TERRORISM AND SECURITY: 
THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE 

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UNITED STATES SENATE 

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,

Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: On April 7, 1982, I wrote to Dr. Daniel J. Boorstin, the Librarian at the Library of Congress, requesting a complete and detailed study on Italian terrorism and security measures. This entailed a major revision and updating of two important Library of Congress reports prepared by Dr. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, i.e., "A Study of the Restructured Italian Intelligence and Security Services" (1978) and "Contemporary Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Countermeasures" (1979).

I requested Dr. Pisano's assistance in this work because I appreciate and greatly respect the professionalism, thoroughness, and objectivity that characterizes not only the above monographs, but also subsequent publications privately authored by Dr. Pisano, who, as you know, is an internationally recognized authority in this field.

Because of the important lessons to be learned from the Italian experience with terrorism, I requested that Dr. Pisano prepare a comprehensive update of his works. This update has now been completed with the enthusiastic assistance of Dr. Thomas J. Blumer, senior editor of the European Law Division, Law Library, who prepared the index.

It is with great pleasure that I transmit to you Dr. Pisano's report, entitled: "Terrorism and Security: The Italian Experience."

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD, Direct Action
AR, Revolutionary Action
AUTOP, Workers' Autonomy
BR, Red Brigades
CBSIS, Intelligence and Security Executive Committee
Co.Co.ri., Communist Revolutionary Committees
CPM, Political Metropolitan Collective
DC, Christian Democratic Party
DIGOS, Division for General Investigations and Special Operations
DP, Proletarian Democracy
ETA, Basque Fatherland and Liberty
FCC, Communist Combat Formations
FdG, Youth Front
FGCI, Italian Communist Youth Federation
FLN, Algerian National Liberation Front
GAP, Partisan Action Groups
GIS, Special Intervention Groups
LC, Ongoing Struggle
MAR, Revolutionary Action Movement
MPRO, Proletarian Offensive Resistance Movement
MRP, Popular Revolutionary Movement
MSI, Italian Social Movement
NAP, Armed Proletarian Nuclei
NAR, Armed Revolutionary Nuclei
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCI, Italian Communist Party
PFLP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PL, Front Line
PLO, Palestinian Liberation Organization
POTOP, Workers' Power
PR, Radical Party
PSd'A, Sardinian Action Party
PSDI, Italian Social Democratic Party
PSI, Italian Socialist Party
RAF, German Red Army Faction
SID, Defense Information Service
SIFAR, Armed Forces Information Service
SISDE, Service for Intelligence and Democratic Security
SISMI, Service for Military Intelligence and Security
UCC, Communist Combat Units
UCIGOS, Central Bureau for General Investigations and Special Operations
UIGOS, Office for General Investigations and Special Operations
UIL, Italian Union of Labor
USSR, Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
TERRORISM AND SECURITY: THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

The manifest objective of this research effort is to examine the Italian terrorist phenomenon and the security measures developed in response at both the governmental and private levels during the period 1968–82.

These years correspond to the infancy, adolescence, maturity, and, in some cases, the demise of terrorist organizations of various ideologies that have declared war on Italian institutions and society.

Between 1968 and 1982, Italy was a major stage for terrorist practices and counterpractices. The Italian experience constitutes an instructive case study that transcends national borders and offers insights into the global terrorist scene and applicable countermeasures.

In the interest of providing a concise narration and analysis supported by an extensive data base, numerous appendices have been prepared. Hopefully, they will also serve as a useful tool for the English-speaking scholar, analyst, or law enforcement officer who wishes to examine the Italian terrorist phenomenon independently of the analysis submitted in the pages that follow.

As this work is being written in the early months of 1983, the author recalls the words of Judge Giancarlo Caselli who summarized the limitations and, indeed, the frustrations of terrorism research:

Whatever can be said about terrorism is valid exclusively at the moment that it is being said. That is to say, it is subject to modifications on the basis of evidence, of new knowledge, which the judiciary, the police, or even the press might acquire in the future.

PART I. THE TERRORIST THREAT

A. NATURE AND INCIDENCE

Ideologically motivated terrorist violence perpetrated by clandestine formations has marred the Italian political landscape for over a decade. It is estimated that 14,613 acts of terrorist criminality were committed between 1968 and 1982 by highly structured organizations and by occasional groupings of individuals in the name of ideologies, or in the pursuit of goals, variously classifiable as Communist, neo-Fascist, anarchist, separatist, nationalistic/counterseparatist, ecological, feminist, internationalist, and transnational (see appendices III–XI).

The often thin ideological line of demarcation between these groups, which in some cases profess multiple ideologies, has in-
duced most observers to distinguish more simply, but somewhat less accurately, between terrorism of the left on one hand and terrorism on the right on the other.

The near totality of terrorist crimes perpetrated on Italian territory is the work of domestic terrorist formations, but there are also cases on record of terrorist operations conducted jointly by Italian nationals and aliens or by aliens alone.

Aggregate statistics on terrorist criminality generally reflect intensity as well as intermittent escalation trends. In point of fact (see appendix I), as opposed to less than 150 incidents recorded in 1968, several hundred per year took place during the period 1969-75, over 1,000 in 1976, and over 2,000 per year during the 1977-79 timeframe. A constant downward trend ranging from over 1,000 to several hundred incidents was recorded, instead, between 1980 and 1982.

While these figures constitute undeniable proof of the extensive terrorist presence in Italian society, the statistics can be deceiving if not properly considered. In the first place, notwithstanding the meritorious efforts displayed by the major law enforcement agencies—State Police and Carabinieri—in compiling them, aggregate statistics are admittedly not fully accurate because of the clandestine nature of the terrorist phenomenon, which often prevents the attribution of a precise paternity to criminal actions.1 Secondly, as a rule, a comparatively small percentage of the annual statistics relates to significant terrorist acts such as murders, woundings, and abductions (compare appendices I and II). Moreover, even though statistics pertaining to specific categories of terrorist crimes may serve as a more reliable indicator of the threat posed by terrorist formations, allowance should be made for multiple deaths and injuries resulting from the detonation of explosive devices during a single terrorist incident. While understandably disquieting, this type of action does not reflect structural or operational sophistication on the part of a terrorist group.

Indirect evidence of the numerical strength of terrorist elements active in Italy is offered by the statistics compiled at various intervals by the Ministry of the Interior on imprisoned and wanted terrorists and/or subversives. On March 1, 1980, the prison population included 604 inmates of the left and 239 of the right. On the same date, 70 members of the left and 48 of the right were on the wanted list. Nearly 2 years later, on October 31, 1982, the prison population included 1,357 inmates of the left and 480 of the right. At the same time, 274 members of the left and 79 of the right were on the wanted list. These figures do not include unidentified terrorists and supportive extremists found among the general population.2

The specific objectives, structures, dynamics, operational environment, and points of contact of individual terrorist formations are ultimately determined or substantially conditioned by the ideological component to which they belong.

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1 The compilation criteria have also changed through the years. For example, minor arson attempts that used to be reported by local police organs to central headquarters in the late 1960's were no longer reported in the late 1970's when ordinary terrorist actions had grown to be much more sophisticated.

B. COMMUNIST COMPONENT

1. Characteristics

A plurality of assets accounts for making this component the most menacing of the entire terrorist spectrum. The Communist or leftist component has consistently displayed an unwaivering commitment to clear-cut principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, despite internal debate, dissent, and schism over the methodology of its armed struggle. Moreover, from the very outset, it has developed viable clandestine structures and efficient operational techniques, while enjoying at the same time notable support from active and passive sympathizers. Traditionally, it is also the largest component from both the standpoint of numerical strength and the number of individual organizations present within its ranks. Not least, it has produced a major organization, known as the Red Brigades, endowed with an exceptional degree of resiliency in the face of cyclic setbacks and with the capability of absorbing less viable terrorist groups of kindred aspirations.

2. Ideology and objectives

All terrorist organizations of this ideological component basically aim at the same objective: the overthrow of the bourgeois, capitalist, imperialist state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their ideology and goals are best expressed in the writings of the Red Brigades. The following are significant excerpts from their doctrinal tracts:

The State, even in the most democratic republic, is only an oppressive machine used by one class against another.

In the capitalistic social formations, the State, its juristic ideology, and its law are nothing other than instruments through which the bourgeoisie exercises its dictatorship over the proletariat.

The only language that the servants of imperialism have demonstrated to understand is the language of arms and it is in this language that the proletariat is beginning to speak.

No objective, no matter how militarily protected, is unattackable by a guerrilla force.

Proletarian power must be affirmed even though the concretization of its own justice, through the capability of trying, passing judgment on, convicting the enemies of the proletariat.⁹

To construct the system of proletarian power means to fight against the power of the opposing class.⁴

Doctrinal belief in the class struggle and advocacy of the armed struggle are more dynamically and synthetically propagandized in the following exhortations addressed to the proletariat in Red Brigades' documents and communiques:

—Bring the attack to the imperialist state of the multinationals;

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³ Passages extracted from a document titled "Red Brigades, No. 6, March 1979, Spring Campaign: Seizure, Trial, Execution of Christian Democratic President Aldo Moro."
⁴ Passage extracted from a document titled "Red Brigades, No. 7, July 1979, From the Field in Asinara."
—Unify the proletarian movement of offensive resistance in the combatant Communist party;
—Create, strengthen, expand the mass organisms of the revolutionary proletarian power; and
—Transform the objectives of the imperialist bourgeoisie into anti-imperialist civil war. 6

3. Factors conducive to growth

In addition to possessing a firmer doctrinal base and a more efficient operational structure, the Communist component of the Italian terrorist milieu has drawn more vitality than any of its counterparts from a general state of malaise, conducive to destabilization, that is attributable to insufficient social services, political contradictions, governmental instability, unenlightened media practices, and the teachings of the Italian Communist Party—not to be confused with the combatant Communist party the Red Brigades and sister groups wish to construct. Each of these five principal factors can be briefly summarized as follows:

(1) By 1960, Italy had experienced the so-called economic miracle, entailing a rapid passage from post-war reconstruction to an advanced industrial posture. Italy is now the seventh most industrialized nation. Regrettably, this momentous industrial expansion, which triggered mass migrations from south to north and from rural to urban areas, was not accompanied by a parallel growth in social structures. The metropolitan centers were ultimately unable to provide adequately for the increased population in terms of housing, schools, hospitals, and other social services. These unsatisfactory material conditions have facilitated subversive propaganda and recruitment.

(2) Not less damaging from a psychological perspective are the contradictions inherent to the deep-rooted practices of Italy's political parties. In the absence of an absolute majority party in the Parliament, parties having discordant platforms coalesce at rhapsodic intervals, after political barter and ideological compromise, in order to form the government (executive cabinet), which, in accordance with the Republican Constitution of 1948, must enjoy the support of Parliament to stay in office. The lack of homogeneity in the makeup of these coalitions frequently constitutes a hindrance to good and efficient government, while it conversely nurtures a spoils system, based on graft and corruption, to the benefit of the coalition partners. Besides creating a state of malaise among the population at large, this situation increases the credibility of the terrorist left in the eyes of youthful extremists and idealists.

(3) The instability of the Italian Government is made manifest by the succession of 39 executive cabinets since the Constitution went into effect on January 1, 1948. Governmental instability, coupled with the political contradictions briefly outlined above, has in turn produced governmental weakness and permissiveness.

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6 These exhortations are recurrent in virtually all Red Brigades documents including resolutions and communiques.
6 Passage extracted from a document titled "For Communism, Red Brigades, For the Construction of the Combatant Communist Party, Resolution of the Strategic Directorate, December 1961."
A macroscopic reflection of this state of affairs is the governmental stance vis-a-vis durable trends of unruliness and violence in expressing socio-economic demands inaugurated by student and organized-labor unrest in the late 1960's. The governmental response prevalent throughout most of the following decade consisted of policies and, indeed legislation that resulted in the downgrading of the educational system, the slanting of labor relations too heavily in favor of employees and the labor unions to the detriment of the national economy, the weakening of criminal laws and procedures in favor of politicized and non-politicized social deviants, the reduction of military and police efficiency, and the virtual emasculation of the intelligence services. The lowering of academic standards turned out to be particularly harmful, because it has produced a larger number of graduates whose increased post-graduation expectations cannot find a receptive job market.

This climate of permissiveness has likewise contributed to emboldening the aspirations and behavior of subversive elements of the left in particular but also of other ideological persuasions. When remedial legislation and policies were resorted to in the late 1970's (as discussed in part II), much of the damage had by then already been done.

(4) Except for the terrorists' own journals and the press organs of sympathetic extraparliamentary organizations, the media cannot be accused of having been supportive at any time of terrorist tactics or goals. Yet, a number of unenlightened media practices have contributed to the public's disorientation, while particularly favoring the terrorist left.

In the first place, an inordinate amount of daily coverage has been devoted to the terrorist phenomenon, which, in the ultimate analysis, produces fewer casualties than careless and wreckless driving. In this sense the terrorist formations, especially the intensively dynamic ones of the left (see appendix XII), have found in the media a much valued sounding board for their ideology and actions, as well as a channel for granting exclusive interviews.

Secondly, as the terrorists ranks of the left were growing in strength and boldness even professionally respected dailies, such as Corriere della Sera of Milan and La Stampa of Turin, and major weeklies, such as L'Espresso of Rome and Panorama of Milan, cast doubt on the Marxist-Leninist matrix of specific crimes, whose perpetrators have since been identified as terrorists of Communist inspiration. According to media perceptions, instead, responsibility rested with the right disguised as the left. Two instructive examples of this media attitude relate to the abduction of Assistant State Attorney Mario Sossi in Genoa and the murder of two Italian...
Social Movement (MSI) activists in Padua, perpetrated in each instance by the Red Brigades in 1974 (see appendix XII).9

Lastly, scoop-oriented journalists have not hesitated to print documents pertinent to ongoing police/judicial investigations into terrorist crimes before their official public release, thus jeopardizing the investigations themselves. The most notorious incident of this nature is the publication of long excerpts from the interrogation record of repentant red brigadist Patrizio Peci in May of 1980 by Il Messaggero, a Rome daily.

(5) Since the early 1970's the official Italian Communist Party (PCI) has considerably toned down its revolutionary rhetoric in order to project an image of moderation to achieve its political ends through a broad electoral base. However, its political ends remain Communist as that party consistently refutes any equation with social democracy. While PCI electoral strategies are of limited interest to the study at hand, its ideological and operational precedents are of significance.

The doctrine, objectives and parlance of the terrorist left are reminiscent of the PCI's more traditional hardline. Rossana Rossanda, formerly of the PCI and now of the Manifesto, in commenting on the proclamations of the Red Brigades picturesquely stated: "It's like leafing through a family album."10 Likewise, the Red Brigades have displayed a deep affinity for democratic centralism, an organizational principle democratic in name only that the PCI itself still refuses to discard.11 Moreover, as the major opposition party and the foremost anti-system element within the system for over three decades, it has provided not only ideological nourishment but also instructive operational precedents to the various terrorist organizations of the left.

From the standpoint of targets and tactics, various parallels may be drawn between the Red Brigades, Front Line, and other leftist terrorist bands of the past decade, on one hand, and the PCI of the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's on the other.

In the mid-1940's, Communist partisans who had expected the War of Liberation to usher in the "Italian Soviet Republic" stored away sizable caches of weapons for future use and organized paramilitary units. One of these, the Red Strike Force (Volante Rossa), remained active in various parts of Italy at least well into 1949. Its activities included abductions, woundings, and murders of political adversaries as well as lesser intimidatory techniques. In 1948, during the 6th PCI Congress, the Red Strike Force was brazenly used by the Party to keep order and to escort the Soviet delegates and French Communist Party leader Maurice Thorez. Other PCI card-carrying members were responsible for uprisings and raids in Ragusa and Schio (53 murders in Schio alone) in 1945, in other northern towns the following year, and through much of the rest of Italy after the abortive attempt on the life of PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti by one Antonio Pallante on July 4, 1948.

8 For an analysis of pertinent media practices corroborated by extensive quotations, see II Giornale Nuovo, Jan. 23, 1980, p. 7 (Milan).
9 Quoted from II Manifesto by Il Giornale Nuovo, Apr. 6, 1978, p. 3 (Milan).
The following evening, Luigi Longo, who succeeded Togliatti as secretary-general and later became president of the party (a position he held until his death in 1980) stated: "Let's see how things go. If the protest wave increases, we will allow it to increase. If it decreases, we will block it." Next day, Longo, backed by Pietro Secchia, another hard liner, made the following statement before the Party's central committee: "The insurgent forces are concentrated in the large cities of the North. . . . The rank-and-file are saying, 'We have the factories in our hands: we have the cities in our hands.' But let the comrades reflect: for the time being neither the police nor the army has intervened. If they do, they have cannon and tanks against which it is impossible to resist." Pragmatism ultimately prevailed over revolutionary fervor and incipient insurgency.

A decade later, in the summer of 1960, the government of Prime Minister Fernando Tambroni, who had accepted the parliamentary support of the rightist Italian Social Movement (MSI), was overturned because of Communist street violence. Particularly affected by the Communist-inspired disorders were the cities of Genoa, Licata, Rome, Reggio Emilia, Palermo, and Catania. Eight casualties and several hundred injuries occurred during the clashes with the police.

While the relationship between today's revolutionaries of the left and the PCI is not one of amity, it is difficult to challenge their joint inheritance right to the "family album" spoken of by Rossana Rossanda.

4. Structural and operational patterns

The structure and operations of the Italian terrorist groups of Communist inspiration are largely patterned after those of the Algerian National Liberation Front and of various South American urban guerrilla groups. In fact, the principles set forth in Carlos Marighella's "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" have been skillfully adapted to the Italian scene.

Five major patterns emerge from the study of Italian terrorist formations that have been part of the Communist ideological component since 1970. Not all five of them have always been practiced simultaneously, nor is any of them necessarily being fully pursued at this writing. However, apart from historical considerations, knowledge of them is most valuable because of evolutionary as well as involuntary trends in terrorist endeavors.

(1) Rigid clandestinity accompanied by selective and systematic actions.—This pattern characterizes the history of the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse, BR), the only terrorist organization of the left in continuous existence since 1970, and, to a lesser degree, the practices of the Armed Proletarian Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Proletari) 'n Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Prole-

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13 For a summary of the incidents, accompanied by photographs, see Il Settimanale, July 27, 1960, pp. 16-19 (Rome); and L'Espresso, June 29, 1960, pp. 32-40 (Rome). According to the latter, in Genoa alone 162 policemen and 40 rioters were wounded on June 30, 1960.

14 In addition to the publications cited in supra notes 12 and 13; the following also address PCI involvement in acts of political violence: A. Ronchey, "Libro bianco sull'ultima generazione," Garzanti, Milano, 1978; and Sozorro Rosso, "Brigate Rosse," Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976.
turi, NAP), a considerably smaller group active between 1974 and 1977, but subsequently absorbed by the BR.

In keeping with the rigidly clandestine organizational concepts used by organizations of the left, the BR adopted a "pyramidal structure with closed compartments, each headed by a person who acts as a filter and assures access to a higher compartment." At this writing, after one year of setbacks of unprecedented magnitude, the organizational structure of the BR is not believed to be intact. In any case, whatever is left of that terrorist formation, whose history is one of resiliency in the face of periodic setbacks, is likely to be influenced by its time-tested model.

At the top of the above-cited pyramidal structure is the strategic directorate, presumably but not provenly, the highest authority within the BR hierarchy. The strategic directorate, which can be regarded as a revolutionary council, decides upon objectives and campaigns. Its functions are therefore politico-military in nature. Since it does not meet in permanent session, but convenes from time to time, the execution of its resolutions is delegated to an executive committee.

The numerical composition and the identity of all members of these two organs, one or both of which may be out of commission at this time of presumable reorganizational efforts by the surviving elements of the BR, require further investigation. According to repentant red brigadist Patrizio Peci, who was captured in February of 1980, the strategic directorate consisted until 1979 of 10 members. With respect to the executive committee, Peci has indicated that its composition varies from four to five members, but this rule is not rigid. The partial list of strategic directorate and executive committee members provided to date by Peci and other repentant terrorists is that of BR militants allegedly known to them directly or from other sources. Consequently, from these confessions no behind-the-scenes principals or figures have emerged.

The immediate lower layer of the BR structure consists of several columns whose responsibilities mostly entail operations and intelligence collection. Under optimal conditions, individual columns are assigned municipal or regional spheres of action. The BR refer to a city as a pole. Through the years, indentified columns include those of Milan, Turin, Genoa, the Veneto region, Rome, Naples, and, at least at the incipient level, the Sardinian region. In the regions of Tuscany and Marche, BR committees are known to have operated as appendages of columns, but with functions analogous to those performed by the columns. The last unclassified semi-annual intelligence report presented by the Prime Minister to the Parliament on November 27, 1982, indicated that the Rome, Milan, Turin, and Naples columns are still potentially dangerous. At the lowest pyramidal level operate brigades having, in some cases subordinate cells. The brigades are directed, managed and su-

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Supervised by the headquarters of the column to which they belong. Each column is composed of two or more brigades.

In addition to this operations-oriented structure, the BR clandestine organization possesses a number of fronts whose mission is somewhat less dynamic, as their activities entail research, certain types of intelligence collection, propaganda, and logistics. A substantial part of their input originates from the columns and the brigades. The fronts include the mass front, the logistical front, and the triple front. The last of these is specifically concerned with intelligence collection/processing regarding the judiciary, the police, and the labor unions.

The actual militants of the BR can be classified as either regulars or irregulars. Both are part of the clandestine structure, but whereas the former lead a totally clandestine life, the latter are only part-timers in the organization and consequently maintain a close to normal lifestyle. According to Antonio Savasta, another repentant red brigadist captured in January of 1982, irregulars are to be found in the strategic directorate as well.\textsuperscript{19}

A more direct perception of the BR structure can be acquired by focusing on the Rome column, one of the most important BR units and one that is still considered operational despite the setbacks suffered by the BR since the beginning of 1982. At least until recently, the Rome column consisted of five brigades designated as Rome North Side, Rome South Side, Ostia, Hospitaliers, and University. The names given to these brigades are indicative of operational spheres of action assigned in relation to territory or to specific institutions. Individual brigade strength ranged from a minimum of two or three members to a maximum of five or six. Besides these organic full-fledged operational units, the Rome column maintained points of contact consisting of at least one irregular in each of a number of other institutions including the local railroad, telephone, labor placement, and school administrations, and Alitalia (Italian Air Lines). The point of contact can expand into a brigade, if the situation is favorable or is a remnant of an inactivated brigade.

Structural clandestinity is inevitably accompanied by a body of security norms that address liaison between members of the organization in special detail. Within the BR, the unflexible application of these norms would require that brigade members be familiar only with members of their own brigade; brigade leaders be familiar only with their column leader; and column leaders be familiar only with one or more representatives of the strategic directorate or of the executive committee. However, since the more complex operations frequently require the combined assets of two or more brigades, of an entire column or even two or more columns, the rigidity of the above cited norms is modified from time to time. This security mitigation is also necessary to allow the fronts to operate efficiently, since their membership is drawn from column headquarters so that they can assess the situation as well as requirements throughout the national territory.

To ensure an acceptable degree of security in all of these cases, the BR meticulously regulate behavior pertaining to movement.

\textsuperscript{19} Il Tempo, Apr 29, 1982, p. 9 (Rome).
and rendezvous. In metropolitan areas, the regular BR militant is
cautions to avoid the historical center, especially during periods
of intense police surveillance, and to move on foot or by public con-
voyage. Meetings with other militants are to take place in areas
of noticeable pedestrian and vehicular traffic, preferably in the less
central sections of the city. Bus stops are considered desirable spe-
cific meeting points within the above-described environment.

Meetings between militants, regardless of their purpose, entail
two procedures known as ordinary and strategic. Ordinary proce-
dure meetings are scheduled in relation to operational/logistical re-
quirements but must avoid set patterns as to the day of the week
or month, time, and place. If one of the two militants fails to
appear, the appointment is automatically postponed to 1 hour
later. If the rendezvous fails a second time, the meeting is once
again automatically set for the following day at the same time and
place. In the event of a repeated failure, no further attempt is
made under the ordinary procedure. At this point, the strategic
procedure goes into effect. The strategic meeting is set from the
very beginning of the relationship between the two militants. The
day of the week or month, time, and place of the appointment sub-
ject to strategic procedure is not open to change and is purely even-
tual, i.e., it takes place only in case the ordinary procedure cannot
be followed. To avoid organizational loss of contact, an encoded
record of all strategic-procedure appointments is kept at both
column headquarters and at higher levels.

Security norms also govern operational and logistical bases, the
number of which varies from column to column. The more impor-
tant bases must be guarded by two regulars. Bases are either pur-
chased or rented by an unsuspected militant with a clean police
record, who theoretically performs no other function within the or-
ganization. For further security enhancement, the location of bases
is periodically changed. Besides their own base, all regulars know
the address of an additional one that is to serve as a back-up facili-
ty in cases of emergency.

The above-described rigidly clandestine structure is accompanied
by selective and systematic terrorist actions. Human targets are
not picked at random but are selectively chosen because of the in-
stitution they represent or because of their own role within the
system the BR wish to destroy. Equally representative or symbolic
are the material targets of the BR. The fact that responsibility is
most often claimed after a terrorist attack does not in any way
alter the clandestine nature of the organization, since the BR are
clandestine in their structure and not in their aims, which they ac-
tively seek to publicize directly through their own proclamations
and indirectly through media coverage. With respect to operational
security, the BR are particularly careful in claiming responsibility
for their actions, especially the more clamor-inducing ones such as
murders, woundings, and abductions. Paternity leaflets are either
immediately dropped off by the unit that perpetrated the criminal
act or delivered a few days after the event by irregulars unconnect-
ed with the operation and unfamiliar with those responsible for it.
These procedures are intended to prevent compromising the indi-
vidual identity of the perpetrators.
Simultaneous political action and armed struggle.—This pattern characterizes Front Line (Prima Linea, PL) and its satellite formations. It should be premised, however, that the ideology and political objectives as well as the human and material targets of PL do not substantially differ from those of the BR. PL came into being in 1976 in the footsteps of the BR, at the same time that numerous minor formations were making their appearance on the terrorist scene. By 1980 PL was second to the BR alone in the menace it posed (see appendix XII). Thereafter, following successful police operations, part of its residual assets were absorbed by the BR, while other remnants have attempted to resurface under their original banner or other names. Most recently the name Communist Combatant Nuclei was used by a commando group that liberated PL prison inmates in Rovigo (see appendix XIII).

