

ABDUCTED CHILDREN:

**A PLAN AND DEMONSTRATED APPLICATION
FOR CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT**

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An Independent Study
By
Richard J. Gordy

Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
Command College
Class X

1990

10-0185

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

A discussion of the issue's background and the project's methodologies.

SECTION II - FORECASTING THE FUTURE

How should California law enforcement respond to cases involving abducted children by the twenty-first century?

SECTION III - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLANNING

Demonstrating the plan.

SECTION IV - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Applying the plan.

SECTION V - CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Direction for this decade.

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ABSTRACT

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FOR CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT

by

RICHARD J. GORDY

COMMAND COLLEGE CLASS X

COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING (POST)

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

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Commission on POST
Order number 10-0185

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part One - Futures Study: This study examines the issue of children abducted by non-family members. Other categories of missing children, i.e., runaways and parental abductions, are briefly addressed as sub-issues. An extensive historical background of the issue at the national, state and local levels illustrates the present state of affairs. This may be perceived by some as disinterested and uncaring. A review of recent literature provides some insight into the nature and extent of the problem. A series of interviews revealed consensus among those knowledgeable about child abductions. They also produced some provocative thoughts for the future.

A nominal group technique was used to forecast the future. Trends and events that will have significant impact on the future of this issue were distilled. These trends and events were cross impacted to evaluate their effect on one another. Trends which will impact on the future were identified. They include: (1) the perceived effectiveness of the criminal justice system, (2) mandates on law enforcement policy from the legislature and/or courts, (3) availability of human, technological and financial resources, and (4) law enforcement's ability to quickly and accurately identify individuals. Events that were calculated to have the most effect on the trends were: (1) an automated on-line Missing/Unidentified Persons System becoming operational, (2) the Violent Crime Information Center being established in the state department of justice, (3) training becoming available to all California law enforcement agencies via satellite telecast, and (4) the occurrence of a notorious kidnapping case. The combination of trends and events become the focus for development of policy. Three scenarios were created to illustrate how the policies might influence the future. Policy changes that focused on reaching a desired and attainable future were: (1) accurate data input for the Violent Crime Information Center; (2) support for continued development of an automated on-line Missing/Unidentified Persons System; (3) support for the statewide implementation of forensic DNA laboratories run by California Department of Justice, (4) regionally developed protocols of interagency assistance in cases of child abduction; (5) support for the development of a statewide interactive satellite training network; (6) coordination of legislative advocacy through professional associations; (7) inclusion of child abduction issues in effective crime prevention programs; and (8) support for future technology that will enhance law enforcement's ability to identify individuals.

Part Two - Strategic Plan: A hypothetical police department was created to demonstrate how a strategic plan could be developed and applied at the local level. Environmental resources were examined. Internal and external forces were evaluated. Stakeholders were identified and their capabilities assessed. A mission statement for the local agency was developed and a plan for execution prepared.

Part Three - Transition Management: Transition involves taking the strategic plan from the local level and applying it statewide. This involved identifying the minimal number of individuals whose support would be needed to implement the change. This critical mass was evaluated for commitment to any proposed changes. When necessary, negotiation strategies were developed to gain the desired commitment. Carrying the plan to implementation statewide required a management structure which changed from chief executive to natural leaders to hierarchy according to the progression of the plan.

The conclusion was a far reaching network of support for resources that would effectively assist during the investigation of multijurisdictional cases. With these resources, law enforcement would be better prepared to confront child abduction cases by the twenty-first century.

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the issue of children abducted by non-family members and suggests a response plan for law enforcement by the year 2000. Includes the influence of historical background material, the trends and events impacting the future, alternative scenarios, and a strategic plan for the future. The plan is demonstrated in a hypothetical model police agency through the development of policy considerations and recommendations. Included is a support mechanism for developing technologies and resources. Discussion focuses on automated data systems, satellite training delivery, interagency protocols and identification through Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). A transition management plan presents a feasible application of strategic implementation statewide. The plan can be replicated at local or state levels desiring to improve response to child abduction cases, as well as other cases involving multijurisdictional investigations. Also included are literature review; trend and event evaluations; forecasts; graphs, with additional data; resources in appendixes; references.

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SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

No event has the potential of inflicting more severe emotional trauma on an individual than the disappearance of a loved one. Even the death of a loved one provides the survivors an opportunity to mourn their loss and put the deceased to rest. A missing person case does not offer this type of closure. When the missing person is an abducted child, the trauma is exceptionally devastating to everyone involved.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has just released the findings of their latest in the series of studies on the incidence of missing children (U.S. Department of Justice 1990). The study attempted to compile the number of crimes in one year (1988) against all children under 18. The study concluded that as many as 4,600 children were abducted nationwide that year. There were more than 100,000 attempted abductions. Many of the abductions ended within hours, often after sexual assaults; however, 200 to 300 children disappeared for longer periods or were killed. The report concluded that despite widespread publicity about specific child abduction cases, efforts to develop public policy have been severely hampered by an ignorance of the gravity of the problem.

In California, the State Department of Justice reports that since 1961 there have been 34 children kidnapped by strangers (Joe 1988). An additional 515 juveniles have disappeared under suspicious circumstances. Although this represents less than 2 percent of all missing children, these cases have the potential for having the greatest impact on every agency and every person who becomes involved. This impact was experienced in Concord, California in 1982 when a 2 1/2-year-old girl was kidnapped from her family's van in a shopping center parking lot. A team of investigators worked on the case for ten months

before the victim was recovered in San Francisco. She had been held captive and sexually abused by her two abductors while living in the back of a filthy delivery van. The details of her captivity were investigated for an additional thirteen months before the case was tried and her abductors successfully prosecuted. The cost of the case through prosecution was estimated at \$400,000. The high cost pales in comparison to the trauma experienced by everyone who was touched by the case. In 1988, nine-year-old Michaela Garecht was abducted in Hayward, California, and the impact of that case continues today as investigators struggle to find out what happened to her. The cost of the investigation has exceeded \$500,000, not an insignificant impact on the budget of the agencies involved, but insignificant when compared to the impact the case has had on the lives it has touched. Michaela's mother calls her daughter's abduction "the moment that changed our lives forever." (Riera-Teixeira 1989, 16). The case manager at Hayward Police Department said that "nothing will ever be the same" at that department because of the impact of this case (Brezeale 1989).

The San Francisco Bay Area has been witness to the disappearance of eight children since March, 1988. Of the eight, three have returned home, one is dead and four remain missing (Riera-Teixeira 1989). The media attention to these cases has saturated the homes and minds of bay area residents. The response has been positive action in some instances and ineffective reaction in others. The problem, however, has not been ignored.

There have been efforts at both the national and state level to respond to the issue. These efforts have come from the legislature, victim's advocacy organizations, technological advances and from law enforcement itself. Reviewing the history of these efforts will prepare us for the future by developing policies and procedures which will allow the most

effective response possible. This effort may also be carried over into other challenges facing law enforcement.

Legislation

National legislation for abducted children came in 1982 with the National Missing Childrens Act. The primary purpose of the act was to expand the use of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) as a national recording system for abducted children. This national registry was made accessible to every law enforcement agency in the country. Parents were permitted to enter information on a missing child into the system if local law enforcement failed to do so (Hotaling and Finkelhor 1988).

Much stronger legislation followed in 1984 with the passage of the Missing Childrens' Assistance Act as Title IV of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. This assigned the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) the coordinating responsibilities for the federal response to missing children. This included a national clearinghouse for technical assistance, public education and investigative information (Hotaling and Finkelhor 1988). OJJDP created the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) to meet this mandate. The NCMEC assists individuals, groups, agencies and local governments in locating and returning missing children.

The federal effort has influenced state and local agencies to be more responsive to missing children. Because being "missing" is not a crime, state and local law enforcement agencies have traditionally taken a low-key approach to these cases.

There has been great variation in laws, policies, training and reporting practices across states and locales. California's first attempt to legislatively mandate standardization

to the issue came in 1977. Law enforcement was required to submit dental records of missing persons to the Department of Justice within 45 days. In 1984 the time frame for submission of dental records was reduced to 24 hours when the missing person was under 18 and missing under suspicious circumstances. Legislation that became effective in 1985 required law enforcement to accept reports on missing persons under 18 regardless of their legal residence. Later that year, it was mandated that law enforcement accept missing person reports without delay and that they cross report to the agency that had jurisdiction where the missing person resided. It further required that missing persons be entered into NCIC and that in those cases where the missing person was under 12, the entry must be made within four hours. The law was amended in 1986 to require a photograph to be submitted to DOJ when the missing person was under 18. 1986 also saw the passage of the Davis-Grisham Missing Childrens Act. This designated the California Department of Justice (DOJ) as this state's official clearinghouse for information about missing children (Joe 1988). DOJ was required to distribute photographs of missing children via monthly posters and quarterly bulletins. They established a continuous 24 hour toll-free telephone hotline to receive and disseminate information regarding missing children and a reward procedure for information leading to the recovery of a missing child who was listed in the Department of Justice Registry. The law also included runaways in the reporting mandates.

In December of 1986 an event occurred which would accelerate the course of missing persons legislation. A 20-year-old college coed disappeared in San Diego County. Her parents naturally became concerned and because she would have travelled by freeway through several cities on her way home they contacted the California Highway Patrol. The

~~highway patrol told them to contact their local law enforcement agency as the highway patrol did not handle missing persons. Since the exact location of the girl's disappearance was~~

unknown, the parents were frustrated in their efforts to report their daughter as missing. They told an assembly subcommittee that during their attempt they were confronted with "rude and discourteous" dispatchers and "disinterested" police officers. Unfortunately the next morning their daughter was found murdered. Her body had been pushed over an embankment near a freeway overpass. The real tragedy for law enforcement came some time later when her killer was identified. At the time of her homicide the perpetrator was an on-duty California Highway Patrolman.

The girl's parents were constituents of Assemblyman Larry Stirling. He wasted little time in drafting extensive mandates into new legislation which became effective in January 1988. This new law required law enforcement to give priority to missing person cases over property crimes. It required the highway patrol to develop policy on how they would respond to missing person cases and to present their policy to the legislature. The law allowed the highway patrol to take reports on missing persons or refer the reporting party to the agency with jurisdiction. The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) was directed to develop guidelines and training for police officers and public safety dispatchers. This training was to be completed by 1991.

January 1989 saw the repeal of Section 11114 Penal Code and all of the missing persons reporting requirements were recodified under Sections 14200 - 14213 Penal Code (Presley 1988). This change also mandated that the California Department of Justice establish and maintain a Violent Crime Information Center (VCIC). The purpose of this

center is to assist in the identification and apprehension of persons responsible for the disappearance and exploitation of missing persons. This includes an emphasis on children.

It further required the establishment and maintenance, within VCIC of an on-line automated computer system. This is designed to effect an immediate law enforcement response to reports of missing persons. The Attorney General was also required to establish and maintain an investigative support unit. This is to be supported by an automated violent-crime-method-of-operation system. Its purpose is to facilitate the identification and apprehension of persons responsible for kidnappings, false imprisonment, sexual exploitation and homicide.

Organizations

Much of the effort on behalf of missing children has been initiated by victims or their families. Parents of missing children have become some of the most vocal critics of the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system. This criticism has created a phenomena in which nearly every new case results in a new organization being formed. One of the earliest and most effective national organizations was the Adam Walsh Foundation. It was established by the parents of Adam Walsh, who was abducted and murdered in Hollywood, Florida. The Walsh Foundation was instrumental in championing the cause of missing children through the enactment of the National Missing Childrens Act in 1982.

~~Child-find~~, based in New York, was one of the first national non-profit organizations to collect and disseminate information regarding missing children. It works in cooperation with law enforcement throughout the country. The creation of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) in 1984 established a connection with the U.S. Department of Justice and the private organizations that were starting to proliferate. It represented an early coordinated effort between private and public organizations to address the issue.

In California, the 1984 disappearance of Kevin Collins in San Francisco led to criticism of law enforcement's response to the case. This criticism was the basis for the formation of the Kevin Collins Foundation. The foundation has since changed its name to the American Missing Childrens Foundation. However, the goal has remained the same, which is to raise the priority of preventing and eliminating these crimes in the minds of the general public as well as elected and appointed officials (Thomas 1986).

In 1984 the California Peace Officers' Association (CPOA) recognized that inconsistencies in law enforcement reporting policies were not in the best interest of a clientele that was too helpless to act on its own. They provided legislative input to Senator Robert Presley who facilitated the change in the reporting mandates (Wasserman 1985).

More recently, a non-profit corporation, Californians for Missing Children, was formed in San Francisco to recover kidnapped children abducted by strangers. This is accomplished through private investigation funded and supported by the business communities, grants, private donations, and fund raising events (Californians for Missing

Children 1989). They promote public awareness and education and distribute a child safety info-pak. This effort is indicative of the atmosphere that surrounds the issue within California communities.

Technological Advances

Technology has its place in the missing childrens issue. Recently introduced is the ability to do age progression of a child's photograph. This has proven valuable due to the rapid rate at which appearances change during growth years. In addition, the ability to transmit and read computer enhanced fingerprint impressions has created a more rapid method of identification of individuals.

The technology that has the greatest potential impact on the issue is identification through the genetic fingerprinting of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). This process has recently been accepted in California courts and courts across the nation.

The use of DNA for identification has tremendous possibilities in child abduction cases. It is presently being used in a case in Fairfax County, Virginia to determine if blood on a suspect's tennis shoe belongs to a missing five-year-old girl. The capability to make identifications from microscopic samples of various fluids and tissues will facilitate case solution. The American Civil Liberties Union has indicated that it does not oppose the ability of law enforcement to make positive identifications through DNA fingerprinting. This will serve to protect those who could be implicated through false identification. They do, however, question the reliability of the laboratory procedures being used in DNA identification.

