139204

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

139204

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
IN DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROGRAMS:
THE EXPERIENCE OF
THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROJECTS

Wayne Lawrence

NCJRS

NOV 3 1992

ACQUISITIONS

NCCD Research Center
760 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94102

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction

An extensive body of delinquency literature has focused on the social environment of youth as the dominant factor in the creation and perpetuation of delinquent activity. Within this literature an important line of argument has been that delinquency is often a product of communities and neighborhoods that are characterized by high indices of "social disorganization". It has been argued that such communities are 1) unable to develop a set of common ideals and standards that can serve as effective social controls and suppress delinquent activity (Shaw and McKay, 1942), and 2) unable to produce legitimate avenues of success for their youth who turn to illegitimate channels as alternative means of advancement (Merton, 1957; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

Corresponding to explanations of delinquency causation such as the above, strategies of delinquency control have often called for programs aimed at community rehabilitation or community development. Often, a rationale for these strategies has been that delinquency can be reduced by enabling resident of delinquent areas to establish institutions and structures that direct youth toward more conventionally acceptable behavior.

The position that delinquency can be reduced by reorganizing or developing communities characterized by high delinquency rates has had a significant impact on this nation's delinquency prevention policy. The theme of community reformation has been prominent in the recommendations of influential national crime commissions (National Commission, 1931;

President's Commission, 1967). Also, some of the largest and best known delinquency prevention efforts have adopted strategy based on community development as the central, or a most significant program approach (Kobrin, 1959; Mobilization for Youth, Inc., 1961; Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited, Inc., 1964). During the decade of the 1960's, the position that community reorganization was the proper way to proceed in preventing delinquency was so well accepted that it was basically adopted as the model upon which federally funded prevention programs would be based (Marris and Rein, 1967; Knapp and Polk, 1971).

The widespread activities of the large-scale federal government programs during the 1960's have left legacies that will influence social programs for several decades to come (Kramer and Specht, 1975). Key among these legacies are the notions that the community is a highly appropriate target towards which to direct programs of major social change and that participation of community residents is a necessary ingredient in a program's success. These principles represent central tenets of the social action strategy commonly referred to as "community development."

Recent attention is again being drawn to community development as an important strategy in preventing delinquent behavior. Much of the attention being given to community development is in reaction to the negative assessments that have been given to the more prevalent methods of delinquency prevention (see Dixon and Wright, 1975; Lundman

et al., 1976; Johnson et al., 1979). Delinquency prevention
practice has been dominated by strategies that focus on
corrective measures aimed at individual delinquents (for
example, counseling, psychotherapy, social casework,
recreation, and behavior modification). One recent assess-
ment of delinquency prevention strategies found most of
such programs to be of questionable merit and that many had
no defensible basis whatsoever (Johnson et al., 1979).
Proponents of community development argue that even if
programs aimed at individuals were to show positive impacts,
the effects would likely be sharply reduced following the
cessation of intervention services. Community development,
on the other hand, would be more prone to eliminate the
"root causes" of delinquent behavior and produce permanent
change with respect to positive socialization of all community
youth.

Recognition of the increasing scarcity of funds available
for social programs has also sparked new interest in community
development. Community development is being identified as
a means of leveraging program funds that are provided by
traditional sources, such as governments and foundations.
It is argued that rather than relying on grants from outside
sources, the community development process will result in
area residents generating their own sources of funds to
operate programs that benefit the community.

There is little literature to support newfound
enthusiasm for employing community development strategy
in preventing delinquency. In fact, little critical attention
has been given to delinquency prevention program models
that have been based on community development. Even more
rare than discussions of program models based on community
development have been comprehensive evaluations of such
programs. Few insights have been provided to program prac-
titioners as to how the community development process operates
under varying sets of contextual conditions. There are few
discussions, based on actual program performances, of the
promise that particular methods hold for future programs.
In short, few guides have been made available as aids to
delinquency prevention programs that are based on a theme of
community reorganization.

This paper was written with the intent to contribute
to the information available to persons deliberating the use
of the community development strategy in delinquency prevention.
The original -- and still a primary -- purpose of this effort
was to evaluate community development within the "Programs to
Prevent Juvenile Delinquency" funded by the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). During data
collection for the evaluation, it became evident that

there was a tremendous amount of confusion among program

operators concerning community development. Not only were

there the expected tactical differences, but also there

existed an obvious lack of clarity over what community

development was, how it was supposed to work to reduce

delinquency and on what basis it should be evaluated. In

response to the observed need for clarification in the field,

this paper will present, in addition to an evaluation report,

discussions based on the literature of the nature of the

community development model, its history in delinquency

prevention, and the problems faced in evaluating delinquency

programs utilizing community development. It is hoped that

the literature reviews and the empirical data presented here

will contribute to advancements in theory building, program

development, and evaluation methods relating to community

development for delinquency prevention.

The evaluation study focuses on four communities served

by two OJJDP projects where systematic effort was undertaken

to implement a strategy of community development. Overall,

the OJJDP program constituted the largest single federal

delinquency prevention effort in American history. Over

168 private youth serving agencies received funds to establish

prevention programs in 118 target areas within 68 cities through-

out the United States.

The study reported here emanates from a much larger

evaluation effort that covered the overall operations of the

OJJDP prevention program during their first two years of

existence. The latter evaluation study represented the largest intensive, nationwide study of delinquency prevention programs ever attempted. The complexities involved in gathering and analyzing program data from such a large number of diverse grantee organizational structures, service offerings, target communities and client groups have been discussed at length in previous evaluation reports (NCCD, 1979; NCCD, 1981). Even without reference to these documents, however, it is not difficult to appreciate that one possible cost of attempting a study of such wide scope was the overlooking of subtle, yet important, changes that may have resulted from community development efforts in individual communities. The need for examination of such possible changes is largely responsible for this supplemental research.

Also important to the initiation of this study was the argument by the staff of many program grantees that the study period covered by the national evaluation did not provide sufficient time to allow for the impacts of community development efforts to manifest. Due to numerous problems in implementing their projects, many grantees did not have their community development activities functioning until well into their second year of operation (NCCD, 1979). It was argued that a reasonable period of time should elapse before attempting to evaluate the slow process of bringing about community change. This supplementary evaluation cannot completely negate the issue raised by this argument. It is difficult to determine a most appropriate time period to observe the

major impacts of such program efforts. This study does, however, take into account the third year of project operations of a selected sample of grantees funded by OJJDP.

II. Study Methods

As has been stated, the present study was designed as a supplement to the National Evaluation of Prevention. It is from the National Evaluation that a great deal of the data analyzed by this study is drawn. The National Evaluation collected an extensive amount of program data aimed at producing two types of evaluation analysis: (1) an impact study which attempted to measure the effects of the project efforts on client youth, on youth-serving agencies in the communities, and on target communities in general; and (2) a process study which described and analyzed how projects were planned, implemented, and modified during the grant period and also, the relationships between the prevention projects and the community as a whole.

Data relevant to community development was collected through a combination of techniques, including interviews with project staff, community residents, and staff of youth-related agencies and institutions. Data collection also included examinations of project records and direct observation of project activities. Most onsite observations were carried out by target area residents employed as local data collectors at each project site (see NCCD, 1981).

Proceeding from the base provided by the National Evaluation data, this study employed a three-step approach to examine community development impact. The selected approach consisted of (1) a review of National Evaluation data and a literature review, (2) collection of additional data from the selected study sites, and (3) verification of data that had been collected.

The procedures of the first phase of the study included an in-depth review of National Evaluation file data concerning the attempts of the OJJDP grantees to implement programs of community development. Also conducted was a review of the literature which was most relevant to understanding the relationships involved in utilizing community development as a means of delinquency prevention.

Heavy emphasis during the file data and literature reviews was placed on determining the theoretical underpinnings for delinquency prevention through community development. A number of authors (e.g., Glaser, 1980; Empey, 1980; Elliot, 1979) have recently stressed the importance of theory in guiding criminal justice evaluations to appropriate methodological frameworks. Empey and Glaser point out that with a clear understanding of the theoretical relationships that are supposed to exist between program activities and program impact a researcher is better able to determine the variables that will be of most significance to investigate. Research design issues, such as sampling, can be assessed in relation to a particular program theory in addition to more abstract principles of proper research methods.

Elliot has observed that the lack of attention to theory by program operators and evaluators has often caused problems in determining appropriate measures of program effectiveness:

> ...the lack of a clear theoretical rationale accounts for why so many delinquency prevention/treatment programs have relied upon recidivism as the single criterion for program success or effectiveness. Projects with a theoretical rationale can often identify multiple success criteria. These additional success criteria are typically intervening variables by which program activities are connected to a reduction in delinquency. The identification of such variables depends in large part upon the presence of some clear, explicit theoretical rationale. Projects operating without a rationale have no clear conceptual basis for identifying success criteria and use recidivism by default (1979).

The review of relevant theory offered by delinquency literature and the OJJDP projects led to the selection of a preliminary set of research questions that served as a guide to the initial investigations of this study. These questions are as follows:

1) What new community structures have been developed or enhanced through project efforts and what have been their functions and activities?

2) To what extent did project activity increase youth and adult involvement in community action?

3) To what extent have project activities been designed to upgrade community residents' knowledge and skills to access community resources and structures?

4) To what extent have the efforts of organized community residents resulted in upgrading of deteriorated community conditions, improving opportunities for youth advancement, or generating new resources for community purposes?

5) To what extent did project activities impact community attitudes on youth, delinquency and delinquency prevention?

6) To what extent do projects alter the policies and procedures of schools, juvenile justice systems, and other public or private agencies?

In addition to identifying program theory, the file review examined the purposes, goals, objectives and activities of the community intervention components of each of the OJJDP grantee projects. The projects were classified according to community characteristics, the type of community intervention attempted, the intensity of the attempted intervention, and the availability of data to document the attempted intervention. From this review a sample of grantees were selected for study based upon evidence of a grantee's systematic approach to attempting some type of community impact, a high level of activity by project staff in this area, the desire to include some diversity in community settings in the study, and the ability to collect relevant data.

Two study communities each were chosen from the prevention projects that were initiated in Boston, Mass., and Tuskegee, Ala. The community development efforts examined involved the work of five youth-serving organizations (a description of the study communities, the grantee agencies, and the intervention methods used by these agencies is provided in a later section of this paper).

The second phase of the study involved making site visits to the selected communities to collect the data that was deemed necessary to make an evaluation of the project's community development impact. The most important sources of new data were interviews conducted with informants that were identified during the file review as likely to be most knowledgeable

about the project's community development activities and impacts. At each site an attempt was made to interview a sample consisting of project staff, community residents and officials from institutions in the community that were most influential to project activity, such as juvenile justice officials and school administrators.

An attempt was made to collect a comparable set of information from each of the study sites. Interview schedules were slightly modified to fit the project, community, grantee agency, and the type of respondent in question. Each of the interview schedules, however, consisted of a series of open-ended questions.

In addition to the interviews, data collection during the study's second phase consisted of searches for written documents that had been produced since the end of the National Evaluation study period bearing on the community development efforts of the selected sites. Writings by the OJJDP grantees, other community-based agencies, public agencies, print media, and other researchers were examined.

The third phase of the study was primarily devoted to verification of the data obtained through the interviews. Recollections, impressions and views expressed in the interview were subjected to further documentation. Data verification relied heavily on written materials. Project documents such as proposals, quarterly reports, minutes of meetings and internal memoranda were utilized in this process. Reports from local data collectors during the National Evaluation

were also of great value. A wide variety of writings from non-project sources were used to verify or discount interview statements. In some cases, follow-up interviews were made with individuals that were not included in the first round of interviews, but were participants in events that were subjects of the first interviews. This step was undertaken as a means of triangulating the observations of informants.

III. The Community Development Model

The idea of using "community development" as a
means to address an extremely wide range of social problems
has continued to grow in favor among many circles. The
question of what form of community organization practice
is signified by this term, however, is far from settled. Although
numerous social programs have been initiated under the
banner of community development, much of the literature in
the area of community organization and social welfare programs
points out the lack of precision with which community dev-
elopment practice proceeds. For example, Khinduka observed
that:

> Despite numerous definitions by conferences, international
> bodies, and writers, the concept of community develop-
> ment remains vague. This vagueness has evoked two
> entirely different reactions. Some social scientists
> tend to dismiss community development as a totally "know-
> lege-free" area, remarkable for, "the murky banalities,
> half-truths and sententious nonsense that abound" in
> its literature. Other writers maintain that community
> development is the only key to the modernization of
> traditional societies (1975:175).

The vague nature of the "new hope" presented by community

development was also pointed out by Biddle and Biddle

> Those who use the term "community development" (their
> number is legion), are enthusiastic for vague reasons.
> They are strongly in favor of "community" (whatever
> that may be). And they are equally in favor of "devel-
> opment" (as long as this moves toward their preferred
> objectives).
>   But the enthusiasts encounter difficulties when
> they become specific....
>   Many authorities use the phrase "community develop-
> ment" as a sort of magic incantation, a cure-all for
> ailing municipalities and neighborhoods, and the residents
> therein. On examination it will be discovered that these
> authorities have a vast variety of meanings in mind. In
> their writings, they may give definitions of the phrase
> and outline specific methods of operation. More charac-
> teristically, they may leave the phrase undefined, on the
> tacit assumption that other peopole will, "of course,"
> agree with their unspoken objectives and outline of
> work (1969:1-2).

The ambiguity that characterizes the use of the phrase

"community development" persists to some degree due to its

continued differing uses in practice to refer to a process,

a method, a program, and a social movement (Sanders, 1958).

Debate continues as to what type of activities fall most

appropriately within the boundaries set by the term. Some

writers, for example, have questioned the use of the term in

reference to programs in "industrial, largely urban communities,"

preferring to use community development to refer to programs

in "pre-industrial, largely rural communities (Warren,

1963:325-6).

The looseness of the term "community development" raises

serious questions as to whether the term conveys a distinct

strategy of social action. While it is true that community

development has not advanced to a stage that allows any stan-

dardization or prescription of methods, there does exist a

basic ideology that most authorities would agree is charac-
teristic of community development. General agreement is
likely to be reached over the proposition that community
development has strong biases in favor of 1) focusing programs
of social change on local or community issues; 2) heavy
involvement of community residents in social action programs;
3) the development of indigenous community leaders and
community structures to carry out social programs; 4) social
programs based on community resident consensus; 5) maximum
reliance upon community resources; and 6) gradual progress as
opposed to rapid change.

Other forms of community action may share allegiance to
some of the biases comprising the above outline for community
development. Taken as a whole, however, the features described
above do combine to produce a philosophy of community inter-
vention that is distinguishable from other strategies. Spergel,
for example, identifies community development as one of four
major strategies of intervention employed by community organ-
izations:

> Maintenance - The maintenance strategy is characterized
> by systematic support of existing institutional patterns.
> Slow incremental progress is sought; radical or utopian
> schemes are rejected. Primary effort is to increase
> the efficiency of present programs and services...Policy
> and program decisions are made by elite or professional
> groups fully sanctioned by the middle-class and offical
> society...
>
> Contest - Contest is a strategy of intervention charac-
> terized by the advocacy of social policies and programs
> which seek to change existing institutional patterns...
> causing major social problems in the urban community.
> The decision to contest is made by an elite or professional
> leadership group. The struggle for social change is carried
> on in an idealistic, fervid, yet respectable and restrained
> manner.

Conflict - The conflict strategy is typified by a
strident insistence on social change and radical
modification of existing institutional programs and
policies. Its concern is not only with significant
problem solving; it seeks at times to substitute new
or utopian alternatives to present arrangements for
distributing social and economic opportunities and re-
sources....

Development - The development strategy is exemplified by
local efforts to develop distinctive human and organiza-
tional potentials, to protect against the expansionist
programs of larger, more powerful organizations or the
"depredations" of extremely deviant members of the
particular community. Development strives for indigenous
"culture building" in its attempt to solve significant
problems, and is a strategy usually followed by minority
groups or socially deprived populations with limited
access to funds, facilities, expertise, and middle-class
standards. Organizational leadership is indigenous and
sometimes charismatic, particularly in the initial stage
of development. Decisions may be made autocratically and
paternalistically but in full accord with the norms of
the indigenous population....
....Although (organizations using this strategy are) ready
to attack those who seek to deprive it of organizational
status and community stability, its strategy tends to
be conservative, emphasizing stability over social change....
(1974:35-6).

Community development has also been distinguished from

social planning as a model of community organization. According

to Kramer and Specht (1975), the community development model

refers to "efforts to mobilize the people who are directly

affected by a community condition," whereas the social planning

model refers to "efforts directed toward integrating and coordin-

ating the efforts of agencies and organizations of the community."

The focus of social planning is upon changing the behavior

of people who are legally and structurally tied to community

agencies, but who are not necessarily community residents.

IV. <u>Assumptions of the Community Development Model</u>

In comparison to the large number of programs that have

been based upon the principles of community development, the

evaluative literature justifying the use of the model has been

extremely sparse. Much of the favor that has been enjoyed

by community development has been based upon assumptions that

have rarely been empirically tested. For example, Fessler

states that:

> Experts in the field of group process have long since
> accepted the fact that the behavior, attitudes, beliefs,
> and values of individuals are all firmly grounded in the
> groups to which they belong. It can therefore be con-
> sidered a basic premise of the entire community improve-
> ment program that if the majority of the residents of a
> given community can be involved in an overall community
> organization, desired changes may be brought about through
> properly directed community activity.
> Where community improvement organizations have failed,
> the failure generally can be traced to the inability or
> unwillingness of community leaders to apply the sound
> principles of group process (1960:34).

