


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National Association of Attorneys General

Committee on the Office of Attorney General



## Organized Crime Control Units

Robert Morgan, Chairman

January, 1974

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National Association of Attorneys General  
Committee on the Office of Attorney General

ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS

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FOREWORD

In recognition of the state Attorney General's responsibility for organized crime control, the National Association of Attorneys General has conducted studies of programs and legislation in this area. Four basic reports have resulted: Organized Crime Prevention Councils, Organized Crime Control Legislation, Legislation Concerning the Corruption of Public Officials, and this report on Organized Crime Control Units.

Most of the information in these reports has been derived from Attorneys General's offices and other state agencies through questionnaires, correspondence, and interviews. The C.O.A.G. staff has visited organized crime control units in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. These reports would not have been possible without the assistance of staff members in Attorneys General's offices and other agencies, who contributed so generously of their time, information, and ideas.

A grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice has helped finance this study. The fact that L.E.A.A. is furnishing financial support does not necessarily indicate its concurrence in the statements or conclusions herein.

Mrs. Patton Wheeler, Executive Director, had primary responsibility for the first edition of this report, published in December, 1972; Mr. Samuel T. Wyrick, III, Staff Attorney, was responsible for updating and revising the report.


  
Attorney General Robert Morgan, Chairman  
Committee on the Office of Attorney General

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## STATE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS

### 1. STATE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS

The states have primary responsibility for control of crime, whether it is street crime or organized crime. Many states have initiated special programs or formed special units to meet the challenge of organized crime. The federal government has recognized the importance of state action by helping to fund these programs. Indicative of the increased impact of such special programs and units are the accomplishments achieved through them over the past year. Representative accomplishments, particularly with regard to prosecutive-investigative units, discussed in Chapter 5, show that federal assistance to state projects through L.E.A.A. funding is yielding concrete results - criminal convictions and intelligence capabilities that have cut significantly into the inroads made in the past by organized crime. These positive results should in turn provide a statistical base for such specialized programs and units to win increasing state budgetary support.

#### The Role of the Attorney General

The National Association of Attorneys General conducted a comprehensive study of the powers, duties and operations of the office. A comprehensive report, The Office of Attorney General, was published in 1971. One chapter of this discussed various state approaches to the control of organized crime, including: investigative and prosecutorial units; intelligence capability; investigating commissions; citizen action programs; organized crime prevention units; and specific statutory approaches.

On the basis of the factual report, N.A.A.G. adopted a series of forty-nine recommendations for strengthening the office. One of these called for action against organized crime:

In states which have an organized crime problem, the Attorney General should establish a special investigative and prosecutorial unit within his office to assist local offices or to act directly depending on conditions in that jurisdiction.

Successful action against organized crime requires specialized legal, investigative and accounting skills. Many offices have created such a capability; the concept of a "strike force," utilizing inter-agency expertise, is applicable anywhere. In some jurisdictions, the unit would be limited to assisting local officials; in others, it would initiate investigations and prosecutions.

Recent federal legislation has authorized wiretapping, witness immunity, civil actions against racketeer-operated business, etc. The constitutionality of such legislation is not firmly settled, but the Attorney General should assure that any similar state legislation conforms to existing constitutional law and allows his office supervisory authority, by requiring his approval of intercepts or immunity grants.<sup>1</sup>

## STATE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS

As a result of the study and recommendation, the Committee on the Office of Attorney General applied for and received a discretionary grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to study organized crime control programs, particularly those in Attorneys General's offices. The study was intended to assist some states in establishing such programs, and to assist others in evaluating ongoing programs. It produced three reports:

Organized Crime Prevention Councils, published in September, 1973, Organized Crime Control Legislation, published in November, 1972, (updated concurrently with the present report), and this revised version of Organized Crime Control Units, originally published in December, 1972. Revisions of these publications have also been made possible through L.E.A.A. discretionary grant funding. Revisions were made on the basis of new data secured through answers to questionnaires sent to Attorneys General's offices, personal visits to appropriate government offices and agencies, and original research by the staff of C.O.A.G. during 1973, and January 1974.

In most states, the Attorney General is responsible for all or part of the organized crime control program. He has usually taken the initiative in establishing such a program and in securing legislative support for it. Many Attorneys General have sponsored legislation to help combat organized crime, such as new witness immunity laws or authority for statewide grand juries. Many Attorneys General have sought funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to initiate organized crime prevention or control programs. The state Attorney General, more than any other official, has assumed leadership in meeting the problem of organized crime.

The Attorney General's role may be limited by statutes and case law, which may restrict his role in prosecutions. His authority to initiate prosecutions or to intervene in actions initiated by the local prosecutor is discussed in the report on Organized Crime Control Legislation. Obviously, the Attorney General cannot establish an investigative-prosecutive unit if he lacks authority to bring prosecutions. A number of states have recently broadened the Attorney General's powers in prosecutions, or have given him specific statutory powers in organized crime control. Recent changes in the statutes are described in the report cited above.

The Attorney General provides the necessary nexus for efforts to control organized crime. One state described a typical situation in its application for a grant to provide "the means necessary to achieve effective, sustained coordination, to develop strategic intelligence and to devise comprehensive strategic plans." It noted that:

The environment in which such an effort is carried out is complex: hundreds of cities and towns with independent police forces; several states which might be expected to coordinate efforts with separate legal systems and agencies with noncomparable functions; a proliferation of intelligence gathering and handling schemes,

## STATE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS

no focused responsibility for the overall problem; a measure of suspicion and mistrust between different agencies with parts of the responsibility or with apparently overlapping or similar functions; and little or no use of advanced technology or tools of operations research, systems analysis and computer-aided information systems or data bases.<sup>2</sup>

Creation of an organized crime control unit, with statewide jurisdiction and adequate resources, is necessary to overcome this fragmentation.

### Existing State Units

Table 1 lists statewide organized crime prevention and control units. The list was originally compiled by C.O.A.G. early in 1972, through questionnaires to Attorneys General's offices, letters to L.E.A.A. regional offices, and review of L.E.A.A. discretionary grants. Every effort has been made to update the list on a continuing basis through October, 1973. It is possible, however, that some existing units are omitted from the list.

The State of Maine, which presently has no organized crime control unit, hopes, through discretionary L.E.A.A. funds, to establish an investigative-prosecutive unit in the near future.

The presence of such funds is pivotal in most units at present, and Hawaii's investigation and prosecution unit ceased operations entirely on October 5, 1973, due to a cut-off of federal funding.

The Table shows that the following states do not have organized crime control units: Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Samoa, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Vermont. In several of these states, however, the Attorney General conducts some activities related to organized crime control. Several others are considering starting programs.

Information was not available from Alabama and the Virgin Islands.

The following seventeen jurisdictions have organized crime prevention councils: Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia and Wyoming.

The following states have organized crime intelligence units which do not have prosecutorial responsibility: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and West Virginia.

Five states have crime investigating commissions, although these may not be concerned exclusively with organized crime: Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania.

TABLE 1: STATEWIDE ORGANIZED CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL UNITS

Illinois	Special Prosecution Unit (investigation and prosecution) in Attorney General's office. Illinois Crime Investigating Commission.
Indiana	Organized Crime Prevention Council. Organized Crime Intelligence Division in State Police.
Iowa	Criminal Prosecutions Unit (investigation and prosecution) in Attorney General's office.
Kansas	Organized crime unit in Kansas Bureau of Investigation (under Attorney General).
Kentucky	Organized crime intelligence unit in Department of Public Safety.
Louisiana	Organized Crime Unit (investigation and prosecution) under the Attorney General.
Maine	None.
Maryland	Committee on Organized Crime (Attorney General a member) attached to Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.
Massachusetts	Organized Crime Prevention Council. Organized crime unit (investigation and prosecution) and technical assistance center in Attorney General's office. Organized crime intelligence unit in State Police.
Minnesota	Organized Crime Prevention Council (Attorney General is Chairman). Organized crime unit (investigation and prosecution) in Attorney General's office.
Mississippi	Organized Crime Section (investigation and prosecution) in Attorney General's office.
Missouri	None.
Montana	None.
Nebraska	None.
Nevada	Organized Crime Prevention Council.
New Hampshire	Organized Crime Intelligence Unit in State Police (under general control of Attorney General).

TABLE 1: STATEWIDE ORGANIZED CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL UNITS

(List compiled by COAG from information furnished by Attorney Generals' offices and by LEAA, 1973).

Alabama	(No information).
Alaska	None.
Arizona	Organized Crime Prevention Council (Attorney General is Chairman). Organized Crime Strike Force in Attorney General's office (Dept. of Public Safety shares supervisory authority).
Arkansas	None.
California	Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence Branch in Department of Justice and a "resource pool" for local prosecutors. Organized Crime Trials Unit in Attorney General's office (prosecution).
Colorado	Organized Crime Strike Force (under supervision of Attorney General).
Connecticut	Organized Crime Unit in State Police. Organized Crime Task Force (Conn., Judicial Dept.).
Delaware	Commission on Organized Crime (inter-agency). Organized Crime Intelligence Unit in State Police.
Florida	Various programs (intelligence and prosecution in Department of Law Enforcement). Office of Attorney General will study the role of state agencies in organized crime control. Organized Crime Fighting Team in Special.
Georgia	Organized Crime Prevention Council attached to State Crime Commission. Statewide Intelligence Unit in Department of Public Safety.
Guam	Special Intelligence Unit (Department of Public Safety).
Hawaii	None. (Formerly in Attorney General's Office).
Idaho	Organized crime control section in Attorney General's office.



TABLE 1: STATEWIDE ORGANIZED CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL UNITS

New Jersey	Organized Crime and Special Prosecution Section, cooperative organized crime investigative and prosecution unit and "resource pool" of personnel and equipment, in the Division of Criminal Justice; intelligence unit in State Police (under Attorney General). State Commission on Investigation (appointed by Governor and Legislature).
New Mexico	Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission (intelligence).
New York	Organized Crime Task Force (investigation and prosecution with offices in 5 cities), directly under Attorney General. Personnel assigned by State Police to assist. State Investigations Commission.
North Carolina	Organized Crime Prevention Council (Attorney General is Chairman). Organized Crime Intelligence Unit in State Bureau of Investigation (under Attorney General).
North Dakota	None. (Bureau of Criminal Investigation in Attorney General's office involved in limited organized crime investigations).
Ohio	Organized Crime Prevention Council in Department of Urban Affairs. Organized Crime Unit in Attorney General's office, in Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation.
Oklahoma	Organized crime intelligence unit in Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation. Organized Crime Prevention Council.
Oregon	Governor's Commission on Organized Crime (Attorney General is Chairman).
Pennsylvania	Organized Crime Strike Force (investigation and prosecution) under Attorney General; Crime Commission.
Puerto Rico	Interdepartmental Task Force under Crime Commission. Organized Crime Section, Criminal Investigation Corps of Police Department.
Rhode Island	Organized Crime Unit (investigation and prosecution) under Attorney General. Intelligence Unit in State Police.

TABLE 1: STATEWIDE ORGANIZED CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL UNITS

Samoa	None.
South Carolina	None.
South Dakota	None.
Tennessee	Organized Crime and Intelligence Unit in Department of Public Safety.
Texas	Organized Crime Prevention Council (Attorney General and Director of Public Safety are co-Chairmen). Organized Crime Intelligence Unit in Department of Public Safety.
Utah	None.
Vermont	None.
Virgin Islands	(No information).
Virginia	Virginia State Crime Commission.
Washington	None.
West Virginia	Organized Crime Intelligence Unit in the Purchasing Practices and Procedures Commission.
Wisconsin	Organized Crime Strike Force (investigation and prosecution) in Attorney General's office.
Wyoming	Organized Crime Prevention Council (Attorney General is Chairman).

STATE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS

Twenty-one states have combined investigative-prosecutive units: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Almost all of these are in the Attorney General's office. The 1971 Maryland Legislature failed to enact legislation "to provide for a statewide multi-faceted approach to fighting organized crime under the direct supervision of the Attorney General."<sup>3</sup>

Since the 1972 report was published new organized crime control units have become operational. They are the Organized Crime Trials Unit in the California Attorney General's Office; the Organized Crime Strike Force, in Colorado, consolidating the resources of state and local police, as well as the prosecutive resources of the Attorney General and the District Attorney for the City and County of Denver; the Organized Crime Task Force in the Connecticut Judicial Department; the Special Intelligence Unit of the Guam Department of Public Safety; Louisiana's Organized Crime Unit, established for investigation and prosecution under the Attorney General; the Massachusetts Organized Crime Prevention Council; the Michigan Organized Crime Prevention Council; the New Mexico Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission; the New York Office of Special State Prosecutor, with primary prosecutorial responsibility for offenses involving corruption in New York City. There appears to be a definite impetus to create units geared to immediately productive intelligence and prosecutive capabilities. This feeling has been characterized by Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General Peter Peshek, who speaks of his Organized Crime Strike Force as being "out of the library business,"<sup>4</sup> and fully prepared for maximum devotion of time to the actual trying of cases.

A number of states have a prevention council and an investigative-prosecutive unit, as these programs complement each other. An organized crime prevention council does not usually operate an intelligence program or undertake specific investigations or prosecutions. L.E.A.A. has summarized the functions of a council as: defining the organized crime problem; developing programs and setting priorities; coordinating programs; encouraging programs, such as recruiting personnel and developing liaison among federal, state, and local officials; maintaining close relationships with the state criminal justice planning agency.<sup>5</sup> Some states establish an organized crime prevention council to survey needs, then establish control programs as indicated. In both Georgia and North Carolina, for example, the prevention council was instrumental in setting up statewide intelligence programs in other state agencies. In other states, like Arizona, the prevention council may act in any advisory capacity to a prosecutive unit. The type or types created depend on a state's assessment of its organized crime problem and on its objectives concerning prevention and control.

STATE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS

Objectives of Programs

Attorney General Richard Israel of Rhode Island, in an interview with C.O.A.G. staff, listed the following essentials of an effective organized crime control program:

1. It must be an investigative-prosecutive team and must emphasize team effort. There is a danger that an investigative effort may be just another police operation, or that a prosecutive unit may be just another legal office;
2. The unit must have a distinct identity and not just be an additional duty assigned to people who have other responsibilities;
3. The unit director must have direct access to the Attorney General, so the latter's policies aren't diffused;
4. The unit must not expect immediate results; it takes time and patience to develop intelligence;
5. It must learn how to develop intelligence, and learn about how the persons and activities involved in organized crime actually operate;
6. The Attorney General must fight for legislative tools, if he doesn't already have these.<sup>6</sup>

This emphasizes the need to create an identifiable, ongoing unit, to build a solid base of information under its activities, and to enact legislation to aid it.

The co-Directors of New Jersey's Organized Crime and Special Prosecutions Section were generally in agreement with Rhode Island in the factors they cited as essential to a good program. These were: (1) an adequate legislative package; (2) adequate investigative resources; (3) separation from political considerations. In a recent interview, on January 11, 1974, Assistant Attorney General Peter Richards reiterated the value of sound legislation, such as New Jersey's statewide grand jury statute, and stressed how important independence and autonomy were the efficient operations of his Section. They noted also that some states create and staff an agency but fail to make it into a permanent institution. The program should strive for continuity of staff and operations.<sup>7</sup>

The Project Director of Wisconsin's organized crime control unit advised any state which is starting a program to put an experienced person at its head, and to develop a table of organization to meet the agency's needs. He also noted that an educational program may be necessary to develop sustained public interest in organized crime.<sup>8</sup> Assistant Attorney General Peter Peshek, who is in charge of anti-corruption operations for the unit, states that the unit is long on experience, and has attracted extremely dedicated personnel. The numerous convictions secured by the unit, especially in the field of public corruption, have been given extensive media coverage.<sup>9</sup>

The Director of West Virginia's Purchasing and Procedures Commission, which was created to investigate certain criminal activities in that state, also stressed in an interview that priority should be given to building a staff and to acquiring information. He also felt that existing laws should be evaluated and, if new ones were needed, they should be sought as soon as possible, while public interest was high.<sup>10</sup>

Arizona's organized crime strike force prepared a written statement of its goals, which is reproduced in the Appendix to this report. It sets forth objectives and the specific programs necessary to achieve them. Objectives are grouped under three primary goals: to solicit, receive, and disseminate information on Arizona and Arizona-related criminal activities of an on-going nature; to correlate and index such information in an effort to determine the persons, locations, organizations involved in, and the extent of such activities; and to select, investigate, prosecute and convict persons shown to be involved in organized crime in Arizona.

A few states define by law the responsibilities of their organized crime control units. New York law establishes a statewide Organized Crime Task Force within the Department of Law and gives it the duty and power: (1) to conduct investigations and prosecutions of interstate or inter-county organized crime activities, and (2) "to cooperate with and assist district attorneys and other local law enforcement officials in their efforts against organized crime."<sup>11</sup> California's Legislature directed the Department of Justice to combat organized crime by:

- (1) gathering and analyzing intelligence;
- (2) providing this intelligence to law enforcement units;
- (3) training local and state law enforcement personnel;
- (4) providing specialized equipment and personnel to assist state, local and federal agencies;
- (5) conducting research;
- (6) initiating and participating in prosecutions.<sup>12</sup>

The California Department of Justice first established a small organized crime control unit in 1967. This was expanded through grants which funded an integrated project, with goals substantially the same as those later set by statute.

Funding for the Organized Crime Trials Unit, located in the California Attorney General's office, began on November 30, 1973. In a letter to all district attorneys in California circulated in early November, the Attorney General described the Unit's role as follows:

The functions of the unit will be to evaluate information concerning organized crime developed by local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and, where the evidence justifies a prosecution, to arrange for the prosecution in the appropriate jurisdiction. Close coordination of this unit with existing units combating organized crime on all governmental levels, including the federal Strike Forces active in California, is contemplated as a part of the project.

The unit can arrange for prosecution in any of a variety of ways. The unit may assist and compensate district attorneys prosecuting organized crime cases in their own counties in an effort to stimulate the prosecution of substantial cases of this nature. Deputy attorneys general or special counsel may be assigned in unusual cases. In addition, the unit can make funds available for trial expenses, such as the services of experts, the preparation of exhibits, travel expenses, and the like. A fund of \$150,000 will be available for the first calendar year of operation.

The objectives of the Mississippi unit, as stated in the initial grant application, are typical of a wide-ranging program;

After completion of the structuring and implementation of the project, Mississippi will possess an organized crime section with statewide jurisdiction, which is capable of:

- (a) Evaluating the extent of organized crime's penetration into the State; and,
- (b) Investigating, through research and surveillance, the activities of individuals and organizations suspect of organized crime involvement; and,
- (c) Effecting and assisting the prosecution of those individuals and organizations found to be perpetrators or practitioners of organized crime; and,

- (d) Developing an intelligence data bank of organized crime cartels, activities and practitioners, providing reference for further disclosure and discovery and general monitorial and preventive efforts; and,
- (e) Assisting establishment of public educational programs designed to inform legitimate businessmen and the general public of the threat of organized crime; and,
- (f) Assisting local, urban agencies in the development of counterpart intelligence units in order to effect a statewide network for resistance, detection and eradication of organized crime in Mississippi; and,
- (g) Serving as the central facility for the statewide network; coordinating the intelligence functions of all local agencies; and, representing the state in regional and national intelligence systems.<sup>13</sup>

Puerto Rico's 1971 criminal justice plan called for continued support of the inter-agency Organized Crime Task Force's work "to coordinate and intensify the investigation and prosecution of organized crime; developing new systems of intelligence gathering; training law enforcement personnel in this area; proposing needed legislation; and promoting an educational effort." Prosecution of cases, if warranted, was to begin in 1972, with emphasis on illegal business, and is to expand into the area of infiltration of legitimate business and government in 1974.<sup>14</sup>

The goals of Organized Crime Strike Force are described in its discretionary grant application as follows:

This project will demonstrate the working relationship of prosecutors and police officers on a day-to-day basis in areas of crime detection, investigation, and prosecution. The project is intended to uncover and eliminate organized gambling and loansharking, which is a major supply of money for organized crime....The Strike Force plans on investigations involving tax evasion, multi-owned regulated businesses, loansharking operations, fencing of stolen goods, and corruption of government officials as the opportunity arises.

The primary goal of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Unit is assistance and coordination of organized crime efforts by state and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies. Once this primary goal is achieved, it will be possible to achieve other objectives which would result in the reduction and control of organized crime influences. The second goal is to deprive organized crime of the advantage of public corruption by the application of this unit to

corruption control problems. A third goal is to suppress illegal gambling, which is a large source of income for the organized crime element. These goals will be accomplished through the use of direct investigation guided by a coordinated intelligence effort. The existence of this project will minimize the effect of the "payoff" as the coordinated interagency effort will range above the influence of local pressures. The fourth goal consists of a full-scale attack on all phases of organized crime activity and sources of revenue. The objective of this phase is the adoption of a "task force" approach to all law violations relating to the area of organized crime which will integrate the resources of all state and local law enforcement with regulatory authority.<sup>15</sup>

#### Planning Programs

To develop plans for control units and for grant applications to fund them, some Attorneys General created study groups and some consulted other states.