Two primary differences in revolutionary strategy account for the distinction between PL and the BR. The latter believe in the determinant and exclusive role of the armed vanguards and are consequently more militarily structured in the Marxist-Leninist sense. PL, on the other hand, has consistently demonstrated its belief in the armed struggle, but it has also displayed a marked propensity for political action. Therefore, its members have traditionally combined, where possible, political militancy at the non-clandestine level with clandestinely perpetrated terrorist crimes.

The second difference stems from the first. The BR have generally condemned spontaneity as damaging to the revolutionary cause, whose vanguard they perceive themselves to be. PL, on the other hand, has adopted a comparatively flexible operational structure that leaves room for individual decision-making by its organic units and satellites in the belief that situational objectives (goals and targets immediately perceivable as significant by the various strata of the proletariat in specific or varying circumstances) can likewise be best achieved through grass-root initiatives.

For these reasons, PL has been defined as a “federation of connected groups lacking the rigid military organization of the BR.”

It is also worth noting how Marco Donat Cattin, a repentant PL member distinguishes his own terrorist band from the BR:

The BR are substantially a Marxist-Leninist organization. PL, instead, is linked from its birth to salaried-workers’ themes and is more oriented toward the achievement of immediate objectives. PL does not consider itself a party, but a service structure, an armed group that carries out actions in reference to the contingent situation.

Given the federative nature of PL, uncertainties still subsist even with respect to its heyday organization. As one can best reconstruct the organization, it included a centralized political structure consisting of various fronts with functions pertaining to intelligence, liaison, recruitment, and logistics and a territorial structure consisting of fire groups with subordinate squads and patrols. These structures were loosely connected by some sort of a central committee.

20 Id. Dec. 12, 1979, p. 16 (Rome).
From a functional standpoint, the fire groups are analogous to the columns of the BR. Known fire groups include those that operated in Turin, Milan, Florence, and Rome. Fire groups headquarters assigned targeting tasks to subordinate or connected squads which had their own internal organization, broad operational autonomy, and an individual name that modified the word squad (see appendix III). Patrols were practically subsquads that shared the nature of the squads except for the fact that their operations were intended to be more intimidatory than violent and their actions were less systematic. Similarly, patrols frequently possessed their own denominations (see appendix III).

Again, because of the aggregative structure of PL and its tolerance for revolutionary spontaneity, responsibility for actions perpetrated by PL has been claimed either under its own name, or that of its subordinate or satellite squads and patrols, or even a combination of these units.

The aforementioned semiannual intelligence report states that a number of affiliations of PL still maintain a certain degree of efficiency. It can therefore be presumed that squads, patrols, and similar units once connected to PL, are now operating without their former umbrella link.

(3) Spontaneous and sporadic actions.—Terrorist crimes that fall within this pattern are among the most complex to analyze with respect to their true objectives and paternity. In many cases, they are perpetrated by previously unknown groups which, after making a brief appearance on the scene, are not heard from again. Their operations most often, but not always (see appendix XIII), entail unsophisticated acts of terrorist violence such as arson or bombings of property. Many of the groups listed in appendix III are examples of this type of organization.

Several actions that appear to be part of this pattern in reality constitute secondary missions of the practitioners of the previous two patterns, including security (e.g., when a new unit is being instituted in a different area of the country but is not yet fully organized or sufficiently supported by nonterrorist elements of sympathetic political fringes), propaganda (e.g., the spreading of the armed struggle), and training or testing of new recruits.

A common tendency is to attribute most actions falling within this pattern to presumable affiliations or satellites of PL, especially if the words "squads" or "patrols" appear in the name of the formation that claims responsibility for a specific action. But such an assumption, while based on a reasonable degree of probability, is not always correct. It should be noted that within what the BR call the Proletarian Offensive Resistance Movement (Movimento Proletario di Resistenza Offensiva, MPRO), which is in essence an outer ring or reservoir for BR recruitment or delegation of specific operations, there are elements which initiate, without mandate, actions under different names to establish themselves as qualified candidates for fullfledged BR membership. Moreover, as it will be discussed in connection with the examination of the fifth pattern, a number of these seemingly spontaneous and sporadic actions is perpetrated by variously named elements of the Autonomy.

\[\text{Note: Supra note 18, p. 9.}\]
Appendix XIII lists significant terrorist actions perpetrated by minor subversive formations of Communist inspiration. These actions, as opposed to the less significant ones, whose paternity is indeed difficult to establish, are likely in most instances to be the work of groups connected to, or commissioned by, Front Line, the Autonomy, or the Red Brigades, in that order. Notable exceptions to this presumption are the October XXII Circle and, probably, the Communist Combat Units.

(4) Interorganizational liaison/support and/or combined operations.—In the quagmire of terrorist and subversive groups, the relationship among them frequently eludes classification. However, certain aspects of this pattern are relatively simple to analyze. Residual assets (manpower, bases, documents, weapons, etc.) of no longer viable groups have been absorbed by more dynamic ones throughout the history of the terrorist wave discussed in this study. At the same time, there have been cases of militants passing from one terrorist group to another.

The Partisan Action Groups (Gruppi di Azione Partigiana, GAP) was a small organization which existed in northern Italy from the late 1960's to 1972. It was financed by the millionaire, publisher and Communist revolutionary ideologist Giangiacomo Feltrinelli as part of his plan to conduct partisan-style field-and-mountain warfare to preempt an alleged impending Fascist takeover of the government. Along with other sundry elements, GAP absorbed the October XXII Circle (Circolo XXII Ottobre), another small group in existence in northern Italy from 1969 to 1971, made up of Communist hard-liners and former partisans who were no longer satisfied with the official Italian Communist Party. Following Feltrinelli's accidental death in 1972, as he was attaching explosives to an electric power pylon, the GAP was in turn absorbed by the BR, which subsequently took over the residual assets of the Armed Proletarian Nuclei (Nuclei Armati Proletari, NAP), a terrorist group with southern Italian roots active from 1974 to 1977 and bent on serving as the operational revolutionary link between prison inmates and the proletarians on the outside, as well as a portion of the remaining assets of PL.

Furthermore, the birth of individual BR columns has entailed, at least in part, the absorption of local subversive groups. For example, the Rome column, founded in the second half of the 1970's, initially acquired the assets of the Communist Armed Formations (Formazioni Armate Comuniste, FAC, a splinter of the now defunct extraparliamentary party Workers' Power) and later on elements of the Communist Combat Units (Unita Combatteiti Comuniste, UCC, another now presumably neutralized offshoot of the extraparliamentary left with a propensity for both political and common crime as well as links with organized crime groups in the region of Calabria).

In addition to absorption cases, such as the above-described ones, there are several instances of terrorists of the left leaving one group to join another. The most notorious case is that of Corrado Alunni, a member of the historic nucleus (an original member) of the BR, who moved on to PL.

The foregoing reflects, as a minimum, the existence of habitual contacts among terrorist groups of Communist inspiration. More-
over, evidence originating from several sources, including police investigations, court records, and terrorism studies, is indicative of various forms of ideological dialog and operational collaboration among Communist-inspired organizations.

In 1971, the BR and the GAP contemplated a merger, but this plan was discarded because of the fundamental difference between the BR's urban-warfare orientation and the GAP's preference for more classical partisan operations. In 1976 a series of joint BR-NAP actions was launched against police barracks and vehicles in Pisa, Rho, Genoa, Turin, Rome, Naples, and Florence. In 1978, while the late Aldo Moro, then Christian Democratic Party President and former Prime Minister, was a captive of the BR, PL inquired as to the feasibility of submitting questions to the elder statesman. Even more numerous are those cases involving the joint perpetration of lesser terrorist crimes by minor formations that proliferated particularly in the period 1977–80.

In connection with this pattern, it is worth noting that the terrorist organizations of the left exercise varying degrees of influence on one another. The GAP and the October XXII Circle included common criminals in their ranks. The NAP's aim was to politicize the prisons and their inmates. After these three organizations were totally crippled by successful law enforcement operations, the BR not only added to their own objectives the specific mission of the NAP, but also began to recruit politicized common criminals. The NAP, PL, and all the minor groups emulated the BR's ambush and/or hit-and-run targeting techniques. One NAP kidnaping, that of Supreme Court Judge Di Gennaro (see appendix XII), was modeled after the BR's political abduction pattern of the time. Mass leg shooting, inaugurated by PL on December 11, 1979, was quickly paralleled by the BR on April 1, 1980 (see appendix XII). Many more examples could be cited.

(5) Auxiliary support.—This last pattern principally entails logistical and service activities in support of terrorist organizations, but does not exclude the direct perpetration of typical terrorist crimes, which is indicative of an operational orientation as well.

Before examining this pattern, it is beneficial to expand briefly upon what has already been stated regarding the organic logistical and service structures of the above-discussed terrorist organizations.

All terrorist groups of the left, and in particular the better established ones, aim at the highest possible level of self-sufficiency. Much of their funds are raised through armed robberies of banks, payrolls, and jewelry stores and, in some cases, kidnaping for ransom. For example, the proceeds obtained by the NAP from the Moccia abduction in 1974 were used to extend their zone of operations to the north of Naples. The proceeds obtained by the BR from the Costa kidnaping for ransom in 1977 were used to finance the political abduction of Aldo Moro the following year (see appendix XII). Material, including weapons, motor vehicles, and other equipment, is most frequently stolen either by stealth or clamorous actions. For example, between March 30, 1980, and November 20, 1982, at least six known raids were disjointly conducted by the BR and by PL against army and air force installations and trucks to obtain weapons. Those attacks that caused deaths and injuries are
listed in appendix XII. Files and other information of intelligence use are likewise often acquired through raids on offices or private dwellings. Other intelligence gathering functions are accomplished by strategically planted irregulars or points of contact.

Logistical requisitioning and intelligence collection are conducted by the operational units or elements of the terrorist organizations. But for purposes of logistical or intelligence planning and distribution, other echelons, such as the logistical front and the mass front of the BR are utilized.

Whenever goods or services cannot be acquired by support structures from within the organization, in accordance with the above-outlined methodology, the organizations rely on three other procedures: overt purchase, if possible; organized common crime channels, against compensation; or auxiliary support.

Auxiliary support is provided by a number of extremist organizations and groups of the extraparliamentary left that regard themselves as part of the Movement or of the Autonomy. As the privileged interlocutors of the terrorist organizations, these outfits not only constitute a terrorist recruitment pool, but also render a variety of services ranging from logistics to propaganda, from cover to intelligence, and from medical to legal assistance.

Of particular significance within this context is the extraparliamentary organization Workers' Autonomy (Autonomia Operaia, AUTOP), which has developed the most refined organization of the entire cluster. Seventy-one of its members are currently being tried by the Court of Assizes of Rome for armed insurrection, the organization of an armed band, participation in an armed band, support for an armed band, illegal possession of explosives and weapons, and other crimes. The proceedings are expected to last 1 year. While the outcome of the trial cannot obviously be predicted, the following observations on AUTOP have a direct bearing on the pattern of auxiliary support.

AUTOP was formed shortly after the self-resolved dissolution of Workers' Power (Potere Operaio, POTOP), a similar extraparliamentary organization in existence from 1969 through 1973. Beginning on April 7, 1979, the judiciary issued a number of arrest warrants and indicted numerous professors, intellectuals, writers, and activists within the ranks of AUTOP. The prosecution has substantially argued that the dissolution of POTOP decided at its party Congress of 1973 in Rosolina was purely tactical. At this time, its members secretly agreed to form two parallel branches of the dissolved organization: one consisting of clandestine elements that were to become part of terrorist organizations and the other consisting of a supporting legal structure that came to be known as AUTOP. Moreover, the leadership of both branches remained vested in a unitary directorate responsible for providing both ideological and operational guidance.

Whatever the merits of the prosecutorial posture, it is a fact that the activism of POTOP/AUTOP runs parallel to the operations of the BR, PL, and sister groups. It initially pursued confrontation politics in the factories, but progressively deemphasized verbal dissent vis-a-vis the system and began to promote disorders and violence, especially in the course of labor union unrest and demonstrations. Its tactics have included public instigation to commit
crimes and urban guerrilla actions entailing the use of Molotov cocktails as well as firearms.

Indicative of AUTOP's ideology are numerous political slogans such as "Work is not a manner of living, but the obligation to sell oneself in order to live." From the struggles within the factories for guaranteed wages, AUTOP expanded its subversive propaganda and militancy to include unilaterally reduced payments of rent by tenants and of public-utility rates by customers, seizure of unrented apartments, resistance against eviction, and proletarian expropriations in supermarkets. It also targeted the school system, because of its alleged role as the school of unemployment, selectivity, and repression.

Moreover, AUTOP devoted intensive attention to the prisons in conjunction with the militancy of such groups as Red Aid (Soccorso Rosso), whose members on the surface render gratuitous legal assistance to political detainees stricken by the bourgeois repression; but in practice, besides serving as defense counsel for extremists and terrorists of the left, act as intermediaries between imprisoned terrorists and terrorists at large, thus providing operation liaison. Significantly, attorney Edoardo Arnaldi, a former Communist partisan, committed suicide on April 19, 1980, as he was about to be arrested by the Carabinieri, pursuant to a warrant issued on those grounds. Another attorney, Sergio Spazzali, received a 4-year prison sentence on the same grounds on March 20, 1982, at the conclusion of the appellate proceedings against 72 members of the Turin column of the BR. Still another attorney, Giovanna Lombardi, is currently under indictment in Rome.

The militancy of AUTOP and of its predecessor POTOP in the Padua province and, through its appendages, in the Veneto region affords an instructive example with respect to both the logistical/service aspects and operational aspects of the auxiliary support pattern as applicable to a specific area of the country.

The University of Padua and, in particular, its Political Science Department served since the late 1960's as a training area for terrorist cadres. Under the intellectual inspiration and charismatic leadership of Professor Antonio (Toni) Negri and his academic assistants—most of whom are today under indictment together with Negri—POTOP developed firm structures within the University itself. A main vehicle used for this purpose consisted of self-managed seminars (seminari autogestiti). Moreover, because of unfavorable local conditions (high cost of food and lodging), the student population, much of which is from out of town, became a fertile ground for extremist recruitment.

During the transition period between the demise of POTOP and the formal birth of AUTOP, loosely structured groups known as the Paduan Political Collectives (Collettivi Politici Padovani) insured an unbroken chain of succession in the province.

Paduan AUTOP has traditionally been a two-tier organization with an overt and a covert structure. The overt structure has en-

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24. In addition to the Padua province, the Veneto region includes the provinces of Venice, Verona, Vicenza, Treviso, Belluno, and Rovigo.
devored to establish its presence in local society and disseminate Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The parallel covert structure, reliant upon sympathizers recruited through the overt organization, conducts subversive and terrorist activities by means of cellular groups that have claimed responsibility for their actions under different names.

Throughout its history, Paduan AUTOP maintained logistical bases in the province by using student off-campus quarters as well as the University grounds. Another frequent technique entailed the occupation of empty facilities belonging to the Municipality of Padua. Its influence over the rest of the region has largely been exercised through social centers (centri sociali) which have propaganda and recruitment purposes. Notably, on April 11, 1979, a few days after the April 7 indictments of leading members of Paduan AUTOP, a device accidentally exploded in Thiene—a municipality in the neighboring province of Vicenza—while it was being manufactured. In the devastated premises, weapons, sketches of Carabinieri installations, and other subversion/terrorism-oriented materials were uncovered and confiscated.

Formations believed to be connected to Paduan AUTOP that have perpetrated major terrorist acts in Padua and elsewhere in the Veneto region include the Combatant Communist Front, Combatant Communist Youth Front, Workers' Organization for Communism, Armed Anti-Fascist Groups, Communist Front for Counterpower, and Communist Combatant Nuclei (see appendix XIII).

Notwithstanding notable setbacks suffered at the hands of the judiciary and police since the late 1970's, Paduan AUTOP retains sufficient assets to publish a monthly, known as Autonomia, which may be considered to be the link between what is left of the overt and covert structures of AUTOP in the province and possibly in the region.

Beyond the above-mentioned aspects of the auxiliary support pattern, AUTOP reportedly entertained much more ambitious plans. For example, ideologues Francesco Piperno, a professor of physics at the University of Cosenza, Lanfranco Pace, and Oreste Scaizone, all associated with the extraparliamentary Communist Revolutionary Committees (Comitati Comunisti Rivoluzionari—Co.Co.Ri.) and the publication Metropoli had attempted to condition the strategies of the BR by infiltrating their ranks through their own disciples Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda. During the recent trial of 63 defendants for BR crimes committed in Rome between 1977 and 1981, including the abduction and murder of Aldo Moro, which produced, inter alia, 32 life sentences, repentant red brigadist Massimo Canfanelli confirmed the existence of such a design.

A similar plan or link may have been contemplated or undertaken by AUTOP. Repentant terrorist Patrizio Peci stated:

We believed that Negri was in direct relationship with PL, in the sense that he provided said organization with the political stance to be followed. This assessment of ours was drawn, at least as far as I am concerned, from the analysis of Negri's writings and of the actions perpetrated
by PL; that is all. When I use the term *we*, I mean myself and other members of the BR in Turin.²³

Peci was the leader of the Turin column of the BR.

Hopefully, the trial of the 71 members of AUTOP and the broader “Autonomy” before the Court of Assizes of Rome will shed more light upon this multifaceted pattern.

5. Militants’ profiles

To date no published work is available which has addressed in a comprehensive manner the background of the individual terrorists of a Communist or any other inspiration. Apart from the fact that it is difficult to gather the pertinent vital statistics and other personal data, it must also be borne in mind that between 1968 and 1982 at least three, if not four, generations of terrorists have succeeded one another by taking over where the previous one left off because of arrests or casualties. This is particularly true of the leftist sector with special reference to the BR.

Most of what is now a generally accepted matter of record pertains to the first two generations of the BR, the founders of the comparatively short-lived NAP, and the original members of PL. Given the relatively limited bearing of this information on the more recent years of Communist-inspired terrorist operations, it can be briefly summarized as follows.

As an organized structure, the BR came into existence in 1970 as an offshoot of the Political Metropolitan Collective (Collettivo Politico Metropolitan—CPM) of Milan. The historic nucleus or first generation of the BR was made up of former Catholic students from the Sociology Department of the University of Trent (e.g., Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol, and Giorgio Semeria), former activists of the PCI and its youth organization (FGCI) principally from the heavily Communist Emilia-Romagna region (e.g., Alberto Franceschini, Prospero Gallinari, Tonino Loris Paroli, and Laura Azzolini), and former militants of extraparliamentary aggregations of the left (e.g., Mario Moretti, Pietro Bertolazzi, and Corrado Alunni), most of whom were employed in Milan by major industries such as Pirelli and Sit-Siemens before assuming a clandestine role. The second generation emerged in the mid-1970’s, when BR actions became more violent. The new militants were former members of POTOP/AUTOP and, to a lesser degree, of the PCI.

The NAP emerged in Naples in May of 1974 as a successor to the Movement of Proletarian Prisoners. NAP membership consisted of former extraparliamentary militants associated with Ongoing Struggle (Lotta Continua—LC) and former convicts with internal contacts in the prisons.

PL came into being in 1976 in the Turin and Milan areas as the direct heir of logistical structures which formerly belonged to the covert segment of AUTOP.²⁶

With respect to the more recent terrorist ranks of the left, i.e., the third and fourth generations, particulars may be drawn from

²³ Supra note 17.
various press sources. This material complements the examination of the organizational and operational structures of the Communist-inspired component by looking into the makeup of its human resources.

The acquired sample consists of 246 identified extremists who either operate, or have operated, within organized terrorist structures or have carried out terrorist actions outside of those structures. The sample affords the following observations and tentative conclusions.

1) Age.—The oldest of the sample was born in 1926 and the youngest in 1962. Only 16 were born before 1945, and 51 were born between 1945 and 1950, 103 between 1951 and 1955, 73 between 1956 and 1960, and just 3 since 1961. The current age, therefore, predominately ranges from the early twenties through the mid-thirties.

2) Sex.—The sample consists of 200 males and 46 females. The ratio is obviously close to 4 to 1.

3) Province of last known legal residence.—It may be assumed that at the time they opted to join the armed struggle, those included in the sample lived in these provinces and municipalities as follows: 52 in Milan, including 22 natives; 49 in Rome, including 14 natives; 19 in Padua, including 10 natives; 16 in Turin, including 8 natives; 11 in Bergamo, including 2 natives; 9 in Genoa, including 5 natives; 9 in Brescia, including 1 native; 7 in Naples, including 1 native; 6 in Vicenza, including 2 natives; and 5 or less in other provinces. The ostensible conclusion is that the near totality of these militants entered extremist and/or terrorist circles in the northern and central areas of the country with Milan and Rome (the two most influential provinces of the country) accounting in each case for over one-fifth of the sample. A parallel assumption is that even if birth took place outside of the province of residence, the environmental conditions in the latter have influenced the terrorist orientation of the extremists studied.

4) Political background.—The sample includes 98 individuals formerly associated with POTOP and/or AUTOP and 8 with Ongoing Struggle. The political background of the remaining 140 cannot be reliably classified beyond a leftist orientation. Yet the high incidence of POTOP/AUTOP clearly emerges.

5) Terrorist affiliation.—A total of 189 individuals appearing in the sample are classifiable as members (at large or in prison) of specific terrorist organizations and 24 as members of AUTOP who have occasionally carried out terrorist actions. The remaining 33 cannot be classified.

Of the 189 militants of specific terrorist organizations, 82 are BR members, 46 are PL members, 24 belong to the Combatant Communist Formations, 11 to the Armed Nuclei for Territorial Counterpower, 10 to the Revolutionary Communist Movement, and the remainder is spread among 6 other groups. The BR and PL clearly account for nearly 70 percent of the subsample. Interestingly

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27 They include the dailies Corriere della Sera (Milan), Il Giornale Nuovo (Milan), Il Tempo (Rome), La Repubblica (Rome), and La Stampa (Turin) as well as the weeklies Il Settimanale (Rome), L'Espresso (Rome), and Panorama (Milan).
enough, 75 out of 189 militated in the ranks of POTOP/AUTOP before joining specific terrorist organizations.

Of the 24 AUTOP members who have occasionally carried out terrorist crimes, 4 are former POTOP militants, one is a former anarchist, and 19 are unclassifiable extremists of the left.

Of the remaining 33 unclassified individuals, the following is their former affiliation: POTOP (2), AUTOP (11), militancy in both POTOP and AUTOP (6), Ongoing Struggle (1), Student Movement (1), PL (2), extreme left in general (10).

The sources from which the sample was gathered do not report additional information that can be processed with any degree of reliability. With respect to education, for example, it would appear that practically all the individuals in the sample have a secondary school education and that at least 5 percent hold university degrees, but this estimate must be regarded as an approximation.

6. Numerical strength

The numerical strength of the leftist sector has frequently been the object of conflicting assessments; however, none of them has proven to be conclusive. In March of 1980, Francesco Mazzola, then acting chairman of the Intelligence and Security Executive Committee (CESIS), warned that any attempt to assess the numerical composition of the terrorist groups of the left is hazardous because "the destructive array of the left if vast, uneven, and composite." 28

An indirect indication of its numerical strength has already been provided in the "Nature and Incidence" section of this study, which reflects that as of October 31, 1982, the Italian prison population included 1,357 terrorists of the left, and 274 additional individuals had been identified and placed on the wanted list. A further classification of those figures affords more significant details. A total of 713 inmates belong to the BR, 305 to PL, 337 to other organizations; and 97 wanted terrorists belong to the BR, 61 to PL, 116 to other organizations. In this connection it is also worth noting that approximately 200 BR bases, 100 PL bases, and 39 NAP bases had been dismantled by the police forces as of the same date.

Although no scientific precision can obviously be attributed to it, the apparent current consensus of terrorism specialists would credit the leftist component with the following numerical strengths at key stages:

1) BR.—50 militants when organized; 1,000 at the point of maximum expansion in 1978-79, plus some 2,000 external supporters; 100 at the end of 1982/beginning of 1983, plus 200 external supporters.

2) PL.—20 militants when organized, plus as many as 1,500 to 2,000 potential supporters; 2,500 at the point of maximum expansion in 1979; 100 at the end of 1982/beginning of 1983. These remaining assets should be considered, however, as remnants that do not necessarily look to PL any longer as an umbrella organization. Moreover, the figure at the point of maximum expansion takes satellite groups into account.

Other formations and terrorist prone elements of extraparliamentary organizations.—6,000 militants by 1978-79; 700 to 800 militants by the end of 1982/beginning of 1983, plus 4,000 supporters/sympathizers.

As pointed out in the “Nature and Incidence” section, there is a generalized tendency to use the term left as a catchall for groups that profess a Marxist-Leninist ideology as well as groups that combine it with other political persuasions, such as the anarchist and internationalist ones. Consequently, figures cited above regarding unspecified organizations should be viewed as slightly in excess of Communist-inspired extremists in the strict sense.

7. Targets and targeting techniques

All the terrorist organizations of Communist inspiration are extremely selective in their choice of targets. A given target is chosen because of its representativeness or symbolic value as well as on account of its comparative accessibility and vulnerability.

Typical human targets include executives, managers, foremen, and representatives in the fields of industry, commerce, and finance; political figures associated with the relative-majority Christian Democratic Party; conservative spokesmen and activists; members of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies; and journalists and professors regarded as part of the establishment. Typical material targets include real and personal property belonging to the state and public entities, private enterprises, and individual citizens.

Actions against property are usually regarded as complementary to attacks on individuals. At the same time, less sophisticated operations against human targets are intended to be complementary to the more sophisticated or complex ones.

Internal debate or dissent within an organization or between different organizations does not address the type of target to be destroyed or otherwise singled out but concentrates on political strategies. For example, the feud between militarists and movementists inside the BR does not involve targeting. The militarists favor BR hegemony over the entire combatant Communist party, as well as concentration of effort in the industrial sector of Italian society. The latter aspect has led some observers to refer to them as the northeners. The movementists, on the other hand, prefer a closer collaboration scheme with sister terrorist bands of the left and concentration of effort in the prisons and among nonskilled workers. For this reason, they have also been termed southerners. It might be said that the less rigid approach of the latter is somewhat closer to that of PL and of the Autonomy.

As a rule, the leftist component adopts three standard targeting techniques: the placement of one or more explosive devices, the classical ambush attack, and the raid. Less frequent is the political abduction, which requires greater organizational assets as well as operational sophistication.

(1) The most rudimentary form of targeting is all too clearly the detonation of explosives. One or more devices are affixed against the selected material target, most frequently during hours of darkness, in order to do damage to property and possibly to given indi-
viduals, although there is always the accepted risk that bystanders will be hurt (see appendices XII and XIII).

