

Cover:

Top Photo: The results of an explosive device that detonated beneath the vehicle as it was traveling through the Kansas City, Missouri, area. The detonation killed the driver and severely injured the driver's wife.

(Photo courtesy of Dan Dyer, the News Leader Newspaper.)

Bottom Photo: The scene of an explosion in Duncanville, Alabama, that killed the two occupants of the trailer.

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Dedication

This year we have seen a significant increase in the number of injuries sustained by our State and local counterparts in the law enforcement and fire service communities. The dangers inherent to their line of work are a given; however, the ever-changing environment in which they work has increased these dangers. Booby-trapped drug operations and illicit explosives manufacturing operations are but a few of the criminal activities that present such dangers, not only to them but to the public as well. And it is the lives and property of the citizens of this Nation that these individuals have elected to safeguard. We dedicate this publication to these individuals and salute them for their courageous efforts and for the sacrifices they make in the line of duty.

126081

Preface

Agencies providing data incorporated in this report are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the United States Postal Service (USPS). The information presented should not be considered exhaustive of all explosives incidents that occurred in calendar year 1989. The data is considered highly representative and sufficient to permit valid chronological, geographical, and trend analyses. Categories appearing in this publication are those used by ATF in its intra-agency tracking of explosives incidents. Also, normal rounding-off procedures have been used. Any minor discrepancies between information presented in this report and information previously published may be the result of these rounding-off procedures. Prior to initiating an analysis with this information, we suggest that the reader review the Glossary of Terms and the appropriate Technical Notes Section.



Message From the Director

The spirit of cooperation—this is the key to the success of any law enforcement effort. ATF is a strong advocate of this concept. It is the basis upon which our Explosives Enforcement Program was developed and our investigations are conducted. It has also been the basis for ATF's yearly preparation of the Explosives Incidents Report. Each report serves to augment law enforcement's efforts with regard to analyzing and combating the illegal and criminal use of explosives. The 1989 Explosives Incidents Report continues in this tradition.

Today's criminal investigations have placed new demands and challenges on law enforcement. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in investigations involving illicit drug operations. The violence associated with these operations is at a peak, and law enforcement is finding that explosives are an instrument of this violence, much as firearms are, yet increasingly so.

In assuming these new demands, law enforcement must share in the belief that its battle with the criminal element is a national priority. Understandably, it is not within law enforcement's power to completely eliminate the threat posed by the illicit use of explosives. But it is within its power to curb the misuse. Governing law enforcement's effectiveness in meeting this goal is the availability and consolidation of resources. Toward this end, ATF developed enforcement support programs designed to enhance the investigative capabilities of ATF special agents and State and local law enforcement officers alike. Instrumental to the success of these programs has been the mutual exchange of information and expertise between all involved agencies. This active exchange is a strong indicator of law enforcement's determination and commitment to stem the criminal violence associated with explosives. ATF is confident that this collegial atmosphere will continue, strengthening law enforcement's resolve to maintain a quality of life in this country that some take for granted.

Atypen E. Higgins

Director

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
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Part I SUPPORT PROGRAMS





NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (NRT)

ATF has found that a timely, coordinated response to major crime scenes is crucial in determining their cause and origin and apprehending those responsible. In response to this, ATF developed a program to help Federal, State, and local investigators meet the challenges they face at these crime scenes. This program involves specialized response teams that respond within 24 hours to any scene of a major explosion or a suspected arson. This specialized response concept is the only one of its kind offered by a Federal law enforcement agency. Organized geographically to cover the United States, the four teams are each composed of 10 veteran special agents, a forensic chemist, and an explosives technology expert. Complementing the team's efforts at complex arson scenes are cause and origin specialists and technical, legal, scientific, and intelligence advisers. A fleet of fully equipped response vehicles is available for the team's use. Used to provide logistical support, these vehicles are equipped with ancillary equipment ranging from shovels to hydrocarbon detectors and the most advanced portable color video equipment.

The NRT's responded to 22 incidents in 1989 and have been mobilized 215 times since their inception in 1979. These incidents have involved the loss of 209 lives, injuries to 643 individuals, and over \$861,125,000 in property damages. Team members determined the cause and origin of the incident in 91 percent of the cases.

The NRT concept continues to be an invaluable tool to ATF and to State and local law enforcement. The concept has met with continued success because it exemplifies that which is the hallmark for any successful investigation—interagency cooperation and teamwork.



FORENSIC LABORATORY SUPPORT

ATF maintains a laboratory system composed of a National Laboratory Center in Rockville, Maryland, and field laboratories in Atlanta, Georgia, and San Francisco, California. The laboratory in Rockville is the second oldest Federal laboratory in the United States. In addition, these laboratories hold the distinction of being the only Federal laboratory system accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors.

These multidiscipline laboratories support the Bureau's explosives and arson programs and accept requests for assistance from State, local, and military agencies. The laboratories routinely examine arson debris to detect accelerants and intact and functioned explosive devices and explosive debris to identify device components and the explosives used. The laboratories also provide trace evidence comparisons. Fingerprint analysis is used in a majority of the explosives cases submitted to the laboratory for analysis. Gas chromotography is the most widely used analysis for arson cases. In 1989, the laboratories nationwide examined 844 explosives cases and 257 arson cases. Examinations for explosives cases alone increased 30 percent.


As well as providing the full range of traditional forensic analysis, the National Laboratory Center conducts training for Bureau scientists and for forensic scientists from other governmental and private agencies. One such training program has been in existence for 10 years, and that is the arson accelerant detection course offered to State and local chemists. To date, approximately 350 chemists have been trained in this course. The National Laboratory Center also maintains liaison with explosives manufacturers. The manufacturers provide the laboratory with exemplars of new explosives products on the market. This enables the laboratory to expand its working knowledge of explosives, as it applies to forensic analysis.



EXPLOSIVES TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT

Complementing ATF's forensic analysis capabilities of explosive devices and debris is one of the Nation's foremost explosives technology branches. This branch supports the Bureau's Explosives and Arson Enforcement Programs by constructing facsimiles of bombs, rendering destructive device determinations for court purposes, and providing expert analysis of intact and functioned explosive/incendiary devices.

The branch is responsible for the evaluation of new explosives developed for sale and distribution within the United States, and provides technical advice on Federal explosives storage regulations. Branch personnel provide explosives training for State and local law enforcement officers. Personnel also train ATF special agents in the handling, transportation, and destruction of explosives to ensure the safe disposal of seized or abandoned explosives. During calendar year 1989, the branch provided onsite investigative technical assistance on 91 occasions. Branch personnel also prepared 638 explosive device determinations for explosives and incendiary incidents. They appeared in court on 78 occasions to provide technical assistance. Sixty-six of the cases in which they testified resulted in prosecution. Branch personnel also participated in all the NRT callouts for the year.



COMPUTERIZED SUPPORT

Stolen Explosives and Recoveries (SEAR)

This computerized system, inaugurated in 1976, is the national clearinghouse for all information regarding thefts, losses, and recoveries of explosive materials.

National Explosives Tracing Center

Established in 1973, the National Explosives Tracing Center (NETC) is the focal point for Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to initiate traces of recovered, stolen, or abandoned explosives, explosive materials, and criminally or illegally used explosives. The NETC has also developed a tracing capability for foreign commercial and military explosives, ordnance, and munitions. The NETC can provide documented information concerning the legitimate source of explosives and explosive materials from the manufacturer to the initial distributor, and, in an emergency situation, to the user. Where explosives and/or explosive materials have been recovered from a post-blast scene, the NETC has been successful in assisting the investigator in determining the origin and identification of the explosive material and by supplying investigative information for use in apprehending the criminal.

The tracing of explosives is made possible by the statute requiring all explosives manufacturers that sell or distribute explosives to legibly identify them with a location, date, and shift of manufacture. This marking, better known as the date shift code, provides the essential link between the manufacturers and distributors. The explosives manufacturers, distributors, and users are required to maintain records of these explosives by amount, type, and date shift code, thereby permitting a trace of these explosive products. In 1989, ATF initiated 326 traces.

Explosives Incidents System (EXIS)

EXIS is an inherent function of ATF's Explosives Enforcement Program. Developed in 1975, EXIS is a computerized source of all pertinent information from every ATF explosives investigation. To date, there are 105,000 detailed records from 32,800 explosives incidents stored within the computer's memory. Its importance as an investigative tool is considerable, for it provides investigators with readily accessible analyses of bombing incidents relative to their trends, patterns, bomb components, and modus operandi.

International Explosives Incidents System (I-EXIS)

This program was conceived in 1986 as a result of the increased threat posed by terrorism. I-EXIS, like EXIS, is a computerized repository for historical and technical data to aid in investigating and monitoring international explosives incidents. This comprehensive computer program assimilates details from reported international explosives incidents that are helpful in determining motives, patterns, trends, and "signatures." These details include the pre- and post-blast indicators, the explosive device used, and the explosive materials used. The technical information captured by the system can also be used for comparison with domestic incidents.



BOMBING/ARSON PROFILING

In 1986, ATF participated in a program sponsored by the FBI at the FBI's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime in Quantico, Virginia. The program trained law enforcement personnel in the art of criminal personality profiling. This form of criminal investigative analysis, which was originally used to identify murderers, rapists, and other violent criminals, was expanded to include arsonists and bombers. A profile can identify personality characteristics of known or unknown suspects. This identification is based upon a detailed crime analysis of any past case trends, past methods of operation of known/unknown criminal offenders, and the likelihood of any future occurrences. Its value as an investigative tool is proving to be very beneficial, and its success rate will continue to rise as more research is conducted on this new science. It is important to stress, however, that profiling is a fairly new investigative technique that is intended for use as an investigative tool. It is not to be considered evidence of guilt.

Part of this program involves the interviewing of convicted bombers and arsonists who are incarcerated across the United States. Fifteen States agreed to assist in this project by allowing interviews in their prison systems. The purpose of the interviews was to talk to as many arsonists/bombers as possible until the reasons and motives for their actions became repetitious. From these interviews, a data base was developed that is used to identify possible suspects based upon characteristics particular to a fire/bombing or a series of fires/bombings. This information is then analyzed and compared, thus expanding the body of knowledge available to profile these types of criminals. Related concepts of profiling can also be successfully applied to other investigative areas such as major case consultations, suspect interviewing techniques, search warrant preparations, proactive suggestions designed to encourage a suspect to confess, and the development of prosecutorial strategies.

During the last year, 425 arson cases, 20 bombing cases, and 11 homicide cases were analyzed. Included in these analyses were 25 formal profiles and 40 recommendations on interviewing and investigative techniques. ATF was directly involved in 18 of the incidents analyzed.



EXPLOSIVES/ARSON TRAINING

Training has always been a hallmark of ATF's Explosives and Arson Enforcement Programs. These training programs foster interagency cooperation and promote an advanced level of investigative expertise in the law enforcement community. Among these training programs are:

Advanced Explosives Investigative Techniques - This 2-week course of instruction was developed in conjunction with the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators. It is offered three times annually at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), Glynco, Georgia. Enrollment in the course is designed for public safety officials (police and fire investigators) involved and experienced in the investigation of bombings and related explosives incidents. Course material is presented in the classroom and through practical exercises. The subject areas covered include preplanning, team concept and individual duties, initial and final explosives scene evaluations, crime scene processing, available technical resources, information management, prosecutors' and expert witnesses' roles, informants and undercover techniques, and pathologists' roles. To date, a total of 775 State and local officers have been trained in 24 schools.

Advanced Arson-for-Profit Investigation for State and Local Officers — This 2-week course is offered three times annually at FLETC. Applicants must be full-time law enforcement and/or fire service personnel whose workload is focused primarily on the investigation/management of arson-related crimes. Each applicant should be familiar with cause and origin determination. Course material is presented in the classroom and through practical exercises. The subject areas include the arson task force concept, analytical techniques, visual investigative aids, financial investigative techniques and motives, kinesic interviewing, report writing, electronic surveillance techniques, real estate and insurance investigative techniques, laboratory capabilities, and the expert witness role. To date, over 800 State and local officers have been trained.


Arson-for-Profit for Prosecutors — This 1-week course was developed in 1986 and was designed to instruct State and local prosecutors in the prosecution of arson-for-profit cases, which are largely based on circumstantial evidence. This year, however, ATF is conducting two courses, one for State and local prosecutors and one for assistant U.S. attorneys. Guest lecturers are brought in from across the country to instruct in such topics as search and seizure, fire investigation, and trial tactics. To date, over 200 State and local prosecutors have been trained.

Arson-for-Profit for Insurance Claim Supervisors — This 1-week course is designed for insurance company claim supervisors and is conducted once annually at FLETC. The course familiarizes the insurance personnel with ATF's task force concept and the intricacies of investigating an arson-for-profit crime. To date, over 200 insurance claim supervisors have been trained.


Any State or local law enforcement agency can access each of the programs described above through the local ATF offices. Student selections for the various training programs are made based upon recommendations by the special agent in charge (SAC) of each district office. (See the back of this publication for an application for training and for a directory of the addresses of ATF district offices.)

Part II EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS ANALYSIS

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Truck bombing that occurred on April 4, 1989, in Sebring, Florida. The explosion killed the vehicle's occupant.



A remote control device recovered from under the passenger seat of a vehicle in Indianapolis, Indiana, on November 14, 1989.

The information provided in this section was derived from statistics reported to and/or contributed by ATF, FBI, and USPS field offices. The categories used are those employed internally by ATF to track and record explosives incidents. If further explanation of categories is desired, please consult the Glossary of Terms in this report.

Table I-Types of Explosives Incidents, 1985-89

This table reflects the reported explosives incidents by type.

Table II—Explosives Incidents by Category by State, 1985–89

The categories Bombings and Incendiary include both functioned and attempted bombing and incendiary bombing incidents, respectively.

The category of Other includes incidents previously categorized as Accidental-Noncriminal, Hoax Device, Threats— U.S. Treasury Facilities, Stolen Explosives, and Recovered Explosives.

Table III—Total Explosives Incidents by State, 1985-89

Ranking of States as to the number of explosives incidents by year was determined through the following process (example follows):

- 1. The number of nonrepetitive totals of explosives incidents for a given year was ascertained.
- 2. That number established by step 1 above was the rank assigned to the State(s) having the lowest number of explosives incidents reported in the given year.
- 3. Successively descending ranks were then assigned to States having successively ascending totals. This inverse ranking procedure continued until that State having the highest number of explosives incidents in the given year was assigned ranking number 1.
- 4. States exhibiting tied totals in a given year were assigned the same rank as was determined appropriate through the foregoing process.
- 5. This process was independently replicated for each year, 1985 through 1989.

EXAMPLE

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State	Number of Explosives Incidents	Assigned Rank
A B C D E F G H I	$ \begin{array}{r} 6 \\ 12 \\ 11 \\ 9 \\ 0 \\ 6 \\ 13 \\ 9 \\ 15 \\ 15 \\ \end{array} $	7 3 4 5 8 7 2 5 1
ป	8	6

Figure I— Bombing and Incendiary Incidents by State for 1989

Data in this figure reflect both functioned and attempted bombing and incendiary bombing incidents occurring in 1989.

Table IV—Analysis of Bombing Incidents by Target as to Deaths, Injuries, and Property Damage, 1985–89

This table reflects the targets of reported explosives incidents where devices functioned and the resultant deaths, injuries, and property damage. The category Other does not include accidental-noncriminal explosives incidents.

Table V—Explosives Incidents by Motive, Including Estimated Damage, 1985–89

Information presented in this table was extracted from reported explosives incidents where devices functioned and the motive was determined and reported. The motive categories, further explained in the Glossary of Terms, are those employed by ATF for internal tracking. The number of explosives incidents where motive was unreported or undetermined is presented by year in the last row of the table.

The Grand Total is a summation of all reported explosives incidents for which motive was reported.

The Unreported or Undetermined category does not include accidental-noncriminal explosives incidents.

Data under 5-Year Total reflect the number of explosives incidents by motive regardless of type for the period 1985–89.

Estimated property damage is entered in rounded \$10,000 increments.

Figure II—Total Criminal Bombing Incidents, 1985-89

Data in this figure reflect criminal bombing incidents, whether actual or attempted, that involve explosives or incendiary devices.

Table VI-Bombing Incidents by Target, 1985-89

Information presented in this table was extracted from reported explosives incidents (functioned bombings and incendiary bombings) where the nature of the target was also reported. Attempted bombing and attempted incendiary bombing data are not included for the years 1985–89. This manner of reporting will be continued in the future. Ranking was determined in a like manner as that elaborated upon under the discussion of Table III—Total Explosives Incidents by State, 1985–89.

The category Other is a catch-all category reflecting explosives incidents where a target was reported but where the nature of the target was not compatible with those target categories employed by ATF. No ranking was given the category Other. Totals reflect all explosives incidents in which the nature of the target was reported. The category Other does not include accidental-noncriminal explosives incident data.

Table VII—Types of Containers Used in Destructive Devices, 1985–89

Information presented in this table was extracted from reported explosives incidents (functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary bombings) where the type of container was also reported.

Table VIII—Pipe Bomb Incidents, 1985-89

This table reflects reported explosives incidents where pipe bombs were used.

Table IX—Types of Fillers Used in Destructive Devices, 1985–89

Information presented in this table was extracted from reported explosives incidents (functioned bombings and incendiary bombings) where the type of filler was also reported.

Figure III—Analysis of Explosives Incidents Directed Against Commercial Targets

The reporting of motive, filler, container, and firing system for any explosives incident is independent of one another. For a given incident, all, any, or none of the categories of motive, filler, etc., may have been determined and reported. Therefore, any analysis such as Motive by Filler by Container by Ignitor is not warranted.

Data presented were extracted from incidents of both functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary bombings. Information presented concerns only the three most frequently identified motives, fillers, and containers.

Commercial targets, for the purpose of this analysis only, include all targets previously reported as commercial plus banks, utilities, and airports.

Figure IV—Analysis of Explosives Incidents Directed Against Residential Targets

Reference Figure III discussion regarding like analysis of commercial targets.

Figure V— Analysis of Explosives Incidents Directed Against Vehicular Targets

Reference Figure III discussion regarding like analysis of commercial targets.

Vehicular targets, for the purpose of this analysis only, include all targets previously reported on as vehicles plus police vehicles and aircraft.