Washington's project was planned by an ad hoc planning committee of representatives from criminal justice agencies in the state. Utah created a short-term interagency planning committee on organized crime to study intelligence operations in other states and determine whether such an agency should be created in Utah. Some other states, including Colorado, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Missouri and Virginia have had study groups which have recommended specific legislation and programs to combat organized crime.<sup>16</sup> In Georgia, the Organized Crime Prevention Council developed the grant application which funded the state's intelligence unit. Several states mention that the state criminal justice planning agency or L.E.A.A. assisted in formulating plans.

One program director commented that changes may be required if the project plan is developed by a committee or agency other than that which will operate the program. The persons who are actually charged with carrying out the grant project may have different ideas than the persons who originally developed it.

Many states consult with other organized crime units of other states before developing a proposal. Delaware, for example, recommends visits to other states because it's a new field and much can be learned by other states' experience and mistakes. The project chief believes that such visits enabled him to proceed at a more rapid pace than otherwise would have been possible. The chief of the Arizona unit visited several federal strike forces as well as other states' units.<sup>17</sup> The Kansas intelligence unit was developed after consultation with the state bureau of investigation, the Kansas City Police, the F.B.I., L.E.A.A., and other states.<sup>18</sup> Utah's Planning Committee for Law Enforcement Intelligence visited units in California, Nevada, Florida, Louisiana, New York and other eastern states.<sup>19</sup>

Timetable for Programs

The development of most organized crime programs has been necessarily tied to federal grant awards. Even if it is anticipated that programs will be ongoing, a timetable must be set for the year or other grant period. Most grants are for one year, although extensions are frequently granted, and subsequent grants have been awarded to continue many organized crime programs. In some states, there were delays in receiving the grant, which resulted in program delays. In some other states, the program did not proceed on schedule, so funds accumulated which were then used to extend the grant period.

It is seldom possible for a new program to be immediately effective. Most states recognize this and plan to use part or all of the first year to develop the unit's capability. In Delaware, for example, it was not possible for the program to get underway immediately, so the effective date was moved to October. In two months, it was staffed. Operating procedures were developed by the end of the first five months and meetings were held with local law enforcement agencies to solicit their assistance. By the end of seven months, the program was in full operation.<sup>20</sup>

The application for Kansas' intelligence program included a five-page, twenty-six step time table. Initial steps were to research the type, size and costs of programs suitable for the state, to obtain the grant, to make agreements with other agencies, and to transfer some personnel to the section. At the end of 90 days, personnel had been employed and equipment was on hand. The final step, to occur after 300 days, was for a systems analyst to present plans for computer use.

Two states reported delays due to civil service requirements. Kansas said the examination process was more lengthy than anticipated and Washington encountered problems due to a requirement that they use existing civil service classifications. No other reasons for program delays were specified.

Evaluation Procedures

While many states appear to be cognizant of the need for evaluation of their organized crime programs, none have developed a wholly satisfactory approach to this problem. Several states proposed to use L.E.A.A. or expert consultants to evaluate their programs. Others expected that their organized crime prevention councils could help measure progress. One state reported that it had tried, without success, to develop statistical measures or cost-benefit ratios to apply to its organized crime program.

Illinois' application for second-year L.E.A.A. funding points out that program evaluation should be approached qualitatively, rather than quantitatively. Consideration should not be restricted to the number of cases brought or the amount of fines recorded, but should include such factors as the following:

(a) development of new and creative approaches against organized crime and their effectiveness;

(b) comparing establishment of the unit with operation of the Attorney General's office before its establishment;

(c) effect of the unit on local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and their response;

(d) effect of the unit on the public.<sup>21</sup>

A 1972 Rhode Island grant application also devotes considerable attention to problems of evaluation. It suggests that criteria be developed to measure the extent to which organized crime activities have been reduced or eradicated. These criteria would have to be measurable by objective data and might include the following: the organizational structure of organized crime leadership identified and prosecuted; illegal operations stopped in loansharking and labor racketeering; number of organized crime leaders put in jail; recoveries of evaded taxes; legitimate business penetrations stopped and fraudulent bankruptcies indentified. The application also suggests that a judgment be made as to whether the public investment in reducing organized crime might have produced better results if utilized in a different manner.<sup>22</sup>

The program description for the California Council on Criminal Justice's Organized Crime Task Force notes that applicants for grants should address the question of "what happened after creation of the organized crime unit (i.e., information developed, prosecutions resulted, etc.) which would not have occurred without the program." Examples would be: how much organized crime information has been developed? Has there been an increase in prosecutions?<sup>23</sup> While no clear criteria exist for judging the effectiveness of state organized crime control units, continued evaluation should be considered essential.

## ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

### 2. ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

Like any other programs, organized crime control units must operate within an organizational framework. They must develop liaison with other agencies, both state and federal. They must develop internal relationships and procedures. They must become functioning administrative units.

#### Basis of Unit

With a few exceptions, organized crime control units have been created by administrative action of the Attorney General or other official. A separate section or division may be established, or an existing unit may be assigned the function of organized crime control.

In a few jurisdictions, the organized crime unit was established by legislation. Puerto Rico's Special Committee of Interdepartmental Action Against Organized Crime originated by statute in 1970. A 1971 Hawaii law established an organized crime unit in the Department of the Attorney General. The unit was directed to:

- (1) Receive, gather, and analyze information;
- (2) Develop tactical and strategic intelligence;
- (3) Assist in control of organized criminal activity;
- (4) Provide technical assistance and training to county law enforcement agencies in the detection and prosecution of organized crime; and
- (5) Provide with the Attorney General's approval specialized personnel and technological equipment for the use of law enforcement agencies in the State with respect to organized crime.<sup>1</sup>

California's legislature directed the Department of Justice to "seek to control and eradicate organized crime" by establishing programs for: operations and training; intelligence; long-range intelligence research; investigation; and prosecution. In New York, a Statewide Criminal Task Force was proposed by the Governor and enacted by the 1970 legislature.

Table 1, in the preceding chapter, shows the location of statewide organized crime control programs. Most organized crime prevention councils are independent programs, but all other units are located with the Attorney General, the state police or the department of public safety. There are obvious advantages to locating the unit within an established agency. It helps assure continuity of staff, funding and program. It enables the special staff to draw on the agency for supportive staff and services. The organized crime staff may exercise powers vested in the parent agency. It can benefit from the agency's experience and contacts.

## ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

Organized crime control units are located in the Attorney General's office in the following nineteen states: Arizona; California; Colorado; Idaho; Illinois; Iowa; Kansas; Louisiana; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; New Jersey; New York; North Carolina; Ohio; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; and Wisconsin. In three of the states, (Kansas, North Carolina and Ohio), the state bureau of investigation is under the Attorney General, and has an organized crime control program.

The state police have the only statewide organized crime control unit in the following states: Connecticut; Delaware; Georgia; Indiana; Kentucky; New Hampshire; Oklahoma; Tennessee; and Texas. These are primarily intelligence programs. Some of these states also have prevention units.

Organizational patterns vary, particularly as they involve the Attorney General - state police relationship. In New Jersey, the Attorney General is in charge of the State Police. The State Police and the Organized Crime and Special Prosecutions Section work closely together. In Arizona, the organized crime unit is responsible to both the Attorney General and the State Police, and was originally housed with the latter.

In Colorado, two Assistant District Attorneys and three Assistant Attorneys General work together in an Organized Crime Strike Force located in Denver, Colorado. The project is under the supervision of the Colorado Attorney General. The Strike Force has its own office, files, equipment, and staff, including agent-investigators contributed by various Colorado law enforcement agencies. The result is notable inter-agency cooperation.

The organized crime staff may assist in other work of the agency. In Massachusetts, for example the organized crime unit is part of the Attorney General's Criminal Division, and occasionally assists in investigations of official corruption. Delaware's organized crime control personnel are located with the State Police, and may become operational in cases of extreme emergency. Most of the units which are located in Attorneys General's offices report that they assist to a limited extent with the office's regular duties. In return, they are assisted by other components of the office.

North Carolina's organized crime intelligence unit has an unusual arrangement. The State Bureau of Investigation has six districts in the state which will be expanded to eight districts on February 1, 1974, and one organized crime investigator is assigned to each. He does, however, spend full-time on organized crime matters and both transmits and disseminates intelligence data. The remaining analyst-investigators and other personnel are stationed at headquarters.

#### Physical Security

Several organized crime units have made special provisions to ensure the physical security of their offices. Rhode Island's organized crime unit is at a confidential, unidentified location. This has numerous advantages, including the ability to interview informants privately.<sup>2</sup> A number of states have electronic devices to protect sensitive files. Pennsylvania has contracted with a professional security service to protect the building housing the organized crime staff.

## ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

### Organization and Administration

A unit's effectiveness will depend in part on its organization and its administrative procedures. These matters are of increasing concern to Attorneys General's offices, and are recognized by many of the organized crime units. The organization of Attorneys General's offices varies greatly, some having numerous specialized units, and others having a few major ones. An example of a state in the former category, showing considerable specialization, is the State of New Jersey. The Division of Criminal Justice in the New Jersey Attorney General's Office breaks down as follows: Office of the Director; Internal Affairs Bureau; Organized Crime and Special Prosecutions; Trial Section; Anti-Trust Section; State Enforcement Bureau; Appellate Section; Prosecutors' Supervisory Section; Employment Security; Research and Planning. In addition, there are special sections dealing with Environmental Protection, Consumer Affairs, Transportation, and other problem areas. Other states such as Delaware, break down principally into criminal and civil divisions with no such specialized units designated. Further information concerning the various sections and divisions in Attorneys General's offices can be found in another C.O.A.G. publication, The Office of Attorney General: Organization, Budget, Salaries, Staff and Opinions (1973).

The importance of effective organization was stressed by several unit chiefs in interviews with C.O.A.G. staff members. The National Association of Attorneys General has recognized the importance of administration in adopting the following recommendations<sup>3</sup>:

Administrative functions should be clearly identified and should be performed by persons with appropriate qualifications.

Internal communications and controls should be constantly reviewed. Staff meetings, reports and other administrative procedures should be employed as appropriate.

Procedures manuals should be developed.

These recommendations are relevant to organized crime control staffs.

The relationship of the organized crime control staff to the rest of the Attorney General's office varies. In some states, like Michigan and Rhode Island, there is an Organized Crime Division. In others, like Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey (discussed above), it is part of the Criminal Division.

New York's Organized Crime Task Force is headed by a Deputy Attorney General who reports directly to the Attorney General. It has offices in five cities, each with an attorney in charge who is responsible to the Deputy. The Task Force has no direct relationship to other parts of the Department of Law, except to the Administrative Office. The Office of the Special State Prosecutor, in New York City, is a very specialized unit with an interesting origin. In September, 1972, as a result of the findings and recommendations of the

## ESTABLISHMENT OF ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption,<sup>4</sup> New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed a Special Deputy Attorney General to supercede the district attorneys in the five counties of New York City with respect to corruption within the criminal justice system. The Special Deputy Attorney General occupies what is known as the Office of the Special State Prosecutor, which has its own staff and training programs.

Some units have formalized their internal organization. Organization charts developed by California, Michigan and Pennsylvania are shown here.

Administrative matters may be handled by the unit or by the parent agency. Most programs are funded at least in part by L.E.A.A. grants, which impose certain reporting and record-keeping requirements. Programs all have other administrative functions, such as keeping payrolls and purchasing equipment and supplies. In New York, the Attorney General's Administrative Office handles budgeting, personnel, finance, space, purchasing and matters concerning L.E.A.A. The Department of Public Safety's Comptroller is fiscal officer for the Arizona project. The Attorney General's office manager serves this function in Michigan. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission, on the other hand, has its own administrative officer, who is responsible for fiscal records, office services, arranging training facilities, and similar matters.

A few organized crime control units have developed training or procedures manuals. Delaware's Manual of Standard Operating Procedures includes: a statement of objectives; definitions; organization; purposes; operational guidelines; internal procedures; and standard forms. Washington's organized crime unit has developed a training manual for the staff and member agencies.


### Advisory Groups

Only a few states use advisory groups in connection with their organized crime control units. Many others, however, have organized crime prevention councils, which may help direct the state's program.<sup>5</sup> Georgia's Organized Crime Prevention Council sets "broad policy guidelines" for the intelligence program, which reports to it.<sup>6</sup>


California's organized crime branch has a Training Advisory Board. Its primary function is to advise the branch on organized crime training needs of local officers and to assist it in developing programs to meet these needs. Members of the Board are selected from police departments and from sheriffs and district attorneys' offices, and have criminal intelligence functions in their own agencies. The Operations Officer of the Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence Branch is Chairman of the Board.

ORGANIZATION CHARTS - ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS


Michigan Department of the Attorney General  
Organized Crime Division



Pennsylvania Crime Commission



CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH





## ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

Puerto Rico has a Special Committee of Interdepartmental Action Against Organized Crime which oversees and coordinates all such activities. It includes: a prosecutor designated by the Secretary of Justice; the Director of the Police Vice Squad; the Director of the Criminal Investigation Corps; the Director of Gambling Inspection; the Racing Administrator; the Director of the Tax Evasion Office; and representatives of the Treasury Department.

Washington's organized crime advisory board was established by the ad hoc planning committee that conceived the program, which has since ceased operations. The board was composed of representatives of police, prosecutors, sheriffs, and private citizens. The Director of the organized crime program was appointed by the Attorney General, with the approval of the advisory board. The board's eleven members were to have served staggered four-year terms and meet bi-monthly. The board set qualifications for membership in Washington's intelligence system and advised concerning types of information collected, as well as the manner of indexing and dissemination.

In West Virginia, the Purchasing Practices and Procedures Commission reviews regular reports on its staff's investigative activities and the posture of cases being pursued. At each meeting, members are given a notebook containing: a flowchart showing the steps involved in each investigation; a list of current investigations; preliminary case outlines; and a list of miscellaneous allegations received by the staff. Cases are identified by number, to preserve the confidentiality of allegations or investigations.<sup>7</sup>

### Relationship to Other State Agencies

Organized crime activities fall within the purview of many state agencies, and their cooperation is necessary to ensure a successful program.

A previous C.O.A.G. report<sup>8</sup> pointed out that Attorneys General's organized crime units should solicit input from appropriate state agencies. Alcoholic beverage control agencies, for example, could provide data on liquor licenses. Tax agencies could provide income information. Purchasing and antitrust agencies could report any apparent instances of price-fixing. In return, the Attorney General could alert agencies to suspected organized crime activities in their areas of responsibility. A 1969 review of federal action against organized crime members showed that indictments had been obtained for extortion, narcotics, counterfeiting, tax evasion, embezzlement, liquor laws, sale of worthless stock, bankruptcy fraud, wagering, hijacking, and many other crimes, including violation of the Migratory Bird Act. This indicates the benefits of interagency cooperation.

## ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

Several organized crime units have established working relationships with a number of other state agencies. Wisconsin notes that the Attorney General's organized crime unit has used other agencies' facilities, such as the Secretary of State's corporate records, the Motor Vehicle Department's records, information from the Licensing and Regulation Division, and the Health and Social Services Department. The State Department of Revenue received a block grant to employ three investigators to assist the organized crime unit by developing tax cases. The Revenue Department has an intelligence division which works closely with the organized crime unit. New York reports that the departments of labor, insurance, audit and control were among those who had assisted its Organized Crime Task Force. The Task Force did not, however, have access to income tax records of the Department of Taxation and Finance, and had requested legislation to allow this.

Colorado notes that the Attorney General's organized crime staff has ready access to the files and the investigative staffs of the departments of revenue, securities, banking, insurance, and the racing commission. This close relationship is due in part to his role as legal adviser to these agencies.

The Illinois Attorney General's organized crime force notes that it works closely with the Illinois Revenue Department and with the Illinois Bureau of Investigation, as well as the Illinois Crime Commission. The Special Prosecution Unit in the Attorney General's office both advises agencies on cases developed by the agencies themselves, and in other instances, initiates investigations on its own, seeking appropriate agency advice as the case progresses. Iowa's Department of Justice cooperates closely with the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation by exchanging investigative leads, making joint use of informants, and in prosecutions. It planned to strengthen cooperation with the State Auditor's office, which has jurisdiction in the area of unauthorized expenditure of state and county funds. Mississippi contacted the state's major law enforcement agencies concerning assignment of officers to work with the Attorney General's staff in organized crime investigation. In New York, the Organized Crime Task Force uses both its own investigators and intelligence assistance from the Special Investigations Unit of the New York State Police.

In several states, the Attorney General's organized crime control staff is augmented by personnel from other agencies. About fifty State Police personnel are assigned to assist the New York Organized Crime Task Force, with the number varying according to need. In Rhode Island, State Police detectives are assigned to assist the organized crime staff on an "as-needed" and "when-available" basis. Laboratory and evidence-gathering support are provided by the State Police Identification Unit and by the University criminalistics laboratory. In Iowa, the Department of Public Safety has close contacts with the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, the Highway Patrol, the Liquor and Beer Enforcement Bureau, the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service, the Treasury Department and the Post Office Department. The Prosecutions Section of the Office of Attorney General works with the staffs of all the above agencies, exchanging information, sharing informants, sharing equipment, and making use of the powers peculiar to one agency - such as the audit power of the IRS and the mail cover power of the Post Office - to aid in investigations.<sup>9</sup> In Arizona, the facilities of the Department of Public Safety are available to the organized crime staff, which it supervises jointly with the Attorney General. These include various crime laboratory and scientific analysis facilities and staff.

## ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

State agencies can render essential administrative assistance to crime units. In November, 1972, before the Louisiana Attorney General's Organized Crime and Racketeering Unit became operational, memoranda of understanding were signed between the Attorney General and the State Banking Department, the Louisiana Department of Revenue, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety, and the Louisiana State Racing Commission. These memoranda formalize the stated "intention of these agencies that mutual coordination and assistance be extended for this effort to include exchange of information, manpower, and equipment, as well as any other assistance as may be useful and proper under the laws and constitution of the State of Louisiana".<sup>10</sup> The Kansas Bureau of Investigation's project plan called for agreements with the following agencies: the Motor Vehicle Department, for secret vehicle registration; the Department of Administration, to eliminate location from travel vouchers; the Personnel Division, for staffing; and the Purchasing Division, to order equipment. Its training courses include talks by representatives of the Secretary of State, on corporate records, and the Register of Deeds, on real estate records.

### Interstate and Federal Relations

There is a high degree of interstate cooperation in organized crime control, and of cooperation with the federal government. Major Herbert Breslow, Commander of the Special Investigation Section of the Miami Department of Police, has expressed the following view, shared by many investigative and prosecutive units, concerning the role of the Internal Revenue Service: "The IRS can do more to hurt organized crime than any other law enforcement agency. It hits them where it hurts - in the pocketbook. A law agency gets its most immediate return by dealing with the IRS, because they cut off funds from organized crime and decrease its activities".<sup>11</sup> Many states visited or consulted with other states' organized crime control units before starting their own programs. All apparently share at least some intelligence with other states and with the federal government. Organized crime staff members often appear on the training programs of other states. Staff members may visit other states which have organized crime problems involving the same leadership. A few channels of cooperation are described briefly here.

An Organized Crime Prosecutors Association has been established with membership selectively extended to those prosecutors who devote a substantial portion of their time to organized crime matters. Admission is by invitation only. The Association will facilitate the free exchange of ideas and information.<sup>12</sup>

Several states mentioned the importance of L.E.I.U. as liaison with other states. The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit is a voluntary association of agencies to exchange certain information. A law enforcement agency may apply for membership if it is sponsored by a member agency. Members are admitted only after careful screening and consideration of their usefulness to L.E.I.U. National conferences are held annually, and additional zone meetings may be held. Members give top priority to requests for information from other members. At least one of the units included in

## ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

this analysis was refused L.E.I.U. membership because the organization thought it was already adequately represented in that geographic area.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has sponsored various national and regional conferences. It contracted with a private consulting firm to hold 10-day conferences on organized crime at three different locations during 1972. A national advanced organized crime seminar was sponsored by L.E.A.A. in New Orleans, Louisiana, July 22 through July 25, 1973. L.E.A.A. has also awarded grants to several states to hold regional organized crime conferences. Most of the state units reported that members of their staffs had attended one or more of these meetings. In addition to the formal programs, these meetings provide an opportunity for informal exchange of information and ideas among attendees.

The New England Organized Crime Intelligence System is a formal regional organization to combat organized crime. It was formed in 1968 by the New England Association of Attorneys General and the New England State Police Administrative Conference, with substantial funding by L.E.A.A. and the participating states. It has a staff, under the direction of a committee representing the two Associations, which receives, processes, and stores information.

Many states also mentioned that they work with federal organized crime strike forces. One state reported that it turned a case it had developed over to the strike force, because federal law provided a better basis for prosecution. The composition of individual strike forces varies. The relationship to state and local agencies also varies. Some include representatives of state agencies, while others have only limited contact with such groups.

