuracy, prioritizing the information, assessing resource availability, and identifying performance criteria, should become a mental mind set within each of the patrol officers. This should not be construed to mean that the officers be required to document this series of activities. A more appropriate purpose is to ensure that the officers be able to clearly envision what they feel should be done to service neighborhood needs.

It is expected that the officers will want to begin servicing those needs as soon as possible. The service would obviously require an articulation of tasks, activities, strategies, and/or programs in need of implementation in order to resolve the neighborhood concerns. The officers, however, would also have to realize that whatever action is taken, it must be performed in conjunction with the delivery of normal, daily responsibilities such as responding to calls for service, making arrests, and writing reports. It would become the responsibility of the supervisors, managers, and administrators to determine how all of these

responsibilities could be blended together to form a deliberate commitment to providing comprehensive service to the officers' respective neighborhoods.

Consequently, it becomes the responsibility of the sergeant to discuss the service needs identified by the officers. Depending upon the nature of the discussion, the sergeants may opt to discuss with the officers the rationale they used to formulate their position. Hopefully, as a result of the sergeants' self-initiative to become aware of the neighborhood needs and problems, there will be some consensus with the officers' viewpoint. If discrepancies or differences of opinion do not exist, the sergeant could authorize the officers to pursue their recommended course of action.

There may be instances, however, where the recommendations warrant the commitment of substantial resources. Additionally, the recommendations for one beat may be similar to those in another. In either instance, the sergeants may decide to reassess the officers' recommendations and make minor adjustments, devise an alternative course of action, or decide to consult with their lieutenant to determine the proper course of action to follow.

An important aspect of the sergeants' role, consequently, is the recognition that they will be receiving a number of recommendations from the officers working the different beats under their direct supervision. It will be the sergeant's responsibility to coordinate and supervise the implementation of the accepted recommendations. This task will not be an easy one to accomplish as the sergeants must still recognize the need to continue supervising the delivery of basic services within the neighborhoods (e.g. calls for service, arrests, and reports).

The sergeants must realize that as the officers assume more responsibility, the job of coordinating the implementation of the activities becomes more difficult. In order for the sergeants to efficiently account for their officers' actions, managerial methods will need to be developed and deployed. Only then can the sergeant be in a position to effectively monitor the progress of the officers' actions.

Once the officers' actions have been administered and assessed, it becomes the responsibility of the sergeant to provide feedback to the officers. The officers may feel their actions were successful from the standpoint of removing the problem; however, the sergeant's observations may provide added insight with respect to citizen feedback (e.g., via civic groups), how efficiently department resources were utilized and coordinated, or, share the concerns from other officers who assisted in the delivery of the service.

Irrespective of whether the sergeants decide to

authorize immediate implementation in response to a given set of requests, it will still be their responsibility to apprise their lieutenants of what is occurring within their districts. This means, especially in the case of recommendations requiring long term attention, that the sergeants be able to sit down and discuss with their lieutenants what the overall course of activity is for their area of responsibility. It becomes the responsibility of the lieutenant to begin coordinating the recommendations received from all of his sergeants. In most cases, this will mean reviewing the activity conducted or recommended from more than one district.

As managers and coordinators, the lieutenants are ultimately responsible for conveying to the division captain what is happening on their shifts across the districts, within the beats. By meeting with their sergeants on a regular basis, the lieutenants can ascertain the compatibility of their sergeants' recommendations with any thoughts they or the captain may have. This is very important given the possibility of there being other specific requests to use resources that have limited availability.

In similar fashion to that of the sergeants, the lieutenants must also recognize the need to coordinate a multitude of potentially different and similar requests. The scope of the lieutenants' responsibility, however, is even broader than those of the sergeants since they must oversee the administration of shift activities. Whereas the sergeants are responsible for examining the recommendations from all of the beats, the lieutenants have the added burden of examining the recommendations for all of the respective districts. Such an examination may also include the need to reverify the quality of information collected, the accuracy of the analysis, the availability of resources, and the compatibility of the recommendations given the identified concern or problem within the different neighborhoods in question. In some cases, this will cause the lieutenants to reprioritize the recommendations.