Besides accounting for the largest number of terrorist crimes, this type of action is usually the work of minor organizations or of militants being trained or tested for membership in the major ones. For its execution, limited assets are required beyond the acquisition or manufacture of the device. In point of fact, one or two militants can simply deposit such ordnance in various areas of the same municipality within a matter of hours if not minutes. The so-called nights of fire entail this technique. Responsibility for this type of action is not always claimed, but its political coloration is often made manifest by the circumstances surrounding its perpetration.

Passage from rudimentary actions of this nature to the more sophisticated ones can be indicative of operational and/or structural enhancement. The BR, the NAP, and PL passed through this stage of bombing and arson attacks before graduating to a more advanced operational status.

(2) The classical ambush attack is obviously conducted against human targets and is predicated upon the element of surprise. It also falls within the concept of hit-and-run operations, speed being essential.

The victim of this targeting technique is usually singular. Occasionally there may be two or more victims, principally when the attack is conducted against motorized human targets. Before attacking the victim, his habits are closely scrutinized and, where possible, intelligence is acquired from planted informants such as the previously described irregulars and points of contact. The ambush itself is conducted at a well surveyed location and at a preestablished time. The size of the commando unit varies from two to five members, a number that roughly corresponds to the typical brigade of the BR or to an otherwise named cell of kindred organizations. One female member frequently participates in the action. The attackers are nearly always unmasked, but disguised. Some of them are responsible for covering the avenue of escape. The attacking party closes in on the victim preferably on foot or, if the situation warrants it, by car or motor scooter.

The ambush mission entails in most cases woundings or murders, in that statistical order. However, victims have also been subjected to minor forms of punishment such as chaining in place, with or without a poster around the neck, and haircuts. A secondary purpose of the ambush may be to disarm a law enforcement agent for procurement purposes. Once the mission is accomplished, responsibility is claimed by means of a leaflet left in place or subsequently made available to a newspaper or press agency or by a telephone call to the media.

The written responsibility claim may relate to a single attack or combine a number of them. For example, the Rome column of the BR issued a single communique in December of 1979 disclosing its paternity in the attacks on policemen Romiti, Granato, and Tedesco; however, in May of 1980, the Veneto column devoted an entire communique exclusively to its action against Albanese, a police official (see appendix XII). The difference in procedure may be related to the importance of the target or to internal organiza-
tional contingencies. Moreover, the communique usually offers an explanation for the selection of the victim and often provides a resume of the victim's career. In still other cases, a paternity claim will make reference to previously perpetrated actions and link the latest one to the explanation given for the former. This was the case with the communique of the Rome column of July 1982 taking responsibility for the attack on police official Ammaturo, while referring to the Delcogliano and Cirillo incidents (see appendix XII).29

A close examination of recorded attacks (see appendices XII and XIII) reasonably leads to the conclusion that many of them are either organized into clusters or are programmed to lend greater sophistication and a more intimidating effect to the endeavors of the terrorist left. The following categorizations seem appropriate:

—Attacks on a specific category of individuals such as businessmen, journalists, magistrates, and Christian Democratic representatives within a brief time span in the same municipality or in areas far apart. For example, the BR wounding of two corporate executive employees on June 30, 1977, in two different cities and two more under analogous circumstances on May 4, 1978; the BR wounding of three journalists at the rate of one per day, 64 between June 1 and 3, 1977, in three different cities; the BR murder of a state attorney and of a supreme court judge on March 16 and 18, 1980, respectively; the BR wounding of three Christian Democratic representatives in three different cities between July 11 and 13, 1977.

—The rotation of category attacks is a corollary to the preceding technique.

—The stepped-up rhythm of violence against specific categories of individuals as a technique was particularly visible during the campaign preceding the national election of June 1979, when the Christian Democratic Party became a frequent target with respect to both personnel and facilities.

—Regarding the selection of a single victim who represents more than one enemy institution, the Christian Democrats are the most common example of dual targets because of their concomitant nonpolitical activities as business executives, professors, and journalists. But the most significant examples relate to the BR murder of Lt. Col. Varisco of the Carabinieri and Professor Bachelet, both of whom merged three targets into one. Varisco, as commander of the unit in support of the Rome court house, represented the police, the judiciary, and the prisons. Bachelet, on the other hand, besides being an academic, was also the Deputy Chairman of the Superior Council of the Judiciary and an active Christian Democrat.

—The time context of the attacks in relation to specific events. For example, the murder of Genoa State Attorney Coco and his escort in 1976 and that of Turin Bar Association Presi-

29. Communiques are issued either by individual columns or by the organization as a whole. Responsibility claims made by the organization rather than a single column can be indicative of multicolumn effort. It might be noted that the columns usually possess a name in addition to a geographical indicator. The name they adopt is that of a fallen comrade. E.g., Turin column: Mario Cagol; Milan column: Walter Alasia; Genoa column: Francesco Berardi; Veneto column: Anna Maria Ludman; Naples column: Fabrizio Pelli.
dent Croce in 1977, thus causing two postponements of the trial of the historic nucleus of the BR; the wounding of a public security patrolman on October 24, 1978, a few hours after the Interior Minister had delivered a terrorism report from the floor of Parliament.

—Retaliation against specific individuals including public security NCO Tuzzolino who was wounded by the NAP because of alleged mistreatment of his prisoners; labor union representative Rossa and extraparliamentary activist Wucher who were murdered by the BR and PL, respectively, because they were accused of being spies and traitors; snack bar owner Civitate who was murdered by PL because he was held responsible for calling the police while two militants were in his business establishment.

—Retaliation in other cases is not directed against the individual himself, but in response to a successful police operation. Prison guard Cinotti was murdered by the BR in April 1981, to avenge the arrest of historic nucleus member Mario Moretti a few days earlier.

—Attacks against individuals believed to be active in removing discontent and consequently hindering the revolution, for instance, the PL murder of Assistant State Attorney Alessandrini in January of 1979.

—Intimidatory attacks against police officials and operatives particularly involved in public order and counterterrorism. In May of 1980, the BR murdered public security official Albanese.

—Random attacks against targets of opportunity. Standard victims are motorized or dismounted police.

In several instances a single attack reflects the application of a combination of the above-listed procedures.

(3) Raids are directed against human targets, material targets, or both. Depending upon the mission of the raid, the numerical composition of a raiding party usually ranges from 4 to 12 people. Raids frequently entail forcible entry into offices or dwellings and serve various purposes which can easily be merged into a single terrorist action.

In the course of the same raid one or more representative individuals might be murdered or wounded, the walls of the premises might be spray-painted with ideological slogans and the name of the perpetrating organization, and documents of intelligence value and/or material of logistical use might be stolen. The raid produces its inherent demonstrative effect if just one or all of these objectives are accomplished.

Moreover, when a selected victim cannot be targeted by means of the classical ambush attack in the street, in an automobile, on a bus, or in any other place easily accessible to the public, the raid affords an alternative solution through an invasion of the victim's office or residence. At the same time, while the ambush attack limits the attackers to the use of firearms (generally pistols and revolvers, less frequently submachine guns and shotguns), the raid allows the added use of explosives.

Appendix XII provides pertinent examples of raids against Christian Democratic and Italian Social Movement party offices, busi-
ness concerns, technical schools, and military and police installations. Particularly significant is the one conducted by the BR on May 3, 1979, against the Christian Democratic Committee offices in Piazza Nicosia, Rome. These examples, however, reflect an absence of overall coordination regarding the utilization of the raid by comparison with the previously discussed classical ambush technique. The only time when raids appear to have been planned in the form of a cluster was in 1982. Three such raids were conducted by the BR against army and air force installations in the Rome and Caserta areas. All three involved silent penetration of the military perimeter, overpowering of elements of the guard force, and the theft of weapons, while no casualties were suffered by either side. This cluster also seems to have been coordinated with attacks on military vehicles.

Unless intended as mere self-financing ventures, such as armed robberies lacking proletarian significance, the responsibility for a raid is always claimed by the perpetrating organization. For example, even though the main purpose of the above-mentioned attacks upon military installations was to acquire weapons, the very fact that the army and air force were being targeted was sufficient reason to claim responsibility for the action and publicize it.

(4) Twenty-four known kidnapings have been perpetrated by the terrorist left. They are usually classifiable as either for political or ransom reasons. The less sophisticated political ones are substantially symbolic. Of this total, 18 are attributable to the BR (15 political, 2 for ransom, and 1 to procure medical assistance); 3 to the NAP (1 political and 2 for ransom); 1 to the October XXII Circle (ransom); 1 to the UCC (political, although it entailed a demand for below-market-price distribution of meat in Rome's proletarian neighborhoods); and 1 to Autonomy-connected elements (ransom). Of the 24 victims, 17 were released by their captors, 3 were freed by the police, and four were murdered (3 executions and 1 accidental death because of improper gagging).

The same type of preparatory work required for ambushes and raids is performed for abductions. However, the latter require greater manpower and assets, especially if the victim is under armed escort or, even more so, if the purpose of the abduction is political, thus entailing in many instances a proletarian trial, interrogation, and sentencing, not to mention the periodic issuance and delivery of trial-related communiques and more or less spontaneous letters from the abductee to relatives, associates, and/or public figures.

Basic data pertaining to these kidnapings, including classification and outcome, appear in appendices XII and XIII. Even a casual reading of this chronology discloses the relatively occasional nature of kidnapings perpetrated by the NAP, the October XXII Circle, and the UCC, as opposed to the usually systematic nature of the ones carried out by the BR. Consequently, some comments are in order with respect to kidnap activities of the BR.

Political kidnapings were inaugurated, developed, and refined by the BR. Contrary to other groups of the left (and of the right) that embarked upon kidnap ventures for revenue purposes, the BR resorted to kidnaping from the very start as a political tool. In fact, the BR ostensibly regard them as military operations within a pro-
gram of political objectives dedicated upon the exploitation of contingent social, economic, and political situations.

The first six, which took place in the industrial triangle of Milan-Turin-Genoa during the period 1972-74, reflect both technical evolution and target expansion. The first two abductions lasted only a few minutes, just long enough to propagandize against capitalism and Fascism. The second two lasted a number of hours and consisted of an interrogation in the first case and a proletarian trial in the second. The fifth and sixth lasted 8 days and 33 days, respectively, and a number of communiques were issued during captivity, as opposed to the heretofore standard responsibility claimer after release. Significantly, the first five victims were business establishment figures or individuals with business connections. The sixth was a prosecutor, and his abduction represents the first direct challenge to the authority of the State itself. Moreover, for the first time the BR attempted to place themselves on a par with the State by demanding the release of eight convicts who had militated in the ranks of the BR-absorbed October XXII Circle.

The four abductions that followed this cluster are not nearly as significant. Two constitute revenue ventures, whereas the remaining two are basically demonstrative. Their comparatively modest caliber may be attributable to the need for self-financing and to the then ongoing changes in human resources as the historic nucleus of the BR was being replaced by a second generation. The BR were in a transition period.

The subsequent two abductions—that of Christian Democratic Party President, member of Parliament, and former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, in 1978, and that of Supreme Court Judge Giovanni D'Urso, detailed to the Ministry of Justice as chief of the Third Division of the General Directorate for Penitentiaries, in 1980—are linked to each other with respect to substance, notwithstanding the time differential. They both represent a deep thrust at the very heart of the state. Just as in the targeting of Aldo Moro, whereby the BR symbolically merged in one victim their attack against a plurality of institutions—the national executive, the Parliament, and the relative-majority Christian Democratic Party—the targeting of D'Urso was a simultaneous attack against the judiciary and the prison system. In both instances, as in the 1974 kidnaping of Assistant State Attorney Mario Sossi, the BR presented themselves as equals of the state at the bargaining level. For Moro's freedom, they asked that 13 jailed terrorists be released. The request was denied. The liberation of D'Urso was at long last left to the decision of the imprisoned terrorists. The outcome is well known: Moro was executed and D'Urso was freed. In both instances, the BR exploited media coverage to the fullest by the use of communiques, requests, and complementary activities. Their inclusion in governmental agendas and in the focus of public opinion was further made manifest by the debate between those who favored negotiating with the BR and those who espoused the hard line.

BR kidnapings in 1981 were once again distributed in a cluster form. Moreover, the fact that four abductions were unprecedently perpetrated during an overlapping period of time did lend a new dimension to the terror campaign. The victims were abducted in four areas of the country, far apart from one another, and for dis-
similar purposes. Yet these abductions represent coordinated campaigns over several fronts.

The first victim was a Christian Democratic councilman responsible for urban planning and economic affairs in the Campania region. His abduction, in addition to deepening the operational penetration into the South, was an attempt to exploit popular discontent, following inadequate governmental relief to the victims of the previous year’s earthquake. The second abductee was the manager of a petrochemical plant in the Veneto region. According to the BR, his abduction and final execution was part of their campaign against the multinationals. The third victim, another executive, worked for the Alfa Romeo motor company in the Milan province. His abduction was intended as a protest against disciplinary measures vis-a-vis certain unruly plant employees. The fourth was the brother of repentant red brigadist Patrizio Peci. The intimidatory purpose of this abduction and ensuring execution is all too obvious.

The kidnapping of U.S. Brig. Gen. James Lee Dozier, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration of the Allied Land Forces Southern European Command in Verona, at year’s end is a tangible manifestation of the BR’s stance vis-a-vis NATO and, indeed, the United States.

There was only one abduction in 1982, and it had no meaning beyond the practical purpose it served: the need for an x-ray technician to assist wounded brigadists.

A few generalizations can be made with respect to the dynamics of kidnappings by organizations of Communist inspiration beyond what already emerges from the preceding discussion:

1. The presence of armed escorts does not discourage abduction plans. This fact is true of the Moro, Cirillo, and Sandrucci cases.

2. There appears to be no preferred specific time or place for the abduction of victims. By and large, it can be said that most abductions take place during early morning, late afternoon, or early evening hours somewhere along the route between the victim’s residence and place of work or other destination.

3. Although in the vast majority of cases the victim is seized in areas open to the public (mostly city streets or country roads), either while moving on foot or, less frequently, by vehicle, there are cases where the abductors have entered private buildings. The Cirillo, Taliercio, and Dozier cases exhibit this point.

4. A van is employed in nearly all kidnap actions.

5. Various disguises are utilized by the abductors. The most recurrent is workers’ overalls. In some cases, disguises such as plumbers’ outfits (Dozier case), or police uniforms (Taliercio case) have been used.

6. Responsibility for political abductions is always claimed. The same is not true with respect to kidnappings for ransom.

The above-discussed targets and targeting practices are a tangible indication of the fact that none of the organizations present in the Communist-inspired component of the Italian terrorist spectrum have been able to graduate from the stage of coordinated terrorist actions to the more advanced stages of insurgency or civil war, their declared aim. Even extremely isolated actions such as
the firing of crew-served weapons against Carabinieri barracks, as opposed to the recurrent four techniques referred to above, is not indicative of progression in the desired direction.

8. Behavior upon arrest and during imprisonment

Hit-and-run operations against unprotected or lightly protected targets—civilian police, or military—constitute the substance of terrorism as opposed to insurgency or civil war situations, where armed dissident forces are able to control a portion or portions of the national territory or, as a minimum, are capable of engaging in a fire conflict with sizeable police or military units.

To date, all terrorist groups of the left and, indeed, of other persuasions active in Italy have carefully avoided any type of fire exchange with the police or the military, regardless of unit size. In point of fact, known fire engagements pertain exclusively to rare attempts on the part of individual terrorists to resist arrest. (Virtually all such cases are listed in appendix XII.)

Militants of Communist-inspired groups have traditionally declared themselves political prisoners upon arrest and have refused to cooperate with the police or judicial authorities. The phenomenon of repentant terrorists, which will be discussed in part II, is a recent development. In keeping with the political prisoner posture, captured terrorists of the left have sought to continue their battle inside the prisons and courtrooms. They have used the prisons for recruitment and agitation purposes by orchestrating uprisings, escapes, taking hostages, and executing traitors. (See appendix XII.) The courtrooms, on the other hand, have been exploited as theatrical stages and sounding boards by unbent terrorists who seek to run countertrials vis-a-vis the judges and the system in the courtrooms themselves. Revolutionary proclamations are frequently read by defendants and in some cases scorn is expressed in the form of poetry. This comportment is primarily attributable to the members of the major organizations (BR, NAP, and PL) but is not altogether foreign to militants of the minor ones. For example, one convicted October XXII Circle member wrote a terrorist manual on toilet paper.

In the philosophy of the terrorist left, as often expressed in its writings, the prisons are the highest expression of class dominance. Consequently, there is a tendency to equate inmates guilty of common crimes with the exploited. For this reason, particular attention is devoted to the prison population in general and to captured terrorists in particular. Many times assaults on prisons have been planned, and in some instances, they have been successfully carried out. For example, in 1975, BR historic leader Renato Curcio was briefly freed by a commando; and in 1982, PL historic leader Susanna Ronconi was also briefly freed by another commando. At the same time, the voice of the imprisoned comrades is actively sought by assigning to them, through the channels already discussed, the preparation of doctrinal tracts. Always in theory, frequently in practice, militancy does not end during imprisonment.

9. International connections

In the murky realm of international connections, a fundamental distinction must be made between ideological, logistical, and, less
frequently, operational links existing between Italian organizations of the Communist component and kindred terrorist organizations or groupings of other nationalities, on one hand, and what has come to be called patron-state support on the other.

The existence of connections between the Italian terrorist organizations of the left and foreign groups of like persuasion is not questioned today by any observer. In fact, a number of concrete examples can be readily cited to illustrate the various levels of international terrorist cooperation.

Since the early 1970's, the BR have been in contact with the German Red Army Faction (RAF) in order to exchange mutual assistance in the areas of safehaven, logistics, and operational experience. In several ways the BR have imitated and even surpassed their German counterparts. For instance, the Hans Schleyer kidnapping served as a blueprint for the Aldo Moro abduction. The Dozier affair surpassed in every respect the RAF's actions against U.S. military installations and personnel in Germany. In March of 1980, three red brigadists were arrested in Toulon, France, along with a number of local counterparts belonging to Direct Action (Action Directe—AD) while conducting joint proletarian expropriations on the Cote d'Azur. The BR were also training AD militants. In October of 1981, five local nationals were convicted in Locarno, Switzerland, for a number of crimes, including supplying the BR and other Italian terrorist organizations of the left with weapons and explosives. In January of 1982, Italian judicial proceedings determined that, after the summer of 1978, 10 members of PL and of the Communist Combat Formations (FCC) had trained in the use of crew-served weapons and explosives with members of the Basque ETA in an area near the Spanish-French border. Approximately 200 Italian extremists associated with the BR, PL, AUTOP, and other groups are estimated to be enjoying safehaven in France, particularly in Paris. In connection with these affairs, the judiciary is investigating the activities of a Parisian language school by the name of Hyperion, founded by Italian national Corrado Simioni, who had militated in the Metropolitan Political Collective of Milan, the above-mentioned extraparliamentary group considered to be the cradle of the historic nucleus of the BR. According to the Italian magistrates, Hyperion serves as a support structure for Italian extremists of the left.

Outside of Europe, the Italian Communist-inspired terrorist organizations have enjoyed contacts with Palestinian groups in Lebanon and elsewhere, primarily for purposes of training and the acquisition of weapons. In February of 1981 the Rome daily II Tempo published a photograph, reportedly acquired in 1980 by the Carabinieri, of the Oreste and Rolando Strano brothers, formerly of POTOP, together with a Fedayeen displaying a Soviet Kalashnikov AK 46 rifle. At least two cargoes of weapons were brought into France clandestinely.

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20 This estimate appears in La Repubblica, Oct. 31/Nov. 1, 1982, p. 12 (Rome). France has a long-established tradition for granting asylum to expatriates of various political persuasions. It is believed, however, that one-half of the cited estimate consists of individuals who have entered the country clandestinely.

21 For informative background, including an interview with Professor Simioni, see II Tempo, Dec. 22, 1982, p. 1 (Rome).

Italy in the late 1970’s by BR historic leader Mario Moretti, the organization’s liaison officer until his arrest in April of 1981. Other cargoes were handled by one Maurizio Folini of the Communist Revolutionary Committees (Co.co.ri.) for distribution among various subversive formations of the left. However, the most clamorous episode of this nature occurred on November 8, 1979, when Daniele Pifano and two other Autonomy-linked extremists were arrested in Ortona (Chieti) while in possession of two Soviet Strela (SA-7) missile launchers. Following their arrest and indictment, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) sent a telegram to the court claiming ownership of the missile launchers and alleging that these implements of war were merely transiting on Italian territory.

Much more difficult to assess is patron-state support, since available knowledge is based on circumstantial evidence and testimony, as well as logical induction and deduction. Cuba, Libya, and the East-European Communist bloc countries have been repeatedly indicated in the press and on the floor of the Italian Parliament as supportive of leftist terrorism in Italy.

Circumstantial evidence accounts for the pointing of an accusing finger at Cuba. Giangiacomo Feltrinelli spent time there in the mid and late 1960’s as Fidel Castro’s personal guest. He was also the Italian editor of Cuba’s revolutionary publication Tricontinental. In 1967, he attended the trial of Regis Debray, the Frenchman who had followed Che Guevara on his last guerrilla campaign. Not long thereafter, Bolivian Consul Roberto Quintanilla, hated by the revolutionary left because of his role in relation to the capture and death of Guevara, was murdered in the Federal Republic of Germany with a pistol owned by Feltrinelli. Moreover, as narrated in a book put out by Feltrinelli’s publishing company, Renato Curcio and his wife Margherita Cagol (Mara), both of the historic nucleus of the BR, visited Cuba at the incipient stage of leftist terrorist activities in Italy. The Cuban link also surfaces in connection with the anarchist organizations, a discussion of which follows below.

A more incisive role in the destabilization of Italian institutions and society has been attributed to Libya’s Muamar Qaddafi. His endeavors reportedly include support for the terrorist left as well as extremist organizations of other persuasions. This is how a specialized English-language publication summarizes Libya’s patron state role vis-a-vis Italian terrorism of the left:

A number of captured terrorists of the Left, including former militants of the Red Brigades (BR), Front Line (PL), and Revolutionary Action (AR), revealed to the investigating magistrates that at least since 1978 Libya has been an intermediary in the purchase of weapons from the Middle East and primarily from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). These weapons which range from automatic rifles to portable missile launchers, were distrib-

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uted to various elements of the BR, PL, and the terrorist-supportive Workers Autonomy (AO). The arms cargoes usually followed water routes and were deposited along the southern Italian coast at selected locations. At least one weapon can be traced directly to Libya. An automatic rifle sold in December of 1978 by the Belgian firm Herstal to the Libyan government was found in June 1980 in a raided PL safehouse. . . . A locality near Bengasi under the code name of "Zujur" has been indicated as the Libyan training site for Italian terrorists of all persuasions.36

But the most grievous accusations have been leveled against the East-European Communist bloc countries, which in fact have a long history of clandestine operations in Italy in the interrelated fields of espionage, recruitment, infiltration, disinformation, and subversion.36

A review of data, circumstantial evidence, and statements available in open sources, both governmental and private, presents a disquieting picture of the varying degrees of linkage in existence through the years between the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia (before its break with the Soviet bloc in 1948), Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, on one hand, and Italian subversive elements and groupings of the left, on the other hand. What follows is a country-by-country summary of significant reported links.

(1) U.S.S.R.—The involvement of the Soviet Union in Italian subversion, political violence, and terrorism is believed to take place in most instances through proxies selected from among its East European satellites, over which the Soviet Union exercises various forms of dominance and direction, and nonsatellite countries otherwise linked to it, such as Cuba and Libya.

There are, nevertheless, specific cases of direct Soviet involvement. According to recently declassified Interior Ministry records from the 1948-50 period, one Victor Pavlov of the Soviet Embassy in Rome was the Cominform’s delegate responsible for the paramilitary activities of sectors of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).37 Thereafter, as late as 1963, the U.S.S.R. arranged for the arming of Italian Soviet-philes through Austrian Communist Party channels.38 On May 29, 1972, SID—the Italian intelligence service

37 For an overview of the entire spectrum of clandestine activities perpetrated in Italy by the Soviet Union and its former and present East European satellites from the end of World War II through April of 1981, see V. S. Piano, "Communist Bloc Covert Action: The Italian Case," International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, MD, 1981.
38 See L’Espresso, July 15, 1979, p. 48 (Rome).
39 "This information was disclosed by Czech defector Jan Sejna during an interview in 1980 with Il Giornale Nuovo of Milan. Sejna, former Secretary General of the Defense Committee of the Czech Central Committee, First Secretary of the Ministry of Defense, and member of the Collegium of the same Ministry, defected to the West in early 1968 before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, as opposed to other defectors from the Czech intelligence service, such as Ladislav Bittman, Josef Frolik, and František August, all of whom left after the "Prague Spring." Moreover, Sejna's defection was less than ideological, since he was involved in a financial scandal, according to the testimony of Czech expatriate Jiri Pelikan, now a member of the European Parliament elected on the Italian Socialist Party ticket (see L’Espresso, Feb. 15, 1981, p. 29). Despite the circumstances of Sejna's defection, his revelations regarding the period before his departure from Czechoslovakia are likely to correspond to reality. Less reliable are his many statements pertaining to events on the borderline between his defection and the explosion of contemporary terrorism in Italy, if not corroborated by other sources.
of the time—sent a memorandum to the government recommending the expulsion of 22 Soviet agents responsible for espionage and subversion, including links with Feltrinelli and groups of the extreme left.\(^\text{39}\) (This recommendation was not approved presumably because of other political considerations.) Excerpts from what appears to be that memorandum were subsequently acquired by the press and published as part of a collection of documents on terrorism. The Soviet agents’ activities included: “...liaison for the support of, and joint action with, the PCI and extraparlamentary movements of the extreme left; special operational liaison with Feltrinelli’s subversive organization and, subsequently, with the Red Brigades...training of activists in Cuba and Moscow.”\(^{40}\) The same memorandum reports that at least until 1971, the training received in Moscow included a bloc of instructions on firearms, explosives, and guerrilla warfare. Finally, Italian diplomat and Russian linguist Renzo Rota, who analyzed the communiques issued by the BR during the Moro captivity, concluded that the political phraseology and linguistic improprieties contained therein could be indicative of Soviet Russian authorship.\(^{41}\)

\(^{(2)}\) Yugoslavia.—The Interior Ministry records cited above also refer to Italian work brigades organized in Yugoslavia for the training of PCI militants who went on from there to fight in Greece under the Communist guerrilla leader Marcos Bafeiades. Overall operational control over recruitment was exercised clandestinely by Soviet Colonel Dukonovski, stationed in Milan.\(^{42}\) Yugoslavia’s involvement was obviously short lived, since that country broke away from the Soviet fold in 1948.