Despite a lack of empirical support, acceptance of

views similar to those expressed above are common among

proponents of community development programming. The

widespread acceptance of the community development approach

has veered much of the literature in the field into discussions

of the proper tactics that should be used in applications of

the model, rather than questioning the logic of the model

itself. Not to be ignored, however, is a smaller, yet no

less significant group of writings that raise serious doubts

about many of the principles that structure the community

development model. Among the basic assumptions of community

development that have been questioned are:

1) the existence of strong social bonds among community
   residents
2) the view of community social problems as parochial
   issues
3) the assessment that local resources will be adequate
   to address community social problems
4) the desirability of action based on community consensus
5) the importance of establishment of the community devel-
   opment process in comparison to the achievement of task
   goals

One of the more fundamental criticisms of community devel-
opment has been that the model proceeds on a conception of
community that is rarely descriptive of the target areas in
which model is applied, especially when programs are based
in urban settings. The community development model assumes
that targeted social units are comprised of social bonds based
on primary relationships. Close personal friendships, common
traditions among residents, common identification among resi-
dents, and community consensus are assumed to abound. Snodgrass
(1976), for example, points out the romanticized view of
community that was held by one of the chief developers of
the community development strategy, Clifford Shaw. Snodgrass
characterizes Shaw as a "folk-idealist" who attempted to
restore village life and tradition to city neighborhoods.
As evidence for his position, Snodgrass turns to Shaw's own
description of his personal life-history:

> Many of my ideas about delinquency seem to spring from
> the situation in which I found myself as I grew up. I
> grew up in the county in what was, in the real sense of
> the word, a community. In this situation, people were
> brought together by certain ties of long acquaintance
> and friendship, by certain common beliefs and interests.
> There was something under the surface which made it pos-
> sible for them to rise to meet a crisis or disaster when

the occasion arose. If there was an illness or death or
if someone's home burned, there was a reaction among all
the people of the community....
    I think that we may perhaps be able to build this
kind of community in these little neighbourhood areas,
and in this way provide the kind of social situation
in which all children may grow up as normal and reason-
ably happy human beings (Shaw, as quoted in Snodgrass,
1976: 12-13).

Writers such as Warren (1963) have indicated that, counter

to the major assumption of the community development model,

many areas that are defined as communities can be character-

ized by a lack of community identification by the residents

therein. Increased residential mobility, for employment pur-

poses for example, has lessened the likelihood that area inhab-

itants will develop close relationships or a community identity

and will more likely consider themselves to be in some form

of transient status. The increasing identification and asso-

ciation of people on the basis of specialized interests, such

as employment groups, lessens the acceptance of their place

of residence as a basis for common identification. To the

degree that community issues coincide with specialized interests,

residents will identify with and become involved in community

affairs. Appeals for resident involvement based upon general-

ized community concern, however, are rarely successful. As

Warren notes:

    One might ask what else might reasonably be expected,
    for time does not permit each individual citizen to par-
    ticipate actively in all the concerns which have broad
    community import. Thus, what is often interpreted as
    apathy, as "nobody cares," is merely an instance of
    the hard fact that the number of legitimate community
    concerns is so great that individual citizens could not
    actively concern themselves with all of them, even if they
    wanted to, which of course many do not (1963:18).

Another assumption of the community development model that
is frequently questioned is the characterization of almost
every type of social ill that has some impact at the community
level as primarily a community problem. Little effort is
taken to distinguish true community issues from those problems
that are not solvable at the community level at all. Problems
that are observable in the community setting, such as unem-
ployment, sub-standard housing or delinquency may be reflective
of short-comings of the larger social systems of which the
community is a part. These problems may be unamenable to
local initiatives. As Alinsky noted:

> It requires nothing more than plain common sense to
> realize that many of the problems in a local community
> which seemingly have their roots in the neighborhood
> in reality stem from sources far removed from the
> community. To a considerable extent these problems
> are the result of vast destructive forces which per-
> vade the entire social scene. It is when these forces
> impinge upon the local community that they give rise
> to a definite community problem. It should however,
> always be remembered that many of these apparently local
> problems are in reality malignant microcosms of vast
> conflicts, pressures, stresses and strains on the
> entire social order (1945:84).

In spite of the "common sense" nature of the above realization,
community development programs have traditionally attempted
to address only the local manifestations of such pervasive
social problems. Solutions to problems at the community level
have been viewed as independent of conditions in the larger
social systems.

An issue closely related to that above is the assumption
inherent in the community development model that the resources

needed to solve community problems exist largely within
the community. The concerted efforts of community residents
(possibly with some limited assistance from government funding
or like sources) is assumed to be capable of producing a resource
base that is sufficient to bring about meaningful social change.
The position, as capsulized by Clinard, is that:

> ...this approach relies directly on the slum dwellers
> themselves. If their apathy and dependence can be
> overcome and replaced by pride and a sense of initiative,
> the slum dwellers can make good use of their "millions
> of hands" and their own resources, meager alone but
> large when pooled, in trying to solve their manifold
> problems (1966:116-7).

The usefulness of pooling existing community resources as
a problem-solving method, however, must be examined in light
of the problems that are most pressing upon a community. As
has been pointed out, many of a community's social ills are
products of problems in greater social systems. Even highly
effective mechanisms for pooling community resources could
not produce the means to have significant impact on such issues.
For example, the combined resources of most communities could
have little effect on a problem of structural unemployment
that may be the root cause of most of the community's other
difficulties.

The high value placed on community consensus for social
programs constitutes another questionable assumption of
community development.

> Community development emphasizes the desirability of
> decisions on the basis of consensus or general agreement
> rather than on the basis of sharp cleavages or close
> votes that tend to divide the community. In this

respect community development differs from "social
action" and ordinary political action, where conflict
of ideological and interest groups, formal parliamentary
procedure, sharp divisions, and decisions by majority
votes are taken for granted (Dunham, 1970:174).

The preference for decision making based on community con-

sensus as opposed to initiating social action on a stance

that is likely to create or continue controversy within a

community is, on its face, readily understandable. The

likelihood that such community-wide consensus is obtainable

on anything but the most superficial of issues, however,

has been questioned (Khinduka 1975:178). Few communities are

of such homogeneous character that widespread agreement can

be reached on most issues of substance. Instead, communi-

ties are usually composed of numerous, diverse and some-

times conflicting subgroups. Decisions on procedures to

bring about change in community life will rarely have an

equally favorable impact on all such groups. Such decisions,

therefore, will normally create some type of controversy.

Initiating social action only when widespread consensus is

reached may therefore delay the bringing about of change

that is beneficial. Few major social reforms have been brought

about in the absence of major controversy.

A matter that has been the subject of much debate has

been the claim that practitioners involved in community

development too often allow their attempts to establish their

community problem solving process to overshadow attempts to

solve community problems. Impact goals (such as delinquency

reduction) are frequently abandoned in favor of "results" such

as increasing community solidarity, developing indigenous community leadership, establishing community councils, increasing resident awareness of community problems, mobilization of resources and establishing collaborative networks in the community. Establishing the community development process, in effect, becomes the program goal. The argument has been raised that practioners who become preoccupied with the community development process too often neglect other avenues of social change that might accomplish the ultimate goals for which their efforts were intended:

> Although some thoerists recognize the significance of accomplishing physical tasks, the community development approach to social change, is still dominated by a process orientation which evaluates the actual outcome of a community project primarily in terms of what happens in the minds of men rather than in terms of its impact on the social structure....
> Community development has a latent propensity for delaying structural changes in the basic institutions of a society. Nowhere does this become clearer than in the familiar strain for precedence between its process and task accomplishment goals. In such a conflict, the community developer typically upholds the process aspect, which stresses citizen involvement, consensus, localism, and change in the attitudes and values of people as a necessary condition for effecting institutional changes (Khinduka 1975:176).

As suggested by Khinduka, the process orientation that is so common to community development has created doubts about its efficacy in producing social change. Moreover, the dominance of process considerations has had great influence in determining the appropriateness of a criteria for evaluating social programs based on a community development model. According to Dunham:

A major change in the way of looking at community
organization is the widespread acceptance by teachers
and practitioners of process goals, as well as task
goals, as a proper objective of community organization.
This idea has always been basic to the philosophy of
community development (1970:86).

Nowhere has the position been advanced that process

objectives should serve as replacements to task goals in

directing social programs. In practice, however, this is

a frequent occurrence. Both practitioners and evaluators

of community development programs have focused primarily

on the achievement of process and other interim objectives

in their assessments, often to the near neglect of discussion

of the program's impact towards their general objectives.

V. Community Development Theory and Practice in Delinquency
    Prevention Programs

Few delinquency prevention programs have based their
efforts solely on the community development model. Numerous
programs, however, have initiated as significant components
of their efforts activities that are largely consistent
with community development, usually incorporating the domain
assumptions discussed above. Still, relatively little is
known about how well community development assumptions can
be substantiated by practical experiences in delinquency
prevention. The evaluation literature on most programs
does not allow an assessment of the degree to which designed
community development features were actually carried out,
let alone determinations of how the model actually operates.
As with most delinquency prevention evaluations, reports on
programs utilizing community development have focused their
discussions on delinquency reduction.

Despite the general lack of data about the community
development process in delinquency programs, information on
two major programs provides valuable insights about the
model's use. The Chicago Area Projects (CAP) and the Mobil-
ization For Youth (MFY) are among those programs that most

deliberately employed the community development strategy. Moreover, these programs not only adopted community development as a strategy of operation, but also contributed greatly to the conceptual development of the model itself.

The CAP and MFY represent the most direct attempts to put into program operation the theoretical rationales justifying most community development efforts in the delinquency prevention field. Examination of the two programs, therefore, gives a better understanding of the logic followed by most delinquency programs for application of the community development model as well as a view of the model's practical application.

The CAP, established in the early 1930's, was largely the product of Clifford Shaw, a sociologist who had been trained under the tradition that is familiarly identified as the "Chicago school". From the extensive ecological studies performed by the scholars of the Chicago school, empirical support was provided for the notion that high indices of social problems, including high rates of delinquency, were associated with declining inner-city areas. These areas were usually populated with new immigrants to the city environment who carried with them social patterns

that clashed with their new surroundings. The social insti-
tutions through which these new inner-city residents had
traditionally regulated the behavior of their community
members became ineffectual. The ineffectiveness of regulating
institutions produced areas which lacked the social cohesion
to retard the development of criminal norms. Tolerance for
delinquent activity became commonplace. According to Shaw
and his colleague Henry McKay, juvenile delinquency, in its
most severe forms, was the result of this process of social
disorganization (Shaw and McKay, 1942). The basic concepts
of the Shaw and McKay theory of delinquency might be summarized
as follows:

1) Areas characterized by deteriorated conditions
   produce social disorganization within a community.

2) Socially disorganized communities are unable to
   establish measures of social control over community
   youth.

3) Lack of effective measures of social control leads
   to the acceptance of delinquent traditions and the
   establishment of delinquent groups.

4) Delinquent traditions and delinquent groups produce
   high rates of delinquency.

According to this formulation, delinquency could be put in
check by the development of effective institutions of social
control by community leaders and the reestablishment of community
norms contrary to delinquent behavior.

A set of principles, corollary to his perspectives, were
developed by Shaw and served as a guide in the CAP approach
to delinquency prevention. These principles were that:

1) rules and values (sources of control) for youth were developed among the primary relationships that they encountered within their community and that delinquency prevention programs would not succeed until community residents accepted the aims of the programs as their own;

2) community residents would only respond to programs in which they had a meaningful role; and

3) the residents of high delinquency communities had the capacity to organize and administer their own welfare programs for youth (Kobrin, 1959).

The CAP approach, in short, was to support the activities of local community organizations and institutions that would aid in directing youth towards more positive behavior. One long-time observer of the CAP offered the following description of the program's approach:

> It is hoped that by enlisting the efforts of local residents in a program to promote the cause of human welfare, constructive values may be made more universal in the community. Perhaps constructive leadership may, in time, be substituted for the destructive leadership that now influences the lives of many children in the neighborhood.
> The Area Project is, briefly, an application of the fundamental principles that are basic to any truly democratic social order: that in the humble environs of the community itself, the good common sense, the deep concern of the parent in his or her child's future, the mutual respect of neighbor for neighbor, the motivations that everyone shares to command the respect and admiration of their fellows, and the common struggle for the simple satisfactions of life can be found the necessary strength and leadership for the solution of local community problems (Sorrentino, 1979:36).

The CAP has been in existence in some form for nearly five decades. The longevity of the project alone makes assessment of the CAP significant in that its evaluation should provide some insight into the possible long-term impact of applying

the community development strategy for delinquency prevention purposes. Evaluation of the CAP takes on added importance due to the fact that the project has served as the prototype of many, if not most, of the community development delinquency programs that have succeeded it.

Individuals closely associated with the CAP (Kobrin, 1959; Sorrentino, 1979) have pointed out the extreme difficulty that is present in attempting to evaluate such delinquency programs. For example, in regards to evaluating program outcome Kobrin observes that:

> The Chicago Area Project shares with other delinquency programs the difficulty of measuring its success in a simple and direct manner. At bottom this difficulty rests on the fact that such programs, as efforts to intervene in the life of a person, a group, or a community, cannot by their very nature constitute more than a subsidiary element in changing the fundamental and sweeping forces which create the problems of groups and of persons which shape human personality. Declines in the rates of delinquency -- the only conclusive way to evaluate a delinquency prevention -- may reflect influences unconnected with those of organized programs and are difficult to define and measure (Kobrin, 1959:20).

As an alternative to measuring the success of the CAP through declines in delinquency rates, Kobrin rested his assessment of the program on the logic that by reaching the objectives suggested by its underlying theory the program would "in all probability" reduce delinquency.

> The present assessment of the Chicago Area Project will have to rest, therefore, on an appraisal of its experience in carrying out procedures assumed by its founders and supporters to be relevant to the reduction of delinquency (Kobrin, id).

According to Kobrin, the achievements of the CAP in this
regard included the creation of stable neighborhood resident
organizations that had the capacity to "take hold" of the
problem of delinquency. Also, the CAP community committees
had been responsible for altering the practices of neighbor-
hood agencies and institutions to be more responsive to the
needs of community youth.

The conclusions of a number of evaluators of CAP activities
have paralleled those of Kobrin. Witmer and Tufts (1954),
for example, also found that in programs using an environmental
approach, such as CAP, examination of delinquency data alone
would not be sufficient to evaluate program accomplishments.
They noted that "under these programs the changes that are
sought lie not in children but in specified social conditions"
(1954:10). Accordingly, they concluded that "the first
question to be decided in evaluation of a program aimed at
effecting environmental change is whether the change itself
occurred (id)." Witmer and Tufts considered that "only if
that question can be answered affirmatively are we really
justified in going on to ask: by how much has delinquency
been reduced by this change? (id)"

Witmer and Tufts presented a somewhat favorable assessment
of the CAP's effectiveness in producing desired change in the
project's target communities. They found that:

1) Residents of low-income areas can and have organized
   themselves into effective working units for promoting
   and conducting welfare programs.

31

2) These community organizations have been stable and
   enduring. They raise funds, admininster them well,
   and adapt the programs to local needs.

3) Local talent, otherwise untapped, has been discovered
   and utilized. Local leadership has been mobilized in
   the interest of children's welfare (1954:15).

Their second question, concerning delinquency reduction,
however, was left largely unanswered. Although it was noted
that delinquency statistics compiled over a twelve-year
period showed a downward trend in rates for some of the project
communities, the finding was that there was no conclusive
statistical proof to judge the effectiveness of the project
in reducing delinquency. The available "bits of evidence
are insufficient to establish with certainty that the kind
of change the Chicago Area Project has brought about is
a useful delinquency prevention measure (1954:16)."

Conclusive statistical evidence indicating success in
reducing delinquency by the CAP has never been produced.
Evaluations such as the above do suggest, however, that the
CAP has achieved successful implementation of the community
development process. Moreover, important assumptions of
the community development model concerning the ability and
willingness of community residents to form stable organizations
to address delinquency seem to be substantiated.

At least one evaluative assessment, however, raises serious
doubts about the generalized abilities of the CAP approach
to bring about the process or social change objectives
of the project. Finestone, while accepting the work of
Witmer and Tufts as "perhaps the most balanced general

evaluation of the Chicago Area Project..." (1976:18), saw a need to "go beyond the summary impressions of competent observers such as Witmer in order to seek to identify the specific conditions which tend to favor or to limit the relative effectiveness of the project approach to community organization (id)." A central question posed by Finestone was to what degree are all types of local communities able to develop the effectively operating community committees that are the essence of the CAP strategy. Finestone found great variation in such abilities among CAP communities.

Finestone established a standard criteria by which to assess the effectiveness of the observed community committees. In his analysis based on these criteria he uncovered two basic types of community organizations which he labelled "strong community committees" and "weak community committees". In analyzing the conditions under which each type of committee developed, Finestone found that areas where strong committees were established were relatively stable communities with residents who were economically secure, motived to seek status through community projects, and whose business, political, or social interests tended to focus their attention upon the local community (1976:143). Concerning the conditions where the weak committees were developed Finestone found that:

> The weaker organizations are to be found either in rapidly changing neighborhoods where a general disorder in social life is prevalent, or in housing projects where population tends to be exceedingly homogeneous, clustered at the lower end of the income scale, and relatively isolated from the rest of the community. In such situations it cannot be routinely expected that the leadership for taking hold in indigenous welfare enterprises will be readily forthcoming (1976:144).

What Finestone felt was the most important differentiating factor between strong and weak committees was that the latter tended to be located in communities with high rates of delinquency while strong committees tended to be located in communities with substantially lower rates. According to Finestone:

> On the basis of this relationship it is possible to conclude that those local communities where the problem of juvenile delinquency is comparatively greater are those which appear to be less amenable to the development of indigenous community organizations. It is also apparent that community committees in such areas are placed under considerable strain in attempting to achieve the goals of the area project (id).

As a summary conclusion to his investigation of the CAP Finestone offered that:

> If one crucial measure of its effectiveness is taken to be the quality and quantity of human resources which can be mobilized within a local community to cope with the problem of delinquency it is evident that inner-city communities differ considerably in such capacity. Particularly at a disadvantage are those areas associated with the problem of delinquency in its most aggravated form in the contemporary metropolis (1976:145).

Other studies have supported Finestone's general conclusions about the variability of communities in regards to their abilities to sustain effective community organizations and to impact upon community problems. To some degree they have agreed with his more specific conclusions about particular types of communities. For example, Spergel (1976), upon developing a typology of Chicago communities, also found substantial differences in the abilities of their resident organizations. Spergel found that:

The better-off economically and socially the residents
of the community, the less active organizations had to
be to obtain resources to meet community needs. The
poorer the community, the more it had to seek resources
outside, but the very poor community could not or was
not permitted to go too far (1976:75).

