



Research and Evaluation

Washington State  
Department of Community Development

**Washington State**  

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**Multi-Jurisdictional**  

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**Drug Enforcement**  

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**Task Force Program**  

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October 1992

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*Stronger Communities For A Better Washington*

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Research and Evaluation

Washington State  
Department of Community Development

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# Washington State

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# Multi-Jurisdictional

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# Drug Enforcement

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# Task Force Program

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
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The first Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Forces funded in Washington State through the Drug Control and System Improvement Formula Grant Program of the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), were established in 1988. The Washington State Department of Community Development (DCD) administers these federal funds under advisement from a statewide Drug Policy Board and, responding to direction from the Office of the Governor and the State Legislature, serves as fiscal intermediary. During the first year of operation, 11 task forces were funded, and now, four years later, 24 task forces, covering 75 percent of the state, are in operation.

In order to more efficiently administer the overall Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Force program, and in response to BJA direction, a comprehensive evaluation was undertaken. The primary objective of this evaluation was to assess past performance, identify statewide and local task force structure, and delineate areas of potential improvement. In order to accomplish this objective, a three-phase evaluation design was implemented:

- 1) a mail-in survey of all task forces;
- 2) an on-site interview with select task force personnel; and
- 3) an analysis of task force performance indicators.

This procedure has uncovered some highly interesting and significant findings:

- o Large amounts of drugs valued in the millions of dollars have been removed from the streets through task force activities.
- o Assets, also valued in the millions, have been taken away from drug dealers.
- o A large number of agencies and personnel, who traditionally might not have coordinated activities, are participating.
- o Personnel serving on these task forces are highly committed to both the task force model and mission.
- o Mid- and upper-level drug distributors and manufacturers are the predominant target of most task forces.
- o The drug network is highly resilient and can respond fairly rapidly to interdiction efforts.

Along with these general findings were some findings which easily lend themselves to policy consideration:

- o Funds obtained through forfeiture of seized assets fall far short of what was originally expected.

- o Certain key task force personnel are not participating.
- o Task forces are under pressure to respond to local political considerations.
- o The multi-jurisdictional component was found, on occasion, to be lacking.
- o Low-level street dealers are targeted, for various reasons, by a few task forces.

A great deal of variability was found in both the composition and structure of Washington State Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Forces. Training needs were found to be diverse and, due to limited resources, meeting these needs extremely difficult. It was found that, on occasion, investigation and enforcement resources were lacking. A number of operational recommendations have been formulated.

1. Most Task Forces are composed of police officers and prosecuting attorneys from different agencies and different jurisdictions working in tandem to prosecute offenders at the highest level possible, though in certain cases this was not so. In response to this variation, the following five recommendations are presented:
  - a. All task forces receiving BJA funds should be composed of both police officers and prosecutors and should be comprised of representatives from different government entities.
  - b. All cases investigated and prosecuted by task force personnel should show a direct impact on the drug network.
  - c. The individuals and networks targeted for investigation should be involved in trafficking drugs at levels higher than street/low-level.
  - d. Task forces which share jurisdictional boundaries, or are located in the same county, should seek ways to minimize duplication of effort and maximize utilization of scarce funding dollars.
  - e. Established task forces should seek ways to involve agencies from currently non-covered neighboring jurisdictions.
2. In order to remediate task force participant skill deficits and respond to the shifting and adapting drug network, four training related recommendations are offered:
  - a. Federal and state administrative requirements and administrative procedures.
  - b. Highly specialized investigative training necessary to pursue upper level dealers.
  - c. Training related to the new state asset seizure/forfeiture law.
  - d. A two and one-half to three year participation commitment on the part of both the task force and participating agency.

3. A resource pool which all task forces could draw from to meet demands related to three areas:
  - a. Geographically assigned surveillance vans with appropriately trained personnel.
  - b. A statewide task force team which would provide assistance upon request and an Asset Seizure Specialist for statewide technical assistance.
  - c. A pool of task force seized equipment available for temporary or permanent loan to all task forces.
4. Due to difficulty in capturing related dollar values, the removal of task force seized weapons from the asset seizure/forfeiture record.

# INTRODUCTION

In order to advance "the war on drugs", the United States Congress signed into law the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. This Act, which was renewed during the 1988 Congressional Session (P.L. 100-690), was intended to provide states with the resources to design and implement a concerted statewide strategy which would adversely affect local drug manufacturing and distribution networks. This Act also addresses, through various means, the drug use patterns of not just current users/abusers, but also those at-risk for such abuse.

The intent of this evaluation is in keeping with the purposes succinctly stated in the formula grant Program Announcement and also restated in the National Institute of Justice, August 1989 publication, Evaluating Drug Control and System Improvement Projects.

"...to assess the extent to which the activities funded have achieved the program's goals. Such assessments should be designed to provide administrators and policy makers with an improved understanding of whether specific activities accomplish their desired results of furthering the state strategy." (p. ix).

## Context of the Problem

Traditionally, law enforcement efforts related to drug interdiction have been hampered by geographic boundaries. Due to political and bureaucratically imposed parameters, interagency cooperation was difficult at best, and in certain cases, virtually prohibited. Although geographic boundaries are the primary barriers, differences in agency philosophies, missions, and procedures also have been traditional obstacles to successful enforcement.

In a state as large as Washington, the geographic and philosophical divisions can be quite pronounced. The state is composed of 39 counties covering an area of over 66,000 square miles and possessing over 4,000 square miles of coastal region. The state can be divided roughly into three geographic and economic regions: the largely agricultural eastern region, the techno-oriented Puget Sound corridor, and the lumber and fishing industry-based western region. Within these broad regions, there is a great deal of diversity in culture, economics, and lifestyle.


The first Washington State Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Forces funded through the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act were established in 1988. These Task Forces, and all subsequently funded task forces, were composed of regional law enforcement agency personnel with cross-jurisdictional responsibilities and authorities. Cooperation and communication among agencies was a central organizational and operational tenet. The number and type of personnel varied according to the unique needs and demands of the area. From 1988 through 1990, 11 task forces were funded at various times through the Washington State Department of Community Development (DCD). In response to local needs and the acknowledgement on the part of local jurisdictions regarding the breadth of the drug problem, DCD funded an additional 13 task forces in 1991.

During the past five funding years, the proportion of Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funds

allocated to the operation and administration of Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Forces in Washington State, has ranged from a low of 54 percent to a high of 78 percent (average of 65 percent). During the State Fiscal Year 1992 (Federal Fiscal Year 1991) 64 percent of these BJA funds have been awarded for the operation and administration of task forces.

**Chart 1**

**BJA FUNDED PROGRAMS:  
SFY 1992 - FFY 1991**



Currently there are 24 BJA/DCD-funded task forces operating in Washington State (Appendix A: Map of Washington). Of the 39 counties, 28 are served by these multi-jurisdictional task forces (72 percent). These counties contain populations at all levels of the socioeconomic spectrum and range in size from 2,300 to 1.5 million individuals. It is important to note that although these task forces cover 72 percent of the counties, these counties contain 95 percent of the population. These 24 task forces are:

- Clark-Skamania Narcotics Task Force
- Clallam County Drug Task Force
- Columbia River Drug Task Force
- Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Narcotics Task Force
- Eastside Narcotics Task Force
- Grays Harbor County Drug Task Force
- Grays Harbor County Prosecutor
- Interagency Narcotics Enforcement Team
- Kittitas County Regional Drug Task Force

Lower Valley Narcotics Task Force  
Makah Tribal Task Force  
North Central Washington Narcotics Task Force  
Northwest Regional Drug Task Force  
Quad-Cities Drug Task Force  
Seattle City Prosecutor  
Skagit County Interlocal Drug Enforcement Unit  
Snohomish County Regional Narcotics Task Force  
South King County Narcotics Task Force  
Spokane Regional Drug Task Force  
Tahoma Narcotics Enforcement Team  
Thurston County Narcotics Task Force  
Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force  
Unified Narcotics Enforcement Team  
West Sound Narcotics Enforcement Team

The general goals of these task forces were aptly stated in the DCD-composed Narcotic Control Strategy:

"The Multi-Jurisdictional Narcotic Task Force Program seeks to 1) take the profit out of crime by seizing the illicit proceeds of all those involved in drug trafficking, 2) build local capacity, and 3) create active cooperation between law enforcement agencies on the state and local levels. Multi-jurisdictional task forces seek to halt the effect of traditional single jurisdiction enforcement, which simply forces crime from high emphasis areas into adjacent municipalities. The active sharing of information and personnel under this program results in interdiction of large quantities of narcotics and the arrest of those individuals who could not previously be reached." (page 21).

The Washington State drug situation was placed in context in the 1992 Drug Control Strategy. This strategy serves as a succinct assessment of the problem which has guided DCD and task force endeavors (see Appendix B).

### **Evaluation Strategy Statement**

In conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the Washington State Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Force Program, it was necessary to identify those characteristics which are both unique and held in common among task forces and, utilizing a common metric, gauge the relative level of effectiveness on a number of variables. Task forces, like any organization with locally determined goals and objectives, are dynamic and subject to external pressures and internal influences. As these pressures and influences exert their control, for whatever reason, the task force evolves, and if responding to real factors and needs, becomes more effective in fulfilling its intended purpose.

# METHODS

## OVERVIEW

In order to more fully understand the form, structure, and function of multi-jurisdictional task forces in the state and assess overall program effectiveness, a three-phase evaluation design was initiated. The primary goal of this evaluation is to assist in the decision making process through providing an analysis of task force performance and accomplishments.

## DESIGN

The three evaluation phases are discussed in more detail in the following sections, but briefly they are:

1. A survey of task force coordinators relating to the form and structure, goals and objectives of each task force.
2. An unstructured interview conducted with a sample of task force participants on-site.
3. An analysis of task force performance summary indicators on two levels:
  - a) a retrospective analysis, year by year (1988 through 1991) using within task force performance figures.
  - b) a comparative analysis of task force performance against statewide drug-related law enforcement efforts for 1986 through 1991.