NEOCIS will have permanently ceased field operations as of January 18, 1973. It is contemplated that NEOCIS will continue as an agency for receipt, analysis, and dissemination of organized crime data. The actual intelligence gathering, however, will probably be done by investigators and police officers operating under the direction and control of their own individual units, rather than under the direction and control of NEOCIS. The exact nature of the planned re-structuring of NEOCIS is unknown at present, but continuation of the unit in some form is highly probable.<sup>13</sup>

The Attorney General of Minnesota has met several times with the United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota, and they are forming a federal-state joint law enforcement council. Their meetings led to excellent cooperation in a large-scale fencing case resulting in convictions in October, 1973.

Michigan reports that because of the close proximity of that state to Canada, an excellent liaison has been established between the Michigan Attorney General's organized crime division and the Ontario Provincial Police, the Windsor Police Department, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Other border states might consider such international cooperation if the potential has not yet been explored.

## ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITS

Delaware State Police Intelligence Central reports the following accomplishments for the period of April 1, 1973 to September 30, 1973. In cooperation with the Wilmington Police Department, a manual identifying known and suspected major organized gambling figures in Delaware was produced. Active liaison has been developed with the following units, due to the development of the Intelligence Central concept: federal strike force, Baltimore, Maryland; U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; major crime investigation units, Maryland State Police; Organized Crime Unit, Prince George's County, Maryland; Organized Crime and Rackets Division, District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department; Intelligence Liaison Unit, Florida Department of Law Enforcement. This extends to nineteen the number of out-of-state departments, units, and agencies engaged in organized crime investigations and intelligence collection with whom Maryland Intelligence Central has effective exchange relationships.<sup>14</sup>

## BUDGETS AND FUNDING

### 3. BUDGETS AND FUNDING

The availability of federal funds has been a major impetus in the establishment of organized crime control programs. State and local governments also contribute part of the cost of these programs. Federal discretionary grants for organized crime control have ranged from under \$50,000 to over \$500,000. Most are for a one-year period.

#### Source of Funds

Most organized crime control units rely in part on funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. This is in keeping with the directive of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which established L.E.A.A. It specified that "special emphasis" be given to "programs dealing with the prevention, detection and control of organized crime."<sup>1</sup> Civil disorders was the only other substantive area given such special attention.

L.E.A.A. funds for the prevention and control of organized crime totaled \$1.4 million in fiscal year 1969, \$11 million in fiscal year 1970, and more than \$20 million in fiscal year 1971.<sup>2</sup> L.E.A.A. funds are distributed through action or block grants and through discretionary grants. Each state has a criminal justice planning agency which distributes that state's share of L.E.A.A. funds to state and local agencies through action, or block, grants. A small share of funds is allocated by L.E.A.A. at its own discretion, through discretionary grants. These are to be used primarily for "special emphasis and supplementation."

Table 2 lists L.E.A.A. discretionary grants for organized crime control. This shows grants to state or local agencies in twenty-nine states. Grants are to the Attorney General in about half of these. This information was derived from various L.E.A.A. lists and from questionnaires to the states. It is not necessarily complete; for example, more grants may have been extended beyond the original expiration date than are shown here.

A total of seventy-nine grants are listed. These can be classified as follows by the size of the grant:

Under \$50,000	11 grants	200,000 - 249,000	12 grants
\$50,000 - 99,000	18 grants	250,000 - 299,000	11 grants
100,000 - 149,000	10 grants	300,000 and over	4 grants
150,000 - 199,000	13 grants		

Table 2 also shows the general purpose for which the grant was made, such as intelligence or prosecution. In addition, grants from regional programs are listed after the table.

The table shows only the amount of the L.E.A.A. share, not the total cost of the program. The law requires matching of federal funds, with the level depending on the purpose of the grant.

TABLE 2: L.E.A.A. DISCRETIONARY GRANTS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS

State	Amount (fed. share)	Date	Purpose	Grantee
Arizona	\$ 94,728	4/71-4/72	Invest. & Pros.	Dept. of Public Safety & Attorney General
	103,058	2/73-1/74	Invest. & Pros.	Dept. of Public Safety & Attorney General
California	250,000	7/70-6/71	Invest. & Pros.	Dept. of Justice
	500,074		Intelligence	Dept. of Justice
Colorado	84,663	6/70-6/71 (ex. to 9/71)	Invest. & Pros.	Denver Dr. Attny.
	93,258	6/71-6/72	Intelligence	Denver Dr. Attny.
	139,915	12/70-12/71	Intelligence	Colo. Bur. of Invest.
	122,185	9/72-9/73	Intelligence	Colo. Bur. of Invest.
	47,598	7/71-6/72	Prosecution	Attorney General
	98,670	3/73-2/74	Intelligence	Div. of Crim. Jus.
Connecticut	52,980	7/70-6/71	Intelligence	State Police
	220,859*	11/73-10/74	Intelligence	State Police
Delaware	124,135	12/70-11/71 (ex. to 10/72)	Intelligence	State Police
	91,685*	(not avail.)	Intelligence	State Police
Florida	150,000	6/70-6/71		Miami Police Dept.
	124,900	10/71-10/72		Miami Police Dept.
	149,920	12/72-12/73	Invest. & Pros.	Miami Police Dept.
	88,238	5/71-4/72	Intelligence	Dept. of Law Enforcement
	136,576	7/71-6/72	Prosecution	States Attny. (Jacksonville)
	86,768		Invest. & Pros.	States Attny. (6th Ct.)
	258,945	8/71-7/72	Intelligence	Dept. of Law Enforcement
	290,626	7/70-5/71	Intelligence	Dept. of Law Enforcement
	275,315	(ex. to 9/71) 8/73-7/74	Investigation	Dept. of Law Enforcement
75,550	7/70-12/71	Training	Dade Co. Public Safety Dept.	
Georgia	66,353	7/71-6/72	Intelligence	Dr. Attny. (Atlanta)
	199,000	7/71-6/72	Intelligence	Dept. of Public Safety
	151,000	10/72-5/73	Intelligence	Dept. of Public Safety
	42,000	/72		Office of Crime & Juv. Delinq. Planning
Hawaii	298,625	7/71-6/72	Intell. & Pros.	Law Enforce. & Juv. Planning. <sup>1</sup>
	220,569*	1/72-12/73	Invest. & Pros.	Law Enforce. & Juv. Planning Agency. <sup>1</sup>
Idaho	48,017	7/70-6/71	Intelligence	Dept. of Law Enforcement

TABLE 2: L.E.A.A. DISCRETIONARY GRANTS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS

State	Amount (fed. share)	Date	Purpose	Grantee
Illinois	\$250,540	7/70-11/71	Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
	250,000	1/72-1/73	Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
	362,045	7/71	Intelligence	Illinois Bureau of Invest.
Indiana	150,000	6/70-10/71 (ex. to 1/72)	Intelligence	State Police
	242,674	9/72-8/73	Intelligence	State Police
Iowa	170,500		Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
	27,647		Prevention	Iowa Crime Commission
Kansas	243,443	5/71-5/72	Intelligence	Kansas Bureau of Invest. (under A.G.)
	244,736	1/73-1/74	Intelligence	K.B.I.
Kentucky	205,967		Intelligence	Ky. State Police
	200,000	(not avail.)	Intelligence	Dept. of Public Safety
Louisiana	183,103	7/70-6/71	Intelligence	Dept. of Public Safety
	250,000	4/73-4/74	Invest. & Pros.	Dept. of Justice
Massachusetts	174,176	7/69-7/71 (ex. to 3/72)	Intelligence	Commission on Law Enforce. & Adm. of Justice
Michigan	67,300	12/69-11/70	Intelligence	State Police
	217,354	2/71-2/72	Intelligence	State Police
	110,254*	5/73-5/74	Intelligence	State Police
	63,500	6/70-6/71 (ex. to 8/71)	Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
	213,701	7/71-6/72	Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
	175,297*	4/73-4/74	Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
Minnesota	117,878	12/70-11/71 (ex. to 6/72)	Intelligence	Attorney General
New Jersey	196,492	6/70-6/71	Invest. & Pros.	State Police (under A.G.)
	327,900*	2/72-2/73	Invest. & Pros.	State Police (under A.G.)
	58,846	6/70-6/71	Intelligence	State Police (under A.G.)
New Mexico	78,327	(not avail.)	Intelligence	Governor's O.C. Prevention Commission
New York	215,037	1/71-6/71	Invest.	Commission to Investigate Police Corruption
	285,552	11/72-10/73		N.Y.C. Police Dept.
	250,000	6/70-6/71 (ex. to 12/71)	Invest. & Pros.	Dept. of Law
	168,432	3/70-3/71		Office of Crime Control Planning
	57,000	6/70-6/71	Intelligence	N.Y. Identification & Intelligence System

TABLE 2: L.E.A.A. DISCRETIONARY GRANTS FOR ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS

State	Amount (fed. share)	Date	Purpose	Grantee
North Carolina	38,506	7/71-10/72	Prevention	Dept. of Justice
	31,232*	7/73-10/74	Intelligence	Dept. of Justice
	182,436	9/72-12/73	Intelligence	State Bureau of Invest. (under A.G.)
Ohio	98,400	7/71-1/73	Prevention	Dept. of Urban Affairs
Oklahoma	21,895	3/70-3/71	Training	Crime Commission
Oregon	32,734	7/71-7/72	Prevention	Law Enforce. Council
	25,000*	(not avail.)	Invest. & Pros.	Ore. Law Enforce. Council
Pennsylvania	263,395	12/70-12/71	Invest. & Pros.	Crime Commission
Rhode Island	48,200	6/70-6/71	Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
	73,185	7/71-7/72	Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
	73,085*	-7/73	Invest. & Pros.	Attorney General
Texas	213,669	6/70-6/71	Intelligence	Dept. of Public Safety
	197,077	10/70-9/71	Intelligence	Dallas Police Dept.
	441,638*	7/72-6/73	Intelligence	Texas Crim. Justice Council
Washington	49,965	10/70-12/71	Intelligence	Attorney General
West Virginia	193,739	7/70-6/71	Intelligence	Purchasing Practices & Procedures Commission
Wisconsin	138,880	6/70-6/72	Invest. & Pros.	Dept. of Justice
	220,000*	7/73-6/74	Invest. & Pros.	Dept. of Justice

<sup>1</sup>Hawaii: Subgranted to Attorney General and to four police departments.

\*Indicates continuation funding on earlier grant project.

Note: the following grants for regional programs are not included:

- \$251,554 to New Jersey (6/70-6/72 for the N. J. - N. Y. Waterfront Commission;
- 11,926 to Michigan (7/69-7/70) for a Midwest Regional Conference;
- 598,430 to Massachusetts (4/70-7/71, ex. 11/71) for New England Intelligence System;
- 16,400 to Georgia (10/69-11/70) for a Regional Training Conference.
- 149,920 to the City of Miami, Fla. (12/72-12/73) for an Organized Crime Fighting Team (investigation and prosecution);
- 285,552 to the N. Y. City Police Department (11/72-10/73) for investigation and prosecution of illegal cigarette operations;

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200,000 to the Wayne Co., Mich., Prosecutor and the Sheriff and Police Commissioners of Detroit (6/73-6/74) for investigation and prosecution;

137,950 to the Genesee Co., Mich., Metropolitan Organized Crime Unit (7/72-7/73) for investigation and prosecution;

141,000 to the Police Chief of Cincinnati, Ohio (5/72-4/73) for investigation;

104,903 to the Dayton, Ohio Dept. of Police (12/72-12/73) for investigation;

186,056 to the Washoe Co., Nevada, Sheriff's Dept. for intelligence.

In some states, the L.E.A.A. - funded program may be only a part of the organized crime control program. Thus, Wisconsin estimated that the Department of Justice's total annual expenditure for organized crime control would be \$230,000, while its 1972 L.E.A.A. grant for organized crime was \$93,000. Several states report that both discretionary and block grant funds are used to support their organized crime control program, along with state funds. In New York, the organized crime task force was established under a \$250,000 discretionary grant a \$250,000 block grant, plus state funds. New Jersey's state-wide investigative-prosecutor unit had \$100,000 in discretionary and \$156,000 in block grant funds. Arizona reported \$50,000 in block grant and \$94,728 in discretionary funding. West Virginia's Purchasing Practices Commission spent \$313,130 of state and \$423,122 of federal funds between July, 1968, and June, 1972; the source of the state funds was not indicated.

In Iowa, the current budget for the Criminal Prosecutions Unit is reflected in two federal block grant awards that extend through March 15, 1974. The two awards support expenses for the Unit in the following proportion: 55.5 percent from the State Crime Commission courts program; and 44.5 percent from the "Law Enforcement" program.

Colorado reports that federal block and discretionary grant funds for its Organized Crime Strike Force total \$323,900, matched by state funds of \$36,150. The grant period is October 1, 1973 through September 30, 1974. It is anticipated that a similar amount of funds will be obtained as a continuation grant on October 1, 1974. The state legislature must appropriate 10 percent cash match funds to assure future federal funding. A number of law enforcement agencies, primarily the Denver Police Department, have assigned detectives to the Strike Force, paying a significant portion of detectives' salaries (at least \$160,000).<sup>3</sup>

## BUDGETS AND FUNDING

During the next two years, a National Scope Organized Crime Program, funded primarily by L.E.A.A., will be carried out. Through four joint investigations, the Program will develop a working relationship, by use of the strike force concept, between the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, U. S. Department of Justice, and other compatible federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.<sup>4</sup>

Prior to fiscal year 1972-73, L.E.A.A. required grantee states to bear the cost of at least 25 percent of a project funded by a discretionary grant, and required that projects funded out of the block grants made to the states also meet the 25 percent match requirement. Many projects met the match requirement with such "soft" match items as contributed time and services.

Now, however, "soft" match has been eliminated, and the grantee must provide a "hard" match requirement of 10 percent of the total cost of the program for which federal support is sought.

### Continuation Funding

L.E.A.A. funds are normally awarded on a one-year basis, although some grants may be for longer periods and many are extended. L.E.A.A. funding is not intended to be permanent, but to initiate programs that will subsequently be absorbed into state budgets. One year is viewed as the normal project period for discretionary grants. Continuation support may be requested, but cannot normally exceed half of the initial award.<sup>5</sup>

To date, there is little indication that state funds are replacing federal grants. Hawaii is a state in which funds have ceased. The Organized Crime Unit, which was located in the Department of the Attorney General, was deactivated on October 5, 1973, due to a cut-off of federal funding assistance. The future is different for the Organized Crime Division in the Michigan Attorney General's Office. In that state, legislation has been enacted placing the Division's budget into the total Michigan State Police budget. In New York, state funds support the Attorney General's Organized Crime Task Force. All of the states which reported to C.O.A.G. on their plans for continued funding will seek or have sought further L.E.A.A. grants. Several states report that they consider discretionary grant funding essential for the first two or three years of a program. This is presumably the goal of most units, but has not yet been achieved. The North Carolina Attorney General has requested a program for fiscal year 1974-75 from its Budget Advisory Committee, in order to provide permanent funding for its Organized Crime Intelligence Task Force. Other states have taken or are considering similar requests for state funds. One such state is Wisconsin, which reports that the State Department of Administration's Bureau of Budget and Planning has been approached with a proposal to pick up the funding for the Attorney General's Organized Crime Strike Force. Initial reaction to the proposal was favorable.

Several states report negatively on the chances of state support. One project director reports that his state legislature is afraid of the organized crime unit and may not fund it. Another reports that there is a question about continued state funding of the regular organized crime control program, and an even greater problem with state funding of the program now underwritten by L.E.A.A.

## BUDGETS AND FUNDING

Several states look to their state criminal justice planning agency for fiscal support. At least two organized crime programs plan to seek further discretionary grant funding but, if that is not available, anticipate that block grant funds will be made available by the state agency. Rhode Island submitted a plan to its state criminal justice planning agency by which block grant funds would be used to maintain the Organized Crime Investigation and Prosecution Unit through April 30, 1974. The request was approved, and additional block grant funds will be requested in April for expanded operations.

### Budget Totals

Table 3 shows the amount budgeted, by categories, for some statewide organized crime control units. Within each selected state two budget breakdowns are presented - the first is the initial projected budget when the unit was first funded, and the second is the budget breakdown for the most current period available.

These figures are taken from L.E.A.A. grant applications. They are, therefore, estimates, and do not necessarily reflect actual expenditures. Some deviation is allowed without a formal transfer of funds, and, in some cases, funds have been transferred from one category to another. In addition, some extensions may have been granted which are not shown here. Despite these limitations, these data give some idea of the total cost and budget components of an organized crime control program.

Some budget categories are discussed below. Salaries and consultant services are considered in Chapter 4.

### Over - and Under - Budgeting

California noted in 1972 that variations may be indicated as experience is gained, particularly in regard to equipment. Equipment other than that budgeted may be needed, or the budgeted equipment may not test out satisfactorily. California reported other problems, such as insufficient money for office space, and more funds than required for consultants and confidential informants. The budget for accountants was in excess of need, because such personnel could be borrowed from other agencies, equipment technicians were hired instead. Hawaii originally budgeted \$35,000 for consultants, but used this instead to acquire communications and surveillance equipment.

Other budget changes resulted from delays in staffing and otherwise activating programs. In Mississippi, a delay in starting resulted in a reduction of the initial 18-month budget from \$333,455 to \$250,745. The difficulty of obtaining qualified personnel reduced the size of the staff, and the sum budgeted for books was reduced, because of the lack of enough appropriate materials. Payments to informants were less than anticipated, because informant development proceeded more slowly than predicted.

An examination of the amounts shown in Table 3 reveals, through side by side comparison, how budgeting has changed, by category, from the earliest to the latest projected budget by each unit. Initial budgets ranged from \$127,616 in Rhode Island to \$343,624 in Kansas. Recent budgets ranged from \$140,425 in Rhode Island to \$379,154 in Michigan. Salaries are the largest items in these budgets, old or new, and account for over half the total in most budgets. Equipment is the second most heavily budgeted item, and travel the third.

TABLE 3: AMOUNTS BUDGETED, BY CATEGORIES,  
SELECTED ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL UNITS

(Information from L.E.A.A. Grant Applications, for initial grant periods, and for latest periods for which information is available).

State & Grant No.	Period	Salaries	Consult.	Travel	Equip.	Supplies	Total
Ariz. (71-DF-722)	4/71-4/72	\$ 110,653	\$ 0	\$ 28,760	\$ 43,084	\$ 14,901	\$ 197,398
(Cont.)	2/73-1/74	121,361	5,000	52,010	70,420	16,200	264,991
Change		10% up	100% up	81% up	63% up	9% up	34% up
Del. (71-DF-634)	10/71-10/72	95,690	10,000	5,800	40,182	8,425	160,097
(Cont.)	3/73-3/74	165,805	0	4,500	12,860	5,023	188,190
Change		73% up	100% down	22% down	68% down	40% down	18% up
Ga. (71-DF-949)	7/71-7/72	159,000	0	11,800	80,400	15,000	266,200
(Cont.)	10/72-5/73	120,975	10,000	5,000	40,225	25,299	201,499
Change		24% down	100% up	58% down	50% down	69% up	24% down
Kan. (71-DF-737)	5/71-5/72	230,553	0	28,121	54,903	30,047	343,624
(Cont.)	1/73-1/74	221,146	0	45,012	48,139	18,487	332,784
Change		4% down	0	60% up	12% down	38% down	3% down
Ky. (71-DF-682)	1/71-1/72	182,769	900	62,722	12,618	18,040	277,049
(Cont.)	6/73-6/74	88,725	0	33,207	103,055	41,680	266,667
Change		51% down	100% down	47% down	717% up	131% up	4% down
Mich. (70-DF-065)	6/70-6/71	104,923	0	18,300	6,650	7,127	137,000
(Cont.)	4/73-4/74	297,881	0	50,020	835	29,918	379,154
Change		184% up	0	173% up	87% down	319% up	177% up
R.I. (71-DF-1078)	7/71-7/72	101,192	0	0	8,224	18,200	127,616
(Cont.)	7/72-7/73	121,325	0	12,600	900	5,600	140,425
Change		20% up	0	100% up	89% down	69% down	10% up
Wis. (70-DF-098)	5/70-5/72	272,800	0	22,400	3,000	9,300	307,500
(Cont.)	7/73-7/74	261,600	0	8,100	800	22,834	293,334
Change		4% down	0	64% down	73% down	146% up	5% down

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The conclusion to be drawn from a comparison of the various shifts in budget emphasis is apparently that no general trend has emerged with regard to budget needs. In Delaware, amounts budgeted for travel, equipment, and supplies are down, and the consultant service budget has been eliminated entirely. Salaries, comparatively are up 73 percent. Georgia, in marked contrast, has cut its salary budget, along with the amounts budgeted for travel and equipment, while emphasizing a greater need for supplies. Precisely the reverse is true for Georgia with regard to its amount budgeted for consultant services. Where Delaware goes from \$10,000 to zero, Georgia goes from zero to \$10,000. Presumably, the message of these shifts from sample units is there is not a hard and fast formula for budgeting an organized crime unit and that significant flexibility and imagination are requisite characteristics of unit directors that have been successful in securing continued funding over the past few years.

Travel

Most organized crime control budgets include a fairly large sum for travel. Out-of-state travel is necessary to permit attendance at conferences and to establish liaison with programs of other states. New Jersey, for example, budgeted \$4,240 for out-of-state travel in one year. This included ten trips to Washington, D. C., fourteen to New York, attendance by four attorneys at a training conference, and trips to Philadelphia, Montreal, Miami, Tucson and Boston to establish lines of communication with other crime control agencies.