In discussing what he termed "Controlled communities,"

which were most often characterized by an extremely low

income and status-deprived population within a ghetto setting,

Spergel noted that:

Emphasis in the Controlled community is on the mobiliza-
tion of clients on a family, or small group basis to
become recipients of services. The system needs and
seeks clients for services. Emphasis on services tends
to personalize problems and direct attention away from
larger environmental or organizational problems which
affect the residents of the local community. Further-
more, programs in this kind of community emphasize the
managerial and supervisory, rather than preventive and
curative, aspects of services (1976:79).

Contextual factors other than community resident income

levels have also produced major differences in the abilities

of communities to sustain the community development process

in delinquency prevention programs. One illustration is

provided by the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention

Project (YDDPP) sponsored by the California Youth Authority.

Each of the communities included within YDDPP contained

residents who were of low income and were areas that were

thought to lack community organization. Included among the

major results sought by YDDPP for each of these communities

were the building of self-maintaining community problem-solving

structures, the enhancement of indigenous leadership, wider

participation in community affairs and establishment of stronger

relationships between local agencies (Knight et al., 1974).

The project was found to have been initially successful at involving citizens, organizations and agencies in developing ideas, plans, and resources for programming aimed at promoting youth development (Krisberg et al., 1978; Knight et al., 1974). Significant differences were noted, however, in the ability of each of the project communities to sustain networks that had been established and in the ability of the project to have a major impact on community institutions. In comparing the La Colonia community in Oxnard and the Toliver community in Oakland, for example, evaluation staff found that:

>The differences in "systems development" between the
>La Colonia and Toliver projects are not surprising.
>The two models are not the same; their aims and
>operations have differed for good reason. Having more
>than five times the population of Oxnard, Oakland
>presents a more knotty web of community life, politics,
>and bureaucracy. The constraints and opportunities for
>change differ from city to city, and clearly any approach
>even bordering on "systems development" is more practicable
>in Oxnard. Hence La Colonia's community-development activ-
>ities have been somewhat less service-bound at Toliver
>and have tended to connect with higher echelons of local
>bureaucracy.
>   In short, attempts to coordinate programs and resources
>for youth (in the absence of authority or power) may well
>be more readily workable in a city like Oxnard than in
>Oakland, where community organization is impeded by size
>and complexity of government (Knight, 1974:60).

The later group of research findings discussed above raises serious doubt about the general assumption of Clifford Shaw that residents of "socially disorganized" communities were capable of creating viable organizations focused on youth welfare and are able to impact on community delinquency. There is little question though that the theoretical work of Shaw and McKay and the operations of the CAP brought consider-

able attention to the dynamics of community social organization as a primary factor in the creation of delinquent behavior. This position was in contrast to more popular notions of the time that delinquency was the result of either biological inferiority or psychological abnormality.

Even the early signs of success that were attributed to the CAP by its early evaluations were insufficient to sway delinquency prevention practice from a dominant concern with psychological factors. With limited exception, such as the Mid-City project in Boston (Miller, 1962), the community development model was not utilized by major prevention programs during the late 1930's, 1940's, or 1950's. Delinquency prevention was recognized primarily as services to individual youth and as an appropriate activity for professional service providers in social welfare agencies.

Development of delinquency theory during this period, however, did give considerable attention to the dynamics of community social organization as a primary factor in the creation of delinquent behavior. In his theory of anomie, Merton (1938) raised the contention that delinquency (among other forms of deviance) was a response by youth to the unavailability of socially approved routes of success. Merton contended that everyone in this society desired the same American success goals. Access to legitimate avenues for achieving these success goals, however, was not equally available to everyone. This problem was particularly

acute in lower-class communities. The inability of individuals within lower-class communities to achieve success through legitimate means causes them to pursue success goals through illegitimate means or to retreat from the pursuit of success through methods such as drug and alcohol addiction.

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) utilized Merton's formulations to elaborate on the process by which the development of lower-class gangs provided the illegitimate avenues for youth that directed them into delinquent activity. In discussing their perspective, Cloward and Ohlin stated:

Our hypothesis can be summarized as follows: The disparity between what lower-class youth are led to want and what is actually available to them is the source of a major problem of adjustment. Adolescents who form delinquent subcultures, we suggest, have internalized an emphasis upon conventional goals. Faced with limitations on legitimate avenues of access to these goals, and unable to revise their aspirations downward, they experience intense frustrations: the exploration of nonconformist alternatives may be the result (1960:86).

The basic tenets of the Cloward and Ohlin theory are that:

1) All youth share a commitment to "success" in material terms.

2) Lower-class youth do not have opportunities for success that are equal to youth of higher class status.

3) High aspiration for material success without having opportunities for achievement produces a condition of intense frustration or social strain among lower-class youth.

4) Frustration from having legitimate opportunities for success blocked leads to the development of illegitimate means.

5) Acceptance of illegitimate means for success produces delinquent subcultures among lower-class youth.

6) Youth activity in delinquent subcultures (gangs) produces high rates of delinquency.

The obvious strategic delinquency prevention approach emanating from the Merton/Cloward and Ohlin perspective was the expansion of legitimate opportunities by which lower-class youth could pursue success. The theoretical logic behind this approach would suggest that, not only should improvements in areas such as education and job opportunities be offered to individual youth to increase their chances for success, but also that the environment within lower-class

communities responsible for the lack of opportunity for success be altered.

Accomplishment of the prevention tasks consistent with the Cloward and Ohlin theory would not necessitate adoption of the community development model. Until recently, however, the influence of the Chicago Area Project as a program of community reorganization to achieve delinquency reduction almost dictated that the community development approach would be used by prevention programs based upon the need for community reformation. The earliest evaluations of the CAP gave every indication that the model had promise for success in delinquency reduction. It is relatively clear that the social action recommendations advanced by Cloward and Ohlin from their theory drew heavily upon the ideas of combating delinquency through building community competence that were developed in connection with the CAP (Knapp and Polk, 1971: 25-35).

Implementation of the social policies suggested by Cloward and Ohlin was realized in the Mobilization for Youth (MFY) project located in the Lower East Side of Manhattan. MFY was commonly recognized as a test of "opportunity theory" as developed by Cloward and Ohlin. The Community Development component of MFY was viewed by many observers as, potentially, the most important aspect of the project.

The MFY original proposal indicates that, at least initially, the project placed heavy emphasis on impacting upon delinquency through community development.

> Participation by adults in decision-making matters
> that affect their interests increases their sense
> of identification with the community...People who
> identify with their neighborhood and share common
> values are more likely to try to control juvenile
> misbehavior. A well integrated community can
> provide learning experiences for adults which
> enable them to serve as more adequate models and
> interpreters of community life for the young. In
> short, there is an inverse relation between community
> integration and the rates of juvenile misbehavior
> (MFY, 1961:126).

In addition to increasing community integration, the Community
Development component of MFY was to affect delinquency through
community organization programs that improve the self-image
of community residents and engage them in bringing about
needed changed in areas such as housing, education and
sanitation (Weissman, 1969-a:24).

The MFY project model was adopted by a number of large-
scale delinquency prevention efforts during the early 1960's.
Projects funded by the Ford Foundation and the federal
government were greatly influenced by strategic preferences
that included heavy citizen participation in social programming,
use of indigenous leaders and general community empowerment
to enable residents to alleviate adverse social conditions
(for excellent reviews of this group of projects, see Marris
and Rein, 1967; and Knapp and Polk, 1971).

As was true with most similar projects during this
period, MFY delinquency objectives quickly took a back seat
to project aims that were more generally directed at alle-
viating poverty conditions in the target communities. The
observation was made by Knapp and Polk in discussing
the large-scale delinquency projects of this time that:

> ...it had become apparent by late 1962 that the
> real target was not delinquency at all, but poverty;
> once this had been realized the delinquency vehicle
> became not only a hindrance, but an embarrassment
> (1971:193).

The lack of attention that was in the final analysis paid to delinquency, per se, resulted in a lack of any serious attempt to measure the project's impact on delinquency. Weissman also notes that the MFY attempt to address the conditions that promoted delinquency was "clearly a long-range strategy, not easily evaluated in the short run (1969-b:195)."

The reduced focus on delinquency-specific considerations by MFY may be, as suggested by Knapp and Polk, a reflection of dominant ideological trends of the early 1960's. The MFY experience, however, may also be indicative of the difficulty in being directed towards specific project task goals in programs employing the community development model. Programs operating during different time periods have found maintaining connections between delinquency reduction and community development activities to present difficulties for project staff in carrying out daily project activities. Again, using California's YDDPP as illustration, the response of one staff member to an evaluation questionnaire indicates the nature of this problem:

> Community programs seem to be nothing more than tinker-
> ing...YDDPP became so conceptually global and grandiose
> that it got lost in vagueness. Everytime some activity
> was undertaken, someone would ask, "Yes, but does that
> really impact delinquency?" The answer would usually
> require a complex chain of logical connections that
> became so abstract hardly anyone could relate to them
> (Krisberg, 1978:92).

Despite the absence of delinquency reduction as a driving force, the fact that MFY was one of the best researched and documented of programs utilizing community development makes it an important example to consider in assessing the value and practicability of the model. A number of accounts of the MFY community development activities allow insights into the difficulty with which the model was applied and how the model's assumptions stood up in practice (see Brager and Specht, 1967; Piven, 1967; Beck, 1969; Weissman, 1969-a). Some of these works point out how previously discussed issues related to community development assumptions surfaced within MFY. For example, considerable debate emerged within MFY over the value of citizen participation and whether community organization in the project should be guided by the objective of building viable citizens actions groups or instead towards using community organization tactics as a tool in achieving substantive social change goals (Weissman, 1969-b:180-182).

Comments by high-level MFY staff questioned the assumption that residents will readily participate in community action organizations:

> ...community action has tended to focus first on gaining power for the poor -- power to control local schools, to influence the policies of the Welfare Department, and then ultimately sufficient power to have their economic demands met. The strategy assumes that the poor themselves desire power and will enlist in efforts to gain it. In fact the poor man is much more concerned about money and purchasing power than he is in wielding power over malfunctioning social

institutions. His interest in community action is
therefore episodic, related to the short-run pros-
pects of immediate gain, and unsuited to a long-
range strategy of developing a political power
base. The only really successful community-action
campaign at MFY was related to welfare, and money
was a central factor in this campaign (Weissman,
1969-b:201).

Serious doubt was also raised over the proposition that

neighborhood groups had an ability to significantly impact

upon major community problems:

The conviction that only the redistribution of wealth
can make a significant dent in social pathology has
caused me to bring new staff into Mobilization and to
reshape the program around the purpose of economic
development. Any thought that major social change
can be induced through a neighborhood organization is
gone; it is plain to me that the future of Mobiliza-
tion depends in large measure on America's willingness
to address economic problems (Beck, 1969:148).

It is safe to say that community development within MFY

did not evolve in the intended manner and few of the original

delinquency reduction objectives were met. Still, however,

it appears that even those who were somewhat critical of the

approach found substantial value in the community work of MFY:

Community-organization programs have traditionally
been evaluated in terms of number of participants, the
substantive changes effected, the ability of the community
as an entity to solve its problems. Certainly only a small
percentage of the neighborhood residents were ever involved
in MFY's Community Development Program, and only a small
dent was made in the social problems within the neighbor-
hood; yet there is one other criterion which must be
considered in evaluating the community-organization pro-
gram -- the ability to raise social issues. In a
democracy, the society as a whole must ultimately decide
how it wishes to solve its social problems. Unless the
entire society becomes aware of social problems,
effective solutions are not likely to result. Perhaps
the most profound lesson of the Mobilization experience
is that slum communities cannot solve their problems

alone. They need outside help and resources. To get
this help, public consciousness and concern for the
slum must be enlisted. To make the public at large
aware of social issues and potential solutions is a
major function of social agencies. In this respect,
Mobilization was enormously successful during the
years from 1962 to 1967 (Weissman,1969-a:186).

The experiences of the other large-city delinquency
projects during the early 1960's period were not dissimilar
to those of MFY. In general, their community action focuses
moved them quickly away from delinquency-specific consider-
ations towards addressing the greater question of poverty in
America. In each case, broadly defined project goals and
wide sweeping approaches to problem correction caused
difficulties in program evaluation. In commenting on the
evaluation dilemma faced by these projects, Marris and Rein
observed that:

> They needed to gather evidence that would answer a
> set of complex questions, in the setting where labora-
> tory controls and exactitude of procedure were impossible
> to secure, and where the criteria which defined success
> or failure were often elusive.
>   To show that the programmes were effective some
> objective measures of achievement had first to be
> put forward. This, in itself, was difficult enough.
> Even if the ultimate criteria -- the reduction of poverty
> and juvenile crime -- were in principle measurable, the
> intermediate criteria were either unquantifiable or
> doubtfully relevant....Whether a neighbourhood was more
> integrated and assertive of its rights for the experience
> of community organization...were largely questions for
> intuitive personal judgement (1967:192-3).

Not only were MFY and its companion projects subject to
criticism for their failure to produce evidence of delinquency
reduction, but also, a great deal of controversy was created
over the community organizing methods that these projects

employed in pursuit of their goals. A not uncommon attack on these projects was that their efforts to involve community residents in social action were responsible for the frequent incidents of riots and other forms of urban unrest that occurred at the time. This objective of "maximum feasible participation" of community residents in project activities that was a central facet of these projects was severely criticized (Moynihan, 1969). By the late 1960's community action as a strategy for reducing delinquency was greatly de-emphasized.

As mentioned earlier in this report, the high level of community development activity that was initiated in the 1960's and the proponents that the strategy had gained, created an atmosphere in which the strategy could not be completely dismissed. During the 1970's, numerous prevention projects proposed activities that were intended to achieve some form of community development. Most often, however, no references were made to any particular theoretical models as providing the rationale for community development in these projects. Moreover, the lack of available evaluation literature on these projects makes difficult an assessment of how far beyond proposal rhetoric the community development activities were carried out.

In programs of the 1970's where rationales were carefully laid out, no new theoretical developments emerged to justify

community development as a means of delinquency prevention. Application of the strategy was usually based on slightly modified versions of the Shaw and McKay or Cloward and Ohlin formulations.

Little progress was made during the 1970's in determining the value of community development in prevention programs. Even in programs where thorough evaluations were tried, there was difficulty in judging the contribution of the strategy. For example, evaluators of the Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program were convinced that the program's community development activities had reduced crime and diminished the community's fear of crime (Fowler et al., 1979). It was concluded, however, that the program's community organization component, was not the primary cause of these changes in crime rates and community attitudes. There was little certainty over how the community development activities were directly related to the program's successes.

By focusing on the CAP and the MFY, this review of programs has downplayed some possible alternative theoretical rationales for community development in delinquency prevention programs. Control models advocated by authors such as Hirschi (1969) and Reckless (1973) provide logical explanations for the strengthening of community institutions and norms through the development process. It is submitted, however, that the CAP and MFY constitute the two most important program histories that were available as guides to the

development of the OJJDP program. As stated, these
programs served as prototypes (in theory and structure),
of the overwhelming majority of projects that have pro-
ceeded with a community development philosophy. Also, the
relative wealth of information on these two projects provides
the most substantial knowledge base on the strategy's
practical application. The history of these two programs
alone would suggest that implementation of community
development for purposes of delinquency prevention may be
difficult, especially in impoverished communities and that
the impact of the strategy is hard to assess.

VI. <u>Theory and Measurement of the OJJDP Community Development Strategy</u>

The ambiguous history of community development in delinquency prevention did not present a strategy that OJJDP could confidently prescribe to its grantees as a successful method of preventing delinquency. Moreover, upon reviewing the field of delinquency prevention as a whole, OJJDP took the position that the state of the art in this field did not allow such a prescription of any single approach.

In a background paper provided to applicants for funding under its delinquency prevention program OJJDP summarized the prevention approaches that had theretofore been taken. According to OJJDP, delinquency prevention efforts could be classified into three major groupings determined by the factors they emphasized as delinquency causational:1) the <u>individual approach</u> which focused on the pathology of the individual as contributing to delinquency; 2) the <u>labelling approach</u> which focused on the process by which delinquency developed as a result of the stigmatization of some youth as deviant by social control agencies; and 3) the <u>environmental approach</u> which focused on situational conditions as the dominant factor in delinquency causation. It was noted that the environmental approach "assumes that the delinquent behavior of youth living in 'high-risk' settings can be reduced by remodeling and reorganizing the community..." (OJJDP, 1976:3). The assessment given by OJJDP to the

program methods that it reviewed within these categories
was that:

> There are no single approaches which have been
> consistently and demonstrably successful in
> preventing delinquency. No one has high-confidence
> solutions, except for the most sweeping injunctions
> to cure social ills, and replicating model approaches
> on a nationwide basis is premature (OJJDP, 1976:6).

As an alternative to basing its program on any one
of the traditional strategies, OJJDP promoted a program
rationale that it claimed "cut across" the three categories
it had reviewed. The approach chosen by OJJDP to guide
its delinquency prevention effort was "positive youth
development". As noted by OJJDP, several formulations of
this approach have been developed. No explicit statement
of attachment to any of the particular formulations was
made by OJJDP. The most important consideration in OJJDP
selecting positive youth development did not appear to be
an agreement with any author's specific development of the
approach, but instead, belief in the general characteristic
of the approach to reduce the "negative emphasis" that is
featured in most delinquency prevention programs. Rather
than direct prevention efforts towards reducing delinquent
and anti-social behavior in a project's target group, the
positive youth development approach focuses upon services
that promote "positive growth". It was the position of
OJJDP that, while this approach may not be a complete
answer to the prevention of delinquency, positive development

services are likely to be part of an "eventual solution".
The OJJDP rationale was stated as follows:

> The underlying logic may be most directly expressed
> in the following way: Until that time when we know
> how to fine-tune programs to prevent delinquency,
> let us at least provide the services which are known
> to be important to the normal, positive development
> of the child (OJJDP, 1976:6).