Table X—Accidental Explosions by Type of Target,1985-89

The category Other includes all incidents in which the site of an accidental explosion was reported and that site was other than categories utilized by ATF. Property loss is presented in increments of \$10,000.

Table XI---Other Explosives Incidents, 1985-89

This table reflects reported explosives incidents not previously categorized.



Results of an April 26, 1989, bombing at a judge's home in Blooming Prairie, Minnesota.

TABLE I.—TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS, 1985–89

TYPE OF INCIDENT	19	85	198	36	19	87	198	38	19	89	5-YEAR TOTAL	
I IPE OF INCIDENT	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	% GT
BOMBINGS	720	32	842	35	816	37	912	36	1065	36	4,355	35
ATTEMPTED BOMBINGS	169	8	167	7	157	7	189	8	268	. 9	950	8
INCENDIARY BOMBINGS	151	7	204	8	169	8	196	8	319	11	1,039	8
ATTEMPTED INCENDIARY	63	3	58	2	45	2	35	1	47	2	248	2
STOLEN EXPLOSIVES	219	10	170	7	122	5	191	8	126	4	828	7
RECOVERED EXPLOSIVES	828	37	879	36	740	33	684	27	769	26	3,900	32
THREATS TO TREASURY												
FACILITIES	8	<u> </u>	. 6		10	— .	7	_	5	-	36	
HOAX DEVICES	17	1	75	3	127	6	253	10	317	11	789	6
ACCIDENTAL-NONCRIMINAL	51	2	31	2	42	2	40	2	44	1	208	2
TOTAL	2,2	26	2,4	32	2,2	28	2,5	07	2,9	60	12,353	100
REPORTED KILLED	1	.04		64		57		60		74	8	359
REPORTED INJURED	4	77	3'	73	3	84	6	91	4	95	2,4	120
REPORTED PROPERTY DAMAGE ¹	\$26	6.5	\$29	.3	\$45	i.6	\$165	5.9	\$48	3.9	\$31	6.2

¹ Property damage reported in million-dollar increments.



One of two devices found attached to gas pipelines in rural Bienville Parish, Louisiana, on August 28, 1989.

TABLE II.—EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS BY CATEGORY BY STATE, 1985–89

STATE	BOMBINGS ¹							<u> </u>	INC	ENDL	ARY ²			5-YEAR					
SIAIE	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	TOTAL	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	TOTAL	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	TOTAL	TOTAL
AL	9	13	11	10	13	56	2	3	4	2	7	18	30	16	20	28	23	117	191
АК	1	6	- 3	. 4	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	. 0	2	4	5	1	4	16	-30
AZ	10	10	16	28	13	77	0	1	- 3	0	1	5	15	10	12	9	14	60	142
AR	9	5	9	15	. 8	46	0	0	4	1	1	6	20	31	23	41	49	164	216
CA	124	154	183	149	203	813	33	38	31	46	46	194	84	126	165	138	133	646	1,653
C0	30	57	31	20	22	160	31	38	15	19	25	128	24	41	22	15	10	112	400
CT	7	9	9	14	13	52	0	4	3	2	5	14	8	14	5	12	15	54	120
DE	-5	3	0	5	2	15	0	0	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	2	0	6	23
DC	6	2	0	2	0	10	1	2	2	2	2	9	8	7	9	4	1	29	48
FL	29	60	77	83	119	368	2	10	10	14	- 12	48	24	39	31	78	72	244	660
GA	17	8	13	15	20	73	4	4	5	4	2	19	27	24	32	40	34	157	249
HI	3	1	4	1	2	11	2	1	0	0	0	-3 -	3	5	2	1	4	15	29
ID	5	11	2	10	1	29	1	0	0	- 0	0	1	5	7	11	7	1	31	61
IL	65	72	69	65	53	324	11	23	14	33	97	178	48	71	55	69	39	282	784
IN	15	15	17	-38	41	126	2	3	1	2	2	10	27	13	20	23	19	102	238
IA	2	4	1	5	23	35	0	0	1	- 0	0	1	7	3	3	1	11	25	61
KS	19	11	19	15	17	81	0	1	0	4	0	5	19	31	19	20	22	111	197
КҮ	25	13	.9	18	28	93	9	5	4	0	3	21	79	46	33	28	97	283	- 397
LA	9	10	4	9	11	43	4	11	2	3	0	20	15	24	17	27	17	100	163
ME	6	2	4	10	0	22	1	0	0	0	0	1 -	5 -	3	2	4	5	19	42
MD	18	17	18	28	.34	115	9	10	6	7	24	56	9	22	12	9	21	73	244
MA	9	12	6	12	17	56	1	4	6	1	5	17	15	8	12	11	23	69	142
MI	20	26	37	28	- 60	171	0	7	7	4	7	25	23	27	33	21	39	143	339
MN	8.	. 8	13	7	17	53	0	0	6	- 1	6	13	6	6	13	13	12	50	116
MS	5	9	3	1	7	25	2	3	0	2	4	11	6	9	9	10	25	59	95
мо	15	10	20	11	13	69	2	6	4	2	6	20	34	47	20	23	19	143	232
MT	1	5	10	3	12	31	0	- 1	0	1	2	4	3	1	2	5	6	17	52

NE	10	4	3	1	3	21	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	3	1	1	2	12	34
NV	8	11	8	12	9	48	0	1	2	3	0	6	- 7	16	19	18	9	69	123
NH	7	3	2	7	4	23	0	0	0	0	1	1	8	7	5	3	3	26	50
NJ	9	16	22	23	35	105	5	4	1	1	2	13	23	23	14	21	19	100	218
NM	26	12	12	21	16	87	8	6	3	4	3	24	13	14	16	22	16	81	192
NY	57	77	48	66	87	335	12	9	7	11	7	46	35	34	31	46	52	198	579
NC	12	11	12	13	- 18	66	4	0	3	2	1	10	46	24	25	14	16	125	201
ND	- 1	4	1	3	2	11	0	0	2	0	1	3	1	2	3	6	2	14	28
	40	49	44	41	48	222	16	13	16	12	12	69	34	34	37	37	35	177	468
OK	16	33	22	21	23	115	0	5	3	6	7	21	31	43	24	23	20	141	277
OR	5	2	9	27	26	69	4	0	1	0	2	7	12	2	7	18	25	64	140
PA	23	28	25	46	33	155	6	5	5	10	17	43	53	50	35	80	76	294	492
RI	2	1	- 5	7	2	17	0	1	1	0	0	- 2	8	1	3	2	1	15	34
SC	4	10	5	4	6	29	0	3	0	. 0	0	3	12	8	12	11	14	57	.89
SD	1	0	6	5	4	16	0	0	4	0	0	4	4	5	0	8	13	30	50
	21	- 36	16	18	23	114	7	5	3	6	23	44	51	30	33	35	37	186	344
TX	74	44	53	60	75	306	19	8	13	10	13	63	108	132	112	85	90	527	896
UT	8	12	7	5	9	41	0	2	1	0	1	4	14	9	11	5	7	46	91
VT	2	3	1	4	3	13	0	0	1	0	0	1	5	1	7	6	6	25	39
VA	26	45	30	34	75	210	4	14	11	6	14	49	38	30	20	30	34	152	411
	27	11	32	40	44	154	4	3	4	3	0	14	35	20	15	25	25	120	288
WV	19	8	1	11	17	56	1	2	1	1	2	7	17	24	10	19	21	91	154
WI	9	4	10	13	10	46	1	0	2	1	0	4	11	4	6	14	15	50	100
WY	2	2	2	6	4	16	1	2	1	1	2	7	4	4	2	4	8	22	45
GUAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	2
PUERTO RICO	8	28	9	7	8	60	5	4	0	3	0	12	0	3	2	2	0	7	79
VIRGIN ISLANDS	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3	5
TOTAL	889	1,009	973	1,101	1,333	5,305	214	262	214	231	366	1,287	1,123	1,161	1,041	1,175	1,261	5,761	12,353
		· · · · ·											·						

¹Bombings include both actual and attempted.
 ²Incendiary includes both actual and attempted.
 ³Other includes accidental, hoax devices, threats, stolen, and recovered explosives.

TABLE III	-TOTAI	L EXPLO	DSIVES	INCIDE	NTS BY	STAT	E, 1985-	-89
STATE	1985	1986	1987	1988	198	9 RANK	5-YE. TOTAL	AR RANK
AL	41	32	35	40	43	21	191	23
АК	3	10	8	5	4	39	30	44
AZ	25	21	31	37	28	29	142	26
AR	29	36	36	57	58	15	216	20
CA	241	318	379	333	382	1	1,653	1
CO	85	136	68	54	57	16	400	9
CT	15	27	17	28	33	28	120	29
DE	6	4	3	8	2	41	23	47
DC	15	11	11	8	- 3	40	48	39
FL	55	109	118	175	203	2	660	4
GA	48	36	50	59	56	17	249	15
HI	8	7	6	2	6	37	210	45
ID	11	18	13	17	2	41	61	36
IL	124	166	138	167	189	3	784	2
IN	44	31	38	63	62	14	238	17
IA	9	7	5	6	34	27	61	36
KS	38	43	38	39	39	23	197	21
<u>KY</u>	113	64	46	46	128	6	397	10
	28	45	40 23	40	28	29	163	24
LA	12	40	6		5	38	42	41
ME	36			14 44		12	244	16
<u>MD</u>		49	36		79			
MA	25	24	24	24	45	20	142 339	26
MI	43	60	77	53	106	9		12
MN	14	14	31	21	35	26	115	30
<u>MS</u>	13	21	12	13	36	25	95	32
MO	51	63	44	36	38	24	232	18
MT	4	7	12	9	20	31	52	37
NE	15	7	4	2	6	37	34	43
NV,	15	28	29	33	18	32	123	28
NH	15	10	7	10	8	36	50	38
NJ	37	43	37	45	56	17	218	19
NM	47	32	32	47	35	26	193	22
NY	104	120	86	123	146	5	579	5
<u>NC</u>	62	35	40	29	35	26	201	21
ND	2	6	6	9	5	38	28	.46
<u>OH</u>	90	96	97	90	95	10	468	7
<u>OK</u>	47	81	49	50	50	19	277	14
OR	21	4	17	45	53	18	140	27
<u>PA</u>	82	83	65	136	126		492	6
<u>RI</u>	10	3	9	9	3	40	34	43
<u>SC</u>	16	21	17	15	20	31	89	34
<u>SD</u>	5	5	10	13	17	33	50	38
<u>TN</u>	79	71	52	59	83	11	344	11
TX	201	184	178	155	178	4	896	3
UT	22	23	19	10	17	33	91	33
VT	7	4	9	10	9	35	39	42
VA	68	89	61	70	123	8	411	8
WA	66	34	51	68	69	13	288	13
WV	37	34	12	31	40	22	154	25

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2,507

2,960

12,353

2,228

2,432

WI.....

WY

GUAM


PUERTO RICO

VIRGIN ISLANDS

TOTAL.....

2,226






^{1/}Includes both actual and attempted incidents.

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FIGURE II TOTAL CRIMINAL BOMBING INCIDENTS, 1985-89



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TABLE IV.—ANALYSIS OF BOMBING INCIDENTS BY TARGET AS TO DEATHS, INJURIES,
AND PROPERTY DAMAGE, 1985–89

TARGET		KILLED							IN	JURE	D		PROPERTY DAMAGE ¹					
IARGEI	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	TOTAL	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	TOTAL	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	TOTAL
RESIDENTIAL	22	18	10	14	15	79	70	69	54	46	114	353	5.7	9.0	6.9	12.1	31.1	64.8
COMMERCIAL	4	13	2	0	2	21	41	54	16	. 30	52	193	37.2	142.0	44.0	29.1	30.0	282.3
VEHICLES	9	5	6	7	8	35	25	28	30	36	26	145	12.6	11.0	8.7	8.1	7.6	48.0
EDUCATION	0	1	0	0	0	1	10	95	10	17	15	147	20.5	2.0	.4	2.7	0.6	26.2
MAIL BOXES	0	0	0	0	0	0	- 1	- 1	_ 1	2	1	6	0	0	0	.1	.2	.3
OPEN AREAS	1	5	6	4	2	18	22	11	36	41	77	187	0	0	.2	.2	.1	.5
UTILITIES	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	4	3.0	1.0	1.4	10.0	15.0	30.4
LAW ENFORCEMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	9	15	4	32	.2	0	10.6	.2	2.0	13.0
STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS	0	0	1	0	0	1	5	1	15	1	2	24	.1	1.0	10.3	.3	10.3	22.0
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	0	0	0	9	.2	0	.2	0	.4	.8
BANKS	0	0	0	0	0	. 0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	2.0	1.6	.2	.2	4.0
MILITARY	0	-0.	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	- 0 -	3	0	0	0	0	.5	.5
AIRPORTS/AIRCRAFT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	8.1	5.0	.2	6.0	.2	19.5
OTHER ²	1	1	4	9	6	21	10	12	11	13	14	60	4.1	7.0	.7	41.8	13.2	66.8
TOTAL	37	43	29	34	33	176	193	283	182	204	305	1,167	91.7	180.0	85.2	110.8	111.4	579.1

¹Property damage estimates presented in rounded increments of \$100,000. ²Other category does not include accidental-noncriminal explosives incidents.

TABLE V.—EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS BY MOTIVE, INCLUDING ESTIMATED DAMAGE ¹ , 1985-	-89
(B-BOMBING, I-INCENDIARY)	

MOTIVE		19	85	1986		19	87	19	88	19	89	-	EAR OTAL	5-YEAR TOTAL
	· · ·	В	Ι	В	Ι	В	I	В	I	В	I	В	I	GRAND TOTAL \$ ²
VANDAT IOM	NUMBER	151	13	224	24	311	20	311	14	351	29	1,348	100	1,448
VANDALISM	DAMAGE	9.2	6.2	.8	2.2	47.1	19.8	13.7	24.7	8.4	104.6	79.2	157.5	236.7
	NUMBER	111	46	125	56	123	53	153	63	181	132	693	350	1,043
REVENGE	DAMAGE	23.7	15.4	9.3	3.4	21.8	76.3	361.3	82.5	52.6	67.3	468.7	244.9	713.6
PROTEST	NUMBER	15	3	24	5	17	7	11	4	18	10	85	29	114
PROIESI	DAMAGE	66.5	7.5	4.3	.2	1.6	5.6	6.3	.3	11.0	61.3	89.7	74.9	164.6
EXTORTION	NUMBER	18	1	20	4	17	2	15	11	13	5	83	23	106
EXIORITON	DAMAGE	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	218.9											
	NUMBER	39	8	14	12	18	8	21	9	41	7	133	44	177
LABOR RELATED	DAMAGE	117.3	8.0	5.0	3.1	3.6	7.3	195.0	7.5	268.6	17.4	589.5	43.3	632.8
	NUMBER	6	1	5	7	1	5	6	. 3	4	5	22	21	43
INSURANCE FRAUD	DAMAGE	30.8	1.0	5.5	3.8	0.	65.0	15.3	42.0	2.1	9.5	53.7	121.3	175.0
	NUMBER	17	1	22	4	27	2	25	3	27	6	118	16	134
HOMICIDE/SUICIDE	DAMAGE	14.8	0	.8	0	100.3	.1	77.2	7.0	19.8	27.6	212.9	34.7	247.6
	NUMBER	357	73	434	112	514	97	542	107	635	194	2,482	583	3,065
TOTAL	DAMAGE	302.6	38.2	35.4	13.5	200.3	221.6	682.1	166.7	366.0	362.8	1,586.4	802.8	2,389.2
UNREPORTED/	NUMBER	363	78	408	92	459	117	370	196	430	172	2,030	655	2,685
UNDETERMINED	DAMAGE	319.7	257.0	118.1	14.1	114.7	317.0	96.6	164.2	322.4	65.8	971.5	818.1	1,789.6

¹Estimated property damage presented in \$10,000 increments. ²Grand total reflects total of all incidents in which a motive was reported.

TABLE	VIB	OMBIN	G INCI	DENTS	51 BY T	ARGE	ET, 1985	-89		
	1985	1986	1987	1988	198	39	5-YEAR			
TARGET	NUMBER	NUMBER	NUMBER	NUMBER	NUMBER	RANK	TOTAL	% OF GRAND TOTAL		
RESIDENTIAL	223	304	232	212	367	1	1,338	25		
COMMERCIAL	189	194	200	202	205	3	990	18		
VEHICLES	188	208	188	218	284	2	1,086	20		
EDUCATION	53	63	59	50	76	6	301	6		
MAIL BOXES	36	74	77	205	204	4	596	11		
OPEN AREAS	39	51	94	90	81	5	355	7		
UTILITIES	16	19	22	14	27	7	98	2		
LAW ENFORCEMENT	19	10	14	20	14	8	77	1		
STATE/LOCAL GOV"T	14	13	18	19	14	8	78	1		
FEDERAL GOV'T	21	19	15	5	11	9	71	1		
BANKS	7	14	7	5	8	10	41			
MILITARY	4	6	4	4	4	11	22			
AIRPORTS/AIRCRAFT	3	4	2	4	2	12	15	_		
OTHER	59	67	53	60	87		326	6		
(NO RANK GIVEN)										
TOTAL	871	1,046	985	1,108	1,384		5,394	GRAND TOTAL		

¹ Includes all functioned bombs and incendiary devices. Does not include attempts.