The use of computer automation has long been used to track wanted persons and stolen property. In the future, this technology will also be applied to missing children cases in California. A task force is presently working in the Department of Justice to establish an automated on-line Missing/Unidentified Persons System (MUPS). Projected to be operational in November 1991, it will provide California law enforcement with access to DOJ files and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This will be done via the current California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS). Containing 103 data elements, MUPS will provide police with identifying capability not currently available through NCIC. The ability to retrieve the information electronically greatly enhances the potential of identifying a missing child or their abductor in the field.

Law Enforcement

Law enforcement has not been unresponsive to the issue of missing children. Nationally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became more actively involved in cases involving abduction with the passage of the National Missing Childrens Act. In 1985 the Illinois State Enforcement Agencies to Recover Children (I SEARCH) became an operational part of the Illinois State Police. Their success in investigating cases, and providing education and training resulted in six other states becoming part of the network. This, in turn, grew to become the Inter State Enforcement Agencies to Recover Children (Ferguson and Mascaro 1986).

The Behavioral Science Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigations studies the actions of child abductors. They hope the information gained can be used to resolve future

cases. Such study may result in a future that prevents these cases from occurring by identifying early aberrant behavior and modifying it.

In California, the thrust has been to train all police officers and public safety dispatchers in missing persons. The curriculum was developed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) in response to legislative mandate. This effort included the inaugural interactive teleconference training via satellite for the dispatchers.

The development of the Violent Crime Information Center (VCIC) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) provides the type of resource that will enable law enforcement to do its job more effectively. VCIC is expected to become operational in July 1990. It has already demonstrated its potential by connecting a prowler arrested in Tucson, Arizona with a series of sexual assaults throughout California. The prowler used a characteristic method of operation in which he would impersonate a police officer, wear a ski mask and arm himself with a chrome revolver during the commission of his crimes. This information was provided to the Violent Crime Information Center which successfully connected the suspect to eleven attacks within this state. Although this was done off-line, when the automated system becomes operational in a few months, the full benefits should become readily apparent.

In 1989 the San Francisco office of the FBI convened a series of meetings attended by investigators from local agencies who had worked on child abduction cases. This was in response to a number of incidents in the Bay Area. The goal of the effort was to share their various experiences, thereby gaining from each other. What developed was a Child Abduction Investigative Guide (Appendix A) which could be used as a plan for future

incidents that might occur. Perhaps one of the investigators summed up the situation best when he noted "once it started, it was too late to plan--there was only time to react!" (FBI 1989, 5).

As a result of this networking, several law enforcement agencies within Alameda and Santa Clara counties have developed an interagency assistance policy for child abduction cases (Appendix B). Called the Child Abduction Protection Protocol, this procedure calls for immediate assistance by providing uniform officers to an agency that experiences a child kidnapping. The immediate assistance can last up to 72 hours and provide a minimum task force of 37 officers to confront the initial stages of one of these high profile cases. Participating agencies may provide long-term assistance for two or three months with up to 21 experienced investigators. This protocol operates outside the scope of California's mutual aid pact. It also represents a significant step in the recognition of and dedication to a serious law enforcement concern.

This historical perspective has brought us to the present. We have seen some trends emerge and some events occur that have provided direction for history and the future. Where do we go from here? There is significant room for improvement. The training mandate is not nearly complete, and when the next child is abducted, it is unlikely that anything revolutionary will occur. Hopefully we have progressed beyond the point where the mother of an abducted child in Nebraska had to launch a petition drive to force a grand jury investigation into her nine-year-old daughter's kidnapping because she had become frustrated by what she considered lax police work!

METHODOLOGIES

In order to gain a clear view of the future, it is first necessary to examine the issues in the world around us. Of course, sub-issues which spring from an examination of the topic must be addressed. This section has shown us how trends and events have shaped history. A nominal group of subject-matter experts met to brainstorm which trends and events could impact the future. These trends and events were subjected to a cross-impact analysis, allowing the determination of which should become policy considerations. Alternative scenarios were created to illustrate what the future might look like. Using one of the scenarios, a strategic plan was developed that demonstrated the plan in a hypothetical model law enforcement agency. To show how the plan might develop statewide over the next decade, a transition management plan was created. It identified the critical mass, who will have specific responsibility and what type of management structure can carry the plan to implementation.

SECTION II - FORECASTING THE FUTURE

THE ISSUE

How should California law enforcement respond to cases involving abducted children by the twenty-first century?

SUB-ISSUES

Complete discussion of law enforcement's response to missing children in California necessitates addressing the other categories defined in the reporting mandates, i.e. runaways and parental abductions. These need to be analyzed in depth through individual studies. Since this study is focused on abducted children, runaways and parental abductions will be only briefly addressed as sub-issues.

1. How should California law enforcement respond to cases involving runaway youth?

There is no simple answer to that question; consequently, a separate study is necessary. Although it is the most common of all missing children cases, it represents the least amount of risk to the child. Most runaways are, in fact, located, although the horror stories that surround this issue continue to shock the conscience. Running away was decriminalized in California in 1977. The motivation behind decriminalization was well intended but the resources at the local level were not ready to provide effective alternatives. Local law enforcement viewed the situation from a pragmatic perspective: If society didn't want us to lock-up runaways, they couldn't be terribly concerned about them, and therefore they aren't worth our time or effort.

One trend today in family law courts is to invoke mediation in child custody cases. Perhaps this is a direction that could prove effective in cases involving runaway children and/or incorrigible parents. Placing runaway cases that stem from dysfunctional families

under the jurisdiction of family law court has two immediate advantages. It can provide mediation services which should resolve a majority of the cases. Those which do not get resolved could invoke the power of the court, which would then provide an appropriate message to law enforcement, i.e. that these cases are important.

Obviously a more comprehensive plan is necessary. This issue deserves the same type of strategic plan for intervention that is being developed here for abducted children.

2. How should California law enforcement respond to cases involving parental abduction?

Many of the same perceptions that exist regarding runaways negatively impact law enforcement's effectiveness in cases of parental abduction. Until 1977 disputes over child custody were handled as civil matters. If a police officer was called, it was to preserve the peace, not to invoke any criminal sanctions. There weren't any. When legislation was passed specifically addressing parental abduction, it attached investigative responsibility to the District Attorney's office. Since they weren't involved, local law enforcement pretty much ignored the new law. Even today it is not uncommon to hear a police officer tell someone, "It is not against the law to take your own kids."

Parental kidnapping accounts for the second largest category of missing children. The public perception is that these children are not at risk. While it is true that most of these children are recovered, researchers agree that the emotional trauma can be as great or greater than when a child is abducted by a complete stranger. Because a parental abduction is usually the culmination of an emotionally charged exchange between parents, there is a

strong likelihood for violence. The child and the police officer who are placed in the middle are targets for victimization.

This issue, once again, is extremely complex and needs to be the focus of an independent study. Key elements that should be addressed might include law enforcement training and interagency cooperation. It is apparent that law enforcement training on handling and diffusing child custody disputes needs stronger emphasis. The curriculum for basic training needs expansion and in-service training should be mandated. Several jurisdictions have found that if parental abduction cases are vigorously prosecuted, the incidence goes down. Furthermore, some District Attorneys' offices have proactive units which effectively and compassionately handle these cases. Fresno County is an example. This unit should serve as a model to be replicated on a regional basis throughout the state. These units could participate in the training of local law enforcement to form a partnership which could effectively impact these cases. To completely deal with this issue, a statewide strategic plan should be developed similar to this effort on abducted children.

Kidnapped children, those who are abducted by someone who does not have a right to them and is generally unknown to them, are the focus of this project. Although this category represents the smallest percentage of missing children cases, it is the category that represents the greatest risk to the victim (U.S. Department of Justice 1989). The abduction of a child draws widespread attention and places the law enforcement agency(ies) involved under close scrutiny. If mistakes are made, they frequently become the focus of media criticism. Generally, law enforcement, particularly California law enforcement, responds to

critical cases very effectively. Problems with child abduction cases usually arise early when the case is assessed incorrectly and appropriate resources are not allocated soon enough.

The initial assessment, from the time the call is first received and dispatched to the first contact by a police officer, is most critical and leaves no room for error. Once the case gains momentum it can quickly get out of control. Proper prior planning is essential and can impact the ultimate outcome. Law enforcement administrators need to be aware of the potential cost of a child abduction. The Hayward, California Police Department has estimated the first year's cost of the abduction of Michaela Garecht at \$500,000 (Brezeale 1989). This is not atypical. A case like this could place substantial financial strain on most local police agencies.

An effective strategic plan for intervention in child kidnappings has the potential for minimizing the risk to the victims and reducing costs. The plan developed in this project will not be able to be implemented at once. It needs to take advantage of resources and technologies as they become available throughout this decade.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Most of the literature on missing children has been focused on the extent of the problem. Selected literature which was more specifically oriented to the issue of abducted children and how that impacts our society was reviewed for this project.

Nationally, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) commissioned the National Studies of the Incidence of Missing Children. This series of six studies has the potential for answering many of the questions surrounding the nature of the

issue of missing children. The results of the first study conducted by Gerald T. Hotaling and David Finkelhor of the University of New Hampshire along with Dr. Andrea Sedlak of Westat Inc., Rockville, Maryland were released in January 1989. This study focused on the stranger-abduction homicides of children. They estimated the number at between 52 and 158 annually, which represents a yearly average of fewer than two stranger-abduction homicides per 1 million children under 18. Teenagers between ages 14 and 17 have the highest rate of abduction homicides of all age groups (U.S. Department of Justice 1989). What message this study should provide to law enforcement is that the chance of finding an abducted child alive far outweighs the probability of finding them deceased. While these estimates provide documentation about the number of children abducted and murdered annually, they represent only a small, albeit tragic, part of the missing children picture. What is not shown are the number of children who are abducted and physically abused and/or sexually exploited before they are recovered alive.

The results of the second in this series of studies were released in May 1990. This study, Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Throwaway Children in America, attempted to compile the number of crimes committed against children under 18 in the year 1988. The study estimated the number of children abducted by non-family members that year at 3,200 to 4,600 with an additional 100,000 being the targets of attempted abductions, primarily from passing motorists. The study also estimated an additional 350,000 children were the victims of abduction committed by a family member (U.S. Department of Justice 1990). These figures represent a sizable law enforcement problem when taken as a whole.

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) released an evaluation of kidnapping committed against children by non-family members in 1986. The overall figures roughly parallel those in the OJJDP study. One interesting revelation was that only 15 percent of the cases studied were classified in police records as a kidnapping or attempted kidnapping. The majority (61 percent) were classified as sexual assaults. Only one of the 269 cases in the law enforcement records that were studied had been reported to NCMEC, suggesting an underutilization of this resource (NCMEC 1986).

Significant literature impacting on the issue in California includes the 1987 report of the Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP). This report, in response to Assembly Concurrent Resolution 34, included the findings of two hearings held within California. Private, non-profit missing children organizations were major contributors to these hearings. These groups were generally critical of the law enforcement response to the issue. Some common concerns voiced included a serious lack of training given to law enforcement on the handling of reports. The report also indicated that improvement was needed in the police response to these cases, along with compassionate and diplomatic communication skills. Specifically cited was the need for a networking relationship between local law enforcement agencies within a specific geographical location (OCJP 1987). Many of the training concerns have been addressed through subsequent legislation.

Early in 1988, Arthur Young and Company released their Field Study of California Law Enforcement Agencies which they conducted for the Department of Justice (DOJ). The study surveyed law enforcement agencies representing 63 percent of the state's population. The study identified law enforcement support for a statewide on-line missing

person system and a statewide violent crime modus operandi system. The report also identified a need for standardization in reporting of missing persons among California law enforcement agencies (Young and Co. 1988).

Late in 1988, the California law enforcement Command College sponsored by POST produced a project by Lt. Jack Griggs of the San Bernardino Police Department entitled, "What Will be the Impact of Missing Children Cases on Law Enforcement by the Year 1998?" That report called for law enforcement taking a hard line against child pornography and developing educational programs for the community. The report further called for establishing units to exclusively handle missing children cases, to share missing children information with other agencies and the public, and lastly to support licensing of missing children agencies (Griggs 1988). In the two years since this report, information is starting to be shared and educational programs are starting to develop.

Legislation passed in 1985 requested the California Attorney General to prepare and submit to the Legislature by July 1988 a report summarizing the data collected by DOJ and the procedures for processing reports on missing persons. The report covered 12 months between September 1985 and August 1986 and recorded a total of 963 cases. This study reported that 60 percent of the 436 persons who were not located were juveniles. Two percent of the missing juveniles were abducted by a non-family member, and another two percent were missing under suspicious circumstances (Joe 1988).

All of the literature reviewed on the issue carried a common message. It called for standardized uniform guidelines in the handling of missing persons reports by law

enforcement. Additional training and improved communications among agencies were also frequently cited as necessary for improved service delivery.

INTERVIEWS

In order to effectively scan the environment surrounding the issue of missing and abducted children, a series of interviews were conducted. These involved individuals who had experience or knowledge related to the topic issue. Interviewees were all asked to provide the same information through an informal individual discussion which was conducted either in person or via telephone. The purpose of the interview was to obtain the interviewee's impression of the nature of the problem today, what lies in the future, what can be done to effectively deal with it today, . . . and tomorrow? Particularly noted in the interviews were areas of consensus and points of deviation. Those interviewed included: a behavioral scientist with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a researcher in criminology, a police manager, a consultant for the United States Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, a project manager for the California Department of Justice, the founder of a victim's advocacy organization, the parent of a child victim, a Special Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a supervisor for the California Department of Justice. The common themes that emerged from the interviews were as follows:

1. Cases involving missing children must be handled and classified in a standardized fashion. Both nationally and throughout California the variance in acceptance, prioritization, response and investigation of these cases frustrates family and law enforcement alike.