### **Phase 1: Task Force Survey**

#### 1. Population Parameters

After extensive discussions with the DCD task force program manager, the Washington State Patrol (WSP) task force coordinator, and members of the Washington State Drug Policy Board, it was determined that the most appropriate informant pool for this phase of the evaluation was the task force coordinators. Typically, these individuals have been assigned to the task force for longer periods of time, possess the relevant knowledge base, and have access to information necessary for instrument completion. Coordinators for all 24 task forces were contacted.

#### 2. Instrument

The survey was designed after a thorough analysis of sections of the individual task force funding application, review of task force evaluation efforts conducted outside of the state,

and with direction and instrument review by select members of the Washington State Drug Policy Board. This Board is made up of a cross-section of service providers and government officials from across the state (see Appendix C). The instrument contained 21 separate items and over 112 discrete variables, excluding open-ended response items (see Appendix D).

### 3. Procedure

Over a three-day period during April 1992, telephone contact was made directly either with the coordinators or their assistants for all 24 task forces. This telephone contact served as a survey introduction and as an opportunity to stress evaluation activity importance, present relevant timelines, and allow them the opportunity to pose any related questions prior to instrument distribution. On April 20, a survey was sent to each coordinator with a cover letter reiterating that which was covered during the initial telephone contact, outlining anticipated survey results utility, and setting a survey completion date of May 15, 1992. On May 19, a follow-up letter with an additional survey instrument was sent to non-respondents. Additional follow-up was conducted by the WSP task force coordinator. This overall procedure resulted in a 100 percent return rate.

## **Phase 2: Interviews with Task Force Personnel**

### 1. Population Parameters

Task force personnel were interviewed at 18 task force sites. The primary criterion for inclusion in this phase of the evaluation was geographic representation. Respondents were identified by the task force coordinator or supervisor as being knowledgeable in task force operations and procedures as well as goals and objectives. Often multiple individuals participated in these interviews. Respondents included task force coordinators, supervisors, lieutenants, sergeants, detectives, prosecutors, and support staff.

### 2. Instrument

A 29-item unstructured interview outline was composed after extensive review of Drug Policy Board survey instrument feedback and initial review of the surveys returned by the task force coordinator (see Appendix E). In addition, the DCD task force program manager as well as the WSP task force coordinator provided input regarding interview direction and substance.

### 3. Procedure

The on-site interviews with the 18 task forces were conducted over a two-month period and 25 respondents participated.

### **Phase 3: Retrospective and Comparative Analysis of Task Force Summary Indices**

#### **1. Population Parameters**

The task forces in Washington State, as part of their contractual obligations, are required to submit on a monthly basis to the Washington State Patrol (WSP) Narcotics Data Tracking Program, data related to the number of individuals arrested, number of charges filed, number of persons convicted, number of convicted charges, and number and length of sentence, all by type of drug involved. In addition, the task forces also report on the amount of drugs seized and purchased by type, the quantity and dollar value of assets seized and forfeited, the number of arrests in which weapons were seized and type, and a profile of all individuals arrested (i.e. gender, age grouping, and offense history). During 1988 and 1989, data on 11 task forces were collected by the Narcotic Data Tracking Program and during 1990 and 1991, data on an additional 13 task forces were collected.

A database fairly similar to the WSP Narcotics Data Tracking Program database has been established on a statewide level by the Washington State Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs. This Association has been collecting data as part of the Washington Uniform Crime Reporting Program (WUCR) since 1979. This data is submitted to WUCR on a monthly basis by the majority of law enforcement agencies across the state (the average yearly report rate for the 1986 through 1991 period is 97 percent). A sample of task force coordinators was contacted during the week of May 22, 1992, by the WSP task force coordinator, and it was found that 75 percent of the task forces report data to the WUCR Program. Those task forces which do not report data directly to the WUCR Program report it through the "home" law enforcement agency. Since the task forces' performance figures are included in the WUCR database, yearly task force performance figures were backed out of the WUCR data for analysis purposes. This procedure had the net effect of yielding a non-task force involved drug enforcement comparison group.

When considering the number of task forces being supported by BJA funds in Washington State, a number of organizational factors must be acknowledged. Although most task forces cover multi-county areas, some, in addressing unique local needs, cover highly specialized areas. During 1992, for example, three task forces operate in King County alone and one of these is concerned solely with prosecution. In Grays Harbor County two task forces operate and one of these is concerned solely with prosecution. In Clallam County two task forces operate and one of these is unique to the indigenous American Indian tribe and is coordinated by the tribal council.

During the 1988 and 1989 funding periods, 11 task forces were supported by BJA funds, but only eight task forces covered county-wide areas (one task force was concerned with prosecution and two task forces were concerned with unique geographic needs). During the 1990 and 1991 funding period, although 24 task forces received BJA support, only 19 covered county-wide areas; three task forces operated in one county and can be considered to cover that county, two were concerned with prosecution, and one covered a unique geographic area. For the 1988 and 1989 period, WSP data for eight task forces covering 12 counties were compared to WUCR data for these same 12 counties, and for the 1990 to

1991 period, WSP data for 19 task forces covering 28 counties were compared to WUCR data for these same 28 counties.

## 2. Instrument

A recording instrument keyed to the WSP task force data elements as outlined above was designed to facilitate analysis of task force performance figures from one year to the next. Likewise, a recording instrument was designed which allowed WUCR data to be viewed from one year to the next by task force county area of impact. In order to accomplish this analysis, certain WSP task force data were collapsed into categories which replicated the WUCR categories.

## 3. Procedure

As part of this second evaluation phase, the data were analyzed on two levels. On the first level, task force performance was viewed year by year according to the data elements reported to WSP; i.e. a retrospective analysis. On the second level, task force performance was compared to overall law enforcement activities at the aggregate covered county level, also year by year; i.e. a comparative analysis. Further, similar WUCR data were analyzed for the two years prior to task force implementation (i.e. for years 1986 and 1987).

# FINDINGS

## PHASE 1: MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE SURVEY

The Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Force Survey was composed of five major sections: Goals and Mission, Activity Impact, Communication and Interagency Cooperation, Staffing, and Role of BJA Funding. Each section was designed to elicit information which would assist in defining task forces on a statewide level and identifying changes in goals and objectives as well as providing an assessment of task force effectiveness related to drug interdiction. A 100 percent return rate on completed surveys was realized and, unless otherwise noted, all items were completed (i.e. a 100 percent item response rate).

The first survey section was concerned with the **goals and mission** of the task force. In reviewing task force funding applications submitted to DCD, five general mission areas were identified. These general areas, plus an open "other" category, comprised the first item.

1. **Recognizing that task force operations are guided by often unique circumstances, what would you say is the primary goal or mission of your task force (you may indicate more than one):**

Table 1

General Goals and Mission	Number	Overall Percent
Investigation	20	83.3
Apprehension	20	83.3
Coordination between jurisdictions	11	45.8
Education	2	8.3
Training of task force members	4	33.3
Other: Prosecution	2	8.3
Asset forfeiture	1	4.2

The majority of respondents identified investigation and also apprehension as the primary missions of their task force (83 percent each). Education, followed by task force specific goals, comprised the smallest goal category.

The task force coordinators were asked to rank order different identified objectives. Although all items received various rankings (for example "arrest and prosecute drug dealers" was ranked sixth by two respondents), not all items received all rankings (for example, no one ranked "arrest and prosecute drug manufacturers" as first). The table below presents the final ranking by the majority of category respondents. The "arrest and prosecution of drug dealers" was identified as being the most important of six offered

objectives by 71 percent of the coordinators who responded. Four coordinators identified five additional objectives.

2. **Realizing that different task forces have different objectives, please rank order the following using "1" to indicate the most important objective.**

**Table 2**

Response Item	Rank	n	Respondents (percentage)	Task Forces (percentage)
Arrest and prosecute dealers	1	17	70.8	70.8
Arrest and prosecute manufacturers	2	8	34.8	33.3
Seize property of those involved	3	6	27.3	25.0
Arrest and prosecute manufacturers	4	7	29.2	29.2
Cooperate on drug investigations	5	9	45.0	37.5
Arrest and prosecute drug users	6	7	41.2	29.2

**Note:** Number of respondents per item are 24, 23, 22, 24, 20 and 17 respectively.

As noted above, four separate respondents identified five "other" objectives. These objectives are: educate public on what to report (rank 7); educate patrol officer on drug enforcement (rank 6); coordinate and assist drug investigations between other agencies/jurisdictions (rank 5); respond to local agency requests (rank 3); and reduce citizen fear associated with neighborhood dealing (rank 3).

As part of the "Arrest and prosecute dealers" item, coordinators were asked to rank order the level of dealer they target.

**Table 3**

Response Item	First	Second	Third	Number Row (percent) Column (percent)
Low-Level Dealers	6	2	13	21
	28.6	9.5	61.9	31.3
	26.1	8.7	61.9	---
Mid-Level Dealers	7	16	0	23
	30.4	69.6	---	34.3
	30.4	69.6	---	---
Upper-Level Dealers	10	5	8	23
	43.5	21.7	34.8	34.3
	43.5	21.7	38.1	---
Number	23	23	21	67
Row (percent)	---	---	---	100.0
Column (percent)	34.3	34.3	31.3	100.0

**Note:** Rows and Columns numbers are rounded and may not equal 100 percent.

Upper-level dealers were the primary target group for 44 percent of the task forces while low-level dealers were the primary target for 26 percent. Three respondents indicated that they did not target low-level dealers at all (a ranking of "3" could also be interpreted to indicate the same thing). Also, one individual indicated that their task force targets only upper-level dealers and another stated that they target only mid-level.

Three respondents offered comments regarding objectives. These comments are:

"Current efforts have a more significant effect on mid-level dealers than the ultimate objective (upper-level)."