\(^{(3)}\) Czechoslovakia.—From the 1940’s through to recent years, the role of Czechoslovakia as a Soviet proxy for Italian operations appears to be the most pervasive. Czechoslovakia initially served as a safehaven for Communist partisans and members of the above-discussed PCI’s Red Strike Force who had to flee Italy because of political and common crimes committed through 1949. One of them, Francesco Moranino, was employed by Radio Prague’s Italian broadcast. This practice was repeated in the early 1970’s when wanted terrorists Augusto Viel of the October XXII Circle and Alberto Franceschini and Fabrizio Pelli of the BR were given asylum. Pelli was also employed by Radio Prague. Moreover, all three clandestinely returned to Italy to resume the armed struggle until finally captured and jailed.

Besides safehaven, Czechoslovakia has provided Italian leftist extremists with training. Senator Eugenio Reale, a former Communist who headed the PCI’s administrative secretariat, has disclosed the existence of Czech training camps organized in that country as far back as the 1950’s with the assistance of the above-mentioned fugitives.\(^{43}\) Subsequent training sites are reportedly located in


\(^{42}\) For a more detailed account in English, see supra note 36, p. 17.

\(^{43}\) Supra note 32, p. 18.
Doupov, Karlovy Vary, Smokovec, Bratislava, Lidice, and Leda.44 Other terrorists and extremists of the left who spent time in Czechoslovakia during the current terrorist wave include Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, who traveled back and forth on regular as well as counterfeit passports; Renato Curcio, the historic leader of the BR; Alvaro Lojacono, a major exponent of the Autonomy-oriented Via dei Volsci Colletive of Rome; and Roberto Mander, whose militancy included contacts with anarchist and ultraleftist groups.

In December of 1977, Czech keys were confiscated by the police in a raided BR safehouse in Ostia (Rome). In 1978, the Milan branch of the Autonomy received a subsidy of Lit. 70 million through the Italian affiliate of Czech motor company Skoda, according to the testimony of Interior Minister Virginio Rognoni.45 Another member of the law enforcement establishment, former Rome Police Superintendent Emanuele De Francesco, testified before the parliamentary committee tasked with the investigation of Italian terrorism that the police had considered the hypothesis that Aldo Moro may have been held captive in the Czech Embassy, which is located a few minutes away from the abduction site. The search did not take place because of extraterritoriality.46

It is an interesting commentary that Czechoslovakia has been specifically named by two very diverse figures: General Miceli, the head of Italy’s former intelligence service (SID), who is now a member of Parliament on the Italian Social Movement Party slate and therefore of presumably conservative orientation, and Christian Democratic member of Parliament and former Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, whose government in 1976-78 enjoyed the unprecedented and unreported parliamentary support of the Italian Communist Party, which has always denied Soviet bloc involvement in Italian subversion.47

(4) Bulgaria.—Until the beginning of the 1980’s, no evidence had surfaced of Bulgarian clandestine operations in Italy other than espionage. The “Bulgarian Connection,” as the media refer to this apparently recent development, is currently the object of intelligence, police, and judicial investigations regarding that country’s involvement in Italian terrorism of the left and transnational terrorist activities in Italy.

Because of the secrecy required by ongoing investigations, the only reliable elements of information available at this writing can be drawn from the official statements of the Ministers of Justice, Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs before the Parliament on December 20, 1982.48

The Bulgarian link with Italian terrorism of the left—the parallel transnational terrorism aspect will be treated under a separate heading—revolves around the person of Luigi Scricciolo, a former

44 The location of Czech training sites has frequently appeared in the press, but a more professional confirmation was provided by former intelligence director Vito Miceli in the course of a parliamentary debate on Dec. 20, 1982. See Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII Legislatura, “Discussioni,” Seduta del 20 dicembre 1982, Edizione non definitiva, p. 91.
activist of a party called Proletarian Democracy (Democrazia Proletaria—DP), who militated in DP's ranks until 1979 when he became the international relations specialist of the Italian Union of Labor (Unione Italiana del Lavoro—UIL). Scricciolo was reportedly in contact with Bulgarian intelligence at least since 1977. In exchange for subsidies badly needed for DP's activities, Scricciolo provided Bulgarian agents with political and military information. Subsequent to his arrest, Scricciolo identified his interlocutors as the formerly Rome-based Bulgarian diplomats Ivan Dartchev and Simeon Guernev.

The relationship between Scricciolo, who was subject to blackmail, and the Bulgarian agents continued after his passage from DP to UIL, which has been very close to its Polish counterpart, Solidarnosc. Through a cousin by the name of Loris Scricciolo, Luigi Scricciolo was also in contact with the BR. His role during the Dozier abduction was to acquire U.S. and NATO intelligence data for his Bulgarian contacts. According to the testimony of repentant red brigadist Antonio Savasta, the BR, on their part, were interested in contacting Bulgarian representatives in an effort to reestablish weapon-supply channels with the PLO, which still, according to Savasta, had been interrupted after the capture of BR liaison officer Mario Moretti in April of 1981.

Significantly, Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio has reported to Parliament that SISMI (the present Italian military intelligence service) monitors "all radio signals transmitted by the Bulgarian security services." A major anomaly was noted "during the days of the abduction, captivity, and liberation of General Dozier." He further stated that "... on the day of Dozier's liberation, there was a most singular transmission, totally exceptional, repeated several times. Counterespionage believes that such type of transmission evidences a direct contact between the intelligence headquarters and an individual and a specific agent in Italy." 49

In the course of the parliamentary debate that followed the reports made by the above-mentioned ministers, former head of intelligence Vito Miceli outlined the history of Communist bloc clandestine involvement in Italy, indicating in chronological order the Soviet Union's proxies: Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. 50

Indeed, the explicit anti-U.S. and anti-NATO sentiment of the Italian terrorist left provides a fertile ground for Soviet bloc exploitation. The following BR exhortations are but a few samples of the international political posture of these groups:

- War to the dominance of American imperialism!
- Attack the imperialism of the multinationals and of its military occupation structures: NATO!
- War on imperialist war! War on NATO! War on preventive counter-revolution!
- Attack the centers, the war strategists, and the bases of the American military machine!

48 Id. pp. 44-45.
49 Id. pp. 90-94.
The revolution will either be internationalistic or will not be!  

C. NEO-FASCIST COMPONENT

1. Characteristics

The threat posed by terrorist organizations of neo-Fascist inspiration is second only to that of their Communist-oriented counterparts. This is true with respect to both the number of stable or occasional groupings (see appendix IV) and the seriousness of their actions (see appendices XIV and XV). It should be noted, however, that the neo-Fascist (or rightist) component does not constitute a close runner-up (compare appendix IV with appendix III, on the one hand, and appendices XIV and XV with appendices XII and XIII, on the other). Moreover, the neo-Fascist component possesses neither the clear-cut ideology and revolutionary fervor peculiar to the Communist component nor an equal sophistication in its organization and dynamics. At the same time, many of its militants dedicate themselves to the commission of common crimes as a form of adventurous living in no way related to revolutionary or otherwise ideological goals. Significantly, the terrorist right lacks the supportive structures available to its leftist counterpart.

2. Ideology and objectives

While it is customary to refer to this sector as neo-Fascist or rightist, its cultural points of reference appear to be outside of the humanistic tradition. Its symbols, in fact, are borrowed from Nordic history and mythology. For this reason a number of qualified observers prefer to classify this component as neo-Nazi. Be that as it may, the common objective of the organizations that make up this component is the violent uprooting of the system as it now exists and its substitution with a totalitarian regime that would combine nationalistic and socialistic elements. The contemplated new regime would presumably constitute the antithesis of both communism and capitalism. However, insofar as these rightist organizations have failed to produce a systematic body of theoretical or doctrinal tracts comparable to those of the Communist organizations ranging from the BR to AUTOP, their ideology and goals surface in a very fragmented and often contradictory fashion and are generally expressed through grammatically impeccable leaflets and graffiti scrawled on the walls of city streets. By and large, the rightist organizations variously display attitudes indicative of nationalism, anti-communism, anti-capitalism, racial superiority, anti-clericalism, rigid order, and romantic adventurism. But, notwithstanding their self-attributed status of revolutionaries, it is far from clear how the revolution is expected to come about. This is why their violent symbols and actions are looked upon as the product of "mere conceptual necessity."  

51 Said exhortations appear in the communiques issued during the Dozier captivity and in a strategic resolution of December 1981. However, anti-U.S. and anti-NATO analyses of the international situation predate that period and are characteristic of the literature of the BR and sister groups. For a brief analysis of these writings in connection with the Dozier kidnapping, which represents the dynamic implementation of BR foreign policy, see V. S. Pisano, "Terrorism in Italy: The 'Dozier Affair,'" The Police Chief, April 1982, pp. 39-41 (Gaithersburg, MD).

52 This expression has been used by A. Ronchey in his analysis of neo-Fascist terrorism in "Libro Bianco sull'ultima generazione," supra note 14, pp. 63-92.
3. Composition, structure, and dynamics

Individuals active in rightist terrorist organizations most often share a background of militancy in the Italian Social Movement (MSI—Italy’s most conservative party enjoying parliametary representation), in the MSI’s youth organization (FdG), or in neo-Fascist organizations without any ties to the MSI. Those who desert the MSI or the FdG to join terrorist organizations generally do so because of disillusionment with the party’s insufficient rightist stance and its limited role within the political scene. Still others are expelled for disciplinary reasons. Although the MSI is frequently termed neo-Fascist, its leaders endeavor to dispel this image, whose pejorative connotation in post-World War II Italian political parlance predates the outburst of contemporary terrorism in the late 1960’s. Other rightist terrorists come directly from petty-crime circles. In many cases, however, the family background of rightist extremists includes at least one parent who is in a learned profession.

Except for its considerably smaller size, assessing the numerical strength of the terrorist right is no easier than an analogous evaluation of its leftist counterpart. The aforesaid acting chairman of the Intelligence and Security Executive Committee, Francesco Mazzola, has stated that the neo-Fascist formations “do not have at their disposal an actual organization. They are spontaneous aggregations of small extremist groups that frequently operate extemporaneously and suddenly.”63 Once again, an indirect indication of numerical strength is offered by the statistics on imprisoned and wanted terrorists of the right provided in the “Nature and Incidence” section of this study. It is a well established fact, instead, that neo-Fascist extremists are concentrated primarily in Rome, in Sicily (particularly in Catania), and, to a lesser degree, in Milan.

Nothing comparable to the structure of the leftist terrorist organizations emerges from the study of the neo-Fascist component. This can be attributed at least in part to the fact that no terrorist band of the right has ever matched the numerical consistency of the major organizations of the left and to the absence of a rightist equivalent of the Autonomy. The court record of the trials against rightist extremists shows that, more often than not, the same individuals tend to revolve around the various neo-Fascist organizations, the most dangerous of which merely discard old names for new ones or simultaneously operate under several names. For example, New Order became Black Order, which in term gave life to the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR). The latter have also carried out terrorist attacks under the name of Popular Revolutionary Movement (MRP).

The targeting methodology of the neo-Fascist terrorist groups is neither as far-ranging nor as selective as that of their Communist counterpart.

Rightist terrorist practices of the late 1960’s and early to mid 1970’s are conventionally termed “blind,” because of a propensity at that time for the indiscriminate use of explosive devices even in public places and on public conveyances. These actions, perpetrated

63 Supra note 23, p. 15.
by such groups as the Armed Revolutionary Movement, the Mussolini Action Squads, and Black Order, were not always followed by responsibility claims. Accounts generally attribute the unclaimed massacres of Milan, Brescia, and S. Benedetto di Val di Sambro (see appendix XX) to the right. Responsibility for none of the three has as yet been judicially established, notwithstanding indictments and proceedings at the trial and appellate stages of jurisdiction.

The purpose behind blind attacks was to create panic and, according to many commentators, to cause the adoption of strong measures by the government, including the intervention of the presumably conservative military establishment. In connection with this so-called strategy of tension, accusations and indictments for attempting to stage a coup d'état have repeatedly been brought against political, military, and intelligence figures, as well as private citizens. Except for the conviction of minor elements—primarily private citizens whose potential for undertaking a coup d'état is highly questionable—no judicial or parliamentary findings have established governmental, military, police, or intelligence involvement at either the planning or execution levels.

Since the late 1970's, the rightist targeting practices have generally conformed to the leftist model by becoming more selective in their objectives, by expanding on the use of firearms, and by claiming responsibility for their actions more routinely. However, the types of targets, especially the human ones, remain comparatively few: lower ranking members of law enforcement agencies, magistrates involved in terrorism-of-the-right investigations, individuals branded as traitors to the cause, and, of course, traditional leftist adversaries.

The new approach basically coincides with the appearance on the scene of the NAR, whose modus operandi includes ambush attacks and raids perpetrated with firearms and occasionally with grenades, under their own name (see appendix XIV), and the detonation of explosives principally against governmental buildings under the name of the MRP. The unexpected and unclaimed bombing, in August of 1980, of the Bologna Railroad Station with the attendant massacre of ordinary citizens (see appendix XX) has been blamed on the right. It still remains to be proven that this was in fact a neo-Fascist action; but, should conclusive evidence emerge, its perpetration would be indicative of an isolated return to blind targeting, since no similar terrorist crimes have since been committed by the right.

In recent years, terrorists of neo-Fascist inspiration have also begun to emulate leftist practices in the prison environment by executing traitors or otherwise creating ferment among inmates. At no time, instead, has any neo-Fascist terrorist group been able to stage a political kidnapping. The only two known instances of rightist abductions were fund-raising ventures. One was carried out by the Revolutionary Action Movement (see appendix XV), while the other was commissioned by rightist extremists and perpetrated by common criminals. Neither was accompanied by a responsibility claim. Moreover, both terrorist right and left traditionally resort to

But, as opposed to leftist responsibility claims, which usually entail a leaflet, the rightist ones frequently take the form of a mere telephone call to the media.
various types of nonpolitical crimes for procurement consider-
tations; however, neo-Fascist elements appear more prone to use the
proceeds to improve their life style rather than to enhance the
cause.

Press accounts have hypothesized terrorist links between groups
professing a Marxist-Leninist ideology and neo-Fascist organiza-
tions. Whereas there are, to date, no reliable reports to substanti-
ate the existence of "red-black cells," as they have been colorfully
termed, evidence has recently emerged regarding what might be
called a tacit nonbelligerence pact between the two ideological com-
ponents.

If followed by operational developments, the above-mentioned
pact might constitute an initial step toward a plan conceptualized
in the late 1960's by rightist extremist Franco Freda to combine
the revolutionary efforts of the right and of the left into a military
strategy. Freda's design, formerly referred to in the media as
"Nazi-Maoism," was subsequently espoused by Professors Claudio
Mutti and Paolo Signorelli, the two best known ideologues of right-
ist extremism.

With respect to the terrorist right in particular, it is important
not to lose sight of the distinction between political violence, which
is not necessarily perpetrated through clandestine structures, and
terrorism which, by current definition or connotation, always is.
The Italian extreme right has frequently resorted to open vio-
lence—in the form of provocative or retaliatory clashes with politi-
cal adversaries—before as well as after the outbreak of contempo-
rary terrorism in the late 1960's. However, that practice is not part
of the terrorist phenomenon. It is also worth noting that open
clashes of the traditional type have become rather sporadic of late.

4. International connections

Public knowledge of past as well as current police and judicial
investigations into rightist extremism would indicate that the
international links of the terrorist right substantially entail
asylum extended to its militants through the years by sympathetic
elements in West European, South African, and principally, Latin
American countries. At the same time, a number of weapons and
explosive devices used by neo-Fascist extremists originate outside
Italian borders. Lastly, the judiciary has occasionally proceeded to
investigate foreign nationals suspected of joint operations with do-
mestic elements on Italian soil, but no conclusive evidence has sur-
faced to date.

At the press level, there are reports to the effect that terrorists
of the left as well as of the right have been indiscriminately
trained in Libya. One such training site, code-named "Zujur," is al-
legedly located near Bengasi. Moreover, a diary kept by jailed
rightist terrorist Mario Tuti reportedly refers to Libyan aid. Other
media accounts claim that Italian neo-Fascist extremists are uti-
lized by Latin American military regimes as hired killers to track
down political dissidents and refugees on the South American con-
tinent and elsewhere.
D. ANARCHIST COMPONENT

1. Background, ideology, and objectives

Anarchist political violence, in its overt and clandestine manifestations, precedes by several decades comparable practices adopted by organizations or groupings of Communist or neo-Fascist inspiration.

In fact, even the revolutionary terminology used by Italy’s most famous anarchist, Errico Malatesta, who was Bakunin’s favorite disciple, recurs with slight variations in the language of contemporary extremists and terrorists of Communist persuasion. Malatesta used to speak in terms of “permanent revolution,” “continuous war against established organizations,” and “anarchist communism.”

Traditionally, the targeting patterns of the anarchists—be they lone actors or small aggregations—entail both the selective and blind varieties. Two examples are most significant. On July 29, 1900, as he was returning from a gymnastics competition in Monza, King Umberto I of Italy was assassinated by anarchist Gaetano Bresci, who fired two pistol shots at close range. On March 18, 1921, a bomb planted by three anarchists exploded in the Kursaal Diana Theater of Milan causing 21 deaths and 100 injuries. The purpose of this act was to avenge an alleged miscarriage of justice suffered by the renowned Malatesta.

From Malatesta’s days (1853-1932) to the present, the objective of the anarchists remains the destruction of established order at every level insofar as considered oppressive. Traditionally the anarchist ideology has not precluded collaboration with political forces connected to Marxist or labor union goals. This less-than-recent attitude explains current tolerance of Communist doctrines by anarchist groups and their minority presence in revolutionary groups of various ideologies. For these reasons, anarchist individuals and formations that resort to terrorist actions are for simplicity’s sake generally listed as part of the terrorist left.

2. Composition, structure, and dynamics

The numerical strength of the anarchist component is minimal. Few, indeed, are also the anarchist terrorist organizations (see appendix V). Yet, their deep-rooted traditions and potential for physical harm and material damage cannot be underestimated (see appendix XVI).

The anarchist group that has towered over the rest in recent years is the now practically defunct Revolutionary Action (Azione Rivoluzionaria—AR), whose appearance on the scene took place in 1976-77. Characterized as a band consisting of anarchists, terrorists of the left, and common criminals, its original inspiration was simply anarchist, as stated in the organizational Charter, which added that “the affinity of our cultural experience can be defined as anarchist-Communist.” The self-attributed role of AR is “to wage the armed struggle for a society of the free and the equal.”

Apart from revenue-raising ventures, its actions are rather selective (see appendix XVI). The medical officer of the Pisa prison who

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56 Corriere della Sera, Sept. 20, 1977, p. 7 (Milan).
had treated anarchist Franco Serantini was wounded by AR because the latter died while in custody after a street clash with the police. In claiming responsibility for this action, AR called it "a settlement of an old account that weighed on the conscience of the anarchists." The wounding of journalist Nino Ferrero of L'Unita, the official daily of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), was explained with the words "AR hereby punishes a bastard who is at the service of the regime," an obvious allusion to PCI endeavors toward participation in the government.

The reputed historic leader of AR is the late Gianfranco Faina, a former professor of political doctrines at the University of Genoa. Faina's political background includes active participation in the PCI's youth organization; authorship of articles for Classe Operaia (Working Class); conceptualizing together with the aforementioned Toni Negri of AUTOP the publication Quaderni Rossi (Red Notebooks); authorship of a book titled "A Ray of Light in the Darkness," dedicated to Ulrike Meinhof of the Baader-Meinhof gang; organizing a committee for the defense of the above-discussed October XXII Circle; and founding the Ludd Circle.

In addition to the various links entertained by Faina himself, press accounts have frequently made reference to AR's organizational contacts with the quarterly Anarchismo, whose offices reportedly move with frequency from city to city.

A forthcoming retrial of Pietro Valpreda of the anarchist March 22d Circle (not to be confused with the October XXII Circle) and of rightist extremists Franco Freda and Giovanni Ventura, all three of whom must answer once again for the Milan massacre of 1969 (see appendix XX), might finally establish the matter and extent of links between anarchists and neo-Fascists.

An indication of surviving anarchist sentiment in Italy may be the proposal made in late 1981 by various anarchist groups of presumably non-terrorist persuasion to erect a statue in the memory of Gaetano Bresci, the assassin of King Umberto I. The selected location is the city of Carrara, which is the traditional center of the Italian anarchist movement.

3. International connections

Although anarchist terrorist circles traditionally entertain international links (e.g., the assassination of King Umberto I was discussed and planned by Bresci with fellow anarchists in Patterson, New Jersey), recent nondomestic contacts appear to have been maintained principally by AR. The pertinent levels of linkage are nonetheless several.

Chilean refugee Aldo Ernesto Marin Pinones, who has spent over 1 year in Cuba before arriving in Italy as a political exile, accidentally blew himself up in Turin in August of 1977, while campaigning in the ranks of AR. His roommate, Juan Teofilo Paillacar Soto, another Chilean refugee with a Cuban background and on the Italian police wanted list, was apprehended in Rome in April of 1979, as he attempted to resist arrest with a 44 magnum revolver. In February of 1979, AR members Rocco Martino and Carmela Pane were

57 Supra note 55.
58 Supra note 56.
arrested together with German extremists Rudolph Piroch and Johanna Hartwig in Parma while transporting explosives in a vehicle. In April of 1978, AR militant Enrico Paghera was apprehended in Lucca together with three fellow nationals and one Spaniard. The police found a Palestinian training camp map in Paghera's pockets. Paghera, who later repented, has testified regarding joint Italian-German terrorist plans to abduct the Archbishop of Florence and contacts with Libyan elements. The press finally reported that SISMI, one of the two present Italian intelligence services, identified a mobile training unit consisting of Chilean refugees and Mexican extremists in contact with AR and PL in November of 1979.

E. SEPARATIST COMPONENT

Separatist organizations, whose extremist fringes have from time to time resorted to violence since World War II, include those active in the islands of Sicily and Sardinia and in the German-speaking South Tyrol area of the region of Trentino-Alto Adige, which borders with Austria. In recent years, however, only Sardinian and South Tyrolean separatists occasionally create law enforcement problems. Sicilian separatist trends practically disappeared in the late 1940's.

1. Sardinia

Background, ideology, and objectives.—The island of Sardinia, which is one of Italy's 20 regions, possesses distinctive and deep-rooted sociological traditions. Sardinian itself is considered to be a separate language rather than a mere Italian dialect. In a population consisting of 1,601,000 inhabitants, approximately two-thirds, regardless of social or economic standing, speak the language of the island as a matter of custom. Sardinian, nevertheless, is subdivided into three linguistic branches of its own: Campidanese (spoken in southern Sardinia, Cagliari, and Oristano, by at least 550,000 individuals); Lugodorese Barbaricino (spoken by at least 370,000 individuals); and Gallurese (spoken by no more than 60,000 Sardinians).58

Of Italy's 20 regions, 5, including Sardinia, enjoy a special charter as opposed to the ordinary charter of the remaining 15. Special charter status affords the region a vast degree of autonomy obviously short of sovereignty and independence. This status is not considered sufficient by an articulate minority of the population, which has founded a number of independence movements that are usually legal. Since December of 1981, the Sardinian Action Party (Partito Sardo d'Azione—PSd'A), the only local party ever represented in Italy's national Parliament, has made the island's independence part of its platform. According to the resolution of the 1981 party congress, the next step following independence would entail federating with Italy or even with other European or Mediterranean states.

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58 See Panorama, Apr. 6, 1981, p. 84 (Milan); and Corriere della Sera, Apr. 21, 1981, p. 6 (Milan).
Whereas such radical aspirations enjoy a comparatively limited following, other initiatives have obtained an enthusiastic backing. For example, in April of 1981—before the December PSD'A congress—the Regional Council passed a regional, as opposed to national, law making Sardinian along with Italian one of the two official languages of the Island. Not all five special charter regions have been granted bilingualism prerogatives by the Italian central government. Apart from cultural consideration, it was argued that the recognition of bilingualism would serve as a vehicle for the many Sardinian-speaking shepherds and farmers to have a voice in agrarian reforms.

To the purely sociological and linguistic aspects of the regional problem should be added the economic malaise caused by unemployment and underdevelopment. This combination of cultural and material aspirations helps explain not only extremist tendencies to rebel against the alleged colonial status of the island, but also the frequent merger of separatist goals with Communist-inspired class-struggle orientations.

Composition, structure, and dynamics.—Appendix VI lists a number of formations that have claimed responsibility for terrorist actions in Sardinia. Such actions are usually minor ones causing, at worst, damage to governmental property or national concerns (as opposed to local ones) through the detonation of explosives.

The only separatist terrorist group that has displayed some degree of organization and has used both explosives and firearms as a matter of standard procedure is Red Barbagia (Barbagia Rossa). This group made its debut in 1978 with a series of attacks on military and police installations and raids on official archives. Its more menacing actions are listed in appendix XVII.

The full political coloration of Red Barbagia and of the other terrorist organizations operating in Sardinia is difficult to assess, since they frequently combine separatist and Communist aspirations, as their names suggest (see appendix VI). In the late 1960's, the aforementioned millionaire, publisher, and Communist ideologue, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, attempted to organize an armed independence movement in Sardinia by offering to finance a local bandit by the name of Graziano Mesina. Interestingly enough, Feltrinelli's executive officer in the above-discussed Partisan Action Groups (GAP) was another Sardinian by the name of Giuseppe Saba. Nearly a decade later, the BR, according to extensive evidence including the confessions of red brigadist Antonio Savasta, decided to expand to Sardinia and developed operational and logistical links with Red Barbagia.

Reportedly, Red Barbagia became for some time the BR's proxy for the conduct of terrorist activity on the island. A number of factors account for Sardinia's importance to the BR. The geography of the island makes it a desirable location for stockpiling weapons, and at least one such depot was set up there by the BR. The presence of maximum security prisons inevitably attracted the BR, as captured plans to organize escapes indicate. And, not least, the NATO installations in Sardinia represent lucrative targets.