TABLE VII.—TYPES OF CONTAINERS USED IN DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, 1985–89

CONTRAINTOR	1985		1986		1987		1988		1989		5-YEAR	
CONTAINER	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	TOTAL	% GT
PIPE	431	45	541	54	543	52	525	45	577	45	2,617	48
BOTTLE	226	24	265	26	235	23	265	23	429	33	1,420	26
DYNAMITE STICKS	44	5	40	4	37	- 4	32	3	44	3	197	4
CANS	41	4	43	4	37	4	39	3	53	4	213	4
BOXES-METAL/ CARDBOARD	57	6	27	3	26	2	30	3	31	2	171	3
OTHER	152	16	93	9	158	15	274	23	155	12	832	15
TOTAL	951		1,009		1,036		1,165		1,289		5,450)
UNREPORTED/ UNDETERMINED	152	•	262		151		167		410		1,142	2

								, _		-		
	1985 NUMBER	%	1986 NUMBER	%	1987 NUMBER	%	1988 NUMBER	%	1989 NUMBER	%	5-YEA TOTAL	
BOMBINGS	358	83	468	87	461	85	446	85	480	83	2,213	85
ATTEMPTED BOMBINGS	73	17	73	13	82	15	79	15	97	17	404	15
TOTAL INCIDENTS	431		541		543		525		577		2,617	
KILLED	17		8	1	10		17		10		62	
INJURED	67		80		72		68		64		351	
PROPERTY DAMAGE	GE \$1,192,464		\$1,106,740		\$1,771,045		\$635,752		\$1,053,044		\$5,759,045	
REMOTE CONTROL PIPE BOMB INCIDENTS	6		4		5		14		5		34	
ELECTRIC	83	27%	77 .	19%	69	17%	72	18%	82	18%	383	19%
NONELECTRIC	229	73%	336	81%	346	83%	322	82%	362	82%	1,595	81%
UNREPORTED/ UNDETERMINED	119	_	128	_	128	-	131	-	133		639	· ·


TABLE VIII.—PIPE BOMB INCIDENTS, 1985–89

TABLE IX.—TYPES OF FILLERS USED IN DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, 1985–89

1985		1986		1987		1988		1989		5-YEAR		
NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	TOTAL	% GT	
224	25	265	26	227	25	258	25	380	29	1,354	26	
204	23	268	26	229	25	219	21	219	17	1,139	22	
76	9	78	7	56	6	84	8	100	8	394	8	
146	17	163	16	178	20	202	20	216	16	905	18	
											•	
93	11	110	10	91	10	157	15	245	18	696	13	
54	6	51	5	49	5	27	3	46	3	227	4	
14	2	12	1	18	2	15	2	21	2	80	2	
23	3	38	4	35	4	42	4	64	5	202	4	
8	1	18	2	9	1	9	1	6	-	50	1	
5	1	5	1	3	_	6	-	2	-	21	. <u> </u>	
31	3	21	2	12	1	12	1	22	2	98	2	
878		1,029		907		1,031	:	1,321		5,166	GRAND TOTAL	
225		242		280		301		378			1,426	
	NUMBER 224 204 76 146 93 54 14 23 8 5 31 878	NUMBER % 224 25 204 23 76 9 146 17 93 11 54 6 142 23 23 3 8 1 5 1 31 3 878	NUMBER % NUMBER 224 25 265 204 23 268 76 9 78 146 17 163 93 11 110 54 6 51 142 12 12 23 3 38 8 1 18 5 1 5 31 3 21 878 1,029 10	NUMBER % NUMBER % 224 25 265 26 204 23 268 26 76 9 78 7 146 17 163 16 93 11 110 10 54 6 51 5 14 2 12 1 23 3 38 4 8 1 18 2 5 1 5 1 31 3 21 2 878 1,029	NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER 224 25 265 26 227 204 23 268 26 229 76 9 78 7 56 146 17 163 16 178 93 11 110 10 91 54 6 51 5 49 14 2 12 1 18 23 3 38 4 35 8 1 18 2 9 5 1 5 1 3 31 3 21 2 12 878 1,029 907 1 1	NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % 224 25 265 26 227 25 204 23 268 26 229 25 76 9 78 7 56 6 146 17 163 16 178 20 93 11 110 10 91 10 54 6 51 5 49 5 14 2 12 1 18 2 23 3 38 4 35 4 8 1 18 2 9 1 5 1 5 1 3 31 3 21 2 12 1 878 1,029 907 -	NUMBER % NU	NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % 224 25 265 26 227 25 258 25 204 23 268 26 229 25 219 21 76 9 78 7 56 6 84 8 146 17 163 16 178 20 202 20 93 11 110 10 91 10 157 15 54 6 51 5 49 5 27 3 14 2 12 1 18 2 15 2 23 3 38 4 35 4 42 4 8 1 18 2 9 1 9 1 5 1 5 1 3 - 6 31 3 21 <t< td=""><td>NUMBER % NUMBER % NU</td><td>NUMBER % NUMBER % NU</td><td>NUMBER % NUMBER % NU</td></t<>	NUMBER % NU	NUMBER % NU	NUMBER % NU	

 1 Total reflects only those incidents where type of filler was reported. Percentage computed using this total. 2 Other than C4.

FIGURE III ANALYSIS^{1/} OF EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST COMMERCIAL ^{2/} TARGETS




Total Number of Explosives Incidents Analyzed-304

^{1/}Only the three most prevalent motives, fillers, and containers are reported by target type. Both functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary incidents are incorporated in the analysis.

^{2/}Commercial targets, for the purpose of this analysis, include all targets previously reported on as commercial plus banks, utilities, and airports.

FIGURE IV ANALYSIS^{1/} OF EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST RESIDENTIAL^{2/} TARGETS




Total Number of Explosives Incidents Analyzed-492

^{1/}Only the three most prevalent motives, fillers, and containers are reported by target type. Both functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary incidents are incorporated in the analysis.

^{2/}Residential targets, as defined in the Glossary of Terms, include all residences including apartments, hotels, and motels.

FIGURE V ANALYSIS^{1/} OF EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST VEHICULAR^{2/} TARGETS



Total Number of Explosives Incidents Analyzed-349

^{1/}Only the three most prevalent motives, fillers, and containers are reported by target type. Both functioned and attempted bombings and incendiary incidents are incorporated in the analysis.

^{2/}Vehicular targets, for the purpose of this analysis, include all targets previously reported on as vehicular plus police vehicles and aircraft.

TABLE X.	-ACCIDENTAL	EXPLOS	SIONS H	BY TYPE	OF TA	RGET,	1985 - 89
	·	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	TOTAL
COMMERCIAL	TOTAL	23	18	23	20	21	105
	KILLED	59	17	18	23	32	149
	INJURED	158	57	187	451	150	1,003
	PROPERTY DAMAGE	692.7	1,037.0	3,356.3	15,437.3	37,557.0	58,080.3
VEHICLES	TOTAL	.9	1	5	3	4	22
-	KILLED	1	0	3	1	3	8
· · · · ·	INJURED	13	2	3	1	6	25
	PROPERTY DAMAGE	190.1	· _	6.0	6.4	151.2	353.7
RESIDENTIAL	TOTAL	11	4	3	6	8	32
· · · · ·	KILLED	6	0	0	0	3	9
. · · · ·	INJURED	34	3	4	6	15	62
•	PROPERTY DAMAGE	331.4	10.2	.1	22.0	45.0	408.7
EDUCATION	TOTAL	1	1	4	0	0	6
-	KILLED	0	0	2	0	0	2
-	INJURED	4	1	6	0	0	11
	PROPERTY DAMAGE	0	20.0	300.0	0	0	320.0
UTILITIES	TOTAL	0	0	1	0	0	1
	KILLED	0	0	0	0	0	0
-	INJURED	0	0	0	0	0	0
	PROPERTY DAMAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPEN AREAS	TOTAL	5	3	1	6	4	19
· · · · · ·	KILLED	1	1	1	0	1	3
•	INJURED		18	0	15	5	113
-	PROPERTY DAMAGE	1	0	0	0	0	500.0
GOV'TSTATE/LOC		0	0	3	1	1	5
	KILLED		0	1	1	0	2
-	INJURED	0	0	1	1	1	2
-	PROPERTY DAMAGE	0	0	50.0	0	0	50.0
MILITARY	TOTAL	0	2	1	0	0	3
	KILLED	0	3	3	0	0	6
-	INJURED	0	7	0	0	0	7
-	PROPERTY DAMAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER ¹	TOTAL	2	2		0	6	15
omen -	KILLED	1	0	0	<u>4</u> 1	2	4
	INJURED	0	2	1	14	13	30
•					14	0	66.5
TARGET	PROPERTY DAMAGE	16.5	40.0	42		44	
IARGET -	TOTAL	51	31		40		208
	KILLED	67	21	28	26	41	183
· -	INJURED	284	90	202	487	190	1,253
	PROPERTY DAMAGE	1,730.7	1,107.2	3,712.4	15,475.7	37,753.2	59,779.2

¹Other includes all incidents in which target was reported and was other than those listed above. ²Property damage presented in increments of \$10,000.

5-YEAR TOTAL DRUG-RELATED EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS¹ BOMBINGS ATTEMPTED BOMBINGS INCENDIARY BOMBINGS ATTEMPTED INCENDIARY TOTAL KILLED INJURED..... PROPERTY DAMAGE \$1,000,000 \$299.500 \$701,800 \$2,001,300 RECOVERED EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVES 1,485 NUMBER OF DETONATORS..... GRENADES..... SIMULATORS..... ILLEGAL FIREWORKS EXPLOSIONS EXPLOSIONS..... KILLED..... INJURED..... PROPERTY DAMAGE \$20,000 \$10,268,000 \$151,000 \$195,000 \$1,000,000 \$11,634,000 LEGAL FIREWORKS EXPLOSIONS EXPLOSIONS..... KILLED..... INJURED..... PROPERTY DAMAGE \$707,100 \$400,000 \$11,000 \$2,000 \$1,265,100 \$145,000 OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANG EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS BOMBINGS KILLED INJURED..... PROPERTY DAMAGE \$292,300 \$35,000 \$82,000 \$90,200 \$10,750 \$510,250 RECOVERED EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS..... POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVES 1,372 NUMBER OF DETONATORS..... GRENADES..... INCIDENTS INVOLVING MILITARY EXPLOSIVES AND/OR COMPONENTS BOMBINGS..... KILLED..... INJURED..... PROPERTY DAMAGE \$146,850 \$56,850 \$81,400 \$162,300 \$58,300 \$505,700 RADIO REMOTE CONTROLLED EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS NUMBER OF BOMBING INCIDENTS WHERE HOME COMPUTER BULLETIN BOARDS WERE USED TO OBTAIN INSTRUCTIONS ON MAKING BOMBS MAILED BOMBING INCIDENTS BOMBINGS..... KILLED INJURED..... \$3.030 \$5,000 \$10.000 \$26.030 PROPERTY DAMAGE \$6,000 \$2,000


TABLE XI.—OTHER EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS, 1985-89


¹ Data not available for 1985 and 1986.




Results of an explosion that occurred on September 8, 1989, at a residence in Pine Hill, Alabama.


Part III STOLEN EXPLOSIVES AND RECOVERIES







A portion of 675 pounds of explosives that had been stolen from magazines in Beattyville, Kentucky, in June 1989. All the stolen explosives were recovered in September 1989.



The information provided in this section was derived from statistics reported to and/or contributed by ATF field offices. The categories used are those employed internally by ATF to track and record stolen and recovered explosives.

Table XII—Quantity of Explosives Stolen by Category,1985-89

Publications of the Explosives Incidents Report for the years 1985 through 1989 included a category entitled Other in this table. This category has been deleted for those years in this 5-year format. Also deleted from this table was the category Potassium Chlorate/Photoflash Powder. Note that those thefts that would have fit either of these categories in 1988-89 have been reported in this table. In that the amounts of explosives involved under the category of Other were small in comparison to yearly totals, it is believed their deletion will have little effect on the overall validity of the data presented for comparative purposes.

Figure VI—Comparison of Categories of Explosives Stolen by Year as Percent of 5-Year Totals

Percentage computations presented in this figure were obtained by dividing individual year totals by 5-year totals for specific categories.

Abbreviations of HE for high explosive, LE for low explosive, and BA for blasting agent were used. The category HE + LE + BA therefore reflects information regarding thefts of all explosives (whose unit of measure was the pound).

Table XIII-Explosives Thefts by State, 1985-89

For an explanation of the procedures used in ranking of States, Modal Rank, please reference Technical Notes, Section I, Table III.

Table XIV—Amount of Explosives Stolen by State, 1985-89

Data listed under columns headed 1985 through 1989 reflect the number of pounds of explosives (high explosives, low explosives, and blasting agents) stolen in a given year for a given government entity.

Data listed under the heading "5-Year" reflect the total number of pounds of explosives stolen for the period 1985 through 1989 for a given government entity.

For an explanation of the procedures used in ranking, please reference Technical Notes, Section I, Table III.

Table XV-Number of Detonators Stolen by State, 1985-89

For an explanation of percentage computations in this table, consult Table XIV directly above.

Table XVI—Explosives Thefts as Reported by Licensees, Permittees, and Users, 1985–89

Data presented in this table include information from 1985 to present.

Figure VII—Percentage Graph of Explosives Thefts as Reported by Licensees, Permittees, and Users

These graphs depict data presented in Table XVI for the year 1989 and an average year computed using data presented for the years 1985 through 1989, inclusive.

Figure VIII— Explosives Thefts by State for 1989

Data in this figure reflect the number of explosives thefts for 1989.

Table XVII—Methods of Entry for Explosives Thefts, 1985-89

This table reflects the methods of entry for reported explosives thefts.

Table XVIII—Quantity of Explosives Recovered by Category, 1985–89

Recoveries include all explosives reported as taken into law enforcement custody either through seizure, abandonment, or purchased as evidence.

Table XIX—Incidents of Recovered Explosives Previously Reported Stolen, 1985–89

This table reflects recovery of explosives verified through corroborating evidence as having been previously reported stolen.

Explosives reported as recovered in a given year are not necessarily explosives reported stolen during that same year.

Figure IX—Comparison of Categories of Explosives Recovered by Year as Percent of 5-Year Totals, 1985–89

Percentage calculations were obtained by the same process as elaborated upon under Figure VI above.

Table XX—Incidents of Explosives Recoveries by State, 1985-89

The discussion entered for Table XIII above is applicable for this table except that the data in the instant table reflect recoveries as opposed to thefts.

Table XXI—Pounds of Explosives Recovered by State by Year, 1985–89

The discussion entered for Table XIV above is applicable for this table except that the data in the instant table reflect recoveries as opposed to thefts.

Table XXII—Number of Detonators Recovered by State by Year, 1985–89


For an explanation of percentage computations in this table, consult discussion under Table XIV above.

Figure X—Explosives Recoveries by State for 1989

The discussion entered for Figure VII above is applicable for this table except that the data in the instant figure reflect recoveries as opposed to thefts.

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	5-YEAR TOTAL
HIGH EXPLOSIVES (IN POUNDS)						
DYNAMITE	24,013	24,945	8,372	12,730	10,801	80,861
TNT, C4 MILITARY	235	2	1	244	5	487
PRIMER	562	1,676	1,304	339	1,485	5,366
BOOSTER	491	788	696	1,306	544	3,825
TOTAL	25,301	27,411	10,373	14,619	12,835	90,539
LOW EXPLOSIVES (IN POUNDS)						
BLACK POWDER	428	170	150	347	318	1,413
SMOKELESS POWDER	87	115	0	0	0	202
TOTAL	515	285	150	347	318	1,615
BLASTING AGENTS (IN POUNDS)	7,132	8,210	4,705	9,439	3,584	33,070
DETONATING CORD/IGNITOR						
CORD/SAFETY FUSE (IN FEET)	85,066	172,588	47,450	57,058	68,807	430,969
DETONATORS (BY QUANTITY)	46,352	31,497	33,112	43,092	21,797	175,850
GRENADES (BY QUANTITY)	1	35	10	1	36	83

TABLE XII.—QUANTITY OF EXPLOSIVES STOLEN BY CATEGORY,1985–89



Detonators and other explosives-related products recovered in Newcastle Township, Pennsylvania, in February 1989.

FIGURE VI COMPARISON OF CATEGORIES OF EXPLOSIVES STOLEN BY YEAR AS PERCENT OF 5-YEAR TOTALS, 1985-89




TABLE XIII.—EXPLOSIVES THEFTS BY STATE, 1985–89

			JIVLIO I		DI DIM.	LLi , LU	00-00	
STATE	1985	1986	1987	1988	19	89 RANK	5-Yl TOTAL	EAR RANK
AL	4	2	6	6	2	8	20	12
AK	1	0	0	1	2	8	4	25
AZ	4	2	3	4	4	6	17	14
AR	4	6	- 7	9	9	2	35	6
		14	4		5	5		4
<u>CA</u>				11			45	
<u>CO</u>	- 40	6		4	0	10	14	15 24
CT		2	1	0	2	8	5	
DE	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	29
DC	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	29
FL	3	3		3	1	9	11	18
GA	4	0	5	10	5	5	24	9
HI	0	1	1	0	0	10	2	27
<u>ID</u>	3	11	4	1	0	10	9	20
IL	3	7	3	7	2	8	22	10
IN	4	0	2	5	. 1	9	12	17
IA	1	2	1	1	3	7	8	21
KS	6	6	4	6	4	6	26	8
KY	37	20	13	13	8	3	91	1
LA	3	0	3	3	0	10	9	20
ME	1	1	0	1	1	9	4	25
MD	2	2	0	1	0	10	5	24
	0	0	0	0	1	9	1	28
MI	1	1	1	5	0	10	8	21
MN	1	2	1	4	2	8	10	19
MS	4	1	1	3	1	9	10	19
	4 11	9	5	6	5	5	36	15
MO						6		·
MT	1	1	0	3	4		9	20
NE	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	29
NV	0	0	1	1	1	9	3	26
NH	2	1	1	1	1	9	6	23
NJ	. 0	2	1	1	0	10	4	- 25
<u>NM</u>	3	3	0	1	2	8	9	20
<u>NY</u>	2	1	2	1	1	9	7	22
NC	14	3	2	3	4	6	26	8
ND	0	1	1	2	1	9	5	24
OH	3	3	1	5	7	4	19	13
OK	5	7	3	6	1	9	22	10
OR	2	1	1	5	4	6	13	16
PA	12	6	9	16	10	1	53	3
RI	1	0	0	0	0	10	1	28
SC	2	0	0	0	1	9	3	26
SD	0	1	0	1	0	10	2	27
TN	11	8	8	10	8		45	4
TX	14	18	11	8	7	4	58	2
UT	6	10	11	0 1	0	10		20
	0	0	3	2	1	<u> </u>	6	20
<u>VT</u>		·						23
<u>VA</u>		11	3	3	4	6	32	
WA	7	5	2	6	1	9	21	11
WV	6	7	2	8	9	2	32	7
WI	3	0	2	2	0	10	7	22
<u>WY</u>	1	0	1	1	1	9	4	25
GUAM	0	0	1	0	0	10	11	28
PUERTO RICO	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	29
VIRGIN ISLANDS	1	2	0	0	0	10	3	26

TABLE XIV.—AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES STOLEN BY STATE, 1985–89 (TOTAL IN POUNDS)