The reprioritization could be justified on the basis of many factors. Among them could be the nature, frequency, and severity of the problem identified, the availability of resources, or its relationship to concerns of the department's administration or those of city council. In other words, the lieutenants may have to assume a very delicate role in coordinating the needs of numerous independent entities, all of whom may have legitimate concerns.

Once the lieutenants have formulated their recommendations, they should arrange a meeting with the division captain. The captain's ultimate responsibility is to approve or disapprove the plans brought forth by each of the shift lieutenants. As was the case before him, the

captains are entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the merits of the recommendations from all of the shifts. The same type of constraints put forth before the shift lieutenants are of equal concern, if not more, to the captains.

Upon approving any of the recommendations, it is imperative the captain be apprised of any progress that is made. In order for the captains to assess the relative merits of any effort, they must be aware of the evaluation criteria. Once the progress is reported back to the captains, they will be in a position to match the officers' performance with the performance criteria associated with the activities, strategies, or programs administered. As the captains review the progress of the endeavor, they will be able to determine the relative success of the officer(s) and proceed to report those findings up through the chain of command to the chief of police.

In summary, this portion of the report sought to identify several steps which could be useful in describing how the concept of NOP could be operationalized. In retrospect, each of the aforementioned stages has a varying degree of applicability as one progresses up the chain of command. The various roles, procedures, and responses mentioned are part of an evolutionary change process associated with operationalizing the concept of NOP. One can not expect the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators to adjust rapidly. Progress must be gradual but deliberate, it must be coordinated, and above all, it must be stimulated by a strong commitment to satisfy both the demands of the neighborhood residents and the desires of department personnel.

To reiterate, conceptually, the process described throughout this portion of the report includes the following elements:

1) Formulation of expectations - the officers must be given the opportunity to develop a realistic set of expectations for their respective beats;

2) Data collection and verification - officers must be allowed to interact with neighborhood residents in order to determine what their concerns are. They should also have access to department statistics which identify work demands within their beats;

3) Analysis and discussion - a mutual responsibility of the officers and sergeants; the purpose of interacting is to identify and verify severity, frequency, and location of crime and noncrime activities within neighborhoods and business areas

in need of attention by the police;

4) Service commitments - primarily the responsibility of the sergeant to determine if the service should be delivered by the officers. The decision must take into consideration the department's ability to allow the officers to perform certain tasks, activities, strategies, or programs. Concomitantly, as assessment of resource availability and appropriate accountability measures should also be made.

Although initial recommendations come from the officers, the sergeants and lieutenants must begin determining how they can combine and/or coordinate the commitment of existing resources; as one progresses up the chain of command, the magnitude of the coordination increases and thus becomes more difficult to administer. All officers must realize that if appropriate resources are not available from within the department, the decision to implement their recommendations may be denied. The officers, however, should be encouraged to rethink another means of resolving the identified problems or delivering the needed services.

5) Implementation - the decision to implement can emanate from any level depending upon the nature of the request. This step basically represents the process of performing, supervising, and managing the actions taken by the officers in response to the citizens' concerns.

Simple requests may be handled directly by the officer or after a quick consultation with the sergeant. More complex demands may require input and confirmation from the lieutenant and/or captain.

Confirmation to implement may be based upon the captain's ability to secure a commitment on behalf of local neighborhood groups to supply certain types of resources or other types of assistance.

The commitment to implement can also be affected by unexpected service demands which can legitimately interrupt officer activity and thereby redirect the officers' attention to another concern. This would result in the officers reinstating their actions at a later time.

6) Feedback and Adjustment - generally a responsibility of all participants. The success of the endeavor is dependent upon the identification of evaluation criteria from which reliable data can be collected and assessed in relationship to the preestablished neighborhood objectives.