Besides the support offered to separatist violence by Communist organizations having by far broader aims and local elements obsessed by an urge for independence—Sardinian nationalists who
fast in jails, university professors dressed in the local garb who conduct doctoral dissertations discussions in the local language, and witnesses who refuse to testify in Italian before magistrates—revolutionary separatism is potentially nourished by a tradition of rural banditry which specializes in abductions for ransom. The court record of recent trials against kidnappers reflects links between Sardinian separatism and common crime. In this connection, it might be noted that Red Barbagia itself has drawn manpower from separatist extremists, Communist elements, and Sardinian bandits.

*International connections.*—Media accounts of ongoing judicial investigations state that in 1981 Sardinian separatists established contact with a Libyan emissary by the name of Ageli Mehemmed Tabet, who offered assistance to the Sardinian Independence Front on condition that the Front infiltrate the above-mentioned PSD'A and demonstrate to be militarily efficient. The contact was arranged in the Sicilian city of Catania by attorney Michele Papa, Libya's principal agent of influence in Sicily. Libyan willingness to provide aid reportedly explains why the 1981 PSD'A party platform included plans for federating an independent Sardinia with Mediterranean states. The Libyan connection had made the headlines once before in 1975, when an Italian intelligence document was allegedly acquired by the press. This memo stated that a member of Parliament from Sardinia by the name of Columbu was in contact with Qaddafi's agents.60

2. Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol)

*Background, ideology, objectives.*—Trentino-Alto Adige is another of Italy's five special charter regions. It became an integral part of Italian territory in 1918, following World War I, Italy's fourth and final War of Independence against Austria. South Tyrol, whose population is predominantly of German ethnic origin, corresponds to the Alto Adige area of the region. The special charter was granted in 1948 in deference to the Germanic elements of the population and calls for the application of the principles of ethnic proportionality and bilingualism. While the full implementation of the special charter has suffered delays, the predominantly German-ethnic province of Bolzano has nevertheless enjoyed a great degree of autonomy. The other province of the region is Trento, and its ethnic stock is predominantly Italian.

From time to time, Germanic elements desirous of complete independence, reunification with Austria, or a merger with the Austrian-held portion of Tyrol as a first step toward formation of an all Tyrolean state, have resorted to terrorist practices. Particularly violent was the period 1956–67. The separatists' actions entailed over 300 bombings of power lines, railroad stations and tracks, newly built low-income housing, army installations, and patriotic monuments commemorative of World War I, as well as some 30 fire engagements with police and military units. The total number of casualties during the 11-year period amounts to 22 victims.61

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60 See, in particular, La Repubblica, Dec. 5/6, 1982, p. 10 (Rome), and l'Espresso, Dec. 19, 1982, p. 24 (Rome).

sponsibility for most of these actions was claimed by an organization by the name of Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol.

Composition, structure, and dynamics.—The recrudescence of the terrorist phenomenon has been registered since the fall of 1978; however, its more recent proportions do not compare to the period 1956–67, since no fatalities have been recorded to date. Paternity for the new bombing attacks has been claimed by an organization called Tirol. This organization enjoys the moral and, by many accounts, the material support of Heimatbund, a league founded by Germanic extremists who served terms in Italian prisons, because of crimes committed during the earlier period of terrorist violence.

In addition to the same type of facilities selected earlier on by Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol, Tirol now targets private vehicles belonging to police personnel and immigrant workers from southern Italy. In some of the leaflets claiming responsibility for these actions, the separatists have compared their status to that of the Palestinians. Whereas during the period 1956–67 a few South Tyrol-related actions were carried out in Rome by terrorist elements, the current violent protest appears to be restricted to the local area. Moreover, while foreign Germanic elements were suspected of perpetrating part of the crimes of the earlier era, the few dozens carried out between 1978 and 1982 are believed to be the exclusive work of local German ethnics.

According to a 1979 census, the ratio between the two ethnic groups in the area roughly amounts to 250,000 German speakers as opposed to 140,000 Italian speakers. The figures of a late 1982 census are expected to show an increase of approximately 5 percent in favor of the German ethnics.

International connections.—South Tyrolean Germanic extremists active in Trentino-Alto Adige have traditionally enjoyed the support of kindred elements in Austria and Bavaria. To date, this support has entailed safehaven, when tracked by the Italian police authorities, and logistical support in the form of explosive devices and propaganda material printed in German, particularly in Gothic letters. Reportedly, Italian intelligence retaliated with clandestine explosions in Vienna and Innsbruck during the earlier South Tyrolean terrorist phase. But even in recent years, there have been problems between Italy, on the one hand, and Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other, because of nonrecognition of Italian sentences against terrorists who have escaped to, or reside in those countries.

Yet, the most disquieting external interference with the South Tyrolean ethnic problem took place in the early 1960's when Czech intelligence, as reported by defector Josef Frolik, surreptitiously supported violent Germanic separatist aspirations by conducting through its own agents dynamite attacks in the area against Italian power lines. The actual purpose was to create ill feelings between Italy and Austria, both of whom are West-oriented.

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F. NATIONALISTIC/COUNTERSEPARATIST COMPONENT

Organizations that militate within this component are motivated by a nationalistic reaction against separatist movements or situations perceived as menacing to the integrity of the national territory. In this sense, they are unquestionably conservative and their violent aims and practices might to a degree be equated to those of the neo-Fascist extremists. However, notwithstanding the prevailing tendency to classify both this component and the neo-Fascist one under the rightist heading, the relative objectives are qualitatively different. Moreover, there are no reliable indicators of stable operational links between the two.

Appendix VII lists various organizations responsible for terrorist actions perpetrated in the name of this form of nationalistic fervor. By every indication, they are present only in the above-discussed South Tyrol and in the province of Trieste, which borders with Yugoslavia.

The groupings active in South Tyrol are believed to constitute a single organization that operates under different names. They made their appearance on the scene in the fall of 1979, 1 year after the recrudescence of Germanic terrorist activities. The tactics of these nationalistic extremists, which to date have caused only material damage, mostly entail retaliatory bombing attacks against the private property of local Germanic ethnics and of German/Austrian visitors, as well as against South Tyrolean patriotic monuments. Tourist structures are also a favorite target in order to curtail the tourist influx from Germany and Austria in this area which is attractive to tourists. Moreover, on at least two occasions, they have injected poison into a small number of apples within the still unpicked crop to create and spread panic. In their written communiques, they frequently honor the memory of Italian policemen and soldiers murdered by South Tyrolean terrorists during the period 1956-67.

Italian governmental offices in the province of Bolzano have not been immune from these nationalistic/counterseparatist terrorist attacks. Such targetings are intended to demonstrate the displeasure of these militants with what they perceive to be a weak governmental posture vis-a-vis the German ethnics.

Analogous motivations have moved Italian nationalistic extremists to detonate explosive devices against governmental office buildings in Trieste. Their protest is against the agreements with Yugoslavia that constitute a renunciation of Italian territory in favor of that country with negative results for both Italian patriotic feelings and economic interests.

G. ECOLOGICAL COMPONENT

To date, only three formations of ecological inspiration have claimed responsibility for terrorist actions, the destructive nature of which was fortunately negligible (see appendix VIII). These groups—or similar ones that might emerge—are nonetheless a potential menace, since preparations are currently underway in Comiso, Sicily, to host elements of NATO's modernized Theater Nuclear Force on a stable basis (TNF).
As experience in other countries teaches, ecological groups are frequently connected to pacifist movements or organizations that preach and practice civil disobedience of the law in the name of peace. During a recent interview, the internationally famous Italian writer and pacifist exponent, Alberto Moravia, advocated the "transformation of pacifism into a large political movement, that is, a force capable of influencing, blackmailing governments. . . ."

In response to a query regarding the modalities to be pursued, he replied, "With all legal means and, if the governments will use force to oppose pacifism, with illegal ones." 65

Moreover, ecological/pacifist fervor is known to have given way to violence and has caused considerable damage. For example, on January 19, 1982, in Grenoble, France, a group of self-styled ecologists and pacifists fired five rockets with a Soviet-made weapon against the construction site of a nuclear breeder reactor. While nothing comparable has as yet occurred in Italy, the imitative factor cannot be discounted in the light of terrorist practices of other ideologically motivated organizations. It suffices to recall the similarities between the Schleyer and Moro abductions, perpetrated by organizations of different nationalities, but of the same ideology in Germany and Italy respectively.

Finally, the ecological and pacifist movements are open to exploitation and infiltration by domestic as well as foreign subversive/terrorist elements. The Red Brigades themselves repeatedly referred to the installation of missile bases on the national territory as an act of war in the communiques issued during the Dozier captivity and subsequently declared their intention to participate in the mass movement for disarmament. In this connection, it is interesting to note that red brigadist Francesco Varanese, arrested in May of 1982, had requested to be exempted from military service because of his moral commitment as a conscientious objector.

Of no lesser importance is the foreign interest in the Italian ecological/pacifist movement. Roland Vogt, a leader of the German Greens, has stated, "We are now aware that the decisive battle for peace in Europe is being waged here in Comiso." 66 Mr. Vogt has subsequently stated, "We wish to defend ourselves, but with peaceful means, passive ones: for example with sabotage actions." 67 Significantly, at least 11 foreigners have been expelled from Italy and one has been arrested on espionage charges because of pacifist militancy and activities in the proximity of the projected missile site at Comiso. Not least, an organization by the name of Struggle for Peace (Lotta per la Pace), headed by a retired Italian Air Force general, Nino Pasti, a senator elected on the Italian Communist Party ticket and a recognized Soviet agent of influence, is active together with other peace groups in protesting against the facilities at Comiso.

H. FEMINIST COMPONENT

Feminist militants unsatisfied with the legal and democratic process have, from time to time, resorted to violent tactics by orga-

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67 Corriere della Sera, Nov. 8, 1982, p. 3 (Milan).
Organizations classifiable under this heading virtually constitute a terrorist category whose aims run parallel to those of the Communist component.

Both components are inspired by Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Moreover, their ranks are most frequently made up of Italian extremists. What distinguishes one from the other is the nationality of their targets. As a rule subject to infrequent exceptions, the organizations belonging to the Communist component have targeted domestic victims and property. The internationalist formations, on the other hand, concentrate on foreign targets located in Italy.

In so doing, they express their commitment to proletarian internationalism or their solidarity with specific causes unrelated to the domestic scene, as the names they use clearly indicate. Significantly, standard targets are embassies, consulates, and representative offices of foreign private concerns. Likewise, the timing of these terrorists attacks, which usually entail the detonation of explosive devices, is in relation to a foreign event.

The names under which these presumably occasional bands have operated are listed in appendix X. Human injuries caused by them until now are limited, as reflected in appendix XVIII. It cannot be denied that in some cases these groupings have operational, as opposed to merely ideological, links with organizations or elements of the Communist components, e.g., the BR, PL, or AUTOP.

J. TRANSNATIONAL COMPONENT

This component includes foreign organizations and/or agents of foreign governments that operate from time to time on Italian territory against non-Italian targets for purposes unrelated to Italy. The choice of Italian soil is largely attributable in most instances to the country’s geographic position at the center of the Mediterranean thus linking three continents.

1. Armenian elements

Armenian terrorist organizations have been active in the Italian cities of Rome and Milan since 1977. They have targeted Turkish diplomats with firearms and centrally located representative offices of Turkish and other non-Italian airlines and tourist agencies with explosive devices.

Appendix XI lists the names under which these Armenian elements have claimed responsibility for their actions. The names used are indicative of two goals: the liberation of Armenia from Turkey and vengeance for the Armenian genocide. It is believed,
however, that the same individuals are behind the variously named organizations. Responsibility for the majority of their actions is often claimed by an English-speaking telephone caller who contacts the Rome offices of Reuter, the Associated Press, and Agence France Presse. He customarily protests against Turkish fascists and the support allegedly provided to them by the country whose facilities have been attacked. Unfortunately, these actions have caused the injury of innocent Italian bystanders.

The most significant Armenian terrorist actions are listed in appendix XIX. Particularly disconcerting is the two-phase bombing technique frequently employed. The explosions are detonated at intervals spaced several minutes apart. Those who are present at, or called to, the scene after the first explosion are potential victims of the second. The presence of Armenian communities in Milan, Venice, and Rome has led the police to investigate in that direction as well, but no evidence of local involvement in, or support for these terrorist actions, has surfaced.

2. Libyan elements

Libyan expatriates residing in Rome or Milan have frequently been targeted by hit-squads made up of fellow nationals. Some attacks have been occasioned by a refusal to return to Libya with their wealth. Appendix XIX lists seven significant cases of this nature that occurred between March 21 and June 11, 1980. On other occasions, Libyan nationals have been attacked for unknown reasons while transiting through Rome's international airport (see appendix XIX).

In nearly all cases, the victims were assaulted with firearms. Among those arrested, one has identified himself as a Qaddafi guerrilla. Press accounts further point to the Libyan Consulate in Palermo as the operational base where these attacks are planned and commissioned.

Other media reports indicate that, in October of 1981, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy, Maxwell M. Rabb, was the intended victim of a Libyan assassination plot discovered by Italian security, but no details of the pertinent operational plan have been disclosed. The reported plot coincided with the aftermath of the Gulf of Sidra incident which forced two U.S. war planes to down two Libyan aircraft.

3. Palestinian elements

As reflected in appendix XIX, Palestinians have been perpetrators as well as the victims of terrorist actions conducted in Italy. In only two of the significant cases recorded by the media has there been a formal responsibility claim. Because of the sporadic and heterogeneous nature of these actions, no patterns are discernable beyond the obvious ambush, raid, and bombing techniques or the circumstantial timeframe with reference to events in the Middle East.

Several Palestinian terrorist actions with potentially disastrous consequences have failed to achieve their ends. Two examples will suffice. In August of 1972, a cassette player filled with explosives was presented as a farewell gift to two English girls who boarded an El Al plane bound for Tel Aviv from Rome's international air-
In September of the following year, some Fedayeens were arrested in Ostia while in possession of a Soviet-made missile launcher they intended to use to down an Israeli airplane.

4. Other elements

The above-discussed elements are the ones that perpetrated the most significant terrorist actions on Italian territory since 1968. Many other foreign nationals have used Italian territory for analogous purposes without becoming a comparable menace.

The only incident of significance which does not fall into an easily categorizable transnational operation relates to the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in Saint Peter’s Square by Turkish national Mehmet Ali Agca on May 13, 1981.

Depending on his multiple positions and roles, the Pope can be regarded as a domestic target or as a foreign one. In his capacity as Bishop of Rome and Primate of Italy, he is unquestionably an Italian figure. As monarch of the State of the Vatican City, he is the head of a foreign state. As Supreme Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church, he is an international figure with broad following and influence. Moreover, in the specific case of John Paul II, his Polish nationality and continuing ties with his country of birth and past religious ministry add to the nature of the victim and could be indicative of the political beneficiaries of his elimination.

Agca, the would-be-assassin, fired two pistol shots at the Pope and seriously wounded him. The assailant was immediately apprehended, tried before an Italian court (pursuant to the Agreement and Concordat of 1929 between Italy and the Vatican City State), and sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequent to the conclusion of the trial, the judiciary, the police, and the intelligence services conducted further investigations into possible accomplices. Agca himself, after several months of imprisonment, reportedly decided to cooperate with the Italian authorities.

The combined reports of the Italian Ministers of Justice, Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs before the Parliament reflect that, pursuant to Agca’s detailed statements and photographic identifications, the office of the prosecutor indicted as accessories in the attempt on the life of the Pontiff a number of Turkish nationals: Bagci Orner, Musa Cerdar Celebi, Celik Oral, and Bekir Celenk. Bulgarian nationals Ayvazov Todor Stoyanov, Vassilev Jelio Kolev, and Antonov Serguey Ivanov were also implicated. Ayvazov and Vassilev, who are no longer in Italy, were assigned to the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome. Antonov, the head of the Balkan Air airport office, was arrested on November 25, 1982.

Agca’s extensive travels before the assassination attempt include a sojourn of 50 days in Bulgaria from mid-July to the end of August of 1980. Moreover, as reported to the Parliament by the Defense Minister, the same Bulgarian radio signal anomalies monitored by the Italian military intelligence service (SISMI) during the Dozier captivity were also noted within the timeframe of the attempt on the Pope’s life.

* * * Supra note 48
Again, because of the secrecy of the judicial investigation, the nature and the extent of additional information collected by the office of the prosecutor remains unpublished at this writing.

PART II. THE COUNTERTERRORIST RESPONSE

A. LEGISLATION

The Criminal Code of 1930 does not define terrorism. A first reference to this political phenomenon was introduced immediately after the abduction of Aldo Moro by Law Decree No. 59 of March 21, 1978—an emergency measure formalized by Law No. 191 of May 18, 1978—which amended the Criminal Code by increasing the penalties for kidnappings motivated by “terrorism or subversion of the democratic order.” These enactments also empowered law enforcement agencies to detain anyone who refuses to identify himself; relaxed the existing strict judicial controls over police wiretapping operations in cases of emergency; and set forth a term of 48 hours within which a landlord, one transferring real estate, and a host must give appropriate notice to the police authorities.

Additional antiterrorist measures were adopted by Law Decree No. 625 of December 15, 1979, which was converted into law by Law No. 15 of February 6, 1980. This legislation amended the Criminal Code to include “attempts committed for purposes of terrorism or subversion of the democratic order” and “conspiracy for purposes of terrorism or subversion of the democratic order.” Moreover, the penalty for all terrorism-related crimes was increased by one-half. The following provisions are likewise part of said antiterrorist legislation:

1. provisional police apprehension of suspects;
2. mandatory arrest warrants for terrorist crimes;
3. extension of pretrial confinement limitations;
4. immediate emergency search of realty or entire blocks of realty in areas where someone wanted for terrorist crimes is justifiably believed to be hiding;
5. mandatory identification for banking transactions in excess of Italian lire 20 million; and
6. reduced sentences for terrorists who voluntarily mitigate the consequences of such criminal conduct and/or aid police and judicial investigations.

The last of these provisions was elaborated upon in detail by Law No. 304 of May 29, 1982, which affords varying degrees of clemency to repentant terrorists depending upon the significance of their contributions in the state’s efforts to counter terrorism. The ultimate deadline for terrorists wishing to take advantage of this measure was January 31, 1983.

In order to facilitate and enhance coordination and cooperation among Italy’s three major police agencies, Law Decree No. 626 of December 19, 1979—converted into law by Law No. 23 of February 11, 1979—set up the National Committee for Public Order and Security within the Interior Ministry. It is chaired by the Interior Minister, and its statutory members are an undersecretary appointed by the minister, the chief of police, and the commanding generals of both the Carabinieri and the Finance Guard.
Although not an antiterrorist measure in the strict sense, another contribution to countering terrorism was made by Law No. 121 of April 1, 1981, on the New Organization of the Administration of Public Security, which provides, among other things, for the establishment of a centralized data bank within the Interior Ministry, under the supervision of the parliamentary oversight committee on intelligence and security.

Finally, pursuant to Law No. 597 of November 23, 1979, a parliamentary committee is making an inquiry into the Aldo Moro affair and terrorism in Italy. The scope of the parliamentary investigation is obviously broader than the ones conducted at the police and judicial levels. Moreover, the specific parliamentary objective is to collect information and analyze a national problem as opposed to law enforcement.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

At this writing, there appears to be a solid consensus that terrorism has been seriously crippled by the confessions of repentant terrorists of both the left and the right. Unquestionably, the clemency measures introduced by the antiterrorism legislation of 1980 and 1982 created favorable conditions for terrorists—motivated by repentance, disillusionment, or opportunism—who decided to cooperate with the police and the judiciary. Interestingly enough, repentance never precedes capture or indictment.

As of January 29, 1983, 389 repentant terrorists availed themselves of the clemency legislation. Thanks to the confessions of many of them, an unprecedented number of terrorists, safe havens, and weapons have fallen into the hands of the State Police and Carabinieri. Unfortunately, however, these confessions contributed little to enhance previously acquired knowledge of terrorist structures and dynamics, not to speak of disclosures as to the behind-the-scene levels of direction or external support. Moreover, the repentance route seems to have been chosen exclusively by members of the more recent generations of terrorists. Conversely, only two older terrorists disassociated themselves from the terrorist ranks.

For the record, well before the emergence of repentant terrorists, valuable information had been collected and processed by the police forces and intelligence services. Noteworthy successes against terrorism has also been scored at the operational level by both the State Police and the Carabinieri.

In December of 1970, several years before Italian terrorism reached menacing proportions, the Prefect of Milan reported to the Interior Ministry that, in his area of jurisdiction alone, there were 20,000 potential terrorists. In July of 1972, the police superintendent of Milan drew up a more detailed report listing violent extraparliamentary organizations of various ideologies, their numerical composition, and subversive aims. A report of the same year, prepared by the now defunct Confidential Matters Office of the Interior Ministry, provided extensive data on the origin, characteristics, and goals of the Red Brigades. Also in 1972, and again in 1973,
SID, the intelligence service of that period, revealed information regarding terrorist links with the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Cuba.71

From the operational standpoint, even before the passage of the very first antiterrorism legislation in 1978, terrorist formations such as the October XXII Circle, the Partisan Action Groups (GAP), and the Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) had been eliminated as autonomous units. Almost the entire historic nucleus and a high percentage of the second generation of the Red Brigades had been arrested or killed in action; the self-styled anarchist-Communist Revolutionary Action was close to neutralization; and such rightist extremists as Luigi Concutelli, who murdered Judge Occorsio, had been brought to justice. It was also during the period before special legislation was enacted and before the days when repentant terrorists began to come forward that the Carabinieri successfully infiltrated the Red Brigades with “Brother Machinegun,” a former clergyman and Latin American revolutionary by the name of Silvano Girotto, who led them to historic leaders Renato Curcio and Alberto Franceschini. Curcio, who was subsequently freed from an experimental prison by a commando unit of fellow militants, was recaptured by the Carabinieri.

The intelligence and law enforcement operations of those years were rendered all the more difficult by an adverse political climate.72 The period 1969-75 in particular was marked by strong antilaw enforcement attitudes. For example, when the above-cited Interior Ministry documents were acquired and published by the press shortly after their preparation, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) branded those who drafted them as provocateurs and even clamored for their resignations. Politicized elements of the judiciary were less than supportive, if not hostile, toward the police. The press was mostly aligned with seemingly libertarian causes. And, not least, on the pretext of actual and contrived abuses within the intelligence establishment, the institutional activities of that security sector were constantly under attack and their confidentiality was violated at the governmental level.

The massacre of his five-man escort and the abduction of Aldo Moro, followed by his murder 54 days later, marked a turning point with respect to the political response to terrorism. In addition to the legislative innovations discussed above, a number of other measures were adopted.

In August of 1978, the late Carabinieri General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, a veteran organized-crime and terrorism specialist, was placed in command of a special counterterrorism task force responsible for both intelligence collection and law enforcement. One year later, after a series of successful operations, he was appointed commander of the First Carabinieri Division which has an area of jurisdiction covering northern Italy. Given the intensity of terrorist activity in that area, Dalla Chiesa’s appointment was unquestionably meant to have a psychological impact. Another special assign-
ment was entrusted to General Arnaldo Ferrara, former deputy commander of the Carabinieri Corps, who was named counselor of the president of the republic for problems relating to democratic order and security in September of 1978. Since his election in 1978, Sandro Pertini, the President of the Republic, has actively chaired the Superior Council of the Judiciary to solidify judges and prosecutors against both terrorism and the frequently reported ambivalence vis-a-vis this phenomenon on the part of elements of the judiciary.

During the electoral campaign for the parliamentary elections of June 3-4, 1979, military units were posted around public utility plants in order to alleviate the security burden on the police forces and allow them to concentrate their efforts on more sophisticated counterterrorist actions. In December of the same year, specialized law enforcement technocrats Enzo Vicari, Emanuele De Francesco, and Carabinieri General Edoardo Palombi were appointed prefects of Milan, Turin, and Genoa, respectively. In December of 1980, on the occasion of their successful employment against imprisoned terrorists of the left who were holding hostages, it became known that the Carabinieri Corps had formed the Special Intervention Groups (Gruppi Intervento Speciali—GIS). In 1981, key law enforcement figures, including Generals Dalla Chiesa, Umberto Cappuzzo, and De Santis were authorized to grant press and television interviews in an ostensible effort to promote a psychological link between the police forces and the public in general.

At present, there are specialized operational offices tasked with combating subversion, political violence, and terrorism, within the State Police and Carabinieri structures. It might be preliminarily noted that both the State Police and the Carabinieri are under the operational control of the Interior Ministry for public order functions; however, while the State Police is now a totally civilian police force under this Ministry, the Carabinieri are both a military organization and a police force and are part of the national defense establishment headed by the Defense Ministry.

Since 1978, the Central Bureau for General Investigations and Special Operations (Ufficio Centrale per le Indagini Generali e le Operazioni Speciali—UCIGOS) was established within the Interior Ministry. The Bureau coordinates the operations of the counterterrorism offices—manned by State Police personnel—set up within each provincial police headquarters (Questura—the local police organization of the Interior Ministry at the provincial level). In the more important provinces and always in the prov-

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73 In each province there is a prefect who represents the Interior Ministry and the central government in a variety of administrative matters, including law enforcement. Another provincial official of the Interior Ministry is the police superintendent (Questore), who is subordinate to the prefect and specifically responsible for law enforcement.

74 The State Police, formerly known as Public Security, has always been an integral element of the Interior establishment. But, before the reform introduced by the above-cited Law No. 121 of 1981, this police force had a militarized status. The reform law also changed its name to State Police and brought about changes in the denomination of the rank structure.

75 UCIGOS is in fact the descendant of a number of similar central offices that preceded it. Until 1974, there was the above-mentioned Confidential Matters Office (Ufficio Affari Riservati), replaced by the Security Service (Servizio di Sicurezza—S di S), which was in turn supplanted in 1976 by Inspectorate for Anti-Terrorist Action (Ispettorato per l’Azione contro il Terroismo). Commentators have argued that all of these changes during critical times for law enforcement were counterproductive.

76 The Questura is headed by the police superintendent (Questore). See supra note 73.
inces that are regional capitals,\textsuperscript{77} the counterterrorism office is known as the Division for General Investigations and Special Operations (Divisione per le Investigazioni Generali e le Operazioni Speciali—DIGOS). In the other provinces, obviously the vast majority, it is called Office for General Investigations and Special Operations (Ufficio per le Investigazioni Generali e le Operazioni Speciali—UIGOS).\textsuperscript{78}

For purposes of law enforcement, the Carabinieri structural organization is called “territorial.” Approximately 80 percent of Carabinieri personnel are assigned to this structure. The entire territorial organization is subordinate to the General Headquarters. The organizational echelons include three divisions (one in the North, Center, and South, respectively) with subordinate brigades, legions, groups, companies, and stations. As a rule subject to few exceptions, there is one legion in every region and one group in every province. Specialized elements of legions and groups are specifically concerned with political crimes and terrorism.