Although revisions to California law have attempted to remedy this problem, there is still widespread divergence from agency to agency.

2. Agencies, both public and private, must network and open lines of communication to reach a common goal. Resources that are already in place are not being used effectively due to a lack of communication.

3. There is a need to provide reunification services after the recovery of an abducted child. This can be facilitated if these cases come under the jurisdiction of an interdisciplinary team.

4. A lack of resources was consistently lamented. The availability of automated systems such as VCIC and an on-line MUPS were felt to be crucial tools to adequately address this issue.

5. Adequate planning and preparation. The necessity to do advance work to prepare for a major case was frequently pointed out. Just as planning is done for disasters, so should it be done for cases that can have a major impact.

6. It was noted that police officers who receive specialized training on issues related to juveniles provide more empathetic service-oriented help in cases involving missing children. They were able to deal with the big picture, not just the enforcement aspect of their work.

Although not a part of the consensus-opinions offered by the interviewees, two suggestions that came out are noteworthy:

1. Since most abductions are spontaneously acted out, with little or no prior planning, the chances are greatest that the perpetrator will make mistakes soon after the crime is

committed. If these mistakes can be capitalized upon, a quick and thorough response by law enforcement will enhance the chance for apprehension and recovery.

2. Law enforcement can learn by reviewing past cases and investigations. Each experience should be utilized as a training scenario for events that will occur in the future.

The interviews revealed some thought provoking suggestions for the future. Among them are the following:

1. The need for our state education system to provide programs which will train tomorrow's researchers. With the closure of the School of Criminology at the University of California, Berkeley, there is no forum within our state to develop future criminologists. The future of scientific research is generally viewed as having growth potential in criminal justice, but California is not prepared to meet this need.

2. The ability to alter behavior through genetic control, early identification of deviant behavior and appropriate intervention may eliminate the criminal element from society. This was believed to be more feasible than attempting the wholesale sociological changes that might reduce crime.

3. Future abducted children cases could be investigated by an interdisciplinary team from within the State Department of Justice. The team could be comprised of investigators, analysts, psychologists and social scientists. This should be done in a coordinated effort to locate the perpetrator, recover the child and provide reunification services. A similar approach is presently used by I SEARCH in the midwest (Crnkovic 1987).

4. The ability to do offender profiling within California's Department of Justice will become available. This will provide California with an additional resource to effectively intervene in child abductions.

NOMINAL GROUP TECHNIQUE

Although nominal groups are usually selected from a broad spectrum of professions and backgrounds, this subject matter required more specific knowledge about missing children's issues. The nominal group consisted of: two police sergeants with investigative experience in missing children cases, one was from a medium size police agency and one from a small agency; two police lieutenants, one from a medium size agency and one from a large agency; two special agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, one of whom was a behavioral scientist; a crimes analyst; and a community college instructor.

The nominal group was asked to generate a list of trends and events that were relevant to the topic issue. They had to include trends and events that were applicable to the State of California, the nation or the world. Events were further defined as discreet occurrences that could be reviewed in history as having occurred. Those events having a low probability of occurrence but a significant impact on the issue were encouraged. Trends had to be non-directional and include both those over which one has no control as well as those which were subject to intervention.

Round table discussion produced a set of 51 trends and 33 events for consideration. These were screened by the group and six trends and six events were selected for inclusion in this study as being the most critical to the issue.

Trends:

1. Effectiveness of Criminal Justice System: The ability to quickly respond to crime, identify perpetrators and remove their ability or desire to commit future crime.
2. Participation of Community Based Victims Advocacy Foundations: Generally non-profit grass roots organizations that assist in dissemination of information and public education programs. They also provide information and advice on state legislation.
3. Legislative Mandates: The specific direction given to law enforcement by the legislative process which impacts local policy or procedure.
4. Emphasis on Crime Prevention: The effort which reduces the ability of the perpetrator of crime to be successful by making the target of intended crime more resistant.
5. Available Resources: The financial, technical and human assets necessary to accomplish any specific law enforcement goal.
6. Ability to Identify Individuals: Defined as the ability to make quick positive identification of all persons. This would include remote fingerprint analysis or, more likely, through Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) genetic fingerprinting. This ability would be available to law enforcement on all individuals.

Events:

1. California's Violent Crime Information Center (VCIC) becomes fully operational: This is the unit within the Department of Justice that assists local law enforcement agencies in the investigation of specific violent crimes. Contained therein is an automated modus operandi system.

2. California's on-line Missing/Unidentified Persons System (MUPS) becomes fully operational: Located within the Department of Justice. This automated system will be accessible directly by all law enforcement agencies in the state and will interface with the National Crime Information Center.
3. California Department of Justice DNA laboratories become operational: With positive identification through the genetic fingerprint contained in DNA being accepted in criminal courts, the state intends to develop its own forensic laboratories to facilitate these identifications.
4. A notorious kidnapping occurs: An abduction which attracts national attention due to the heinous nature of the crime or the status of the victim.
5. Interagency Assistance Protocols are implemented statewide: An agreement, reduced to writing, which formalizes the procedure for providing assistance to allied law enforcement agencies on a regional basis when a child is abducted.
6. Interactive law enforcement training via satellite becomes available statewide: This was described as the ability to receive training via satellite transmission at every law enforcement agency throughout the state. This would include the ability to interact with the instructor(s) via video teleconference or telephone.

FORECASTING

Trends

The nominal group participants were then asked to forecast the trends. Each was provided a form on which they were to evaluate the level of the trend five years ago using a figure of 100 as the baseline for the level of the trend today. They were then asked to forecast the level of the trend five years into the future and ten years into the future. A consensus evaluation for the trends was created using the median figures produced by the nominal group.

| LEVEL OF TREND (Ratio: Today = 100) BASED ON GROUP MEDIAN | | | | |
|---|----------------|-------|---------------------|--------------------|
| TREND STATEMENT | FIVE YEARS AGO | TODAY | FIVE YEARS FROM NOW | TEN YEARS FROM NOW |
| T1: Effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System | 95 | 100 | 110 | 130 |
| T2: Participation of Victims Advocacy Foundations | 20 | 100 | 125 | 140 |
| T3: Legislative Mandates | 70 | 100 | 110 | 120 |
| T4: Emphasis on Crime Prevention | 90 | 100 | 105 | 110 |
| T5: Available Resources | 90 | 100 | 110 | 120 |
| T6: Ability to Identify Individuals | 75 | 100 | 150 | 200 |

Illustration 1: Trend Evaluation

This provided a direction for each of the trends with the results being rather consistent among group participants.

Range of Trends:

The range of the trends is represented by the highest and lowest numbers produced by the nominal group. The range is critical to understanding the diversity of opinions within the group and the strength of their convictions. These numbers were produced from the baseline of 100 which represents the level of the trend today.

| RANGE OF TRENDS | | | |
|---|----------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| TREND STATEMENT | FIVE YEARS AGO | FIVE YEARS FROM NOW | TEN YEARS FROM NOW |
| T1: Effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System | 100 | 150 | 200 |
| | 75 | 90 | 85 |
| T2: Participation of Victims Advocacy Foundations | 50 | 150 | 175 |
| | 0 | 110 | 125 |
| T3: Legislative Mandates | 50 | 140 | 150 |
| | 20 | 100 | 100 |
| T4: Emphasis on Crime Prevention | 100 | 150 | 170 |
| | 70 | 90 | 85 |
| T5: Available Resources | 120 | 130 | 150 |
| | 80 | 100 | 100 |
| T6: Ability to Identify Individuals | 85 | 180 | 200 |
| | 50 | 120 | 150 |

High

Low

Illustration 2: Range of Trends

T1. The effectiveness of the criminal justice system shows great diversity among the group. One member of the group felt that five years ago it was only as effective as it is today while the lowest score showed that it was 25 percent less effective. The diversity into the future is even greater. The lowest figure in ten years indicates that the criminal justice system will decrease in effectiveness from today's level by about 15 percent while the strongest figure predicts improved effectiveness of 100 percent. These scores indicate that the events can dramatically impact upon the perception of how effective the criminal justice system is viewed.

T2. Five years ago, victims advocacy foundations were felt by the group to range from being practically non-existent (0) to half as active as they are today. The group was consistent in predicting that their participation would continue to rise through the next ten years ranging at that time from 25 percent to 75 percent more active than they are today.

T3. State legislative mandates that impact local law enforcement policy were felt to be increasing over the past five years. In 1985 the range was placed at 30 points. The group felt that the legislature was likely to continue to respond to perceived disinterest by the police with additional mandates. One group member thought this would not occur, while another felt the increase would be 50 points over the next ten years. Consensus had the trend gradually increasing but subject to significant impact of occurring events. The definition of this trend includes only state legislation, although local policy is subject to mandates from local and federal sources as well as the courts.

T4. Five years ago the issue of missing children was not included in many crime prevention programs. The narrow range set by the group emphasizes this assessment. The future of the issue being a part of crime prevention received mixed predictions from group members. Some felt missing children would receive less emphasis while others felt the emphasis would increase. In ten years the range increased to 85 points, indeed manifesting those feelings that missing children will receive more emphasis.

T5. The issue of available resources received a diverse forecast from the group. Some felt that available resources had increased over the past five years while others felt that these resources had decreased by a like amount. The future forecast was optimistically consistent: resources would not decrease over the next ten years. However, a minority felt an increase

by as much as 50 percent could be ahead. The definition of this trend includes technical, human and financial resources. The group, as a whole, appears confident that an increase in these resources lies ahead.

T6. The group indicated that the ability to identify individuals has increased over the past five years. Three felt this increase was substantial, 50 percent in one case, prompted by the implementation of the Cal-ID Automated Fingerprint System. The members were further convinced that this ability would continue to increase perhaps by as much as 100 percent over today's level.

Events

In order to determine the impact on both trends and events, the nominal group was asked to evaluate the events for probability and impact. For each event they were asked to predict the year in which the probability of the event occurring first exceeded zero. Then they were asked to rate the probability of occurrence on a scale of 0-100. This was done for each event as it occurred within the next five years and within the next ten years. The group was then asked to consider the impact each event would have on the issue. Each event was rated on a scale of 0-10 for its potential positive impact and its potential negative impact. Using the median figures from the group, a consensus evaluation of the probability and impact of the events was constructed.

| EVENT STATEMENT | PROBABILITY | | | IMPACT ON THE ISSUE IF THE EVENT OCCURRED | |
|---|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---|--------------------|
| | YEAR FIRST EXCEEDS ZERO | FIVE YEARS FROM NOW | TEN YEARS FROM NOW | POSITIVE 0 - 10 | NEGATIVE 0 - 10 |
| E1: VCIC Becomes Operational | 1990 | 100 | 100 | 7 | |
| E2: MUPS Becomes Operational | 1991 | 100 | 100 | 9 | |
| E3: DNA Laboratories Become Operational | 1993 | 100 | 100 | 7 | |
| E4: Notorious Kidnapping Occurs | 1990 | 50 | 50 | 5 | 5 |
| E5: Interagency Protocols Implemented Statewide | 1995 | 50 | 80 | 8 | |
| E6: Interactive Satellite Training Statewide | 1995 | 50 | 90 | 6 | |

Illustration 3: Event Evaluation

CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS

The nominal group was then requested to determine the impact each event would have on every other event, and on each of the trends. For the event-to-event portion of the analysis the following question was asked: "If the event actually occurred, how would the probability of every other event be affected at the point of greatest impact?" If the probability increased or decreased, that number, expressed as a percentage, was placed in the appropriate intersection on a matrix. If there was no effect, the intersection was left blank, and such events are said to be uncoupled.

For the event-to-trend portion of the analysis, the following question was asked: "If an event actually occurred, what percentage change, if any, would it cause in the projection of the trend at the point of greatest impact?"

| Year Probability > 0 | 1990 | 1991 | 1993 | 1990 | 1995 | 1995 | CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION BASED ON GROUP MEDIAN | | | | | | HITS * ACTORS |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------------------|
| % Probability by 2000 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 50 | 80 | 90 | T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | T5 | T6 | |
| If event below occurred, its impact on --> | E1 | E2 | E3 | E4 | E5 | E6 | T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | T5 | T6 | HITS * ACTORS |
| E1: VCIC Becomes Operational | X | | +10 | -10 | -5 | | +10 | -5 | +5 | | -5 | +10 | *8 |
| E2: MUPS Becomes Operational | | X | +10 | -15 | -5 | +5 | +15 | +5 | +5 | -5 | -5 | +20 | *10 |
| E3: DNA Laboratories Become Operational | | | X | -15 | | +5 | +20 | | | | | +5 | 4 |
| E4: Notorious Kidnapping Occurs | +5 | +50 | +50 | X | +75 | +20 | +10 | +70 | +30 | +80 | +20 | +15 | *11 |
| E5: Interagency Protocols Implemented | | | | -5 | X | +5 | +25 | | +10 | +10 | +80 | +10 | 7 |
| E6: Interactive Satellite Training | | | +5 | -5 | +15 | X | +20 | | -10 | +30 | +20 | +5 | *8 |
| # Hits - Reactors * -> | 1 | 1 | *4 | *5 | *4 | *4 | *6 | 3 | *5 | *4 | *5 | *6 | |

CROSS-IMPACT MATRIX

- T1 = EFFECTIVENESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
- T2 = PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS ADVOCACY FOUNDATIONS
- T3 = LEGISLATIVE MANDATES
- T4 = EMPHASIS ON CRIME PREVENTION
- T5 = AVAILABLE RESOURCES
- T6 = ABILITY TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS

Illustration 4: Cross-Impact Matrix

The number of hits along each row indicates the importance of each event as a change agent. Those events with the highest number of hits (*) are known as "actor" events and should become the primary focus of any policy considerations.