"Upper level dealers are investigated thru a joint effort of the task force and D.E.A. Resources do not allow for lengthy, involved investigations of upper-level people without assistance. (At this point in time)."

"Objectives are set by Executive Task Force Board Policy."

Narrowing the focus further, the coordinators were asked to identify the priority level of 25 task force-identified goals. Further, the respondents were asked to gauge the level of success which they feel the task force has experienced in meeting these goals. These

goals were divided among three areas of operation. The following contingency tables present the coordinator's assessment of goal priority level and the related task force activity success level (tables with blank rows or columns have been truncated for ease of interpretation).

- The following general goals have been identified by various task forces throughout the state. Please identify the relative level of priority and, in your estimation, the degree to which you feel you have been successful in achieving this goal.

**ENFORCEMENT**

**Table 4**  
Case Investigation

		Success Level	
		Medium	High
Priority Level	Medium	3 13.0	1 4.3
	High	7 37.5	12 52.2

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

The above Case Investigation table, like all the following contingency tables, are read on the y-axis first then the x-axis. For example, in the above table, seven coordinators stated that although case investigation was a high priority, only a medium level of success was realized. In addition, these coordinators in the High Priority/Medium Success category made up 38 percent of the respondent pool. The "Missing data" notation at the bottom of the table refers to the number of individuals who, for whatever reason, did not complete this item.

**Table 5**  
Case Preparation

		Success Level	
		Medium	High
Priority Level	Medium	1 4.2	0 0
	High	9 37.5	14 58.3

Number of respondents = 24.

Table 5 indicates that most participants (58 percent) felt that case preparation was a high priority area in which there has been a high rate of success.

**Table 6**  
Case Prosecution

Priority Level	Success Level	
	Medium	High
Medium	2 8.3	0 0
High	8 33.3	14 58.3

Number of respondents = 24.

The Case Prosecution table also indicates a high priority and high success rate being in the majority (n = 14).

**Table 7**  
Reduction in Distribution

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Medium	2 8.7	3 13.0	0 0
High	2 8.7	15 65.2	1 4.3

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

The above data indicate that although reduction in distribution is a high priority area, only one respondent feels their task force was highly successful in achieving this reduction. The majority of respondents indicated a medium level of success in this area (n = 15).

**Table 8**  
Reduction in Consumption

Priority Level	Success Level	
	Low	Medium
Low	5 21.7	1 4.3
Medium	8 34.8	6 26.1
High	3 13.0	0 0

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Table 8 indicates that whatever the level of priority regarding reducing drug use, approximately 70 percent state that the success level is low (n = 16).

**Table 9**  
Reduction in Manufacturing

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	2 8.7	1 4.3	0 0
Medium	4 17.4	5 21.7	0 0
High	3 13.0	7 30.4	1 4.3

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

The Reduction in Manufacturing table shows that this is a high priority for 48 percent of the respondents. Approximately 60 percent of these individuals state they have experienced a medium success rate (n = 7).

**Table 10**  
**Target Street Level**

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	4 14.4	4 17.4	2 8.7
Medium	0 0	2 8.7	0 0
High	0 0	4 17.4	7 30.4

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Approximately the same proportion of respondents recorded targeting street-level dealers as a high priority as did those who recorded it as a low priority. Of those who did record it as a high priority area, 64 percent noted a high success rate (n = 7).

**Table 11**  
**Target Mid-Level**

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	1 4.3	0 0	0 0
Medium	1 4.3	8 34.8	2 8.7
High	0 0	6 26.1	5 21.7

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Table 11 shows that equal numbers of respondents ranked targeting mid-level dealers a medium and upper level priority target. Those individuals who recorded mid-level dealers as a high priority area (n = 11) did slightly better in achieving a medium to high success rate than those assigning a medium priority level (n = 10).

**Table 12**  
Target Upper Level

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	6 26.1	1 4.3	0 0
Medium	4 17.4	4 17.4	0 0
High	3 13.0	4 17.4	1 4.3

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

The data in the above table indicate that approximately 35 percent of the respondents targeted upper level dealers as a high priority and one-half of these realized a medium success rate.

**Table 13**  
Develop/Use Informants

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	1 4.2	1 4.2	0 0
Medium	0 0	2 8.3	0 0
High	0 0	7 29.2	13 54.2

Number of respondents = 24.

The Develop/Use Informants table records that 83 percent of the coordinators place this as a high priority area for their task force. At least a medium success rate was realized and 65 percent stated that a high level of success was accomplished (n = 13).

**Table 14**  
**Penetrate Organizations**

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	2 8.7	0 0	0 0
Medium	3 13.0	7 30.4	1 4.3
High	1 4.3	5 21.7	4 17.4

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Table 14 above shows that 48 percent of the respondents have targeted penetrating organizations as a medium level goal. A medium to high level of success was recorded by 73 percent of these (n = 8), but of the 44 percent of coordinators who ranked this as a high priority level, 90 percent recorded a medium to high success level (n = 9).

**Table 15**  
**Asset Seizure/Forfeiture**

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	2 8.3	0 0	0 0
Medium	4 16.7	6 25.0	1 4.2
High	0 0	7 29.2	4 16.7

Number of respondents = 24.

The above tabled data show that 92 percent of the respondents ranked asset seizures and forfeitures as a medium or high priority task force area. Those that ranked this area as a high priority area realized a 100 percent medium to high success rate as compared to 64 percent for those ranking it as a medium priority (n's of 11 and 7 respectively).

## ADMINISTRATION/OPERATION

**Table 16**  
Financial/Self-Sufficiency

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	5 21.7	2 8.7	0 0
Medium	2 8.7	4 17.4	1 4.3
High	3 13.0	5 21.7	1 4.3

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Financial self-sufficiency was assigned a medium to high priority level by 70 percent of the respondents (n = 16). Regardless of level, only nine percent of all respondents recorded a high success level (n= 2).

**Table 17**  
Training Detectives

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Medium	0	3 13.6	1 4.5
High	1 4.5	4 18.2	13 59.1

Number of respondents = 22. Missing data = 2.

Training detectives was a high priority area with a high corresponding level of success for 59 percent of the task force coordinators.

**Table 18**  
Training Uniformed Officers

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	5 23.8	1 4.8	0 0
Medium	1 4.8	10 47.6	1 4.8
High	1 4.8	1 4.8	1 4.8

Number of respondents = 21. Missing data = 3.

Just under 50 percent of the respondents assigned a medium priority level with a medium success level to training uniformed officers. Regardless of priority level, only 10 percent recorded a high success level (n = 2).

**Table 19**  
Training Prosecutors

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	3 13.0	1 4.3	0 0
Medium	1 4.3	6 26.1	2 8.7
High	0 0	4 17.4	6 26.1

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Table 19 shows that training prosecutors was at the very least a medium priority area for 83 percent of the respondents (n = 19). In addition, 95 percent of these individuals recorded at least a medium level of success in this area (n = 18).

**Table 20**  
**Training Private Sector**

	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Priority Level Low	11 52.4	3 14.3	0 0
Medium	0 0	5 23.8	0 0
High	0 0	1 4.8	1 4.8

Number of respondents = 21, missing data = 3.

The above table indicates that relatively few task forces have identified training the private sector as a goal. Of those who did target it as a low priority goal, 79 percent had achieved a low level of success (n = 11).

**Table 21**  
**Other Training: Chiefs and Sheriffs**

	Success Level
	Medium
Priority Level Medium	1 100.0

Number of respondents = 1. Missing data = 23.

Only one respondent offered an additional training target group. This task force has achieved a medium level of success in meeting this high priority goal.

**Table 22**  
Increase Personnel

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	5 20.8	0 0	0 0
Medium	3 12.5	4 16.7	1 4.2
High	7 29.2	2 8.3	2 8.3

Number of respondents = 24.

Table 22 shows that increasing personnel was considered at least a medium priority goal for 79 percent of the respondents. Of those who reported this area as a medium priority area (n = 8), 63 percent achieved a medium to high level of success and of those who reported this as a high priority area (n = 11), 36 percent achieved a medium to high level of success.

**Table 23**  
Equipment Purchase

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	3 12.5	2 8.3	0 0
Medium	2 8.3	7 29.2	2 8.3
High	2 8.3	4 16.7	2 8.3

Number of respondents = 24.

Regardless of level, purchasing equipment as a priority goal achieved a medium to high success level in 71 percent of the task forces (n = 17).

**COORDINATION AND OUTREACH**

**Table 24**  
Interagency Coordination

	Success Level	
	Low	High
Priority Level		
Medium	1 4.3	0 0
High	8 34.8	14 60.9

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

The above tabled data clearly indicate that a full 96 percent of the task forces have targeted interagency coordination as a high priority goal. Of these, 64 percent have achieved a high level of success in meeting this goal (n = 14).

**Table 25**  
Meetings and Strategy Development

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	1 4.3	0 0	0 0
Medium	2 8.7	13 56.5	1 4.3
High	0 0	4 17.4	2 8.7

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Conducting relevant meetings and development of related strategies was considered a medium to high priority area for 96 percent of the respondents. Regardless of priority level, a medium to high success rate was recorded by 87 percent of the respondents (n = 20).

**Table 26**  
**Communication and Information Sharing**

	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Priority Level			
Medium	0 0	7 30.4	0 0
High	1 4.3	6 26.1	9 39.1

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Communication and information sharing was recorded as at least a medium priority by all respondents. Of those individuals who rated this as a high priority area, 56 percent recorded a high level of success (n = 9).

**Table 27**  
**Liaison with Private Sector**

	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Priority Level			
Low	8 34.8	1 4.3	0 0
Medium	2 8.7	9 39.1	1 4.3
High	0 0	2 8.7	0 0

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Roughly one-half of the respondents stated that private sector liaison was a medium priority area (n = 12). Thirty-nine percent of the respondents ranked this as a low priority goal area and of these, 89 percent achieved a low level of success (n = 8).