In-state travel is necessary to establish and maintain contact with local law enforcement officials and to conduct intelligence operations. To budget for this, states usually estimate the number of days agents will be traveling. Kentucky, for example, in 1972 estimated 62 nights a year that each investigator would be away from his duty post. Kansas estimated that nine special agents would be away from the office 76 days each on investigative work. Pennsylvania's Crime Commission estimated that twenty-five employees, or about half its staff, would each be away from their posts 50 days per year. Arizona estimated that six men would each travel 15,000 miles per year by car, and that three officers would each travel 100 hours by plane in-state. Iowa predicted that investigators would be in the field 75 percent of the time and attorneys 25 percent.

Supplies

Supplies include such routine items as rent and office supplies. A few components of this budget category, however, are relevant to a review of organized crime control units. The following figures are, of course, meaningful only if related to the total budget and to the size of the staff.

Several units include funds to purchase the state statutes and advance sheets. Several budget funds for city directories, to use in intelligence work. New Jersey, for example, budgeted \$2,800 for a set of city directories and \$1,413 for a confidential street-name-telephone index. Kansas budgeted \$400 for city directories and \$160 for newspaper subscriptions.

## BUDGETS AND FUNDING

Funds for printing and publication may be included. New Jersey estimated \$2,800 printing costs in one year to reproduce court decisions which concerned investigation techniques, print wanted posters and other materials, and to develop films. Pennsylvania included \$5,000 in one budget and \$1,100 in another for editorial assistance in preparing reports. Arizona budgeted \$820 for printing and photography, and Kentucky budgeted \$1,000.

Several states budget for court reporters, transcripts, and other costs related to legal proceedings. Wisconsin had a budget one year of \$10,000 for such legal expenses as court costs, witness fees, sheriffs fees, grand jury expenses, transcripts and briefs. Pennsylvania budgeted \$2,000 for hearing facilities and \$10,000 for stenographic reporting services.

Telephone budgets reflect the need for close liaison with local officials. The budget for a Texas intelligence unit in 1972 included inward and outward WATS lines at \$815 per month each, and a portable telephone with tolls at \$2,350 per year. Minnesota budgeted \$100 per month for long distance calls in 1972, based on an expectation of 200 to 300 calls per year. Kentucky's budget included \$3,600 for annual WATS line costs and \$6,600 for credit card calls.

### Equipment

Budgets usually include two types of equipment. One is office equipment, such as desks and files. The other is investigative equipment, which includes surveillance and communications equipment and vehicles. The former category is routine, and presents no significant budgeting or purchasing problems. Investigative equipment, however, involves problems of selection and purchase.

The types of equipment purchased by organized crime control units are discussed in a subsequent chapter on equipment. Equipment items range from cameras and recorders in the \$100 range to low-light cameras and binoculars that cost thousands of dollars. Most units have also purchased surveillance vehicles at \$3,000 or \$4,000 each, or are leasing vehicles. Presumably, future equipment budgets will consist primarily of replacement items, improved items, and additional equipment if staffs are expanded.

Most states from which information is available reported that equipment was purchased through bids. One mentioned that it was frequently necessary to specify that no substitutes be allowed, because the purchasing agent had a tendency to buy cheaper items which proved to be unsatisfactory. It was also mentioned that no single vendor had all types of equipment, so it was necessary to do a great deal of shopping to learn who could provide needed items. Some items were not available from any source, although they were needed.

## BUDGETS AND FUNDING

Several states have a staff specialist who can test equipment and believe this is highly desirable. The equipment originally selected may prove to be unsatisfactory; one program director commented that "vendors often grossly exaggerated the capabilities of their equipment." The Director of the California Division of Law Enforcement stresses the need for a complete evaluation by experts of all equipment before purchase. For this reason, he believes "it would be much better to allocate a lump sum for the purchase of surveillance equipment. Specific items of equipment to be purchased would only be identified for purchase after testing and determining its suitability for field use."<sup>6</sup>

### Confidential Funds

Almost all organized crime control budgets include a "confidential fund". This is usually listed in the grant applications as a confidential fund, but may be budgeted under "communications consultants", "informant expense", or other heading. Such a fund is a new element in most Attorney Generals' budgets, and poses problems of accountability.

Some states reported the amount of this fund in 1972: \$2,500 in Minnesota, \$5,000 in Colorado and Kentucky, \$15,000 in Mississippi, \$25,000 in West Virginia, \$30,000 in New York, and about \$35,000 in Pennsylvania. These figures are for one year, or for somewhat longer if the grant has been extended. Both Pennsylvania and New York said the fund would be substantially increased in the future. Texas budgeted \$5,000 to rent a location for surveillance, \$20,000 for evidence, and \$14,208 for informant expense.

In Colorado, a confidential fund of \$36,000 is budgeted. Included in this fund is a provision for retention of "special employees" who provide information and leads regarding the activities of organized crime figures and major narcotic dealers. Confidential payments, based on prior years expenditures, are projected to be \$6,000. Expenditures from this fund are described in the Strike Force's application for discretionary grant funds as the "gut" of the operation.

The primary uses of these funds, as reported to C.O.A.G., are: to pay informants and other confidential sources; to purchase contraband for use as evidence; to cover room rental and other expenses involved in surveillance; to protect witnesses; and to pay other expenses of investigation, such as to buy drinks for potential informants, to place bets with gamblers, etc.. One state also says the funds will be used to purchase securities in business fraud cases. The same state indicates that a limited amount of funds will be used to reimburse local prosecutors for informants they have developed, and to assist them with the costs of convening grand juries in their areas.

A few states report that they do not have such a fund. One project director explained in an interview that he considers it unnecessary and open to possible misuse.



## BUDGETS AND FUNDING

A few states explained what controls were placed on these funds. Pennsylvania said that a procedure similar to that of the U. S. Customs Bureau is followed, whereby the investigator submits a memo prior to making the expenditure, and the Director gets a word-of-mouth evaluation of the need. The U. S. Department of Justice Organized Crime and Racketeering Section authorizes certain persons to issue prior approval for expenditure of confidential funds, or, in emergencies, to approve by telephone.

Mississippi says that a separate checking account is set up under the jurisdiction of the Project Director. Checks on this account are paid to investigators, who then pay each to the informants, and obtain receipts for such payments. Wisconsin reports that confidential funds "will be receipted in such fashion as to ensure an audit trail." At Louisiana's newly formed organized crime and racketeering unit, approval must be obtained from the chief of the unit prior to paying a source from confidential funds. A signed receipt must be returned from the source, along with a memorandum from the investigator setting out information received. Expenditures over \$500 must be approved by the Attorney General himself.<sup>7</sup>

In Ohio close scrutiny of each expenditure, plus periodic in-house audits insure proper accountability of confidential funds. Only three people have authority to approve, dispense, or review such funds. They are the Superintendent, the Assistant Superintendent, and the Intelligence Analyst of the organized crime section in the Attorney General's office. Any requests by an agent for funds must be reviewed by the Assistant Superintendent and countersigned by the Superintendent before that agent will receive the funds. All three key personnel in charge of the funds are bonded privately in the amount of \$20,000.

On the basis of the Ohio report and similar positive reports from other units, the problems of accountability posed by confidential funds are apparently being met with no great degree of difficulty as organized crime control units gather more and more experience in budget control and analysis.

## PERSONNEL

### 4. PERSONNEL

One of the most difficult problems in developing organized crime control programs has been staffing them with qualified persons. Most units have been created only the past few years. There are a limited number of persons available who have relevant experience, and there are few guidelines as to desirable qualifications. There are special problems of security. Most programs involve a combination of various professions, and there are no standards for determining the proper "mix". New positions, such as crime analyst, have been developed, and there are not established job descriptions for these. This chapter discusses some of these problems.

#### Types of Positions

All statewide organized crime units employ investigators. All but a few employ attorneys, the exceptions being some intelligence units. Most also employ some fiscal or analytical personnel.

The accompanying table gives an idea of the number and "mix" of various types of personnel in organized crime control programs. These figures are not entirely accurate, because some are based on authorized, rather than actual, staff. Some are based on information in Discretionary Grant applications, which may have since been modified. They are based on the latest data available to C.O.A.G., which may not be current. These positions are also often supplemented by personnel borrowed from other state or federal agencies. In 1972, New York, for example, listed 43 positions, including 12 attorneys and 7 accountants, but these were augmented by 50 assigned State Police employees.

Personnel may be classified as follows, using titles which currently exist in state programs:

- (1) attorneys or prosecutors;
- (2) investigators, including detectives, agents, field agents, and special agents;
- (3) stenographic, clerical or secretarial staff;
- (4) accountants, including tax analysts, a tax-accountant; one state notes that the account position may be filled by an economist or a labor-management specialist.
- (5) organized crime analysts, including statistical analysts, criminal research analysts, organized crime specialists, or data analysts;
- (6) equipment specialists, including radio engineers, photo-electronic specialists, equipment specialists, or electronic technicians;

PERSONNEL

(7) management personnel, including bookkeepers and administrative officers.

One state, Pennsylvania, has hired a writer-consultant to help prepare reports. Another reports that a planning and training officer is needed for public relations, informing police, and similar duties.

TABLE 4. TYPES OF POSITIONS IN ORGANIZED CRIME UNITS

(Data for the latest year available to C.O.A.G.; not necessarily current. FT means Full-Time; PT means Part-Time.)

State	Number of Positions Authorized				
	Attorneys	Investi- gators	Clerical & Steno	Accoun- tants	Other
Colorado	5 FT	17 FT	3 FT	1 FT	1 FT intelligence spec.
Delaware		7 FT	2 FT		1 FT analysts
Kentucky		22 FT	4 FT		4 FT analysts
Louisiana (1)	6 FT	7 FT	3 FT	1 FT	
Michigan	2 FT	7 FT	7 FT		2 FT analysts
Minnesota	2 PT	3 FT	2 FT; 1 PT	1 FT	1 FT analysts
Mississippi		7 FT	4 FT		1 FT director
New Jersey (2)	11 FT		5 FT	1 FT	1 FT sec. expert
New York	6 FT	10 FT	17 FT	7 FT	
North Carolina	3 PT	11 FT	6 FT		3 FT intelligence spec. 9 FT analysts
Pennsylvania (3)	7 FT	28 FT	19 FT		3 FT admin.asst. 1 FT admin. off. 1 FT director

(1) One attorney is a CPA, and serves as account-investigator as well.

(2) The State Police serve as investigators for the Unit.

(3) Pennsylvania

There is considerable variation in states' approaches to combining these types of personnel. They usually employ more investigators than attorneys, except in states like New Jersey, where another state agency provides the investigators. Five out of the eleven states listed employ some type of analyst. Five of these eleven states also have an accountant on the staff. Some states also use or plan to use consultants to add specialized expertise. Minnesota, for example, indicated that consultants would be employed from the fields of criminology, economics, sociology, psychology and related disciplines. Kentucky noted in 1972 that its budget may seem to be shallow in the area of professional services, but many of these are offered without charge by the U. S. Department of Justice.

PERSONNEL

The special nature of organized crime investigation and prosecution has generated new personnel needs and new job qualifications. Even investigators are a recent addition to many Attorneys General's staffs. In the 1968-69 fiscal year, only thirty-eight Attorneys General employed investigators, and some of these used them only for consumer fraud cases.<sup>1</sup> A 1973 survey showed that, of fifty-one Attorneys General reporting, forty-four full-time investigators were employed, and the other four replies failed to specify any figure with regard to investigators.<sup>2</sup> The position of organized crime analyst has come into being only in the past few years.

An L.E.A.A. study, The Basic Elements of Intelligence, notes two categories of professional analyst in organized crime control. One is the non-specialized analyst:

many intelligence units in the country have found that the use of recent liberal arts graduates is rewarding. Such people, frequently young women, are quite simply analysts. On arrival they know nothing about criminology, or police work, or the law, or even the methodology of data analysis, but if they are intelligent, precise, and anxious to explore generally uncharted waters, they can soon make important contributions to criminal analysis.<sup>3</sup>

The other category, the specialized analyst, may be an accountant or economist who is used to studying business frauds and related matters. Or, the analyst may be a sociologist or psychologist who is used to studying inter-group behavior "with a view towards detecting weak lines in organized crime combinations."<sup>4</sup> This study also suggests that the academic community can be a significant source of specialized personnel assistance. Iowa's Special Prosecutions unit reports that it has made extensive use of law school faculty, who have participated in litigation, and has also used the services of students.

The Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the United States Department of Justice has developed detailed job descriptions for its specialized analyst positions - such as Intelligence Research Specialist, Senior Intelligence Research Specialist, and Intelligence Operations Specialist. Each position description includes an in-depth introduction setting out the organizational role that the person would occupy, as well as precise delineation of duties, responsibilities, work controls, and other factors significant to the job. The position of Intelligence Research Specialist, for example, is described as that of a person "who exercises mature judgment necessary to the retrieval and analysis of intelligence data pertinent to the investigation, parole, or prosecution of racketeers in the United States." Duties include acting as liaison with Federal Strike Forces and preparing analytical studies such as surveys of labor unions or corrupt organizations. Analysis of intelligence data from the Section's computer is expected, in order to discern patterns of activities or behavior with criminal prosecution potential.

## PERSONNEL

Several states use students to augment their staffs. In Colorado, a law clerk is employed to do research. In Wisconsin, three law clerks have proven of valuable assistance on a part-time basis. Massachusetts employed two interns under a 5-year program at a nearby university, where students alternated 3 months of college with 3 months of work.

### Position Classifications

The success of a program depends on the qualifications of personnel more than any other factor. Defining these qualifications poses special problems in organized crime programs, because the requisite experience in operating programs is lacking and it is difficult to determine precisely what skills will be needed.

In a few states, including California, Wisconsin and Michigan, organized crime personnel are under civil service or merit systems. Kansas reported that civil service requirements delayed the program's progress, as job descriptions had to be developed. In most states, however, organized crime personnel are exempt from such requirements, allowing more flexibility in recruiting.

It is usually necessary to develop special job descriptions for organized crime positions, as existing personnel categories may not be appropriate. California, for example, has a two-page specification for photo-electronic specialists, setting forth a definition, typical tasks, minimum qualifications, education, knowledge and abilities, and pay scales. This description was developed by the organized crime staff and was based to some extent on existing electronic specialist positions, with significant variations. Michigan has a "crime investigator" classification for persons who "make investigations of organized crime for the Attorney General" and perform other specified duties.

Preparation of such job descriptions requires careful consideration of proposed programs. Wisconsin, however, reports that no special job descriptions have been developed. Some states, like Mississippi, were able to prepare specifications on the basis of reviewing descriptions from other agencies.

Sample job descriptions for investigators and analysts are included in the Appendix to this Report.

States have not generally prepared new job descriptions for attorneys in organized crime control programs. Some use existing personnel qualifications, and others have no formal requirements.

A number of states apparently have developed qualifications for investigators. Minnesota sets the following criteria:

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- a. Extensive law enforcement experience, preferably in organized crime investigation;
- b. Ability to write reports and initiate projects;
- c. Personality suitable for liaison with other agencies;
- d. Knowledge of major criminals and their operation in the state;
- e. Good educational background.

Arizona summarized investigators' duties as: development of material needed to establish probable cause in connection with electronic surveillance affidavits; field investigations in re grand jury activities; and follow-up investigation on organized crime activity leads.

Kansas has adopted written qualifications which include: knowledge of current principles, practices, and techniques of criminal investigation; knowledge of criminal law; ability to work independently or in cooperation with other agencies; skill in the use of firearms and identification equipment.

Wisconsin differentiates between special agents and investigators. A special agent must be experienced in broad criminal investigation and able to plan and develop special investigations. He works with considerable independence and he needs judgment as to procedures and techniques. An investigator is primarily responsible for more systematic and repetitive procedures and responsibilities in gathering and analyzing data. His work does not involve as much flexibility.

The position of analyst is difficult to define. Delaware is typical in reporting problems "in ascertaining the type of person with the background to be an intelligence analyst. This was because it is a relatively new field with a limited amount of known personnel with qualifications."<sup>5</sup> Minnesota requires that a "data analyzer" have: two years of college; a background in the use and analysis of statistics; an ability to prepare reports; have a "personality suitable for extensive research into very complicated financial material"; be "conversant or trainable in rudimentary law enforcement techniques." They "will be highly trained in research, statistical compilation and analysis, and data extrapolation."

In Pennsylvania, crime analysts are career government trainees, selected on the basis of their academic records. Delaware noted that military intelligence retirees will be considered, as well as college graduates with degrees in relevant disciplines, for the position of analyst.

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### Qualifications of Present Staff

Attorneys with prosecutive experience or prior work in organized crime control have customarily been recruited as program directors. For example, the Arizona Strike Force Director has served in the offices of county, city and U. S. attorneys. Colorado's Organized Crime Strike Force Director is an Assistant Attorney General, and worked for that office prior to becoming director. The Illinois director came to that position after 4 1/2 years with a State's Attorney's office. In Michigan, the Chief of the Organized Crime Division was with a city police force for 25 years.

Mississippi's organized crime chief is a retired F.B.I. supervisory special agent, with experience in supervising organized crime investigations. The co-directors in the New Jersey strike force had served with the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the U. S. Department of Justice. The head of Pennsylvania's Crime Commission was with the Internal Revenue Service and the Massachusetts' chief was with the F.B.I.. In Iowa, the director of the Special Prosecutions Staff was in general practice for 11 years, holding the position of County Attorney for 6 of those years. He became an Assistant Attorney General in 1971.

West Virginia hired an out-of-state attorney to head the staff of its Purchasing Practices and Procedures Commission, because there was no in-state expertise, and because it was considered desirable to hire someone with no local ties. He was assisted by local personnel, who knew about the state.

In Wisconsin, the Director was a chief deputy district attorney and had five years with the Judge Advocate General's staff. The head of California's Organized Crime Trials Unit has many years experience as an Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice. New York reports that all organized crime attorneys and accountants have pre-employment investigative and prosecutive experience.

Organized crime units have generally succeeded in recruiting some experienced investigators. For example, of Mississippi's five investigators, one is a former F.B.I. agent; two are experienced state-level law enforcement officers; and one has a degree in criminology, with experience as a state investigator. The supervisor of the Tennessee unit is a criminal investigator with 24 years of service. In Iowa, one investigator has 29 years experience as a city police detective; one is a former private industry detective; and one a retired F.B.I. agent. Hawaii's three investigators were recruited from the Honolulu Police Department and had a total of 12 years experience.

A number of units have hired retired Internal Revenue Service agents. One program head considers the best source, because over half the investigations involve accounting. Massachusetts employs several former F.B.I. agents. New Jersey has former agents of both the F.B.I. and I.R.S. on its organized crime staff.

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### Consultants

About half the states for which budget data are available employ consultants. Several states include informant payments in the consultant budget, which makes this figure higher than it would be otherwise.

There is a wide range in the extent to which consultants are used. Delaware hired one nationally-known consultant for two days "to stimulate interest and ideas", and this was their sole use of consultants. Hawaii, on the other hand, included a consultant fee of \$35,000, on an annual fixed contract basis, in its budget. It was felt that an out-of-state expert was needed because of the newness of the program and the inexperience of personnel assigned. The full-time consultant would, as stated in the grant application, "research, coordinate, evaluate and structure the organized crime unit and also provide the training required." However, this sum was apparently later transferred to other purposes.

While the 1972 Illinois budget included \$5,000 for consultants - specialized personnel such as accountants, engineers, and chemists employed to develop evidence and appear as expert witnesses - Illinois currently reports that no consultant services are used.

Ohio states that professional services were not excluded from its budget because no need for them was felt. Rather, it was a matter of other budgetary items being of higher priority. The use of professional services in the area of training is presently being considered and funding for such services may be included in the formal 1974-1975 project plan for the organized crime unit.

### Recruitment and Retention

Recruiting personnel for organized crime units seems to involve two problems: an excess of applicants, because of the interesting nature of the work, and a shortage of qualified applicants, because of the scarcity of experienced personnel. Mississippi, for example, recognized the lack of persons with experience in investigating organized crime, so attempted to recruit those individuals who have an extensive law enforcement investigation background and who are of proven ability and maturity. New Jersey tries to mix beginners and experienced personnel. Both New Jersey and Pennsylvania personnel commented in interviews in 1972 that there was a shortage of experienced people. Kansas planned to transfer some experienced agents to the organized crime section, to serve as a cadre in building a new staff and to act as team leaders. Iowa encountered trouble recruiting investigators at the proposed salary level, so amended their original L.E.A.A. grant to authorize higher salaries.

A few states have special recruiting programs. In addition to normal recruiting through the state personnel agency, the Kansas organized crime unit planned a recruiting effort to include articles in law enforcement publications, news media, personal contact, talks before college groups and college personnel. California, on the other hand, found that no special efforts were needed because many persons had been laid off by industry and were seeking re-employment. Wis-

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consin reports that some attorneys clerked for the Attorney General's office before joining the organized crime unit, and that other personnel with prior legal experience had even left higher paying jobs to join the unit's staff.