Process Requirements

The implementation of any new process should require the recognition and acceptance of adjustments to the present method of operation. As noted previously, the transition associated with adopting the NOP philosophy affects each and every rank within the department. Among the more prominent changes in need of consideration are the following:

1) The development and incorporation of a patrol management plan which assists in operationalizing the NOP concept;

2) The development of information gathering strategies which are designed to unite the officers with the neighborhood residents in an attempt to identify local concerns and/or problems; these strategies must contain criteria which identify for the officer how different types of information can be collected from different sources; and

3) A recognition of the fact that interaction on behalf of the officers and the citizens, other officers, and/or their supervisors requires time. Not only is cooperation from the dispatch personnel important, but supervisors should consider devising methods of allowing their officers to conduct meetings during their duty hours. Examples of how this could occur include:

- Considering the use of split roll call sessions, whereby time is devoted to having the sergeant meet with his respective beat groups;
- Establishing district group meetings consisting of representatives from each beat group and a sergeant to act as a resource person and document the minutes of the meetings. The meetings could be held on a bimonthly basis with a rotating membership so all beat officers would be involved in the interaction process;

- Providing time for the officers to collect data from their internal and external sources without interruption to handle calls for service. This could be accomplished by reassigning a beat officer to perform this function over the span of a couple of days and then rotating it to the next beat officer; and

- Allowing the officers time to meet and discuss their method of analysis of the data they collected. This would allow them to develop more meaningful and effective recommendations governing their respective plans.

The incorporation of these changes and others serve only to place the beat officer in a more advantageous position to acquire data, analyze it, and react to it in a responsive and efficient manner. The benefits to be gained from this transition are innumerable. The efforts expended by the department to facilitate and support this change will surely have a direct bearing on how successful the concept of NOP can be operationalized.

Chapter 9

THE FRAMEWORK for NOP

NOP is a concept which seeks to define and describe a philosophy which guides and directs the delivery of police services throughout the city of Houston. As a philosophy, NOP attempts to incorporate the department's values into a responsive policing style which is dependent upon quality day to day interactions between the police and the public. Quality daily interactions are based upon the success of being able to establish a desire and willingness within the officers to work together with the public. This feeling should become inherent within all officers up to the point that it becomes a representation of the department's culture. By adopting this philosophy as the department's culture and transforming it into operational reality, a firm foundation will have been set from which the quality of life within all neighborhoods throughout the city of Houston can be improved.

This basic description of NOP served as the impetus for the Executive Session membership to identify a variety of aspects which would assist the officers, supervisors, and managers in describing how they could best operationalize the philosophy of NOP. As the Executive Session membership began to grapple with the task of incorporating the NOP philosophy within the day to day attitudes and behaviors displayed by the officers, two critical aspects of the definition garnered their attention. The first aspect focused upon the phrase:

"an interactive process between the police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats. . ."

This phrase suggests that department personnel need to rethink what the nature of their relationship with the public should be. Traditionally, there was little, if any, reciprocity between the officers and the public in sharing responsibilities for the delivery of police services. Under the concept of NOP, police personnel and members of the community must learn how to work together.

The nature of this relationship, therefore, requires both parties to actively communicate with one

another. By virtue of communicating with one another, both the police and the community assume the responsibility of identifying issues in need of resolution. As these issues are identified, it will invariably cause the officers to think about new and innovative methods of providing services. This is not to suggest that traditional service delivery methods are no longer valid.

What is apt to occur is the identification of issues which require different types of commitments or methods of delivering services. Herein lies the second key aspect of the NOP definition:

". . . assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns."

This implies that the role of the citizen becomes a more active one whereby they seek to assist the officers in resolving identified neighborhood concerns.

No longer should the public assume the police can single-handedly identify all of their neighborhood problems. Furthermore, the public must assume the posture of not only informing the police of their concerns, but they must also be in a position to assume some responsibility for helping the police address these concerns. The extent of this involvement on behalf of the public will vary depending upon the types of concerns needing attention and the ability of the police to respond, given the magnitude of their overall responsibilities.