Columns representing both events and trends are also calculated for number of "hits." Events and trends with the larger number of "hits" (*) are identified as "reactors," as they

are buffeted by the occurrence or non-occurrence of the actor events. Events three, four, five and six along with trends one, three, four, five and six are reactors. They should be focused upon for future policy consideration.

In order to systematically and visually examine the interrelationships and implications of these individual trends and events, the data from the cross impact matrix was displayed on a graph. The graphs depict the impact that each event will have on each of the other events and on all of the trends. The impact is shown at the point in which the probability of the event occurring is greatest.

EVENT NO. 1
VCIC Becomes Operational
Impact Of E4




Illustration 5: Event One - Cross Impact

Event number one is the Violent Crime Information Center in the Department of Justice becoming operational.

This unit would provide investigative support to local law enforcement in the event of a child abduction. The nominal group was convinced that VCIC would become operational possibly as soon as 1990, but certainly by 1995. This certainty carried through the year 2000. Event four, a notorious kidnapping, was the only other event impacting event one. Should that kidnapping occur, it would increase the probability of VCIC becoming operational by 5 percent. This figure was not calculated any higher by the nominal group because of their certainty of event one occurring. Event one impacts on three other events and on five trends. Therefore, it is considered an actor event, one that definitely needs to be considered in future policy.

EVENT NO. 2
MUPS Becomes Operational
Impact Of E4




Illustration 6: Event Two - Cross Impact

Event two is the on-line Missing/Unidentified Persons System becoming operational in California's Department of Justice.

This system would allow local law enforcement agencies to inquire into data reported on missing persons. This would facilitate their identity and recovery. The nominal group felt that this event had the strongest positive impact on the issue. They were convinced that it would occur, possibly as soon as 1991, but certainly by 1995, a conviction that continued through the year 2000. The group felt that the occurrence of a notorious kidnapping (E4) would increase the probability of event two by 50 percent, indicating that it could become operational as much as three years sooner than originally forecast. Event two impacts on four other events and all six trends, making it a virtual necessity for inclusion into future policy consideration.

EVENT NO. 3
DNA Laboratories Become Operational
Impact Of E1, E2, E4 & E6




Illustration 7: Event Three - Cross Impact

Event number three represents the Department of Justice DNA laboratories becoming operational.

This was felt to be a critical event because it will enhance law enforcement's ability to identify individuals. It will also reduce the effectiveness of defense challenges regarding the laboratory procedures used in making the identification. The group felt that the earliest the first laboratory would become operational would be 1993. They thought that the laboratory would be a certainty by 1995, and this confidence carried into the next century. If events one and four occurred in 1990, they would increase the probability of the laboratory becoming operational by 60 percent. The occurrence of event two in 1991 would increase the probability by an additional 10 percent, while the addition of interactive satellite training in 1995 added an additional 5 percent to the probability of the laboratory becoming

reality. Should events one, two, four and six occur, they raise the probability of having the laboratory operational in 1993 from 0 to 75 percent.

EVENT NO. 4
Notorious Kidnapping Occurs
Impact Of E1, E2, E3, E5 & E6




Illustration 8: Event Four - Cross Impact

Event four is the occurrence of a notorious kidnapping.

This event is, obviously, very unpredictable. It could occur at any time and would have impact on the issue, both positive and negative. The occurrence of all of the other events was seen by the group as having a negative influence on the probability of event four occurring. If event one were to happen in its earliest year of probability (1990), it would reduce the probability of a notorious kidnapping by 10 percent. MUPS coming on-line in 1991 would reduce the probability by 15 percent. The DNA laboratory becoming operational in 1993 reduces the chance of a notorious kidnapping by an additional 15

percent. The occurrence of events five and six in 1995 further reduces the probability of event four by 10 percent. This event impacts on every other event and trend. As an actor, its occurrence increases the likelihood of everything else taking place. As a reactor, it is very much subject to negative impact by the occurrence of the other events. While it is beyond our capability to completely eliminate the possibility of a notorious kidnapping, we can, by strategically planning the events of the next decade, substantially reduce its probability.

EVENT NO. 5
 Interagency Protocols Instituted Statewide
 Impact Of E1, E2, E4 & E6




Illustration 9: Event Five - Cross Impact

Event five is the statewide implementation of interagency protocols on a regional basis to provide additional resources in a child abduction case.

Although seen as having significant positive impact on the issue, the group felt that this event would only have a 50 percent probability by 1995. This was the first year its probability exceeded zero. By the year 2000 this event was only forecast to have an 80

percent probability. The potential relinquishment of local control and politics were cited as the reasoning behind this somewhat pessimistic forecast.

Event five is a reactor, and the impact of events one, two, four and six change the probability of implementation. Events one and four were predicted to occur as early as 1990. If they did, it would raise the probability of this event by 70 percent (75-5). This would actually move the year this event first exceeds zero up to 1989. History supports this premise with the implementation of the Alameda-Santa Clara Counties' protocol in 1989 (Fremont P.D. 1989). The protocol followed three notorious cases in the Bay Area. If event two occurs in 1991, the probability dips slightly, but increases another 15 percent with the occurrence of event six in 1998. This puts event five on track to rise to 100 percent probability by 1996 and on into the twenty-first century.

The group felt that events one and two would have an adverse impact on event five due to a perception that interagency protocols would not be needed if VCIC and MUPS were operational.

EVENT NO. 6
Interactive Satellite Training Statewide
Impact Of E2, E3, E4 & E5




Illustration 10: Event Six - Cross Impact

Event six is the statewide availability of interactive satellite training.

The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) telecast the first of these in California in November 1989. Although training programs via satellite transmission are becoming widespread, this event would necessitate the ability of the student to interact via video teleconference or telephone with the instructor(s) during the training. The inaugural POST program was restricted to approximately 30 down-link sites which limited student attendance. This event is defined as follows: satellite training would be available to every law enforcement agency within the state.

The nominal group felt that this event would have a positive impact upon the issue, but not as strong as event five. They did, however, give it a greater probability of occurring by 2000 (90 vs. 80 percent). The group did not feel this event could occur prior to 1995.

The impact of events two, three, four, and five would serve to hasten and increase the probability of this event substantially. Event one was felt to be uncoupled because it would already be in place before this event could occur. The impact of a notorious kidnapping (E4) would raise the probability by 20 percent in 1990.

The combined impact of events two, three and five raise the probability of event six by a total of 35 percentage points by 1996. This takes the probability of event six from 90 percent in the year 2000 to 100 percent in 1998.

The trend graphs show the impact each of the events has on those trends with which they interact. The events impact chronologically based upon the revised data taken from the cross impact analysis of the events upon each other. This revised data shows event one, VCIC becoming operational, occurs in 1990. Event two, MUPS becomes operational, occurs in 1992. Event three, the DNA laboratories becoming operational, happens in 1995. The notorious kidnapping never reaches 100 percent probability, while event five, the implementation of interagency protocols, occurs in 1996. Event six, the interactive satellite training, occurs in 1998.

TREND NO. 1

Effectiveness Of The Criminal Justice System

Impact Of Revised E1, E2, E3, E4, E5 & E6




Illustration 11: Trend One - Cross Impact

The nominal group median predicted that the criminal justice system would become more effective by some 30 points if none of the events occur. This is a reactor trend, subject to modification by all of the events. The rise in effectiveness begins slowly in 1990 when impacted by event one. It increases more dramatically in 1996 when events two, three and five have impacted on it. Event four does not impact because it never reaches 100 percent probability. In 2000 this trend will increase by 90 points over its original level if each of the events that impact it occur.

TREND NO. 2

Participation Of Victims Advocacy Foundations Impact Of Revised E1, E2 & E4




Illustration 12: Trend Two - Cross Impact

The participation of Victims Advocacy foundations is predicted to increase by 40 points over today's level by the twenty-first century. The impact of event two in 1992 causes a slight dip, but the impact becomes negligible by 1995. Events one and two curiously negate each other. This was resolved by the group's feeling that implementation of VCIC would make the foundations' work seem less important. Conversely, the on-line Missing/Unidentified Person's System would make the work of the foundations slightly more effective. Although the impact of a notorious kidnapping would be substantial, it does not occur in the revised data.

TREND NO. 3
Legislative Mandates
Impact Of Revised E1, E2, E4, E5 & E6




Illustration 13: Trend Three - Cross Impact

It was the collective feeling of the group that legislative mandates would increase 20 points by the twenty-first century. This trend was impacted by five events. Events one and two start a slight incline in 1990. Revised event four did not occur, and event five, occurring in 1996, culminated the increase. Event six, occurring in 1998, started a downward trend that ultimately brought the level of legislative mandates back to 120 in the year 2000. The group felt that legislative mandate would be necessary to implement interagency protocols but that interactive satellite training would demonstrate that legislative mandates were not required.

TREND NO. 4
Emphasis On Crime Prevention
Impact Of Revised E2, E4, E5 & E6




Illustration 14: Trend Four - Cross Impact

The emphasis that law enforcement places on crime prevention efforts is 10 points higher today than it was five years ago. The nominal group felt that this trend would continue to rise slightly over the next ten years to a level ten points higher than today. This trend is a reactor, subject to the impact of four events. Event two, MUPS becoming operational, is going to de-emphasize the need for prevention efforts on child abduction. The notorious abduction does not impact because its probability does not reach 100, but the occurrence in 1996 of event five starts an upward movement that is accelerated in 1998 by the impact of event six, ultimately taking this trend to a level 40 points higher than originally forecast in the year 2000.

TREND NO. 5
Available Resources
Impact Of Revised E1, E2, E4, E5 & E6




Illustration 15: Trend Five - Cross Impact

The nominal group felt that resources available to deal with the issue of child abductions had risen by ten points over the past five years, primarily through the funding within the State Department of Justice for VCIC and MUPS. The group felt that these resources would most likely be channelled elsewhere upon the implementation of these events. The group was confident that other resources would become available for the issue on a gradually increasing basis through the year 2000. Trend five is also a reactor, and the impact of interagency protocols (E5) and interactive satellite training (E6) provide personnel and educational resources that increase the level of this trend by 100 points in the year 2000.

TREND NO. 6
Ability To Identify Individuals
Impact Of Revised E1, E2, E3, E4, E5 & E6




Illustration 16: Trend Six - Cross Impact

Our ability to identify individuals has improved by 25 percent over the past five years. This is due, primarily, to the advent of the Cal-ID Automated Fingerprint System. The group felt that this ability had the potential to increase substantially over the next ten years to a level twice that of today. This was due to technological advances and the use of DNA genetic fingerprinting. This trend is subject to the impact of every event occurring. The notorious kidnapping does not occur. However, the impact of events one, two, three, five and six accelerate the ability to identify individuals to two and one-half times today's level by the year 2000.

SCENARIOS

The information developed in the cross-impact analysis was applied to three possible scenarios. These were mechanisms for integrating the information into hypothetical situations that will illustrate what might be. The scenarios will explore a broad range of situations which will illustrate principles, issues or questions that might otherwise be neglected. Furthermore, they will illustrate some policy considerations that will carry into the strategic plan that lies ahead.

These scenarios will all take place in the Concordia Police Department, a hypothetical municipal law enforcement agency in Northern California. In 1990, the police department employs 150 police officers and 70 non-sworn personnel. The community comprises 115,000 residents living over 33 square miles. The city is a middle class bedroom community providing comfortable living for the work force of the San Francisco Bay Area. Concordia has recently experienced rapid growth in professional offices and white collar industry and is developing into an employment center in its own right. Future growth, however, will be carefully controlled as the city struggles with traffic problems and environmental concerns that inevitably accompany the move toward urbanization. This movement has also brought about a more culturally diverse community and increased activity requiring police intervention. Concordia Police Department represents a modern, well trained suburban police department. The policy considerations facing Concordia Police Department could be easily applied to law enforcement agencies throughout the state.

Nominal Scenario

The Nominal Future Scenario is "surprise free." It is a narrative of the situation as it might exist if some of the events did not occur as projected. The past and present trend levels do not change dramatically, and no new policy change is implemented.