	<u></u>				10	89	5-YEAR		
STATE	1985	1986	1987	1988	1.	RANK	TOTAL	RANK	
AL	150	135	704	233	51	22	1,273	27	
AK	950	0	0	0	212	16	1,162	30	
AZ	925	0	0	127	500	11	1,552	24	
AR	593	1,587	244	2,159	237	15	4,820	9	
CA	501	1,647	50	655	1,050	5	3,903	13	
CO	287	238	0	425	0	28	950	32	
CT	0	200	0	0	137	18	337	38	
DE	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	48	
DC	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	48	
FL	1,836	2,750	2,250	120	107	20	7,063	4	
GA	651	0	854	1,595	906	7	4,006	12	
HI	0	1	0	0	0	28	1	47	
ID	82	30	400	100	0	28	612	34	
	58			624	0	28		5	
IL	697	4,199	2,083				6,964		
IN		0	53	590	0	28	1,340	26	
IA	75	400	150	56	503	10	1,184	29	
KS	1,816	211	613	126	333	14	3,099	16	
<u>KY</u>	6,239	2,674	743	1,803	3,458		14,917	1	
	158	0	0	100	0	28	258	39	
ME	75	0	0	17	50	23	142	42	
MD	18	0	0	0	0	28	18	45	
<u>MA</u>	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	48	
<u>MI</u>	132	683	2	49	00	28	866	33	
<u>MN</u>	180	410	150	986	0	28	1,726	22	
MS	1,988	60	150	95	0	28	2,293	19	
MO	1,280	904	251	642	445	13	3,522	14	
MT	50	25	0	389	69	21	533	35	
NE	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	48	
NV	0	0	5	230	0	22	235	40	
NH	201	2,700	0	5	27	25	2,933	17	
NJ	0	56	0	5	Û	28	61	44	
NM	110	1,005	0	0	1,046	6	2,161	20	
NY	79	3	252	65	120	19	519	36	
NC	1,546	898	22	552	158	17	3,176	15	
ND	0	0	5	156	2	27	163	41	
OH	100	695	900	1,625	1,169	4	4,489	11	
<u>OK</u>	1,218	904	249	2,175	0	28	4,546	1 10	
OR	1,210	20	108	1,028	471	12	1,727	21	
PA	488	411	497	1,990	2,163	2	5,549	7	
RI		0		0	0	28	5	46	
	<u> </u>	0	0	0	0	28	1,014	31	
SC	1,014 0	0		0	0	28	0	48	
SD			0						
TN	320	1,090	1,977	1,117	789	9	5,293	8	
TX	3,264	3,956	315	2,027	796	8	10,358	2	
UT	370	800	0		0	28	1,253	28	
<u>VT</u>	0	0	1,365	0	50	23	1,415	25	
VA	1,023	982	155	200	38	24	2,398	1.8	
WA	2,672	2,017	125	990	10	26	5,814	6	
<u>wv</u>	1,513	2,812	450	1,104	1,840	3	7,719	3	
WI	197	0	107	62	0	28	366	37	
<u>WY</u>	5	0	0	100	0	28	105	43	
GUAM	0	0	0	0	00	28	0	48	
PUERTO RICO	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	48	
VIRGIN ISLANDS	0	1,680	0	0	0	28	1,680	23	
TOTAL	32,966	36,183	15,229	24,405	16,737		125,520	T	

TABLE XV.-NUMBER OF DETONATORS STOLEN BY STATE, 1985-89


			5-YEAR					
STATE	1985	1986	1987	1988	19	RANK	TOTAL	AR RANN
AL	149	1,049	808	230	200	19	2,436	15
\K	0	. 0	0	0	50	25	50	37
Z	33	44	322	518	180	21	1,097	26
R	390	8	1,126	1,574	247	18	3,345	11
CA	1,060	1,894	330	1,596	2,647	2	7,527	7
0	0	1,098	0	85	0	30	1,183	25
ЭС ЭТ	0	1,000	100	0	40	27	314	32
DE	0	0	0	0		30	0	46
DC	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	40
			0	95	0	30	637	28
۲ <u>L</u>	80	462			·	·		
łA	0	0	0	1,211	353	14	1,564	21
II	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	46
D	100	100	13,315	100	0	30	13,615	3
L	0	0	0	2,595	170	22	2,765	13
<u>N</u>	263	0	64	809	80	23	1,216	24
A	0	1,282	165	0	584	11	2,031	17
IS	1,211	311	204	30	320	15	2,076	16
<u> </u>	12,942	6,326	10,124	1,302	7,417	1	38,111	1
A	7	0	0	25	0		32	39
<u> </u>	125	0	0	0	0	30	125	36
1D	22	245	0	00	0	30	267	33
<u>IA</u>	0	0	0	0	908	6	908	27
<u> </u>	0	2,600	2	250	0	30	2,852	12
1N	15	0	0	0	10	29	25	41
4S	11,380	64	0	0	250	17	11,694	4
40	2,121	728	30	50	875	7	3,804	10
<i>μ</i> Τ	0	0	0	0	360	13	360	30
NE	0	0	G	0	0	30	0	46
۷V	0	0	0	0	30	28	30	40
VH	0	0	0	6	0	30	6	44
۶J	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	46
VM	0	516	0	0	1,025	4	1,541	22
VYYI	0	0	1	0	0	30	1	45
۱C	1,881	200	321	5	51	24	2,458	14
۱D	0	1	0	394	0	30	395	29
DH	99	45	238	393	865	8	1,640	18
DK	232	412	185	717	46	26	1,592	19
)R	202		400	480	500	12	1,580	20
A	2,930	879	400	480	1,661	3	7,157	8
	2,930	0	0	1,007	2,001	30	13	43
۲ <u>۲</u> ۲	hannen			·····	0	30	13	40
<u>SC</u> מי	0	0	0	0		30	0	40
5D	0	0	0	0	0			
<u>'N</u>	2,534	2,086	675	25,004	837	9	31,136	2
<u>IX</u>	1,539	1,689	2,018	353	613	10	6,212	9
<u>JT</u>	160	100	60	0	0	30	320	31
/T	0	0	0	47	0	30	47	38
/A	2,676	3,426	1,530	490	289	16	8,411	6
VA	1,900	4,924	50	1,684	0	30	8,558	5
<u> </u>	2,053	709	575	497	994	5	4,828	.9
WI	0	0	450	815	0	30	1,265	23
WY	0	0	0	50	195	20	245	35
JUAM	0	0	19	0	0	30	19	42
PUERTO RICO	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	-16
/IRGIN ISLANDS	140	125	0	0	0	30	265	34
TOTAL	46,255	31,497	33,112	43,092	21,797		175,753	

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	%	5-YEAR TOTAL	%
MANUFACTURER	12	7	6	9	3	2	37	5
DEALER	27	16	16	29	30	24	118	14
PERMITTEE	49	51	34	58	34	27	226	27
USER	131	96	66	95	59	47	447	54
TOTAL	219	170	122	191	126	100%	828	100%

TABLE XVI.—EXPLOSIVES THEFTS AS REPORTED BY LICENSEES, PERMITTEES, AND USERS, 1985–89

FIGURE VII PERCENTAGE GRAPH OF EXPLOSIVES THEFTS AS REPORTED BY LICENSEES, PERMITTEES, AND USERS, 1985-89





5-Year Grand Total Percentages





FIGURE VIII EXPLOSIVES THEFTS BY STATE FOR 1989



<u>3</u>6

1985-89									
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	%	5-YEAR TOTAL	%	
LOCKS CUT AND PRIED	66	72	27	55	43	34	263	32	
DOORS PRIED AND BLOWN OPEN	20	7	11	7	6	5	51	6	
KEYS USED	20	13	11	12	8	6	64	8	
WALL ENTRY	6	7	5	8	3	2	29	4	
ROOF ENTRY	4	1	3	3	3	2	14	2	
WINDOW AND VENT ENTRY	5	3	2	3	3	2	16	2	
FLOOR ENTRY	2	0	0	0	2	2	4	-	
"INSIDE" HELP	1	0	4	0	0		5	- 1	
OTHER/UNKNOWN	95	67	59	103	58	46	382	46	
TOTAL	219	170	122	191	126	99%	828	100%	

TABLE XVII.—METHODS OF ENTRY FOR EXPLOSIVES THEFTS, 1985–89

TABLE XVIII.—QUANTITY OF EXPLOSIVES RECOVERED BY CATEGORY, 1985–89

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	5-YEAR TOTAL
HIGH EXPLOSIVES (IN POUNDS)						
DYNAMITE	22,536	16,635	14,226	15,305	11,810	80,512
TNT, C4 MILITARY	329	424	285	377	1,955	3,370
PRIMER	339	148	1,004	219	0	1,710
BOOSTER	1,179	200	171	1,545	371	3,466
TOTAL	24,383	17,407	15,686	17,446	14,136	89,058
LOW EXPLOSIVES (IN POUNDS)			-			
BLACK POWDER	1,044	261	588	1,720	1,224	4,837
SMOKELESS POWDER	162	625	414	340	174	1,715
TOTAL	1,206	886	1,002	2,060	1,398	6,552
BLASTING AGENTS (IN POUNDS)	3,793	1,603	4,147	8,695	7,318	25,556
DETONATING CORD/IGNITOR	· ·					
CORD/SAFETY FUSE (IN FEET)	87,820	111,033	31,311	55,212	100,752	386,128
DETONATORS (BY QUANTITY)	29,571	17,017	15,619	35,389	19,512	117,108
GRENADES (BY QUANTITY)	314	295	299	144	356	1,408

TABLE XIX.—INCIDENTS OF RECOVERED EXPLOSIVES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED STOLEN¹, 1985–89

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	TOTAL
NUM! OF INCIDENTS	103	88	53	68	64	376
POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVES	15,125	9,411	8,060	5,460	9,065	47,121
DETONATORS	22,479	11,716	3,210	8,711	12,128	58,244
FEET OF DETONATING CORD/ SAFETY FUSE	49,378	45,488	7,208	26,170	64,378	192,622

¹ Recovered explosives may have been reported stolen in years other than in years recovered.

FIGURE IX COMPARISON OF CATEGORIES OF EXPLOSIVES RECOVERED BY YEAR AS PERCENT OF 5-YEAR TOTALS, 1985-89




TABLE XX.—INCIDENTS OF EXPLOSIVES RECOVERIES BY STATE, 1985–89

STATE	1985	1986	1987	1988	19	989		EAR
						RANK	TOTAL	RANK
AL	25	14	13	20	16	12	88	15
<u>AK</u>	0	4	3	0	1	25	8	42
AZ	9	6	8	4	6	20	33	30
AR	14	24	16	30	39	4	123	7
CA	67	91	108	65	52	3	383	2
<u>20</u>	19	31	15	6	3	23	74	18
<u></u>	6	12	3	10	9	17	40	27
DE	1	1	2	2	0	26	6	43
DC	3	4	2	0	0	26	9	41
۲L	18	33	24	32	38	5	145	6
GA	22	22	25	26	24	. 8	119	9
HI	3	3	1	1	4	22	12	39
D	2	6	6	5	1	25	20	34
L	45	55	38	51	27	6	216	3
N	23	12	16	17	13	14	81	16
A	5	1	2	0	5	21	13	38
۲S	12	23	11	10	15	15	71	19
<u>(Υ</u>	39	26	20	13	74	1	172	5
A	11	20	14	18	12	15	75	17
ИЕ	4	2	2	3	3	23	10	37
4D	5	18	11	5	10	16	49	24
1 <u>0</u>	15	7	8	3	10	10	45	25
4I	21	23	29	8	25	7	106	11
	4	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	29	[
1N		4		8	8	18	32	31
<u>1S</u>	1	6	4	5	20	11	36	29
<u>10</u>	23	36	15	15	12	15	101	12
<u>4T</u>	2	0	2	2	2	24	8	42
<u>1E</u>	5	3	0	1	2	24	11	40
<u>۷۷</u>	7	16	15	13	6	20	57	21
٩H	6	6	4	1	2	24	19	35
۱ <u>၂</u>	21	17	12	8	5	21	63	20
۱ <u>M</u>	9	10	13	15	6	20	53	23
<u>۷۲</u>	25	30	21	24	23	9	123	7
1C	31	20	20	10	9	17	90	14
۷D	1	0	1	3	1	25	6	43
)H	28	26	24	19	12	15	109	10
)K	21	32	18	13	13	14	97	13
)R	10	1	6	9	13	14	39	28
Ά	36	39	22	50	52	3	199	4
	7	1	3	1	1	25	13	38
5C	10	7	10	5	13	14	45	25
5D	4	3	0	6	10	16	23	33
N	37	19	21	20	25	7	122	8
X	85	104	90	63	68	2	410	1
JT	6	6	9	3	5	21	29	32
7T	5	1	4	4	5	21	19	35
/A		16	16	18	12	15		15
		·			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			15
VA	27	14	10	16	21	10	88	+
VV		15	8	8	12	15	54	22
VI	8	4	4	12	15	13	43	26
VY	3	3	1	3	7	19	17	36
¥UAM	0	0	1	0	0	26	1	45
UERTO RICO	0	2	1	0	0	26	3	44
/IRGIN ISLANDS	0	0	0	0	0	26	0	46
TOTAL	828	879	740	684	769		3900	1.


TABLE XXI.—POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVES RECOVERED BY STATE BY
YEAR, 1985–89 (TOTAL IN POUNDS)

				[89	5-Y	EAR
STATE	1985	1986	1987	1988		RANK	TOTAL	RANK
AL	167	46	2,691	136	1,306	5	4,346	11
AK	0	754	2	0	0	41	756	33
AZ	1,126	112	188	91	220	21	1,737	23
AR	853	201	1,159	1,828	758	11	4,799	10
CA	174	694	1,038	455	1,085	6	3,446	14
CO	66	119	54	32	575	14	846	32
CT	16	802	159	43	4	38	1,024	28
DE	4	0	0			41	4	50
DC		0	0	0	0	41		52
	1,278				67	28		
FL	<u>1,278</u> 569	1,162	3,192	3,190		28	8,889	3
GA	<u>509</u>	320	201	2,113	1,008		4,211	12
HI	11	0	0	0	0	41	11	49
ID		11	579	77	1	40	678	37
IL	1,278	570	279	302	18	36	2,447	17
<u>IN</u>	584	199	206	211	41	32	1,241	26
IA	9	0	330	0	401	15	740	34
KS	310	1,463	173	83	164	23	2,193	19
<u>KY</u>	5,738	910	1,918	921	1,938	3	11,425	2
<u>LA</u>	201	265	232	120	60	29	878	31
<u>ME</u>	76	9	0	17	55	30	157	45
<u>MD</u>	0	50	169	30	2	39	251	41
MA	5	139	1	0	0	41	145	46
MI	222	758	59	177	581	13	1,797	22
<u>MN</u>	52	8	485	69	1,618	4	2,232	18
MS	1	258	52	32	351	17	694	36
MO	637	552	201	4,946	79	27	6,415	7
MT	0	0	3	280	36	33	319	38
NE	168	8	0	0	1	40	177	44
NV	203	207	211	91	229	20	941	29
NH	3	19	200	0	1	40	223	43
NJ	48	8	37	141	0	41	234	42
NM	9	142	2,559	467	736	12	3,913	
NY	165	72	296	35	149	25	717	35
NC	1,083	322	345	170	259	19	2,179	20
ND	2	0	0.0	250	0	41	252	40
0H	1,935	613	198	1,996	915	9	5,657	. 9
OK	248		502	1,990	12	37	·	21
	837	1,396 2		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			2,165	
<u>OR</u>			6	63	372	16	1,280	25
PA	889	1,931	208	2,996	881	10	6,905	6
RI	5	0	23	0	0	41	28	48
SC	806	121	18	65	26	35	1,036	27
SD	71	9	0	8,116	200	22	8,396	4
TN	2,456	3,032	827	1,009	931	8	8,255	5
<u>TX</u>	4,202	3,075	1,537	1,930	2,174	2	12,918	. 1
<u>UT</u>	161	160	382	94	5,105	1	5,902	8
<u>VT</u>	855	0	50	0	0	41	905	30
<u>VA</u>	1,037	24	63	63	180	24	1,367	24
WA	503	1,722	204	74	279	18	2,782	16
WV	1,715	880	301	178	44	31	3,118	15
WI	138	8	52	78	29	34	305	39
WY	2	16	0	0	102	26	120	47
GUAM	0	0	0	0	0	41	0	52
PUERTO RICO	0	1	0	0	0	41	1	51
VIRGIN ISLANDS	0	0	0	0	0	41	0	52
TOTAL	30,928	23,170	21,390	32,976	22,993		131,457	

TABLE XXII.—NUMBER OF DETONATORS RECOVERED BY STATE BY YEAR, 1985–89

	1985	1000	1987	1000	19	89	5-Y	EAR
	1999	1986	1987	1988		RANK	TOTAL	RANK
AL	74	183	1,038	6,385	229	18	7,909	5
AK	0	4	5	0	0	35	9	50
AZ	44	12	6	0	52	25	114	43
AR	94	83	255	469	747	7	1,648	16
CA	196	1,014	177	618	833	6	2,838	12
CO	142	2	281	46	372	13	843	23
CT	34	397	18	5	1	34	455	29
DE	0	161	0	0	0	35	161	41
DC	0	17	0	0	0	35	17	48
FL	129	5	52	32	17	27	235	36
GA	24	428	674	1,266	601	10	2,993	11
HI	0	0	3	0	1	34	4	52
D	0	223	0	256	1	34	480	27
L	290	18	13	2,703	13	28	3,037	10
N	946	239	50	543	64	24	1,842	15
	261	2.39		045	04	35		
A	787		1,282			<u> </u>	1,543	18
(S		160	30	89	175	19	1,241	19
<u>(Y</u>	2,255	741	1,721	571	7,093	1	12,381	3
<u>A</u>	0	30	7	6	157	20	200	38
<u>4E</u>	125	3	0	0	5	32	133	42
<u>4D</u>	.0	228	1	0	0	35	229	37
<u>IA</u>	16	0	. 19	317	647	8	999	22
<u> </u>	63	2,634	42	263	250	16	3,252	9
ſ <u>N</u>	50	0	13	2	9	30	74	44
AS	1	111	4	45	286	14	447	30
40	2,049	736	83	2,584	26	26	5,478	7
ИТ	0	0	3	0	3	33	6	51
VE	10	0	0	0	0	35	10	49
NV	32	683	37	12	1	34	765	-24
NH	0	8	400	0	0	35	408	31
v]	15	1	3	0	1	34	20	46
NM	7	131	760	415	1,026	4	2,339	14
NY	168	98	13	110	3	33	2,000	33
VC	2,453	37	99	41	80	23	2,710	13
	2,400	0	0	374	0	35	374	32
<u>VD</u>								
)H	48	50	110	199	639	9	1,046	21
<u>)K</u>	188	56	87	153	12	29	496	26
)R	15	2	0	51	103	22	171	39
<u>A</u>	3,311	627	102	656	407	12	5,103	8
ξΙ	13	11	0	0	0	35	24	45
<u>sc</u>	12	10	39	105	0	35	166	40
SD	50	0	0	12,652	110	21	12,812	2
N	11,564	367	5,904	2,345	840	5	21,020	1
TX	2,588	1,367	1,138	1,466	2,545	2	9,104	4
JT	107	0	399	44	0	35	550	25
/T	0	0	199	41	0	35	240	35
/A	255	119	44	18	1,194	3	1,630	17
VA	1,029	5,858	0	56	473	11	7,416	6
vv	19	139	169	506	251	15	1,084	20
vI	107	0	320	39	8	31	474	28
VY	0	24	0	0	237	17	261	34
GUAM	0	240	19	0	<u>237</u> 0	35		47
PUERTO RICO	0	0	0	0	0	35	0	53
VIRGIN ISLANDS	0	0	0	0	0	35	0	53
TOTAL	29,571	17,017	15,619	35,389	19,512		117,108	

FIGURE X EXPLOSIVES RECOVERIES BY STATE FOR 1989




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Part IV SIGNIFICANT EXPLOSIVES INVESTIGATIONS





Random bombing of a vehicle that occurred on January 17, 1989, in Council Bluffs, Iowa. There were no injuries.