Providing and promoting positive youth services to
the program's targeted youth, therefore, became the central
consideration of the OJJDP "Program's To Prevent Juvenile
Delinquency". Three strategies were chosen by OJJDP as
most appropriate for grantees to employ in reaching these
general objectives. 1) Direct services strategy allowed
grantees to act as providers of services that promoted
positive youth development. 2) Improving delivery of
services was a strategy to be utilized by youth service
agencies to ameliorate service delivery problems and build
agency capacities to deliver positive services. 3) Community
development was designed to increase the capacity of the
program's target communities to develop and sustain youth
services.

It is most clear that an intended impact of the commun-
ity development strategy in the OJJDP program was to strengthen
the youth service offerings that were available within
funded communities. Less certain is the degree to which
OJJDP intended its community development efforts to reach
objectives such as general community competence and commun-
ity itegration as did the CAP and MFY. OJJDP did not adhere

to the doctrines of Shaw and McKay or Cloward and Ohlin,
but a number of assumptions made within the OJJDP program
announcement suggest substantial agreement with the
theoretical principles forwarded by these authors. For
example, the target population selected for the program
was identified as:

> Youth in greatest danger of becoming delinquent living
> in communities characterized by high rates of crime
> and delinquency, high infant mortality rates, high
> unemployment and underemployment, substandard housing,
> physical deterioration and low median incomes (OJJDP,
> 1976

The most obvious support for the use of such characteristics
as criterion for defining the appropriate target population
for a delinquency prevention program is the work of the
social ecologists Shaw and McKay (1942). They found such
conditions to be evidence of a community's social disorgan-
ization and linked these conditions to high rates of delin-
quency. Cloward and Ohlin also viewed such conditions as
leading to the formation of illegitimate subcultures.

In the statement of results sought by the OJJDP program
it is implied that by increasing the competence of community
units in areas such as those described above that a wide
range of preventive mechanisms will be fostered. OJJDP
dictated that grantee projects should seek:

> To increase the capacity of target communities to
> respond more effectively to the social, economic
> and familial needs of youth residing in target
> communities (OJJDP, 1976:59).

The OJJDP specification of its community development strategy is highly suggestive of the assumptions that served as the basis for the Chicago Area Project. OJJDP listed as minimum requirements for grantees attempting community development that projects should:

    (a) Be directed toward improving and increasing services for youth through involvement of residents and youth from target communities in planning and implementation of youth service programs.

    (b) Address those community conditions and organizational/ institutional policies, practices and procedures which limit accessibility and restrict utilization of services within target communities.

    (c) Facilitate the community's ability to support and sustain improved and expanded services to youth.

    (d) Provide for appropriate training of staff, residents and youth, as well as other support services essential to developing and sustaining viable programs (OJJDP, 1976: 60-61).

Implicit in these requirements are the assumptions that residents of the depressed areas for which the program was targeted can be motivated in substantial numbers to participate in community groups focusing on youth services or delinquency prevention, that community-based groups have the potential to significantly alter major institutions which shape the community environment, that the community has or can obtain sufficient resources to sustain needed youth services, and that indigenous leadership will emerge from the community to guide the community in its process of development.

Taken as a whole, the major focus of the required

components of the OJJDP community development strategy
appeared to be on empowering the target communities to enable
them to initiate or sustain services that address those
community conditions that are contributing to the delinquency
problem. A reasonable inference that may be drawn is that
the strategy assumes that delinquency results from communities
that lack sufficient organization to suppress such delin-
quency causing condition or alternatively that delinquency
is produced in communities lacking sufficient organization to
deliver services that might suppress delinquency. Such
notions of community disorganization were central components
of both the Shaw and McKay and Cloward and Ohlin theories.

Unfortunately, the degree to which community development
in the OJJDP program was actually based on principles estab--
lished in the Shaw and McKay and/or Cloward and Ohlin theories
(or any other theory) was never clarified by OJJDP staff.
The lack of an explicit statement of theoretical rational
for the strategy by OJJDP had two important consequences.
The first of these issues relates to the guidance provided
to the program grantees. The objectives of the other two
allowable strategies of the program (direct services and
improving service delivery) were relatively understandable.
It could not be expected, however, that the intent of the
community development strategy would be immediately clear
to grantees. In the absence of theoretical direction it
was difficult for grantees to set appropriate goals for
community development activities of their projects. Also,

no chain of logic was established for grantees as to how or why the elements of the OJJDP strategy would produce any delinquency prevention impact. Direction of project activities by grantee directors under such circumstances was often difficult.

It is possible that OJJDP expected its grantees to provide their own theoretical rationales for application of the community development strategy. In general, such was not the case. Most grantees accepted the theoretical summary provided in the background paper as constituting a statement by OJJDP of the theoretical stance that would guide the program. The general belief was that no further theoretical justification for their individual projects was necessary. OJJDP had provided them with theory. Typical of the responses given by grantees when question- ed about the theory that guided their project activities were:

Project 1: Well, to be quite honest, we simply
            accepted the theory that LEAA gave us
            (National Evaluation Field Notes).

Project 2: In this case, the program announcement
            from LEAA contained 11 pages on theoretical
            assumptions related to juvenile delinquency.
            It was our impression that by applying
            for a grant based on these regulations,
            we were stating that we subscribed to these
            assumptions and no additional theoretical
            treatment was therefore necessary (National
            Evaluation Field Notes).

These beliefs may have been re-enforced by the fact that no instructions were given to program applicants directing them to identify the theoretical basis for their proposed

projects. Few program proposals contained any discussion whatsoever of theoretical rationale. The result was that for most projects no explicit theoretical rationale existed for community development.

The second issue resulting from the lack of clarification of theoretical rationale by OJJDP relates to the evaluation of the program's community development strategy. As stated in the methods section of this report, it was the design of this study to determine relevant variables for investigation according to the factors stressed by program theory. The lack of an explicit statement of program theory prevents any certainty in determining the most significant evaluation variables for the OJJDP program in this manner. The risk exists that the evaluation will impose a post-hoc theoretical model that had little relevance to program operations. The relevance of evaluation findings based on examiniation of variables determined by such an inappropriate model would, of course, be open to serious question.

Rather than impose a single theoretical model on OJJDP community development operations, for purposes of this study a decision was made to evaluate program operations in accordance with any of the competing rationales that emerged from relevant discussions by OJJDP or by grantees for their individual projects. Not suprisingly, due to

the relative lack of discussion of theory, a limited set
of rationales were identified. In general, rationales con-
formed to the explanations that community development was
primarily a means of increasing support for youth services
and was not in itself a prevention mechanism, or alter-
natively, that community development could achieve the
benefits that were attributed to it by the Shaw and McKay
or Cloward and Ohlin theories.

According to any of the identified rationales,
community development projects should be directed towards
the following aims:

1) organizing community-based groups aimed at
    increasing youth services, expanding community
    resources, enhancing opportunities for youth,
    influencing community attitudes in behalf of
    youth; and perhaps addressing conditions of
    community deterioration;

2) involving community residents in organized
    efforts of community betterment and youth
    advocacy;

3) encouraging cooperative activities among
    residents and community institutions that
    result in action beneficial to youth.

These basic aims of the chosen theoretical approaches were
translated into the set of research questions and measures
that appeared in the methods section of this paper.

As with many prior studies of the impact of
community development on delinquency prevention, the efforts
of this study to measure area rates of delinquency reduction
were largely frustrated. Rarely did the target areas upon
which OJJDP grantees were attempting to impact correspond

in any way to reporting jurisdictions of local justice
system agencies. In some areas, juvenile records were
kept only on an informal basis. Attempts by the National
Evaluation to administer impact questionnaires to samples
of youths from targeted communities also proved unsuccess-
ful (NCCD, 1981). Somewhat consequently, the focus of
investigations of this study are almost exclusively on
what Witmer and Tufts identified as the primary question
for evaluations of programs aimed at bringing about
delinquency prevention through environmental change --
did the environmental changes that were sought actually
occur?

VII.   The Relevance of Community Development to OJJDP Grantees

Even if theory and strategy for community development
had been well specified by OJJDP, there was little guarentee
that such guidance would have been utilized by program
grantees.   OJJDP placed few controls on the daily operations
of the implemented projects.   An issue faced by this study
prior to measuring the grantees' community development impact
was determining if projects had, in fact, proceeded in their
activities under any conception of the appropriateness of
community development.   It could not be assumed that the
projects conformed to any of the identified theoretical
justifications.   As noted by Glaser:

> Evaluations guided by theory as to why an activity should
> have a particular effect may be severely limited if
> they unquestioningly accept official prescriptions,
> administrative descriptions, or traditional conceptions
> of what occurs in treatment endeavors.   Administrators
> of programs have multiple goals and diverse pressures
> or constraints that make their practices diverge from
> their ideals, their plans, and even their statements
> about their activities.   Whenever this divergence
> occurs, ignoring it may attenuate the findings of the
> theory-guided evaluations.   Thus, a key issue in evalua-
> tions should be that of the reality of theory relevance.
> Does the program to be evaluated have, in fact, the
> characteristics that are assumed in a theory on why
> the program should be effective and for whom? (1980:
> 130).

While each of the OJJDP grantees verbalized plans for
community development, examination of their characteristics
made success of the strategy doubtful from the outset.

The extremely diverse mix of agency, community, and program contexts that made up the subjects of the National Evaluation most often created difficulty in attempting to generalize findings made at individual study sites. While there was an abundance of apparent commonalities among the projects, it was most usual that, given a particular issue, there would be a significant group of projects that stood out as important exceptions. Nevertheless, the consistency in the reports from almost all evaluation sites did allow the conclusion to be reached that, in general, community development, despite its supposed major emphasis in the OJJDP program, was a strategy that was largely untested by the prevention grantees.

Although a myriad of staff decisions and circumstances during program operations contributed to lessening the significance of community development at each site, choices made by program developers in structuring their respective projects made the successful implementation of any programs based on a strategy of community development questionable from the outset. For example, the previously discussed literature points to the importance of paying attention to community typology in developing programs of community change. This was an issue that was largely ignored by the developers of the OJJDP prevention projects. The grant application procedures for the OJJDP program did not require applicants to define the concept of community under which project services would be structured or to specify the relationships according

to which target communities were determined. Few discussions pertaining to these matters were voluntarily offered by the proposals of the grantees.

Agency histories and staff experiences among the grantees, for the most part, revolved around providing direct services to individuals. Community environmental change was, for most of the grantee agencies, highly desirable, but not the primary focus of agency services. Impact upon a specific community unit had not been a forefront consideration of agency interventions. "Community" had remained for these agencies a loosely held conception for which most grantees offered little more precision in their proposals for the OJJDP Programs To Prevent Juvenile Delinquency.

Typically, the description of a target "community" by a grantee offered a collection of demographic characteristics, including statistics on population size, employment, health, housing, and crime and delinquency. The statistics themselves often provided only a sketchy portrayal of the nature of the target area that the grantees would be serving. Moreover, there was a virtual absence of discussion within project proposals concerning any systems of inter-relationships among target area residents that might be used to identify the geographic areas portrayed by the demographic data as distinct communities. Few proposals pointed to any sort of mutual identifications among target area residents. The governing criteria for the formulation of target areas for many grantees was the availability of corresponding

to reduce community development efforts in order to avoid
the appearance of establishing a preference of any particular
group.

Staff confusion over the nature of the community that
their project was attempting to develop was mitigated at some
sites by a tacit understanding of an integrated target
community more limited in size and scope than the broad
service areas that had been described in project proposals.
Even at sites where such a potentially effective community
unit to be served existed, however, the ability of staff to
carry out a program of community development was most often
severely diminished by the lack of a well defined strategy
or appropriate program structures.

Although such an option was apparently open to applicants
for OJJDP funding, none of the eventual grantees selected
community development as their primary intervention strategy.
Few projects identified community development as a distinct
strategy at all. In most projects, staff could not identify
any systematic approach that guided their community develop-
ment efforts and could not point to a project administrative
component or unit that had specific responsibility for the
management of such activities. At most sites, community
development was always an adjunct to direct service activities
and never developed an identity of its own. Often the deter-
mination that an activity was community development was made
only after the fact, when it was found that enough community
residents had participated in an event to allow seeming
justification of this label.

Despite the general failure of the OJJDP grantees to develop systematic approaches to community development, a majority of the grantee proposals did acknowledge the critical importance of developing some method of community resident involvement in project activities to assure the successful implementation of a delinquency prevention program. Very few projects, though, established any impact goals that were to be accomplished specifically as a result of programs involving citizen participation.

Most projects did propose some type of process objectives that were centered on community residents and at least loosely modeled around a community development strategy. For example, the following objectives were among those proposed:

Project 1: To establish advisory groups, including youth and adults, at each project site as vehicles for broader input into program development and implementation in order to expand the level of community participation and support.

To organize a comprehensive volunteer corps made up of parents and other concerned adults to ensure direct community involvement in the prevention program while presenting a full range of appropriate role models for the program participants.

Project 2: To develop and involve committees composed of youths, representatives of governmental and voluntary agencies, the corporate community, and community volunteer programs in carrying out all phases of the program.

Few project proposals discussed the relationship that community resident boards would have to project activities or explained the significance of community involvement to delinquency prevention. The responsibilities and authorities of the project formed community resident boards were often

left unclear. Few proposals provided details on the specific functions that would be performed by community resident participants within the project framework. There is little evidence that greater attention was paid to these matters once the projects were operational. Interviews with project staff indicate that, at most sites, they were required to form community resident boards without sufficient guidelines on the appropriate structures for such bodies as to what types of community representation were necessary for project purposes.

Among other contributing factors to the reduced effort in community development within the OJJDP prevention program were the agency histories and experiences of the grantees. As was mentioned, with very few exceptions, the backgrounds of the grantee agencies primarily involved providing direct services to youth. This factor caused project staff to be more predisposed to direct service activity. Moreover, direct services accounted for the service reputations that grantee agencies had most interest in protecting. Almost across the board, grantees would not consider implementation of any other strategical approach until they had satisfactorily implemented a program of direct services to youth. Most grantees never progressed beyond this stage. Project directors and other key staff were very reluctant to initiate other strategic activity at the cost of diverting resources that might jeopardize the operation of direct services.

The project operated at Venice, California provides a good example of the above problem. The Venice project was among the few that designed a separate project component and specific tactics to carry out community development activities. The plan in Venice, called the "Block Club Linkage System," called for the initial selection by project staff of the ten project target area blocks with the highest incidence of juvenile crime. Each of the six agencies that made up the collaboration operating the Venice project were to participate equally in organizing meetings on each of these blocks at which community residents could identify community problems that contributed to delinquency and propose activities aimed at delinquency reduction.

The Venice plan called for the employment of target area parents and youth as block club aides to assist in organizational and programmatic planning. Among the intended impacts of the block clubs were the establishment of a communication system among community residents, the provision of education and information useful to crime prevention, the identification and training of community volunteers, the improvement of communication between law enforcement and community residents, and the prevention of a specified list of crimes.

During the project's first year of operation, staffing for the block club component was highly dependent on CETA employees. It became quickly evident to the project administrators, however, that this type of community organization

required skills and experiences that the minimally trained CETA staff did not possess. The claim made by most of the collaboration agencies, however, was that they could not spare professional staff from their service programs to provide extensive supervision to the CETA staff in carrying out the block club plan. Eventually, due to the reluctance of these agencies to lend their staff to the effort, and the inability of the CETA staff to operate the plan, the block club system was redesigned to operate primarily as a mechanism that referred youth and adults to the grantee agencies' direct service programs. The lack of interest that both community residents and agency staff showed in this new service resulted in the formal dissolution of the block club system mid-way into the project's second year.

In spite of the lack of planning and administrative support for community development at most prevention project sites, there was a sincere effort by project staff to initiate community development activities. Much of the staff efforts were expended in attempts to establish the advisory boards, community councils, or other formal mechanisms for community resident participation that had been called for in statements of project objectives. Techniques used to gain community resident interest in project community activities varied from site to site. Most grantees used some combination of solicitation by telephone, letter writing, and posters and flyers distributed throughout the target community. Some projects were able to recruit citizens through local media

advertisements. Staff from some projects engaged in door-to-door recruitment.

At a limited number of sites, recruitment efforts initially paid off in an adequate level of resident attendance at organizational meetings. There was hope that projects could establish decision-making bodies that were truly representative of the project's target communities and carry out community sentiments. Such high levels of participation, however, quickly waned. After the first few months of organizing efforts, community resident board meetings, even at most sites that were initially successful, were characterized by attendance that was so low or inconsistent that cancellation of scheduled meetings was a frequent occurrence. As a consequence of the lack of resident participation, most community councils or boards, as envisioned in the objectives of the projects, never materialized.

Even if, as at some sites, the community units were able to continue a formal schedule of meetings, they most often functioned as inconsequential decision-making bodies. The following represents a consistent pattern that developed in the reports of on-site observers testifying to the lack of meaningful participation by community residents in prevention project functioning.

> There has been very little community development work
> done by the project. In the project's proposal, one
> of the objectives was to develop community councils
> in the target areas. This didn't happen. In the
> second-year plans it revised this objective, saying

that the project would work with already existing councils in the target areas. This has actually happened in only one area (National Evaluation field notes).

There is no evidence to suggest that the program advisory council has played a significant role in the on-going project's decisions affecting the overall prevention approach (National Evaluation field notes).

The Community Council is not into the crux of things. It deals only with issues like whether the gym should be open on Saturdays (National Evaluation field notes).

Rather than carrying hope for a turnaround in community attitudes towards their projects, staff at most projects simply accepted the disinterest among residents as too pervasive to overcome. Staff commonly attributed their inability to attract community residents to project programs to factors such as "resident apathy," "ghetto mentality," and "preoccupation with survival needs." In general, these phrases were shorthand for the belief shared by staff members of many projects that community residents who worked hard all day did not perceive a sufficient interest for themselves in attending night or weekend board meetings of a project that had as its major intended payoff the reduction of community delinquency.