January, 2000:

The headline of the Concordia Transcript newspaper read, "Concordia Police to Start Twenty-First Century with New Chief." As Chief Johnson cleared out his office, that headline haunted him. He thought back over the past ten years and contemplated where things had gone awry. When he took over as Chief in 1990, he did a fine job of getting the department focused on providing good police service to the community. Things seemed to go sour in 1992 when the Mayor's sixteen-year-old daughter disappeared. The officers that responded felt she had probably run away. It was just before report cards were due out, and she did not want her father to know she was flunking three classes due to excessive absences. Being the daughter of the Mayor put so much pressure on her. The Mayor was adamant that something evil had happened because his daughter's purse was still in her room. She wouldn't have run away without it. He also felt her boyfriend had something to do with his daughter's disappearance. Reluctantly, Chief Johnson assigned four of his best investigators to the case. He didn't have adequate personnel, and this was the most he could provide. The investigators didn't have much in the way of resources to work with either. The proposed on-line Missing and Unidentified Persons System in the California Department of Justice was dropped when adequate funding couldn't be allocated. Lack of funding also stopped the development of the DNA laboratory in Berkeley and limited use of the Violent

Crime Information Center to serial homicides and gang killings. Although they worked diligently, the Concordia investigators got nowhere. The Mayor kept the case in the headlines by criticizing the cops at every opportunity. He became the honorary Chairman of "Concordians for Missing Children," a grass roots foundation supporting abducted and exploited children. As the case entered its second year, the investigative team was reduced to one due to the cost and pressures of increasing caseloads. Things really got ugly in 1996 when some skeletal remains were unearthed from a shallow grave in a remote area a few miles from the Mayor's home. Every available investigator was assigned to work on this homicide. Wanting no mistakes, one of the bone fragments was sent to a private laboratory for identification by DNA genetic fingerprinting. When the results were compared to the genetic fingerprint derived from a hair follicle collected from the mayor's daughter's hairbrush, the worst fears were realized. The mayor's daughter had been abducted and murdered. The investigators got a break when a hair that did not come from the daughter was discovered among the remains. A DNA genetic fingerprint from that hair identified it as belonging to her boyfriend. The investigators arrested the boyfriend on the basis of this evidence even though he claimed innocence and began to prepare the case for trial. Meanwhile, the Mayor sued the police department for negligence. Feeling that she was originally a runaway, the officers never reported the victim's disappearance to the Department of Justice within the time frame required by legislative mandate. The boyfriend was convicted after a lengthy and expensive Superior Court trial. The conviction was appealed, naturally, to the Ninth District Court of Appeals. Ironically, the appellate court heard the appeal at the same time the Mayor's lawsuit went to civil court. Financially, things

were tough in Concordia. The investigation and trial of the Mayor's daughter's homicide had exceeded a half million dollars. The Mayor was seeking \$100 million in his civil suit. The citizens' faith in the criminal justice system was shattered when the appellate court ruled that the laboratory which produced the DNA genetic fingerprints did not use an acceptable forensic practice to reach its conclusion, and the evidence would have to be suppressed. Without an identification on the victim or the suspect, the case was dismissed and the boyfriend set free. Then, the civil court awarded the Mayor a \$30 million judgment. The City nearly went bankrupt. Looking back, Chief Johnson began to feel fortunate that he was able to retire early.

Normative Scenario

The Normative Future Scenario illustrates a desired and attainable future. If the events were to occur at their revised probability, what impact would that have? If the trends were to move to the levels forecast in reaction to the revised events, what would the future hold? The policy considerations that lead to a desired and attainable future will be useful in strategic planning.

January, 2000:

The headline of the Concordia Transcript newspaper read, "Mayor's Daughter Found!" Rocking back in his chair, Chief of Police Johnson couldn't help but smile as he reminisced. He had always been sensitive to missing persons cases since the kidnapping of a child in their city in 1982. He recalled working on the legislative task force that proposed the Violent Crime Information Center in the Department of Justice. When it became

operational in 1990, it began to prove its worth almost immediately by matching suspects to enumerated crimes, including child abductions, based upon the suspects method of operation. Next came his work on the Department of Justice Task Force that created the on-line Missing and Unidentified Persons System. It took a tremendous amount of advocacy in the legislature to convince them to provide adequate funding for that project, but it was worth it. Missing persons finally achieved the same status as stolen cars and VCR's with their own automated computer system. When MUPS became operational in 1991, its impact on child abductions was almost immediate. When combined with renewed prevention efforts which "hardened" children against non-family abductions, the level of incidence began a decline which made child abduction nearly extinct. When a case did occur, there were plenty of resources available to apply toward a quick resolution. The Concordia Police Department had entered into countywide interagency protocol in 1993. This was implemented through the County Chiefs' Association to which Chief Johnson belonged. Unfortunately, the effort to enact these protocols throughout the state had taken an additional three years due to political resistance. Chief Johnson had enlisted the assistance of the California Police Chiefs' Association, the California Sheriffs Association and the California Peace Officers' Association (CPOA) to overcome the territorial resistance. He was also thankful that the Department of Justice had gone ahead and funded and built the four DNA labs throughout the state. For that battle, it took a herculean effort on the part of the legislative advocates of CPOA, the California State Juvenile Officers' Association (CSJOA), and the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC) to convince the Governor to fund the laboratories. They have given law enforcement a forensically

correct resource for identification of unknown individuals in a variety of crimes. Although they didn't become operational until 1995, the labs have been capable of keeping current with the cases sent to them for the last five years. These resources proved their worth when, 4 years ago, the Mayor's five-year-old daughter was taken from her mother's car while Mom ran into the child rearing complex for "just a second" to pick up her infant son. The police officers who responded immediately invoked the interagency protocol and had the assistance of 35 additional officers within the hour. The girl's description, including her genetic fingerprint, was immediately entered into MUPS via the mobile digital computer terminal in the patrol car. The Mayor had been one of the first to have his daughter's genetic fingerprint developed at a crime prevention fair sponsored by the police department. An inquiry into VCIC, using the method of operation in this crime, produced a list of possible suspects. Sending a flake of dried skin, removed from the edge of the automobile window sill through which the child was lifted, to the DNA laboratory confirmed the identify of the suspect. A vehicle description was obtained through VCIC and Department of Motor Vehicle records. An alert highway patrol officer stopped the vehicle traveling south on Interstate Five and the Mayor's daughter was safely recovered. Chief Johnson broke into a grin. "Damn, this system just might work alright after all," he thought.

Hypothetical Scenario

The Hypothetical Future Scenario takes the imagination to the limit. It asks, "what if...?" It portrays a future where the events and trends are played out to the extreme. It will illustrate some of the possibilities of an alternative path.

January, 2000:

The headlines of the Concordia Transcript Video Telecast read, "Child Abductor Executed." Chief Johnson had mixed feelings as the story unfolded on his video screen. Knowing that the kidnapper had been instantly and painlessly vaporized by laser made the execution a bit more palatable. The Chief's mind wandered back over the past decade and the events that led to today's headline. In the summer of 1990, the Governor's daughter had been kidnapped from the swimming pool of the hotel in Sacramento where the Governor was making a public appearance. The girl was not immediately found, but her disappearance brought about legislation and funding for a number of resources which could be used in resolving crimes of this nature. The California Department of Justice was provided funding to make the Violent Crime Information Center, the on-line Missing and Unidentified Persons System and four forensic DNA laboratories operational by 1991. Regional interagency assistance protocols were established by legislative mandate in law enforcement agencies throughout the state in the same year. The following year the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) had implemented a statewide network of interactive satellite training that reached every agency. 1993 also saw the passage of legislation making the kidnapping of a child under 12 for sexual exploitation punishable by death. Persons who were released from the California Department of Corrections were required to submit a blood or saliva sample for genetic fingerprinting. It was in 1995 that technology was developed that allowed the DNA genetic fingerprint code to be harmlessly implanted into the skin of a person's forehead without being visible to the naked eye. An electronic scanner could read the code for positive identification. When the public became

aware of the improved effectiveness this could provide to law enforcement and the Criminal Justice System, they voted for federal legislation making such implants mandatory, over the vehement opposition of the National Defense Lawyer's Guild. The following year law enforcement received a hand-held scanner that could read the implant from a distance of 100 yards and relay the information via satellite to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). NCIC interfaced with VCIC and MUPS in California, providing the officer on the street with these data resources via the hand-held scanner. Since victims of abductions could be identified by scanner as well, child abductions seldom occurred any more. Unfortunately, in September 1999, Concordia experienced one of the few. The officers that immediately responded found a drop of saliva on the window of the transporter the five year old girl had been taken from. The saliva sample was placed in a field examination module and electronically transmitted to the DNA laboratory in Berkeley. The laboratory transmitted the genetic fingerprint to VCIC. VCIC identified the perpetrator as a recently paroled inmate from the Department of Corrections and transmitted this information to every law enforcement agency in the nation. It had been thirty minutes since the abduction. Upon hearing of the perpetrator's identity, one of the officers from an adjacent community, responding to the interagency assistance protocol, recalled knowing that the perpetrator had recently resided in his jurisdiction after his release from prison. The officers responded to the last known residence for the perpetrator, but before they got there, the perpetrator was stopped for a traffic violation. As the officer approached the vehicle, the driver got out. The officer scanned him for identification and told him to move to the side of the street. As he moved to the side of the street, the officer noticed the young girl sitting upright and

motionless in the passenger seat. She quickly scanned the child as she moved toward the driver. By the time she had reached the driver's location, the officer's scanner had told her that the driver was the perpetrator of an abduction, and the child was the victim.

The driver was quietly and efficiently taken into custody. Unfortunately, a medical examination revealed that the young victim had been sexually assaulted. The perpetrator was tried and convicted. Since this was a capital offense, the criminal justice system, under careful public scrutiny, moved with unprecedented speed. The perpetrator was sentenced to death at the end of October. His appeal took the entire month of November and his execution date set for December. He made a last minute appeal to the Governor for leniency. The Governor, remembering her predecessor's daughter, was not inclined to be lenient.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The scenarios have provided some insight into what the future could become. In order to ensure that the future for abducted children is a positive one, policy must be developed that will enhance the opportunity for the desired future state while mitigating an undesirable one. The Normative Scenario, which illustrated a desired and attainable future, will be used to identify targets for strategic planning. These will consist of the policies that must be considered if that scenario is to come true. Once the initial policies are developed, they will be subjected to review and evaluated by established selection criteria.

Policy Alternatives

1. The Violent Crime Information Center will only be as effective as the data put into it. Consequently, law enforcement should be encouraged to accurately input all available information into VCIC.
2. The California Department of Justice needs support for continued funding and development of the on-line Missing and Unidentified Persons System. Local law enforcement must, in order to gain a maximum benefit, develop a statewide support base for this critical resource.
3. The California Department of Justice needs additional funding for development of state operated forensic laboratories. This will allow them to provide identification through DNA genetic fingerprinting. Advocacy for this important resource needs to be developed throughout the state at the local level.
4. Interagency protocols need to be implemented throughout the state on a regional basis. This will provide adequate resources in the event of a child abduction. This effort needs to be championed from the local level through a statewide association of law enforcement leaders such as CPOA, etc.
5. Interactive satellite training needs to be available to every law enforcement agency within the state. The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) needs to be supported in its effort to further develop this resource and the implementation of it.

6. Legislative mandates that impact law enforcement policy and procedure need to have input from law enforcement. Developing a system of legislative advocacy through professional associations is an effective way to provide input.
7. Crime prevention efforts should be encouraged to include child abductions.
8. Technological advances which will promote law enforcement's ability to identify individuals quickly and accurately need to be supported.

Selection Criteria

In order to evaluate the value of the policy alternatives, they were measured against the following criteria:

1. Is it cost-effective? Is it affordable, and can it be funded?
2. Will the policy apply to more than one trend and event? Does it have a broad range?
3. Is the policy politically feasible?
4. Will the policy collect enough support over a broad base to facilitate implementation?
5. Timing is everything. Is the timing for the impact of any policy correct?
6. Will the policy provide a specific benefit to the people it will impact?

All of these policy alternatives meet the selection criteria. All of them will be examined for impact on the issue.

Policy Impacts

1. Accurate VCIC Data Input:

The implementation of VCIC is only months away. It has the potential of becoming an extremely valuable resource for California law enforcement. However, it will never reach its full potential if the information entered into this system is incomplete or restricted to only a few local agencies. Even though the Department of Justice has provided local law enforcement with preliminary training in the effective use of VCIC, many agencies are not even aware of its existence. Local law enforcement agencies must subscribe to a policy of accurate and thorough input of data in order to achieve maximum benefit from the Center. The Department of Justice needs to saturate the law enforcement community with the effectiveness and success of VCIC.

2. Support for MUPS:

The continued development of the on-line Missing and Unidentified Persons System in the California Department of Justice will depend upon the funding provided for it. MUPS has been identified as having the strongest impact on the topic issue and must remain a priority within DOJ. Although it was created by legislative mandate in Senate Bill 2282, there was no funding attached to it. The system has been developed to its current state through allocation of funds within DOJ's operating budget. Local law enforcement must adopt a policy supporting continued funding of this valuable resource if it is to be implemented in a timely manner. This policy can be conveyed through an organization such as the California Peace Officers' Association (CPOA) in order to provide the type of broad-based impact that will be most effective.

3. Support for DNA Labs:

The funding for regional DNA forensic laboratories operated by the California Department of Justice has recently been reduced to provide for only one of the four originally planned. If these laboratories are not recognized as a priority, the future of this valuable law enforcement resource could be jeopardized. In its early years the use of DNA to make identifications is sure to be carefully scrutinized and challenged at every opportunity. It is certain that the laboratory techniques used will be the subject of much of the scrutiny. A state operated forensic laboratory has the best chance of meeting the challenges that are sure to come. As with MUPS, local law enforcement must develop a broad based policy of support for the Department of Justice DNA labs.

4. Interagency Protocols:

Law enforcement administrators are constantly faced with the challenge of doing more with less. Many are not aware of the impact that a major case can have upon their resources. Some of those agencies that have experienced a notorious child abduction have developed policies of interagency assistance to provide necessary resources which are essential for the initial response and investigation. These protocols must overcome territoriality and be developed regionally throughout the state. An organization such as the California Sheriffs' Association or California Police Chiefs' Association could spearhead such an effort for the mutual benefit of all.

5. Interactive Satellite Training:

Being able to communicate information via satellite telecast to law enforcement agencies throughout the state has tremendous ramifications in a variety of applications.

Sending employees to distant sites for continued training has always presented a burden for most law enforcement agencies. The ability to conduct that training at, or close to home, provides definite advantages. POST has successfully presented one of these telecasts on a limited basis. Making it available statewide should be viewed as a long range goal, but POST must be encouraged to adopt a policy making the availability of this type of training a priority.