Many states look to other agencies for recruits. New York says that district attorneys' offices are the chief source of lawyers, because of their experience in prosecution. Persons retiring from the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Internal Revenue Service are recruited by many organized crime units.

Staff turnover has generally been a problem in Attorneys General's offices<sup>6</sup> and many now require that job applicants agree to remain for a stated number of years. While organized crime units have not been in existence long enough to make firm projections on staff turnover, the following response from Michigan is typical of the assessment by many units: "The Attorney General's Organized Crime Division has not found that the turnover of personnel poses any problem. In fact, it is noted that persons engaged in criminal intelligence operations become extremely loyal and devoted to the work and their co-workers, and with few exceptions, rarely leave a unit. However, it should be noted that recruiting attorneys, to maintain the investigative-analytical-legal team concept, is difficult; but only because of the limited tenure of the position as it is an L.E.A.A. supported position."<sup>7</sup>

Other states such as Wisconsin, however, have experienced no such difficulty in attracting qualified attorneys, even in the face of possibly limited tenure.

### Salaries

Salaries in organized crime units vary greatly among the states. This is true of salaries in Attorney General's offices for other types of work. A recent C.O.A.G. survey showed, for example, that salaries of attorneys who had four years service in an Attorney General's office, but no other experience, ranged from \$11,586 - 23,628 with a median of \$15,421.

Organized crime control grant applications generally budget attorneys at about \$15,000, although this goes as high as \$28,000 for a Director. Investigators are generally paid from \$8,000 to \$14,000, although this goes to \$22,000 in one state. There is a wide range in salaries of analysts, as qualifications may differ sharply from state to state. One state pays an intelligence analyst \$5,760, while another pays \$18,000.

Consultants are often paid more than regular staff members, presumably because of their special expertise. West Virginia, for example, hired a consultant at a rate of \$40 per hour.

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### Staff Training

Training of staff is especially important, because there are few people with relevant experience. Available information indicates that training consists primarily of attendance at regional and national conferences, although a few states have developed in-house training programs. One such state is Michigan, which comments as follows: "The most valuable training program is the in-house training. These sessions are conducted by the more experienced agents and supervisors. The value of this training is in the timeliness of the material covered and the instructor-student ratio is usually one on one".<sup>8</sup>

Almost all of the reporting states indicated that some staff members had attended one or more nationally-sponsored conferences or schools. The most frequently mentioned were: those sponsored by L.E.A.A., through a grant to the consulting firm of Peat, Marwick and Mitchell; conferences held by the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (L.E.I.U.), which is a voluntary association of selected crime control agencies; the Internal Revenue Service school; the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs training course. These courses are described in more detail in Chapter 7 of this Report.

Comments about conferences such as those held periodically by L.E.A.A., or the National College of District Attorneys, or the Northwestern University prosecutors' course are generally favorable, not only because of the course content and the formal presentations, but also because of the opportunity to converse with personnel from other states. The only suggestion states made to C.O.A.G. for improvement was that such conferences are not specialized enough for experienced personnel.

Named by various reporting units as publications providing the most valuable in-house training and education were the following: L.E.A.A.'s Basic Elements of Intelligence and its Police Guide on Organized Crime; the Crime Control Digest, published by Sci-Tech, Inc., of Washington, D. C.; the Legal Digest prepared by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

It is difficult to provide practical training experience. As one state notes, there are no unimportant cases to practice on in the organized crime area. Wisconsin assigns new attorneys to assist a district attorney for two months, so they can get experience in prosecuting more routine cases.

Attorneys from the area prosecutors' section of the Iowa Attorney General's Office attend most county attorney conventions and training programs, which serve a dual purpose. Not only are they informative, but the county attorneys get to know the members of the Attorney General's staff and what their functions are. New attorneys in the Attorney General's Office - attorneys with no previous trial experience - are given misdemeanor and indictable misdemeanor cases to try by the Polk County Attorney, who assists them in the preparation and trial of assigned cases.

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Other state agencies or divisions of the Attorney General's office may help train staff. In New Jersey, some organized crime control personnel take courses in statistics and accounting at selected colleges. In Michigan, the Attorney General's organized crime personnel have in-house training, and attend intelligence programs presented by the State police.

Use of specialized state-sponsored training open to out-of-state trainees has increased. New Mexico's Organized Crime Intelligence Unit, which became operational in 1973, is sending personnel to Intelligence Collector and Intelligence Analyst schools held by the California Department of Justice. Personnel from outside Michigan have been trained at the Michigan Intelligence Network Team (M.I.N.T.) School.

Recent L.E.A.A. discretionary grants are making possible regional seminars for specialized training in the field of organized crime. From November, 1973, through May, 1974, the National College of District Attorneys is conducting five 3-day regional seminars on organized crime primarily for attorneys engaged in public prosecution and their investigators. Subjects treated include investigative and prosecutive techniques, the use of immunity statutes, intelligence gathering, witness protection, inter-jurisdictional cooperation, and managing an organized crime unit. Beginning in March, 1974, C.O.A.G. will conduct a series of eight 2-day regional seminars on advanced prosecutive techniques in the field of organized crime, concentrating on the topics of tax law violations, violations of antitrust law, and violations of laws pertaining to the corruption of public officials. These seminars will be limited to twenty prosecutors each, made up of district attorneys and Attorneys General's and their staffs. Emphasis will be placed on workshops, and special effort will be devoted to developing take-home seminar materials that will serve as continuing prosecutive guides and references.

### Security Checks

The need for security in organized crime control programs is obvious. An investigation could be rendered fruitless if someone warned its subjects or divulged the content of confidential files. Release of data could also be damaging to the persons involved.

Almost all of the reporting states conduct pre-employment checks of all organized crime control personnel. This is usually done by the state police or the department of public safety, using trained investigators. Questionable persons are not hired. Only one state reports any security problems to date; in that instance, two secretarial applicants apparently were sent as spies by persons under investigation.

The thoroughness of the investigation varies. In Wisconsin, all Department of Justice employees are given a pre-employment investigation by the Department's own internal security unit. In the case of organized crime control personnel, this investigation is very extensive and is similar to the federal investigation for "top secret" clearance. Kansas reports that

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the background investigation includes checking fingerprints with the F.B.I., a local agency check, and interviews with references, past employers, neighbors, etc. Mississippi conducts complete investigations on some persons, but not on others, who "are well known to this office as to reputation, integrity, and ability." Pennsylvania may postpone or omit a check if the applicant is known to the staff.

No state appears to have a system for continuing security checks, although Wisconsin reports there is a procedure to be followed if problems appear. Michigan is apparently typical in reporting that "post-employment security controls involve constant alertness to the symptoms and dangers of corruption." Other states say that security is not a problem with a small staff, where the supervisor would spot any unusual behavior.

It was noted that long tenure of staff is an aid to security. If there is a high rate of personnel turnover, there would be a substantial number of ex-employers who were familiar with the program's method and files. The high percentage of former F.B.I. and I.R.S. agents employed by organized crime units is undoubtedly an aid in assuring security; not only would they be personally reliable, but their experience would make them "security-conscious."

## 5. PROSECUTION AND INVESTIGATION UNITS

An increasing number of Attorneys General are establishing organized crime control units which are staffed with both attorneys and investigators, who work closely together throughout the investigation and subsequent prosecution. These units are modeled in part on federal strike forces, which bring investigators and attorneys from various federal agencies together to identify and prosecute organized crime leaders. This coordinated approach has proven successful and is being applied to an increasing number of problem areas.

Federal Operation of Investigative-Prosecutive Units

Federal strike forces came into being to foster inter-agency cooperation in organized crime control. A former strike force attorney writes that:

Until the institution of the strike force concept, agents working on their own who happened to be sufficiently familiar with the law in other areas to spot potential evidence had to forward the information they uncovered to their headquarters in Washington. There (if all went well) it would be referred to the proper agency. Speaking off the record, law-enforcement officials and department lawyers will admit that the old system was at best haphazard and at the worst hampered by interagency rivalry.<sup>1</sup>

The Department of Justice initiated its first strike force in 1967 in Buffalo, New York. "A penetrating investigation and intelligence analyses was made into every aspect of the crime syndicate's operations" in the area and, within an 18-month period, more than thirty individuals had been indicted.<sup>2</sup>

Strike forces bring together in one target area personnel from various federal agencies. These may include the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Bureau of Customs, the Secret Service, the Labor Department, the Alcohol and Cigarette Tax Division, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others. The makeup varies, as does the relationship to state officials. These officers work under the leadership of Organized Crime and Racketeering Section attorneys from the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. Each member of the strike force remains responsible to his own agency.

These officers work together to analyze intelligence and develop strategy:

A Strike Force is given a stiff orientation program, which includes lectures on the federal statutes applicable to each government agency represented. In this way every member of the team recognizes evidence of possible violations of the

laws in any of these areas. Working side by side in the same offices and "on the spot," members are able to check with each other immediately when their suspicions are aroused.<sup>3</sup>

Presently there are eighteen strike forces. One is in the District of Columbia, and the rest are scattered throughout the United States. They have from four to nine members each. Procedures vary among strike forces as to how cases are handled. Sometimes cases are turned over to the local U. S. Attorney, and sometimes court proceedings are handled in conjunction with the appropriate Attorney General.<sup>4</sup>

The Committee for Economic Development, in its report on Reducing Crime and Assuring Justice,<sup>5</sup> said that "the initial successes of 'strike forces' mobilized against the syndicates in a score of large cities by the U.S. Department of Justice, staffed with highly qualified and diversified personnel drawn from several agencies, are encouraging" and recommended that this approach be used more widely.

That the strike force concept has now established itself as an effectual means to neutralize organized criminal activities cannot be disputed. The organized crime strike force in the Wisconsin Attorney General's office includes criminal prosecution and criminal antitrust units. The strike force has had a 100 percent conviction ration in all cases for which it has had primary responsibility. Mr. Ronald L. Semman, Administrator in the Wisconsin Department of Justice states:

"We attribute our success to both the very concept of a strike force and to the philosophy that we issue criminal charges only when we are sure we have evidence which satisfies beyond all reasonable doubt that the individual did, in fact, commit the offense or offenses for which he or she is charged. When attorneys and agents work together on a case from the very beginning, there is but a single goal in such an effort. That goal, simply stated, is to secure a guaranteed conviction. The goals and objectives of both the police agency and the prosecutors office therefore are uniform, and there are no territorial interests to interfere with a successful prosecution. Finally, strike force members have an opportunity to build up areas of expertise which normal law enforcement agencies simply do not have the time or resources to develop."<sup>6</sup>

Operation of Investigative - Prosecutive Units

The reasons for establishing units incorporating both investigative and prosecutive capability are well stated in a grant application prepared by the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice:

The basic structure of an efficient organized crime program includes two components -- the investigative personnel who gather the raw facts which are necessary for prosecution, and the legal personnel who structure these facts into cases which ultimately are presented in a courtroom. The standard organized crime case is a complex, multi-defendant, multiple count prosecution, defended by professional criminal lawyers who are paid well to exploit any factual or legal weaknesses in the state's case. Legal judgements, which must be made during the investigative, fact-gathering, pre-grand-jury phase of each case must withstand scrutiny in the appropriate appellate Courts.

The application contends that "much of the difficulty experienced in prosecuting organized crime cases is rooted in the break in the continuity of steps as the case passes from the investigatory phase to the prosecutive stage." Therefore, "the problem becomes one of devising a system where the prosecution of individuals engaged in organized crime is structured into one cohesive enforcement effort, from the inception of the investigation to conviction at trial." Lawyers and police investigators should work closely together:

It is only by such a welding together of the investigative and legal functions that lawyers can develop the trust of investigators and thereby be privy to daily investigative developments and have access to even the most sensitive information obtained in the course of a case. It seems clear that the techniques which routinely must be used to augment normal investigative procedures in organized crime cases -- electronic surveillance, search and seizure, use of grand jury subpoena power, witness immunity, obtaining cooperation of prosecutors and the judiciary, utilization of sensitive informants -- require experienced, competent, and trusted legal advice at every step of the investigation.<sup>7</sup>

Georgia points out an attorney's "involvement on a day-to-day basis in the investigative process would result in much more personal interest and much better and more vigorous prosecution coordination with appropriate authorities."<sup>8</sup> While the attorney-investigator ratio varies among these units, all stress that close and continuing cooperation is essential to success.

Rhode Island identifies five key phases of operations. These are:

1. Intelligence gathering and analysis;
2. Targeting, using the information gathered to select individuals as targets for prosecution;
3. Surveillance of targeted individuals;
4. Investigations, and preparation of cases by the investigative staff working with the unit lawyers;
5. Prosecution and conviction.<sup>9</sup>

The investigators and prosecutors not only work together in each phase, but work with state, local and federal authorities.

In Colorado, experienced law enforcement investigators combine with a staff of prosecutors, working together on a daily basis. The Strike Force program is prosecution-oriented, and the investigators are required to strive for criminal case filings that will be prosecuted successfully.<sup>10</sup> Some organized crime units are broadening their activities beyond the traditional scope of criminal investigations. Wisconsin comments that organized crime is active not only in gambling and vice areas, but also in activities regarding contraband merchandise, tax fraud, bid-rigging and price-fixing. The organized crime unit is paying particular attention to these matters, especially in regard to government construction, and municipal purchasing procedures. The Illinois organized crime unit has investigated collusive bidding in connection with public projects, and the related problems of official corruption.

Iowa's Attorney General has created a Special Prosecutions Staff, divided into two general fields - "special prosecutions" consisting of four attorneys, and "area prosecutors", consisting of seven attorneys. It is the Special Prosecutions' function to independently investigate organized crime and antitrust violations. This unit, which has three full-time investigators in addition to the attorneys, acts on leads or complaints from any source, be it citizen, members of legislature, law enforcement agencies or other local or state agencies.



Selection of Targets

The selection of specific targets for investigation and ultimate prosecution is a critical phase in organized crime control. Great care must be taken to use resources wisely by setting realistic and significant goals. To a large extent, this is dependent on an adequate intelligence system, that has achieved adequate input, classification, and analysis. This is discussed in the chapter on intelligence operations. The co-directors of the New Jersey Organized Crime Strike Force view the intelligence function as the continuing collection of information, then the organization of special groups to transform the intelligence picture into a tactical investigation of areas or problems. This involves deciding how to attack, once the people and problems have been identified. Some states go from raw intelligence to tactical operations, but New Jersey has an intermediate stage: a short-term commitment to further study to determine what can be done, and what is the chance of serious impact through prosecution.<sup>11</sup>

In Wisconsin, a task force approach is used. Planning sessions are held to select targets, which may be either individuals or subject areas. The chief of the tax agency is included in these sessions.<sup>12</sup> The Illinois unit routinely checks with federal strike forces in the area before selecting targets. It also follows leads from such sources as newspaper articles, disgruntled former employees of businesses, and private citizens.<sup>13</sup> A grant application by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission says that "the priorities of targets for investigation are assigned on the basis of the relative importance of the problem area as disclosed by intelligence reports and the availability of manpower." These "are generally broad in scope, such as allegations of organized criminal activities and official corruption within a given geographical area or particular governmental unit."<sup>14</sup>

In Colorado, targets for the Task Force are selected through joint consultation between the prosecutors and the agent-investigators, who work cases together on a daily basis. Michigan notes that its targets for investigation and prosecution are selected from those organized crime figures known to be operating in upper-management levels well insulated from day-to-day street level criminal activities. Priority of investigative action is determined by factors such as:

- a. Conditions requiring immediate and prompt action;
- b. Criminal climate in certain areas;
- c. Trends in organized criminal activity;
- d. Requests from the Attorney General and other responsible agencies.<sup>15</sup>

A committee or advisory group may help select targets. In Arizona, the Organized Crime Prevention Council participates in this process. Prevention councils usually include representatives of various state and local criminal justice agencies, who would reflect the needs of different components of the criminal justice system.

This area of illegal activity is of increasing concern to law enforcement officials nationwide, and gave impetus to the recent C.O.A.G. report Legislation Concerning the Corruption of Public Officials. The Attorney General of Rhode Island is particularly interested in setting up a specific anti-corruption strike force. In 1973 a grant application for L.E.A.A. discretionary funding was developed for such a strike force, which would have a staff of four prosecutors, eight investigators, including two accountants, and four secretaries. Submission of the application was opposed by the Governor's Committee on Crime, which is the Rhode Island state planning agency, on the ground that no proven need for the project had been demonstrated. The Attorney General is hopeful of demonstrating this need through appropriate indictments and convictions, in order to secure funding in the near future.

Relationship to Local Officials

Most of the statewide investigative-prosecutive units try to develop effective liaison with local prosecutors and law enforcement officials. Some also cooperate in prosecutions.

The staff of Arizona's organized crime strike force visited most cities in the state. The staff went together to some places, then divided up the state and each member visited the remaining cities in a given area. Wisconsin's organized crime unit is discussed at the annual Attorney General's conference, which is attended by local officials.

The New York Legislature also found a fragmentation of effort.

Hundreds of local law enforcement agencies throughout the state, as well as the sixty-two district attorneys of the state, are empowered to investigate and prosecute organized crime cases, but the ability of these agencies and prosecutors to deal with a broad-based organized crime enterprise is severely hampered because of their limited resources and restricted geographical jurisdiction.<sup>16</sup>

To meet the problem, it established a statewide Task Force under the Attorney General, which investigates and prosecutes multi-county activities and assists local prosecutors and law enforcement officers. Prosecutions are mostly brought through district attorneys, who use investigative material evolved by the Task Force.

Louisiana has an Organized Crime and Racketeering Unit under the control of the Attorney General. The cohesive value of the unit, which has statewide investigative and prosecutive authority, is described in the Grant application from the Louisiana Department of Justice as follows:

The Legislature of Louisiana has enacted laws which fragment the efforts of law enforcement. Each Sheriff or Chief of Police is supreme in his own geographic locality and there is no statewide law enforcement agency which may intervene. They are also limited by the Legislature to matters occurring outside of incorporated municipalities. Local law enforcement officials, who attempt to fight organized crime, find themselves hampered by lack of resources and public apathy. Even where these efforts have been successful, the scope of that success has been limited due to the movement of organized crime across municipal and parochial boundaries.

The establishment of a statewide unit with a pool of highly qualified specialized personnel and resources for the purpose of assisting local District Attorneys in the prosecution of matters relating to organized crime and for the assistance and coordination of organized crime efforts by state and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies, is the primary goal of this project.

Kansas reports that its organized crime agents have worked with local, state and federal authorities "in a genuine spirit of co-operativeness." In one case, the co-operative efforts of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, the Wichita Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Internal Revenue Department resulted in the detection and apprehension of the principals in a bookmaking operation that had thrived for twenty-five years with a gross weekly take of about \$5,000.<sup>17</sup>

Michigan's Organized Crime Division has handled a significant number of prosecutions which have been developed by its own personnel, but says that "the principal function of the AG - OCD is to stimulate proper government action in the field of organized crime." Therefore, most prosecutions it develops actually go to court through the offices of local prosecutors. The Division will, however, handle on request:

certain cases which, for one reason or another, have proven too difficult, time consuming or sensitive for handling by local personnel. Our relationship with all local prosecutors is at an extremely high level as a result of the above mentioned policy in as much as we are willing to take their 'hot potatoes' and yet refer the more routine type prosecutors to them after we have developed information.<sup>18</sup>

A verbal request is generally sufficient, and no request for assistance has been refused. The Division makes the full resources of its investigative-prosecutive-analytical staff available to local officials and consults with them in matters relating to organized crime and corruption.

Due to the concentration of organized crime in the City of Detroit and its surrounding environments, the Intelligence Section of the Detroit Police Department has been the single most productive relationship to the organized crime division located in the Attorney General's office.

Arizona also contemplates that most of the cases it develops will be handled by local prosecutors.<sup>19</sup> Mississippi's Organized Crime Section brought no legal action in its first year of operation, but turned over to local law enforcement agencies information which resulted in appropriate action.<sup>20</sup> In Wisconsin, the relationship depends on the locality involved. Usually, the organized crime unit makes the case, then asks local officials for help in making the arrest. They are credited with this cooperation, and great care is exercised in dealing with the media, so that local officials get proper publicity.<sup>21</sup>

The Director of the Organized Crime Trials Unit in the California Attorney General's office is adopting the following approach to improve liaison efforts. Representative counties are being selected throughout the state, and district attorneys for those counties will be interviewed, with an eye toward determining what case problems present the greatest difficulties for prosecution with county resources only. On this basis, a determination will be made as to the exact manner in which the Organized Crime Trials Unit may be of assistance.<sup>22</sup>

The newly formed Organized Crime Strike Force in Denver, Colorado, has a makeup conducive to good inter-agency relations. The prosecutive staff is made up of three Assistant Attorneys General and two Assistant District Attorneys (for the City and County of Denver). Each Assistant District Attorney is deputized by the Attorney General as a member of his office and each Assistant Attorney General is similarly cross-deputized as a member of the office of the Denver District Attorney. Agent-investigators include five members of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, ten members of the Denver Police Department, one member of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, and one member of the Lakewood City Police Department.<sup>23</sup>

The Massachusetts Attorney General's organized crime unit used to hold formal meetings with the Boston Police and the federal strike force.<sup>24</sup> Minnesota has helped county attorneys in investigations.