This shift in orientation toward the public, by the police, will change the role of the beat officer. Although there will still be a need to recognize the value of enforcement activities, the desired perception is for the officer to be viewed as someone who can provide different forms of help and assistance. It requires the officers to demonstrate an attitude of caring about the safety and well being of the citizens, someone who is not afraid to express compassion through empathizing and sympathizing with victims of crime. It also requires officers to be able to organize community groups, inspire and motivate community groups

into action, and facilitate and coordinate the collective efforts and endeavors of others.

As so poignantly discussed by the Executive Session membership, this shift in emphasis cannot occur without a commensurate shift in the attitude and behavior by the supervisors and managers. Some resistance is expected as the philosophy of NOP challenges the overreliance on using autocratic management styles. A different more responsive attitude and managerial style will be required to stimulate, accommodate, and perpetuate the desired behavioral changes which will occur as a result of redefining the officers' role.

This new form of management must encourage a willingness within all managers to transform new concepts into attainable goals and objectives. These goals and objectives must, in turn, be articulated within the organization and must be transformed into actions which are consistent with the service demands expressed by the citizenry. Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the administration to create an environment which will facilitate and support the development and implementation of a policing style under the NOP concept.

In discussing how such an environment can be created within the department, the membership began to examine a number of programs that had been or still are being administered throughout the country. Based upon an analysis of these programs, it became apparent that the success of creating such an environment was primarily attributed to the ability to effectively manage police operations. Based upon a review of the research trends and implications, it became clear to the membership that in order to effectively manage police operations several department commitments had to be made.

Chief among these commitments was the need to recognize the relationship between managing the calls for service workload and the ability to manage patrol and investigative operations. The membership was quick to concede, however, that significant strides could not be made in strengthening these functional relationships unless changes were made within accompanying support operations.

One of those changes involved a massive reconfiguration of all police beat boundaries. As a forerunner to the development of the NOP concept, the new beat boundaries were aligned in accordance with neighborhood affinities. Concomitantly, efforts were also taken to conduct a work demands analysis study which identified prospective manpower allocation levels based partly upon the workload handled by the line officers. From this data a patrol schedule plan was developed which served as a guideline in identifying scheduling assignments for the beat officers. Collectively, this information provided the administration

with a glimpse of resource needs in relationship to the documented work demands within the department.

As these changes were being made, other experiments were being administered to determine what type of program would best serve as the foundation from which the line operations at the command station could be based. The most notable programs and strategies discussed within this report were the D.A.R.T. Program, Fear Reduction Program, the Oasis Technique, and the Positive Interaction Program. Each of these programs sought to alter the traditional roles of the officers, supervisors, and managers. More importantly though, was the fact that these programs introduced into the arena of police operations a responsibility on behalf of the public to mutually participate in the performance of certain duties with the police officers.

Since the inception of the D.A.R.T. Program, the role of the public in police operations had not been envisioned as a significant one. As a result of implementing the Community Contact strategies, however, the officers began to develop an appreciation for the citizens' concerns as did the citizens become more knowledgeable of what the officers could and could not do. Coupled with the experiences from other programs (e.g., PIP and Fear Reduction) and strategies implemented throughout the department, officers, supervisors, and managers began to realize that interacting with the community could lead to obtaining information which could be of value to police operations.

In responding to this realization, further developments transpired within the department which focused upon analyzing and responding to community input. An extensive crime analysis system, for example, has been developed. This system contains centralized and decentralized components. Through this system, personnel can assess the relevancy of information as it relates to resolving neighborhood problems, interdicting criminal perpetrators, and preventing crime. The Police/Citizen Cooperative Agreement project has also been completed and is presently being reviewed by department personnel. The purpose of this endeavor is to formalize, to some extent, a commitment on behalf of the department and neighborhood civic groups as to the responsibilities each will share in addressing local neighborhood concerns.