6. Legislative Mandates:

The voice of California law enforcement is represented by a number of legislative advocates in Sacramento. Unfortunately, some of them are in conflict with one another on issues of mutual interest. Some of the legislative mandates that have had the most detrimental impact on law enforcement have resulted from ineffective service delivery at the local level. Improved training and inspection can improve delivery of services and prevent reactionary legislation. Unless the law enforcement community adopts a proactive policy of legislative advocacy they will be vulnerable to the emotional reaction to their errors.

7. Encourage Crime Prevention:

The emphasis on crime prevention seems to ride the waves of whim. It has become recognized as an entrenched tool in the war on crime, but it is often aimed at the current topic of interest. Crime prevention efforts aimed at child abduction can be extremely effective but seem to be a low priority. Local agencies should be encouraged through a state organization such as the California Crime Prevention Officers' Association (CCPOA) to make child abduction an integral part of every crime prevention program.

8. Ability to Identify Individuals:

The technology to identify individuals quickly and accurately has tremendous growth potential over the next decade. Law enforcement must support these technological advances and participate in their development at every opportunity. Commitment of resources is necessary. Commitment has brought about programs such as the Cal-ID automated fingerprint system. Even though such a program takes tremendous resources, there should not be any hesitation to move forward and re-commit to innovative programs. Law enforcement and the communities served will be the ultimate benefactor.

SECTION III - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN

DEMONSTRATING THE PLAN

SITUATION

Before any changes can be made statewide, it is best to demonstrate what can be achieved at the local level. The Concordia Police Department will be the demonstration forum. Once the mechanism for change has been established at this level, a transition plan for application statewide will be developed.

The object of this strategic plan is to isolate the critical elements of the normative scenario that are desirable. This will be followed by efforts to cause these elements to happen while preventing the undesirable elements from occurring. Fundamental to the situation is an audit of Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats and Strengths that Underlie Planning (WOTS-UP).

WOTS-UP ANALYSIS

This is the beginning of the strategic planning process as it relates the organization to the environment around it. Weaknesses and strengths are internal and are best described by someone who is familiar with the organization on an intimate level. They represent limitations, or resources for the organization to achieve its objectives. Opportunities and threats are external to the organization. They may include previously identified trends and events that impact the organization's ability to respond to the issue. The following WOTS-UP analysis was prepared for the issue of abducted children cases in the Concordia Police Department.

Weaknesses

1. The perception by the officers that these cases are not important because of their association with parental abductions and runaways.
2. The officers' frustration in dealing with cases involving status offenders.
3. Lack of information about the impact a child abduction case can have on the department and its officers.
4. The lack of updated procedures for handling an abducted child case.
5. Lack of an interagency protocol to provide assistance in a child abduction case.

Opportunities

1. There is a countywide association of law enforcement executives.
2. Department members are active participants in professional law enforcement associations representing diverse interests.
3. The department has a solid working relationship with POST and rigidly adheres to POST's standards.
4. There is a commitment to abducted children's issues by a number of community based non-profit organizations.
5. The community is sensitive to the issue of abducted children due to the unusual number of highly publicized incidents that have occurred in the area.
6. The media readily covers missing children's issues.

Threats

1. The financial picture is very unstable and unpredictable.

2. Civil libertarians would be expected to take exception to some of the resources desired by law enforcement to resolve these cases.
3. Statewide communication among local law enforcement is severely lacking.
4. Statewide, law enforcement influence on the legislative process is uncoordinated.
5. Law enforcement's priority on abducted children varies between jurisdictions.

Strengths

1. Concordia Police Department is committed to effective in-service training programs.
2. The department has been involved in the legislative process on prior occasions.
3. The department has an active crime prevention unit.
4. The department's crime analysis section is technologically modern and innovative.
5. The department subscribes to the value of trained juvenile specialists.
6. The department has previous experience with cases involving abducted children.

Concordia Police Department has the capacity to implement change in the organization. The department's executive level has a sufficient level of concern to implement the steps that will make the change occur. There are sufficient internal resources to provide the training necessary to gain the commitment of the organization. The agency is competent enough to realize the benefits that are derived from providing effective law enforcement service to the community.

Policy decisions are not made in a vacuum. They will have implications beyond the local level. A Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique will be used to determine how far the implications of any decisions might reach.

Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique

Before any policy changes are attempted, it is wise to review the environment and determine which individual groups and organizations will be affected by what is done.

Stakeholders: Those individuals, groups or organizations that have an interest in any decisions that are made regarding the issue. They could be affected by any change, affect any change themselves or merely have an interest in the change.

Snaildarters: These are stakeholders who are unexpected or perceived as insignificant, yet have the ability to negatively impact the direction of a plan in a significant way. A list of those stakeholders who would have the most interest in the issue of abducted children was created and reviewed by members of the original nominal group. The list was refined to include those stakeholders who had the most influence or would be influenced the most by policy decisions made regarding the issue. The final list included some snaildarters(*).

1. Law Enforcement Administrators
2. Victims Advocacy Organizations
3. Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
4. State Legislature
5. State Attorney General
6. Courts
7. American Civil Liberties Union*
8. State Bar Association
9. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

10. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
11. Federal Bureau of Investigation
12. Governor of California
13. Private Industry*
14. Professional California Law Enforcement Associations
15. California District Attorneys
16. California Department of Corrections
17. Police Academy Administrators
18. Media
19. Citizens

Stakeholder Assumptions

Certain assumptions were made regarding each stakeholder's relation to the issue.

1. Law Enforcement Administrators
 - Want to provide quality law enforcement services.
 - Want to avoid externally mandated programs.
 - Want to minimize financial impact of changes.
2. Victims Advocacy Organizations
 - Want abducted children to receive highest law enforcement response.
 - Want to be involved in the case.
 - Want community-based financial support.

3. Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
 - Wants responsibility for standard of training.
 - Wants financial support to implement programs.
4. State Legislature
 - Wants to satisfy constituents.
 - Wants recognition with issues of public concern.
5. State Attorney General
 - Wants to satisfy legislative mandates.
 - Wants to be identified with issues of public concern.
 - Needs to be concerned about costs.
6. Courts
 - Want to see justice served.
 - Want to see caseloads reduced.
7. American Civil Liberties Union*
 - Wants to see individual freedoms unabridged.
 - Wants to restrict government intrusion into individual lives.
8. State Bar Association
 - Wants to see justice served.
 - Wants law enforcement to operate within judicially acceptable boundaries.
9. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
 - Wants to research issues of concern to the American public.
 - Wants to direct resources where they will be most effective.

10. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
 - Wants to be the national clearinghouse for missing children.
11. Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - Wants to bring its resources to abducted children investigations.
12. Governor of California
 - Wants to control spending.
 - Wants to be responsive to perceived public concern.
13. Private Industry*
 - Wants to provide laboratory services for DNA identifications.
 - Wants to provide technology for satellite telecasts.
14. Professional California Law Enforcement Associations
 - Want to be recognized as the voice of law enforcement.
 - Want to provide the best service to the public.
15. California District Attorneys
 - Want evidence which will support successful prosecutions.
16. California Department of Corrections
 - Want sufficient resources to control inmate population.
 - Do not want repeat customers.
17. Police Academy Administrators
 - Want input into training mandates.
 - Want adequate financial assistance for mandated programs.

18. Media

- Want to capture the public attention.


19. Citizens

- Want law enforcement to be responsive to their needs.
- Want to feel secure.

In order to visualize the position of the stakeholders in relation to their importance to the issue and certainty of the assumptions made, an SAST map was created by asking the following two questions of each stakeholder:

1. How important is the stakeholder to the issue of the law enforcement response to abducted children by the twenty-first century?
2. What is the level of certainty that the assumptions made regarding each stakeholder are correct?

Illustration 17: SAST Map



1. Law Enforcement Administrators
2. Victims Advocacy Organizations
3. Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
4. State Legislature
5. State Attorney General
6. Courts
7. American Civil Liberties Union*
8. State Bar Association
9. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
10. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
11. Federal Bureau of Investigation
12. Governor of California
13. Private Industry*
14. Professional California Law Enforcement Associations
15. California District Attorneys
16. California Department of Corrections
17. Police Academy Administrators
18. Media
19. Citizens

The map demonstrates that certain stakeholders are both very important to the issue and are assigned very certain assumptions. These are the most critical when developing policy. Others must be closely monitored for response to policy decisions. It is critical to maintain open communication with the stakeholders to avoid unexpected pitfalls.

MISSION STATEMENT

The macro-mission statement of the Concordia Police Department is a straightforward statement:

The primary mission of the Concordia Police Department is to provide the finest service-oriented law enforcement to the community.

The micro-mission statement that relates directly to the issue of abducted children cases is:

The Concordia Police Department will be a role model by supporting efforts locally and statewide to develop resources that will enhance the resolution of child abductions.

EXECUTION

The mission will be accomplished through implemented policy. Some policy considerations were developed at the end of the futures forecasting section. These policy options appear to meet the immediate objectives of the Concordia Police Department's mission. Prior to implementation, they should be evaluated for feasibility and desirability.

Policy One: Accurate VCIC Data Input. This policy is feasible at the local level. It requires getting officers who are in a position to use the system to realize its value when accurate information is input. The desirability of having accurate information will prove

itself. This policy should definitely be included in any strategy implementation.

Policy Two: Support for MUPS. This policy is also feasible for local implementation. When the time savings and value of an on-line automated system are fully realized, support should be prompt and widespread. The ability to input mandated reporting data electronically will represent sufficient time savings and make it desirable to local agencies. This policy should be included in the strategic plan.

Policy Three: Support for DNA Labs. In order for this policy to be feasible, a broad-based network of support must be developed. It is a desirable resource for local law enforcement; therefore, developing the support necessary should not be insurmountable. This policy should be part of the plan.

Policy Four: Interagency Protocols. Although it has historically taken a notorious incident to produce interagency protocols, they are feasible due to their ease and cost effective implementation. They are desirable, especially to those local agencies that have limited resources. This policy should be included in strategy plans.

Policy Five: Interactive Satellite Training. This policy is feasible but will involve significant cost and coordination. Whether or not it will be implemented will depend upon its desirability. If agencies who are having problems meeting training mandates can raise a sufficient level of concern, then commitment should follow. This policy should be carefully evaluated in the planning process.

Policy Six: Legislative Mandates. This policy calls for a coordinated system of proactive legislative advocacy to provide law enforcement input into legislative mandates. This is desirable but may not be feasible unless coordination and lines of communication

improve significantly. The best implementation policy is to prevent negative mandates by effective and efficient service delivery by local law enforcement agencies.

Policy Seven: Encourage Crime Prevention. This policy is easily enacted at the local level and desirable just from its ease of implementation and cost effectiveness.

Policy Eight: Ability to Identify Individuals. This policy is feasible with some work, but broad support can be generated when the positive aspects are touted. It is very desirable to law enforcement and should be considered in strategic planning.

Policy Pros/Cons

The next step is to evaluate the suggested policies for their impact on the stakeholders. This is done by carefully considering the pros and cons of each.

Policy One: Accurate VCIC Data Input

Pros

1. Provides an effective resource for law enforcement.
2. Provides better service to citizens.
3. Shows legislature that money is well spent.
4. Helps DOJ meet legislative mandates.

Cons

1. Requires accurate work at local level.
2. Requires time for input from local level.
3. Returns may not be quickly apparent.

Policy Two: Support for MUPS

Pros

1. Increases efficiency of local law enforcement.
2. Shows response to legislative mandate.
2. DOJ perceived as responsive to local needs.

Cons

1. Requires time commitment at local level.

Policy Three: Support for DNA Labs

Pros

1. Provides law enforcement with a valuable resource.
2. Provides District Attorneys with best evidence.
3. Improves perception of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system.

Cons

1. Cost could be substantial, reducing resources elsewhere.
2. Might be opposed by private interests.

Policy Four: Interagency Protocols

Pros

1. Easily implemented.
2. Satisfies citizens' desire for responsiveness.
3. Opens lines of communication for future networking.
4. Can be extended to other problem areas.

Cons

1. Can potentially deplete local resources.
2. Subject to potential abuse.

Policy Five: Interactive Satellite Training

Pros

1. Helps overcome charges of inadequate training.
2. Enhances level of professional law enforcement service.
3. Provides previously unavailable resource, i.e. satellite telecommunications.

Cons

1. Cost of implementation.
2. Necessity of commitment at the local level to participate.
3. Opposition by private enterprise.

Policy Six: Legislative Mandates

Pros

1. Improved communications among members of law enforcement profession.
2. Legislative support for effective law enforcement procedures.

Cons

1. May be perceived as manipulative by the public.
2. Potential for political backlash.

Policy Seven: Encourage Crime Prevention

Pros

1. Welcomed by the community.
2. Easily implemented.

Cons

1. Must be balanced to not induce paranoia.
2. Might reduce resources for other crime prevention efforts.

Policy Eight: Ability to Identify Individuals

Pros

1. Has greatest potential for improved law enforcement service to community.
2. Will improve efficiency of criminal justice system.
3. Promotes technological innovation.

Cons

1. Will require substantial commitment of resources.
2. Has appearances of big brother.
3. Will take time.
4. Likely to face stiff opposition.

Recommended Strategy

It shall be the policy of the Concordia Police Department to place a high priority on cases involving children under 18 abducted by non-family members. This priority will be reflected in the crime prevention programs and in-service training provided by the

department. This department will promote interagency assistance protocols with allied agencies and support a coordinated effort to recover abducted children. Concordia Police Department, through active participation in professional law enforcement associations, will support legislative advocacy that provides more effective service to the community. We are committed to the development of technological resources that will contribute to the resolution of child abduction cases.

STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

In order to implement that policy at Concordia and make the desired and attainable future a possibility, some specific steps must be taken. These steps will also pave the way for application of the plan statewide. Similar action steps could be applied to the sub-issues if directed at the appropriate resources and agencies. These steps could also be applied to strategic planning at law enforcement agencies throughout the state.

Action Steps:

1. Gain commitment to department policy by soliciting input from department employees.
2. Standardize the reporting procedures and classification of cases involving missing children.
3. Raise level of concern through education and training programs.
4. Re-confirm the department's desire to provide service-oriented law enforcement.
5. Establish the department as a role model.

6. Solicit support from the community.
7. Develop an effective crime prevention program addressing the issue of abducted children.
8. Use the media to promote positive steps taken.
9. Share successful programs with allied agencies.
10. Solicit support for interagency assistance protocols through regional law enforcement executives' association.
11. Maintain communication with state Department of Justice on new programs and innovations.
12. Stay abreast of technological advances through staff review of professional journals.
13. Encourage work through professional associations to advocate support for developing state programs or resources that will assist local service delivery.
14. Give recognition where appropriate for efforts that support the department's mission statement.
15. Support POST in the development and delivery of training programs related to this issue.
16. Solicit political support for abducted children issues at local, regional, state and national levels.
17. Plan and prepare for major case investigation.
18. Promote an interdisciplinary reunification team to facilitate child recoveries.
19. Provide specialized training in juvenile issues to officers and involve them in cases of abducted children.

20. Champion the cause of abducted children through public appearances and journal articles.

Time Frame

Some of the steps for implementation can be acted upon immediately. Some are going to be dependent on entities and events over which there is little or no control. A notorious kidnapping could potentially accelerate the time frame substantially. Setting the goal of total implementation over ten years is realistic. Reaching the goal sooner is desirable, but probably not attainable without significant environmental influence.

Resources Required

1. Commitment to abducted children cases from employees of Concordia Police Department.
2. Active participation by department employees in professional associations.
3. Knowledge of latest technology and innovation that will impact the issue.
4. Cooperation from organizations who have an interest or are impacted by abducted children.
5. Desire to make changes designed to improve delivery of services to the community.
6. An ability to withstand substantial frustration.

SECTION IV - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

APPLYING THE PLAN

The transition management plan involves a series of steps which will implement the strategy developed in the previous section. In order to accomplish this effectively, it is desirable to assess the readiness and capability of the key stakeholders. If any changes to their level of commitment are necessary, a strategy of negotiation must be planned. Following this, an appropriate management structure must be identified. It will be this plan that will serve as the guide to implementation. This plan will originate within the police department of Concordia but will move statewide, which is the ultimate goal.

COMMITMENT PLAN

To successfully implement any change, it is necessary to identify key components whose active support can ensure that the change will occur. They are also in a position to prevent the change from occurring if they oppose it. Key components may be groups or individuals. Within any group, one individual can usually be identified as one who can deliver the support of the entire group if he/she can be persuaded to do so. If a group will not actively support the change, it might be convinced to allow the change to occur. The minimum number of components whose commitment must be gained in order to facilitate the change is known as the critical mass. The critical mass for this issue is comprised of the following components:

Critical Mass Defined

For the purpose of this project, the critical mass is defined as follows:

1. Governor of California. The chief executive officer of the state. Of particular note is that there will be three general elections during the course of this project, including a definite change in November, 1990 and quite probably, again in 1998. Although this position has the potential for remaining stable during eight years of this decade, effective transition management needs to consider potential ramifications of this situation.
2. Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. The key individuals at POST include the Executive Director and the Commissioners themselves. Transition management strategy must consider impacting the entire spectrum of the Commission.
3. California Attorney General. As with the Governor, this political office is subject to change during the transition period of this project. Since most of the changes that impact this project will have to occur in the Attorney General's Office, particular attention should be devoted to efforts directed here.
4. Californians for Missing Children. Although specifically named in this project, this component of the critical mass could be represented by any or all of the numerous victim's advocacy organizations within the state. Effective transition management will require support from these private non-profit groups.
5. Concordia Police Employees. They represent the grass roots support that provides the foundation of any effective transition management. The organization name is irrelevant. Support in any organization is best generated from the lowest possible level to ensure success.

6. CPOA Executive Board. Although specifically named, this component of the critical mass could be represented by any of the effective professional law enforcement associations. CPOA has a proven record of involvement with the issue, but coordination of the strength available through professional associations statewide is the desired goal.
7. State Bar Association. This organization is included as a component of the critical mass due to its ability to influence the direction of the transition plan. Its support would assist the process greatly, while its opposition would make transition very difficult.
8. Industry Representatives. They represent any of the private enterprises that may perceive their market infringed upon by government developed resources. They have the ability to generate substantial opposition.
9. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. The component of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in the United States Department of Justice that is most directly involved with the issue on the national level.
10. American Civil Liberties Union. This component could actually represent any organization which could be expected to resist the strategic plan on legal grounds involving individual rights.

Readiness/Capability

Individual components of the critical mass have varying levels of readiness for change. They also have varying levels of capability to impact change. Understanding where the critical mass stands on a scale of readiness and capability is helpful to

successful transition management. The levels of readiness and capability for the critical mass in this issue are estimated on the following graph.




Illustration 18: Readiness/Capability Chart

Commitment

Successful transition management depends upon achieving a commitment from each component of the critical mass that it will either support the proposed changes or at least

allow them to occur. To proceed with the strategic plan, it will be necessary to identify the present level of commitment for each component of the critical mass. If the level of commitment is not appropriate to facilitate change, then a strategy must be developed which will move a component's level of commitment to one which will accomplish the change.

To graphically represent the necessary level of commitment, a chart will show where each component of the critical mass presently stands and where it needs to be in terms of commitment to make the change occur.

Illustration 19: Commitment Chart
COMMITMENT CHART

| CRITICAL MASS | TYPE OF COMMITMENT TO CHANGE | | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | BLOCK CHANGE | LET CHANGE HAPPEN | HELP CHANGE HAPPEN | MAKE CHANGE HAPPEN |
| GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA | | X → | → O | |
| COMMISSION ON POST | | X → | → O | |
| CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL | | X → | → O | |
| CA'NS FOR MISSING CHILDREN | | | XO | |
| CONCORDIA POLICE EMPLOYEES | | X → | | → O |
| CPOA EXECUTIVE BOARD | | | X → | → O |
| STATE BAR ASSOCIATION | | | XO | |
| INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES | X → | → O | | |
| NAT'L CENTER MISS/EXPL CHILDREN | | | XO | |
| AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION | X → | → O | | |

X = Level of Commitment Now
 O = Level of Commitment Needed

Influencing the Critical Mass

Concordia Police Department Employees: When support for change starts at the lowest level possible, the chance for success is greatest. The police department employees

in this transition plan are vital. They will be asked to set an example and promote the issue beyond their own work environment. They have been assessed at a level of commitment to let change happen. They will be called upon to champion the issue, through various professional associations, to law enforcement statewide. To achieve this, their level of commitment needs to be raised to making the change happen. This represents a substantial movement, so several strategies should be used. Education would bring sensitivity and understanding to the employees. Following this, the chief of the department needs to role model what he expects from the employees. If the issue is important to him, it will be important to the employees. The chief needs to carry the issue to organizations and associations in which he has influence so that they can generate broad-based support for those resources that will assist in providing better service. Employees should be encouraged to do the same. Some employees will adopt the cause as their own. This should be encouraged and recognized when it occurs.

Californians for Missing Children: This organization is at a satisfactory level of commitment. Normally, no strategy would be needed in these situations. Law enforcement needs to monitor non-profit organizations. They can provide valuable resources in child abduction cases, but they have a tendency to manipulate and become overly involved in the investigation. Law enforcement will want to use a resistance management technique in case a non-profit organization starts moving toward a make change position. This would be accomplished by emphasizing the increased risk and disruption such a move could have.

CPOA Executive Board: CPOA represents one of many professional law enforcement associations and community service organizations, such as the Exchange Club,

whose national cause is child abuse. They comprise the support base needed to bring about change statewide. These components are committed to a level of helping change occur. They need to be convinced to move to a leadership position of making change occur. CPOA has a proven track record of change statewide for the benefit of law enforcement. A strategy of educational intervention, making key individuals aware of the need for change should successfully raise the level of commitment. This can be carried forward by members of Concordia Police Department.

Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training: POST is presently assessed at a level of commitment to let change happen. It will be necessary to move their level of commitment to help change occur. POST has a vested interest in the training technology that this issue espouses. They will want the responsibility for developing the training delivery system, but will need support to do so - a problem finding strategy in which the supporters and POST can meet informally and brainstorm where they want to go. With this direction in hand, the groundwork can be laid to produce the support necessary to implement the desired change.

Governor of California: The Governor is assessed at a level to let change happen. Obviously, the Governor's support is going to be critical to success. A level of commitment that will help make change happen will provide that support. The Governor will be sensitive to public pressure and costs. Broad-based support for the issue can be spearheaded by the professional associations and community-based organizations. Commitment should be obtained in election year politics through an educational intervention strategy which will make the gubernatorial candidates sensitive to abducted children's issues.

State Attorney General: Like the Governor, the Attorney General needs to be moved from letting change happen to helping change occur. This position is critical because the Attorney General is responsible for many of the desired changes. A resistance management strategy on the part of supporters should prove most effective. The Attorney General needs to be impressed with the level of dissatisfaction with the status quo, the desirability of the proposed changes and the practicality of the change. These should outweigh the "cost" of the desired changes.

State Bar Association: The Bar Association is perceived at a level of commitment that is sufficient to allow change to occur. No influence is necessary.

Private Industry Representatives: Private industry that has an interest in forensic laboratories or satellite communications technology can be expected to block the changes proposed. A problem-finding negotiating strategy should be employed to move them to a position of allowing the changes to occur. Informal meetings with opponents to discuss the intent and direction of the changes may convince them of the limited impact the government's participation will have on the field. Areas that may actually benefit both components could be the focus of these discussions.

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children: The National Center is in a position of helping the changes occur. This is a sufficient level of commitment and no influencing strategy is necessary.

American Civil Liberties Union: This component, which actually represents all civil libertarian organizations, is in a position to block some of the desired changes. They need to be moved to a level where they will let change occur. The strategy for raising their

commitment is forced collaboration. There is a consensus on the bigger objectives of accurate identifications, recovery of abducted children and justice served. Building upon these common desires may provide solutions for overcoming differences.

Implementation Technologies

In order to move the transition forward, appropriate technologies must be used. These should be carefully thought out after the direction for implementation of the strategic plan is firmly in place.

Initially, in order to gain support at the local level, a pilot project would be started. This should occur in Concordia Police Department, where the employees will be provided training and education to raise their level of awareness.

Moving beyond the local level to a regional application should involve educational interventions. Since these are considered neutral, they will only seek to garner support from a broader base.

In order to move statewide, a temporary management structure made up of representatives of support groups would be formed.

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The transition state will take us from a disorganized response at the local level to a coordinated interdisciplinary statewide response by the twenty-first century. This represents a quantum leap, and no singular management structure can effectively implement it. Therefore, a flexible structure that can meet each level of development is desired.

At the local level the chief of police can develop the support necessary to implement the desired changes. When support is needed at the regional level, the chief executive can select a group whose members have the confidence and trust of large numbers of their colleagues. These natural leaders should be able to deliver a constituency. To take this proposal statewide and as high as the Governor's office, a hierarchy will be most successful. This will consist of formal representatives of support groups (Beckhard and Harris 1987). They would operate as a statewide committee which would generate support for the change effort.

Responsibility Charting

Responsibility charting clarifies behavior that is required to implement important change tasks, actions, or decisions. It will help focus the efforts of the transition managers. Members of the hierarchy will want to develop their individual RASI charts and then collaborate on a consensus chart that would provide them with appropriate direction for their change efforts. The chart shows who has responsibility (R) for a particular action, but not necessarily authority. The actor who has to approve (A) any change also has the right of veto. An actor that must support (S) the change may not agree with it but has to provide resources for it. Some actors must be informed (I) or consulted before the action, but they cannot veto it. Those actions that are not relevant to any particular task are left blank. The following RASI chart demonstrates what responsibilities would be assigned for this project.

Illustration 20: Responsibility Chart

| ACTORS | V C I C | M U P S | D M A | P R O T O C O L S | T R A I N I N G | M A N D A T E S | C R I M E P R E V | A B I L I T Y |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Police Dept. Employees | S | S | S | S | S | - | S | S |
| Chief of Police | S | S | S | R | S | - | R | S |
| Governor of California | A | A | A | - | S | A | - | A |
| State Attorney General | R | R | R | - | - | - | - | S |
| Commission on POST | - | S | - | - | R | - | - | S |
| Non-Profit Organizations | I | I | - | I | - | - | - | S |
| Professional Associations | S | S | S | S | S | - | S | S |
| State Legislature | S | S | S | - | I | R | - | R |

- R = Responsibility (not necessarily authority)
- A = Approval (right to veto)
- S = Support (put resources toward)
- I = Inform (to be consulted before action)
- = Irrelevant to this item

SECTION V - CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

California law enforcement enjoys a reputation for being on the leading edge of the law enforcement profession. Consequently, there is no reason to expect that children abducted in California, as well as their loved ones, receive anything less than the best service possible. Recent history has indicated that an error in a media sensitive case will result in criticism which overshadows the accomplishments of an agency. The results are that individuals with little or no understanding of law enforcement procedure attempt to influence the police response. Clearly, external observation and constructive modification are effective mechanisms for improved service delivery. However, reactive measures to mistakes frequently result in reactionary responses which may impede efficiency.