#### Resource Pools

Several units operate resource pools from which local agencies may borrow the specialized equipment, and sometimes personnel, that is often required for organized crime control. Equipment pools are discussed in the chapter on equipment; it appears that these programs have been well received by local agencies. Frequently, the state unit will loan skilled operators as well as equipment, or will loan personnel to train local officers in its use.

PROSECUTION AND INVESTIGATION UNITS

Some resource pools also include specialized investigative personnel or prosecutors. Michigan has an organized crime prosecutors' pool in the Attorney General's office. This has met a real need, because county staffs are overburdened and may be reluctant to handle organized crime cases, due to the time required. The discretionary grant application to fund the pool noted also that "the utilization of specially trained prosecutors in this field on a continuing basis would most certainly impress trial judges who sometimes need to conduct seminars on criminal law, especially conspiracy law, during trials."<sup>25</sup> In 1972, California included the specialized services of financial experts in its resource pool, but gave this low priority, because the larger law enforcement agencies could obtain such experts locally, and the smaller agencies didn't have the kind of cases that would utilize them. New York's Organized Crime Task Force has rendered technical, legal, accounting and investigative assistance to local units in a number of instances, on their request.

Accomplishments of Units

The broad range of activities and accomplishments that may be expected from an investigative-prosecutive unit are illustrated by the following report from Wisconsin on that unit's achievements during 1973, principally since July. Since approximately October 15, 1972, organized crime attorneys and agents have been involved in the investigation of a systematic effort on the part of several corporations and salesmen to bribe public employees of local units of government relative to the purchasing of industrial and maintenance chemicals. A statewide investigation was commenced in January of 1973 through the request of Attorney General Robert Warren pursuant to a letter of authorization from the Governor of the state. A "John Doe" is a judicial proceeding, established by statute in Wisconsin, whereby any person can complain to a judge of crimes being committed in that judge's jurisdiction. The complainant, in Wisconsin, is often a member of the Attorney General's prosecutive staff, since he is authorized to investigate crime "which is statewide in nature, importance or influence." The judge, in turn, is empowered to subpoena and examine witnesses within his discretion to determine if a crime has been committed.

As a result of the above described bribery investigation, which required 15 sessions and 5,500 pages of testimony, the unit has served ninety felony court convictions against seventeen individuals and three corporations. Total fines and costs assessed to date total \$77,150. Four chemical salesmen have been convicted of either receiving bribes or perjury. Eleven of the aforementioned individuals have received jail terms. Additionally, three corporations have been convicted of bribing public employes.

Seven corporations have been enjoined from operating their chemical sales staff in such a manner as to prohibit them from violating Wisconsin's bribery statutes in the future. Charges are pending against a deputy sheriff charged with accepting a bribe resulting from this investigation. Yet another chemical salesman has been convicted by a jury for bribery. Actions relative to this investigation have now been filed with seventeen counties in Wisconsin. Several additional charges are expected to be brought in the form

of either civil or criminal complaints in the forthcoming months.

A significant antitrust investigation resulted in complaints being issued against five individuals and eight corporations as a result of a John Doe investigation into bid rigging on sewer and water contracts which were being let by the city of Madison. These complaints were issued on December 6, 1973. To date, two of the corporations have been convicted after entering pleas and received a maximum fine of \$5,000 per corporation. The conspiracy operated on sewer and water contracts which were being let by the city of Madison. These complaints were issued on December 6, 1973. To date, two of the corporations have been convicted after entering pleas and received a maximum fine of \$5,000 per corporation. The conspiracy operated on sewer and water contracts whose face value totaled more than one and one-half million dollars.

The Organized Crime Strike Force continues to monitor government corruption in the state of Wisconsin in other areas as well. A high ranking state employee was arrested in March, 1973 for soliciting a substantial bribe and was convicted in November. A jail term was imposed by the court. Recently, the head of a county traffic patrol law enforcement agency was arrested for embezzlement of county funds, and a conviction in this case is expected in the very immediate future. In December of this year, the Organized Crime Strike Force was successful in securing the resignation of a Wisconsin sheriff and the removal of an acting district attorney.

On December 12, twelve individuals were charged with 124 felony counts involving the fraudulent sales of securities and related offenses. Litigation is pending on these matters. Thirty-three bookmaking convictions, concerning 120 felony counts of commercial gambling have been secured, and total fines assessed total nearly \$90,000. Three additional John Doe inquiries have resulted in criminal complaints for commercial gambling. Two bookmakers and three street level operators have been convicted. Fines exceeding \$13,000 have been assessed. Finally, agents and investigators from the Attorney General's consumer protection unit have been assigned to assist the organized crime unit in investigating the home improvement industry's involvement with organized crime figures in Wisconsin.<sup>26</sup>

In New Jersey, the following statistics reflect the activities of the Organized Crime and Special Prosecutions Section from its beginning in 1969 through December 29, 1973. Eight hundred forty-one defendants have been named in 330 indictments. The breakdown of indictments is as follows:

Public Corruption	
Public Official Defendants:	54
Non-Public Official Defendants (i.e. contractors):	9

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Gambling:	122
Loan Sharking:	8
Major Thefts:	43
Possession of Weapons:	2
Perjury:	12
Narcotics:	11
Contempt:	2
Murder:	6
Fraud:	7
Labor Corruption:	4
Prison Riot Cases:	43
Arson:	2
Illegal Electronic Surveillance:	2
Criminal Antitrust:	1
Forgery:	1
Conspiracy:	1

Notable among the Section's activities are the following. The Secretary of State was indicted and convicted of conspiracy to prevent the state bidding laws and receiving a bribe. In another case, a state Senator was convicted of bribery and giving false information to a law enforcement agency.

In December, 1973, ten people were indicted for six gang-style homicides ranging back to 1969. The case, which took fourteen months investigative work, is presently pending trial. The strength of the section lies largely in the fact that in five years the New Jersey statewide grand jury has become institutionalized, and is functioning extremely smoothly as a vehicle for indictments in the fields of organized crime and public corruption.<sup>27</sup>

Accomplishments of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission also illustrate the types of investigations that may be undertaken. An investigation of bail bond corruption and pre-trial release resulted in testimony by prominent political leaders and appointment of a special prosecutor. In another county, the district attorney indicted persons for fixing races, pursuant to Commission investigations. An investigation of local corruption resulted in several resignations; but no indictments. As the result of a Commission report, a district attorney indicted several persons for illegal real estate transaction.<sup>28</sup>

In New York, about ninety individuals were indicted from December, 1970, to February, 1972, by the Organized Crime Task Force; about seventy-five of these were indicted for gambling. Grand juries in fourteen counties were involved in the indictments. Activities of the Task Force diminished during 1973 as a result of personnel being diverted to legal problems stemming from the Attica prison uprising, but as of January, 1974, a separate unit has been designated to handle those problems, hopefully returning the Strike Force to full time strength in the investigation and prosecution of organized crime.<sup>29</sup>

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From 1970 through September, 1973, the Organized Crime Unit within the Rhode Island Attorney General's Office handled numerous cases. Those cases were categorized as gambling, theft rings, crimes of violence, horse race fixing, jury tampering, extortion, narcotics, and miscellaneous. A total of 915 indictments have been returned, of which 335 indictments have been disposed, leaving a total of 579 indictments pending trial. Of the indictments closed, the following results were obtained: 90 indictments resulted in fines totaling \$16,925; 47 indictments resulted in suspended sentences; 62 indictments resulted in jail terms, amounting to 171 3/4 years plus two life sentences; 31 indictments resulted in probation; 13 indictments resulted in deferred sentences; 50 indictments were dismissed; 9 indictments were dismissed due to death of defendant; 2 indictments were nolle prossed; 21 indictments ended in findings of not guilty; 12 indictments led to findings of guilty, but the defendants had not been sentenced as of September, 1973.<sup>30</sup>

The principal accomplishment of the Illinois Special Prosecution Unit (SPU) in 1972 has been to develop an organization through which crimes of multi-county interest can be prosecuted in a coordinated fashion. In addition, there have been several significant convictions. William Riley Gonder was convicted of the offense of aggravated kidnapping and murder. His crime was committed in two counties and crossed state lines. A corporal in the State Police was convicted of electronic eavesdropping. Two members of a group alleged to have committed murders in four separate counties in this state have been convicted of murder in one county. The cases against others in the group are still pending. A prosecution for manslaughter was conducted in a small county because the case required extremely sophisticated proof of arson and sanity. Numerous convictions have been obtained for violations of state revenue laws. Several of these convictions have resulted in jail sentences. Prior to the creation of SPU, prosecution for state revenue violations rarely, if ever, occurred.

Significant indictments in cases not yet tried are as follows:

(a) Twenty-three indictments containing ninety-five counts against twenty-two individuals for violation of the insurance code were returned. Conspiracy and two-count forgery indictments were returned against eight persons in one county.

(b) The Cook County Grand Jury returned a forty-nine count indictment after a presentation of evidence by a unit member who drafted the indictment. The offenses charged grew out of schemes to avoid payment of state motor fuel tax in the amount of \$150,000. The case also involved the evasion of \$250,000 of federal excise tax and the files have been made available to the Internal Revenue Service.

(c) In another case, the Cook County Grand Jury returned eight indictments containing one hundred fourteen counts after a presentation by a unit member who drafted the indictments. The offenses charged grew out of a conspiracy to avoid payment of the state retailer's occupational taxes. The conspirators included businessmen, accountants, tax advisers and state officials. The cases involve over two million dollars in taxes.

(d) In a final case, the Cook County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment after a presentation of evidence by a unit member who drafted the indictment. The offenses charged grew out of a scheme to avoid payment of state motor fuel taxes in the amount of \$40,000.<sup>31</sup>

During 1973, the Michigan Attorney General's Organized Crime Division has been actively involved in the investigation and/or prosecution of more than sixty cases, either initiated by or turned over to the Organized Crime Division by other agencies. The Division was actively involved in three separate cases involving police corruption and payoffs in the narcotic trafficking field. These cases were worked in conjunction with the Detroit Police Department, Wayne County Sheriffs Department, and the Wayne County Prosecutors Office. All defendants were bound over for trial. A conviction for conspiracy to bribe and another for attempted bribery against a state senator and a probate judge were obtained. Both defendants received jail sentences and stiff fines. A bribery case against a mutual numbers operator is now in the preliminary prosecutorial stage. Working with the Muskegon Police Department, the Attorney General's Organized Crime Division successfully investigated and prosecuted a large gambling conspiracy in the Muskegon area. This was the first successful gambling conspiracy case and conviction in that section of Michigan in almost 10 years.<sup>32</sup>

The Minnesota Attorney General's Organized Crime Intelligence Unit just began operations during 1973. It was successful, however, through cooperation with local police, in developing evidence against a large-scale theft ring that resulted in convictions for receiving and concealing stolen property against two major fences and two professional shoplifters.<sup>33</sup>

The "special prosecutions" section lists the following achievements:

- a. One hundred forty-two International Harvester Implement Dealers were indicted for price fixing under state law. Sixty-one individuals pleaded or were found guilty. The other cases were dismissed.
- b. A civil suit has been filed in federal court alleging price fixing violations under the Sherman Act, against two nozzle spray manufacturers.
- c. Five chemical company salesmen have been indicted on sixteen charges of bribing public officials to purchase their products. One salesman has pleaded guilty to five charges and another salesman to one charge. More indictments against both individuals and corporations are expected.

- d. Members of the Johnson County board of supervisors were indicted under Iowa law for receiving gifts in connection with contracts let by them. One trial resulted in acquittal by directed verdict on the ground that the statute did not apply to the accused, but this ruling was overturned by the Iowa Supreme Court, thus clearing the way for the remaining prosecutions.
- e. Alleged Clayton Act violations against an exclusive dealer of compressed gas are being investigated.
- f. Investigation into various organized criminal activities in the Des Moines area continues.<sup>34</sup>

While the Organized Crime Section in the Mississippi Attorney General's Office is strictly an investigative agency, information developed by the Section and provided to agencies with prosecutive authority netted the following results from July, 1972 through June, 1973. Information developed by the Organized Crime section as to the identities of the perpetrators of numerous robberies and burglaries in Mississippi produced fourteen convictions and the recovery of \$58,000 in stolen property. Through the use of confidential sources, a "contract" on the life of a Mississippi public official was caused to be cancelled.<sup>35</sup>

The Ohio Organized Crime Unit within the Office of the Attorney General has no original jurisdiction or arrest powers. In terms of investigation, however, it has opened 248 cases involving 200 subjects from January, 1972 through October 31, 1973.<sup>36</sup>

Accomplishments by the Special Attorney General for the City of New York, from September, 1972, through August, 1973 include numerous criminal indictments of public officials. Numbered among the officials are detectives, city aides, including the president of the City Tax Commission, and a District Attorney, who subsequently resigned his position.

The Colorado Organized Crime Strike Force has produced significant results from its investigations and prosecutions. The principal targets have been approximately fifty major organized crime figures selected in 1971. Since that time, as a result of the efforts of the strike force, twenty-eight of those major figures are in jail and ten are pending appeal or other judicial action. In 1971, the Strike Force secured the first perjury conviction in Colorado since 1946, and six perjury convictions are reported during 1972. These cases, nearly all of which involve the use of Colorado's transactional immunity statute,<sup>37</sup> have been developed primarily because of the Strike Force's monitoring of the records of all grand jury proceedings relevant to major organized crime targets. These proceedings are kept on file in the Strike Force's office for easy reference and comparison of past grand jury testimony with current judicial proceedings.

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Of the two hundred cases filed in 1972 by the Strike Force, most cases involved bookmaking. In terms of time consumption, a multiple-accused perjury case involving four weeks actual court time was the most demanding case in 1972. In 1973, an auto theft ring case involving thirteen accused was quite lengthy. Most recently, through the summer of 1973, a commercial bribery case was developed, extending into eight counties, with forty to fifty felony counts secured against six accused in eight indictments. Half of the accused were public officials occupying purchasing positions. One member of the Strike Force commented that his investigations had led him to the conclusion that "public corruption is an open door to organized crime".<sup>38</sup>

The usefulness of Colorado's immunity statute in making cases was noted above. The statewide grand jury statute<sup>39</sup> is described by the Strike Force as indispensable to its operations, because the alternative, multiple presentments in multi-county cases, produces unmanageable duplication of testimony in large cases. Finally, great credit for prosecutive success is given to the Colorado wiretap statute.<sup>40</sup> Of the fifteen court authorized intercepts in Colorado over the past three years, the Strike Force (and its organizational predecessor, the joint Organized Crime Unit) has conducted twelve of the taps. As a result of the wiretaps conducted in 1972, convictions were secured as follows: two for gambling; five for burglary, and nine for possession of narcotics and dangerous drugs.<sup>41</sup>

The Organized Crime Unit of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation has established the presence of organized criminal groups in that state, active in residential burglaries, gambling, business frauds, illegal liquor traffic, and the fencing of stolen property. One area of particular concern is the illegal exportation and sale in other states of non-tax paid, or bootleg cigarettes which originate primarily in North Carolina. Through the assistance of the Organized Crime Control Unit at least fifty major narcotic violators were apprehended in North Carolina during 1973.

Intelligence, and analytical and technical support for a combined Delaware strike force resulted in the arrest of fourteen persons operating the largest known narcotics and dangerous drug ring in Delaware history. A by-product of this investigation was the arrest by New York authorities of a Delaware drug trafficker for conspiracy to deliver cocaine and marijuana. The hashish alone (700 pounds) was valued at \$600,000 and was the largest seizure every made at the Brooklyn Port.

Currently in progress are:

a. A joint investigation with the Federal Strike Force, Baltimore, Maryland, Maryland State Police Intelligence Division, and the Maryland State Fire Marshal. This investigation involves arson allegedly done by hired professionals, organized gambling, corruption of public officials, hi-jacking, counterfeiting, real estate fraud, and income tax evasion; and

## PROSECUTION AND INVESTIGATION UNITS

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b. A joint investigation with the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. The investigation involves the illegal importation of aliens and narcotics distribution by known organized crime figures.<sup>42</sup>

The success of combined prosecutive-investigative units in combating organized crime makes it probable that more Attorneys General will adopt this approach, not only in dealing with organized crime, but in other areas. The coordination of investigative and legal services assures that the investigation will produce a case that meets both the formal and substantive requirements for successful prosecution. The prosecution will be firmly based on facts developed in investigation and on a broad understanding of the case.

## 6. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence is an essential element of any organized crime control program. All of the units listed in Table 1, except the organized crime prevention councils, conduct at least some intelligence operations. Some units conduct only intelligence operations, while others also prosecute cases. Some work closely with local law enforcement units, while others restrict information to their own personnel.

In recognizing intelligence as the lifeblood of effective law enforcement, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended in 1973 that every police agency and every state should establish and maintain the capability to gather, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence in a manner designed to curtail organized crime. The specific guidelines of the Standard are valuable, and the Standard has been included in this report as Appendix E.

The Intelligence Process

A Delaware State Police procedures manual describes the production cycle for intelligence as follows:

Collection (which includes research, field investigation, collateral information, etc.) is followed by collation, or comparison, and evaluation of both the reliability of the source and the credibility of his information.

These steps are followed by integration of the evaluated information into the larger body of information for correlation. Simplified, this means putting the newly evaluated information in proper relationship and perspective with information already on hand.

Although analysis appears to be a distinct step following correlation, in actual practice, some degree of analysis is conducted from the time the information is first received. It is a continuing on-going process....

All of this activity culminates in the production or compilation of the resulting intelligence, usually in the form of summaries, estimates and analyses.

The final step in the cycle is the dissemination of finished intelligence to designated consumers.<sup>1</sup>

The manual notes that intelligence is a continuing process:

Often, the disseminated product will include requests for additional collection efforts needed to throw more light on the subject. In other words, the production cycle is just that -- a cyclic effort -- never really ending.<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of the collection process is stated in one grant application as "to remove important information from desks and personal notebooks and place it in the statewide intelligence file where it can be used effectively."<sup>3</sup>

The Attorney-in-Charge of the Intelligence and Special Services Unit of the U. S. Department of Justice, which deals primarily with federal strike forces, describes the advantages of centralization of intelligence as follows: (1) duplication of effort is avoided; (2) multiple leads are combined, and isolated facts put together; (3) the gap of non-communication among agents is bridged; (4) potentially relevant information, that might appear worthless when considered in isolation, and be thrown away, is captured for study.<sup>4</sup>

Mississippi reports that during 1973, intelligence officers representing agencies in eleven states formed the Regional Organized Crime Information Center for the purpose of sharing intelligence data relating to the traveling criminal, through the use of a central repository. The repository is located in the office of the Attorney General, in Jackson, Mississippi. Data from member agencies are correlated, analyzed and furnished to all other member agencies through the central repository.

The New England Organized Crime Intelligence System (NEOCIS) has developed into a viable regional criminal intelligence system functioning on a daily, operational basis. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of organized crime data are the heart of NEOCIS. When analysis of incoming intelligence from NEOCIS field personnel or other sources shows unusual or significant organized crime activities, special probe files are set up, and requests and guidelines for more detailed and specific information are sent to the field intelligence officers. Personal history dossiers are created for persons identified as being important or prominent in organized crime. Periodic reviews of these dossiers are made, and frequent inquiries are made into the activities of these persons. Whenever significant information is developed, detailed summaries of all available intelligence are made and disseminated to the participating and cooperating agencies throughout New England. Disseminations are concise, factual, and include NEOCIS' estimate of reliability. The disseminations also include a description of how the information was acquired and from what geographical source it originated. The final aim of NEOCIS' collection, analysis, and dissemination of data is coordinated law enforcement among participating agencies. It should be noted that at the time of the printing of this report, NEOCIS had scheduled a termination of its own field operations with regard to data collection, and a re-organization is pending that would significantly change the manner of data input into NEOCIS.<sup>5</sup>

Most units collect intelligence information from local law enforcement agencies as well as through their own operations. As discussed elsewhere in this report, an effort is usually made to develop effective liaison with local agencies, using visits to their offices, bulletins, presentation at meetings, and other types of contacts. State agencies, such as regulatory boards may provide information. New Mexico's Organized Crime Intelligence Unit selects targets through the combined efforts of its executive and assistant director working with the staff. Intelligence used in target selection comes from other law enforcement agencies and regulatory agencies as well as the staff

## INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

itself. "Every effort is made to effect agreement with law enforcement agencies, since the element of coordinated resources is so vital".<sup>6</sup> North Carolina's intelligence unit has placed six agents throughout the state with the primary duty of collecting information from other agents, and from local and federal law enforcement officers.

Intelligence units appear to be placing increasing emphasis on evaluation and analysis of data. Wisconsin, for example, reports that information in the Crime Intelligence Information Program is evaluated for reliability, accuracy, timeliness, pertinency, and usefulness. In Michigan, all information is processed through the organized crime unit's analytical section, then is collated with existing information in the State Police files as well as the unit's files.