Project directors also claimed that community attitudes about their projects were less than enthusiastic due to the past experiences of residents with government-funded programs. It was said that residents had become wary of government programs that had been initiated with grand promises of bringing about major improvements in the community, but had terminated at the end of their funding period without showing any tangible impacts.

For some project directors, the failure to organize community residents was not taken as a failure of program strategy or tactics, but instead as a function of insufficient time having passed to allow these methods to become successful:

> To really have real community involvement is ridiculous because of the time frame for the development of the project. It was a miracle that we got ourselves together (National Evaluation field notes).

> Most programs are of short duration and they never show any fruits because they are cut off before they can do it. It's going to take three to five years (for any agency) to gain community acceptance and no program is funded for that long a period (National Evaluation field notes).

Despite the questionable project structures, the problems in implementation, and the lack of observable impacts, most project directors felt that they had been successful in community development. Most often, directors offered some evidence of community resident support for project direct services to corroborate their claims. Few directors, though, were able to point to systematic project efforts that produced resident support. The general conclusion must be reached that there was a very limited number of OJJDP projects that offered a well structured community development approach, fewer projects that had commitment from project administrators to carry out such an approach, and even fewer (less than six) that generated enough project activity within a well structured approach to warrant intensive investigation.

Process data from the two year on-site investigations of the national evaluation indicated two projects as being most likely to have produced some observable impact as a result of community development activities. The two projects - the Positive Youth Development Project in Boston, Massachusetts and the Youth Services Program in Tuskegee, Alabama - in addition to being among the better projects in terms of systematic community development approach, also offer the opportunity to compare the experiences of project efforts in both urban and rural contexts.

VIII. The Positive Youth Development Program - Boston, Massachusetts

The Positive Youth Development Program (PYDP) was administered by the Boston Teen Center Alliance (TCA). The Teen Center Alliance was incorporated in August, 1973 by several leaders from key youth agencies in Boston who recognized the need to form a coalition to reduce competition among themselves for increasingly scarce funds. The Alliance served as a coordinating base and fund developer for its member agencies. At the time of the OJJDP grant membership included over 35 agencies. TCA also offered technical assistance to agency staff to strength their youth programs. The underlying purpose of TCA was,

> ...to increase the capacity of its member centers
> to live up to their potential both as mechanisms
> of delinquency prevention and as agencies serving
> the needs of community youth (TCA, 1977).

For purposes of the OJJDP program, TCA contracted with ten of its member agencies to provide service programs. The service programs developed by TCA agencies were designed to meet unmet needs of youth in the agencies' target communities. Each of the grants was small (usually $30,000) and was designed to supplement services that were already being offered by the funded youth agencies. TCA allowed member agencies to develop programs that uniquely fit the needs of the neighborhoods in which they operated. TCA imposed a minimum of bureaucratic and directive administration over the grantees in an attempt to allow them to preserve their "community-backed integrity".

Notwithstanding the aim of allowing agency sub-grantees maximum flexibility to develop programs that they thought would meet the needs of their communities, there was an attempt by TCA to tie all member agencies receiving OJJDP funds to a basic set of program assumptions. TCA guidelines required that the clients of sub-grantees be chosen from populations consisting of:

> high risk, delinquency vulnerable youths from among (1) disadvantaged, poor white communities, (2) disadvantaged black youth, (3) disadvantaged Hispanic youth, and (4) female adolescents from one of the other groups (TCA, 1977:100).

The TCA conception of disadvantaged youth was in line with the OJJDP guidelines for target populations in the program.

TCA also required that agencies to which it provided funds share in the organization's commitment to making services operate as a product of the communities in which the offering youth service agencies were located. The belief of TCA in youth agencies' need to engage in an interactive process with their community is emphatically stated (in capital letters, underlined) in its funding proposal to OJJDP:

> COMMUNITY YOUTH AGENCIES PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN PROVIDING POSITIVE GROWTH EXPERIENCES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE IN A PREVENTIVE SENSE MUST ENGAGE AND UTILIZE THE SUPPORT OF THE PERSONS MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED AND WHO HAVE THE MOST AT STAKE: THE KIDS AND THEIR PARENTS (TCA, 1977:73)

In furtherance of this belief, TCA mandated that each agency participating in the OJJDP grant come up with a plan for community development and devote a minimum of fifteen percent of their project funds towards community development activities.

A wide variety of mechanisms were utilized by the TCA-funded agencies to further community development aims. The use of a number of different project methods was fully anticipated by TCA. The City of Boston is separated into distinct neighborhoods, largely composed of and identified with one or two specific ethnic groups. Quite disparate community standards and acceptable modes of agency operation are associated with each of the neighborhood settings. Designing programs that fit the uniqueness of each community would almost necessitate a variety of approaches.

For the purposes of this study, two Boston communities were chosen for examination. TCA staff identified these communities as areas in which funded agencies had most success in terms of the community development aspects of their project operations. The two communities chosen and the agencies operating therein are as follows:

Charlestown

A recently prepared profile of Charlestown provides the following description:

> Charlestown occupies an area of approximately one square mile and in 1980 had a population of about 17,000. Located on a small peninsula between the estuaries of the Mystic and Charles Rivers, it is cut off from the surrounding communities by bay, river, bridge, expressway, and railroad yards. There is no way to enter Charlestown without crossing a bridge. There is thus a definite transition when one enters Charlestown: the narrow streets and closely packed houses contrast with the openness of the expressway, railroad tracks, and water (Gilman et al., 1980: 25).

The population in Charlestown is virtually all white. Most recent estimates identify Charlestown's residents as being 98% white, with 2% being listed as Hispanic. At the turn of the century, the residents of Charlestown were 90% Irish. Today the representation of other nationalities has increased, but the area is still often identified with its Irish residents.

The physical isolation of Charlestown from other Boston neighborhoods and its near homogeneity have contributed to a strong community identification among residents.

> Long-term residents refer to themselves as "townies". This label is selectively applied and to a certain extent reflects standards of acceptance in the community. In general, the term "townie" is conferred upon long-term residents and those of their offspring who reside in the community. The term is generally used only when discussing interactions with or referring to outsiders. Not commonly used in "normal" conversation in the town, it does reflect, however, a certain community spirit and identification (Gilman et al., 1980:25).

Significantly excluded from "townie" label have been the newly arrived young professional families who have been attracted by the existence of rehabilitation properties at low cost and the residents of Charlestown's three low-income housing projects, consisting of 1,100 units.

While the median income of Charlestown families is not low, the area ranks well above the average for the city in the percentage of families living below the standard used to determine low-income status. Unemployment is a serious problem within Charlestown, with estimates going as high as 30% of the population over sixteen years of age.

Charlestown is not among the city's communities most plagued by serious delinquent activity. Although there are a significant number of juveniles arrested for burglary and auto theft, by far, most juvenile arrests are for offenses such as vandalism, traffic offenses, simple assaults, drugs, and disorderly conduct. Serious delinquent activity is identified by both residents and police officers as being the work of a small number of youth, most of whom are residents of the housing projects.

TCA provided funds for one agency to operate a prevention project in Charlestown -- the John F. Kennedy Teen Center (JFK). The JFK Teen Center operated from the basement (2 rooms) of its parent agency -- the JFK Family Service Center. The teen center had an active clientele of approximately 100 youth. Traditional services had been tutoring, arts and crafts, "family life counseling", and recreation.

Roxbury

Unlike Charlestown, Roxbury has been the home of a number of succeeding ethnic groups over the years. In recent decades, however, the population of approximately 50,000 has been commonly identified as the heart of Boston's black community. Recent estimates of Roxbury's ethnic mix are that blacks comprise 78% of the population, Hispanics 9%, whites 8%, and Cape Verdeans 4%. Much of the consideration of Roxbury as a community is based upon the shared ethnic

identification of the majority group. The population of the

area has been far too transient to build shared community

sentiments that come about through long-term residence.

Roxbury as much as any community serviced by OJJDP

grantees typifies the appropriate program target area as

outlined in the program announcement. A recent survey by

the Boston Redevelopment Authority (1980) showed that the

median family income in Roxbury was lower than any other

community within the City of Boston. Roxbury also had

the highest percentage of families living below the level

of low-income status. Unemployment was listed as well above

the City's average.

Much of the housing in Roxbury is in a serious state of

deterioration. Many of the buildings in the community have

been abandoned. According to TCA staff the abandoned

buildings "pose a considerable threat to the security,

safety, and economic viability" of Roxbury.

Roxbury has been consistently at or near the top of

the list in terms of juvenile arrests among Boston communities

over the last several years. The area has been the locus of

a high percentage of the city's more serious delinquent activity.

The fear of youth crime among community residents has become

a major social issue.

Two agencies working within the Roxbury area were provided

funds by TCA during the OJJDP grant. Hawthorne House was an

agency that had traditionally offered an informal youth program

covering a wide spectrum of services. Most of the agencies' services were oriented around recreation and arts and crafts. It also, however, offered tutoring, informal counseling and employment-related services.

Marcus Garvey House prior to the OJJDP grant offered a multi-service program with a unifying theme of Afro-American culture. Operated from a badly deteriorated building, the agency offered services such as African dance, Black history, tutoring, counseling, drug seminars, leadership development, and community beautification.

Community Development in the Positive Youth Development Project

The discussion of the experiences of the TCA project in community development have been organized according to the research questions under which project activities were examined.

1) What new community structures have been developed or enhanced through project efforts and what have been their function and activities?

It was not the intent of TCA to establish completely new organizations to carry out community development in the target communities of its grantees. Each of the TCA member agencies had some form of community resident board already in existence. It was felt by TCA that the strengthening of these groups would be an important step in pursuing community development aims. According to the TCA project director:

Yeah. Well, I suppose through community development
you could mobilize people over any issue, and there
are groups who will mobilize communities over a series
of issues. We weren't trying to do that. Our major
goal for the community development section of our project
was to get community support for the youth agencies, and
the by-product of that would hopefully be some effect in
all of the neighborhoods in Boston. But our concentration
at the TCA level was to make sure that the ten agencies
that got money from us, had the support of their communi-
ties and could demonstrate that in a number of ways.

The steps proposed by TCA for grantees to establish community

support are as follows:

Community Involvement Program

Grantees should seek to give the community a stake in
the success of the programs by involving them in an
appropriate way in the program itself.
1. Involvement in Decision-making:
Efforts should be made to incorporate community people,
particularly parents, into the decision-making structure
of the agency such as serving on the board of directors,
its youth services sub-committee, or on a separate
Parents Advisory Council (TCA proposal).

Despite the requirement for all TCA grantees to involve

community residents in decision-making roles in their programs,

there was wide variation in how effectively this mandate was

implemented. TCA's project director said that few grantees

actually established effective local resident decision-making

avenues. The agencies operating in Charlestown and Roxbury,

however, were singled out as having a much stronger commitment

to improving community resident involvement and decision-

making processes.

Prior to the OJJDP grant, JFK in Charlestown included

community representation in agency operations through a

community board that acted in an advisory capacity. Attempts

to strengthen the input of residents during the grant met with

some difficulty. One JFK staff member explained that:

> One of the things that is happening is that there is a
> group of (agency) people who have started from the
> community for developing sort of a, community based,
> issue related group, holding people together; but although
> we're a community agency, we can't really impose a certain
> structure on the community. There's always that distance
> and balancing act that has to be kept, and it's also a
> very proud community and has its certain ways to do things
> and certain ways of not doing them. You know, it's not as
> easy as just bringing everybody together. There's always
> questions such as who's from the town and who isn't. So
> there's always been an inherent kind of difficulty in
> bringing people together in the long run.

While it did not appear that JFK significantly improved

the structures through which residents might take a leader-

ship role in addressing community issues, a new mechanism

with promise for achieving important community input in

matters relating to delinquency was established. With the

funds provided by TCA, JFK was able to establish the Neighbor-

hood Response Team (NRT). NRT was designed to operate as a

network consisting of police, youth service agencies, youth,

and other residents in Charlestown. The purposes of NRT

were to improve teen/police relations, explore the problems

related to delinquency within the community, develop alter-

natives to official justice system processing of juvenile

cases, and identify youth who were exhibiting problems that

might lead them into trouble with the police and locate

appropriate services to aid such youth.

For Hawthorne House in Roxbury, the structures for adult
community resident involvement in agency-related activities
that existed before the grant continued in existence. The
agency had a Board of Directors who were responsible for
"agency business." It also had an advisory board which did
long-range fund raising planning. Both of these groups
were comprised of parents, professionals, and business people
from the Roxbury community. There was little attempt by
Hawthorne House to broaden the scope of its board structures
to issues other than those of concern to the continued
existence of the agency. Most board activities concerned
fund raising. Hawthorne House had no plans for altering
this primary community resident function as a result of the
TCA grant.

As a result of the TCA grant Hawthorne House did initiate
new structures for the formal involvement of youth in agency
decision making. The agency formed a Junior Council of
Youth for preteens. A teen council was also established.
The functions of these youth councils are, as with the
adult boards, primarily focused on internal agency matters.
Representatives of the Youth Councils serve as members of
the agency's Board of Directors and sit on the Personnel
Committee, giving youth an active voice in the hiring of
program staff. Youth of the Hawthorne House periodically
fill out check lists which are used to plan future programs.
The youth also plan and carry out fund raising activities
of their choice and are involved in grant hearings when
decisions are made about funding for the agency.

No attempt was made by Marcus Garvey House to develop or strengthen a formally structured community resident organization as part of its TCA funded activities. At the initiation of the TCA grant, the extensive community support and involvement associated with the parent agency of Marcus Garvey (the Roxbury Action Program) was considered to be a major strength of the organization. Rather than devoting its attention to the development of new community resident structures, it was the decision of Marcus Garvey to concentrate efforts on its youth service programs. Because the agency's services were largely geared to community beautification, they were considered to be within the framework of community development.

2) To what extent did project activity increase youth and adult involvement in community action?

It was the intent of TCA that its grantees develop some formal structure for community resident involvement in their projects:

> Community people should be encouraged and given the formal vehicle to volunteer their services for a few hours a week in the program itself (TCA Proposal).

Accurate records on the numbers of residents that became involved in any sort of project activities were not kept by the agencies receiving TCA grants. In some cases agencies did keep volunteer lists, but they did not record the types of involvement that persons on the list may have had with the agency or even if the volunteer had participated in activities sponsored through the OJJDP project. It was

admitted by the TCA project director, however, that enticing community residents to take some meaningful role in youth-related activities had not been a successful aspect of the project. Most grantees, he felt, were extremely limited in terms of any concrete involvement of adult or youth community residents in project affairs. JFK and Hawthorne House, however, were noted as significant exceptions to this general state.

The staff of both JFK and Hawthorne House did feel that they had won a great deal of support from community residents and for occasional special activities could expect more active involvement. The degree to which community residents became involved in agency-sponsored service activities of either a direct service or community action nature, however, was much less than they had hoped. According to one JFK staff member:

> There have been a lot of mixed feelings. People have been real ambivalent. It's been real hard because people feel like there are very limited resources, and very limited energy, and that you have to protect what you have, and that reflects where the community is at, you know, sort of to a "T". People feel very protective of what they have, and rather than putting it together with yours to have more, they'll hold on to what they have. And that's how most people...I mean, it's really, take care of yourselves. You don't throw your peas into the community pot, and then always get your needs met there. It's much more, each man for himself. It's a real barrier, just in terms of what we're trying to do.

The inability to secure ongoing resident involvement was measured by Hawthorne House staff in terms of their inability to get commitments from volunteers.

We've had some students from the university volunteer
to conduct activities and we had a basketball coach
from a local school for awhile, but overall, use of
community volunteers has not been real successful.
We have parents volunteer for various activities,
but we can't get anyone long-term.

3) To what extent have project activities been designed
   to upgrade community resident knowledge and skills
   to access community resources and structures?

Providing community residents with information relevant

to youth programming was stated to be a priority of the TCA

project. Rather than providing residents with knowledge

that might increase their abilities to take some leadership

role in the structuring of community services, however,

information appeared to be geared to channeling resident

support for the existing agency structures that were

funded by TCA. According to the TCA director:

Well, I think there was a heavy emphasis on infor-
mation -- getting information out -- which these
agencies normally don't. That was because we felt
that even people on the board of some of these
agencies didn't know what their own youth agencies,
or youth component was doing. We didn't feel that
other people in the community knew anything. So
we wanted specific information involving what these
youth agencies did, to get out in their community.
We did open houses and that kind of thing, we also
wanted to get people in, to show them that, again,
put out some more information but, the other way,
come in, take a look at our place, see that we do
more than just have a drop-in center. There are
more activities here for these kids, and there are
some good kids here too.

One of the activities that TCA proposed for its grantees

to assure that a process of information sharing with the

community would take place was that each agency publish a

newsletter. The evidence from the three TCA agencies upon

which this study is focused suggests that this aspect

of the TCA project was not well implemented and had little

impact. When JFK staff were questioned about their news-

letter (evaluation staff were told that one existed) their

reply was:

> We have board minutes, and that goes out to everybody,
> but we don't have a newsletter. That's interesting,
> about a newsletter, but I don't know where they (TCA)
> got that. Nothing I've ever read on any of the original
> stuff, that looks like a newsletter, per se.

There was no evidence that a newsletter had been attempted

by Marcus Garvey House either. The reply to this inquiry

at Hawthorne House was:

> We have a newsletter, "Hawthorne Happenings", which
> tells the community what we are doing. At first we
> mailed them out, but the cost was prohibitive. So
> kids passed them out from house to house. I measure
> effectiveness by asking parents if they got their
> letter or if they know of an upcoming event. A lot
> of times they don't. I can be sure that they get the
> newsletter but there is no guarantee that they will
> read it.

Little information was provided to community residents

by TCA agencies that was specifically related to delinquency

or delinquency prevention. Some residents may have derived

such information from their participation in the Charlestown

NRT, but there was no systematic attempt to use this structure

to distribute information to the general public. Marcus

Garvey House utilized a community festival that it sponsored

as part of Marcus Garvey day to focus on prevention of crime

and delinquency in Roxbury. This activity, however, was only

a one-day affair. There is no evidence that there was any follow-up procedure connected with this function.