Arsenal of explosives recovered from a drug trafficker in Cumming, Georgia.

On April 9, 1989, two young boys were accidentally injured when a pipe bomb detonated at a farm in rural Sumter County, Georgia. The two boys were making a homemade cannon after having seen it done on two television programs. The device detonated when one of the boys struck the shotgun primer with a hammer. As a result of the detonation, one young boy lost parts of his right hand and sustained fragmentation wounds to his body. The other young boy's right arm and hand were shattered by the blast. He also sustained powder burns to his body.



On or about March 6, 1989, ATF initiated an investigation of an individual suspected of setting up a facility to illegally manufacture destructive devices. ATF had received information that the individual, who has a Ph.D. in electrical engineering and owns an electronics business, wished to supply certain devices to drug traffickers for protection of their products. After ATF's receipt of two improvised devices from the individual, he was arrested. Subsequently, a Federal search warrant was executed at his residence. There, investigators recovered smokeless powder, rocket ignitors, inert military ordnance, and a test device. The individual appeared before the U.S. magistrate and was detained. On April 12, 1989, a Federal grand jury indicted the individual on charges of manufacturing, possessing, and transferring unregistered destructive devices, to which he subsequently pled guilty in January 1990. On April 10, 1990, he was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment.

On December 28, 1989, an explosion occurred at a house trailer in Duncanville, Alabama. Two females occupied the trailer at the time of the explosion. As a result of the explosion, one woman, age 44, sustained burns over 70 percent of her body. She subsequently died on January 8, 1990. The other woman, age 26, sustained burns over 50 percent of her body, and she died on January 19, 1990, from complications stemming from her burns. ATF's joint investigation with the Tuscaloosa Police Department determined that the explosion was caused by the ignition of liquid propane gas that had settled in the lower interior of the house trailer. The gas was ignited when the 26-year-old lit a cigarette. Because of the unusual circumstances involved, investigators believe that this was not an accidental explosion, and as such, the investigation continues.




On August 16, 1977, in Dothan, Alabama, an 11year-old girl was killed when a pipe bomb she discovered on her porch exploded. As a result of the ATF investigation, the perpetrator was identified and convicted, and was sentenced to die in the electric chair. The perpetrator filed several appeals and received stays of execution in 1980 and 1985. On August 17, 1989, a Federal judge denied the perpetrator's last appeal, and on August 18, 1989, the perpetrator was executed. In his last appeal, the perpetrator, who had always maintained his innocence, admitted to placing the bomb. He stated that he had not intended to kill or harm but rather had intended to scare the child's mother. The mother had dated the perpetrator in 1977 until she learned that he was married, at which time she broke the relationship off.

On March 10, 1989, a hand grenade that was being carried in an individual's front pants pocket detonated, killing him instantly. The victim's girlfriend lost her right hand as a result of the blast. The two victims were traveling by car through Norris, South Carolina, with two other individuals when the blast occurred. Neither of these individuals was injured. The victim's girlfriend, when questioned by the authorities, stated that they were enroute to Clemson, South Carolina, to scare an individual. It is believed that the victim's scare attempt was related to a bad drug deal.

★

On September 13, 1989, in Merrillville, Indiana, a bomb exploded in a vehicle, killing its occupant. The explosion completely destroyed the truck and most of the component parts of the device, which is believed to have been constructed from a metal pipe. Witnesses reported seeing the victim lying on the ground about 25 feet from the vehicle. Investigators believe that the victim either had crawled out from inside the vehicle or had been blown from the vehicle. Investigative efforts by ATF; the Merrillville Police Department; the FBI; the U.S. Labor Department; the bomb and arson squads from the Hammond and Gary, Indiana, Police Departments; and the Lake County and Porter County, Indiana, Sheriff's Offices have not developed any suspects. Investigators suspect, however, that the explosion was connected to the victim's recent election to the position of secretary-treasurer of a labor union in Valparaiso, Indiana. Reportedly, the campaign was highly emotional, and several threats had been directed at the victim. The investigation continues.



On January 31, 1990, a defendant, the ex-president of a local mine workers union, was convicted on charges of possessing an unregistered destructive device and maliciously using explosives to damage a vehicle used in interstate commerce. The defendant's conviction stems from an indictment rendered after his arrest on October 17, 1989. His arrest followed confessions from three other miners who participated with him in an October 6, 1989, vehicle bombing at a mine in Industry, Illinois. Investigators from ATF, the Illinois State Police Division of Criminal Investigations, and the McDonough County Sheriff's Department determined that the motive behind the bombing stemmed from the vehicle owner's nonunion activities.

On October 25, 1989, the National Response Team responded to Conneaut, Ohio, to assist in an investigation of two separate explosions that occurred in a residential neighborhood on October 24. The explosions killed 2 people and injured 17 others, some seriously. In addition to the deaths and injuries, 56 homes and businesses were damaged, and 7 homes were destroyed. The damages total \$1.5 million. The

ensuing investigation by ATF, the Conneaut Police and Fire Departments, and the Ashtabula County Sheriff's Department revealed that the explosions were caused by an illegal M-80 explosive device manufacturing operation. The manufacturing operation was situated in a two-story frame house and detached garage that belonged to one of the deceased. Investigators determined that the northwest corner of the garage was the seat of the first explosion. Evidence recovered there revealed that as much as 500 pounds of explosive chemicals was involved in the explosions. The seat of the second blast was in the northwest corner of the basement where the finished products were stacked in boxes awaiting removal and storage. The perimeter of the blast scene was littered with M-80 and M-1000 casings, most of which were filled with explosive powder. After removing the debris surrounding the scene, investigators recovered additional evidence of the illegal operation, including three industrial-type glue guns; approximately \$16,000 in U.S. currency; records, receipts, and documents, some bearing suspected aliases; cardboard tubes; and chemicals. The investigation also led the investigators to Erie, Pennsylvania, where the deceased manufacturer had two storage bins. The bins contained approximately 10,000 pounds of potassium perchlorate, sulfur, and aluminum powder as well as 434 10-pound boxes of completed M-80's having a street value of approximately \$500,000.

★

On July 13, 1989, three children broke into the facilities of a federally licensed fireworks manufacturer located between Cleveland and Youngstown, Ohio. The children removed two cases of Class B explosives and took them to a nearby residence where they were joined by three other children. They were setting the explosives off when a quantity of them accidentally detonated, killing a 13-year-old and an 8-year-old. A third child, age 7, lost an arm. The three children who committed the theft were not injured. The Portage County Sheriff's Office and the Summit County Bomb Squad responded and took custody of the remainder of the explosives.

*

On January 30, 1989, police officers from the Lawton, Oklahoma, Police Department made a traffic stop in relation to a domestic disturbance that had occurred earlier at a nearby residence. The driver of the vehicle was reported to be the ex-boyfriend of the complainant who resided at the residence. As one officer exited the patrol car and approached the vehicle, he observed a male subject exit the vehicle. The male subject was beligerent toward the officers, stating that he had dynamite and explosives and was going to "blow them up." At that point, one of the officers noted that the subject had several wires and a battery in his hands. The subject then moved toward the officer and detonated the device by connecting the wire to the battery. The police officer sustained minor injuries; the male subject sustained shrapnel wounds to his abdomen and groin and burns around his neck. ATF agents and

Lawton police officers conducted a search of the male subject's residence. There, the investigators found components similar to those used by the subject to detonate the device. On March 17, 1989, the male subject pled guilty to the charge of assault and battery with intent to kill, and was sentenced to 20 years in the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.

*

On November 3, 1989, in Garden City, Michigan, an explosion occurred in an automobile, killing the occupant. Evidence collected at the scene by ATF, the Garden City Police Department, and the Michigan State Police revealed that the device causing the explosion had been a pipe bomb. Subsequent investigation revealed that the victim's wife was having an extramarital affair. Consequently, the wife and her boyfriend became principal suspects in the bombing. Interviews with the boyfriend led to the execution of a search warrant at his residence and his father's. Evidence seized included wire, tape, an M-180 explosive device, suspected gun powder, cut-up shotgun shells, and clothing similar to those worn by a person seen near the scene prior to the explosion. Laboratory personnel later determined that the wire taken from the boyfriend's residence matched the wire fragments collected at the bombing site. Laboratory personnel also determined that hair found on masking tape used to construct the bomb matched that taken from the boyfriend's dog. In addition, investigator's determined that the wife had the victim's car on the evening prior to the bombing and that the boyfriend had done some "mechanical" work on the vehicle before the wife returned home with the vehicle. Based on this evidence, ATF agents and Garden City police officers arrested the victim's wife and her boyfriend on charges of firstdegree murder.



47

In January 1989, ATF and DEA joined in an investigation initiated by the Detroit Police Department. The investigation involved the bombing of a police officer's personal vehicle. The bombing was committed in connection with the officer's investigation of a narcotics operation. Investigators identified and arrested the individual who bombed the officer's car. Arrested on charges of possessing an unregistered destructive device, the individual was subsequently sentenced to 3 years in the custody of the Attorney General and 3 years of probation. The investigators also developed information on a clerk at the Detroit Police Department who was illegally supplying information to this individual. Further investigation led to the execution of a search warrant at a residence used in the drug operation. Incident to the execution of the search warrant, investigators arrested two individuals. Judicial action against the clerk and these individuals is pending.

×

On August 8, 1989, a young woman from Ann Arbor, Michigan, was severely injured when a homemade pipe bomb detonated on the playground of an elementary school. The victim was walking through the playground when the device exploded. Her purpose there is not known. The victim is reported to have been approximately 213 feet from the device when it detonated. As a result, she sustained severe head injuries and was not expected to live. A young man, also from Ann Arbor, was taken into custody by local authorities shortly after the incident. He subsequently confessed to having made the device and placing it on the playground. It is believed that the device prematurely detonated. The young man was not injured from the blast, and he has not expressed any motive for setting the device.

×

On October 16, 1989, ATF agents arrested a convicted felon and known illegal drug trafficker on charges of illegally possessing explosives. The U.S. magistrate ordered him held without bond pending further investigation. Since January 1989, ATF, in conjunction with the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office, has investigated 11 bombings that have occurred around a predominantly Chaldean-American neighborhood on Detroit's north side. These bombings have resulted in injuries to five individuals. Evidence recovered during these investigations link the subject to these explosions, which appear to be part of a "turf war" between narcotics trafficking organizations. The subject allegedly is a member of one of these drug trafficking organizations. A blasting cap found at the subject's residence led investigators to an individual who allegedly supplied the subject with the explosives in exchange for drugs and cash. Between October 1988 and September 1989, this individual acquired 1,118 sticks of dynamite, 496 blasting caps, 449 feet of safety fuse, 241 feet of high explosive fuse, and 250 pounds of ANFO from a hardware store in Posen, Michigan. He has been ordered held without bond on drug charges pending further investigation.

On January 5, 1989, in El Paso, Texas, a pipe bomb

exploded, causing damage to a vehicle belonging to a

17-year-old. Investigators from ATF, the Naval Inves-

tigative Service, the El Paso Police Department, and

the El Paso Fire Department identified two individuals as suspects in the bombing. The brother of one of the suspects, a second-year midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, was also identified as a suspect. A fourth individual, an Air Force scholarship recipient at USC, was identified as a possible witness. On April 19, 1989, the investigators received a confession from the midshipman that his brother was involved in the bombing. A consent search of the midshipman's dorm room produced evidence that linked his brother to the explosion. On April 21, 1989, a Federal search warrant was executed at the residence of the midshipman's brother. There, the investigators recovered component parts similar to those used in the bomb. Indictments are pending.

*

On January 14, 1989, ATF received information that two individuals had high explosives for sale. During an undercover meeting, agents purchased samples of the explosives from the individuals and arranged to buy the whole cache of explosives from them. On January 19, agents from ATF and officers from the Bell County. Texas, Sheriff's Department met with the individuals and negotiated the sale of 28 1/2 cases of high explosives, for which the individuals were seeking approximately \$6,000. Consequently, the agents arrested the individuals and took custody of the explosives. Further investigation established that the explosives had come from a burglarized explosives storage facility belonging to a construction company near Belton, Texas. The individuals were subsequently charged with possession, transportation, and concealment of stolen explosives. Judicial action is pending.

\star

On April 15, 1989, an individual was arrested by Corpus Christi, Texas, police officers for reckless conduct after he was found in possession of five pipe bombs. Shortly before his arrest, the individual had approached a group of young children playing and had asked them for a match to "set off a bomb." He then proceeded to a nearby field where he detonated a pipe bomb. He then departed the area on foot. The mother of one of the children alerted the police, who subsequently located the individual and discovered that he possessed the five pipe bombs. The individual stated to the police that he was making the bombs in response to the anticipated efforts by authorities to ban assault weapons. Following their recovery of the pipe bombs, the police requested ATF assistance. ATF's subsequent investigation led to the execution of a search warrant at the individual's residence, where a large quantity of device components was recovered. The quantity recovered was sufficient to construct approximately 50 additional devices. On June 15, 1989, the individual pled guilty to charges of possessing unregistered destructive devices. He was subsequently sentenced on August 9, 1989, to 5 years' probation.




On October 22, 1989, a husband and wife were traveling by vehicle through rural Greene County, Missouri, when the vehicle exploded, killing the husband and critically wounding the wife. Only one witness was available to describe the explosion, and this was another motorist ahead of the victims' vehicle. The witness could not add any specific details other than that he heard an explosion and observed the vehicle go out of control. The explosion left a 1" x 8" x 10" crater in the asphalt. Large nails were embedded in the asphalt crater and scattered down the roadway as far as 150 feet. Nails were also embedded in the roof of the vehicle. The device had apparently been attached to the undercarriage of the vehicle, beneath the driver's seat. The initial investigation revealed that the victims were returning to their home in Florida after spending 2 days in the Kansas City, Missouri, area.

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On June 14, 1989, in Kansas City, Missouri, an information was filed against the foreman and the president and owner of the construction company that was at the site of the November 28, 1989, explosion that killed six Kansas City firefighters. The information charged them with failing to adhere to the table of distances for storage of explosive materials, storing high explosives in a magazine with metal tools, and acquiring explosives storage magazines without notifying ATF. On January 18, 1990, after a 2-week trial, the defendants were found guilty of the charges. The Kansas City Police Department and ATF investigated the incident.

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On February 24, 1989, in Bloomington, California, a bomb that had been placed on the fuel tank of a commercial vehicle exploded, killing the driver. The driver, an employee of an oil company, had been the target of an earlier truck bombing on November 29, 1988. The driver did not sustain any injuries from this explosion, which was initially investigated as an outburst stemming from an internal dispute that existed at the oil company. The investigation undertaken by ATF, the Rialto Police Department, and the San Bernadino Sheriff's Office after the second bombing revealed that the victim had experienced poor marital relations with his wife, who was involved in an extramarital affair. The investigators soon discovered that the roommate of the wife's lover had purchased smokeless powder at the lover's request and that the roommate Lad also assisted the wife's lover in manufacturing several pipe bombs. The roommate stated that the wife's lover had told him the device would be used for harassment purposes. The roommate's description of the devices was similar to the description of the device used in the second bombing. Subsequently, ATF agents and local officers executed a State search warrant at the residence of the wife's lover. There, the investigators seized evidence that linked the lover to the bombing, for which he was arrested and charged with murder. Federal explosives violations are pending.



On June 27, 1989, ATF responded to a scene where 10 Los Angeles, California, Police Department officers were injured as a result of two separate explosions that took place at a suspect's residence. The officers were executing a search warrant at the residence when the explosions occurred. Some of the officers were inside the dwelling when the first blast occurred. These officers sustained cuts, bruises, and hearing loss as a result of the blast. When they exited the building, the second blast occurred, injuring the remaining officers, who also sustained hearing loss. This investigation began when the suspect sought treatment for injuries that attending medical personnel thought were caused by explosives. This premise prompted the suspect's subsequent arrest and the execution of the search warrant.

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On July 20, 1989, a husband and wife returned to their residence in Terre Haute, Indiana. Upon their arrival, they found the front door of the residence slightly ajar. When they entered, they discovered an 8" x 8" x 8" package that had been wrapped in brown paper. The wife began to unwrap the package, and upon opening the lids, the package exploded. The wife sustained injuries to her left thigh and arm. Her husband sustained injuries to his left knee. Investigators from ATF and the Terre Haute Police Department determined that the second cardboard lid, when it was lifted, pulled a string that pulled a switch, causing the device to detonate. On July 26, 1989, a suspect was arrested on State charges of attempted murder and possession of a bomb. The arrest followed the execution of a search warrant at the suspect's residence. There, evidence was recovered that implicated the suspect in the bombing. The suspect had mailed the package to the husband, with whom he had had an altercation.