**Table 28**  
Obtaining Public Support

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	0	2	0
	0	8.7	0
Medium	1	5	2
	4.3	21.7	8.7
High	1	5	7
	4.3	21.7	30.4

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Obtaining public support for task force activities was seen as a high priority area by 57 percent of the respondents. A medium to high success level was recorded by 92 percent of these individuals.

**Table 29**  
Community Meetings

Priority Level	Success Level		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	9	3	0
	39.1	13.0	0
Medium	2	7	2
	8.3	30.4	8.3

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

No respondents ranked conducting community meetings as a high priority area. Whether a low or medium priority, 52 percent had achieved at least a medium level of success (n = 12).

The above tables reflect a great deal of variation related to prioritization of goals and objectives and also related levels of success. Although the data and the brief discussions following each

table highlight commonalities and disparities, the task force variation reflected in these tables is just as significant. Not too much should be read into this data, though. It would be an oversimplification to view in a purely negative manner data which reflect a low level of success in achieving a low level priority goal, just as it would be in viewing in a purely positive manner a high level of success in achieving a high level priority goal. For example, a low level goal might not be actively pursued so no substantial accomplishments occur. Conversely, a high level goal might be very actively pursued leading to a high level of success. It is very important to remember that the level of success in meeting a specific goal, regardless of priority level, is often dependent on matters outside of the control of the task force. In addition, these goals and objectives may be fairly new to a particular task force, and the success level may not be reflective of effort. In order to assess stability of goals and objectives over time, the coordinators were asked if the goals and objectives have changed during the lifetime of the Task Force.

4. Since your task force's inception, have your goals and objectives changed at all?

Table 30

Response	n	Percent
Yes	11	45.8
No	<u>13</u>	<u>54.2</u>
Total	24	100.0

Those who responded that there had been a change were asked to provide an explanation. These verbatim responses are:

"Initially targeting upper-level violators - now mid to upper and responding to local needs/requests."

"Increased the level of offender."

"The task force started out with an aim at affecting mid to upper level dealers; however, the expertise was not available to effect that goal. The goal was redirected to lower level dealers and street level activities. Once expertise was gained, goals were set again to higher level dealers. Also, as the task force increased experience, asset forfeiture became a primary goal."

"We are directing more time and resources to high level dealers and financial investigations with asset seizure."

"In 1988 we attempted to arrest and prosecute all levels of dealers, we are now focused on mid and upper level dealers. Manpower shortage has altered our goals and we are investigating high and mid level dealers and their assets."

"Although goals and objectives have not significantly changed, we have adjusted to meet perceived needs. Our size, talent pool, and public support required adjustment of (offender) level for 1991."

"We've gone from hand to hand undercover buys to working C.I.'s which so far has proved to be better for our detectives but C.I. management is difficult at times."

"We were originally tasked to investigate mid and upper level dealers. We are now tasked to investigate street level dealers, due to low arrests."

"Our drug problem is different from what we thought and a lot more complex. Due to the Canadian Border we have found that smuggling is much more active than we thought."

"We are beginning to place greater emphasis on community oriented policing and public education."

"In the 1992-93 application, more emphasis will be placed on training for both law enforcement and civilian personnel."

Eight of these respondents noted a change in dealer target level. Education, training, and community involvement were also mentioned areas.

The second survey section was concerned with the respondents assessment of task force activities on both drug use and the supply network in their jurisdiction. The first item in this section was a rank ordering of drug type related to drug use.

5. Rank the relative level of seriousness of drug use in your area (place a "1" next to the most used/available, "2" next to...)

Table 31

Drug Type	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Number Row % Col. %
Amphetamines	0	0	6	10	5	2	1	0	0	24
			25	42	21	8	4			100
			25	42	23	10	6			--
Barbiturates	0	0	0	2	0	4	4	6	1	17
					12	24	24	35	6	100
					8	19	22	38	50	--
Cocaine	15	8	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	24
	63	33	4							100
	63	33	4							--
Crack	2	1	3	2	3	1	3	5	0	20
	10	5	15	10	15	5	15	25		100
	8	4	13	8	14	5	17	31		--
Heroin	0	4	5	2	6	5	0	1	0	23
		17	22	9	26	22		4		100
		17	21	8	27	24		6		--
Hashish	0	0	1	1	0	6	9	2	0	19
			5	5		32	47	11		100
			4	4		29	50	13		--
LSD	0	0	4	6	7	2	1	2	0	22
			18	27	32	9	5	9		100
			17	25	32	10	6	13		--
Marijuana	7	11	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	24
	29	46	17	4	4					100
	29	46	17	4	5					--
Other	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
						50			50	100
						5			50	--
Number	24	24	24	24	22	21	18	16	2	--
Row %	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	100
Col. %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: Row and column percents are rounded to eliminate decimals. Not all respondents ranked all drug categories. The two drugs listed in the "other" category, are "legend drugs" (i.e. pharmaceuticals requiring a prescription) and "mushrooms."

Certain coordinators listed more than one drug type as being equal in seriousness. For example, one respondent recorded barbiturates, crack, and hashish as all being the sixth most serious type in the task force area. Also, certain drug types did not receive a ranking by the respondent and therefore it can be assumed that it was not perceived as a serious problem within their geographic area. The drug type which was ranked by the largest number of respondents as being the most widely used was cocaine (63 percent) followed by marijuana (46 percent). Amphetamines received a total of 67 percent of responses putting it in the third and fourth place for type of drug.

Realizing that drug use, per se, may not be the most serious of drug related problems, the coordinators were asked to identify the area of most concern.

6. **All things being equal, what type of illegal drug-related activity is of most concern in your area?**

Table 32

Activity	Number	Percent Reporting
Use	7	29.2
Sales	18	75.0
Manufacturing	9	37.5
Distribution	15	62.5
Other	2	8.3

Note: Percentages do not equal 100 due to multiple responses.

Some respondents listed more than one activity as comprising the area of most concern. Overall, sales, which 75 percent of the respondent pool identified, was the activity of most concern followed fairly closely by distribution with 63 percent. Two coordinators identified "Other" drug-related activities which are of concern in their area. They are:

"Related Crimes (i.e. burglary/theft)."

"Financing/Money Laundering (profits accumulated through drug sales/distribution used to acquire legitimate business, real estate, and personal property)."

The percentage of drugs being seized as part of task force activity is a further indicator of level of seriousness in the task force area.

7. Please provide approximate percentages of cases/investigations which resulted in drugs being seized during the past year (1991). For this question, the disposition of the actual case is not important, so please consider all related activities which resulted in drugs being seized (as separate from drugs being purchased).

Table 33

Drug Type	Number of Responses	Percentage Range	Average Percent
Amphetamines	11	1 - 20	9.8
Barbiturates	3	1 - 3	1.7
Cocaine	23	5 - 85	51.7
Crack	7	1 - 60	13.9
Heroin	15	1 - 15	8.3
Hashish	2	1	1.0
LSD	11	1 - 15	7.3
Marijuana	22	3 - 95	31.4
Other: pharmaceuticals	1	4	4.0

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Note: Not all respondents recorded seizures in each drug category. Only one respondent left this item totally blank. Average percent does not total 100 percent due to variability in the number of respondents.

Roughly 52 percent of drug seizures performed by 23 respondents in 1991 involved cocaine. Marijuana made up 31 percent of the seizures reported by 22 respondents. As part of this item, respondents were given the opportunity to "describe any unusually large or significant 1991 seizures." Eight coordinators took this opportunity to relay some highly significant information.

"During a joint investigation with Spokane Regional Task Force, three kilos of cocaine was seized."

"Seized 18 kilograms of cocaine in 1991. Seized 4 lbs. of methamphetamine in one major investigation that was prosecuted in federal court."

"Dalton marijuana case, a multi-state operation, in which 16 to 25 pounds of processed marijuana was being distributed from Washington to Alaska per week through the post office, flights and other methods. McCauley grow was another significant indoor grow operation in which a production line turning out 250 to 300 mature plants every three months was being

operated, along with grows in two other counties. Lynn Waters' case was a significant RICO case in which grows were being operated in Lewis County, Thurston County and Hermiston, Oregon, distributing over a wide network."

"28 kilos cocaine distributed by Hispanic to Spokane for which indictment handed down. He and others distributed approximately 120 kilos plus to Spokane in a year."

"The task force handled a total of 266 cases in 1991. Of those, 107 cases (40.3 percent) resulted in narcotics seized; 53 reverse investigations (19.9 percent); 85 purchases (31.9 percent); and 21 other vice investigations."

"Most of our work involves purchases. However our seizure cases usually are of grow operation investigations."

"Current investigations indicate an increase in potential heroin."

"Large marijuana traced out of jurisdiction in Sandpoint, ID; Meth lab in Kamiah, ID."

Clearly, from this narrative information, a large amount of drugs was removed through seizure activities.

Like the previous two items, the purchasing of drugs as part of the investigation process helps describe the seriousness of the drug problem.

8. Please provide approximate percentages of cases/investigations which resulted in drugs being purchased during the last year (1991).

Table 34

Drug Type	Number of Responses	Percentage Range	Average Percent
Amphetamines	13	1 - 98	15.3
Barbiturates	0	--	--
Cocaine	16	5 - 90	79.3
Crack	5	1 - 80	20.2
Heroin	10	3 - 40	11.1
Hashish	1	5	5.0
LSD	14	1 - 25	5.1
Marijuana	20	2 - 95	21.4
Other: mushrooms and missing	2	1 - 5	3.0

Number of respondents = 22. Missing data = 2.

**Note:** Not all respondents recorded purchases in each drug category. Two respondents left this item totally blank and one respondent recorded purchases equalling five percent in the "other" category but did not identify the drug. Average percent does not total 100 percent due to variability in the number of respondents.

As found in the drug seizure item, cocaine made up the largest drug purchase category (79 percent). Also like seizures, marijuana made up the second largest category (21 percent). Four coordinators offered comments regarding the more significant purchases of 1991.