As can best be reconstructed from media reports and unclassified official records (neither of which can be regarded as particularly detailed) a number of sources, procedures, and techniques have been used by law enforcement authorities in combating terrorism.

The most recent is obviously the use of confessions by repentant terrorists. Other sources include paid informers and social deviants who operate on the periphery of subversive circles and can be influenced. Papers seized in captured safe havens and operational bases, but also analyses of documents openly issued by the terrorist organizations themselves, have contributed to law enforcement operations. In some cases, identified and even escaped terrorists were put under surveillance to establish their points of contact. In other instances, marginal subversive elements were used as agents within the terrorist organizations themselves. Operations of this nature, although presumably rare, could be of particular importance because of governmental and parliamentary policies that practically forbid direct infiltration by police or intelligence personnel into terrorist organizations. Also, acquired knowledge of the terrorists’ method of operation has apparently led to a number of identifications and arrests.

A continuing problem that at least in part bears upon counterterrorists efforts addresses the functioning of the intelligence services.

The Italian intelligence system was reformed by Law No. 801 of October 24, 1977. A major factor behind the reform were the actual, alleged, or perceived abuses of institutional functions by the directors and other key personnel of the former services, SIFAR (Armed Forces Information Service), in existence from 1949–65, and SID (Defense Information Service), its successor, in existence from 1965–77.

\textsuperscript{77} From an administrative standpoint, the national territory is subdivided into 20 regions, 95 provinces, and several thousand municipalities. The Republic of Italy is a unitary state opposed to a federal republic.

\textsuperscript{78} The DIGOS/UIGOS combines the now defunct Political Office (Ufficio Politico) and the Anti-Terrorism Nucleus (Nucleo Antiterrorismo) of the Questura. The political offices have a long history, while the antiterrorism nuclei were established at the time the S di S was set up. See supra note 75.
The reform introduced four major innovations:

1. a more stringent supervision of the intelligence and security services by the government (executive cabinet) and, for the first time, oversight by the Parliament;
2. the separation of intelligence and internal security functions into two services;
3. an additional separation of intelligence and security functions from law enforcement functions; and
4. new regulations governing state secrecy.

Of the technical drawbacks caused by the compromises that went into the text of the law because of proverbial ideological differences among the forces that make up parliamentary and governmental majorities in Italy, two tower above the rest. In the first place, the statute vaguely defines the respective responsibilities of the two new organizations: Service for Military Intelligence and Security (Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza Militare—SISMI) and Service for Intelligence and Democratic Security (Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza Democratica—SISDE). Secondly, it bars the two services from employing permanently or occasionally (the language of the statute is open to interpretation and debate in this connection as well) traditional sources of intelligence information including members of parliament; regional, provincial, and municipal councilmen; magistrates (this category includes both judges and prosecutors); clergy; professional journalists; and individuals whose records do not guarantee fidelity to democratic and institutional principles.  

But apart from technical difficulties, the fact remains that ever since the late 1960's the Italian intelligence services have been under attack because of scandals, partisan political accusations, and unenlightened media practices, such as revealing the names of agents. SISMI and SISDE themselves have frequently made the press headlines since 1980. However, of the four major scandals, only one appears to have involved an actual security violation. This case entails the leaking of the confessions of captured red brigadist Patrizio Peci to II Messaggero of Rome by the deputy director of SISDE.  

An unprecedented problem, which is possibly even more disquieting, entails the accusations of torture brought by captured current generation terrorists against the police since the Dozier affair. The charge is that torture took place immediately after the suspects were arrested and while they were still in police custody. These tactics were allegedly used for the purpose of inducing confessions and revelations. Five members of the State Police have been indicted. The trial should determine whether this development constitutes presumably isolated incidents or constitutes a new terrorist attempt to discredit the law enforcement agencies. In any case, the medical authorities have reportedly established that no injuries re-

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80 Of the other three, at least two appear to be traditional intelligence operations: Attempting to obtain information and/or collaboration from common crime elements in connection with the BR kidnappings of Cirillo and Dozier (see appendix XII). The third, which still requires clarification, is the matter of membership in an especially secretive masonic lodge by the directors and other functionaries of both services as well as of the Executive Committee on Intelligence and Security (CESIS).
Quiring more than 20 days to heal have been suffered by terrorists released from police to judicial custody. Consequently, if any reprehensible prisoner mistreatment took place, it would fall short of physical impairment.

C. PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion polls consistently reflect a comparatively high degree of concern regarding the terrorist phenomenon by the general population, including those segments that are presumably immune from selective terrorist attacks. Consequently, it has been suggested that a large number of citizens fails to differentiate between political terrorism and violent acts of common criminality which are on the rise in most urban centers.

Moreover, popular rejection of terrorism and sympathy with its victims have frequently been manifested by large crowds participating in funeral rites and dedication ceremonies of memorial busts and plaques on streets and in squares. Considerable generosity has also been displayed on the occasion of collections sponsored by private nonpolitical organizations on behalf of the orphaned dependents of terrorism victims in order to supplement the indemnity provided by the state. Still other demonstrations, whose pertinence is open to debate, include strikes called by the major labor unions in response to the more clamor-inducing terrorist acts, such as the abduction and murder of Aldo Moro.

But beyond private and collective protest entailing sentiments of human solidarity, affirmations of civic-mindedness, or release of emotions, the popular response to terrorism has also taken political forms.

Several candidates in local, regional, and national elections owe their seats at least in part to the fact that they were physically attacked by the terrorist left. Major examples are Christian Democrats Massimo De Carolis in Milan, Publio Fiori in Rome, Enrico Ghio and Fausto Cuocolo in Genoa, and Giovanni Picco in Turin. Analogous significance can be attributed to the casting of the largest number of nominal ballots in favor of Giorgio Almirante in the city of Naples during the regional elections of 1980. Though not a victim of terrorist violence, Almirante is the head of the Italian Social Movement (MSI), which advocates the severest measures against terrorism. His party was successful in collecting over 1 million signatures for the introduction of a bill to have terrorist-infested areas placed under the purview of the Military Code of War with the consequential application of the death penalty.

Not less significant is the overwhelming popular rejection of the proposal put to national referendum, at the initiative of the Radical Party, to abrogate the legislative antiterrorist measures adopted by the above-outlined Law Decree No. 625 of December 15, 1979, and Law No. 15 of February 6, 1980. In the Referendum of May 17, 1981, 85.2 percent of the voters opted for the retention of this legislation. In another referendum, also sponsored by the Radical Party and held on the same day with the intent of abrogating legislation that allows licensed private citizens to carry a pistol or a revolver, 86 percent of the voters expressed themselves in favor of the retention of that private security measure.
With the inherent objective of influencing public opinion, terrorism has been the focus of considerable attention by all of the political parties represented in Parliament, as reflected by party publications, parliamentary debates, interviews granted by leading party representatives, and various party initiatives, including those mentioned above.

The Christian Democratic Party (DC) has repeatedly pointed out its front-line position in combating terrorism. Because of its status as the relative majority party, the DC can credibly allege a predominant role in the passage of recent antiterrorist legislation. Moreover, the Interior Minister post has uninterruptedly been held by a Christian Democrat. But, above all else, the DC can objectively claim, as indeed it does, to be the party most targeted by terrorist violence. On the other hand, it tends to forget not only its weak leadership—albeit conditioned by coalition governments—since the late 1960's, but also its vacillating attitude through the mid-1970's with respect to the political coloration of the terrorist phenomenon.81

Terrorism has likewise drawn considerable attention from the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Italy's second largest party whose governmental opposition role has been continuous since 1948, except for a brief period in 1976-78. During this 2-year period, the PCI finally conceded the existence of terrorism of the left. However, this belated acknowledgment did not put an end to PCI denunciations of the forces of reaction as ultimately responsible for terrorism—a theory dear to the Soviets. Moreover, in its innovative publications on terrorism of recent years, which address both the leftist and rightist manifestations of the phenomenon, the PCI skeptically puts the word "left" between quotes: terrorism of the right and terrorism of the "left." The party has also conducted opinion polls on the topic of terrorism containing questionnaires worded in such a manner as to elicit answers in accordance with the party's ideology.82 In conjunction with its post-1977 terrorism research policy, the PCI has repeatedly called for mass mobilization against terrorism. At the same time it has also expelled party members involved in terrorist organizations. This policy, however, is not altogether new, since even in the days of the Red Strike Force, the PCI would officially disclaim any relationship with its armed parallel groups. Finally, the party has supported legislative antiterrorist measures enacted since 1978, fully oblivious of its earlier stances in the mid-1970's against public order legislation and of its past efforts aimed at police disarmament. Despite the PCI's ostensible firmness of recent years against political terrorism of all varieties, indeed few of its militants have been targeted by the terrorist left (see appendices XII, XIII, and XVI).

The smaller parties do not trail far behind the major ones in their interest for the terrorist phenomenon. The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the Radical Party have attempted to mediate the release of major BR kidnapper victims for asserted humanitarian rea-

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81 This attitude has been summarized by a senior journalist and university professor as follows: "... at one time there was only one violent extremism (of the left), then two opposing extremisms (of the left and of the right), then only one (of the right), finally one full extremism (of the right), plus one-half (of the left)." See D. Bartoli, "Gli italiani nella terra di nessuno," Mondadori, Milan, 1976, pp. 189-197.

sons. The PSI has frequently been at odds with the PCI, its one-time ally at the national level, over the hard no-bargain stance adopted by the latter. The PSI and the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) have been perhaps the strongest accusers of Soviet bloc support for terrorism in Italy. In this respect too, the PSI is at odds with the PCI. The Italian Social Movement (MSI), in addition to the death penalty proposal referred to above, has expelled from its ranks individuals involved in terrorist violence and has adopted as one of its campaign slogans: "Against terrorism the barrier is to the Right: Vote Italian Social Movement—National Right." Interestingly enough, however, it sided in practice with the Radical Party during the referendum for the repeal of the terrorism laws, alleging that said legislation is ineffective and limits personal liberties.

For their part, the labor unions, somewhat forgetful of their own violent and violence-inductive role during the "hot autumn" of 1969 and in the years that followed, have been pulling the alarm signal since the beginning of the 1980's with respect to terrorist infiltration of the factories and of the labor unions themselves. Several of their internal circulars provide analyses of terrorist documents in relation to labor and the unions. The leaders of the Italian Union of Labor (UIL), one of Italy's three major unions, have been especially forceful in expressing their concern even before the name of Luigi Scricciolo and his terrorist links, both domestic and foreign, made the headlines.

The highly visible presence of terrorist activity is also responsible for a flourishing literature on the topic, largely during the period 1976-80. Book-length essays and accounts reached their market peak in the aftermath of the Aldo Moro affair. Apart from its actuality, the topic did attract the public interest from the sociological and criminological standpoints.

Far greater profits than those accruable to the publishing market continue to be made by industries and concerns that specialize in products and services related to private security. However, in the latter case, it is difficult to assess the comparative weight of the terrorist factor as opposed to the common crime factor. They are at any rate concomitant causes.

The combined outburst of political and common criminality has had an enormous impact on the construction and/or importation of steel doors and windows and alarm systems for offices and dwellings, body armor, and armored cars. Moreover, over 400 private security agencies have been formed, approximately 20,000 dogs have been trained as body guards, gun-permit applications are on the rise, and enrollment in martial arts and protective driving courses has increased. Pertinent training not available in Italy is acquired abroad by private citizens with special security needs.

**Concluding Remarks**

After 15 years of unconventional warfare, several hundred murders, over 1,000 woundings, and considerable damage to property, Italian terrorism, in all of its manifestations, can safely be termed

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83 See works by D. Bartoli and A. Ronchey in supra note 8.
a failure, if its objective was and continues to be the radical uprooting of institutions. In point of fact, its propaganda and tactics have proven to be ill-suited to bring about any kind of political revolution. Moreover, at this writing, civil war is nowhere discernible on the horizon.

If, on the other hand, the objective of the practitioners of terrorism or of possible secret exploiters or supporters—domestic or foreign—was and remains the fostering of confusion, malaise, disunity, and social strife, then Italian terrorism can be regarded as moderately successful.

Various trails have been explored in order to identify a central figure or power center, conventionally denominated "the grand old man," as the brain or patron behind terrorist strategies. Logic would discount that a single person or entity can effectively perform the role of puppeteer of a phenomenon whose dimensions are as vast and diverse as those displayed by Italian terrorism from 1968 through 1982. At the same time, no trace of such a secret potentate has emerged, even in connection with individual organizations or isolated actions, except perhaps for the wealthy and ubiquitous Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, who died in 1972.

Nevertheless, the absence of one or more patrons is not fully convincing, inasmuch as self-financing, coupled with the recorded forms of lateral support, does not appear to be sufficient to account for the nourishment of major organizations such as the Red Brigades for over a decade. Nor is it a conclusive argument that the official terrorist proclamations and the statements of repentant terrorists exclude the presence or interference of secret forces.

Experience teaches that the official proclamations of these organizations are intended to serve revolutionary propaganda purposes and are not conditioned by any commitment to truth. Similarly, the confessions of repentant terrorists on the matter of secret leadership or support are of dubious value. The repentant ones, all of whom belong to the more recent generations, fall within the category of operatives at various levels, but do not combine direct and complete knowledge of the organization—including its developmental stages—in which they participated until they were captured. Moreover, repentance itself is in many cases all too sudden to merit full faith and credit. Finally, key repentant terrorists of both the left and the right continue to express their belief in the ideology that inspired them, while they ostensibly renounce violent means. This latest aspect raises unanswered questions as to whether they may ultimately be protecting someone who could still provide leadership or support for the cause in conjunction with new strategies.

But, should there be no secret supporter at any level, the Italian terrorist experience would assume a substantially more foreboding dimension not only in historical perspective, but also with regard to potential future developments. In essence, this would mean that under given socio-political tensions any group motivated by ideological considerations and bent on resorting to violence has the potential to become for an indefinite period of time a political player and a dispenser of death.

On the positive side, Italian terrorist organizations of all ideologies have suffered unprecedented setbacks throughout 1982, while
terrorist actions have dramatically dwindled during the same year to the point of becoming almost negligible in the first quarter of 1983. Consequently, the surviving assets of the terrorist world must currently be in a deep state of crisis. Whereas any prediction as to future developments is unlikely to graduate beyond the realm of speculation, it must be realistically acknowledged that many a time-tested terrorist model is available for emulation, adaptation, or operational refinement by those who either refute or are disillusioned with the democratic process.

SELECTED LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The books and monographs listed below constitute valuable reference material because of three considerations. Some of them provide extensive coverage of Italian terrorism as known at the time of authorship. Others address specific aspects of the multifaceted terrorist phenomenon. Still others afford interesting analyses. However, since the contemporary and fluid nature of terrorist practices nearly always cause books and other printed works of some length to become outdated shortly after publication, no source can be realistically expected to replace the systematic reading of dailies and periodicals. For this reason, instead of listing specific articles, the attention of the interested researcher is directed to Italian publications of that nature whose national circulation and editorial policies call for broad and continuing coverage of terrorism.

The documents section is comprised of parliamentary records and debates and unclassified intelligence reports. These sources are worth consulting inasmuch as their contents are rarely fully represented elsewhere. Regrettably, very few publications that specifically address Italian terrorism have been authored in English. Coverage in that language is nearly always limited to brief and occasional press reports or cursory sections of broader work on terrorism.

1. Books and monographs

———. Communist Bloc Covert Action: The Italian Case. Gaithersburg, MD, The International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1981.


———. The Structure and Dynamics of Italian Terrorism. Gaithersburg, MD, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1980.


2. Dailies and periodicals

(1) Dailies.—Corriere della Sera (Milan); Il Giornale Nuovo (Milan); Il Messaggero (Rome); Il Tempo (Rome); La Repubblica (Rome); La Stampa (Turin).

(2) Periodicals.—Il Settimanale (Rome—ceased publication in 1981); L’Espresso (Rome); L’Europeo (Milan); Panorama (Milan).

3. Documents


———. VIII Legislatura. Relazione del comitato parlamentare per i servizi di informazione e sicurezza per il periodo dal 25 gennaio 1979 al 30 aprile 1981.


4. Codes and statutes


Legge. 29 maggio 1982. N. 304. Misure per la difesa dell'ordinamento costituzionale.

APPENDIX I

AGGREGATE ANNUAL STATISTICS PERTAINING TO TERRORIST CRIMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of incidents</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of incidents</th>
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<td>1969</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
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Note.—Figures in the Number of Incidents column reflect individual terrorist actions regardless of single or multiple targets.
APPENDIX II

ANNUAL STATISTICS PERTAINING TO SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF TERRORIST CRIMES

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<th>Year</th>
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APPENDIX III

TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF COMMUNIST INSPIRATION

Antifascismo Militante (Militant Anti-Fascism)
Autonomia Operaia (Workers' Autonomy)
Autonomia Operaia per il Comunismo (Workers' Autonomy for Communism)
Avanguardia Comunista (Communist Vanguard)
Azione Combatteute per il Comunismo (Combatants' Action for Communism)
Banda Armata per il Comunismo (Armed Band for Communism)
Bande Proletarie Pendolari (Proletarian Commuters Bands)
Brigade Antifasciste (Anti-Fascist Brigades)
Brigate Armate Comuniste (Armed Communist Brigades)
Brigate Combatteute Proletarie (Combatant Proletarian Brigades)
Brigate Comuniste (Communist Brigades)
Brigate per il Comunismo (Brigades for Communism)
Brigate Rossi (Red Brigades)
Cellule Combatteute Comuniste (Combatant Communist Cells)
Cellule Comuniste (Communist Cells)
Cellule Comuniste Territoriali (Communist Territorial Cells)
Cellule Rivoluzionarie (Revolutionary Cells)
Circolo XXII Ottobre (October 22 Circle)
Comando Antifascista Armati (Anti-Fascist Armed Command)
Comando Comunita di Contropotere Territoriale (Territorial Counterpower Communist Command)
Comando Comunista Territoriale (Communist Territorial Command)
Comando Rivoluzionario (Revolutionary Command)
Comitati Combatteuti per il Comunismo (Combatants for Communism)
Comitati Clandestini di Contropotere per la Lotta Rivoluzionaria (Clandestine Counterpower Committees for Revolutionary Struggle)
Comitati Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Committees)
Comitato di Lotta per il Comunismo (Struggle Committee for Communism)
Comitato di Lotta agli Studi Professionali (Struggle Committee for Professional Education)
Comitato Lotta per la Casa (Struggle Committee for Housing)
Compagnie Comuniste Combattenti (Communist Combatant Comrades)
Compagni Antifascisti Organizzati (Organized Anti-Fascist Comrades)
Compagni di Lotta Armata per il Comunismo (Armed Struggle Comrades for Communism)
Compagni Organizzati (Organized Comrades)
Compagni Organizzati Contro la Selezione (Organized Comrades Against Selection)
Compagni Organizzati in Nuclei Partigiani (Comrades Organized in Partisan Nuclei)
Compagni Organizzati per il Comunismo (Organized Comrades for Communism)
Compagni Organizzati-Volante Rossa (Organized Comrades-Red Strike Force)
Comunisti Combattenti (Communist Combatants)
Comunisti Organizzati (Organized Communists)
Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communists)
Contropotere Armato per il Comunismo (Armed Counterpower for Communism)
Contropotere Comunista (Communist Counterpower)
Contropotere Operaio (Workers' Counterpower)
Contropotere Popolare (Popular Counterpower)
Contropotere Proletario (Proletarian Counterpower)
Corpi di Liberi-Frazione Combattenti Comunisti (Free Forces—Communist Combatant Faction)
Donne Organizzate Proletarie (Organized Proletarian Women)
Esercito di Liberazione Comunista (Army of Communist Liberation)
Formazioni Combattenti Comuniste (Communist Combatant Formations)
Formazioni Comuniste Organizzate (Organized Communist Formations)
Forze Armate per il Comunismo (Armed Forces for Communism)
Forze Armate Proletarie per il Comunismo (Proletarian Armed Forces for Communism)
Fronte Combattente Comunista (Combatant Communist Front)
Fronte Comunista per il Contropotere (Communist Front for Counterpower)
Fuochi Metropolitani per la Rappresaglia Comunista (Metropolitan Fires for Communist Retribution)
Gatti Selvaggi (Wild Cats)
Giovani Proletari Organizzati per il Comunismo (Young Proletarians Organized for Communism)
Giovventù Organizzata per il Comunismo (Organized Youth for Communism)
Giovventù Popolare Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Popular Youth)
Giustizia Comunista (Communist Justice)
Giustizia Proletaria (Proletarian Justice)
Gruppi Armati Anti-fascisti (Armed Anti-Fascist Groups)
Gruppi Armati per il Contropotere Territoriale (Armed Groups for Territorial Counterpower)
Gruppi Armati Proletari (Armed Proletarian Groups)
Gruppi di Azione Partigiana (Partisan Action Groups)
Gruppi Comunisti Armati Territoriali (Armed Territorial Communist Groups)
Gruppi Comunisti di Combattimento (Communist Combat Groups)
Gruppi Comunisti Organizzati (Organized Communist Groups)
Gruppi Comunisti per il Contropotere Territoriale (Communist Groups for Territorial Counterpower)
Gruppi Comunisti Proletari (Proletarian Communist Groups)
Gruppi Organizzati per l’Azione Diretta (Organized Groups for Direct Action)
Gruppi Proletari Organizzati (Organized Proletarian Groups)
Gruppi Proletari Organizzati Armati (Organized Armed Proletarian Groups)
Gruppi Rivoluzionari per il Comunismo (Revolutionary Groups for Communism)
Gruppi Territoriali Anti-fascisti (Anti-Fascist Territorial Groups)
Gruppi Territoriali Comunisti Metropolitani (Communist Metropolitan Territorial Groups)
Gruppi Urbani Popolari (Popular Urban Groups)
Gruppo Armato Comunista (Armed Communist Group)
Gruppo Armato Rivoluzionario (Armed Revolutionary Group)
Gruppo Armato Rivoluzionario per il Comunismo (Armed Revolutionary Group for Communism)
Gruppo Compagni Organizzati per il Comunismo (Group of Organized Comrades for Communism)
Gruppo Comunista Liberazione Carceraria (Communist Group for Prison Liberation)
Gruppo Comunista Territoriale (Communist Territorial Group)
Gruppo Controllo Comunista (Group for Communist Control)
Gruppo Contropotere per il Comunismo (Counterpower Group for Communism)
Gruppo di Azione Proletaria (Proletarian Action Group)
Gruppo di Azione Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Action Group)
Gruppo Giovani Proletari dell’Autonomia Diffusa (Group of Diffused Autonomy)
Gruppi Operai Comunisti Combattenti (Communist Combatant Workers' Group)
Gruppo Popolare Urbano (Popular Urban Group)
Gruppo Proletario (Proletarian Group)
Gruppo Proletario di Guerriglia (Proletarian Guerrilla Group)
Gruppo Proletario per il Comunismo (Proletarian Group for Communism)
Gruppo Rivoluzionario (Revolutionary Group)
Guardia Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Guard)
Guardie Comunista Territoriali (Communist Territorial Guards)
Guerriglia Armata di Lavoratori (Workers' Armed Guerrilla)
Guerriglia Comunista (Communist Guerrilla)
Guerriglia Comunista Combattente (Combatant Communist Guerrilla)
Guerriglia Proletaria (Proletarian Guerrilla)
Guerriglia Proletaria per il Comunismo (Proletarian Guerrilla for Communism)
Guerriglia Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Guerrilla)
Guerriglia Rossa (Red Guerrilla)
Guerriglieri Comunisti (Red Guerrilla Fighters)
I Nuovi Partigiani (The New Partisans)
Lotta Armata per il Comunismo (Armed Struggle for Communism)
Lotta Armata per la Rivoluzione (Armed Struggle for Revolution)
Lotta Armata Proletaria (Proletarian Armed Struggle)
Lotta Comunista (Communist Struggle)
Lotta per il Comunismo (Struggle for Communism)
Lotta Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Struggle)
Morte al Fascio (Death to the Fasces)
Movimento Comunista Combattente (Communist Combatant Movement)
Movimento Comunista Rivoluzionario (Revolutionary Communist Movement)
Movimento Giovanile Comunista (Communist Youth Movement)
Movimento Popolare di Liberazione (Popular Liberation Movement)
Movimento Proletario Contro il Fascismo (Proletarian Movement Against Fascism)
Movimento Proletario di Resistenza Offensiva (Offensive Resistance Proletarian Movement)
Movimento Proletario Antifascista (Anti-Fascist Proletarian Movement)
Movimento Rivoluzionario di Liberazione (Revolutionary Liberation Movement)
Nuclei Antifascisti (Anti-Fascist Nuclei)
Nuclei Antifascisti Comunisti (Anti-Fascist Communist Nuclei)
Nuclei Antifascisti Territoriali (Territorial Anti-Fascist Nuclei)
Nuclei Armati Comunisti (Communist Armed Nuclei)
Nuclei Armati Combattenti per il Comunismo (Combatant Armed Nuclei for Communism)
Nuclei Armati contro la Repressione (Armed Nuclei Against Repression)
Nuclei Armati Organizzati Comunisti (Communist Organized Armed Nuclei)
Nuclei Armati per il Comunismo (Armed Nuclei for Communism)
Nuclei Armati per il Contropotere (Armed Nuclei for Counterpower)
Nuclei Armati per il Contropotere Popolare (Armed Nuclei for Popular Counterpower)
Nuclei Armati per il Potere Operaio (Armed Nuclei for Workers' Power)
Nuclei Armati Proletari (Armed Proletarian Nuclei)
Nuclei Armati Proletari per il Comunismo (Armed Proletarian Nuclei for Communism)
Nuclei Armati Rossi (Red Armed Nuclei)
Nuclei Armati Territoriali (Armed Territorial Nuclei)
Nuclei Azione Proletaria Armata (Nuclei for Armed Proletarian Action)
Nuclei Azione Proletaria Organizzata (Nuclei for Organized Proletarian Action)
Nuclei Combattenti Comunisti (Communist Combatant Nuclei)
Nuclei Comunisti Armati (Armed Communist Nuclei)
Nuclei Comunisti Contro il Carovita (Communist Nuclei Against the High Cost of Living)
Nuclei Comunisti Organizzati (Organized Communist Nuclei)
Nuclei Comunisti Organizzati per il Contropotere Territoriale (Organized Communist Nuclei for Territorial Counterpower)
Nuclei Comunisti per la Guerriglia Proletaria (Communist Nuclei for Proletarian Guerrilla)
Nuclei Comunisti Territoriali (Communist Territorial Nuclei)
Nuclei Contropotere Proletario (Proletarian Counterpower Nuclei)
Nuclei Contropotere Territoriale (Territorial Counterpower Nuclei)
Nuclei di Azione Comunisti (Communist Action Nuclei)
Nuclei di Contraffermazione Territoriale (Territorial Counterinformation Nuclei)
Nuclei di Fuoco Comunisti (Communist Fire Nuclei)
Nuclei Guerriglieri Proletaria (Proletarian Guerrilla Nuclei)
Nuclei Iniziativa Popolare (Popular Initiative Nuclei)
Nuclei Operai Combattenti (Combatant Workers' Nuclei)
Nuclei Organizzati di Compagni (Comrades’ Organized Nuclei)
Nuclei Organizzati per l’Antifascismo (Organized Nuclei for Anti-Fascism)
Nuclei per la Costruzione del Movimento Comunista Rivoluzionario (Nuclei for the Construction of the Communist Revolutionary Movement)
Nuclei per l’Organizzazione Comunista (Nuclei for Communist Organization)
Nuclei Proletari (Proletarian Nuclei)
Nuclei Proletari Combattenti (Proletarian Combatant Nuclei)
Nuclei Proletari Combattenti Comunisti (Communist Proletarian Combatant Nuclei)
Nuclei Proletari Comunisti (Communist Proletarian Nuclei)
Nuclei Proletari Pendolari (Proletarian Commuters’ Nuclei)
Nuclei Rivoluzionari Antimperialisti (Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Nuclei)
Nuclei Rivoluzionari Combattenti (Combatant Revolutionary Nuclei)
Nuclei Rivoluzionari di Contropotere (Revolutionary Counterpower Nuclei)
Nuclei Rivoluzionari per il Comunismo e la Libertà (Revolutionary Nuclei for Communism and Freedom)
Nucleo Armato Comunista (Communist Armed Nucleus)
Nucleo Armato per il Movimento Proletario Offensivo (Armed Nucleus for the Proletarian Offensive Movement)
Nucleo Combattente per il Contropotere Territoriale (Combatant Nucleus for Territorial Counterpower)
Nucleo Comunista (Communist Nucleus)
Nucleo Comunista Armato Proletario (Communist Armed Proletarian Nucleus)
Nucleo Comunista Combattenti per il Movimento Proletario di Resistenza Offensiva (Communist Nucleus of Combatants for the Offensive Resistance Proletarian Movement)
Nucleo di Controinformazione Territoriale (Territorial Counterinformation Nucleus)
Nucleo Operai Comunisti (Communist Workers’ Nucleus)
Nucleo Operativo per il Potere Rosso (Operative Nucleus for Red Power)
Nucleo Proletario per il Potere Rosso (Proletarian Nucleus for Red Power)
Nuova Formazione Partigiana della Nuova Resistenza (New Partisan Formation of the New Resistance)
Offensiva Comunista (Communist Offensive)
Operai Comunisti Combattenti (Communist Combatant Workers)
Opposizione Popolare Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Popular Opposition)
Organizzazione Armata Proletaria (Armed Proletarian Organization)
Organizzazione Operaia per il Comunismo (Workers’ Organization for Communism)
Organizzazione Proletaria Combattente (Proletarian Combatant Organization)
Partito Combattente Comunista (Combatant Communist Party)
Popolo Armato-Gruppo 1 Maggio (Armed People—May 1st Group)
Prima Linea (Front Line)
Prima Posizione (Front Position)
Proletari Armati Comunisti (Armed Communist Proletarians)
Proletari Armati per il Comunismo (Armed Proletarians for Communism)
Proletari Armati per il Contropotere Rivoluzionario (Armed Proletarians for Revolutionary Counterpower)
Proletari Armati per il Contropotere Territoriale (Armed Proletarians for Territorial Counterpower)
Proletari Combattenti Comunisti (Combatant Communist Proletarians)
Proletari Combattenti per il Comunismo (Proletarian Combatants for Communism)
Proletari Comunisti (Communist Proletarians)
Proletari Comunisti Organizzati (Organized Communist Proletarians)
Proletari Comunisti per il Contropotere (Communist Proletarians for Counterpower)
Proletari Metropolitani (Metropolitan Proletarians)
Proletari Metropolitani senza Salario (Metropolitan Proletarians without Salary)
Proletari Organizzati per il Comunismo (Organized Proletarians for Communism)
Proletari per l’Offensiva Comunista per Combattere il Sistema (Proletarians for Communist Offensive to Fight the Establishment)
Proletariato Armato (Armed Proletariat)
Proletarie in Lotta (She-Proletarians in the Struggle)
Rapressaglia Comunista (Communist Reprisal)
Reparti Comunisti Armati (Armed Communist Units)
Reparti Comunisti d’Assalto (Communist Assault Units)
Reparti Proletari di Combattimento (Proletarian Combat Units)
Rivolta Socialista (Socialist Revolt)
Ronda del Proletariato (Proletarian Patrol)
Ronde Antifasciste (Anti-Fascist Patrols)
Ronde Armate Comuniste (Armed Communist Patrols)
Ronde Armate per il Comunismo (Armed Patrols for Communism)
Ronde Armate Proletarie (Armed Proletarian Patrols)
Ronde Armate Proletarie contro la Selezione (Armed Proletarian Patrols Against Selection)
Ronde Comuniste (Communist Patrols)
Ronde Comuniste contro i licenziamenti (Communist Patrols Against Dismissals)
Ronde Comuniste d’Assalto (Communist Assault Patrols)
Ronde Comuniste Organizzate (Organized Communist Patrols)
Ronde Comuniste Patrolar per il Contropotere Territoriale (Communist Proletarian Patrols for Territorial Counterpower)
Ronde Operaie per il Contropotere Territoriale (Workers' Patrols for Territorial Counterpower)
Ronde Proletarie (Proletarian Patrols)
Ronde Proletarie Antifasciste (Anti-Fascist Proletarian Patrols)
Ronde Proletarie Antifasciste per il Contropotere Territoriale (Anti-Fascist Proletarian Patrols for Territorial Counterpower)
Ronde Proletarie per il Comunismo (Proletarian Patrols for Communism)
Ronde Proletarie di Combattimento (Proletarian Combat Patrols)
Ronde Proletarie per il Contropotere Territoriale (Proletarian Patrols for Territorial Counterpower)
Ronde Staliniiste per il Combattimento (Stalinist Combat Patrols)
Ronde Territoriali per il Comunismo (Territorial Proletarian Patrols for Communism)
Ronde Territoriali per il Comunismo (Territorial Patrols for Communism)
Ronde Territoriali di Vigilanza Antifascista (Territorial Patrols for Anti-Fascist Vigilance)
Squadre Antifasciste (Anti-Fascist Squads)
Squadre Antifasciste Territoriali (Anti-Fascist Territorial Squads)
Squadre Armate Antirepressive (Anti-Repressive Armed Squads)
Squadre Armate Combattenti (Combatant Armed Squads)
Squadre Armate Comuniste (Communist Armed Squads)
Squadre Armate Operaie (Workers' Armed Squads)
Squadre Armate per la Lotta di Liberazione Comunista (Armed Squads for the Communist Liberation Struggle)
Squadre Armate Proletarie (Proletarian Armed Squads)
Squadre Armate Proletarie di Combattimento (Armed Proletarian Combat Squads)
Squadre Armate Territoriali per il Comunismo (Territorial Proletarian Squads for Communism)
Squadre Comuniste Combattenti (Communist Combat Squads)
Squadre Comuniste dell’Esercito Proletario (Communist Squads of the Proletarian Army)
Squadre Comuniste Proletarie (Communist Proletarian Squads)
Squadre Comuniste Territoriali (Communist Territorial Squads)
Squadre di Combattimento Proletarie (Proletarian Combat Squads)
Squadre Proletarie per il Controllo Territoriale (Proletarian Squads for Territorial Control)
Studenti Proletari (Proletarian Students)
Unione Bande Armate Proletarie (Union of Proletarian Armed Bands)
Unione Gruppi Armati Proletari (Union of Proletarian Armed Groups)
Unità Combatteuti Comuniste (Communist Combat Units)
Unità Proletarie Revoluzionarie (Revolutionary Proletarian Units)
Unità Proletarie Territoriali (Proletarian Territorial Units)
Unità Territoriali Comuniste (Communist Territorial Units)
Vigilanza Comunista (Communist Vigilance)
Volante Rossa (Red Strike Force)