On October 9, 1989, the principal defendant in an explosives investigation was convicted in U.S. District Court, New Albany, Indiana. A jury found the defendant guilty of all 29 counts of his May 18, 1989, indictment on Federal explosives violations. The violations consisted of 14 counts of manufacturing unregistered explosive devices, 13 counts of using explosives to interfere with interstate commerce, 1 count of conspiracy, and 1 count of possessing stolen explosives. A codefendant was previously found guilty on September 5, 1989, of the same Federal violations. The violations stem from an indepth, 10-month joint investigation by ATF and the Indiana State Police into the July 5, 1988, detonation of 3 bombs and the recovery of 10 others in and around the town of Salem, Indiana. ATF's National Response Team played a significant role in this investigation. On December 8, 1989, the defendants were sentenced in U.S. district court. The principal defendant received a 15-year, 8-month prison term, and his codefendant received a 12-year prison term. Additionally, each man was fined \$1,450.

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On October 31, 1989, at Studebaker Park, Elkhart, Indiana, a 15-year-old girl was showing some of her friends how hair spray that had been sprayed onto their hands could be lit with a match and not cause any burns. One of the girl's friends, a 16-year-old male, introduced a small amount of flash powder to the open flame. The powder flamed up into the bottle of powder the 16-year-old was holding, which caused the bottle to explode. The explosion blew off the 16-year-old's hand at the wrist. A knuckle from his hand was blown through the hand of a friend who was creating the flame. This juvenile also sustained eye injuries and flash burns. The other juveniles observing the act suffered minor cuts, flash burns, and hearing loss. Investigators from ATF and the Elkhart City Police Department determined that the 16-year-old had stolen the flash powder from a Halloween pyrotechnic display at Elkhart. The juvenile was a volunteer at the display, which permitted easy access to the explosives used in the display.

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On April 17, 1989, a pipe bomb that had been placed on a merchandise shelf in a K-Mart store in Indianapolis, Indiana, exploded. The explosion injured a 4-yearold and her mother. The device, which was constructed within a pump-type dispenser of toothpaste, detonated when the 4-year-old randomly picked it up. The child sustained burns and injuries to her face, eyes, and abdomen. She also lost one hand. Her mother sustained minor fragmentation injuries to one leg. The preliminary investigation by ATF and the Marion County, Indiana, Sheriff's Office revealed that the device was constructed from a 1" x 5" metal pipe. The pipe, which contained black powder, was capped on both ends and had electrical wires connected to a battery. Investigators also believe that the device had a pressure switch mounted to its side, which when released by the little girl, caused the device to detonate. Investigative leads are being pursued at this time.

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On September 12, 1989, a suspect was arrested on charges of using explosives to destroy property used in interstate commerce. The charges stem from an investigation into an explosion that occurred at a bank in Sutton, West Virginia, on November 14, 1988. As a result of the explosion, the bank's executive vice president sustained serious head and chest injuries. Preliminary investigation by ATF, the West Virginia State Police, the West Virginia State Fire Marshal's Office, and the FBI revealed that the device, a pipe bomb containing smokeless powder, had been placed on the victim's desk sometime on November 13, 1988, when the bank was closed. The followup investigation centered on the suspect, a bank employee who had unlimited access to the bank. A search of the suspect's residence on November 16, 1988, revealed pipe wrenches that were identified later as those that had left the tool marks found on parts of recovered pipe. The suspect's apparent motive for the bombing revolved around his desire to be promoted to executive vice president. Judicial action is pending.

On February 25, 1989, ATF received information regarding an incendiary arson at a show management warehouse in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, on May 4, 1988.

A member of a local trade union relayed that he and an associate started the fire at the direction of the union business manager. The business, which provided services to trade shows and conventions in the southeastern United States, was owned and operated by an individual who refused to use union labor. The union member later relayed to ATF that he had received a 1-pound block of C-4 from the union business manager. who made incriminating statements regarding a plot to blow up the owner of the show management business and his warehouse. Additional conversations substantiated these statements. On March 23, 1989, the union member's associate and the union business manager were arrested. They were subsequently indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit a bombing, criminal solicitation, and attempted bombing of a facility used in interstate commerce. On November 9, 1989, the union business manager was convicted of all three charges, and was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment and 3 years' probation. The union member's associate pled guilty to all charges as well. He was sentenced to 57 months' imprisonment and 3 years' probation, and was ordered to pay \$60,000 in restitution.

On March 20, 1989, the Hillsborough County, Florida, Sheriff's Office requested ATF assistance regarding a detonation of a suspected destructive device and a recovery of an additional destructive device. The detonation occurred on March 19, 1989, when a 27year-old male attempted to throw a lit destructive device into the water and the device blew up in his hand. The sheriff's office recovered the second device from the victim's friend. Information obtained from the victim led investigators to the individual who supplied the devices to him and his friend. A subsequent consent search conducted at this individual's residence resulted in the recovery of fuses, electric squibs, a fireworks pamphlet, and two rolls of paper that contained thick cardboard spools identical to the cardboard casings in the destructive devices. This evidence and fingerprints obtained from the individual led to the filing of a criminal complaint on charges of manufacturing and transferring T-II destructive devices. The individual was arrested on March 31, 1989. Further judicial action is pending.

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On March 3, 1989, ATF received information that an individual, a convicted felon, had high explosives and detonating cord for sale. The person relaying this information told the agents that the explosives had been stolen from a storage trailer belonging to an explosives company in Nashville, Tennessee. This same person also informed the agents that he had participated in the theft. He subsequently led the agents to the location where he had hidden the explosives. Further investigation led to the indictment of the two individuals on charges of receiving, concealing, transporting, and storing stolen explosive materials. The one individual was also charged with the unlawful receipt of explosive materials by a convicted felon. He was later convicted and sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment. His partner was later convicted to 2 years' probation.

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On January 9, 1989, three individuals, one a juvenile, drilled a hole into the roof of a permanent explosives magazine and removed 430 pounds of explosives and seven rolls of detonating cord. On January 10, during the execution of a State search warrant for stolen property, the Benton, Arkansas, police found explosives in both the attic and a closet of a residence belonging to one of the individuals. ATF and an Army explosives ordnance disposal unit responded to the scene. On July 27, 1989, one individual pled guilty to conspiring to transport/conceal stolen explosives, for which he was sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment and 2 years' supervised probation. The second individual pled guilty to the same charges on September 14, 1989. His sentencing is pending.

On July 10, 1989, an 18-year-old male was severely injured while constructing explosive devices in the garage of his grandmother's house in Alexandria, Louisiana. The young man lost one finger and portions of his left hand, and he sustained shrapnel wounds to both legs. Subsequent to the explosion, ATF agents and Louisiana State police officers received consent to search the residence. They recovered six additional devices and three partially constructed devices. The devices were constructed of $1/4" \ge 15"$ electrical conduit that had been filled with flash powder and fused with cannon fuse. Apparently, the victim was drilling a fuse hole when the device detonated.


On July 19, 1989, four defendants were sentenced for their parts in the December 15, 1988, bombing of the LaFourche Parish sheriff and his deputy outside the Thibodaux Civic Center in Thibodaux, Louisiana. The explosion resulted in severe injuries to the sheriff's foot and fragmentation wounds to the deputy. All four defendants previously pled guilty to an indictment that charged them with solicitation to commit a crime of violence, conspiracy to possess a destructive device, possession of an unregistered destructive device, and use of explosives to damage property used in interstate commerce. The principal defendant was sentenced to 29 1/2 years' imprisonment. Of his three codefendants, one was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment, the second was sentenced to 19 1/2 years' imprisonment, and the third was sentenced 11 years' imprisonment. All four defendants still face attempted murder charges in State court. Investigative efforts by ATF, the LaFourche Parish Sheriff's Office, and the Thibodaux Police Department resulted in the successful prosecution of these defendants.



On July 7, 1989, ATF was contacted by the Guiderland, New York, Police Department and the New York State Police to report the discovery of unsecured and improperly stored fireworks and other explosives in an abandoned fireworks factory. This hazardous condition was discovered after neighborhood residents turned large fireworks in to the police that had been brought home by their children. The abandoned factory is part of property belonging to a licensed fireworks manufacturer. Investigators responded to the scene where several sheds, makeshift magazines, and vehicles were found containing thousands of pounds of fireworks, black powder, flash powder, chemicals, and other explosives. A recent inspection of two explosives magazines currently used by the manufacturer found him in compliance with Federal law. A subsequent investigation of the scene revealed additional sheds containing explosives. Deteriorated wooden barrels of picric acid and other barrels of chemicals were also found. The buildings on the property were unlocked and the roofs of some had fallen in, exposing the explosives and chemicals to the outside elements. In a period of 10 days, the hazardous devices, chemicals, and explosive materials were removed from the scene and destroyed. Investigative efforts continue.

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On April 26, 1989, a Marion County, West Virginia, deputy was seriously injured when a bomb exploded while he was investigating an abandoned vehicle that had been reported stolen. A towing service employee who had been dispatched to assist the deputy was also injured. On April 27, the NRT responded to the scene to assist investigators from the Worthington, West Virginia, Police Department. Consequently, evidence recovered at the scene and information obtained during interviews led investigators to the suspects. The investigators had determined that the owner of the vehicle had previously been involved in a high-speed chase with the Farmington Police Department because of a traffic violation. He eluded the police officers and abandoned the vehicle in order to escape on foot. The abandoned vehicle was subsequently recovered and impounded by the Worthington Police Department. The vehicle owner and his brother located the vehicle,




broke into the impound lot, and stole the vehicle. They first rigged the vehicle with a bomb that would explcde when the door was opened and then abandoned the vehicle on a highway with the intention of blowing up a police officer. The vehicle owner was arrested and charged with State explosives violations. His brother, a convicted felon, was charged with Federal firearms violations stemming from firearms recovered during the execution of a search warrant at his residence. Further judicial action is pending.

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On December 4, 1989, three defendants pled guilty to charges stemming from a 20-count indictment on Federal explosives violations. Included among the charges was the illegal sale, transportation, and concealment of stolen explosives. The charges stem from a 7-month investigation conducted by ATF and the Wyomissing, Pennsylvania, Police Department into a January 4, 1989, explosives theft. Much of the stolen explosives, approximately \$5,000 worth, was subsequently recovered during a search that was incident to the arrest of one of the defendants. The defendants are associated with a radical group known as the Skinheads. Sentencing is scheduled for early 1990.

On December 8, 1989, a suspect was indicted on charges of possessing an unregistered destructive device and making telephonic bomb threats. The indictment follows the suspect's arrest on November 13, 1989, after he confessed to his involvement in the manufacture and placement of a pipe bomb. The arrest was made as a result of a joint investigation by ATF, the FBI, and the Auburn, California, Police Department. The suspect, a bomb technician and 15-year veteran investigator with the California State Fire Marshal's Office, had manufactured a pipe bomb, placed it on the roadway near his residence, and anonymously called crisis intervention services to report the device. Along with local police and fire units, he responded to the scene and disarmed the device. It appears that the suspect had not intended to injure anyone but had wanted to be seen as a hero for disarming the device.

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On May 15, 1989, the principal defendant in an explosives case pled guilty to dealing in explosives without a license and selling stolen explosives. He was subsequently sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release. Of his three codefendants, one is awaiting sentencing, one was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment and 3 year's supervised probation, and one was sentenced to 3 years' supervised probation. The sentences stem from an investigation that was initiated after ATF received information that two of the defendants were in possession of a large quantity of explosives. These explosives were allegedly part of a 350-pound explosives theft from a mine in rural Boulder County, Colorado. Subsequent undercover purchases of some of the explosives resulted in the arrests of the individuals and the recovery of the remaining explosives. The Boulder County Sheriff's Office, and the Longmont, Fort Collins, and Commerce City, Colorado, Police Departments also participated in this investigation.

On July 26, 1989, two local drug dealers asked an undercover Pike County, Missouri, deputy sheriff to assist in the murder of the Pike County sheriff. The two men felt that the sheriff's enforcement of the State and Federal narcotics laws was interfering with their illegal drug business. In retaliation, they decided to blow up the sheriff in his official vehicle to set an example for other law enforcement officers in the area. Conse-

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quently, ATF assistance was requested. Tape recordings were made of the men planning the murder and devising how the device would be constructed, wired to the sheriff's vehicle, and detonated. A device was assembled and was subsequently recovered as evidence. On July 30, 1989, the two men were arrested and charged in State court with conspiracy to commit murder and to distribute narcotics. Federal conspiracy, firearms, and explosives charges are pending.



On January 4, 1989, an explosion resulted in the complete destruction of a 2-ton grain truck in rural East Prairie, Missouri. ATF conducted the crime scene search and determined that a pipe bomb caused the explosion. During the followup investigation, agents from ATF and officers from the Mississippi County, Missouri, Sheriff's Department uncovered the sources of all the component parts of the pipe bomb. Further investigation led the investigators to three suspects. During subsequent interviews, the suspects admitted to their involvement in the bombing. They also admitted to making and detonating two other devices at another location earlier on January 4. The investigators arrested the three individuals on January 24, 1989. They subsequently pled guilty in State court, and were each sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment and 5 years' probation.

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On August 4, 1989, a defendant was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder and 5 years' imprisonment for reckless endangerment. The sentences are to be served consecutively. The sentencing follows a 4-day jury trial in which the jury determined that the defendant was guilty of possessing and detonating a destructive device in his pickup truck. The explosion resulted in injuries to a pedestrian passer-by and damages to 60 parked vehicles. The defendant's motive for detonating the device was to kill the pedestrian. The defendant had been stalking him for several months, having previously alleged that the pedestrian had molested his children. The efforts of the Green Bay, Wisconsin, Police and Fire Departments, ATF, and the Brown County Sheriff's Department resulted in the successful conclusion of this investigation.

On June 12, 1989, five defendants pled guilty to violations of the Federal explosives laws. As a result of their guilty pleas, the defendants were each ordered to serve 2 years on probation and 3 months at a community treatment center. They were also ordered to pay restitution of \$1,035 and a fine of \$2,000. The sentencings stem from an investigation into the defendants' theft of 327 pounds of explosives and 394 blasting caps from a storage magazine in Kenmare, North Dakota. The defendants were also involved in two bombings of vacant farmhouses during the fall of 1988. This investigation involved the efforts of several law enforcement agencies, including ATF; the U.S. Border Patrol; the U.S. Air Force Security Police; the North Dakota Highway Patrol; and the Minot, Marshall, and Kenmare Police Departments.



On January 5, 1990, the second of two defendants was sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release on charges of possessing an unregistered destructive device. His codefendant was previously sentenced on December 1, 1989, to 9 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised probation on charges of possessing an unregistered destructive device and conspiring to commit civil rights violations. The sentences stem from the defendants' arrest on May 4, 1989, for possessing a pipe bomb. A subsequent search of one of the defendant's residence produced components to make 11 more pipe bombs. The defendants had intended to use the pipe bomb to intimidate the Chippewa Indians, with whom resort owners and others in Solon Springs, Wisconsin, have been having a dispute.

On August 8, 1989, the principal defendant in a bombing investigation received a 15-year mandatory sentence for being an armed career criminal and a 5year mandatory sentence for conspiracy. The court also imposed a 5-year period of supervised release. The defendant, an escapee from the Oregon penal system, acted in concert with three other individuals to commit a series of robberies/bombings at AM/PM mini-markets in the greater Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon, areas. In addition, the subjects of this investigation committed three other armed robberies, one of which was directed at a federally insured bank. The AM/PM store safes were blown open by pipe bombs that had been dropped into the night deposit slots of the safes. The resulting explosion forced the door open. The coordinated investigative effort between ATF; the Everett, Seattle, and King County, Washington, Police Departments; and the Washington County and Portland, Oregon, Police Departments resulted in the sucessful arrest and prosecution of the subjects.

On January 1, 1990, mining operation officials and labor union representatives reached a tentative settlement after a 9-month labor dispute in southwest Virginia, southern West Virginia, and eastern Kentucky. The dispute began on April 5, 1989, when negotiations involving employee benefits broke down. The labor union set up picket lines at all coal-producing operations of two large coal companies located in Virginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky. When the coal companies continued operations by using supervisors and replacement workers, the picketers resorted to civil disobedience tactics. The picketers also used bombings and arsons to destroy mine-owned property and utilityowned property. These arsons and bombings were also directed at the personal property of supervisors and replacement workers to further intimidate the mine operators. Most of the violations were in violation of the Federal explosives laws. Consequently, on August 28, 1989, ATF established task forces in Bristol, Virginia, and Charleston, West Virginia. A total of 22 special agents from eight district offices made up the task forces. The State police organizations agreed to concentrate on crimes against persons, while ATF agreed to pursue arson/explosives incidents that merited Federal involvement. As a result, ATF's task forces inherited 15 investigations that were initiated by the State police organizations. The task forces also inherited 27 investigations that ATF initiated at the outset of the violence, but prior to the formation of the task forces. Property damage alone for these investigations was estimated at \$3.1 million. The task forces' initial analysis indicated that a significant bombing/arson occurred on an average of every 1.3 weeks. The task forces' cumulative efforts during the course of the investigation resulted in 29 perfected cases involving 30 defendants. Eleven of these cases were explosives related. Not only did the task forces meet with investigative success statistically, they also demonstrated ATF's commitment to assisting State and local law enforcement and fostering cooperation within the Federal criminal justice community.

On March 26, 1989, a pipe bomb exploded on the outside wall of an occupied residence in Germantown, Maryland. No injuries were reported; however, the targeted residence and several others sustained minor property damage. The ensuing investigation identified a suspect who had been manufacturing bombs since October 1987. Investigators also determined that the suspect had been ordering chemicals for manufacturing the explosives since June 1988. On April 27, 1989, ATF assisted the Montgomery County, Maryland, Fire Marshal's Office and the Maryland State Explosives Ordnance Disposal Team in their execution of a search warrant and their arrest of the suspect at his residence in Germantown. Seized pursuant to the warrant were explosive chemicals, galvanized pipe, and fuse. Additional items seized included a homemade rocket launcher, a formula for solid rocket fuel, and numerous







computer disks. These disks were for an extensive computer bulletin board for bomb makers, the subscribers for which possibly totaled 1,200. The suspect and three other individuals monitored and updated the computer programs, which included sources for bomb components and formulas for explosives that are the most suitable for specific targets. Subsequent to the search, the suspect and his cohort, the individual who planted the bomb, were arrested and charged with destruction of property by explosives, a State charge that carries up to life imprisonment. The suspect, a juvenile, was arrested as a adult. Under Maryland law, a juvenile can be charged as an adult for using explosives to destroy property that is occupied. He later agreed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, manufacturing a destructive device, which is punishable by up to 20 years in prison. On January 6, 1989, the suspect was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. The suspect's cohort is awaiting trial.