In relation to this project, attempts are also being made to further develop and expand the use of the Houstonians on Watch Program. When coupled with the Positive Interaction Program, the citizens will become actively involved in working with the police in improving the quality of life in their neighborhoods.

Equally as important is the commitment to establish a teleserve program which, as a call management tool, will assist in providing the beat officers with more time to work in the neighborhoods. The Victimization Program

along with a number of the D.A.R.T. Program strategies are being institutionalized within the Field Operations Command. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the development of a new performance evaluation system which will allow one the opportunity to assess performance activities associated with NOP.

It is quite apparent that a number of changes have been and still are in the process of being made within the department. In discussing these changes and related issues during the Executive Sessions, a number of questions arose. Probably the most perplexing, yet vitally critical question, centered upon how the acquisition, analysis, and reaction to information obtained from the public would effect the ability to efficiently manage patrol operations. It became clear to the membership that a process needed to be developed which would define how the cooperative relationship between the public and officers would be developed. Through the implementation of this process, it was perceived that significant steps could be taken to improve the quality of life within the neighborhoods. It was at this juncture the membership felt their responsibility ended. It had clearly become their feeling that operational personnel should assume the responsibility for developing this process.

Chapter 10

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, the Executive Session meetings accomplished several tasks. Among them, the membership:

- 1) Clearly articulated what the philosophy of the department was as it related to the concept of NOP;
- 2) Defined the concept of NOP. The definition was firmly associated with the department's mission and values. It also clearly established the need to develop, implement, and maintain the process of having the beat officers interact with the community;
- 3) Described role expectations associated with the concept. This included identifying certain traditional policing assumptions that would be challenged by the NOP concept;
- 4) Reviewed findings from programs administered throughout the country as well as within the department in order to determine what would represent an appropriate operational foundation from which to base the NOP concept; and
- 5) Discussed the ramifications of operationalizing the concept of NOP. It became quite apparent that any adjustment in operations, to support the concept of NOP, would require input from the personnel affected by the new process.

Collectively, the material contained within this report represents the membership's attempt to describe the characteristics of the policing style to be adopted by all department personnel, especially the beat officers working in the neighborhoods. In the minds of the membership, it is the acceptance of this policing style by the beat officer that is crucial to the success of the philosophy. If the officers

are allowed to develop a sense of accomplishment in servicing their respective neighborhoods, then the desire, willingness, and motivation to support NOP will become commonplace.

It becomes the responsibility of personnel outside the scope of the Executive Session membership to determine how this sense of ownership and pride can be developed as a part of the officers' policing style. There are other, equally demanding issues contained within this report that are also in need of attention by operation personnel. For example, what type of management structure is needed to sustain NOP, can supervisors and managers support NOP given their present types of responsibilities, how will NOP effect department policies and procedures, what types of implications does NOP have for the department, and so forth. Failure to recognize and address these issues and others could result in the inability to sustain the NOP philosophy.

In closing, the occupation of the Westside Command Station represents a turning point in time in the history of the Houston Police Department where all of the discussions, experiments, and expectations are transformed into an operational format that epitomizes the philosophy of neighborhood oriented policing. This transformation process contains a multitude of different commitments which have already been made or are in the process of being made within the department. All of these accomplishments represent years of dedication and commitment, not to mention the thousands of man-hours spent in preparing for the occupation of the Command Station.

It now becomes the responsibility of field operations personnel to continue the transformation process by examining the material contained within this report, to discuss its operational implications, and to use it as a guide in developing a plan which seeks to convert the concept of NOP into a viable and realistic policing style for the Westside Command Station, and eventually, the City of Houston as a whole.