   4) To what extent have the efforts of organized
      community residents resulted in upgrading of
      deteriorated community conditions, improved
      opportunities for youth advancement, or generated
      new resources for community purposes?

The limited possibilities for their project having any significant impact on deteriorated conditions in the target communities of their member agencies was an issue that was recognized by the TCA staff from the outset. A principle that was listed as a "Functional pre-supposition" of the TCA proposal was that:

   First, we intend to deal primarily with those factors
   which are, more or less, within our capacity to influence.
   Hence, there will be no grandiose schemes to solve the
   City of Boston's fiscal problems so that the City can
   make more money available for youth services (TCA,
   proposal).

Two factors were largely responsible for the reluctance of TCA to give much attention to even attempting to direct their project at the upgrading of community conditions. The first of these factors was an assessment by TCA that the problems of the poor were so severe that any impact that their project might have in addressing them would be insignificant. As expressed by one TCA administrator:

   You are aware of the Columbia Point housing project.
   What can any delinquency prevention project really
   do for kids there....There are millions of dollars
   in different kinds of programs pumped into Columbia
   Point every year and they show no effect....We have to
   be realistic about this thing. We could take the
   entire (OJJDP) grant and dump it into Columbia Point
   and it will have little effect in comparison to the
   needs of the people....It won't show up as impressive
   statistics....

The second factor resulting in the lack of attention to attempt to alter material conditions that existed in the target communities of TCA was the reluctance of the agency to become involved in what TCA staff saw as a highly politicized process, whereby their effectiveness would be dependent on their ability to curry favor on the city's elected officials. A TCA administrator stated this issue in the following terms:

> We didn't really direct our community development
> activities at community conditions...within the
> target community. We didn't really do that and it
> wasn't our intention to do that. We probably
> accepted the fact that in Boston, unless you want to
> be part of the political structure, you're not going
> to get anywhere. We've never bought into that, so....
> Well, the realities of working and living in Boston are
> that, if you want money from the city or support from
> the city, you work for (the Mayor). And the quality
> of services that you deliver has very, very little
> impact on whether you get money or get what's important.

In general, the sentiments of the TCA staff in regard to the abilities of their agencies to address community conditions were echoed by the staff of their grantees. For example, in response to questions about impacting upon conditions in Roxbury, Hawthorne House staff stated that:

> Hawthorne House is a very small organization; these
> areas alleviating depressed conditions are all very
> important but it is not within our capacity to
> address them. We don't even have a permanent
> facility from which to operate. How could we
> address the larger issues of lack of city services?

Despite the general agreement among the TCA grantees that the overall conditions of their target communities were too overwhelming for them to significantly alter,

addressing the deteriorated housing conditions in Roxbury appeared to be a main component of the Marcus Garvey House project. With the grant received from TCA, this agency started an employment training, community beautification program. Under the supervision of trained construction personnel, youth received on-the-job training while rehabilitating their teen center. The center was a three-story building which had been run down and gutted by fire, and was bought from the City for $1. Plans were made for the project youth to complete the renovation of the teen center and to continue the upgrading of the community by renovating at least ten other houses in the neighborhood. In addition to the building renovations, Marcus Garvey House initiated a more expansive environmental beautification program in which youths cleaned up sidewalks and front yards in the community.

According to the observations of evaluation staff during the National Evaluation, the project youth seemed very committed to their work, especially in renovating their center into a structure that the community would admire. Due to financial problems experienced by the parent agency House, however, the agency was not able to maintain its staff. The renovation work during much of the TCA grant was dormant. According to TCA staff the program was "barely alive".

The ability of the funded TCA agencies to generate additional resources for youth services was considered by

the TCA project director to be the most important accomplishment of the project's community development activities. According to the director:

> Interestingly enough, what happened was, the federal
> money which we had the grantees' use of for community
> development projects, ended up being one of the
> reasons why several of those agencies were able to
> get Community Development Block Grant money (CDBG).
> At least four of the ten agencies, no, at least five
> of the ten agencies got grants from the alliance, from
> this project, got CDBG community development grants
> later, and these were agencies who had never gotten
> a grant before. But of the very limited amount of
> community development money that's available in the
> city for non-political payoffs, five of those ten
> agencies were able to get fairly decent chunks of
> money. Twenty-five, thirty, fifty thousand dollars.

Of the study agencies, Hawthorne House was the only one to receive CDBG funds. It was the initiative of Hawthorne House that was said to cause other agencies to pursue this funding process. According to TCA staff:

> It was the CDBG grant that Hawthorne got that triggered
> other people's active interest in pursuing community
> development efforts, to finally get a fairly substantial
> group of people who were coming regularly to either
> volunteer for programs, or sit on boards and committees. They
> brought down this big group of people to really a very small
> community development planning meeting, and politics being
> what it is in this city, when they finally saw this youth
> agency, and maybe it was the first time that a youth
> agency had ever done it -- I don't know -- when they
> saw this group, they said, "Hey, there are some political
> benefits to be guarded," whereas prior to that, youth
> services was not seen as something that was politically
> something that was a good investment.

Although the additional resources that were generated by Hawthorne House project activities came through a structure that was set up for community development, the funds were given without an explicit conception of how the money would

be used to develop the community. The grant given to
Hawthorne House was utilized to hire additional direct
service personnel for the agency.

5) To what extent did project activities impact
community attitudes on youth, delinquency and
delinquency prevention?

Sophisticated methods for assessing community attitudes
were beyond the resources available for the supplementary
evaluation of the OJJDP grantee projects. Changes in
community attitudes or outlook on youth and delinquency,
however, were considered to be an important indicator of
the projects' community development activities to produce
a contribution to delinquency prevention. An attempt,
therefore, was made to derive some measurement in this
area. Interviews with agency staff and knowledgeable
community resident informants supplied the data for this
assessment.

Perhaps, the most important goal of the TCA community
development activities was to favorably impact the attitudes
of community residents towards youth and youth services.
In discussing its proposed community development program,
the TCA proposal states that its purpose is to "inform
the community about the 'good things' that their youth are
involved in and to win the community's moral and financial
support". As explained by one TCA administrator:

> What we were trying to do is to get the community to
> accept programs geared toward teenagers and to do
> that, getting them a stake in the program and also
> giving the youngsters more of a stake in their own

community so it was a two-way street. One of the
things that was true then and I am sure is still
true now is that programs for teenagers scare people
half to death. It doesn't matter whether it was just
a question of having the kids coming in to play basket-
ball, or a more sophisticated program, people are afraid
of them and the success of the programs depends to a
large extent to turning them (community residents)
around and having people involved in the program who
will support the program both politically and finan-
cially. And that also involves getting the teenagers
out there doing productive projects so that people see
them contributing back and it will lessen their fear.
It's a basic form of communication.

Affecting the attitudes of community residents on youth
issues was not a deliberate aspect of the JFK program in
Charlestown. In fact, JFK staff admitted that if you
asked most residents about the NRT, they would never have
heard of it. Specific activities to impact upon community
attitudes were not a major concern at Hawthorne House.
Hawthorne House staff claim, however, that the agency
keeps a high profile in the community and that their
impact in producing favorable attitudes toward youth should
be inferred from the support it had in getting the CDBG
funds. Interestingly, it was the position of Hawthorne
House staff, however, that:

Delinquency prevention is implicit in the project because
we are funded by a D.P. grant. But it was never an overt
topic. We are not concerned with prevention or community
attitudes toward prevention.

Marcus Garvey House did attempt one program, the purpose
of which was to alter the community residents' conception
of neighborhood youth. The effort sponsored by Marcus
Garvey was a security program in which youth escort elderly
residents on a variety of outings to insure their safety.
According to Marcus Garvey staff:

The mere fact that the senior citizens are letting
the youth enter their homes is a first for this area
in a very long time. The interaction and communication
with the youth and adults have improved.

6) To what extent do projects alter the policies and
   procedures of schools, juvenile justice systems,
   and other public or private agencies?

It was the assessment of the primary evaluator of the

TCA project during the national evaluation that:

Although TCA highly values the coalition concept, it
has only sporadic interaction with non-project youth-
related agencies. TCA does make contacts with some
public agencies to deal with specific problems of
individual grantee agencies, but it has not established
consistent, on-going relationships with the schools
housing authority, welfare and juvenile justice agencies.

Interviews during the supplemental study tended to confirm

that, although some agencies had made some limited service-

related agreements with major community institutions, in

general, there was a lack of interaction. There was almost

an absence of activity specifically geared to change insti-

tutional policies in favor of community youth. The closed

nature and lack of responsiveness to outside intervention

of the formally structured community institutions was

commonly noted as constraining factors in establishing

better relations. According to TCA staff:

To redirect institutional arrangements would be too
difficult and beyond our scope...I think on any level, if
you're talking about a city organization, you're talking
politics. You could talk about the school department,
I suppose. There are a number of reasons why the alliance
would have had a difficult time in dealing with the school
system, and making changes within the school system. In
'77 the school system was in total chaos. And they
weren't looking to outside agencies. There was a lot

of mistrust about outside agencies, involving the school system. I think the school system in Boston is different. It's political, but it's not part of the Mayor's political machine. It's very political, but in a different sense. The real problem that we saw in the planning stages of the grant was not that necessarily the politics within the school system, but more the chaos that was rampant in the administration of the Boston Public Schools. The schools threw up a barrier. Contact with community groups and non-school department people is almost a no-no, simply because they had so many problems, they didn't want it to become well known, and they didn't know how to deal with other agencies that might be of help.

While opinions among TCA staff varied as to the cause, there was general agreement that school policy was not responsive to local initiative. For example, staff of JFK related that:

We do a lot of advocacy. Try to help people, to help parents and kids too, to get educational services. But it's such a headache. The problem is that nobody else has control. You can sit and meet with the school and try to develop a plan, an appropriate plan for a kid....That plan has to be reviewed by a central committee. If it doesn't fit the racial quota, they can't send the kid there. And the school doesn't want to spend money for certain other kinds of things, so even though this is the best plan for what the kid needs, there are so many roadblocks in the way that we have no control over decisions that are made somewhere else. I've sat through (school meetings) out there, and if I were a parent, I would have walked out. It's so unresponsive and inaccessible that their needs are certainly not getting met. The schools are not run locally, so you don't have anywhere to go.

Opinions similar to those expressed about the school system were registered by TCA staff in discussing the justice system:

It played a very minimal role. The Charlestown program was designed specifically to impact on the police, so their linkage was with the juvenile justice system. Other than that, it was more of an isolated kind of phenomenon if you will. Some police became aware of what some of our agencies were doing, and made referrals or called about certain kids, but that was done on an individual basis. It was not part of a strategy to change the juvenile justice system. Which is not to say that interaction didn't happen. It probably happened as a by-product, similar to what we were talking about with the schools, only to a much less extent, I think... The police aren't very receptive to community agencies coming in and working with them.

Lack of interaction between community agencies and justice system personnel appeared to be an accepted condition in Roxbury. Staff of the TCA agencies seemed to believe that the relationship between the community and the police had deteriorated to such an extent that working to establish a cooperative atmosphere would have been futile. Staff of Hawthorne House, for example, stated that:

We did have an officer make one presentation to the youth. This officer was a former youthworker. We also have a parent who is a cop. This has done a lot to improve the image of policy by youth. Otherwise, working with the police was not a concern. The police don't do much for this community. They don't care about the kids.

The uniqueness of the relationship established between the community agency and the police in Charlestown was noted even by the participants in the NRT program. As one police officer associated with the program observed, "Nowhere else in Massachusetts that I know of does anything exist like a social worker having an office in a police station" (as was the case with NRT staff). Everyone involved with the program agreed that a new process of sharing information

and joint problem solving between community agencies, the police and community residents had been initiated with the NRT program. Serious doubt was raised, however, that this process represented any type of policy change on behalf of the police department. As a staff member of JFK explained:

> We were always working with a real small part of the police, we weren't working with the Boston Police Department per se, although the Commissioner approved it; there wasn't a formalized system for incorporating us into the police department. So, it was based on individual people, in the police department, saying that this is an appropriate, legitimate way for us to use our time. We had three different captains at the station during the grant period. That meant, starting from scratch with each one. We had to ask, "Is it okay if we're here? You know, and how can we work together?" The program started from people who were working in the community and then had to be sold on the people on top. But it wasn't their (police administrators') program to begin with; it's not like the director or commissioner saying, "This is the way it's going to be."

Given the criteria set out by this study, the conclusion must be reached that the agencies examined did not have a significant impact in developing their target communities for purposes of delinquency prevention. Few achievements, in terms of increasing youth services, upgrading community conditions, altering institutional policies and procedures, or enhancing the abilites of community residents to reach these objectives were observed to be the result of the Boston agencies' community development activites.

The small amount of funds that were available to the agencies for community development purposes made significant

impact upon complex communities unlikely from the outset. It questionable,though, that if the Boston agencies were to adopt the same community development approaches again that even substantial increases in funds would produce meaningful differences in project outcome. The approaches chosen by these agencies did not show a commitment to bringing about community change.

As stated, it is understandable that TCA left it to the individual agencies to fill in the specifics of their programs. There was a need, however, for a central authority within the PYDP to provide an outline for what an acceptable program of community development might entail. As with most staff of OJJDP funded agencies, the experience of the staff studied in Boston was largely in direct services. It was to their agencies' direct service programs that the staff devoted their energies. No scheme was ever provided for staff members on how they might redirect their efforts towards community empowerment. Community development, although stressed by PYDP, never really emerged as a distinct strategy.

A major factor in the lack of attention to building a community development strategy within PYDP may have been a lack of belief in the essence of the approach. It was apparent that few staff at any level in the project believed in the ability of community resident organizations or community-based agencies to meaningfully impact on large and impersonal city government and public institution bureaucracies that were important in determining the nature of youth

services. The attitude that significant change could not be made at the community level resulted in approaches that were more geared towards maintenance of existing services than developing the community towards progressive change.

IX. <u>Youth Services Program - Tuskegee, Alabama</u>

The Youth Service Program (YSP) operates under the
auspices of the Human Resources Development Center (HRDC)
of Tuskegee Institute. HRDC is a rural development agency
that has established an outreach service network that extends
to many regions throughout the southeastern United States
and a number of foreign countries. Operations of HRDC have
included programs in the areas of home economics, food and
nutrition, health career opportunities, manpower training,
business development, community education, housing,
veterinary medicine, farm techniques and general community
services. Characteristic of these programs has been a
planning process that included substantial input from clients.
HRDC administration has stressed that all of the center's
programs, including YSP, are developed through "planning
with people and not for people."

The project operates in small towns within Alabama's
"Black Belt". YSP activities are spread over a consider-
ably wide area, with dispersed target sites. The project's
target areas include four counties - Macon, Bullock,
Russell, and Lowndes. Project operations are focused on
the towns of Shorter, Roba and Notasulga (Mason County);
Hayneville and Fort Deposit (Lowndes County): Midway and
Union Springs (Bullock County); and Hurtsboro and Pittsview
(Russell County). The project's service population is
drawn from the rural communities surrounding the towns.

Most project activities are conducted within school facilities in each town. In many cases, youth must travel long distances from extremely isolated areas to attend project functions.

It was well recognized that YSP was a program that was primarily focused on the black residents of the selected target communities. Policies of segregation that had existed in the region have resulted in the development of separate community structures by the black and white populations. The effects of these segregation policies are in large part responsible for the development of YSP. YSP was intended to alleviate some of the inequities that existed due to a lack of social, economic, and recreational outlets available to black youth as a result of historical patterns of separation of races. YSP attempted to work within the community structures and institutions of black residents towards alleviating such inequities. Nearly all of the project's clients were black.

Aside from its primary attention to black youth, YSP identification of the proper target group for delinquency prevention efforts bore a strong resemblance to OJJDP's notion of deliquency as a product of deteriorated community settings. YSP described their desired clients as follows:

> The youth we propose to address are those in the
> greatest danger of becoming delinquent. Their
> common denominators are: despair, deprivation,
> poor housing, isolation, poor health, poverty, neglect,
> and those other indices that characterize them as
> socio-economically deprived.

in cotton production began a continual decline in the

agriculture as the area's major source of employment.

This decline has been somewhat accelerated by industrialized

methods of large-scale farming operations that lessen the

need for manual labor.

The dependence upon agriculture for employment in the

Black Belt is exhibited by the fact that, in spite of

its rapid decline, agriculture remained as the area's

major employer until 1970. Growth in other enterprises

has begun to make contributions to the area's economy.

This growth, however, has not proceeded at a rate sufficient

to absorb the large numbers of workers idled by agricultural

declines. The result has been rapid migration from the

rural areas in recent years and a serious unemployment

problem among remaining residents.

For the purposes of this study, Russell County, the

county identified by YSP staff as having most success in

terms of community development, was chosen for investigation.

Of the counties serviced by YSP, Russell was the most highly

populated and affluent, but still was characterized by

depressed conditions. Russell County has a total popu-

lation of approximately 45,000. It has a population

density of 72.4 people per square mile. Almost half of

its residents live outside city limits in the rural areas

of the county.

Although it was the least poor of the YSP counties, the

mean family income in Russell, according to the 1970 census,

was only $2,126. Figures prior to the initiation of YSP
listed the official unemployment rate at approximately 8%.
Lack of employment in the county, however, was felt by most
residents to be a much more serious problem than would be
indicated by this figure.

The percentage of soundly structured houses in Russell
was listed at 46.7 in 1970 data. This figure was much
higher than other YSP counties. Still, almost one-fourth
of the housing in Russell lacked plumbing. In Pittsview,
YSP drew a good portion of its clients from within a two-
block radius. The entire area appeared rundown and cluttered
with debris. Housing consists of two-room, stone block
shacks that seem to reflect the same overcrowded appearance
as some urban "slums". Conditions in Hurtsboro were less
depressed, but signs of deprivation were clear.

The preference in the county for the informal handling
of delinquency cases made official data a poor indicator
of the seriousness of delinquency as a problem within
Russell. Few cases were formally referred to the juvenile
court. In an HRDC survey conducted prior to YSP, however,
delinquency was identified by parents within the YSP
target area as one of the area's most pressing social
problems.