APPENDIX IV

TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF NEO-FASCIST INSPIRATION

Alleanza Anticomunista (Anti-Communist Alliance)
Alleanza Armata Anticomunista (Anti-Communist Armed Alliance)
Alleanza Armata Popolare Nazionalista (Popular Nationalist Armed Alliance)
Avanguardia Militare Neofascista (Neo-Fascist Military Vanguard)
Avanguardia Nazionale (National Vanguard)
Azione Anticomunista (Anti-Communist Action)
Azione Nazista Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Nazi Action)
Bande Fasciste (Fascist Bands)
Belve Nere (Black Beasts)
Brigate Nere (Black Brigades)
Comitati Autonomi Nazionali Rivoluzionari (National Revolutionary Autonomous Committees)
Comitato Nazionale Rivoluzionario (National Revolutionary Committee)
Comunità Organiche di Popolo (Organic Communities of the People)
Comunità per la Rivoluzione di Popolo (Community for the Revolution of the People)
Comunità Rivoluzionarie Autonome (Autonomous Revolutionary Communities)
Coordinamento Comitati Fascisti (Fascist Committees Coordination)
Corpo Armato Nero (Black Armed Corps)
Esercito Clandestino Anticomunista (Anti-Communist Clandestine Army)
Fraternanza Ariana (Arian Brotherhood)
Fronte Organizzato per la Libertà dell’Ordine (Organized Front for the Freedom of Order)
Fronte Paramilitare di Azione Rivoluzionaria (Paramilitary Front of Revolutionary Action)
Fronte Revoluzionario Anticomunista (Anti-Communist Revolutionary Front)
Fronte Unito Rivoluzionario (United Revolutionary Front)
Giovani Fascisti (Young Fascists)
Gioventù Ariana (Arian Youth)
Gioventù Nazista (Nazi Youth)
Giustizieri d’Italia (Executioners of Italy)
Gruppi Armati Fascisti (Armed Fascist Groups)
Gruppo Armato Nazista (Armed Nazi Group)
Gruppo di Fascisti Combattenti (Group of Fascist Combatants)
Gruppo Falangisti per l’Ordine (Phalangists’ Group for Order)
Gruppo Fascista Italiano (Italian Fascist Group)
Gruppo Gioventù Nazifascista (Nazi-Fascist Youth Group)
Gruppo Nero (Black Group)
Gruppo Rivoluzionario Nazista (Revolutionary Nazi Group)
Guerriglieri Nazifascisti Brigate Nere (Nazi-Fascist Guerrilla Fighters Black Brigades)
Movimento Azione Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Action Movement)
Movimento Rivoluzionario Popolare (Popular Revolutionary Movement)
Movimento Politico Fronte Nero (Political Movement Black Front)
Neo fascisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Neo-Fascists)
Nuclei Anticomunisti Urbani (Anti-Communist Urban Nuclei)
Nuclei Armati Fascisti (Armed Fascist Nuclei)
Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (Armed Revolutionary Nuclei)
Nuclei Fascisti Organizzati (Organized Fascist Nuclei)
Nuclei Fascisti Rivoluzionari (Fascist Revolutionary Nuclei)
Nucleo Fascista di Guerra Rivoluzionaria (Fascist Nucleus for Revolutionary Guerrilla)
Nuova Fenice (New Phoenix)
Ordine Futuro (Future Order)
Ordine Nazionalsocialista (National Socialist Order)
Ordine Nero (Black Order)
Ordine Nuovo (New Order)
Organizzazione Clandestina Fascismo Militante (Militant Fascism Clandestine Organization)
Organizzazione Resistenza Anticomunista (Anti-Communist Resistance Organization)
Soldati Combattenti per l’Ordine Nuovo (Combatant Soldiers for New Order)
Squadre Antiterrorismo (Antiterrorism Squads)
Squadre Armate Combattenti Fasciste (Armed Combatant Fascist Squads)
Squadre Azione Mussolini (Mussolini Action Squads)
Squadre Armate Naziste (Armed Nazi Squads)
Squadre di Azione Nazifasciste (Nazi-Fascist Action Squads)
Terrore Nero (Black Terror)
Terza Posizione (Third Position)
Unità Organiche di Popolo (People’s Organic Units)
Unità Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Unity)
APPENDIX V

TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF ANARCHIST INSPIRATION

Anarchia Armata (Armed Anarchy)
Associazione Rivoluzionaria Anarchici (Revolutionary Association of Anarchists)
Azione Diretta—Gruppo Rivoluzionario Anarchico (Direct Action—Anarchist Revolutionary Group)
Azione Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Action)
Cellule Anarchiche Organizzate (Organized Anarchist Cells)
Comitato Centrale Sacco-Vanzetti (Central Committee “Sacco-Vanzetti”)
Gruppi Anarchici Individualisti (Individualist Anarchist Groups)
Gruppo Anarchico Bakunin (Anarchist Group “Bakunin”)
Gruppo Anarchico Contropotere (Anarchist Counterpower Group)
Nucleo Anarco Comunista (Anarchist Communist Nucleus)
Nuovo Nucleo Anarchico (New Anarchist Nucleus)
Organizzazione Rivoluzionaria Anarchica (Anarchist Revolutionary Organization)

APPENDIX VI

TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF SEPARATIST INSPIRATION

SARDINIA

Barbagia Rossa (Red Barbagia)
Brigate Proletarie della Barbagia (Proletarian Brigades of Barbagia)
Combatentis Rivoluzionariusi Sardus
Comitato Rivoluzionario Sardo per il Comunismo (Sardinian Revolutionary Committee for Communism)
Fronte Nazionale di Liberazione della Sardegna (National Front for the Liberation of Sardinia)
Fronte Rivoluzionario Indipendentista Sardo (Sardinian Independent Revolutionary Front)
Nuclei Rivoluzionari Sardi (Sardinian Revolutionary Nuclei)
Ronde Proletarie Sarde (Sardinian Proletarian Patrols)

TRENTINO—ALTO ADIGE (SOUTH TYROL)

Befreiungsauusschuss Suedtirol
Heimatbund Tirol

APPENDIX VII

TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF NATIONALISTIC COUNTERSEPARATIST INSPIRATION

Associazione Protezione Italiani (Association for the Protection of Italians)
Combattenti Italiani per l’Alto Adige (Italian Combatants for Alto Adige)
Movimento Italiano Adige (Italian Adige Movement)
Nuclei Difesa Territoriale Triestina (Nuclei for the Territorial Defense of Trieste)

APPENDIX VIII

TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL INSPIRATION

Brigate Verdi (Green Brigades)
Gruppi Ecollogici Popolari (Popular Ecological Groups)
Nucleo d’Azione Ecologica Robin Hood (Ecological Action Group “Robin Hood”)

APPENDIX IX

TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF FEMINIST INSPIRATION

Compagne Organizzate per il Contropotere Femminista (Organized She-Comrades for Feminist Counterpower)
**APPENDIX X**

**TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF "INTERNATIONALIST" INSPIRATION**

Baader Meinhof
Brigate Internazionali contro la Repressione in Europa (International Brigades Against Repression in Europe)
Collettivo Veneziano Belfast (Venetian Belfast Collective)
Gruppi Proletari Internazionali (International Proletarian Groups)
Gruppo Internazionalista Proletario (International Proletarian Group)
Movimento Eurorivoluzionario Antimperialista (Euro-Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Movement)
Nucleo Internazionalista Proletario (Internationalist Proletarian Nucleus)

**APPENDIX XI**

**TERRORIST FORMATIONS WITH "TRANSNATIONAL" OBJECTIVES**

**ARMENIAN ORGANIZATIONS**

Commando della Giustizia per il Genocidio Armeno (Justice Commando for the Armenian Genocide)
Esercito Segreto per la Liberazione dell'Armenia (Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia)
Gruppo della Resistenza Armena (Armenian Resistance Group)
Organizzazione Armena per la Lotta Armata (Armenian Organization for the Armed Struggle)
Organizzazione 3 Ottobre (October 3 Organization)

**PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS**

Organizzazione del Libano Nero (Black Lebanon Organization)
Organizzazione del 15 Maggio per la Liberazione della Palestina (May 15th Organization for the Liberation of Palestine)

**APPENDIX XII**

**CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIONS PERPETRATED BY MAJOR SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF COMMunist INSPIRATION**

**RED BRIGADES (BRIGATE ROSSE—BR)**

March 3, 1972.—Milan. Political abduction of Idalgo Macchievini, personnel manager, Sit-Siemens (Corp.). Released same day.
March 18, 1972.—Cesano Boscone (Milan). Political abduction of Bartolomeo Di Mino, deputy secretary of the local MSI section. Released same day.
February 12, 1973.—Turin. Political abduction of Bruno Labate, provincial secretary of CISNAI Metalworkers. Released same day.
June 28, 1973.—Milan. Political abduction of Michele Mincuzzi, executive employee, Alfa Romeo (Corp.). Released same day.
December 10, 1973.—Turin. Political abduction of Ettore Amerio, personnel manager, FIAT (Corp.). Released on December 18.
April 18, 1974.—Genoa. Political abduction of Mario Sossi, Assistant State Attorney. Released on May 23.
October 14, 1974.—Robbiano di Mediglia (Milan). Murder of Carabinieri NCO Felice Maritano during a fire engagement.
December 5, 1974.—Argelato (Bologna). Murder of Carabinieri NCO Andrea Lombardini during an abortive bank robbery.
May 15, 1975.—Milan. Wounding of Christian Democratic councilman Masimo De Carolis during raid on his law office.


October 21, 1975.—Rivoli (Turin). Political abduction and wounding of Enrico Bossa, Christian Democratic municipal councilman and plant manager, Singer (Corp.) released same day.

October 22, 1975.—Arenzano (Genoa). Political abduction of Vincenzo Casabona, personnel manager, Ansaldo Nucleare (Corp.) released same day.

December 17, 1975.—Turin. Wounding of Luigi Solera, medical officer, Miraflorio Plant, FIAT (Corp.).

April 2, 1976.—Milan. Wounding of Matteo Palmieri, private security guard, Magneti Marelli (Corp.).

April 4, 1976.—Nichelino (Turin). Wounding of Giuseppe Borello, foreman, Miraflorio Plant, FIAT (Corp.).

June 8, 1976.—Genoa. Murder of State Attorney Francesco Coco and of escort members, public security NCO Giovanni Saponara and Carabinieri trooper Antico Deiana.

September 1, 1976.—Biella (Vercelli). Murder of Deputy Police Commissioner Francesco Cusano.


January 12, 1977.—Belvedere Montalto (Genoa). Abduction for ransom of Piero Costa, shipowner. Released on April 3, after payment of Lit. 1.5 billion.


February 17, 1977.—Turin. Wounding of Mario Scaffone, personnel manager, Rivolta Plant, FIAT (Corp.).


April 20, 1977.—Turin. Wounding of Dane Notaristefano, Chief Secretary of the State Attorney’s Office and Christian Democratic councilman.

April 22, 1977.—Turin. Wounding of Antonio Munari, foreman, Miraflorio Plant, FIAT (Corp.).

April 28, 1977.—Turin. Murder of Fulvio Croce, president of the local bar association.

June 1, 1977.—Genoa. Wounding of Vittorio Bruno, editor of daily Secolo XIX.


June 9, 1977.—Sesto S. Giovanni (Milan). Wounding of Fausto Silini, foreman, Breda (Corp.).

June 12, 1977.—Milan. Wounding of two Carabinieri assigned to protect Mario Triamichi, Chief Judge of the local Court of Appeals.

June 21, 1977.—Rome. Wounding of Remo Caccialusta, Dean, School of Economics, University of Rome.

June 28, 1977.—Genoa. Wounding of Sergio Prandi, executive employee, Ansaldo (Corp.).

June 30, 1977.—Milan. Wounding of Luciano Maraccani, executive employee, OMFIAT (Corp.).

June 30, 1977.—Turin. Wounding of Franco Visca, executive employee, Miraflorio Plant, FIAT (Corp.).


October 11, 1977.—Turin. Wounding of Rinaldo Camaioni, executive employee, Personnel Office, Miraflorio Plant, FIAT (Corp.).


November 8, 1977.—Milan. Wounding of Aldo Grassini, executive employee, Alfa Romeo (Corp.).

November 10, 1977.—Turin. Wounding of Pietro Osella, executive employee, FIAT (Corp.).

November 17, 1977.—Genoa. Wounding of Carlo Castellani, executive employee, Ansaldo (Corp.), and PCI regional committee member.

November 29, 1977.—Turin. Demise of Carlo Casalegno, Deputy Editor of daily La Stampa, following firearm attack of November 16.

December 24, 1977.—Rome. Wounding of Mario Pucci, journalist and wife Franca Mosco.

January 10, 1978.—Turin. Wounding of Gustavo Ghiorri, executive employee, FIAT (Corp.).


January 24, 1978.—Milan. Wounding of Nicola Toma, Public Relations Office, Sit-Siemens (Corp.).

February 14, 1978.—Rome. Murder of Riccardo Moro, Supreme Court Judge detailed to the Ministry of Justice.


April 7, 1978.—Genoa. Wounding of Felice Schiavetti, president of the local association of industrialists.


April 20, 1978.—Milan. Wounding of Francesco De Cataldo, prison guard NCO.


April 27, 1978.—Turin. Wounding of Sergio Palmieri, executive employee, Miraflorio Plant, FIAT (Corp.).

May 4, 1978.—Milan. Wounding of Umberto Degli Innocenti, manager, Castelletto Plant, Sit-Siemens (Corp.).

May 4, 1978.—Genoa. Wounding of Alfredo Lamberti, executive employee, Alpalsaider (Corp.).

May 9, 1978.—Rome. Murder of captive Aldo Moro.


May 15, 1978.—Bologna. Wounding of Antonio Mazzotti, personnel manager, Memm (Corp.).


July 5, 1978.—Milan. Wounding of Gavino Manca, executive employee, Pavelli (Corp.).

July 6, 1978.—Turin. Wounding of Aldo Ravaolo, president of the local small industry association.


September 28, 1978.—Turin. Murder of Pietro Coggiola, executive employee, Chiasvasso Plant, Lancia (Corp.).

September 29, 1978.—Milan. Wounding of Ippolito Restonso, executive employee, Alfa Romeo (Corp.).


December 15, 1978.—Turin. Murder of public security patrolmen Salvatore Lanza and Salvatore Porceddu assigned to external surveillance duties in the proximity of the local prison.


January 20, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of public security patrolmen Francesco Sanna and Angelo Calì during a fire engagement.

January 24, 1979.—Genoa. Murder of CGIL labor union representative Guido Rossa, a PCI member who had testified against a HR "courier."

March 27, 1979.—Cittadella (Naples). Wounding of prison guard Giacomo Vegliante.


April 24, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of Franco Piccinelli, journalist with TGI television news cast and Christian Democratic exponent.


April 30, 1979.—Genoa. Wounding of Giuseppe Bonzani, executive employee, Ansuldo (Corp.).


May 31, 1979.—Genoa. Wounding of Fausto Cuocolo, Christian Democratic regional councilman and Dean, School of Political Science, University of Genoa.

June 8, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of Giovanni Farina, watchman, FIAT (Corp.).


October 4, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of Cesare Varetto, executive employee, FIAT (Corp.).


November 9, 1979.—Murder of public security patrolman Michele Granato.

November 21, 1979.—Sampierdarena (Genoa). Murder of Carabinieri NCO Vittorio Battaglini and trooper Mario Tosa.


December 12, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of Adriano Albertini, foreman, Mirafiori Plant, FIAT (Corp.).


January 8, 1980.—Milan. Murder of public security NCO Rocco Santoro and patrolmen Antonio Cestari and Michele Tatulli.

January 13, 1980.—Rome. Wounding of 18 public security personnel resulting from the detonation of an explosive device in the "Massana" Barracks. (Responsibility also claimed by the Popular Movement for Revolution and Communist Patrois for Territorial Counterpower.)


January 29, 1980.—Mestre (Venice). Murder of Sergio Gori, manager, Marghera Plant, Petrochimico (Corp.).

February 12, 1980.—Rome. Murder of Vittorio Hachelet, Vice-President of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, Professor of Administrative Law, and former President of Catholic Action.

February 21, 1980.—Milan. Wounding of Piero Dall'Era, executive employee, Ares Plant, Alfa Romeo (Corp.).

February 29, 1980.—Genoa. Wounding of Roberto Della Rocca, personnel manager, Cantieri Navali Rizzini (Corp.).


March 18, 1980.—Rome. Murder of Girolamo Minervini, Supreme Court Judge, and wounding of bystanders Roberto Aversa, Maria Aversa, and Gina Latini.
May 12, 1980.—Mestre (Venice). Murder of Alfredo Albanese, public security official.
May 20, 1980.—Milan. Attack on a Carabinieri barracks with a grenade launcher and wounding of trooper Maurizio Marcovati.
June 19, 1980.—Turin. Murder of Pasquale Viale, local prison inmate accused of being a “spy.”
October 27, 1980.—Nuoro. Murder of prison inmates Biagio Giaquinto and Francesco Zarillo during uprising led by jailed red brigadists.
November 12, 1980.—Milan. Murder of Renato Briano, general manager, Ercole Marello (Corp.).
November 13, 1980.—Civitella Alfetana (L'Aquila). Wounding of Carabinieri trooper Antonio De Crescenzo during an armed robbery.
November 28, 1980.—Milan. Murder of Manfredo Mazzanti, executive employee, Falk (Corp.).
December 11, 1980.—Rome. Wounding of Maurizio Caramello, executive employee, Breda (Corp.).
December 28, 1980.—Trani (Bari). Wounding of five prison guards during internal uprising. Nineteen hostages freed by the Carabinieri Special Intervention Groups (GIS) on December 29.
February 17, 1981.—Milan. Murder of Luigi Marangoni, M.D., director of the local hospital.
February 26, 1981.—Matera. Wounding of prison guard Immacolata Schiuma by two jailed red brigadists.
March 12, 1981.—Milan. Wounding of Alberto Valenzasca, foreman, Alfa Romeo (Corp.).
April 27, 1981.—Torre del Greco (Naples). Political abduction of Christian Democratic regional councilman Ciro Cirillo; murder of his two-man escort; public security NCO Luigi Carboni and driver Mario Cancelli; and wounding of his secretary, Ciro Fiorilli. Released on July 24.
May 20, 1981.—Marghera (Venice). Political abduction of Giuseppe Taliernio, executive employee, Montedison (Corp.).