It is clear that it is not possible for law enforcement to take a path of least resistance. Child abduction cases must be handled error free. A successful plan to do so begins at the local level with education. This should be in the form of a training program that increases police employees' sensitivity to the impact of these cases, as well as the need to be responsive.

Local law enforcement administrators need to be aware of the potential impact a child abduction case can have on their personnel, agency, and budget. Having learned valuable lessons from the past, it is appropriate to look to the future. Preparation begins with support for abducted children's issues being nurtured in local agencies. Looking beyond the local response, resources available regionally must also be inventoried. Child abduction cases will require resources beyond the capability of most local agencies. The role of the efficient police administrator is to apply planning techniques to major case investigations in advance. Developing resources regionally through mutual assistance protocols is a vital part

of this planning. The planning and organizing process developed for abducted children can be applied to other multijurisdictional events.

Beyond local and regional assets, the future promises substantial support through state resources. Over the next decade, the direction of law enforcement will be revealed. In order to ensure that it develops into a desired and attainable future, law enforcement must strategically plan for implementation. It is a fact of political life that state and federal resources tend to be allocated according to perceived need and public pressure. There exists a network of stakeholders who have the ability to generate sufficient support for these future resources. However, a coordinated effort is needed to develop this support into a viable statewide force. Law enforcement associations represent the best vehicle to achieve the necessary coordination.

The immediate statewide goals include supporting the implementation of the Violent Crime Information Center and the automated on-line Missing/Unidentified Persons System. Future goals will consist of developing support for forensic laboratories that can do DNA analysis and the creation of an interactive statewide satellite training system. Accomplishing these goals will increase the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and reduce the possibility of a notorious abduction taking place. Developing support for technology aimed at improving law enforcement's ability to effectively identify individuals should be a long term goal.

Throughout this decade, effective crime prevention measures directed at child abductions should be advanced. To support this, a service-oriented law enforcement delivery system should be continuously promoted. The transition that needs to occur over the next ten years is easily within our reach if we are willing to visualize a future where abducted children cases are a priority. They are to most of the law enforcement officers who have been involved in one. If 1988 represents a typical year, and there is no reason to believe it does not, each year this country will see more than 100,000 abductions attempted by non-family members. As many as 4,600 of those will be successful. Most will end quickly, usually after the victim is sexually assaulted, but as many as 300 will last longer. Of those, as many as 158 of the victims will be killed.

In 1982, a 33-year-old pedophile from Northern California, who enjoyed the company of 10 to 12 year old boys, read in the tabloid news that a six-year-old girl had given birth. The fantasy of fathering the perfect male child began its path to obsession. Feeling that if he could successfully abduct a girl of five with certain physical attributes, he could regulate her thinking and behavior by controlling her diet. After approximately a year, she would be sufficiently indoctrinated and prepared to give birth. Feeding her the appropriate foods on the night of conception would guarantee the child would be a male and genetics would take care of the rest. Unfortunately, the victim, selected purely by chance, was only 2 1/2 at the time of her abduction. The sexual indoctrination began almost immediately, but after several months, the dream began to deteriorate when the perpetrator realized he would have to run and hide much longer than he anticipated. After ten months, the travesty ended with his arrest and the victim's recovery. Thirteen months later he was convicted of his crimes

and sentenced to 527 years in prison. The appellate court felt this was excessive punishment and reduced the sentence to 464 years. He will never be able to realize his fantasy, but there are plenty of individuals in society who will attempt to realize theirs. If their fantasy involves abducting a child from your jurisdiction, will you be ready?

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

Child Abduction Investigative Guide

CHILD ABDUCTION

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDE

FORWARD

It is hard to imagine a more frightening crime in our society than the abduction of one of our children. Unfortunately, the strong emotional impact and the demands placed on the investigating agency and those involved in managing the case are seldom fully realized until actually experienced. In an effort to more efficiently resolve these cases, the San Francisco Bay area law enforcement agencies that have experience working on abduction cases came together to pool their experience and learn from each other.

This guide is the product of their knowledge and experience that should contribute greatly to future cooperation and efficiency in handling these investigations.

Child abduction cases are made more difficult because of their high profile nature in the community. When we operate without a plan the results are often wasted effort and lost opportunities. As one officer said, "once it started, it was too late to plan-there was only time to react." By adopting some of the strategies contained in this guide we will be able to plan for the unexpected, hopefully resolving more cases and eliminating some of the past problems.

DETERMINATION OF A VALID ABDUCTION

It is extremely important that experienced officers and detectives be involved in ultimately making the determination as whether or not an abduction is valid. It is the experience of these investigators which affords them the knowledge, background and well developed intuitive feelings to make the best decision.

During the neighborhood investigation conducted immediately after the report of a missing child, particular attention should be given to inconsistent statements given by witnesses as to what they heard or saw. Incorporating a "Behavioral Analysis Interview" (BAI)* approach during the neighborhood investigation will not only provide investigators with information, but will also provide indicators as to those people who may be deceptive in their responses.

Needless to say, everyone who might have witnessed the abduction should be interviewed. Those persons who should have seen something because of their proximity to the abduction site are extremely important for two reasons. First, they will help determine if it was a righteous abduction. Secondly, their observations of the victim's behavior (screams, resistance, etc.) will help determine whether the victim went willingly because they may have been familiar with the subject.

VICTIMOLOGY

In cases in which there are no witnesses it is especially critical to know the victimology; i.e., as much information about the victim as possible before a determination can be made as to whether or not a child has been abducted. This information should be obtained as expeditiously as possible and in as much detail as possible. This will also be of assistance in assessing the type of offender who is most likely to be responsible. The following information about the victim should be obtained:

1. Full description of the victim (also did he/she look their age).
2. Victim's normal patterns of activity.

* A non-accusatory interview in which a series of structured questions are asked in order to assess a suspect's verbal and non-verbal responses. Using the BAI approach allows the investigator to screen and evaluate suspects. See appendix for sample questions.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Listed below are some of the common organizational and administrative problems which have been encountered during serial murder investigations. Contributors to this guide identified similar problems as "barriers" in investigating child abduction cases.

1. Lack of overall administration.
2. Lack of overall coordination.
3. Lack of ongoing case review and analysis.
4. Lack of information management.
5. Too many non-investigative responsibilities for case investigators.
6. Undefined investigative priorities.
7. Interaction with news media.

Set out below is a suggested approach that will help to resolve many of the above problems.

ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD

This person would have overall responsibility for dealing with the public, budget matters, assignment of personnel, authorization of resources, and establishment of reporting policies. This person therefore needs to be someone with the decision making authority that is either present at the command center or is available to the investigators working the case.

The major personnel assignments that this person should make immediately are:

1. Assign a lead investigator.
2. Assign a media coordinator.
3. Assign a support coordinator.
4. Assign a special operations coordinator.

Most agencies will not have the personnel to handle every aspect of the investigation while meeting the day to day demands of the department. Therefore, the primary investigative agency will want to consider immediate access to qualified personnel from other law enforcement agencies. Utilizing personnel from other agencies results in cost sharing. In addition there is a resulting cost sharing in which they will be able to receive help at little or no cost from other agencies.

Stress-

The stress associated with managing the investigation is an issue that must be addressed, especially if the case goes on for a long time without being resolved. Police management should be sensitive to the extreme stress of this type of case and its long term effects on the detective responsible. Very frequently the attitude of the department is that the case will only be solved by "luck". This type of attitude conveyed to the detective can result in a feeling of futility toward his efforts at resolving the case and finding the missing child.


The department should be sensitive to the investigator's emotional needs during this type of investigation, assuring that he not only takes time off but that he has time to be "away from" the investigation. This is important for him to maintain his productivity while sustaining a healthy outlook on the case. Pay, motivation, rotation and days off are therefore considerations for everyone who is fully involved in this type of investigation.

DUE TO THE LENGTH OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT, IT
HAS BEEN REPRODUCED HERE IN ABBREVIATED FORM.
FOR A COMPLETE COPY OF THE INVESTIGATIVE GUIDE,
CONTACT:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE
BOX 36015
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
ATTN: S. A. MARY ELLEN O'TOOLE

Appendix B

Interagency Assistance Policy



City of Fremont
POLICE DEPARTMENT
OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE

LOG: 89-06 DATE: 9/19/89 INDEX: G-10

Index:

Child Abduction, Interagency Assistance
Interagency Assistance, Child Abduction

I. POLICY

It is the policy of the Fremont Police Department to participate in the Child Abduction Protection Protocol developed between Milpitas Police Department, Union City Police Department, Hayward Police Department, Newark Police Department, East Bay Regional Park Police, Alameda County Sheriff's Department, California Highway Patrol Hayward Office, and Fremont Police Department for investigation of child kidnappings.

II. PURPOSE

It is the purpose of this directive to outline the procedure for implementation of the Child Abduction Protection Protocol.

III. PROCEDURE

- A. A Watch Commander may request implementation of the Child Abduction Protection Protocol under the following circumstances.
1. Child kidnappings where facts indicate that the child has been abducted and is in great bodily danger. (This generally would not include parent custody disputes involving kidnapping.)
 2. Child kidnappings that fit murder/abduction profiles.
 3. Extraordinary criminal violations that create extreme hazard to the community or police personnel and require large numbers of officers for initial or follow-up investigations, i.e., police officer shootings, serial killers.

- B. The Child Abduction Protection Protocol interagency agreement should be implemented as follows:
1. Requests for assistance will be made by the Watch Commander after approval of the Chief of Police. If the Chief of Police or his designee is not available, the Watch Commander has the authority to implement the protocol without his approval.
 2. All requests for assistance will be made by teletype and confirmed by telephone.
 3. Requests will provide appropriate information on where responding personnel will report and to whom they will report.
- C. Immediate interagency assistance for child kidnappings.
1. Each agency involved will provide officers for immediate use at the scene of the kidnapping upon request of the originating agency. This immediate assistance can last up to 72 hours. The following is a list of the agencies participating in the protocol and the number of persons they will send.
 - a. Union City PD - 3 officers
 - b. Newark PD - 3 officers
 - c. East Bay Regional Park Police - 3 officers
 - d. Milpitas PD - 2 officers
 - e. Hayward PD - 8 officers
 - f. CHP Hayward - minimum of 3 officers
 - g. Alameda County Sheriff's Department - minimum of 5 officers
 - h. Fremont PD - 10 officers

Total number of officers - minimum 37
- D. Long-term assistance to follow up investigative leads for child kidnappings.
1. Each agency involved will provide officers for long-term investigation at the originating agency's request. This long-term commitment may last as long as two or three months. The following is a list of the agencies participating in the protocol and the number of persons they will send.

- a. Union City PD - 2 officers
- b. Newark PD - 2 officers
- c. East Bay Regional Park Police - 2 officers
- d. Milpitas PD - 1 officer
- e. Hayward PD - 4 officers
- f. Alameda County Sheriff's Department - 5 officers
- g. Fremont PD - 5 officers

Total number of officers - 21

E. Special conditions for interagency Child Abduction Protection Protocol.

1. The requesting agency is in charge of all personnel at the scene of the investigation including those responding from other agencies.
2. When personnel are requested under the immediate response procedure, every effort will be made to send them promptly, and the responding agency should indicate the anticipated time of arrival.
3. While each request for assistance dictates its own special procedures, it can be anticipated that persons responding under this procedure will work a maximum of 12-hour shifts and will be relieved by the agency providing the personnel. The agency providing the personnel will be responsible for insuring that their personnel are properly relieved.
4. Agencies providing personnel as first-in responders at the beginning of the investigation should provide supervision if at all possible.
5. The requesting agency will provide appropriate information on where responding personnel will report and to whom they will report.
6. The Child Abduction Protection Protocol is intended to provide interagency assistance for child abduction cases and is not considered mutual aid. Agencies supplying personnel for these incidents incur full costs for the personnel.

7. It is understood that each jurisdiction's first responsibility is to insure emergency service within its own jurisdiction. Therefore, should an agency not be able to participate due to emergency requirements within its own jurisdiction, it is excused from participation.
 8. Agencies providing personnel will be responsible for providing vehicles for their personnel.
- F. Fremont Police Department response to interagency request for assistance via the Child Abduction Protection Protocol.
1. Immediate interagency assistance to participating protocol agencies.
 - a. Upon request, the Fremont Police Department Watch Commander will send up to ten (10) officers to the requesting agency for assistance and notify the Patrol Section Captain. The number of officers needed should be specified by the requesting agency. If not specified, ten officers will be sent.
 - (1) Officers should respond with individual vehicles and radios.
 - (2) At least two cellular phones should be sent with the responding officers, and, if possible, officers should bring tape recorders.
 2. Watch Commanders should assign Traffic Unit officers first; special detail officers, second; and Patrol officers last.
 3. Watch Commanders may go below Patrol minimums to supply the necessary officers but must keep at least 8 officers operational in Fremont.
 4. Watch Commanders not having the proper number of officers available on duty will send those available and call off-duty officers in to fill the additional positions.

5. Watch Commanders going below minimums to supply the proper number of personnel shall also call officers in to bring Patrol back to minimums.
6. Watch Commanders shall assign a supervisor to coordinate response to the scene and proper relief of personnel.
7. Long-term assistance to participating protocol agencies.
8. All officers responding to immediate interagency assistance will be in uniform and properly equipped for patrol field operations.
 - a. Upon request, the Investigative Section Lieutenant will assign five officers to long-term assistance under the protocol agreement.
 - (1) Long-term investigators shall respond in individual vehicles with radios and at least two cellular phones.
 - (2) Long-term investigators assigned to the Child Abduction Protection Protocol assignment shall be experienced officers with proven ability as investigators.

R. Wasserman

ROBERT WASSERMAN
CHIEF OF POLICE

RW/mm

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