"In 1991, INET purchased 32 ounces of cocaine in a buy-bust arrest."

"Of the 266 total task force cases, 85 cases (31.9 percent) involved the purchase of drugs."

"1991 has been a year primarily focused on neighborhood dealing and mid level suppliers. Search warrants have failed to uncover large supplies of drugs following purchase/arrest."

"The availability of heroin has increased significantly. However, the cost of purchasing exhibits is (also) significant."

Task Force coordinators are in an excellent position to assess the general direction of drug use in their area. Although offered four choices, many respondents, displaying a sophisticated level of knowledge regarding this direction, offered more than one response with explanatory comments.

9a. Within your task force geographic area, do you feel that during the 12 months of 1991, drug use has generally been:

**Table 35**

Direction	n	Percent of Respondents
Decreasing	3	12.5
Staying relatively the same	13	54.2
Increasing	6	25.0
Shifting	5	20.8

**Note:** Number of respondents equals 24; number of response items (n) equals 27 due to multiple response choices. Percent does not equal 100 due to multiple choices by respondents.

Although it would appear that over half of the respondents felt that there is no movement in community drug use, the responses indicate that at some level drug use patterns are at least shifting. Three respondents, in offering multiple assessments on drug use in their area, also offered qualifying statements. These assessments plus their corresponding statements, are:

**Decreasing and remaining relatively the same:** "Survey shows a slight reduction in school age usage."

**Remaining relatively the same and shifting:** "Levels appear to be basically the same as far as quantity and "type of person involved." There has been a shift in type, black tar heroin becomes more prevalent and users tending to be more in a "lower socio-economic class."

**Increasing and shifting:** "More users have become dealers. More cocaine addicts also use heroin or have switched entirely to heroin."

Aside from the reduction in school age use statement, it would appear that heroin use is on the rise. One individual who stated that he felt that drug use was going down (decreasing) during 1991, wrote:

"We prosecuted 182 violators in 1991 versus 91 violators in 1990. Many were mid and upper level dealers affecting the drug organizations and scaring many lower level dealers."

The respondents who stated that they felt that drug use has been **staying relatively the same** did so for various reasons. Five coordinators offered the following explanations:

"Slight increase in LSD and Crack Cocaine, but within above parameters, it is staying relatively the same."

"If anything, Cocaine price declined slightly while demand relatively the same since it appears distributors do little to market their product."

"Drug investigation and awareness has increased but not enough information is available to evaluate use patterns just yet."

"I have no specific stats to address this, it is just a perception."

"I would like to think that "DARE" and "PRIDE" have caused drug use to decrease, but these programs impact the school age children, not the adult user which historically has been greater in number."

It would appear that even though the respondents feel drug use patterns are not changing, they do feel that there is movement.

One coordinator, who stated that drug use is **increasing**, recorded this comment:

"Casual use of drugs has declined. Hard core narcotics users and dealers are increasing."

Here too, movement in the overall drug use picture is indicated. This movement is also reflected in the comments that two of the five individuals who stated that drug use is **shifting**, recorded:

"We see LSD on a rise locally. We also see that cocaine use as a preferred drug is replacing methamphetamine. Methamphetamine production seems to be dropping in the local area, while marijuana production and use is on the rise."

"Shifting from cocaine to marijuana."

Perhaps these comments are reflective more of individual respondent's outlook than a measure of drug use. Virtually all indicate movement and even the comment offered in support of the "decreasing" statement could be interpreted as indicating an increase in drug use (i.e. more individuals were prosecuted in 1991 than 1990 so more people, it could be argued, were selling/buying/using).

As part of the drug use question, coordinators were asked whether other, non-law enforcement factors have had an impact.

9b. **Have the drug use patterns in your area been influenced by factors other than task force and other law enforcement activities?**

**Table 36**

Response	n	Percent
Yes	13	56.5
No	10	43.5

Respondents = 23 (95.8 percent). Missing data = 1 (4.2 percent).

Note: Percent total may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Over half of the respondents stated that factors other than task force and other law enforcement activities have had an impact on drug use patterns. Those individuals who recorded that they do feel other factors besides law enforcement have influenced local drug use patterns (n = 13) identified 25 sources.

**Table 37**

Source	Number	Percent
Demographic change	3	23.1
Market forces	7	53.8
Education	11	84.6
Other	3	23.1

**Note:** Due to multiple responses, number of respondents is greater than 13. Percent total is greater than 100 due to the same reason. In addition, four respondents identified the DARE program in the margin next to the Education category.

Education appears to be the largest source of influence on drug use patterns. The three respondents who identified "Other" influences offered:

"Increased prosecution interest."

"Socially drug use is unacceptable. Thurston County Togethers Efforts."

"We have community support."

Like the direction of drug use overall, task force coordinators are in an excellent position to assess the general direction of the drug supply network in their area. Also like the preceding question, many respondents offered more than one response with explanatory comments.

**10a. Within your task force geographic area, do you feel that during the 12 months of 1991, the drug supply network(s) has generally been:**

**Table 38**

Direction	Number	Percent of Respondents
Decreasing	2	8.3
Staying relatively the same	10	41.7
Increasing	8	33.3
Shifting	7	29.2

Note: Number of respondents equals 24; number of response items (n) equals 27 due to multiple response choices.

Like the previous item, the largest proportion of coordinators stated that they felt the drug supply network is staying relatively the same. Also like the previous item, this assessment was often coupled with another response or offered with a qualifier. The three task force coordinators who offered multiple assessments on the direction of the drug supply network(s) in their area, also offered qualifying statements. These assessments, plus their corresponding statements, are:

**Decreasing and shifting:** "Fewer users of marijuana - they can no longer buy large amounts locally - users switching from cocaine to marijuana and methamphetamine."

**Remaining relatively the same and increasing:** "Cocaine - same; Marijuana - increase."

**Remaining relatively the same and shifting:** "Any reduction in cocaine has been offset by increases in methamphetamine, certain cocaine organizations have been replaced by other personnel."

The one respondent who stated that the drug supply network has generally been **decreasing** offered the same response as he did for assessment of drug use decrease (question 9a):

"We prosecuted 182 violators in 1991 versus 91 violators in 1990. Many were mid and upper level dealers affecting the drug organizations and scaring many lower level dealers."

Three of the 12 respondents who stated that they felt that the drug supply network is **staying relatively the same**, offered the following observations:

"Even after arrest and prosecution we continue to encounter repeat offenders."

"As usual, as fast as one dealer and sources are taken out, a new one takes over."

"Not enough information to prove otherwise, although the feeling is that supply is increasing."

Of the eight coordinators who indicated that the supply network is **increasing**, four noted:

"Although there has been some price fluctuation, the overall indications are an increase in supply."

"Upper level dealers from other regions are increasing the supply into the task force geographic region."

"This factor is difficult to gauge. The information is based solely upon our own ability to interpret known networks. Until we know about all networks this cannot be accurate."

"The hispanic supply network which has been bringing cocaine into the area are now bringing tar heroin & cocaine."

An assessment of a **shifting** drug supply network was presented by five of the seven respondents who noted the following:

"When a supply network is removed another moves in and fills the demand, usually within three months."

"We see the trend in our local area. The supply networks are shifting towards well-organized Hispanic distributors, away from methamphetamine distribution and production to well-organized marijuana production."

"Some movement from the core area of task force operations, i.e. population centers, to more remote areas."

"There has been a shift from local unorganized dealers to more gang dealing."

"Most of the same networks are in place, however, 1991 focus on street level violators has caused conflict with some organizations, all to our advantage."

10b. **Has the drug supply network(s) in your area been influenced by factors other than task force and other law enforcement activities?**

**Table 39**

Response	Number	Percent
Yes	8	36.4
No	14	63.6

Respondents = 22 (91.7 percent). Missing data = 2 (8.3 percent).

Note: Percent total may not equal 100 due to rounding.

Unlike the previous item related to drug use patterns, the majority of respondents stated that they do not feel that the drug supply network has been influenced by factors other than law enforcement activities (n = 14). Those eight individuals who recorded that they do feel other factors besides law enforcement have influenced the drug supply network, identified 15 sources.

**Table 40**

Source	Number	Percent
Demographic change	1	12.5
Market forces	6	75.0
Education	5	62.5
Other	3	37.5

**Note:** Due to multiple responses, number of respondents is greater than eight. Percent total is greater than 100 due to the same reason. In addition, one respondent offered this observation regarding Market Forces: "Drugs are less expensive in bulk quantities. We have an affluent area."

The three identified "other" sources of influence included:

"Weather - very mild winter allowed continued influx of those distributing. Have seen increase in gang influx who have shifted from trying to sell crack in some cases to selling cocaine and marijuana."

"Greater community support. Fewer growers and laboratories because of greater community awareness."

"I believe task force efforts, and extended jail sentencing, is the only force giving the community relief from drug traffickers."

An exclusively open-ended item was included to allow the respondents an opportunity to highlight perceived areas of change in both the community and the task force leadership ranks. Twenty-two coordinators responded to this two-part item, although only 20 responded to the first part and 21 to the second part. Below is a sampling of six responses per item component (a complete record of these responses can be found in Appendix F).

11. Please provide a narrative description regarding; (a) how the narcotics picture has changed in your area of operation since your task force was formed:

"The task force has put pressure on the mid-level dealers causing them to be less open in their operations. It is costing them more to stay in business."

"The narcotics picture in Lewis County, since the task force inception, has changed from methamphetamine use and production to cocaine use and distribution. Laboratories were a particular problem when we started up, and have dropped off in the past few years as a primary problem. Replacing that have been more organized and larger drug trafficking distribution schemes."

"We are cooperating and sharing more with other agencies. The cost of marijuana is increasing. Methamphetamine is sometimes hard to find. Cocaine is more available. LSD is becoming popular again."

"Dealers are cautious, drive beater cars, do not deal to strangers and hide cash. M.J. growers using sophisticated equipment to hide odor of M.J."