Captain Paul Oboz, Deputy Commander of the Special Investigation Section of the Miami Department of Police, has stressed the need of concrete intelligence analysis in this way:

Any organized crime unit should work on a person with a goal in mind of getting him on a specific violation. Gathering intelligence for intelligence sake is just busy work. If it appears that you can't get a man on a specific charge, shift your target. <sup>7</sup>

The computerized data stored for use by the Intelligence and Special Services Unit of the U. S. Department of Justice helps that Unit serve federal strike forces both in the field of intelligence and in the field of management. Mathematical analysis of stored data from strike forces yields information on arrests, investigations, convictions, and other vital statistics. The results are correlated by subject, such as commercial gambling, to particular geographical areas in order to discern recognizable patterns of criminal activity that would give leads to strike force personnel in that locale. The same data used for intelligence analysis are screened in a management context, to learn how long different investigations have gone on, how many cases have been disposed of in a given time period, and other statistics that indicate the effectiveness and efficiency of the various strike forces. <sup>8</sup>

One possible future expansion of data use would be into the area of projection of trends in criminal activities. For example, if X, a known organized crime figure, had bought out strings of bars in Columbus and Cincinnati to use as fronts for illegal activities, the data might lead the Unit to project to Toledo authorities to be aware of possible infiltration by X in the same or allied businesses. <sup>9</sup>

### Indexing and Filing

If intelligence is to be an effective tool, information must be systematically classified and filed. It can then be used for analysis and planning. Various systems have been developed for classifying data.

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The Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the U. S. Department of Justice developed a "Racketeer Profile" form in December, 1971. The Profile includes about nine hundred items, which can be grouped generally under the following headings: the name, aliases and nicknames of the subject; sources of information; physical description; identification numbers; employment and work history; illegal organizations and activities; hangouts and travel patterns; automobile descriptive data; weapons; associates; and complete prosecution data. The Profile was tailored to provide data for a computerized intelligence data retrieval system. Use of the Profile was first explained to Strike Forces in July, 1972, and data began being fed to the computer maintained by the Intelligence and Special Services Unit of the U. S. Department of Justice in October 1972.

In addition to statistical data fed in from Profiles, all computer input is referenced by date and agent so that the computer has a record of every subject it has been asked, and who made the contribution or inquiry on the subject. In this way, by simply knowing a subject's name, a complete updated print-out can be obtained with agents' names who are connected with the investigation, and they can be contacted for further information. Also, if data are found by an agent to be incorrect, other agents who may have been connected with the subject in the past and been misinformed may be contacted and brought up to date on new corrections.<sup>10</sup>

State units usually maintain indexes to information on card files. Arizona, for example, uses a four-card set, for a person's name, place, type of activity, and organization and contacts.

Most state files are manual, although several states note that they are adaptable to computerization or have been designed for ultimate conversion to computers. The Miami Police Department's Special Investigation Section has hopes for a new computerized data system by mid 1974, to be managed by its full time data systems consultant. One state says that the possibility of computerization was considered, but was discarded because all computers are under the control of the central state data processing authority. Confidential information would thus leave the organized crime unit's control. Massachusetts' Organized Crime Retrieval and Dissemination System uses a Kodak Miracode microfilm unit. After a document, report or photograph is assigned a digital code number, it can be filed randomly. The system will automatically recall all pieces of information which match a given code number. The coding gives the name, period, location, type of information and other characteristics. By using the proper code number or range of numbers, the system can recall, almost instantly, all reports on a problem; for example, all reports dealing with gambling activity in a given neighborhood during a certain period of time. The records are located and processed in the organized crime unit's offices.



## INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

### Classification and Dissemination

It is essential that access to intelligence be closely restricted, for two reasons. One is that release of information might jeopardize an investigation or a prosecution. The other is that organized crime files usually contain unverified data that could be damaging to the persons involved if it were released.

An L.E.A.A. study, Basic Elements of Intelligence, defines dissemination as "the exposure of a finished intelligence product to those whom it is designed to serve or support in some way."<sup>11</sup> The study contends that the decision to disseminate data must be the prerogative of the unit commander because he is responsible for the product of his unit and he is in a position to know where it can be most useful. Also,

If he allows furnished intelligence material to flow uncontrolled from his unit at the decision of subordinates, the quality standards he has set for himself and his unit will rapidly collapse.... a study based on less than factual data may get into the hands of another law enforcement agency, which, believing it to be sound, takes action against an element of the criminal conspiracy in its own jurisdiction.<sup>12</sup>

Such faulty reports will quickly damage the intelligence unit's credibility.

Intelligence units dissemination policies vary widely. Some restrict intelligence to their own staff, while others disseminate it more widely. Several have developed classification systems which govern dissemination.

In Arizona, the person who initiates intelligence information assigns it one of the following classifications:

- (1) no dissemination;
- (2) no dissemination, but the submitting agency will be notified of inquiries;
- (3) no dissemination, but the inquiring agency will be told whether information is available;
- (4) dissemination, but no publication;
- (5) dissemination.

Delaware has three classifications:

- (1) restricted, for data that is obtained from open sources;

## INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

- (2) confidential, for information that may not be disseminated without prior approval of the submitting agency;
- (3) "eyes only", for unusually sensitive information.

The L.E.A.A. publication on Basic Elements of Intelligence suggests color coding files to indicate the appropriate degree of confidentiality.

Most states do not have such classification, but consider all material confidential on an equal basis.

Information is usually furnished to other agencies on a "need-to-know" basis. Idaho, for example, says that findings of the Organized Crime Prevention Council are held in a confidential, central file, and released on a need-to-know basis. Minnesota reports that county attorneys will be informed on this basis, and will be furnished copies of all reports necessary for effective law enforcement. Michigan says that any law enforcement agency making a legitimate request has access to data, and it is also disseminated to any agency in the criminal justice system that has basic responsibility in relation to the information, on a need-to-know basis. The Attorney General's Organized Crime Division cooperates with the Michigan Intelligence Network, which is located with the State Police, but it also maintains its own intelligence staff; "otherwise, the Attorney General would be at the mercy of any agency which had control over the available information."<sup>13</sup>

With regard to Racketeer Profile data and other intelligence data received from federal strike forces and other federal sources, the policy of the Intelligence and Special Services Unit of the U. S. Department of Justice is that information in its computer is available only to other federal agencies. A request from a state unit would have to be handled through the most proximate Federal Strike Force chief, who would decide what data could be disseminated to the local unit.<sup>14</sup>

Some of the states have formal request procedures. A member agency may request information from the Washington intelligence system on a need-to-know basis. The request is documented through request forms, which are filed, and an information request log is maintained. There is a printed "Intelligence Exchange Card", with spaces to fill in a description of the individual, his history, associates, and other information. The card also states in bold-face type that the information is confidential and shall not be disclosed to anyone other than an authorized law enforcement officer, acting in his official capacity. These follow the basic format of cards developed by L.E.I.U. The Wisconsin Crime Intelligence Information Program will not disseminate information until approval is received from the submitting group's supervisor.

A few states report that no formal arrangements for exchange of information have been necessary. Colorado reports that information may be exchanged informally with the Denver district attorney and the U. S. Attorney, although there are no formal agreements. In North Carolina, the organized crime control unit of the State Bureau of Investigation receives requests for information from local agencies by both telephone request and written request. As is common practice now, organized crime specialists and analysts have been trained to facilitate the dissemination of intelligence to local agencies.

Units usually provide for the physical security of their files. In Delaware, for example, the intelligence file room is accessible only through a single door, and is steel construction. Three separate keys are required for access to a specific file case. Rhode Island's organized crime unit is in a confidential location and the files are protected by alarm systems. Several states require that any staff member who uses a particular file sign a log sheet; if information is improperly disseminated, this helps determine who is responsible. Some units have also noted the importance of restricting access to Xerox machines and similar equipment, to prevent unauthorized reproduction of documents.

## 7. TRAINING PROGRAMS

Training is an integral part of most organized crime control units programs, because of the lack of experienced personnel and the continuing need to disseminate information on programs and problems. It includes both programs to train the unit's own staff, and programs to train local prosecutors and law enforcement officers. Staff training is discussed briefly in Chapter 4.

Types of Programs

Most training programs to date have been intended for a diversified group of law enforcement officers, prosecutors, or other persons concerned with organized crime control. One grant application commented on the consequent problem

....of making all of the material meet the needs of the student body. Relating such diverse subject matter as electronic surveillance, intelligence processes, photography, interrogation, etc., to the operational environs of state, local and specialized law enforcement officers is a most difficult task whether it be the first or fiftieth experience.<sup>1</sup>

It added that the problem is particularly difficult because "the majority of the instruction must be provided by individuals outside of the direct control of the Program's administration." Few organized crime units, however, have been able to provide specialized programs, although there seems to be a trend toward greater variety.

As earlier noted in Chapter 4, in the section on staff training, the National College of District Attorneys is sponsoring a series of five three-day seminars from November, 1973 through May, 1974, with instruction covering a spectrum of subjects from investigative and prosecutive techniques to management of the Unit. C.O.A.G. will sponsor eight two-day seminars in advanced organized crime prosecutive techniques beginning in March, 1974. More specialized training will be offered on prosecuting tax, antitrust, and public corruption cases.

Mississippi is among the states which has held a training course that was open to a variety of officials. The Attorney General's office held a 3-day seminar in 1972 to which representatives of all law enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices in the state were invited; about sixty-five of them attended. The Massachusetts Attorney General's office conducts an organized crime training program, consisting of two- or three-week training sessions held at the state police academy. One purpose is to encourage local police action against organized crime, and another is to encourage use of the office's technical assistance program.

## TRAINING PROGRAMS

In 1972, Washington's Attorney General's office held three organized crime training conferences, with a total of two hundred attendees. Two of the meetings were limited to law enforcement personnel. The third included legislators, business leaders, and members of the press. It later held a statewide intelligence meeting, which was attended by over fifty graduates of the training conferences. Participants suggested that these meetings be held twice a year and restricted to persons who exchange organized crime information. In Rhode Island, the Attorney General worked with the Police Chief's Association to institute a training seminar series for local police on organized crime.

Some training programs are more specialized. Named by the Kansas Bureau of Investigation as the most valuable training programs were two local organized crime seminars sponsored by the Bureau itself, as well as a seven week course which one of its agents recently finished at the U. S. Internal Revenue Department. Staff prosecutors of the Illinois' Attorney General's office have spoken to key personnel in the Chicago Police Department to educate them about the application of antitrust laws to organized crime. Georgia's Organized Crime Prevention Council has held training sessions for intelligence agents. California holds several types of training courses. Three-day courses on the use of surveillance equipment are held for small groups of officers. Monthly courses for local officers are also held on intelligence collection and on its analysis.

### Content of Programs

Training programs are generally concerned both with the nature of organized crime and with the methods of combatting it. They usually include sessions on the structure of organized crime, legislative approaches, methods and techniques of investigation, and the role of various agencies in controlling it.

A program for the ten-day regional organized crime conferences sponsored by L.E.A.A. in 1972 is summarized below. The first day was devoted to registration. The next five days were devoted to topics 1 through 6, and the rest of the meeting to topic 7.

1. Overview of organized crime (scope and structure, efforts to combat it, and problems involved);
2. Intelligence function (collection, collation, analysis, dissemination; operational and strategic intelligence; setting up intelligence units; analysis techniques);
3. Intelligence and evidence collection techniques (informants, witness development and protection, financial and documentary analysis, forensic science, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance);
4. Interdepartmental and interjurisdictional coordination and cooperation (strike force concept; roles of attorney and investigator);

## TRAINING PROGRAMS

5. The prosecutive function (grand juries, administrative penalties);
6. Planning a program (setting goals, identifying and selecting targets, planning);
7. Problems in investigating and prosecuting organized crime (narcotics, gambling, loan sharking, securities, thefts and fencing, frauds, infiltration of business, corruption control, labor racketeering).

While no other programs have been as detailed, most cover a similar range of topics. The program for a two-day Washington state workshop, for example, is shown in the appendix. It included sessions on patterns of organized crime, intelligence, corruption, white collar crime, and resources to combat organized crime. Massachusetts has held two or three-week training sessions, with a curriculum that included: intelligence; surveillance; use of informants; interviews and interrogations; report writing; photography; and search and seizure.

The Intelligence and Special Services Unit, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, U. S. Department of Justice has sponsored two training sessions for state and local personnel. One lasted from January 10 to January 28, 1972 and most of it was concerned with the "extracting process" and the "control process." Some specific topics were: "La Cosa Nostra"; counterfeiting; labor racketeering; alcohol and gun violations; infiltration of business and labor unions; computer techniques; the strike force; and gambling. Other lessons were aimed at how to abstract intelligence from investigative reports for computer input, how to evaluate intelligence, and how to write queries in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Intelligence Language.

From July 22, 1973 through July 25, 1973 LEAA sponsored an advanced organized crime seminar in New Orleans, Louisiana, for investigators; prosecutors; and a broad spectrum of other law enforcement personnel. Topics treated included the following: gangland assassinations; commercial gambling; uses of intelligence other than for arrest and prosecution; international narcotics operations; development and control of confidential informants; electronic surveillance techniques; the impact of strike forces; public corruption, forming an organized crime prevention council; loansharking; and criminal penetrations of legitimate businesses.

### Format for Programs

Programs range from one-day meetings to 10-day seminars. Most are one or two days, and consist primarily of speeches and panel discussions.

The 10-day L.E.A.A.-sponsored seminar combined lectures, panel discussions, case studies, workshops, and group discussions. Many subjects were treated several ways, with a lecture followed by a case study or by a workshop. Workshops were held, each led by a moderator, wherein members outlined their own experiences and activities. These helped to get the participants acquainted with each other and to stimulate self-analysis. A California course in surveillance equipment stresses practical demonstrations in simulated field problems. These seminars held evening, as well as daytime, sessions.

## TRAINING PROGRAMS

Schedules are customarily fixed in advance. One state notes the difficulty of estimating the time required for various sessions, but indicates that experience should improve scheduling.

The process of developing a training course for organized crime investigations in Dade County, Florida was described in detail in The Police Chief.<sup>2</sup> The seven-week course used many techniques: quizzes, research papers, preparation of case files, oral presentations by students and field demonstrations. Each week, students were asked to evaluate the content and method of the preceding week. A number of other units report that attendees are asked to evaluate training courses, usually through completing a printed rating sheet.

### Public Information and Education

Organized crime control units are not engaged in public education to any significant extent. The primary activity of this type is speeches by staff members to professional and civic groups.

The education function is more frequently assumed by organized crime prevention councils.<sup>3</sup> Idaho's council, for example, planned three regional seminars for all state and local public officials on the symptoms of organized crime. The seminars were intended to make all those serving in public office more aware of those things which indicate organized criminal activity and encourage them to report such activity to the Council.<sup>4</sup> Council members and staff frequently speak before interested groups, and are interviewed on television. Some councils have also developed more formal education programs. The Texas council developed and funded a program through the Department of Public Safety consisting of color movies, radio and television spot announcements, and articles for newspapers and magazines.

New Mexico states that its newly formed Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission will direct its intelligence products to the executive and legislative branches of the state government, to the news media, the business community, and academic institutions where appropriate. This caveat is added: "It is to be understood that all dissemination will be conducted under clearcut guidelines so that rights of citizens are fully protected."<sup>5</sup>

## SELECTION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

### 8. SELECTION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

Organized crime control activities often require sophisticated and costly equipment. Attorneys General's offices do not normally have such equipment, so its acquisition has been an essential part of establishing organized crime units. Some state units operate "equipment pools", through which local prosecutors or law enforcement officials may borrow such equipment.

This Chapter discusses only specialized equipment for organized crime control. It does not include normal office equipment.

#### Selection of Equipment

Chapter 4 discusses equipment budgets and shows the amount spent for equipment by those programs for which information is available. It also notes that equipment is usually purchased through bids, under normal state purchasing procedures, and mentions the difficulty involved in deciding what to buy.

A number of units mention that some items have been used more than anticipated, and others less. One unit reported to C.O.A.G. that the most essential equipment items were a surveillance van, recording devices, and photography equipment. Another reported that body-worn transmitters, with accompanying receiver and recorder, were most often used. Another state agreed that the body-worn transmitter was very useful and that it was becoming standard equipment. A fourth reported that the most useful items were a night viewer, a video-tape camera, and a 33 mm. camera. One state did not purchase telephone scramblers as planned, because it decided their use was too limited. Another reported that the gyro-stabilized binoculars were rarely used, although they were essential for aerial surveillance.

#### Types of Equipment

While no two states had identical equipment lists, most tend to purchase certain types of equipment. These include photographic equipment, recording and transmitting equipment, vehicles, binoculars and telescopes, personal intelligence kits, and guns.

Most units purchased several types of cameras. Illinois' budget, for example, included a 35 mm. camera, a Polaroid, a motion picture camera with zoom lens, telephoto lens, and a projector and screen. A new Jersey grant included three 35 mm. cameras with 5 mm. F 1.4 lens, three 85-300 mm. F/5 zoom lens sets, three tripods with tv heads, and six Minox B cameras. California purchased twenty Polaroid cameras and five other cameras. A Pennsylvania budget included two 35 mm. cameras. one 500 mm. lens, one 16 mm. camera, and one low-light source camera. Rhode Island bought one 33 mm. camera with telephoto lens, and two Minox C. cameras with attachments.

## SELECTION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

The Organized Crime Section of the Mississippi Attorney General's Office forwarded information concerning their experience with camera equipment. It was observed that because of the readjustment required to the use of highly sophisticated 35 mm cameras, the average investigator missed photographs or took poor quality photographs under surveillance conditions. The purchase of simple, cheap, more easily concealed cameras was recommended for all but long range and fixed point surveillance.<sup>1</sup>

Prices for photographic equipment range from Polaroids, at \$125-\$150 each, to a low light source camera at \$3,500 per unit. The 35 mm. cameras are usually listed at about \$300, and 16 mm. at about \$850.

Some states purchase specialized surveillance equipment. North Carolina's budget includes four portable intelligence base stations with recording capacity, at \$2,100 each; two 1 watt transmitters at \$600 each; two vehicle surveillance transmitters at \$1,000 each; and one \$1,500 base station transmitter. New Jersey's 1970 grant included three sets of auto trailer systems, ten portable radios at \$1,200 each and six at \$800 each. A California grant included five mass detectors, to identify concealed objects such as weapons, at \$600 each, two "room sweeping" devices at \$2,500 each, five low-light passive night viewing devices at \$7,000 each, and other surveillance equipment.

States which authorize electronic surveillance usually get equipment for this purpose. Rhode Island purchased two touch-tone decoders for \$3,400. The Kansas budget included \$8,232 for listening devices, recorders, and accessories. New Jersey purchased three brief case tape recorders, with telephone pickup coils. In the same 1970 budget, New Jersey also had fifteen tape recorders at \$41 each, and three on-body recorders at \$150 each.

Individual intelligence kits are often listed. Pennsylvania's 1972 grant, for example, included three at \$992 each; its 1972 grant included a \$2,112 intelligence support system, which included a pocket transmitter, automatic receiver, battery tape recorder and an attache case. Illinois budgeted two at \$1,280 each.

Binoculars and telescopes have been purchased by most states. New Jersey's 1970 grant included three 15x to 16x power telescopes at \$200 each. Rhode Island's budget included four 10 x 50 and two 20 x 60 glasses, at a total cost of \$532. Illinois included \$175 for a telescope and \$350 for binoculars. Arizona purchased a \$5,000 stabilized image binocular for aerial surveillance.

A few states budgeted items for securing their locations. Rhode Island's budget included a \$1,000 alarm system for the office interior, and \$360 for four secure file cabinets.

Most units include automobiles in their equipment lists. Some units, including Arizona, Georgia and Kentucky, provide each attorney and investigator with a car. Others provide fewer cars. Illinois, for example, budgeted two cars for six investigators. Mississippi included funds for a surveillance vehicle in its organized crime budget, but was unable to purchase it because state law prohibits all but a few state agencies from owning vehicles.

## SELECTION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

Minnesota and Kentucky lease autos, at from \$145 to \$165 per month. Kentucky's grant application notes that leasing will provide a variety of makes and models, "eliminating the standard detective automobile which, although unmarked, still lends itself to the appearance of a police vehicle." Most, however, purchase cars. Budgeted prices range from \$2,500 to \$4,200; the range in prices presumably depends in part on the equipment included. One unit budgeted \$800 to change the appearance of four cars by adding accessories, painting them, etc..

Colorado credits much of its success to the use of late model leased automobiles, which are not recognizable as law enforcement vehicles. In its grant application, \$190 per month rental cost was projected on eighteen leased vehicles.

The Organized Crime Strike Force in Colorado makes extensive use of a piece of equipment known as a "Pen. register". The register, when used as a monitoring device on a given subject's phone lines, provides a readout of all numbers dialed from the subject's telephone. The Strike Force Director believes that the register is invaluable in making cases against bookmakers, and foresees the possibility of expanded use of the register because of a Maryland case. That case, U.S. v. Focarile,<sup>2</sup> held that use of the register need not be preceded by a showing of need so great as that required for wiretap operations, involving the interception of oral communications. The Task Force believes that it may be successful in securing court permission for use of the register on a showing of probable cause only, a lesser burden, requiring significantly less documented investigation and paperwork than would be necessary to secure permission for a wiretap. The theory relied upon is that use of the register is not a proscribed activity within the meaning of the federal electronic surveillance statute.