YSP was designed to deliver a comprehensive package of
services organized around the needs of youth in its target
communities. As stated in HRDC's 1978 Annual Report:

The project concentrates on providing community-based
enrichment programs in the areas of 1) academic tutoring
and remedial education, 2) vocational and career education
and awareness, 3) cultural education and enrichment,
4) family and youth counseling, 5) arts and crafts,
6) parent involvement, 7) citizen education and aware-
ness, 8) community youth clubs, and 9) social and
recreational activities.

Community Development in the Youth Services Program

As with the Positive Youth Development Program, the

discussion of community development in YSP is organized

by the study's research questions.

1) What new community structures have been developed
   or enhanced through project efforts and what have
   been their functions and activities?

One of the explicit goals of the YSP was to develop

organizational structures that would allow target community

residents to direct their own approaches to solving problems

of juvenile delinquency. YSP proposed to:

Establish youth and adult organizations in the target
communities to carry out activities and functions that
will continue to carry out the main objectives of
juvenile delinquency prevention beyond the life of the
project period (YSP Proposal).

An elaborate community advisory council network was

incorporated into YSP. The councils not only served

the purpose of informing project personnel of the concerns

of target area residents, but also introduced to the target

communities an organizational framework that, hopefully,

residents would adopt and develop as their own. The

network consisted of: 1) a Community Advisory Council at

each project site composed of two parents, two youth, two

interested citizens, and two persons representing the

business section; 2) a County Advisory Council, for each project county composed of four representatives of each Community Council; and 3) one Regional Advisory Council composed of four representatives from each County Council. In addition to the advisory councils, at some sites a great deal of community input into the project was offered by YSP-organized parent clubs. Many of the efforts of both the advisory councils and the parents clubs were devoted to developing means of assuming financial responsibilities or otherwise sustaining services initiated by YSP once federal funds for the project ceased.

In addition to the project's general commitment to community participation, special attention was paid to involving community youth in decision-making roles. As previously indicated, youth participation was required on community advisory councils. A "Youth Club Congress" was also established during the early phases of the project's operations. The Youth Club Congress was given considerable authority in making project policy by YSP staff. The Congress formulated the rules by which project youth were governed and decided upon the penalties for violations of the rules.

The YSP-prescribed community organization structures were established in both of the project communities within Russell County. There was also a great deal of interaction between the YSP-organized community groups from Hurtsboro and Pittsview. Overall Russell was among the better of the YSP counties in terms of successful implementation of

advisory councils and other resident groups. As will be discussed, however, there was not uniformity in the abilities of the Hurtsboro and Pittsview sites to sustain the community organizations.

    2) To what extent did project activity increase youth and adult involvement in community action?

As with the PYDP project in Boston, the staff of the YSP project kept no accurate records on the numbers of community residents that participated in project activities. It was the assessment of the project's evaluators during the national evaluation, however, that both the advisory councils and the parent clubs clearly made a number of important contributions to the project. In spite of their accomplishments, several of the councils and clubs experienced problems maintaining themselves as viable units. Much of the energies of these organizations went towards attempting to keep an acceptable level of interest among their members. Some groups had to cancel a substantial number of meetings due to lack of attendance.

The project evaluators also felt that non-council community volunteers had been extremely helpful to project service operations. At some sites, community volunteers contributed greatly. Overall, however, the participation of volunteers was not of a nature that enabled YSP to make planning decisions with the assurance of some outside assistance to project staff.

The assessments of YSP staff provided a somewhat mixed picture of the extent of citizen involvement with project

activities. According to YSP's director, resident involve-
ment was "pretty good". A coordinator of the project's
Russell County operations gave the following account:

> The citizen involvement and the community participation
> was good those first two years. I'm a little hesitant
> to say it was large, no, but we had a core group of
> people that were dependable, they were considered as
> somewhat the community leaders in regard to they were
> concerned about the youth. So, I'd say we had about
> twenty-five or thirty people that were constantly
> involved, but not at one single time.

YSP's Hurtsboro community coordinator believed the
ability of the project to motivate community residents
to be one of the more successful aspects of YSP operations.
As she stated:

> We were real successful in getting community residents
> involved. We didn't have any problem with it. I
> would use the advice of the community advisory council
> and the parents club that I was working with. You
> know, each of these groups had their input and we
> worked together. They would come as volunteers to
> the program and we had quite a few people involved,
> both politically, you know, I don't mean political in
> terms of politics, but I mean some of the elected
> officials would even, you know, do different things
> to help us out. They (community residents) will come
> out and help with different things. They would help
> supervise the kids, help with the tutorial program,
> assist with the arts and crafts program, serve as our
> big brothers, fathers to the boys, in terms of basketball,
> you know, different types of recreational activities
> that they knew how to do, they would come, you know.

In the view of YSP's Pittsview coordinator, getting
community residents involved in project activities was a
difficult proposition:

> We were to bring parents in....but we couldn't ever
> get full participation from our parents. We had
> just one or two that would come out and take part.
> Well most of the parents were single parents, you know,
> mother and no father, other children around, and they
> have to work. They would just say that they're too
> busy to come, you know, they didn't find the time to
> come.

The views of the YSP staff on citizen involvement in
their target areas were supported by on-site evaluation
observers who consistently reported heavy participation
in Hurtsboro and low turnouts in Pittsview. Overall,
however, it appears that YSP was able to generate enough
community interest in youth issues in Russell County
to gain the commitment of a wide variety of community
segments for, at least, short durations. For example, the
YSP citizen structures were able to gain widespread support
for a county fair that was developed as a fund raising
mechanism for youth services. As described by a YSP staff
member:

> We had what we call a country fair, and it was superb,
> because we reached out and had elected officials, we
> got the army involved, we got the different agencies
> involved, individuals, different organizations, the
> school officials, the total community, you know, the
> business sector. It was really a dynamite day, the
> first of its kind...

3) To what extent have project activities been designed
   to upgrade community resident knowledge and skills
   to access community resources and structures?

Imparting a wide variety of skills to community residents,
enabling them to function more effectively in directing the
future of their community constituted a major aspect of

the YSP project. One of YSP's program components -- Citizen
Effectiveness Training -- was devoted specifically to this
purpose.

The original intent of the Citizen Effectiveness component
was to educate community residents about delinquency problems,
involve them in delinquency prevention efforts, and promote
crime prevention techniques. The activities of this
component were designed to be coordinated with similar
efforts being sponsored by local police and sheriff depart-
ments.

No regular schedule of activity was developed for
citizen effectiveness training. A number of "special
events" within the component's original design took
place, such as films and discussions on crime prevention.
It was apparent, however, that as the component developed
in operation, the scope of the training became broader.
Besides being specifically focused on crime prevention issues,
a number of activities were conducted aimed at improving
general coping skills of target area residents. Among these
activities were informational discussions about political
issues in statewide elections, workshops on independence
and self-awareness.

According to YSP's director the broad based training
that was provided to community residents was consistent
with the programs' primary intent to produce citizens
that are more capable of coping with their total community
environment:

We're trying to develop them into becoming productive citizens and we had all kinds of training programs for that. Dealing with attitudes, behavior, giving them an understanding of the justice system through a lot of mock juvenile court situation-type things through our leadership development program. We dealt with a lot of citizen effectiveness stuff. We talked about their rights, their voting rights, youth rights. That is citizen effectiveness training. We had consumer economics, consumer buying courses that we sponsored for the kids. They could learn how to shop. We taught them, through the workshops, how to select clothes at an economical cost, how to use the Good Will store, or a neck blouse and match it up with this or that and show them the same fashions in Vogue magazine. And that was good for them because it got them thinking.

While it is understandable that a program that is aimed at producing effective citizens might take on an expansive scope of activities, staff in Russell County attributed much of the looseness of subject matter in the component to their attempt to be directed by the interests of community residents. They felt that the more that residents were responsible for the agenda of the training sessions, the more the training drifted from its original intent.

In addition to YSP's Citizen Effectiveness Training component, a Leadership Development component was also designed to better prepare residents to take control of their community.

The Leadership Development component was aimed at enhancing the "untapped" leadership abilities of youth in the project's target communities. In addition to benefiting the individual youth that were directly serviced in this component, Leadership Development was

designed to benefit all community youth by developing positive peer models. It was the belief of YSP that youth trained through this component would "lead their peers in positive activities".

Project youth who were outstanding in terms of leadership capabilities were hired by the project as youth worker aides and assisted staff in many facets of programming. Periodic workshops on leadership skills were provided for these youth.

Another important facet of Leadership Development was the project's Residential Camp located on the Tuskegee Institute campus. The camp was operational during the summer months. Eight youths from each target community resided on the Tuskegee Campus for periods of two weeks. A number of recreational and educational activities were offered, all of which were designed to promote leadership.

4) To what extent have the efforts of organized community residents resulted in upgrading of deteriorated community conditions, improved opportunities for youth advancement or generated new resources for community purposes?

As with the staff of TCA in Boston, YSP staff perceived the depressed conditions that existed in the communities that made up their project's target area as too pervasive to be addressed effectively by any of their programs. The YSP director stated that:

>...if you look at it, we didn't have the resources to address that particular problem. Not just in terms of manpower, but (overall ability) to deal with the economic conditions of those communities. Now what we did was we did take advantage of CETA programs and referring kids

to them. We employed as many as we could in our
programs. We even helped kids get on jobs in the
private sector where they existed, but I mean it
was just not an awful lot there. We don't even have
a MacDonald's to hire 15 kids. Those things don't
exist. So it is more than a notion. We basically
did not have the resources to go in and change the
economic conditions of the communities. We did have
some ideas on some things we could have done, some
strategies, but we did not have the money to implement
those. As a matter of fact, we brought this to the
attention of the Technical Assistance people and they
sent somebody down and we had a meeting with staff for
two days but it just scratched the surface of the
problem. Basically to address those types of issues
was beyond the scope and resources of our project.

Despite the conclusion that the project could be

of little aid in alleviating general community conditions,

as the director stated, YSP did exert efforts in the area

of enhancing employment opportunities for youth. It was

YSP philosophy that:

> Youth have an immediate need for employment so that
> they can earn money to develop skills needed in the
> procurement of goods and services required for whole-
> some living. Parents or guardians may not be able to
> provide for their children's survival needs, let alone
> luxuries. The temptation to steal and cheat is greater
> for children whose parents do not have the financial
> ability to purchase goods and services. Children
> cannot learn self-sufficiency, responsibility, nor
> self-respect by being denied a place in the world of
> work (HRDC 1978 Annual Report).

To accommodate youth currently seeking employment,

YSP structured a Job Banks component. Community residents

were incorporated into an attempt to match project youth

with jobs. Initially, both community youth and adults

had high hopes that the Job Banks would be successful in

significantly reducing the serious youth unemployment

problem in target areas. It was never intended that the Jobs

Banks would actually increase the number of available jobs. The

Job Banks service was to make finding work an easier process
for youth by establishing a large listing of employers that
had openings for the types of youth that are normally part
of YSP.

Unfortunately, in comparison to the number of available
job listings, there were an overwhelming number of youth
looking for work. As was discussed, employment, in general,
is in a very depressed state in the YSP target counties.
It is, therefore, not surprising that finding jobs for
youth in this setting was extremely problematic. YSP
has noted that:

> This service (Job Bank) experienced considerable
> difficulty in locating jobs for many of the youth.
> This is attributed to the fact that there are few
> businesses and little in the way of industry in
> the rural communities.

Some YSP staff observed that the inability of the project
to secure jobs for youth resulted in a lessening of enthusiasm
for YSP.

While YSP efforts at developing job listings from private
industry and businesses were less than successful, the
project worked closely with individuals responsible for
the administration of the Comprehensive Employment Training
Act (CETA). Eighty-five percent of the jobs found for
youth by YSP came from the CETA program. In effect, YSP
served as an unofficial screening agency for youth CETA
jobs.

Factors related to the poverty conditions of the YSP
target communities were stated by YSP staff to be a primary

factor in the project's inability to take over and be self-sustained by community residents. As noted by a YSP administrator:

> The problem that I found, as a result of this whole
> initiative, was that we were charged with the respon-
> sibility of operating a program in areas characterized
> by high unemployment and all of the other social indices
> of poverty and then we were forced to terminate services
> abruptly, although we knew that it was a two- or three-
> year project. When the funding ended we did not feel
> that there was adequate time for the community to
> develop the resources to support the program. They
> (the community residents) don't have the money to do
> what we did. I do not feel that the government, or
> Tuskegee Institute, could just continuously help them
> to operate the program, but I think that we have to be
> more realistic in terms of the time frame that we are
> talking about for capacity building on the part of the
> communities because these areas are faced with so many
> problems that they consider priority that they have to
> address.

The lack of time allowed to the project in order to develop the community resources to a state where community residents might run their own programs was often mentioned as a problem by YSP staff. Staff from Hurtsboro, for example, stated:

> Had it not been for the federal funds, there's no
> way for the program, there's just no way that the
> services could have been provided, and now, since
> then, no funds, the project has died, you know.
> And I feel things would have changed if we could have
> kept the program for minimum of an additional three
> years, because the people were really getting to
> respect and appreciate what they had. You know,
> it takes time. It would take a President of the
> United States four years to get his foot in the door.
> By the time they were becoming knowledgeable of what's
> going on and how it should be implemented, the program
> wasn't there anymore.

Pittsview staff stated:

We were trying to work with the parents, you know, so
that they could start a fund raising drive that would
start to show a definite need down there for some kind
of facilities, maybe, you know, get matching funds.
The program was phased out before fund raising ever got
off the ground.

It was the general opinion of both YSP staff and community

residents that the project was responsible for bringing to

its target communities at least one concrete resource.

YSP appeared to have success in each of its target areas

in putting at the disposal of community residents the

facilities available in the public school buildings. It

was stressed by YSP staff that this was an extremely

important new resource, especially for blacks. The facilities

of the schools, in these rural areas, are really the only

public facility that the community has at its disposal.

Many school systems, it was explained, were very protective

of the schools in that they didn't want kids "hanging around"

after school hours. The opening of the schools for community

purposes provided an opportunity for the residents to show

that they could work in a common endeavor by protecting

their newly found resource. According to YSP's director:

The Youth Services Program was able to win the acceptance
of the community to, first of all, let us have the
opportunity to try the program. The first two years
of the program were so successful, according to the
citizens, the principal, and the superintendent of the
schools, that we were permitted to utilize those
facilities the third year at no cost to the project.

The feeling of YSP's Russell County coordinator was that:

it proved to the community that the school facilities
could be used; after shcool, holidays, week-ends, without

causing a big disruption in the school activity or
destroying property. I think that was the biggest
accomplishment of all because before our program,
never had there been use of the school facilities.
And therefore, I think that had a big impact on
the community.

5) To what extent did project activities impact
   community attitudes on youth, delinquency and
   delinquency prevention?

The changing of the attitudes of community residents

in regard to their youth was said by the YSP director to

be a priority in the project's community development program:

It was just so common to hear everyday citizens talk
about these young folks -- "All they're doing is hanging
out and stealing and doing this and that and they're
getting in trouble and using dope." So it was a priority.
Through our community development activities we were
able to provide the citizens of the community with an
alternative and this is what they lacked because they
didn't have one before. An alternative solution. Not
to feel that it was hopeless, that nothing could be done.

As stated earlier, this study did not employ an objective

measure to determine community attitudes. Moreover, the

residents that were interviewed during the study were most

likely to have a favorable attitude towards the YSP project.

Even given these caveats, the responses that were given

to inquiries about youth attitudes and resident attitudes

about youth strongly suggest that there were perceivable

changes in both of these variables as a result of the

project operations. Respondents gave glowing reports of

their assessment that YSP had had an extremely positive

impact upon their community's youth. From their responses

one might assume that their opinions of the youth had also

improved. For example, one community resident explained that:

So many of them (youth) had attitudes that you couldn't break down. So many of them had ways that you thought you couldn't break down. But YSP had a discipline there that was carried out. They were able to discipline the children, and I think it did them a whole lot of good.

One school administrator commented:

It (YSP) certainly did help us as far as creating a student desire to like their own school. It gave them more school pride and interest, I think, because they participated in a lot of the extra-curricular activities. That's generally what it boiled down to. I've seen some good things come out of the program. We had a lot of vandalism; I saw this decrease because those kids who would be involved have had a change of attitude.
This is what we need; I think this is a plus for us because in this area, we have parents who in some cases dropped out of school in the third grade. Since they're involved, through this organization (YSP), we've gotten more parents involved in PTA activities.

YSP staff in Russell County explained that such views of the project's ability to change youth attitudes were commonplace in their communities.

I know from a lot of the compliments that I received from the parents there (Hurtsboro) they had seen the change in their kids, since they had been coming up through the program. I had a lot of parents come up to me and say, "I don't know what y'all done to those kids but they're sure allowed to come up here. My son, he just gets straight on over to the school." So I see that some positive things came out of it.

6) To what extent do projects alter the policies and procedures of schools, juvenile justice systems, and other public or private agencies?

Probably the most important relationships that YSP made during its tenure was with the public schools. YSP was dependent upon the public schools for facilities for most project activities. The ability of YSP to work out

low-cost lease arrangements with the school system for use of school property was essential to the project's ability to operate. The schools had the only facilities that were appropriate for YSP services and available to Black youth. Even if alternative facilities were available, paying what would be the full cost for their operation would have been impossible within the budget of YSP.

In addition to the use of facilities, school officials played an important role in other project activities, such as recruitment drives. Some school principals expressed a great deal of enthusiasm for the program. One community gave their school's principal a declaration of special recognition for his work with YSP.

In spite of the amicable relationship between YSP and the schools, there appeared to be little action by YSP toward changing school policies that might negatively affect youth. The project made recognition that there was a need for educational "innovations not previously utilized in this area with the socio-economically disadvantaged rural child." YSP, however, did not seem to act as an advocate to see that such innovations were instituted into the school systems. Also, there seemed to be little coordination between the educational services offered by YSP, such as its tutoring program, with the curriculum of the schools. Although Russell County's Superintendent of Schools acknowledged that YSP had a beneficial effect on

the school system's youth, he stated that, "I don't

know that it affected to a great deal school policy and

procedures."