"Heroin and marijuana use and distribution appears constant. Grows moved indoors with greater sophistication of concealment. Cocaine among school age kids may have lessened some but the 20-40 year olds still abusing and demand is present enough to allow kilo dealers to be complacent in moving product. LSD returning to schools in a few instances."

"The narcotics picture has shifted to previously mentioned gang influences including drug related drive by shootings and murders that are directly drug related."

**11. (continued) (b) how leadership perceptions have also changed during this time:**

"Leadership perceptions have seemed to change toward the overall approach as opposed to independent geographical areas. In other words, team approach is now the common rule and not the exception."

"Management philosophy has remained relatively constant with one exception and that being an aggressive stance toward asset forfeiture."

"Leadership more knowledgeable as are all task force members. Focus has shifted to higher level distribution, organizations, conspiracy cases. Day to day work with FBI and ATF."

"The perceptions of leadership have also changed in that we realize that law enforcement efforts alone can not resolve this major social issue. It requires the assistance of the judicial system, education, treatment, and each citizen if our efforts are to be realized."

"Realization that reducing supply is a long term project. There will always be suppliers as long as the profits are high."

"Due to local politics, higher visibility targets, generally lower to mid level violators, must be arrested for media/publicity coverage on a semi-frequent basis."

Task force activities impact on a number of levels both on the macro level (i.e. drug use and drug supply networks) and also on the micro level (i.e. the user). In an attempt to assess some of the more particular impact areas, the following question was asked:

12. The following questions are qualitative questions requiring somewhat of a subjective judgement on your part. Please indicate which items you feel task force activities have had an impact on:

**Table 41**

Item	Indicating Impact	
	Number	Percent
Information sharing related to investigation	23	95.8
Information sharing related to prosecution	22	91.7
Community awareness related to interdiction	17	70.8
Likelihood of successful investigation	24	100.0
Likelihood of successful arrest	24	100.0
Likelihood of successful prosecution	23	95.8
Reducing duplication of effort between agencies	18	75.0
Knowledge of local drug network	23	95.8
Knowledge of statewide drug network	18	75.0
Other	3	12.5

As is evidenced in the above table, coordinators have assessed task force activities as having an overwhelming positive impact on all areas. The areas which relatively fewer respondents assigned a positive rating had to do with community awareness, reduction in duplication, and knowledge of the statewide drug network. Even with these areas, though, the majority of respondents noted a positive impact.

The three respondents who identified "Other" task force activity impact areas, offered:

"Education/perception of locals, i.e. on the seriousness of the problem."

"Knowledge of interstate drug investigations."

"Statistics."

In addition, six respondents commented on the type of effect:

"In each instance there has been an impact; in some areas it is greater than others."

"Seeing the task force have a positive and educational impact on local jurisdictions."

"Increase in arrests, seizures, and prosecutions."

"The impact of the task force has been positive. Improvement has been seen in nearly all areas of local operations."

"The major dealer in this area is less likely to slip thru due to the resources now available to go after them."

"Progress has been made (in educating the public regarding the seriousness of the drug problem), however, this is the area that needs the most critical of changes."

The **third survey section**, using scaled response items, asked the task force coordinators to provide **assessments in the general areas of communication and interagency cooperation**. The first section item dealt with the coordinators knowledge of other in-state task forces.

13. **How much knowledge do you have of the form and structure of other task forces in the state?**

**Table 42**

Response	Number	Percent
A great deal	3	12.5
Less than a great deal (but more than some)	11	45.8
Some	7	29.2
Less than some (but more than none)	3	12.5
None at all	0	--
Total	24	100.0

The level of assessed knowledge of other task forces in the state, appears to be quite high. Almost 60 percent of respondents state that they possess more than "some" such knowledge. Three respondents took this opportunity to comment on their response.

"Knowledge has improved of other task forces through organized task force commander conferences, where task force structure information and other matters are shared openly."

"So much to do, so little time. We learn something new each time a contact is made with another task force."

"I attend all Community Development supervisor training. I also know many of the task force supervisors."

These comments, along with the tabled data, indicates a continuing process of familiarization.

14. Realizing it's often difficult to generalize, please rank your working relationship with:

Table 43

Agency	Rank					missing	$\bar{X}$ Response Score
	No. of Responses						
	1	2	3	4	5		
Federal	-	3	6	12	3	--	3.6
State	-	1	6	11	6	--	3.9
County	-	-	4	9	11	--	4.3
Tribal	-	4	9	2	1	8	3.0
City/Town	-	1	4	8	11	--	4.2
Other TF	-	-	-	11	12	1	4.5

Note: 1 = poor; 2 = less than average; 3 = average; 4 = above average; 5 = excellent.

Respondents indicated that of all the presented agency types, the working relationship with other task forces was the most positive. This level of response, combined with the fairly high level of knowledge of other task forces as indicated in item number 13, indicates a task force network with a great deal of interaction and information exchange. The working relationship with county agencies received the next highest mean score.

Eight coordinators offered comments relating to this working relationship question.

"Improved relationships with other agencies, especially federal agencies. Increased credibility."

"FBI agent working in the task force on specific cases has become an integral part of our operation. Relations excellent. Relations with ATF excellent and frequently work joint investigations. Positive relationship with DEA, U.S. Attorney very supportive and accepts cases readily from the task force."

"Working relationships vary greatly with federal agencies. DEA is generally most difficult."

"Even when the federal agencies are trying to be helpful they aren't."

"I don't think our situation in this regard is unique." (i.e. respondents ranking of agency working relationships)."

"The Tribal Police just hired a professional police chief and I foresee our unit being utilized more in the near future."

"Have not worked with tribal agencies as of yet."

"Our most difficult in working relationships has been integrating small police agencies into the task force."

These respondents indicated, for the most part, highly positive working relationships. The two somewhat negative comments had to do with two agency types dissimilar in both size and scope; small local law enforcement agencies and large federal law enforcement agencies.

Insufficient communication and often non-existent cooperation are general areas which have been identified by law enforcement agencies as being obstacles to successful drug investigation and prosecution. Task forces were created to, in part, remediate this situation. The coordinators were asked to indicate their perception of change in these areas among various agency levels.

15. **Since your task force was formed, please identify the relative degree of change realized related to the following: (It is realized that the task force may experience varying degree of cooperation, for example, with different federal agencies, also for example. Please try to generalize the relative degree of change for each agency type.)**

**Table 44**

Agency Type and Area	Response					
	Improved		No Difference		Missing	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Federal - Cooperation	19	79.2	5	20.8	--	--
Federal - Communication	18	75.0	6	25.0	--	--
State - Cooperation	17	70.8	7	29.2	--	--
State - Communication	16	66.7	8	33.3	--	--
County - Cooperation	19	79.2	5	20.8	--	--
County - Communication	17	70.8	7	29.2	--	--
Tribal - Cooperation	6	25.0	11	45.8	7	29.2
Tribal - Communication	5	20.8	11	45.8	8	33.3
City/Town - Cooperation	19	79.2	5	20.8	--	--
City/Town - Communication	18	75.0	6	25.0	--	--
Task Force - Cooperation	20	83.3	3	12.5	1	4.2
Task Force - Communication	19	79.2	4	16.7	1	4.2

**Note:** Row percents total to 100 percent with rounding. Although a "worse" response item was offered in Item 15, no respondents indicated that since task force formation, communication or cooperation has deteriorated with any agency type.

This table, like the Item 14 table, also places task forces in first place. Cooperation and communication with other task forces has shown the greatest overall level of improvement. City/town agency and federal agency, two agency types dissimilar in size and scope, received virtually the same score. A "no difference" score is not necessarily a negative rating, especially if the level of communication and cooperation was already positive. It is necessary to view Item 14 data with Item 15 data to obtain a clear picture of the working agency relationship. For example, it would be a matter of great concern if the working relationship with state agencies was poor and the levels of communication and cooperation showed no difference (or if they were poor and this was recorded as an improvement).

Three respondents recorded comments related to the degree of change.

"Cooperation with U.S. Customs and IRS has greatly improved."

"Improved operations with prosecutors."

"Have always had good cooperation and communication with state."

The relative levels of knowledge of other task forces, the working relationship with various agencies, and communication and cooperation with these agencies, impact on task force effectiveness. In addition, the level of support displayed by other law enforcement agencies for task force activities also has a direct impact on effectiveness.

16. **What do you feel is the general level of support for task force activities by other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies?**

**Table 45**

Level	Number	Percent
High	21	91.3
Low	1	4.3
Indifferent	1	4.3
Opposition	0	--

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

Overwhelmingly, respondents felt that the level of support for their activities by other law enforcement agencies was high. Four coordinators offered comments regarding this general level of support:

"This has been achieved through demonstrated abilities and proven track record of success."

"I feel we are very well respected. We receive all necessary assistance when outside our area. The cooperation and support has been excellent. We also give 100 percent to other jurisdictions when requested."

"Locally support is very high. Cannot judge on broader scale."

"This is a "general" comment; high support is evidenced by two of the six agencies." (In Item 15.)

In addition to law enforcement and criminal justice agency support, support by the media and community is key to task force effectiveness.

17. **What do you feel is the general level of support for task force activities by the media and the community?**

**Table 46**

Level	Number	Percent
High	20	83.3
Low	3	12.5
Indifferent	1	4.2
Opposition	0	--

Number of respondents = 24.

Although not quite as overwhelming as support by other law enforcement agencies (Item 16), community and media support is approximately six to one on the high side. Four of the coordinators offered comments relating to community and media support:

"The local paper has been very good to us. Very supportive. We were praised in the editorial pages three times."

"The media has been brought in and involved directly with task force activities. A good working relationship has been established with a high level of community exposure for task force activities and successes."

"Extremely good relationship with local media and community as a whole."

"Good with local newspaper, one of our radio stations has been in opposition."