Several states mention that autos are equipped with two-way radios. At least one state uses car telephones, to provide a means for prosecutors to confer with local prosecutors while enroute, and to provide a means for immediate changes in strategy. Several states provide a variety of vehicles. One grant application, for example, included funds for two automobiles, one station wagon, and one van truck. Another included funds for four used, "assorted older type" automobiles at \$2,000 each; it also included \$5,000 for a window van truck, with equipment to make it look like a camper, a utility service truck, or a delivery truck.

North Carolina indicates that the least valuable item of equipment it owns is an automobile tracking device (a "bumper beeper"). This is due to the high risk of loss to the implanted transmitter.

## SELECTION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

### Equipment Pools

Several states loan equipment to local law enforcement agencies. These include Arizona, California, Massachusetts and Mississippi. They maintain for loan the more sophisticated equipment, particularly that used for surveillance, which would probably be beyond the budgetary reach of individual agencies. They are also able to employ trained personnel to operate and maintain the equipment.

These four units loan equipment to any state or local agencies, on the basis of need. The equipment may be used only for organized crime control, under the conditions of the L.E.A.A. grants which financed its purchase. One unit director commented that this limitation is unfortunate, because much of the equipment would be useful in other situations, such as student disorders.

California publicized its resource pool by sending a bulletin, signed by the Attorney General, to each law enforcement agency in the state, after enough equipment was on hand to start operations. Information was also given at the L.E.I.U. meeting, and through the agency's monthly Intelligence Bulletin. The agency believes that the most effective announcement was word-of-mouth advertising given by users of the equipment. Massachusetts contacted each district attorney and police chief individually to advise them of the Technical Assistance Center. Mississippi advertised its equipment pool through personal contact and discussion at an organized crime seminar.

To help evaluate equipment, California requests that agencies using equipment from the Resource Pool complete a one-page questionnaire and return it with the equipment. The questionnaire asks:

1. In what general type of case was the equipment used?
2. For how many hours or days was it in operation?
3. What limitations did it have in the case?
4. Did it prove reliable? If not, what were the problems?
5. How could the Equipment or Resource Pool help the agency better in the future?

When a local agency borrows equipment, it must complete a form which lists the equipment and specifies that the borrowing agency is responsible for its safekeeping and return within fifteen days. The form also contains a statement that the equipment will be used only as authorized by state and federal law. The borrowing agency must also complete an agreement holding the state blameless from claims arising from the use of the equipment. The borrowing agency is responsible for safekeeping of the equipment and return. All equipment is delivered complete with film, tape, or other essential supplies, so it can be used immediately. The borrowing agency is responsible for providing additional consumables.

## SELECTION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

California reports that agencies are often reluctant to return the equipment at the end of the 15-day loan period. An extension is usually granted, unless another agency has requested it. Massachusetts also finds that individuals tend to hold equipment, so requires a verbal report twice a month.

At least one state does not loan any equipment to local officials, because it does not want to be responsible for their actions.

The Massachusetts Technical Assistance Center, in a progress report, noted an ancillary advantage of equipment pools:

exposure to the application and use of this type of equipment has been the foundation for many investigations because it has taught the investigators to approach the investigative problems with more imagination...Many tasks that would not have been undertaken were initiated with the use of the Technical Assistance Center in mind.<sup>3</sup>

This would presumably become more true as more local officials used the equipment, and as they became better versed in its potential application.

California has developed an evaluation system for its resource pool. A review of some actions which involved use of its equipment indicates this approach has been of measurable assistance. Some results during the pool's first two years of operations were reported to C.O.A.G. by the program director<sup>4</sup>:

A small police department made two felony arrests following the use of photographic equipment which documented assaults during a civil disorder;

A Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement office made seven arrests using transmitters;

A district attorney's office used a night viewing device and concealable transmitters in investigating a major organized gambling operation, resulting in fifteen arrests;

The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control made one arrest;

A Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement office made seventy-five arrests while using pool equipment and, because the transactions were recorded, the defense attorney advised the client to plead guilty in 90 percent of the cases;

A district attorney's office made one arrest for extortion and one for kidnapping;

A sheriff's office made twenty arrests for book-making and prostitution.

## SELECTION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

Available information indicates that equipment pools have been a successful approach to strengthening state and local crime control capabilities.

### Operation and Maintenance

The specialized equipment used by organized crime control units requires skilled personnel if it is to be operated and maintained efficiently. Most units employ technicians for this purpose. Arizona has an Equipment Coordinator, who is responsible for systems design, development, maintenance, installation and removal of surveillance equipment. California has an equipment testing laboratory, and employs Photo Electronic Specialists. North Carolina has a Radio Engineer in the organized crime control unit.

Indiana's State Police Department has a full-time electronic technician assigned to conduct evaluation studies of its equipment and projected equipment purchases.

These specialists may also train local officials to use equipment. Each time equipment is loaned by California's equipment pool, one of the specialists contacts the borrowing agency and describes in great detail how the equipment can be used. Massachusetts' Technical Assistance Center trains local officials in the application and use of its equipment. Mississippi requires, in some instances, that a state operator accompany equipment when it is loaned out, to assure it is not damaged.

California's program director noted that there was a need for test equipment: "This highly sophisticated electronic equipment requires highly sophisticated testing equipment to keep it in proper operating condition. This test equipment is also essential for modifying existing or constructing new equipment for specialized purposes." He noted also that it is sometimes necessary to purchase auxiliary equipment in order to obtain maximum use of the original equipment.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1. State Organized Crime Control Units

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# 1 OF 2

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4. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Martin R. Ward, Chief, Criminal Division, Idaho Office of the Attorney General, to Patton G. Wheeler, June 21, 1972.
5. Letter from Sam J. Papich, Executive Director, Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission, State of New Mexico, to Samuel T. Wyrick, III, December 21, 1973.

Chapter 8. Selection and Use of Equipment

1. Letter from Paul R. Alker, Chief, Organized Crime Section, Mississippi Attorney General's Office to Samuel T. Wyrick, III, November 15, 1973.
2. 11 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2009, Dist. Ct. Md.
3. Massachusetts Department of Attorney General, Report on Project No. 70 - 014a - OC3GAS, March 31, 1972.
4. Letter from Robert A. Houghton, Director, Division of Law Enforcement, California Department of Justice, to Patton G. Wheeler, February 7, 1972.

APPENDICES

GOALS OF STRIKE FORCE  
prepared by  
Arizona Office of the Attorney General

I. To Solicit, Receive, and Disseminate Information on Arizona and Arizona-Related Criminal Activities of an On-Going Nature.

A. Sub-objectives: Problem Statements

1. To obtain and disseminate intelligence information
  - a. with other law enforcement agencies
    - 1.) initially
    - 2.) on a continuing basis
  - b. to the business community and concerned citizenry
  - c. from informants
  - d. through independent investigation.

B. Program

1. To develop channels of communication with other law enforcement agencies for purposes of receiving and disseminating intelligence information.
  - a. intrastate - meetings and correspondence
    - 1.) periodic publications
2. To develop a program of education of the public
  - a. by personal contact
  - b. by periodic publications
3. To develop informants with means of obtaining information of organized crime activities.
4. To make use of all available investigative techniques
  - a. electronic
  - b. physical
  - c. intelligence analysis
  - d. investigative grand jury.
5. To participate, whenever possible, in continuing education schooling in all phases of the investigation-prosecution aspects of organized crime.

## C. Summary

Intelligence information gathering and exchange is the basis and foundation of any systematic effort to combat organized crime. It is necessary to have as many law enforcement agencies as possible aware of the importance of the concerted effort of the Strike Force to gather and utilize the submitted information, as well as to make them aware of the caliber of information needed.

Electronic surveillance and the use of informants have, nationwide, produced perhaps the majority of the substantive evidence obtained by investigative committees and also the majority of substantive evidence introduced in courts concerning organized crime. Recognizing the significance of this information is oftentimes, however, the result of the original painstaking gathering and exchanging process.

II. To Correlate and Index Such Information in an Effort to Determine the Persons, Locations, Organizations Involved in, and Extent of, More-than-Local Arizona and Arizona-Related Criminal Activities.

## A. Sub-objectives: Problem Statements

1. To correlate and index received information in such a way that it will become apparent, from the indexing analysis, to what extent and in what respect certain persons, places, crimes and organizations are interrelated.

## B. Program

1. To use the indexing system which has been devised and which, it is hoped, will result in a type of automatic analysis.
2. To use organizational charts and other analytical techniques.
3. To obtain continuing education in the field of intelligence indexing and analysis at every opportunity.

## C. Summary

When a substantial amount of information is gathered for the purpose of attempting to recognize patterns and trends in the information it must be, to some extent, indexed along the lines of the desired inquiry and correlated among those lines of inquiry.

To the extent that this is possible without losing sight of the ultimate objective of attacking organized criminals in the courtroom, it is the process of being done by the Strike Force.

III. To Select, Investigate, Prosecute and Convict Persons Shown to be Involved in Organized Crime in Arizona.

## A. Sub-objectives: Problem Statements

1. To select, from among the recognized on-going organized criminals, those most apparently amenable to further investigation and ultimate prosecution and conviction.

## B. Program

1. To select targets upon which to concentrate on the basis of judgment as to: importance in organized crime circles; importance in terms of criminal impact on the State of Arizona; ability of the Strike Force to investigate; probability of obtaining sufficient information to indict.
  - a. through analysis of available information
  - b. through independent investigation.
2. To investigate every possible avenue for additional information with an eye to detecting illegal activities.
  - a. by going to the agency within whose jurisdiction the crimes occurred or the suspect lives, for assistance
  - b. by investigating possible income tax violations
  - c. by looking at possible illegal corporations manipulations
  - d. by looking at any and all dealings with other administrative agencies
  - e. possible dissatisfied associates
  - f. by personal surveillance
    - 1.) electronic
    - 2.) physical.
3. To prosecute through the courts
  - a. by indictment
  - b. by complaint.
4. To convict
  - a. by remaining current in the field of criminal law
  - b. by concentrating on only one defendant, or only a few defendants, at any one time.
5. To maintain a high level of proficiency by continued reading and attending continuing education schools in the field of prosecution.

6. To cooperate with other prosecutive agencies to the extent of informing them and helping them if there is information gathered of violations in their jurisdictions.
7. To propose legislation where there is discovered a need for additional legislation or a lack in the law as it exists.

C. Summary

The gathering and analyzing of information will probably not result in the revelation of evidence of crimes sufficient to indict. The most probable result of the analysis will be merely to indicate areas of possible fruitful investigation. It will then be the job of the Strike Force to develop prosecutable cases, with the help of the local law enforcement people and county attorneys offices, and thereafter to assist with indictments and prosecutions.

POSITION DESCRIPTION FOR CRIME INVESTIGATION  
prepared by  
Michigan Department of Civil Service

6522110 \*CRIME INVESTIGATOR 10

General Description

An employee in this class makes investigations of criminal matters, including organized crime; and performs related work.

Examples of Work

As an experienced investigator of organized crime: conducts preliminary investigations of complaints to determine whether or not the criminal act has connotations of organized crime activities; conducts round-the-clock surveillance on principles connected with organized crime; investigates matters involving organized crime wherein local enforcement officials have failed to act; performs investigative work for grand juries; works in conjunction with other state agencies on matters concerning organized crime or official corruption; uses and maintains electronic and photographic equipment in surveillance activities; interrogates witnesses and suspects, takes statements for use in trials and hearings, obtains documents and other items of evidence; works in constant consulting cooperation with city, county, state, and federal law enforcement officials in the field of organized crime investigations; and prepares reports and conducts correspondence related to this work.

Experience and Education Requirements

1. \*Four years of recent experience in crime investigation, one year of which shall have been in the investigation of organized crime, and graduation from high school;
2. or, \*three years of re-ent experience in crime investigation, two years of which shall have been in the investigation of organized crime, and graduation from high school;
3. or, \*two years of recent experience in crime investigation, one year of which shall have been in the investigation of organized crime, and possession of a bachelor's degree in police administration, criminology, or a related field.

Other Requirements

Physical condition adequate for performance of the work; appropriate appearance, dress and personal habits; judgment, emotional stability; tact, and similar qualities necessary in meeting and dealing effectively with others; willingness to participate in inservice training programs; willingness to travel; willingness to work erratic hours, and on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays; willingness to live in any area of the state; know-



APPENDIX B: POSITION DESCRIPTION FOR CRIME INVESTIGATION

ledge of police work, facilities and methods; knowledge of police investigation techniques; knowledge of methods of investigating organized crime; knowledge of what constitutes essential evidence in the prosecution of specific crimes; knowledge of state and federal laws and court proceedings; ability to identify, collect and analyze crime data; ability to write adequate reports; ability to work with supervisors and to take over the supervision of investigations if necessary; ability to coordinate work with that of other agencies; and ability to maintain favorable public relations.

APPENDIX C: POSITION DESCRIPTION FOR ANALYST

POSITION DESCRIPTION FOR ANALYST  
prepared by  
Kansas Department of Administration

What decisions will be made by appointee?

Coorelate intelligence data, determine what data to release and when to release. Determine proper time to write summaries. Determine what should receive further investigation.

Nature of contacts the appointee will make.

Liaison with intelligence officers from the 50 states. Federal Government and Bureau personnel. Lisison with representatives of several other state agencies, in person and by telephone.

Qualifications

College preferred. Other training provided by the Bureau. Special knowledge, skills and abilities include techniques of criminal investigation, plan and conduct some investigations, ability to think and write clear concise reports, public speaking ability.

Definition of Work

Conduct analytical research and investigations; review and become familiar with all criminal intelligence previously developed and current raw intelligence; maintain liaison with other intelligence personnel; analyze and correlate intelligence information; prepare and disseminate intelligence summaries; maintain and insure security of intelligence files; prepare reports showing coorelation of activities between two or more criminals; make recommendations for the additional investigation in areas where such investigation is potentially productive; and conduct oral briefings.

Persons best suited for this work must be of excellent character, a loyal citizen, be intelligent and a logical thinker, have a wide range of interests, have an inquiring and analytical mind, have a good memory, an interest in law enforcement in general and organized crime in particular, have the ability to use the English language properly, and have an ability to speak, write, and express thoughts in a logical concise and easily understood manner. The analyst must be able to type and have an understanding of filing procedures.

STANDARD CONCERNING  
STATEWIDE CAPABILITY TO PROSECUTE CORRUPTION

National Advisory Commission on Criminal  
Justice Standards and Goals,  
Report on Community Crime  
Prevention, 272 (1973)

States having a history of concern regarding the existence of public corruption and organized crime, both within and outside the criminal justice system, should establish an ongoing statewide capability for investigation and prosecution of corruption.

1. The office charged with this responsibility should have clear authority to perform the following functions:
  - a. Initiate investigations concerning: the proper conduct and performance of duties by all public officials and employees in the State, and the faithful execution and effective enforcement of the laws of the State with particular reference but not limited to organized crime and racketeering;
  - b. Prosecute those cases that are within the statutory purview and that the State unit determines it could most effectively prosecute by itself, referring all other evidence and cases to the appropriate State or local law enforcement authority;
  - c. Provide management assistance to State and local government units, commissions, and authorities, with special emphasis on suggesting means by which to eliminate corruption and conditions that invite corruption;
  - d. Participate in and coordinate the development of a statewide intelligence network on the incidence, growth, sources, and patterns of corruption within the State; and
  - e. Make recommendations to the Governor or State legislature concerning: removal of public officials, government reorganization that would eliminate or reduce corruption and encourage more efficient and effective performance of duties and changes in or additions to provisions of the State statutes needed for more effective law enforcement.
2. The office should have the following minimum characteristics and powers:
  - a. Statewide jurisdiction;
  - b. Constant capability to obtain and preserve evidence prior to the filing of formal complaints;

- c. Power to compel testimony for purposes of investigation and prosecution; authority to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, obtain grants of immunity, and have access to the sanction of contempt; ability to hold private and public hearings; and power to prosecute cases in court;
- d. Adequate budget, protected from retaliative reduction;
- e. Specialized staff: investigators, accountants, and trial attorneys, with access to others as needed;
- f. Consulting services available to all units of State and local government, commissions, and public corporations for counsel on means of maximizing the utilization of available staff and resources to meet workload demands, with special priority for service to licensing, regulatory, and law enforcement agencies; and
- g. Annual disclosure of financial interests to the State Ethics Board by all persons performing regular duties in fulfillment of the above. Legislation should be enacted to authorize these and other powers as needed.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS STANDARD

National Advisory Commission on Criminal  
Justice Standards and Goals,  
Report on Police, 250 (1973)

Every police agency and every State immediately should establish and maintain the capability to gather and evaluate information and to disseminate intelligence in a manner which protects every individual's right to privacy while it curtails organized crime and public disorder.

1. Every State should establish a central gathering, analysis, and storage capability, and intelligence dissemination system.
  - a. Every police agency should actively participate in providing information and receiving intelligence from this system.
  - b. Every police agency should designate at least one person to be responsible for liaison with the State intelligence system.
  - c. Every State intelligence system should disseminate specific intelligence to local agencies according to local needs and should disseminate general information throughout the State.
2. Every local agency should participate, where appropriate, in the establishment of regional intelligence systems. Every regional intelligence system should participate actively in the State system.
3. Every police agency with more than 75 personnel should have a full-time intelligence capability.
  - a. The number of personnel assigned to this operation should be based on local conditions.
  - b. The intelligence operation should be centralized; however, intelligence specialists may be assigned, where appropriate, to major transportation centers.
  - c. When the size of the intelligence operation permits, organized crime intelligence should be separate from civil disorder intelligence.
  - d. In smaller agencies the intelligence specialists should be required to take direct enforcement action only where limited agency resources make it absolutely necessary. In larger agencies the intelligence specialist should be required to take direct enforcement action only where a serious threat to life or property makes it absolutely necessary.
  - e. The intelligence operation should include an independent and well-secured reporting and record system.
4. Every police agency should insure exchange of information and coordination between the intelligence operation and all other operational entities of the agency and with other government agencies.

5. Every police agency should supply its intelligence operation with the funds, vehicles, vision devices, and other specialized equipment necessary to implement an effective intelligence operation.

Appendix F: ORGANIZED CRIME WORKSHOP  
 Sponsored by the Washington Organized Crime Intelligence Unit  
 and The Criminal Justice Education and Training Center

March 7, 1972 - Tuesday

9:00 SEMINAR ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME  
 Herb Edelhertz  
 Battelle Northwest

Dave Boerner  
 Chief Criminal Deputy  
 King County Prosecutor's Office

Seymour Glanzer  
 Assistant U.S. District Attorney  
 Washington, D.C.

10:30 COFFEE BREAK

10:45 SEMINAR ON STOLEN PROPERTY  
 Ralph Salerno

Vincent Piersante

Al Tebaldi  
 Chief of Police  
 Pasco

12:00 LUNCH

1:30 WASHINGTON RESOURCES TO COMBAT ORGANIZED CRIME  
 Slade Gorton  
 Washington Attorney General

Stan Pitkin  
 U.S. Prosecuting Attorney

Robert Schillberg  
 Prosecuting Attorney  
 Snohomish County

Chris Bayley  
 Prosecuting Attorney  
 King County

Jack Davis  
 LEAA, 10th Region

Mark Cooper  
 Director of Public Relations  
 Safeco Insurance Companies

3:30 SUMMATION  
 Ralph Salerno

Vincent Piersante

Ken Grosse

4:00 EVALUATION

4:15 ADJOURNMENT

The development and presentation of this workshop was assisted by federal funds provided by the United States Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, pursuant to Public Law 90-351.

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 Sponsored by the Washington Organized Crime Intelligence Unit  
 and The Criminal Justice Education and Training Center



ORGANIZED CRIME WORKSHOP

Sponsored by the  
 Washington Organized Crime Intelligence Unit  
 and  
 The Criminal Justice Education and Training Center

March 6, 1972 - Monday

8:00 Registration and Assignment to rooms

9:20 Welcome and Introductions  
 Jay R. Dixon  
 Director  
 Criminal Justice Center

Ken Grosse  
 Director  
 Organized Crime Intelligence Unit

9:30 PATTERNS OF ORGANIZED CRIME  
 Ralph Salerno  
 Central Intelligence Bureau  
 New York Police Department, Retired

10:30 COFFEE BREAK

10:45 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS  
 Vincent Piersante  
 Chief Investigator  
 Michigan Attorney General's Office

11:45 LUNCH

1:15 SEMINAR OUTLINE AND INTRODUCTIONS  
 Ken Grosse

1:30 SEMINAR ON CORRUPTION  
 Vincent Piersante

Reg Bruce  
 Chief Investigator  
 Washington Attorney General's Office

3:15 COFFEE BREAK

3:30 SEMINAR ON VICE AND NARCOTICS  
 Ralph Salerno

E. C. (Cal) Davis  
 Chief of Police  
 Vancouver

Otto Heinecke  
 Director  
 Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

5:00 SOCIAL HOUR

6:00 DINNER

7:00 Films: CORRUPT CITY  
 BIOGRAPHY OF A BOOKIE JOINT

8:30 Informal Discussion led by:  
 Ralph Salerno and Vincent Piersante

**END**