APPENDIX A

Panel Participants and Resource Personnel

EXECUTIVE SESSION No. 1

Developing a Policing Style for
Neighborhood Oriented Policing

CHAIRMAN

Lee P. Brown, *Chief of Police*

PANEL COORDINATOR

T. N. Oettmeier, *Lieutenant, Field Operations Command*

PARTICIPANTS

George Alderete, *Southwest Patrol Division*

John Bales, *Field Operations Command*

Artie Contreras, *Northeast Patrol Division*

Ed Davis, *South Central Patrol Division/D.A.R.T.*

Ruben Davis, Jr., *Westside Command Station Operations Division*

Jerry DeFoor, *Office of Planning and Research*

Dorothy Edwards, *Internal Affairs Division*

Rudy Garza, *Southeast Patrol Division/Magnolia Park Substation*

Chris Gillespie, *Inspections Division*

Ralph Gonzales, *Westside Command Station Operations Division
(Crime Analysis)*

Jerry Jones, *South Central Patrol Division*

Robin Kirk, *North Shepherd Patrol Division/
Northline Park Community Center*

PARTICIPANTS -- CONTINUED

Tom Koby, *Burglary and Theft Division*

Steve Lyons, *Westside Command Station Operations Division*

Gary Matthews, *South Central Patrol Division/D.A.R.T.*

Paul Michna, *Major Investigations Bureau*

Tommy Mitchell, *Support Services Command*

Sam Nuchia, *West Patrol Bureau*

Martin Reiner, *Police Advisory Committee*

John Robertson, Jr., *Southwest Patrol Division*

John Snelson, *Westside Command Station Operations Division*

Dennis Storemski, *Investigative Operations Command*

Gene Thaler, *Southeast Patrol Division*

Victor Trevino, Jr., *Northeast Patrol Division*
(*Wesley House Community Center*)

David Walker, *Southeast Patrol Division/Park Place Substation*

Betsy Watson, *Auto Theft Division*

Frank Yorek, *Professional Standards Command*

RESOURCE PERSONNEL

Bill Bieck, *Houston Police Department*

Bob Bowers, *Houston Police Department*

Herman Goldstein, *University of Wisconsin at Madison*

George Kelling, *Harvard University*

J. Seitzinger, *Houston Police Department*

Mary Ann Wycoff, *Police Foundation*

APPENDIX B

Definition of Elements

- 1) Focus upon the expectations and/or perceptions of what is desired in terms of service delivery from the police and the public;
- 2) Effectiveness is based upon the need to have the officers involved as well as the citizens;
- 3) Efforts should be made to determine what the public wants in terms of service delivery;
- 4) Alter the role of the officer;
- 5) Develop a sense of trust between the officers and the citizens;
- 6) Improve the officers' attitude by instilling a willingness to provide the service;
- 7) Responsibilities must be well defined and communicated to the officers;
- 8) Allow for operational flexibility to match resources to community needs;
- 9) Develop a means of learning how to stimulate community involvement;
- 10) Key is the initial contact of the citizen by the officer; we must make a conscious effort to approach people;
- 11) Officers must be willing to accept responsibility;
- 12) Control rumors regarding the perception of what is occurring within the neighborhood;
- 13) Be accessible to the public with a willingness to share information;
- 14) We should shoulder the responsibility for getting the community involved;
- 15) Beat officers should be responsible for providing community service functions;
- 16) Must have good communications and be responsive to the communications;
- 17) Style is dependent upon intentions;
- 18) A sense of responsibility is needed;
- 19) Motivation is based upon being given responsibility;
- 20) Motivation comes from working with people who care about them;
- 21) Must be aware of the change, monitor responses through feedback and evaluations;
- 22) Coordinate the delivery of services with a perspective for the whole;
- 23) Refrain from using special squads when no longer needed;
- 24) Learn how to use the information (crime analysis) we receive;
- 25) Be sensitive to the different needs of ethnic groups;
- 26) Learn to utilize the information we obtain from the public;
- 27) Officers must mature faster to overcome problems associated with youth and aggressiveness;
- 28) Recognize fiscal limitations;
- 29) Recognize the issue of job satisfaction for the officers;
- 30) Assist in helping the citizens determine their role with respect to addressing problems or requesting service.



Kathryn J. Whitmire
Mayor