Of these comments, only one individual indicated a negative level of local media support. This respondent also recorded a positive level of support displayed by another branch of the local media.

The fourth survey section asked the coordinator to respond to items relating to task force staffing patterns.

18a. Please describe the staffing pattern of your task force:

Table 47

Pattern	Number	Percent
Highly stable	8	33.3
Relatively stable	12	50.0
Fluctuating	4	16.7

Number of respondents = 24.

Note: Levels of stability were operationally defined as: Highly Stable - having the same core personnel for at least two years; Relatively Stable - possessing the same core personnel for at least one year but less than two years; and Fluctuating - core personnel have changed within the past year.

Over 83 percent of the respondents stated that at the very least, their task force has had the same core personnel for at least one year. Five respondents offered comments relating to the staffing pattern question.

"Stability has produced very knowledgeable effective investigators."

"Hope it stays this way." [highly stable]

"Normal rotation is two and one-half to three years and is usually well staggered - 1991 was an exception. 1992 should be relatively stable."

"Funded positions have fluctuated - our officers starting to produce after one year."

"We have had a major turnover in the last 18 months."

It is possible that, regardless of staffing pattern, there may have been changes from earlier patterns.

18b. Does this staffing pattern represent a change from earlier staffing patterns?

Table 48

	Number	Percent
Yes	5	21.7
No	18	78.3

Number of respondents = 23. Missing data = 1.

The level of stability for task force core personnel displayed in the previous item is also reflected in the above table. These two tables combined indicate that not only are these task forces stable related to these timelines, but also, almost paradoxically, that this stability appears to be relatively constant. Individuals who responded "Yes," that the recorded staffing pattern represented a change from an earlier staffing pattern, were asked to explain this assessment. All five coordinators responded:

"Due to some unusual circumstances plus normal rotation pattern that resulted in considerable detective turnover."

"Personnel staffing was very unstable at the beginning, with a major turnover of personnel during the first two years. Since that time, the organization has improved and staffing has become highly stable."

"All but one funded position has been replaced - we have increased non-funded positions."

"We have two-year rotation - but lost two people and got two new ones."

"We are a new task force and are currently in a growth phase."

The size and composition of task forces is guided by the often unique characteristics of local demands and resources. The coordinators were asked to provide a breakout of types of assigned personnel.

19. What is the normal, or average, staffing level in number of full-time equivalent positions (FTEs)?

Table 49

Position	Task Forces	Range	Total FTEs	Average
Coordinator	20	1 - 5	24	1.2
Detectives	22	2 - 10	112	5.1
Prosecutor	18	1 - 3	23	1.3
Clerical	18	1 - 3	29	1.6
Other	10	1 - 3	13	1.3

Note: Average number of positions were computed based on the number of task forces identifying that position category as being included in task force composition (i.e. not 24). No task forces have assigned uniformed officers as part of their normal/average staffing pattern.

Keeping in mind that not all task forces have personnel assigned to all position types, an "average" task force can be described. This hypothetical task force is composed of one coordinator, five detectives, one prosecutor, two clerical staff, and one "other". The ten coordinators identifying the 13 "other" FTEs, recorded the type of position involved:

Table 50

Position	Task Forces	FTEs
Sergeant	3	3
National Guard	2	2
Date Analyst	1	1
County Deputies	1	2
City Patrolman	1	1
P.A. Secretary	1	1
Supervisor	1	1
Financial Investigator	1	1
Drug Dog Handler	1	1

Note: Ten separate coordinators identified FTEs in the "other" category; two of these individuals listed more than one type of FTE in this category. Also, two of the three sergeants were recorded as Washington State Patrol Sergeant and Unit Supervisor Sergeant.

The final survey section sought primarily open-ended information related to the role and future need of BJA funding in task force operation. The sole forced choice item was:

20. **If these federal funds were not available, do you think that a multi-jurisdictional task force such as you now currently have, would exist in your area?**

**Table 51**

Response	n	Percent
Yes	8	33.3
No	16	66.7

Number of respondents = 24.

All respondents were asked to comment on their answer. Two individuals who responded "No," the task force would not exist without these federal funds, did not record any comments. One-half of the responses for each answer are provided below; the remainder can be found in Appendix G.

**Yes - the task force would exist without these federal funds.**

"Would still function, but with a skeleton crew. And, would not be as effective without the federal fund support."

"To some extent TNET existed prior to any federal funds. Whether or how long the agencies would maintain this cooperative effort, absent federal funds, is open to question."

"But we would not have the enhancement personnel nor the mandated training or federal standards which has made us more effective and professional."

"Prior to federal funding this would not be the case. After seeing the success of the task force, the agencies have indicated they will keep the task force in operation."

Three of these four comments highlight a prevalent theme; that although the task force would continue to exist, a diminished level of effectiveness would most likely be displayed.

**No - the task force would not exist without these federal funds.**

"These funds are the only reason we exist. Local politicians do not spend money in this area on drug enforcement, unless they absolutely have to."

"There is not self-sufficient local funding or overall support by participating agencies."

"Without the federal assistance to operate the drug task force in our area, it would cease to exist, as local funds are unavailable to support it. Being a rural area, with a timber-dependent economy, the general taxing revenue is decreasing."

"The financial burden would be too much for the involved/participating agencies."

"Cost of the task force is primarily wages, most departments in county can not give up staffing without compensation."

"The task force takes a lot more to operate than our communities have to offer. We are not able to get the seizures that everyone had hoped we would."

"The federal funds make possible the High Impact Offender Project. Without these funds it would be difficult, if not impossible, to have both the county and city to fully fund the project."

These comments reflect the general tone of all those individuals who offered responses to their "No" statement; the task force could not exist as it is now without these federal funds. The commitment to the task force structure clearly is there, but the local financial resources do not, according to the respondents, exist. Six of the eight individuals who stated that the task force would continue to exist even without these funds, made it clear that effectiveness would be reduced. This "yes but no" implied response was put in perspective by one respondent who recorded "No":

"Currently, local law enforcement agencies do not have the funds or manpower to commit to a task force without federal assistance. It is hoped that enough assets will be generated over the course of this operation to make local funding possible."

Current realities versus future hopes is a common thread found throughout not just this particular item, but the entire survey.

## PHASE 2: INTERVIEWS WITH TASK FORCE PERSONNEL

Over approximately a two-month period (June - July 1992), 25 individuals were interviewed at 18 separate task force sites. The respondents varied in both **rank and responsibility** from task force to task force although the majority were involved with either coordination or supervision. Although these two areas of responsibility entail distinct duties, it was found that a certain amount of overlap was common. For the most part coordinators were concerned with fiscal matters and policy issues whereas supervisors were concerned more with personnel management and general case supervision. Coordinators reported that they often filled in for supervisors and assisted in personnel supervision, and supervisors occasionally reported that grant writing and budget management were integral parts of their position. Both positions were largely administrative though supervisors were also involved in actual case investigation. Coordinators held the rank of chief of police, assistant chief of police, captain, lieutenant, or sergeant. Supervisors were either lieutenants or sergeants. Street level detectives were also interviewed and their duties were concerned with the actual drug offender investigations and arrests. Prosecutors who were interviewed served as task force coordinator, legal advisor, and court attorney.

The length of **time attached** to their task force varied from, in the case of one individual, one week, to as much as four years. The coordinator who was with the task force for one week had worked with the task force in the past, had been involved with narcotics investigation prior to his assignment, and was accompanied to the interview by the task force supervisor and a support staff person.

For the most part it appeared that coordinators were **assigned this duty** as part of their job responsibilities. Also, few of the coordinators received any funds from BJA to cover their time. When asked, coordinators responded that assignment to the task force did not lessen their other job-related duties. Despite this increase in workload, no coordinator relayed that they regretted the assignment. Supervisors were typically offered the position as part of a promotion. Often, the coordinator coordinates the oral board component of the detective level recruitment procedure. Open-recruitment and nomination by the participating law enforcement agencies were the standard recruitment procedures for detectives.

The extent of **training** received prior to task force participation was very broad. Coordinators possessed the basic administrative knowledge and training base prior to assignment, but a number of coordinators stated that training specifically aimed at their precise task force duties is lacking. Such training was offered on one occasion in 1988 and was mostly concerned with meeting state and federal contractual and reporting requirements. The amount and type of training which the remaining members of the task force bring with them was noted as highly variable. With few exceptions, supervisors reported that task force detectives had previously attended the Basic Narcotics School through the Washington State Criminal Justice Commission, and those who had not completed it did so within one year. Other training frequently mentioned was that conducted by the Washington State Narcotics Investigators Association (WASNIA), the Western States Information Network (WSIN), the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), REID School, and the Institute of Police Techniques and Management. In addition, training offered through the Washington State Department of Community Development and the Washington State Patrol were also mentioned. Also, in-service and on-the-job training were

considered a matter of course and included such things as prosecutor's presentations on case documentation, pairing of experienced detectives with new members, and detective training of patrol officers who are then returned to their home agency. Training areas include electronic and physical surveillance, use of body wires, informant handling, and interviewing and interrogation. Of course training needs largely depends on training history and although most respondents stated the training was adequate, a number of needs were also identified. Training in conducting financial investigations and asset seizure/forfeiture policies and procedures were continually mentioned as training need areas.

Not surprisingly, the older the task force the more likely it is that a change in the **organizational structure** had occurred. These changes were mostly along the lines of shifting personnel. For the most part the personnel change had to do with adding more detectives, patrol officers, or prosecutors although losing participants was also noted. Prosecutor non-involvement, a federal agency dropping out, and a major city deciding not to participate are three such examples. Also, one multi-county task force broke up into two single-county task forces. Executive board micro-management was also noted by three respondents as obstacles to early task force effectiveness, and all noted that once this situation was remedied effectiveness increased.