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On February 23, 1989, a suspect was arrested and charged with the interstate transportation of explosives with the intent to kill. The charge stems from an investigation by ATF, the Fairfax County, Virginia, Fire Marshal's Office, and the Maryland State Fire Marshal's Office into a residential bombing in Herndon, Virginia, on February 20, 1989. The light switch for an upstairs bathroom had been rigged to activate a pipe bomb. Despite substantial structural damage, the victim sustained only a superficial cut. The victim of the bombing revealed that he had been involved in an ongoing domestic dispute with the suspect concerning the victim's ex-wife. Allegedly, the suspect had threatened the victim's ex-wife to have her husband killed. The suspect, who was arrested in Maryland, was transported to Virginia where he was arraigned on February 24, 1989. On March 22, 1989, the suspect was indicted on charges of the interstate transportation of explosives with intent to kill and the malicious damage of property used in interstate commerce.




An explosive device that was recovered during the investigation of an explosion in the ventilation system of a mine in Fayette County, West Virginia. The device, which consisted of 51 sticks of high explosives, an alarm clock, a battery, and detonators, was recovered at a power transformer station at the mine. This investigation was one of multiple investigations conducted by the Coal Field Task Force in 1989.



Pipe bombing of a home-built aircraft that occurred on August 10, 1989, in Miami, Florida.

Part V PROGRAM INITIATIVES





Results of an explosion and fire that occurred on April 6, 1989, in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. The explosion and fire were caused by an illegal explosive device manufacturing operation. The manufacturer of the explosives was killed in the explosion.



A vehicle destroyed by an explosion that occurred on March 10, 1989, in San Diego, California.



EXPLOSIVES INTERDICTION

Familiar targets of ATF's enforcement actions are the manufacturers and distributors of illegal destructive devices such as M-80's. ATF has been conducting such investigations since the passage of the explosives laws promulgated in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.

In 1984, after a careful assessment of the threat to public safety posed by the unregulated production of these devices, ATF initiated its Illegal Explosives Interdiction Project. Investigations monitored under the project were directed at the disruption of the illegal and/or unsafe practices of the manufacturers and distributors of M-80's and like devices. Efforts were also directed at educating the public on the hazards presented by the explosives. As part of the first initiative, ATF joined with other Federal and State law enforcement agencies to form a special task force. The task force applies its knowledge of explosives licensing laws and regulations and the explosives materials distribution system to identify the receiver of the explosive materials used in the manufacture of illegal devices. In support of the second initiative, ATF conducted vigorous public awareness campaigns, using local law enforcement authorities and the media to impress upon the public the seriousness of these explosives. These efforts have had a positive effect. In 1989, 54 cases involving 73 defendants were perfected, and approximately 600,000 illegal explosive devices and 55,000 pounds of raw chemicals were seized. Nonetheless, there appears to be an increase in the activity in the illegal explosive device market. Providing the impetus to this increase is the profitability of the illicit operations involved. Law enforcement authorities liken this profitability to that experienced by drug traffickers.

Lessening the profitability of these illicit operations is only one matter of contention for the law enforcement community—lessening the destruction and devastation is yet another. The full impact of this destruction and devastation can be seen in the statistics for 1989. Two explosions alone resulted in 3 deaths, 19 injuries, and over \$1.5 million damage. Such is the consequence of a lack of understanding as to the dangers involved with these explosives.

Clearly, the interdiction of illegal explosive devices has posed a challenge to both the law enforcement and the regulatory communities. This challenge can be met, however, if enforcement agencies at all levels unite to attack the growing problem. Narratives highlighting ATF's efforts in this regard follow.

ATF initiated an investigation of an individual who, along with his wife, was illegally selling M-80's and M-1000's from his home in Vermont. The husband and wife team were also dealing in Class B and C explosives. From January 3 to February 21, 1989, the couple sold 765 M-100's and M-1000's to an ATF undercover agent. On March 16, 1989, ATF and the Vermont State Police executed a Federal search warrant at the couple's residence. Recovered during the search were approximately 1,500 illegal explosive devices, \$6,840 cash, records, and written instructions on how to manufacture the devices. The State police seized 2 1/2 truckloads of Class C fireworks valued at a street price of \$100,000. The couple was subsequently arrested. Further investigation revealed that the couple received some of the explosive materials and illegal devices from federally licensed dealers in New York and Ohio. As a result of this information, the investigation was expanded in an effort to identify a multistate conspiracy involving explosives licensees. Two licensees, one in New York and one in Ohio were named as principals. During the course of the investigation, both licensees sold illegal explosive devices to undercover agents. On April 26, 1989, investigators executed Federal search warrants at the licensees' premises. Recovered during the search were approximately 536,000 M-80's, M-100's, and M-1000's, miscellaneous fuses, tubes, other components, and business records. The approximate wholesale value of the devices seized is \$70,000. The investigation continues.

On June 1989, the Loveland, Colorado, Police Department executed a State search warrant at the residence of a suspect in Loveland. The suspect is a licensed manufacturer of high explosives. The warrant, however, was based on information that the suspect was illegally manufacturing fireworks. Upon entering the residence, the officers discovered an illegal fireworks manufacturing operation that was extremely hazardous. The police department contacted ATF and requested assistance in the investigation. The investigation determined that the suspect was also manufacturing special fireworks at three mini-warehouses located in Loveland. Consent searches conducted at the three warehouse sites revealed hundreds of pounds of black powder and other dangerous chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives. The investigation continues.

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On October 11, 1989, ATF agents, in conjunction with investigators from the Wichita, Kansas, Police and Fire Departments, the Kansas Highway Patrol, the Sedgwick County Fire Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Customs Service, executed two Federal search warrants at the properties of an unlicensed explosives dealer in Wichita. Approximately 86,000 illegal Class B explosive devices, labeled as "ground bombs," were found. These explosives were in the process of being labeled as Class C fireworks. Twenty tons of Class C fireworks and approximately 149 cases of safety fuse were also recovered during the search. All total, the Class B explosives and the Class C fireworks have an estimated value of more than \$1 million.

On November 11, 1989, ATF agents in Avion, Ohio, assisted State parole officers and local police in the search of a storage facility belonging to a parolee. The parole officer had received information from the Cleveland Police Department's Intelligence Unit that the parolee had drugs, bombs, and firearms stored at the storage unit. The parole officer requested assistance from ATF and a local bomb squad after being told about the illegal explosive devices. The subject was on parole for a prior murder conviction. The parole officers used their inspection authority to enter and search the parolee's storage facility. As a result of the search, the authorities seized narcotics; 4 firearms; 15,000 unfinished M-80's, M-100's and M-1000's; 5 bombs; 2,000 finished explosive devices; 175 pounds of assorted explosive chemicals; and a 10,000-foot roll of fuse and cap wire. During the search, the parolee unexpectedly appeared at the scene, and a chase ensued that ended with his arrest.

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On December 20, 1989, ATF agents and West Bloomfield, Michigan, police officers executed a Federal search warrant at the home of an individual who had been selling illegal explosive devices out of his automobile. Investigators recovered 144 M-80 type devices during the search. The individual cooperated with the investigators and provided information about another individual who was also selling large amounts of illegal explosive devices in the Detroit area. On December 21, 1989, the investigators, who were now joined by police officers from the Warren Police Department and the Plymouth Township Police Department, executed a Federal search warrant at this individual's residence. There, the investigators recovered 288 M-500 type devices. Additional Class C explosives were taken into custody by the Warren Police Department.

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On June 26, 1989, ATF and the Montgomery County, Maryland, Fire Marshal's Office culminated an explosives investigation with the arrest of two subjects in Burtonsville, Maryland. The undercover investigation involved the purchase of a large quantity of explosive devices referred to as "quarter sticks." As a result of the arrests, additional information was developed which led to the execution of a search warrant and the arrest of an additional subject at a State and federally licensed fireworks manufacturer in Maryland. The undercover purchases and the seizure of the illegal explosive devices during the execution of the search warrant netted 68,000 explosive devices worth in excess of \$200,000. Administrative action has been initiated by the Maryland State Fire Marshal's Office to revoke the State license of the manufacturer.

On April 25, 1989, ATF was apprised by the Lawton, Oklahoma, Fire Marshal that an individual was conducting a clandestine explosives manufacturing operation in Lawton. ATF agents surveilled the location and observed the individual conducting the operation. A subsequent search of the premises, a rented warehouse, resulted in the recovery of 3,738 pounds of explosive devices, 65 pounds of explosive cylinders, component parts, tools, and machinery. Agents also conducted a search at the individual's residence, where additional explosive devices, device components, and explosive materials and chemicals were recovered. Concealed in a shed behind the residence were more chemicals and explosive devices. All total, the searches at the above locations resulted in a recovery of approximately 11,000 pounds of explosive devices and chemicals.

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On June 13, 1989, an individual was arrested after delivering a quantity of M-200's to an undercover agent. This was the fourth undercover purchase of explosives from the individual. During the course of the investigation, the individual delivered approximately 1,170 illegal devices to the agent. Following the arrest, agents conducted a consent search at the individual's residence and seized approximately 700 pounds of Class B and C explosives. The individual also identified his source for the explosives, at whose residence ATF subsequently conducted a consent search. There, the agents found a clandestine explosives manufacturing operation and seized approximately 200 pounds of Class B explosives components and finished devices, 100 pounds of illegal device components, and 200 pounds of completed illegal devices. In addition, the agents seized machinery used in the manufacture of the devices and documents relating to the suppliers of the device components. On September 18, 1989, the arrestee pled guilty to the felony charge of dealing in explosives without a license, for which he was sentenced to 3 years' probation and fined \$1,400. A portion of this fine will be used to reimburse the Government for the money spent to purchase the illegal devices from the arrestee. An indictment against the arrestee's source for the explosives is pending.

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These investigations began when ATF received a price list for fireworks and illegal M-500's and M-1000's from a company in Kent, Washington. Undercover contact with the general manager of the company led the agents to an individual, from whom they purchased M-1000's on two occasions. During both purchases, the agents instructed the individual to go to his supplier for additional products, surveilling him each time. Evidence developed against the supplier led to the execution of a search warrant at the supplier's place of business. There, the agents seized 13,000 pounds of illegal explosive devices, explosive chemicals, Class B and C explosives, and manufacturing machines. The agents also searched two storage lockers leased by the supplier. There, the agents seized 10,000 pounds of illegal explosive devices and explosive chemicals. The explosives seized from both locations were destroyed. The value of these explosives was estimated at \$500,000. On December 5, 1989, ATF agents and Auburn, Washington, police officers arrested the supplier without incident. He was transported to Seattle where he made his initial appearance before the U.S. magistrate and was released on \$15,000 bond.

Information developed during the course of the above investigation linked the supplier to another individual in Vancouver, Washington, who was involved in the manufacture and distribution of illegal explosive devices. Two undercover purchases of approximately 2,220 illegal explosive devices led to the execution of search warrants at three locations in Vancouver. There, the agents seized approximately 20,000 illegal explosive devices, which were subsequently destroyed. A third undercover purchase prompted the seizure of over 50,000 illegal explosive devices, two illicit manufacturing laboratories, 1,000 pounds of explosive chemicals, and 390,000 tubes. The agents also uncovered evidence of the ongoing conspiracy between this individual and the previously mentioned supplier and their large-scale manufacturing and distribution operation. Judicial action against both men is pending.

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On July 3, 1989, a suspect was arrested after he was caught selling illegal Class C explosives. This was the suspect's third arrest. Investigative efforts by ATF, the Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Office, and the Oakland Park Police Department had previously identified the suspect as a participant in an operation involved in the interstate manufacture/transportation/ distribution of a large volume of illegal explosive devices. Incident to the arrests, investigators recovered approximately 8,000 illegal explosive devices and thousands of pounds of Class C explosives. In cooperating with the investigators, the suspect identified a fireworks manufacturer in Illinois as his source for the explosives. It is anticipated that this manufacturer will be charged as the suspect's coconspirator. The suspect was released on a \$50,000 corporate surety bond.



ABORTION CLINIC INITLATIVES

Indicative of ATF's successes in its explosives enforcement efforts are those statistics memorializing ATF's investigation of explosives- and arson-related violence at abortion clinics. Since 1982, a total of 85 abortion-related bombings/arsons or attempted bombings/arsons have been investigated by ATF. Fifty-two of those investigations have successfully been concluded, and 38 defendants have been prosecuted. Twenty-nine of those convicted were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 18 months to 30 years.

The abortion issue will remain an emotionally charged one in the future. As such, ATF will continue its vigilant pursuit of any person or group that would jeopardize the lives and properties of others and violate the Federal explosives laws to promote its own cause. Highlighted below are recent successes in ATF's enforcement efforts with regard to abortion clinic violence.

On October 17, 1989, an ATF fugitive was arrested in New Caldwell, New Jersey, by ATF agents, New Caldwell police officers, and Fairfield, New Jersey, police officers. It is believed that at the time of her arrest, the fugitive was enroute to an abortion clinic in Fairfield, New Jersey, to attempt a second arson at the location in a 3-day period. The first arson attempt occurred during the early morning hours of October 14, 1989. The arson attempt resulted in only minor damage to the exterior of the building. Following her arrest, the subject appeared before a U.S. magistrate and was ordered held without bond. The subject was a fugitive as a result of a multiple-count indictment rendered in 1987 in Ohio. The indictment charged her with committing two abortion clinic arsons and making telephonic bomb threats. She was also being sought for bond jumping and for being a prime suspect in abortion clinic incidents in Pennsylvania and western Maryland. She was subsequently convicted in June 1988 of assaulting ATF agents during her October 1987 arrest on the charges stemming from her indictment. On November 2, 1989, the subject was indicted by a Federal grand jury in New Jersey on one count of attempting to set fire to the abortion clinic in Fairfield. On November 6, 1989, the subject was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on the assault charges. She still faces the Federal charges for the two abortion clinic arsons, the telephonic bomb threats, and the bond jumping. The New Jersey charges will be held in abeyance until the court activity in Ohio is completed.

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On December 1, 1989, a defendant was sentenced to 6 months' incarceration at the Federal Mental Institution in Rochester, New York. He was also sentenced to 3 years of probation, and was ordered to pay a fine of \$1,000 and to perform 100 hours of community service. The sentence follows the defendant's guilty plea to five counts of a 15-count indictment. The indictment charged the defendant with making a series of telephonic bomb threats to abortion clinics located in Florida and Texas. The defendant's motivation for making the threats developed as a result of his employment with his father's insurance company. There, the defendant learned that insurance companies were supplying coverage to abortion clinics. The defendant devised his plan in an effort to make the cost of clinic insurance prohibitive or unavailable. Efforts in conducting this investigation include those of ATF, the Texas Rangers, and the Victoria, Texas, Police Department.

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On December 29, 1989, a Planned Parenthood facility in Independence, Missouri, was firebombed, causing approximately \$100,000 in damages. There were no injuries. A joint investigation by ATF and the Independence Fire Department ensued. During the course of this investigation, an attempted arson occurred at an abortion clinic in Kansas City, Missouri. ATF assistance was again requested because of the similarity to the incident in Independence. Two juveniles observed at the scene in possession of jars of gasoline were questioned by ATF agents and a Kansas City police detective. The juveniles subsequently admitted to attempting the arson at the abortion clinic and firebombing the planned parenthood facility in Independence. They also admitted to vandalizing the facility prior to committing the firebombing. State juvenile charges for vandalism are being filed in Kansas, and Missouri authorities are contemplating adult felony charges in connection with the firebombing.



ARSON ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES

Combatting the crime of arson is an integral part of ATF's overall enforcement responsibilities. Congress defined ATF's jurisdictional role in the investigation of arson crimes with the passage of the Anti-Arson Act of 1982. This role is predicated on the fact that explosive materials are used to cause the fires. By fulfilling the congressional mandate "to protect interstate and foreign commerce. . .from the misuse and unsafe storage of explosives," ATF is confident that its investigative efforts will promote the Federal role in combatting arson crimes.

Statistically, ATF investigates only a small percentage of arsons that occur in the United States each year. While statistics on the total of incendiary and suspicious fires are not yet available for 1989, in 1988, the National Fire Protection Association reported 99,500 fires of incendiary and suspicious origin that caused \$1.6 billion in damage. By comparison, in 1989, ATF responded to 446 arson incidents that resulted in 49 deaths, 126 injuries, and \$326.3 million in property damage. ATF's arson efforts, however, have had a substantial monetary impact on the insurance industry and the general public. This year, it is estimated that the insurance industry has "saved" more than \$29.7 million as a direct result of effective law enforcement. The money has been saved in the sense that in the absence of these effective law enforcement efforts, the insurance industry could have potentially payed out that amount for arson-related crimes, thus creating a greater burden on the premium-paying general public and the national economy as a whole. Since 1980, these savings have amounted to \$382.4 million.

ATF's past and continuing efforts to combat arson crimes include the use of many investigative techniques, as follows:

Task Force Approach — Since 1982, ATF has spearheaded a drive to coordinate arson enforcement efforts among Federal, State, and local authorities. One of the most successful ways ATF has found to address and combat arson crimes is by pooling its talents and resources with those of State and local agencies in task forces to attack arson in those areas experiencing significant problems. ATF currently has 15 formal task forces in operation in the following cities: Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Newark, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Seattle, San Francisco, St. Paul, Kansas City, and Pittsburgh. Typically, each task force is comprised of three to five ATF special agents and at least two arson investigators from the local police and/or fire service agencies. Representatives from the U.S. attorney's office and prosecutors at the State and local level are also on the task force and are available for consultation during each step of the investigation. Traditionally, ATF has relied on the local investigators to provide cause and origin determinations and expert testimony on such, while having all other member agencies provide additional investigative talents and assist in other support areas. Recently, however, ATF initiated its own cause and origin training program to augment the assistance provided by its State and local counterparts. This cause and origin training, 2 years in length, encompasses formal instruction and field experience. Twenty-two ATF special agents have completed the training thus far, and 22 more are being trained.