July 6, 1981.—Mestre (Venice). Murder of Giuseppe Taliercio after 46 days of captivity.


July 30, 1981.—Rome. Armed robbery of SIP payroll in the amount of Lit. 736 million and wounding of private security guard Luciano Careddu and bystander Roberta Hoschioli.


October 19, 1981.—Milan. Murder of public security patrolmen Vincenzo Tuminello and Carlo Bonantuono and wounding of patrolman Franco Epifanio and bystander Angelo Baiati during fire engagement.


April 10, 1982.—Rome. Wounding of Carabinieri NCO Giulio Gregori and troopers Francesco Valori and Michele Scaringella during attack on special facilities for the trial of the Rome column of the BR.


June 8, 1982.—Rome. Murder of state police agents Franco Sammarco and Giuseppe Carretta.


July 16, 1982.—Lissone (Milan). Murder of Carabinieri NCO Valerio Renzi. (Responsibility also claimed by Front Position.)


August 26, 1982.—Salerno. Assault on two army vehicles to seize weapons; murder of soldier Antonio Palumbo, state police agents Antonio Bandiera and Mario De Marco; and wounding of agents Salvatore Manci, Pasquale D’Amelio, soldiers Ventura Talamo, Sergio Garau, and bystanders Salvatore De Sio and Lorenzo Trevisone.

October 21, 1982.—Turin, Murder of private security guards Antonio Pedio and Sebastiano D’Alleo during armed robbery of Banco di Napoli.


**ARMED PROLETARIAN NUCLEI (NUCLI ARMATI PROLETARI—NAP)**

July 25, 1974.—Naples. Abduction for ransom of student Antonio Gargiulo, son of a prestigious local physician. Released on the same day after payment of Lit. 70 million.


December 18, 1974.—Naples. Abduction for ransom of liquor producer Giuseppe Moccia. Released on December 22, after payment of Lit. 1 billion.

May 6, 1975.—Rome. Political abduction of Supreme Court Judge Giuseppe Di Gennaro detailed to the Ministry of Justice. Released on May 11, after transfer of imprisoned NAP members to jails of their choice.

October 7, 1975.—Milan. Wounding of Carlo Vernich, prison guard NCO.


March 22, 1977.—Rome. Murder of public security patrolman Claudio Graziosi and zoological guard Angelo Cerrai during attempted apprehension of NAP member.

April 18, 1977.—Milan. Wounding of Bruno Rucano, personnel manager, Vanossi (Corp.).

FRONT LINE (PRIMA LINEA—PL)


June 22, 1977.—Pistoia. Wounding of Giancarlo Niccolai, Christian Democratic provincial deputy secretary and executive employee, Breda (Corp.).

June 24, 1977.—Milan. Wounding of Roberto Anzalone, M.D., provincial secretary of the participating physicians in the Medicare Program.


January 29, 1979.—Milan. Murder of Emilio Alessandri, assistant state attorney.

February 1, 1979.—Ragugno di Cremasco (Cremona). Wounding of Carabinieri NCO Camillo Mangini and trooper Raffaele Giardello.


March 5, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of public security patrolman Gaetano D’Angiullu and bystander student Enamuele Jurili during a fire engagement.

March 11, 1979.—Cologno Monzese (Milan). Wounding of four Carabinieri with an explosive device.


July 18, 1979.—Turin. Murder of snack bar owner Carmine Civitate.

September 21, 1979.—Turin. Murder of Carlo Ghiglione, manager, Planning Branch, FIAT (Corp.).

October 5, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of Piercarlo Andreoletti, managing director, Praxi (Corp.).


December 11, 1979.—Turin. Raid on the Industrial Management School and mass shooting of five instructors: Diego Pannoni, Vincenzo Musso, Lorenzo Vassile, Angelo Scordi, Paolo Turin; and five students: Tommaso Prete, Pietro Tantari, Giampaolo Giuliano, Renzo Peder, Giuliano Dall’Oechia.


February 5, 1980.—Monza (Milan). Murder of Paolo Paoletti, manager, Icmesa (Corp.).

February 6, 1980.—Rome. Murder of public security patrolman Maurizio Arnesano. (Responsibility also claimed by Armed Revolutionary Nuclei.)

February 7, 1980.—Milan. Murder of William Waccher, an extra-Parliamentary activist accused of being a “spy.”
February 26, 1980.—Viareggio (Lucca). Wounding of bank employee Enzo Bono during armed robbery of Banco del Monte.


September 22, 1980.—Rome. Assault on an army truck and wounding of soldier Giovanni Faga.

February 4, 1981.—Turin. Fire engagement with a public security motor patrol during the armed robbery of a jewelry store and wounding of two bystanders.

May 15, 1981.—Mongrendo (Vercelli). Murder of private security guard Antonio Rinaldo during a bank robbery.


APPENDIX XIII

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIONS PERPETRATED BY MINOR SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF COMMUNIST INSPIRATION

OCTOBER XXII CIRCLE (CIRCOLO XXII OTTOBRE)

October 5, 1970.—Genoa. Abduction for ransom of Sergio Gadolla, member of a family of wealthy constructors. Released on October 11 after payment of Lit. 200 million.


CLASS WARFARE FOR COMMUNISM (GUERRA DI CLASSE PER IL COMUNISMO)

June 19, 1975.—Rivalta (Turin). Wounding of Paolo Fossati, executive employee, FIAT (Corp.).

CLASS STRUGGLE (LUTTA DI CLASSE)

November 11, 1975.—Milan. Wounding of Valerio Di Marco, personnel manager, Leyland-Innocenti (Corp.).

ARMED STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNISM (LUTTA ARMATA PER IL COMUNISMO)

March 26, 1976.—Brembate di Sopra (Bergamo). Wounding of Dietrich Herkech, executive employee, Philco (Corp.).


June 28, 1981.—Milan. Wounding of graphics technician Sergio Albertario.

COMMUNIST COMBAT UNITS (UNITA COMBATTENTI COMUNISTE—UCC)

June 14, 1976.—Rome. Political abduction of meat dealer Giuseppe Ambrosio. Release made contingent upon distribution of 710 quintals of meat at below market prices. Victim freed by Carabinieri the following day before distribution could take place.


November 26, 1976.—Cassino (Frosinone). Wounding of Rocco Favolaro, accountant, Labor Union Office, FIAT (Corp.).

ARMED WORKERS’ SQUADS (SQUADRE OPERAIE ARMATE)

February 18, 1977.—Turin. Wounding of Bruno Diotti, foreman, FIAT (Corp.).
June 22, 1978.—Pomigliano d’Arco (Naples). Wounding of Salvatore Napoli, technician, Alfa Romeo (Corp.).

COMBATANTS FOR COMMUNISM (COMBATTENTI PER IL COMUNISMO)


COMBATANT WORKERS’ SQUADS (SQUADRE OPERAIE COMBATTENTI)

June 6, 1977.—Milan. Wounding of Giuseppe D’Ambrosio, foreman, Sit-Siemens (Corp.)

COMBATANT WORKERS FOR COMMUNISM (OPERAI COMBATTENTI PER IL COMUNISMO)

June 27, 1977.—Pollena Tracchia (Naples). Wounding of Vittorio Flich, executive employee, Alfa Romeo (Corp.).

COMBATANT COMMUNIST FRONT (FRONTE COMBATTENTE COMUNISTA)

September 26, 1979.—Padua. Wounding of Angelo Ventura, university professor.

PROLETARIAN ARMED SQUADS (SQUADRE ARMATE PROLETARIE)

September 26, 1977.—Varese. Detonation of explosive device in front of local Carabinieri station and wounding of trooper Michele Venci.
February 13, 1979.—Turin. Arson of Navona, construction firm, and wounding of employees Mario Navona, Gianluigi Brancatelli, and Giuseppe Sirze.

ARMED NUCLEI FOR TERRITORIAL COUNTERPOWER (NUCLEI ARMATI PER IL CONTROPOTERE TERRITORIALE)


UNEMPLOYED WORKERS’ ARMED NUCLEI (NUCLEI ARMATI OPERAI DISOCCUPATI)


COMBATANT WORKERS’ UNITS FOR COMMUNISM (REPARTI OPERAI COMBATTENTI PER IL COMUNISMO)

February 16, 1978.—Milan. Wounding of Domenico Segala, personnel manager, Alfa Romeo (Corp.), and bystander Simona Croce.

PROLETARIAN COMBAT SQUADS (SQUADRE PROLETARIE DI COMBATTIMENTO)

June 8, 1978.—Turin. Wounding of Giacomo Ferrero, M.D., MSI sympathizer.
November 14, 1978.—Pisa. Detonation of explosive device in front of IACP offices and wounding of two bystanders.
November 14, 1978.—Florence. Detonation of an explosive device in the building where the Provincial Directorate of the Ministry of the Treasury is located and wounding of two bystanders.
January 24, 1979.—Milan. Wounding of Battista Ferla, hospital attendant and FLO-CISL labor union representative.

COMBATANT NUCLEUS FOR COMMUNISM (NUCLEO COMBATTENTE PER IL COMUNISMO)
April 22, 1978.—Padua. Wounding of Ezio Riondato, President, EDIT (Corp.).

ARMED PROLETARIANS FOR COMMUNISM (PROLETARI ARMATI PER IL COMUNISMO)
April 19, 1979.—Rome. Murder of public security patrolman Andrea Campagna.

ARMED COMMUNIST PROLETARIAN PATROLS (RONDA PROLETARIE COMUNISTE ARMATE)
May 10, 1978.—Milan. Wounding of Franco Giacomazzi, executive employee, Montedison (Corp.).

POPULAR LIBERATION ARMY (ESERCITO POPOLARE DI LIBERAZIONE)
July 20, 1978.—Rome. Detonation of an explosive device against the Prefecture and wounding of a public security patrolman.

ARMED NUCLEI FOR COMMUNISM (NUCLEI ARMATI PER IL COMUNISMO)
August 10, 1978.—Bergamo. Detonation of an explosive device in front of the local Carabinieri station and wounding of trooper Giovanni Vergottin.

PROLETARIAN PATROL (RONDA PROLETARIA)

COMBATANT COMMUNIST YOUTH FRONT (FRONTE GIOVANILE COMUNISTA COMBATTENTE)

COMMUNIST COMBATANT FORMATIONS (FORMAZIONI COMBATTENTI COMUNISTE)
November 8, 1978.—Patrica (Frosinone). Murder of state attorney Fedele Calvosa and his escort members, security guard Giuseppe Pagliari and driver Luciano Rossi.

COMMUNIST ATTACK UNITS (REPARTI COMUNISTI DI ATTACCO)
November 13, 1978.—Milan. Wounding of Mario Marchetti, former medical officer of the S. Vittore Prison.
February 10, 1980.—Milan. Wounding of Mario Miraglia, executive employee, CECOF.

COMMUNIST GUERRILLA (GUERRIGLIA COMUNISTA)

WORKERS' ORGANIZATION FOR COMMUNISM (ORGANIZZAZIONE OPERAIA PER IL COMUNISMO)
December 19, 1978.—Mestre (Venice). Detonation of explosive device against Regional Industrialists Federation and wounding of a bystander.
January 10, 1979.—Rome. Murder of Stefano Cecchetti and wounding of Allesandro Donatone and Maurizio Battaglia, rightist militants.

January 10, 1979.—Castel Cisterna (Naples). Wounding of private security guard Domenico Manna during attempt to place an explosive charge at Alfa Sud (Corp.).

January 26, 1979.—Rome. Wounding of MSI political candidate Nicola Nusea and his son Antonello.

March 7, 1980.—Rome. Detonation of an explosive device against premises of MSI daily Il Secolo d’Italia and wounding of seven printers.

March 12, 1980.—Rome. Murder of Angelo Mancia, MSI activist.

February 1, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of Grazio Romano, medical officer of the local prison.

May 18, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of obstetrician Domenica Nigra.

February 16, 1979.—Milan. Murder of Pierluigi Torreggiani and wounding of Alberto Torreggiani, goldsmiths.

February 10, 1979.—S. Maria di Sala (Venice). Murder of Lino Sabbadini, butcher.

February 26, 1979.—Canale di Ceregnano (Rovigo). Wounding of artisan shop owner Mario Toso in the explosion of a device placed in front of his dwelling.

March 1, 1979.—Rome. Detonation of an explosive device in the commercial offices of Denito Vinci and wounding of employee Cinzia Giacomini.


March 7, 1979.—Rome. Wounding of municipal policemen Carlo Accardi, Alfio Moriganti, and Vincenzo Feliciotti by incendiary devices hurled against a police vehicle.


April 8, 1979.—Rome. Detonation of an explosive device in front of Standa department store and wounding of public security patrolman Antonio Paro.
April 12, 1979.—Rome. Detonation of explosive device inside premises of real estate company "Magna Grecia" and wounding of owner Prudenza Ruggeri.

COMMUNIST PROLETARIANS FOR COUNTERPOWER (PROLETARI COMUNISTI PER IL CONTROPOTERE)

April 27, 1979.—Milan. Detonation of explosive device inside offices of SIAS and wounding of employees Maria Scaramba and Donata Amoruso.

COMMUNIST PROLETARIAN SQUADS (SQUADRE COMUNISTE PROLETARIE)

April 30, 1979.—Salesino (Padua). Wounding of one Carabinieri during arson attempt against local Carabinieri station.

ARMED PROLETARIAN COMBAT SQUADS OF THE COMMUNIST LIBERATION ARMY (SQUADRE PROLETARIE ARMATE DI COMBATTIMENTO PER L’ESERCITO DI LIBERAZIONE COMUNISTA)

May 11, 1979.—Turin. Detonation of an explosive device in front of a local Carabinieri station and wounding of trooper Erminio Baldari.

ARMED NUCLEI FOR WORKERS’ POWER (NUCLEI ARMATI PER IL POTERE OPERAIO)


PROLETARIAN COMBAT PATROLS (RONDE PROLETARIE DI COMBATTIMENTO)


PROLETARIAN TERRITORIAL SQUADS (SQUADRE PROLETARIE TERRITORIALI)


PROLETARIAN UNITS OF THE COMMUNIST LIBERATION ARMY (REPARTI PROLETARI PER L’ESERCITO DI LIBERAZIONE COMUNISTA)


COMMUNIST COMBATANT ORGANIZATION COMMUNIST ASSAULT UNITS (ORGANIZZAZIONE COMUNISTA COMBATTENTE REPARTI COMUNISTI D’ATTACCO)

December 21, 1979.—Turin. Wounding of Ezio Gavelli, laboratory chief, FIAT (Corp.).

PROLETARIAN COMBATANT ORGANIZATION (ORGANIZZAZIONE PROLETARIA COMBATTENTE)


COMMUNIST TERRITORIAL NUCLEI (NUCLEI COMUNISTI TERRITORIALI)

January 31, 1980.—Settimo Torinese (Turin). Murder of Carlo Ala and wounding of Gianni Pecorin, private security guards, FIAT (Corp.).

ARMED ANTI-FASCIST GROUPS (GRUPPI ARMATI ANTIFASCISTI)

February 4, 1980.—Rovigo. Wounding of rightist sympathizer Benvenuto Farinella during arson attempt against his dwelling.

PROLETARIAN COMBATANT FORMATION (FORMAZIONE PROLETARIA COMBATTENTE)

ORGANIZED ARMED PROLETARIAN GROUP (GRUPPO PROLETARIO ORGANIZZATO ARMATO)  
February 23, 1980.—Rovigo. Wounding of bystander Graziaella Marzolla during arson attempt against a snack bar usually frequented by rightist elements.

ORGANIZED COMRADES (COMPAGNI ORGANIZZATI)  
March 10, 1980.—Rome. Murder of PSI card-carrying member Luigi Allegretti (mistaken identity).

PROLETARIAN COUNTERPOWER NUCLEI (NUCLEI DI CONTROPOTERE PROLETARIO)  

ARMED GROUPS OF ORGANIZED PROLETARIANS (GRUPPI ARMATI PROLETARI ORGANIZZATI)  

MARCH 28 BRIGADE FOR COMMUNISM (BRIGATA 28 MARZO—PER IL COMUNISMO)  
May 28, 1980.—Milan. Murder of Walter Tobagi, journalist with daily Corriere della Sera.

ARMED TERRITORIAL COMMUNIST GROUPS (GRUPPI COMUNISTI ARMATI TERRITORIALI)  

ASSAULT NUCLEUS FOR TERRITORIAL LIBERATION (NUCLEO D'ASSALTO PER LA LIBERAZIONE TERRITORIALE)  
July 3, 1980.—Naples. Wounding of Luigi Ammendola, M.D.

REVOLUTIONARY COMBATANT FORMATIONS (FORMAZIONI COMBATTENTI RIVOLUZIONARIE)  

ARMED COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY NUCLEI (NUCLEI ARMATI COMunisti RIVOLUZIONARI)  
June 19, 1981.—Rome. Wounding of Giuseppe Francoñieri during raid on his agency “Nader.”

POPULAR LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MOVIMENTO POPOLARE DI LIBERAZIONE)  

COMMUNIST NUCLEUS (NUCLEO DI COMUNISTI)  
September 18, 1981.—Milan. Murder of prison guard Francesco Rucci.

COMMUNIST FRONT FOR COUNTERPOWER (FRONTE COMUNISTA PER IL CONTROPOTERE)  
December 1, 1981.—Vicenza. Wounding of Antonio Mundu, medical officer of local prison.

COMMUNIST COMBATANT NUCLEI (NUCLEI COMBATTENTI COMunisti)  
January 3, 1982.—Rovigo. Detonation of an explosive device to facilitate a prison break and murder of one bystander and wounding of six others.

METROPOLITAN COMMUNIST FRONT (FRONTE COMUNISTA METROPOLITANO)  
OFFENSIVE RESISTANCE PROLETARIAN MOVEMENT (MOVIMENTO PROLETARIO DI RESISTENZA OFFENSIVA)

May 17, 1982.—Milan. Murder of rightist sympathizer Girolamo Scardigno.
November 18, 1982.—Milan. Murder of private security guard Erminio Carloni during attempted armed robbery of a Banco di Napoli branch.

NUCLEUS OF COMMUNISTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE RED POWER SYSTEM (NUCLEO COMUNISTI PER LA COSTRUZIONE DEL SISTEMA DEL POTERE ROSSO)

October 8, 1982.—Corio Canavese (Turin). Murder of Carabinieri NCO Benito Atzui and wounding of trooper Giovanni Bertello during fire engagement.

ARMED PROLETARIAN POWER (POTERE PROLETARIO ARMATO)


APPENDIX XIV

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIONS PERPETRATED BY MAJOR SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF NEO-FASCIST INSPIRATION

NEW ORDER (ORDINE NUOVO) BLACK ORDER (ORDINE NERO)

November 20, 1974.—Savona. Murder of one tenant and wounding of seven others following detonation of an explosive device inside an apartment building.

ARMED REVOLUTIONARY NUCLEI (NUCLEI ARMATI RIVOLUZIONARI—NAR)

November 20, 1978.—Rome. Wounding of PCI militants Roberto Raparelli, Mauro Sanfilippo, and Angelo Misini during Molotov cocktail attack against a local PCI section.
January 9, 1979.—Rome. Shooting assault on Radio Citta Futura of the extraparliamentary left and wounding of five radio station operators: Anna Attura, Gabriella Zignone, Rosetta Padula, Carmela Ingafu, and Annunziata Mioll.
June 16, 1979.—Rome. Raid on the Via Cairoli section of the PCI and wounding of 23 activists with an explosive device.
October 9, 1979.—Rovigo. Murder of an extraparliamentary leftist Roberto Cavallo.
December 17, 1979.—Rome. Murder of Antonio Leandri, mistaken for attorney Giorgio Arcangeli, a “spy.”
February 6, 1980.—Rome. Murder of public security patrolman Maurizio Arnesano. (Responsibility also claimed by Front Line.)
September 2, 1980.—Rome. Murder of printer Maurizio Di Leo, mistaken for Il Messaggero journalist Michele Concina.
September 24, 1980.—S. Maria Capua Vetere (Caserta). Murder of retired prison guard NCO Alberto Contestabile and wounding of sister-in-law Maria Merola.
January 6, 1981.—Rome. Murder of rightist sympathizer Luca Perucci. (Responsibility also claimed by Communist Combatant Committees.)
March 5, 1982.—Rome. Armed robbery of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro branch and coincidental murder of bystander Alessandro Caravilluni and wounding of public security patrolmen Antonio Petrillo and Paolo Espa and bystanders Alvaro Parlati, and Olga Racio, and Alessandra Falsetti.


October 10, 1982.—Rome. Wounding of Banco di Santo Spirito employees Bruno Simonetta, Maurizio Colarelli, and Mario Bonifazi following detonation of explosive device.

APPENDIX XV

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIONS PERPETRATED BY MINOR SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF NEO-FASCIST INSPIRATION

REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT (MOVIMENTO DI AZIONE RIVOLUZIONARIA—MAI)

November 22, 1973.—Milan. Abduction for ransom of industrialist Aldo Cannavale. Released on December 4, after payment of Lit. 350 million.

NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE (GIUSTIZIA NAZIONALE RIVOLUZIONARIA)


MILITANT FASCISM CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION (ORGANIZZAZIONE CLANDESTINA FASCISMO MILITANTE)


BLACK ARMED CORPS (CORPO ARMATO NERO)


ORGANIZED GROUP FOR DIRECT ACTION (GRUPPO ORGANIZZATO PER L’AZIONE DIRETTA)


THIRD POSITION (TERZA POSIZIONE)

November 26, 1980.—Milan. Murder of Carabinieri NCO Ezio Lucarelli and wounding of NCO Giuseppe Palermo during an investigation.

APPENDIX XVI

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIONS PERPETRATED BY SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS AND FORMATIONS OF ANARCHIST INSPIRATION

ANARCHIST GIANNFRANCO BEROLI

May 17, 1973.—Milan. Four murders and 31 wounding resulting from the detonation of an explosive device placed in front of the Police Headquarters of the Province of Milan during the unveiling ceremony of a bust in memory of murdered police security official Luigi Calabresi.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTION (AZIONE RIVOLUZIONARIA—AR)


REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION OF ANARCHISTS (ASSOCIAZIONE RIVOLUZIONARIA ANARCHICI)

March 28, 1979.—Rome. Detonation of an explosive device inside an apartment building and wounding of tenants Bernardino Berardi and Orlando Fiori. (Responsibility also claimed by Proletarian Patrols for Territorial Counterpower.)
APPENDIX XVII

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIONS PERPETRATED BY SUBVERSIVE FORMATIONS OF SEPARATIST INSPIRATION

Sardinia

RED BARABAGIA (BARBAGIA ROSSA)
May 26, 1980.—Orani (Nuoro). Detonation of explosive device against Carabinieri barracks and wounding of trooper Guerino Contu.

SARDINIAN REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE FOR COMMUNISM (COMITATO RIVOLUZIONARIO Sardo per il comunismo)
August 14, 1980.—Orgosolo (Nuoro). Detonation of explosive device against public security precinct and wounding of patrolmen Simone Puledda and Elia Cuccu.

APPENDIX XVIII

A TERRORIST ACTION PERPETRATED BY A SUBVERSIVE FORMATION OF "INTERNATIONALIST" INSPIRATION

COMMUNISTS GROUPS FOR PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM (Gruppi Comunisti per l'internazionalismo proletario)
October 10, 1981.—Rome. Detonation of an explosive device inside the Embassy of Guatemala and wounding of the doorman.

APPENDIX XIX

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIONS PERPETRATED BY FOREIGN FORMATIONS (OR AGENTS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS) WITH "TRANSNATIONAL" OBJECTIVES

ARMENIAN TERRORIST ACTIONS

June 9, 1977.—Rome. Murder of the Turkish Ambassador to the Holy See (Justice Commando for the Armenian Genocide).
December 9, 1979.—Rome. Detonation of explosives against offices of British Airways and El Al and consequential wounding of nine bystanders (Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia).
March 10, 1980.—Rome. Detonation of explosives against offices of Turkish Airlines and consequential murder of two bystanders and wounding of 14 others (Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia).
April 17, 1980.—Rome. Wounding of the Turkish Ambassador to the Holy See and his bodyguard (Justice Commando for the Armenian Genocide).
October 3, 1980.—Rome. Detonation of an explosive device against the offices of the Turkish Airlines and consequential wounding of 2 bystanders (Armenian Organization for the Liberation of Armenia).
November 10, 1980.—Rome. Detonation of explosives against the offices of Swiss Air and the Swiss Federal Railways with consequential wounding of 7 bystanders (October Third Organizations).
January 27, 1981.—Milan. Detonation of explosives against the offices of Swiss Air and the Swiss Tourist Agency and consequential wounding of 2 bystanders (October Third Organizations).
October 25, 1981.—Rome. Wounding of Turkish diplomat Gokberg Eregenekon (Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia).

LIBYAN VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ACTIONS BY FELLOW NATIONALS


PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ACTIONS AND TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST PALESTINIANS

December 17, 1973.—Fiumicino (Rome). Commando action at the International Airport entailing the employment of automatic weapons and explosives resulting in 34 murders and 41 wounding.
August 9, 1981.—Fiumicino (Rome). Detonation of an explosive device against El Al offices at International Airport and wounding of 3 passengers (May 16th Organization for the Liberation of Palestine).
October 9, 1981.—Rome. Murder of Majid Abu Shrar by an explosive device planted in his hotel room (member of Central Committee of Al Fatah and PLO information officer).
September 10, 1982.—Rome. Raid on the Rome synagogue resulting in 1 murder and 36 woundings of worshippers (Black Lebanon Organization).

APPENDIX XX

TERRORIST MASSACRES OF STILL DUBIOUS IDEOLOGICAL INSPIRATION BUT GENERALLY ATTRIBUTED TO "NEO-FASCIST" ELEMENTS

December 12, 1969.—Milan. Sixteen deaths and 90 woundings caused by the detonation of an explosive device inside the Piazza Fontana branch of Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura.
May 28, 1974.—Brescia. Eight deaths and 100 woundings caused by the detonation of an explosive device in Piazza della Loggia.
August 4, 1974.—S. Benedetto di Val di Sambro. Twelve deaths and 44 woundings caused by the detonation of an explosive device on the “Italicus” express.
August 2, 1980.—Bologna. Eighty-five deaths and 181 woundings caused by the detonation of an explosive device in the 2d class waiting room of the railroad Station.

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