Establishing linkages with the justice system was one

of the more important objectives of the staff in each of

YSP's target areas. In discussing the project's success

in this endeavor, YSP's director explained:

> Oh, yes. That part of community development is very
> important. We've had so many letters on file in
> testimony to that. Our ability to bring probation
> officers into the project as volunteers to work and to
> bring the local policemen and sheriff deputies into
> the project really, really enhanced our community
> development efforts to work with the kids. What it
> really did, it created a new awareness on the part of
> the young people toward the juvenile justice system.
> It reduced animosities among many kids who used to
> think that they were pigs. But to be able to play
> basketball with them and to have them drop in just
> to see what was happening with them in their street
> clothes, and to be volunteers to come in and talk on
> career day about their profession as police officers
> or probation officers, all of that I think was very,
> very important in creating strong community police
> relationships which in itself helps in the development
> of any community where you can have a close relationship
> between the law, the justice system and your populace.
> One of the things that was happening was that kids would
> get referred to our project and police officers would
> tell us that if they had any trouble with one of the
> kids in our program.

The reports of the national evaluation corroborate the

view that YSP received strong support on an individual

basis from juvenile justice officials. In many project

communities, justice officials have publically expressed

their support for YSP. In one county, the judge in charge

of juvenile cases served as the chairman of the community

advisory council. In Hurtsboro, the Chief of Police was

at one time the chairman of the advisory council. Other judges, sheriffs, and police officials have expressed their satisfaction with YSP and their desire to see the program expanded. Justice officials have often been speakers at YSP programs. One sheriff offered his land for use in a YSP program.

It was the opinion of staff that the active participation by justice officials gave lay citizens greater incentive to become involved in YSP activities. Citizens could discuss their views on the justice system directly with system personnel. No forums for such discussions were available before YSP.

Despite the extensive involvement of justice officials with YSP, there is no evidence that any formal policy changes were made within the justice system as a result of YSP efforts. It may be the case that the informality with which justice system procedures were carried out within YSP target communities made formalized policy much less of a concern than changing the attitudes of individual officials. The apparent danger in this approach, however, is that when there is a turnover in system personnel, the project work on behalf of youth may be lost. For example, the Chief of Police in Hurtsboro once chaired the YSP community advisory council. At the time of this supplemental study, a new chief had been sworn in. The new chief was not only unfamiliar with any referral agreements between the project and his department (YSP had received a small amount

of funding to continue its efforts in the area), but he

seemed to be unaware that YSP had been in existence.

It is difficult to speculate on what might be the impact

on community institutions of the YSP community development

efforts sustained over a much longer period of time. It does

appear that YSP was able to initiate a process that showed

promise in generating community concern over youth issues

and motivating residents to action. Even in the Pittsview

community where participation was low, there were signs that

the process was beginning to take hold. The process, at the

least, opened up previously nonexistent lines of communication

between community residents and government and public insti-

tution officials. In many instances, officials were individ-

ually responsive to resident opinions. The evidence suggests,

however, that the gap between winning favor with individual

officials and formally changing institutional policy would

have closed very slowly under the YSP process.

While it may have been a contributing factor, the slow-

ness of the process did not appear to be the most critical

issue in sustaining community development for YSP. It appeared

that most detriment was done to the process by cutbacks in

program funds. The experience of the HRDC staff in programs

of community development and their commitment to this process

resulted in the successful implementation of structures that

might carry out the strategy. Within the relatively short

period of time aloted to them under program funds, however,
they could not organize the community to the degree that residents
could take full responsibility for the operations of their
community boards. Paid staff continued to be needed as moti-
vators and guidance providers. As funds for YSP were reduced,
it was necessary to reduce the number of staff working with
the community groups. Lessening in the participation of community
residents in the YSP community development process appeared to
be highly related to staff reductions.

X. Discussion

As a whole, the OJJDP "Programs to Prevent Juvenile Delinquency" offered a poor test of the ability of community development to contribute to delinquency prevention. While program grantees may have engaged in a variety of forms of community work, for most program sites it is questionable that there was ever an attempt to carry out a distinct set of activities based on community development strategy. Nevertheless, many of the experiences from the OJJDP program may be important to consider in future attempts at community development.

Perhaps, the most obvious lesson from the OJJDP program is the need for programs to proceed from a well conceptualized and specified community development approach. Although community development is growing in acceptence among community agency practitioners, it remains the case that there is a great deal of imprecision in how the term is defined as a method of social action. If OJJDP grantees are at all typical, it appears that there is a high risk that community development will be taken by community agencies as a rhetorical charge that presents little substance as an approach to social change. There was near unanimous agreement among OJJDP grantees over the need for community development in addressing social problems faced by their target communities. The fact that few agencies created schemes for carrying out the strategy, however, most often resulted in either a dearth of project activity or directionless staff efforts.

It is an often given, but seldom followed, recommendation

that delinquency prevention programs should be developed from an explicit theoretical paradigm that provides a logic as to how program activities will lead to the suppression of delinquent activity. It is once again submitted here that this type of process is essential in initiating prevention programs based on community development. One of the major factors that retarded project administrators in structuring community development activities was lack of understanding of how and why they were expected to work.

Aside from theoretical conceptualization, comparing the YSP project procedures with those of the PYDP suggests the importance of a specified plan in implementing the community development process. YSP staff were directed towards creating a specific set of community structures that would serve as the mechanisms by which the community established a power base. While sufficient funds were available to support YSP efforts there was evidence of movement towards establishment of viable community resident organizations. Even though there was equal commitment to community development on the part of the PYPD central administration, the absence of a plan of action for agency staff to follow resulted in diffuse activity in furtherence of project aims and an inability to monitor and evaluate how project aims were being met.

The experiences of both of the study's projects indicates the need for future efforts to pay much closer attention to the specific objectives that community development activities are expected to reach. Most of the participants in the studied projects were in agreement with critics of community development

that the strategy could not overcome major social ills (poverty, unemployment, and underemployment, for example) that adversely affected the local community. It is unclear, however, that the projects were motivated by alternative objectives that, if reached, might contribute to reductions of delinquency.

PYPD administrators stated that the major objective of their community development effort was to gain community support for the participating youth service agencies. The PYPD agencies, however, gave no assurance that they would be guided at all by delinquency prevention interests. Some agencies explicitly stated that it was not a concern. There was no funded agencies would attempt to offer those "positive youth' services" that appeared most related to reduction of delinquency. There was also no commitment that funded agencies would serve as youth advocates in those institutions that are commonly associated with delinquency issues (such as schools and the justice system).

In the YSP, most community development activities appeared to be directed towards process objectives, such as establishing community councils and other resident boards. There is some evidence that positive impact, such as altering community attitudes, may have resulted from this process, but little headway was made in affecting other community conditions or institutional policies that might be responsible for the development of delinquent behavior. This is a situation that may have changed if councils were given more time to become better established. During the period for which YSP was given funding,though, impacting upon conditions that are most directly linked to delinquency did

not appear to be among the objectives of the project's community
development activities.

The issues of community determinants and community variability
for community development projects were greatly highlighted by
the OJJDP program. Most clearly pointed out was the need for
the identification of a community unit that is consistent with
the development approach that is adopted by a project. The
futility in attempting to develop subdivisions created for purposes
such as bureaucratic data collection with methods appropriate
for intimate neighborhood groups was well illustrated by many
OJJDP grantees.

The studied cases from the OJJDP program also lend support
to prior observations that the success of the community devel-
opment strategy may vary tremendously depending upon the
community conditions into which it is introduced. Even with
better plans of action, the ability of the PYDP agencies to have
significant impact on the complex interrelationships that made
up community life in the city of Boston was extremely limited.
Through community organization in the areas served by YSP there
were more plausible expectations of directly contacting key
decision makers and eliciting some response to local initiative.
Such issues pertaining to the relative abilities of groups
working in particular community contexts should be taken into
account when setting the objectives for community development
programs.

The backgrounds of the grantee agencies in the OJJDP
program appeared to be of great significance to success in
implementing the community development strategy. The primarily

direct service experiences of agency programs and staff train-
ing dictated that project concentrations would be on direct
service activities. On the other hand, the lengthy experience
of HRDC in sponsoring development projects allowed them to
initiate a well structured community development program from
the outset of YSP activities. There was little floundering for
proper focus that was evident in other projects. Funders of
future community development programs should insist that their
grantees exhibit some expertise and/or agency history in operating
a program uniquely within a design consistent with community
development. Programs of community development that operate
simply as an afterthought to direct services will not bear fruit.

Even when community and agency contexts are appropriate,
the community development strategy does not appear to be amean-
able to short-term demonstration projects, such as was the OJJDP
program. Few impacts can be expected within a two or three
year time frame. As many project staff have suggested, the
process of organizing community residents to take leadership
roles in community problem solving is a slow one. Even, as if
in the YSP example, resident organizations begin to take hold,
maintaining a steady focus on single issue goals such as delin-
quency prevention is difficult. Resident interests do not conform
to funding categories.

Funders of community development programs should be prepared
to make a commitment to providing support for community organ-
izing activities on a long term basis. The available evidence
suggests that the more depressed the community, the longer out-
side support will be needed. There seems to be little validity

to the notion that residents of "poor" neighborhoods can, with proper direction, quickly pool their resources to address community social problems. Withdrawing support funds from resident organizations while they are in the process of building their capabilities may produce cynicism and retard future efforts at community action.

An issue raised by the slow progress with which community development proceeds towards impact goals is the legitimate need for short-term evaluation of projects. Community development is not incompatible with short-term evaluation, but there is a need to rethink the use of standard criteria used in evaluating delinquency prevention programming. Measures such as the changes in official delinquency rates do not provide a good indicator of the initial progress of projects based on community development strategy. It is reasonable to expect that over time reductions in area rates of delinquency will result from project operations. For projects aimed at altering community conditions or attiutdes that were created over generations, however, comparing rate changes in the first two or three years of the projects may produce all but meaningless statistics. It cannot be expected that any impact on delinquency rates will be produced so quickly. A project may be having tremendous success in building community organizations that may eventually contribute to delinquency reduction without impacting upon area rates in its first few years.

Short-term evaluations of community development projects should measure the project's abilities to meet short term objectives and assess whether project processes are leading in

logical fashion to the achievement of ultimate goals. The determination of proper interim objectives and the logic of the flow of project activities should be derived from explicit statements of project rationale. The time frame in which objectives will be met should be determined with the specific community conditions faced by the project in mind.

There is little evidence from this study for optimism that community development will be a major key in solving problems of high levels of delinquent activity. That the community development process will significantly alter those community conditions usually associated with delinquency causation appears doubtful. It does seem, however, that in certain community settings, the community development process can lead to community residents having greater influence on the major social control institutions, such as the schools. More precise statements on which communities are best served by the strategy, the limits of community groups to affect institutional policy, and the impact of such efforts on reducing delinquency are needed. Such statements will most likely come from examinations of communities more advanced in the process than those that were the subjects of this study. It does appear, however, that attempting to alter negative policies and procedures of community agencies and institutions would be an appropriate focus of future community development programs.

REFERENCES

ALINSKY, S.
   1945   Reville for Radicals. Chicago: University of Chicago
          Press

BECK, B. M.
   1969   "Mobilization for Youth: Reflections About Its
          Administration" in H. Weissman (ed) Justice and Law
          in the Mobilization for Youth Experience. New York:
          Association Press

BIDDLE, W.W. and L. J. BIDDLE
   1969   The Community Development Process: The Rediscovery
          of Local Initiative. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
          Winston, Inc.

BRAGER, G. and H. SPECHT
   1967   "Social Action by the Poor: Prospects, Problems and
          Strategies" in G. Brager and F. Purcell (eds)
          Community Action Against Poverty. New Haven: College
          and University Press.

CLINARD, M. B.
   1966   Slums and Community Development: Experiments in Self-
          Help. New York: Free Press

CLOWARD, R. A. and L. E. OHLIN
   1960   Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent
          Gangs. New York: Free Press

DIXON, M. D. and W. C. WRIGHT
   1975   Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Programs. Nashville:
          Peabody College for Teachers.

DUNHAM, A.
   1970   The New Community Organization. New York: Thomas Y.
          Crowell Co.

ELLIOT, D. S.
   1979   "Recurring Issues in the Evaluation of Delinquency
          Prevention and Treatment Programs" Unpublished paper.
          Boulder, Colorado, Behavioral Research Institute.

EMPEY, L. T.
　　1980　"Field Experimentation in Criminal Justice:
　　　　　Rationale and Design" in M. Klein and K. Teilmann,
　　　　　Handbook of Criminal Justice Evaluation.　Beverly
　　　　　Hills: Sage Publications.

FESSLER, D. T.
　　1960　"The Group Process Approach to Community Organization"
　　　　　Community Development Review, Vol. 5 pp. 33-39

FINESTONE, H.
　　1979　Victims of Change: Juvenile Delinquents in American
　　　　　Society.　Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

FOWLER, F. J. and M. E. McCalla and T. W. MANGIONE
　　1979　Reducing Residential Crime and Fear: The Hartford
　　　　　Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program. Washington,
　　　　　D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

GILMAN, B.
　　1980　Police Handling of Juveniles,　The Center for
　　　　　Criminal Justice of the Boston University School
　　　　　of Law: Boston, Mass.

GLASER, D.
　　1980　"The Interplay of Theory, Issues, Policy and Data"
　　　　　in M. Klein and K. Teilmann, Handbook of Criminal
　　　　　Justice Evaluation. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

HARLEM YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES UNLIMITED, INC.
　　1964　Youth In the Ghetto: A Study of the Consequences of
　　　　　Powerlessness and a Blueprint for Change.　New York:
　　　　　Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited Inc.

HIRSCHI, T.
　　1969　Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: University of
　　　　　California Press.

JOHNSON, G. and T. BIRD and J. W. LITTLE
　　1970　Delinquency Prevention: Theories and Strategies.
　　　　　Arlington, VA: Westinghouse National Issues Center.

KHINDUKA, S. K.
　　1975　"Community Development: Potential and Limitations"
　　　　　in R. Kramer and H. Specht (eds) Readings in Community
　　　　　Organization Practice (2ed) Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
　　　　　Prentice-Hall, Inc.

KNAPP, D. and K. POLK
1971 Scouting the War on Poverty. Lexington, MA.: Health
       Lexington Books.

KNIGHT, D. and R. GOLDSTEIN and J. GUTIERREZ
1974 Organizing for Youth Development and Delinquency
       Prevention - Youth Development and Delinquency
       Prevention - A Second-Year Report. Sacramento,
       California Youth Authority

KOBRIN, S.
1959 "The Chicago Area Project - a 25-year assessment."
       The Annals of the American Academy of Political
       and Social Science, March Vol. 322: 19-29).

KRAMER, R. M. and H. SPECHT (eds)
1975 Readings in Community Organization Practice.(2nd.ed),
       Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

KRISBERG, B.and C. McCall and J. Munson
1978 Pioneering in Delinquency Prevention: The California
       Experience. San Francisco: National Council on
       Crime and Delinquency.

LUNDMAN, R. J. and P. T. McFARLANE and F. R. Scarpitti
1976 "Delinquency Prevention: A Description and Assess-
       ment of Projects Reported in the Professional
       Literature", Crime and Delinquency. July 297-308

MARRIS, P. and M. Rein
1967 Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community
       Action in the United States. New York: Atherton Press

MERTON, R. K.
1938 "Social Structure and Anomie." American Sociological
       Review, 3:672-682

MERTON, R. K.
1957 Social Theory and Social Structure.(2nd.ed) New York:
       Free Press.

MILLER, W. B.
1962 "The Impact of a 'Total-Community' Delinquency

Control Project." Social Problems, Volume 10, No.
2, Fall pp 168-191.

MOBILIZATION FOR YOUTH, INC.
1961 A proposal for the Prevention and Control of Delin-
quency by Expanding Opportunities, New York:
Mobilization for Youth, Inc.

MOYNIHAN, D. P.
1969 Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action
in the War on Poverty. New York: Free Press.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW O SERVICES AND ENFORCEMENT.
1931 (Wichersham Commission) Commission Report No. 13,
Vol 2. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office.

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
1979 The National Evaluation of Prevention: Preliminary
Report. San Francisco: NCCD.

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
1981 The National Evaluation of Delinquency Prevention:
Final Report. San Francisco: NCCD.

PIVEN, F.
1967 "Resident Participation in Community Action Programs"
in G. Brager and F. Purcell (eds) Community Action
Against Poverty. New Haven: College and University
Press.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE
1967 The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.Washington
D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

RECKLESS, W. C.
1973 The Crime Problem (5th ed) Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.

SANDERS, I. T.
1958 The Community: An Introduction to a Social System.
New York: The Ronald Press Co.

SHAW, D. R. and H. D. McKAY
    1942   Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago:
            University of Chicago Press.

SNODGRASS, J.
    1976   Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay: Chicago
            Criminologists: The British Journal of Criminology
            Vol. 16, No. 1, pp 1-19.

SORRENTINO, A.
    1979   How To Organize the Neighborhood for Delinquency
            Prevention. New York: Human Sciences Press.

SPERGEL, I. A.
    1974   (3rd. ed.) Community Problem Solving: The Delinquency
            Example.Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

SPERGEL, I.
    1976   "Interaction Between Community Structure, Delinquency
            and Social Policy in the Inner City" in M. Klein
            The Juvenile Justice System. Beverly Hills: Sage
            Publications.

TEEN CENTER ALLIANCE
    1977   "Positive Youth Development" a proposal to the
            Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
            Boston, Mass.

WARREN, H. ed.
    1969-a Community Development in the Mobilization for
            Youth Experience. New York: Association Press.

    1969-b Justice and the Law in the Mobilization for Youth
            Experience. New York: Association Press.

WITMER, H. L. and E. TUFTS
    1954   The Effectiveness of Delinquency Prevention Programs
            Children's Bureau Publication No. 350. Washington, D.C.:
            U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

YOUTH SERVICES PROGRAM

1977   Proposal to the Office of Juvenile Justice
       and Delinquency Prevention. Human Resources
       Development Center: Tuskegee, Alabama.