Another valuable member of the task force is the auditor from ATF's Office of Compliance Operations. In the past, auditors were used primarily to assist in the collection of revenues from the alcohol and tobacco industries. As ATF's arson program grew, so, too, did the auditor's involvement, and their expertise in profitrelated arsons have proven very valuable. ATF's investigations of arson crimes are directed at significant incidents that involve profit-motivated schemes. A recent example of the task force approach to investigating an arson-for-profit scheme was the Michigan Joint Arson Task Force. Established in 1985, the task force investigated fire repair contractors in Detroit that solicited individuals to burn residences. In some instances, the arsonist was an employee of the fire repair contractor. The fire repair contractor would then retain the insurance proceeds for the cost of the repairs. At the conclusion of the task force operation in October 1989, a total of 160 incidents had been investigated, of which 27 cases involving 98 defendants were adjudicated. Total property damage resulting from the incidents was \$2,971,822.

Canine Arson Detection — ATF is constantly alert to the changing needs of law enforcement. In 1984, ATF conducted a feasibility study to determine the possibility of imprinting a dog with an accelerant odor in a simulated search. The results exceeded all expectations. Not only did the study demonstrate the dog's ability to discriminate between pyrolysis and accelerant odors, it also proved that a canine's olfactory abilities surpass that of a commercially developed detector. Following the success of the feasibility study, the Connecticut State Police Emergency Services Canine Unit, in conjunction with ATF and the Connecticut State Police forensic laboratories, agreed to train a dog to determine the effectiveness of the canine program and to identify additional training needs. As the training expanded, the dog was tested for its ability to detect flammable and combustible liquids in very small quantities under high dilution. The test showed that the dog could detect 20 petroleum odors ranging from kerosene to naptha. The dog's subsequent success in the field prompted a formal agreement between ATF, the Connecticut State Police, and the New Haven County State Attorney's Office to implement the Accelerant Detection Canine Program in Connecticut. The dog's performance has been so successful that her abilities have been applied beyond the actual fire scene search. These applications include the searching of suspect vehicles, clothing belonging to suspects, and containers handled by suspects. This unprecedented success generated considerable interest from law enforcement agencies throughout the United States and Canada, some of which have since duplicated the training program. Moreover, with the value of a canine as an aid in fire investigation proven, further examination of the investigative applications of canines is justified.

The following is a sampling of ATF's work in the area of arson investigation:

Harvey, Illinois. On May 15, 1989, a fire occurred at a restaurant, causing \$500,000 damage. An investigation ensued, and a suspect was developed. As a result of investigative efforts by ATF and the Harvey, Illinois, Police Department, the suspect (the owner of the restaurant) pled guilty to arson charges and was subsequently sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment. This case is significant because it was based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence.

Waco, Texas. On February 23 and April 5 and 6, 1989, fires were set at a chiropractic clinic in Waco, Texas. The fires caused damage in excess of \$450,000. The initial investigations conducted by ATF and the Waco Police and Fire Departments revealed inconsistencies in the financial statements of the clinic. Further investigation revealed that an employee of the clinic had endorsed checks to the clinic without authorization. Discrepancies in statements made by the employee in an interview prompted the execution of a search warrant at her residence. There, the investigators uncovered incriminating evidence, including a signature stamp, bank deposit records, and deposit envelopes. During a subsequent polygraph examination, the employee admitted to setting the fires in an attempt to cover up the fact that she had embezzled funds from the clinic. On October 6, 1989, the employee pled guilty to arson charges and was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised probation. She was also ordered to pay \$472,000 in restitution.


Miami, Florida. On December 28, 1989, a defendant in an arson-for-profit case was sentenced to 32 years' imprisonment. His codefendant was previously sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised probation. The sentences stem from a 1-year investigation that began on September 6, 1988, when the NRT responded to the scene of a \$5 million arson fire at a warehouse in Miami, Florida, that belonged to an international distribution operation. This arson fire was one of at least three multimilliondollar arson fires for which the defendant and his arson ring were responsible. Total losses as a result of these fires are estimated at \$15 million.



DRUG-RELATED INITIATIVES

The ever-changing criminal environment, particularly the violence associated with drug trafficking, places new demands on law enforcement efforts. Drug traffickers have a proclivity for using explosives, and as such, they are continually targeted in ATF's explosives investigations. In 1989, ATF investigated 51 actual bombings and 11 attempted bombings known to be drug related. These incidents resulted in 13 deaths, 11 injuries, and \$525,300 in property damage. ATF also made 143 explosives recoveries during drug-related explosives investigations. These figures are double those that were reported in 1988. The investigations indicate that the explosives are used to further the illegal drug enterprises, to protect the territorial boundaries, or to take over rival territories.

ATF's enforcement of the Federal explosives laws gives an added dimension to law enforcement's efforts against drug trafficking operations. ATF is promoting this enforcement role by participating in 11 regional task forces designed to combine the investigative efforts of Federal agencies and State and local narcotics units. These regional task forces are located in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Diego, San Francisco, and St. Louis.




Explosives, firearms, and cocaine recovered during an investigation in Providence, Rhode Island.

Part VI DIRECTORY OF ATF OFFICES

ATF Headquarters

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Associate Director, Law Enforcement Ariel Rios Federal Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20226

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Chief, Explosives Division Ariel Rios Federal Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20226 (202) 566-7159 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Special Agent in Charge Explosives Enforcement Branch Ariel Rios Federal Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20226 (202) 566-7395



ATF District Offices

All addresses given below should be preceded by: Special Agent in Charge Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

State

Address

Alabama 2121 8th Avenue North Room 725 Birmingham, AL 35203–2307 (205) 731–1205

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

Counties of Mississippi and Crittenden

All other counties

California

Southern

Northern and Central

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of Columbia Jackson Federal Building Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442–4485

P.O. Box 1991, Main Office Los Angeles, CA 90053–1991 (213) 894–4812

215 Centerview Drive Suite 215 Brentwood, TN 37027 (615) 736–5412

10001 Lake Forest Blvd. Room 309 New Orleans, LA 70127 (504) 589–2350

P.O. Box 1991, Main Office Los Angeles, CA 90053–1991 (213) 894–4812

221 Main Street, Suite 1250 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 744–7001

221 Main Street, Suite 1250 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 744–7001

Boston Federal Office Bldg. 10 Causeway St., Room 701 Boston, MA 02222–1081 (615) 565–7040

U.S. Customs House, Room 504 2nd and Chestnut Streets Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 597–7266

7799 Leesburg Pike Su've &02 South Falls Church, VA 22043 (703) 285-2543 Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois Northern and Central

Southern

Indiana Northwest counties

All other counties

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky Counties of Campbell, Kenton, and Boone 8420 NW., 52nd Street Suite 120 Miami, FL 33166 (305) 536–4368

101 Marietta Street, NW., Suite 406 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 331–6526

Jackson Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442–4485

Jackson Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442–4485

2115 Butterfield Road, Suite 300 Oak Brook, IL 60521–1364 (312) 620–7824

1114 Market Street Room 611 St. Louis, MO 63101 (314) 539–3560

2115 Butterfield Road, Suite 300 Oak Brook, IL 60521-1364 (312) 620–7824

510 West Broadway Suite 807 Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 582–5211

811 Grand Avenue, Room 106 Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 426–7188

811 Grand Avenue, Room 106 Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 426–7188

Plaza South One, Room 300 7251 Engle Road Middleburg Heights, OH 44130 (216) 522–7210

All other	510 West Broadway	New	Boston Federal Office Bldg.
counties	Suite 807	Hampshire	10 Causeway St., Room 701
countries		mampshire	
	Louisville, KY 40202		Boston, MA 02222–1081
	(502) 582–5211		(617) 565–7040
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Louisiana	10001 Lake Forest Blvd.	New Jersey	
	Suite 309	Northern	90 Church Street
	New Orleans, LA 70127		Room 1016
	(504) 589–2350		New York, NY 10007
			(212) 264 - 4657
Maine	Boston Federal Office Bldg.		
	10 Causeway St., Room 701	Southern	U.S. Customs House
	Boston, MA 02222-1081		Room 504
	(617) 565–7040		2nd and Chestnut Streets
			Philadelphia, PA 19106
Maryland	7799 Leesburg Pike		(215) 597–7266
Man y Iana	Suite 802 South		
	Falls Church, VA 22043	New Mexico	
	(703) 285–2543	Northern and	P.O. Box 50906
	(103) 203-2545		
TC 1 (1)		Central	Dallas, TX 75250–0906
Massachusetts	Boston Federal Office Bldg.		(214) 767–2250
	10 Causeway St., Room 701		
	Boston, MA 02222–1081	Southern	16630 Imperial Valley Drive
	(617) 565–7040		Suite 263
			Houston, TX 77060
			(713) 445-2291
Michigan	231 W. Lafayette		
U	533 Federal Building	New York	90 Church Street
	Detroit, MI 48226		Room 1016
	(313) 226–4830		New York, NY 10007
			(212) 264–4657
Minnesota	316 North Robert Street		
miniesota	Room 658	North	4530 Park Rd.
		-	
	St. Paul, MN 55101	Carolina	Suite 400
	(612) 290–3092		Charlotte, NC 28209
			(704) 371–6125
Mississippi	2121 8th Avenue North		
	Room 725	North Dakota	316 North Robert Street
	Birmingham, AL 35203–2307		Room 658
	(205) 731–1205		St. Paul, MN 55101
			(612) 290–3092
Missouri			
Eastern	1114 Market Street, Room 611	Ohio	
	St. Louis, MO 63101	Counties	510 West Broadway
	(314) 539–3560	immediate to	Suite 807
		tristate	Louisville, KY 40202
Western	811 Grand Avenue, Room 106	area	(502) 582–5211
11 000011	Kansas City, MO 64106	urvu	(002) 002 OATT
	(816) 426–7188	All other	Plaza South One Room 200
	(010) 420-1100		Plaza South One, Room 300
Mant	Is shown The down Devil 11 - D	counties	7251 Engle Road
Montana	Jackson Federal Building, Room 806		Middleburg Heights, OH 44130
	915 Second Avenue		(216) 522–7210
	Seattle, WA 98174		
	(206) 442–4485	Oklahoma	P.O. Box 50906
			Dallas, TX 75250–0906
Nebraska	811 Grand Avenue, Room 106		(214) 767–2250
	Kansas City, Mo 64106		
	(816) 426–7188	Oregon	Jackson Federal Building, Room 806
			915 Second Avenue
Nevada	221 Main Street, Suite 1250		Seattle, WA 98174
. IVI UUU	San Francisco, CA 94105		(206) 442–4485
	(415) 744–7001		

Pennsylvania	U.S. Customs House, Room 504 2nd and Chestnut Streets Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 597–7266	Vermont	Boston Federal Office Bldg. 10 Causeway St., Room 701 Boston, MA 02222–1081 (617) 565–7040
Rhode Island	Boston Federal Office Bldg. 10 Causeway St., Room 701 Boston, MA 02222–1081 (617) 565–7040	Virginia	7799 Leesburg Pike Suite 802 South Falls Church, VA 22043 (703) 285–2543
South Carolina	4530 Park Rd. Suite 400 Charlotte, NC 28209 (704) 371–6125	Washington	Jackson Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442–4485
South Dakota	316 North Robert Street Room 658 St. Paul, MN 55101 (612) 290–3092	West Virginia Northwest Panhandle area	U.S. Customs House, Room 504 2nd and Chestnut Streets Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 597–7266
Tennessee	215 Centerview Drive Suite 215-A Brentwood, TN 37027 (615) 736–5412	All other counties	510 West Broadway Suite 807 Louisville, KY 40202 (502) 582–5211
Texas Northern	P.O. Box 50906 Dallas, TX 75250–0906 (214) 767–2250	Wisconsin	316 North Robert Street Room 658 St. Paul, MN 55101 (612) 290–3092
Southern	16630 Imperial Valley Drive Suite 263 Houston, TX 77060 (713) 445–2291	Wyoming	Jackson Federal Building, Room 806 915 Second Avenue Seattle, WA 98174 (206) 442–4485
Utah	221 Main Street, Suite 1250 San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 744–7001		

Part VII GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Accidental Explosion: An unplanned or premature detonation/ignition of explosive/incendiary material or material possessing explosive properties. The activity leading to the detonation/ignition had no criminal intent. Primarily associated with legal, industrial, or commercial activities.

Attempted Bombing/Attempted Incendiary Bombing: Incidents in which a device designed or purposefully contrived to detonate/ignite fails to function. Intent of activity was criminal in nature. Pertains to malfunctioning, recovered, and/or disarmed devices.

Blasting Agents: Any material or mixture of materials, consisting of fuel and oxidizer, intended for blasting purposes, not otherwise defined as an explosive (e.g., ammonium nitrate and fuel oil composition), provided that the resulting material or mixture of materials cannot be detonated by a number 8 test blasting cap when unconfined.

Bombing/Detonation/Functioned Device: Any incident in which a device constructed with criminal intent and using high explosives, low explosives, or blasting agents explodes. These terms also refer to incidents where premature detonation occurs during preparation, transportation, or placement of a device so constructed.

Boosters: An explosive charge, usually of high strength and high detonation velocity, used to increase the efficiency of the initiation system of the main charge.

Dealer: Any person legally engaged in the business of explosive material distribution.

Delivery Method: The manner in which an explosive/incendiary device was transported/positioned at the site of an explosives incident (e.g., hand carried or mailed).

Detonating Cord: A flexible cord containing a center cord of high explosives used to detonate other explosives with which it comes in contact.

Detonator: Any device containing a detonating charge that is used for initiating detonation in an explosive. This term includes, but is not limited to, electric and nonelectric detonators (either instantaneous or delayed) and detonating connectors. **Explosive:** Any chemical compound mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion. The term includes, but is not limited to, high explosives, black powder, pellet powder, initiating explosives, detonators, safety fuses, squibs, detonating cord, ignitor cord, and ignitors.

High Explosives: Explosive materials which can be used to detonate by means of a blasting cap when unconfined (e.g., dynamite).

Low Explosives: Explosive materials which deflagrate rather than detonate (e.g., black powder, safety fuses, and "special fireworks" as defined as Class B explosives).

Explosives Incident: Any explosives-involved situation impacting on ATF jurisdiction. This term encompasses bombings, incendiary bombings, attempted bombings, attempted incendiary bombings, stolen and recovered explosives, threats to U.S. Treasury facilities involving explosives, hoax devices, and accidental noncriminal explosions.

Extortion: The wrongful taking of a person's money or property through use of violence or intimidation. The elimination of competition or bettering of one's position through use or threat of violence.

Filler: Type of explosive/incendiary/chemical substance which, in combination with a detonating/ignitor system and container, constitutes an improvised explosive device (e.g., dynamite, matchheads, gasoline).

Hoax Device: An inactive or "dummy" device designed and intended to appear as a bomb or explosive material.

Ignitor Cord: A small cord which burns progressively along its length with a short, hot external flame used to ignite safety fuses in the execution of multiple shot patterns.

Improvised Explosive Device: A homemade device consisting of an explosive/incendiary and firing components necessary to initiate the device. Similar in nature to a grenade, mine, or bomb.

Incendiary Bombing/Functioned Incendiary: Any criminally motivated bombing incident in which an incendiary/chemical device which induces burning is used (e.g., Molotov cocktail).

Insurance Fraud: The purposeful destruction or damaging of property with the intent of collecting insurance monies for same.

Labor Related: Acts related to strikes, job actions, lockouts, etc., perpetrated by management, organized labor, or others to increase one side's bartering leverage over another.

Manufacturer: Any entity legally engaged in the business of making explosives for distribution or personal use.

Other: Subcategory of a general category reserved to reflect all reported incidents of the general category that do not conform to one of the other subcategories enumerated in a specific analysis. Unless otherwise specified, the subcategory "other" will not contain data of a general nature (e.g., bombing incidents) for which categorical information (e.g., type of container) was either listed as "unknown" or "not reported."

Permittee: Any person possessing a federally issued permit authorizing acquisition and interstate transport of explosives for personal use.

Primer: A unit, package, or cartridge of explosives used to initiate other explosives or blasting agents.

Property Damage: The monetary loss resulting from explosives/incendiary incidents. In that estimates of property damage are generally reported during the initial stages of an investigation, these estimates may not reflect in totality all property damage that occurred. Property damage in this report has on various charts and figures been presented in \$10,000, \$100,000, and \$1 million increments. Please note the appropriate footnotes and/or Technical Notes section to determine increments used.

Protest: This motive category includes any expression of objection, disapproval, or dissent manifested through the use of explosive/incendiary devices. Political- and terrorist-type incidents are also included in this category.

Recovered Explosives: Any seized, abandoned, or purchased (undercover) explosive material taken into custody by ATF or other law enforcement agencies. **Safety Fuse:** A flexible cord containing an internal burning medium by which fire or flame is conveyed at a uniform rate from point of ignition to point of use, usually a detonator.

Targets: The following categories are mutually exclusive.

Commercial: Any structure whose principal purpose is to facilitate the generation of revenues in the private industry sector. This category does not include airports or those industries involved with furnishing temporary or permanent housing. Included in this category are factories, banks, office buildings, bars, theaters, and restaurants.

Federal Government: This category does not include information regarding education or law enforcement targets.

Law Enforcement: This category includes all law enforcement facilities, vehicles, and personnel regardless of State, local, or Federal affiliation.

Military: This category includes Reservesand National Gaurd-type facilities, vehicles, and personnel, but does not include ROTC facilities located at a college or university.

Residential: Any structure whose principal purpose is to house individuals on a permanent or temporary basis. This category includes private residences, hotels, motels, and apartments.

State/Local Government: This category does not include information regarding education or law enforcement targets.

Vehicles: This category includes all forms of transport either private or commercial in nature (e.g., tractor-trailers, automobiles, buses, trains, and boats). This category does not include aircraft, law enforcement vehicles, or military vehicles.

Users: Individuals who acquire and use explosives in the same State for legitimate purposes through legal means.

National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Glynco, Georgia



REGISTRATION REQUEST

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Program Title				Preferred Program Date(s)			
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	Federal Law E	Inforcement Tra	lining Center				

Building 262 Glynco, Georgia 31524

912-267-2345