Task force policy regarding **rotation** of task force participants was split roughly between those that do possess such a policy and those who do not. Of those which do have such a policy, the time varied from one year to four years and all stated that continuation after this point is upon review and subject to the demands of ongoing investigations. Home agencies, though, frequently do have such a time limit policy and this was viewed as a definite limiting factor to productivity. Two years appeared to be the most common home agency imposed time limit, and a number of respondents noted that it takes roughly one and one-half years before any substantial investigative productivity occurs. Task force rotation of different types of employees was also not uncommon; one respondent, for example, stated that it is 27 months for the supervisor, three to five years for detectives, and 18 months to three years for all other personnel.

Case investigation selection is largely dependent on three primary factors:

1. Policy/executive Board direction
2. Seriousness/level of dealer
3. Availability of necessary resources

Certain policy/executive boards have set goals according to level of offender or type of drug; for example, mid level dealers in distribution areas or marijuana in grow areas. The relative seriousness of the particular situation or the level of dealer also helps determine which cases are investigated. A task force which has targeted street level dealers will try to "work" the target up to his/her supplier if possible, or if a new drug appears on the street additional resources may be devoted to it in an attempt to prevent it from becoming established. Some task forces will "farm out" certain types or levels of cases to local drug units, whereas other task forces do not have this option since they may be the only drug unit in the area. Task forces which are not able to refer cases to other drug units reported that they investigate all cases they are informed of at some level, even if it's only a "knock and talk."

Aside from these three primary factors, there are other factors which play a role in selection.

For example, if the task force is informed that someone wishes to buy a large quantity of drugs, as one informant put it, "everything stops" for two basic reasons; 1) to arrest the buyer who, due to the quantity of drugs involved, is quite probably a dealer; and 2) the amount of money he or she uses to buy the drugs will eventually become task force property (also, money is much easier and cheaper to store than other types of seizures). A number of respondents mentioned the "squeaky wheel" phenomena or, as others referred to it, "politics," "public relations," and "reality." Telephone calls to local politicians or policy makers may result, at the direction of the local board/chief, in a reprioritization of short-term goals and objectives.

Most respondents reported that **case assignments** are made by the supervisor after review of manpower availability. There were a number of qualifiers to this, though. For example, in one task force all marijuana grow operations were assigned to one detective, in another a detective with a degree in chemistry received all cases which utilized his expertise, in still another each detective maintains two major investigations, and another assigns cases according to geographic region with each detective working in the jurisdiction of his home agency. Detective specialization was the exception and generalization was the normal.

Of course task force **target areas** are largely dependent on locally identified needs. Level of targeted dealer (low, medium, high) and type of drug involved varies according to assessed impact and prevalence. Although, as mentioned previously, low level, or even mid level, may be "worked" to gain access to the next higher level, it was reported as often being necessary to reverse this direction in order to more directly impact the demand side of the equation. For example, one largely urban task force reported that identifying and closing down crack houses was a priority target; another that operationally detectives work the mid-upper level cases while task force assigned patrol officers work street level; and still another that mid level was the primary target but that the task force conducts three low level "sweeps" per year.

Task forces by their very existence change the drug world landscape. For example, different **dealers** move in as old ones are arrested, different networks develop, new targets are identified, and drug availability and price fluctuate. Respondents continually noted such action and what has emerged is a picture of a drug landscape that changes and adapts almost as fast as task forces can impact it. Gang involvement was mentioned as a fairly new phenomena and these individuals, involved largely in marketing crack cocaine, are reported to be moving into the more rural areas of the state. Motorcycle gangs are involved in all areas of the drug network, from manufacturing through distribution and into sales. Much of this type of gang activity is found in the largely rural areas of the state. "Hispanic families" with connections in California and Mexico are, according to respondents, largely responsible for powder cocaine trafficking and the reintroduction of black tar heroin. Four respondents noted that when working a non-Hispanic powder cocaine or black tar heroin dealer, the supplier is frequently found to be Hispanic.

Two of the more historical **drug types**, marijuana and LSD, appear to be, for the most part, decreasing and increasing respectively. Large amounts of high quality marijuana are grown in Washington State in mostly sophisticated grow operations. A number of task forces have targeted these operations and as success has been achieved, they have adjusted their target to other drugs and individuals. The effect of this is, of course, increased price in response to the marijuana shortage and an invitation to new entrepreneurs to fill this lucrative void. A number of task

forces noted that newly reported increases in availability dictate that they must now return to marijuana grow operations as a target area. LSD is also being reported as experiencing a resurgence in popularity, mostly among high school age individuals.

As new dealers, manufacturers, and distributors are identified, task force targets are adjusted, and as success is achieved, new targets and markets develop. For example, in certain urban areas the crack cocaine market has been targeted and the task forces report that they have been fairly successful in their market interdiction efforts. It would appear, though, that as a result of this activity there is a transplanting effect of both the individuals involved and the drug itself into areas which previously had been unaffected. A case could be made that the new area was simply a virgin market waiting to be filled, and task force activity did not directly contribute to this expansion. The other case, though, is that in order to escape the increased law enforcement scrutiny, the dealers sought out this new market area. The actual cause of this transplanting and market development can be attributed, in varying degrees, to both of these causes and, in any case, is case specific.

Regardless of these new players and markets, feedback by informants is that task force activities have had a definite impact on the **drug market**. Intelligence indicates that after a major dealer is "taken out," drug availability decreases for two to three months and prices inflate. Not surprisingly, during these periods, informants report that it is more difficult to obtain drugs and what they could once obtain in one or two telephone calls, is now taking five or more such contacts, and the quantity that they are able to obtain is much smaller and the relative price is greater.

Task forces have experienced varying levels of success in investigating and arresting targeted individuals. Many notable cases have been mentioned by the **media** and have involved varying levels of drugs and offenders (see Appendix H for copies of an assortment of task force involved news clippings). Aside from cases which were solely involved with the main goal of task force activities (i.e. drug interdiction), a number of cases have resulted in convictions on non-drug related charges. For example, one task force was informed by a confidential informant of an individual who had committed a double homicide. Another task force, after investigating and arresting two drug dealers, was offered the identity of an individual who had committed two separate murders. In both cases the individuals involved were arrested and prosecuted as the result of direct task force involvement.

Task force involvement outside of drugs proper is not unusual. The training and expertise which task force participants have obtained places them at a premium. A number of respondents noted that task force detectives are often called upon to secure and investigate various crime scenes. The level of such involvement varies on a geographic/resource availability basis (some areas possess crime scene trained personnel), but the cross-training makes the participants frequently unique to their area. In one jurisdiction, for example, the task force was requested to participate in an investigation of a youth who was trying to hire a "hit man" to murder his parents. The unique expertise of the task force in the use of body wires and air surveillance enabled them to successfully investigate the case.

Different task forces have different philosophies on public and media exposure. Some respondents reported that such exposure is counterproductive and could put detectives and

confidential informants in jeopardy, while others consider such exposure an important part of their interdiction efforts. A number of task forces utilize public service announcements and even feedback circulars (see Appendix I). The types of media exposure have ranged from one-inch columns in local papers referring to task force involvement to national exposure on syndicated television (one task force is being featured on the television show "COPS"). A few task force respondents stated that they have allowed reporters to sit in on scheduled staffings. One respondent stated that the best feedback they have ever received was when an individual they were targeting informed them that the task force "was all over the place...don't you read the papers?"

**Meetings** held to facilitate the investigation process, share information, and provide direction vary from scheduled daily meetings at the start of each shift to daily ad hoc meetings between supervisor and detective. Meetings with assigned prosecutor(s), task force coordinator, and local executive board and chief's of police vary also from non-existent to highly structured and scheduled. Meetings with law enforcement agencies outside of the immediate task force jurisdiction appeared to be held on an ad hoc/per need basis, although one task force did report that meetings are held on a monthly basis with such agencies. The reason most often given for not conducting more formalized meetings with other agencies was that the logistics were simply too complicated. In addition, task force detectives are responsible for intelligence liaison with their home agency.

Respondents identified numerous **law enforcement agencies** as those with which they frequently worked. The U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, as well as the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Immigration and Naturalization were the agencies most often cited. The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the National Guard, as well as State Patrols from Oregon, Idaho, California, and Alaska were also agencies which respondents identified as being co-investigators on drug cases. Various county and local law enforcement agencies were also involved with task force investigations. The U.S. Customs occasionally refers cases of two kilograms of cocaine or less to certain task forces. In addition, two task force respondents noted they have cultivated such a positive relationship with the U.S. Attorney's Office that they are able to refer directly to that office rather than first going through a federal agency.

All respondents noted that they cooperate on investigations with neighboring task forces and, at least with state level task forces, all described a highly favorable and mutually beneficial working relationship. The only problems were noted by three task forces in their co-investigation efforts with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Task Forces. These comments did appear to be the exception, and most task forces reported that DEA was cooperative and often would refer "small cases" to the local task force. It should be noted that what DEA defines as "small" may be very large on the local level, e.g single kilograms of cocaine or, very recently, 230 pounds of marijuana. One respondent noted that the friction between the task force and local DEA was due, in part, to the relationship which the task force has been able to cultivate with the U.S. Attorney's Office. The DEA has stated that the situation where the task force refers cases directly to the U.S. Attorney's Office has had the net effect of relegating them to the position of "scribe" where they sign off on cases in which they were not directly involved. A few problems were also noted in working with local drug units and prosecutors offices. These problems appear to have to do with scheduling and "turf" issues and

respondents note that ongoing efforts are being made to address these issues.

Asides from interlocal agreements which outline the responsibilities of participating agencies (see Appendix J for an example of such an agreement), no respondent noted a set procedure or policy for co-investigation or sharing of information. The response to this policy query was almost universal among respondents and "All they have to do is ask" was the general flavor. Even when a "Mutual Aid Agreement" exists as part of an interlocal agreement (see Appendix K), co-investigation is handled on a highly interpersonal basis. The use of a multi-state mutual aid agreement is seen as a highly effective means to have maximum impact by allowing the targeted offender to place him/herself in "double jeopardy." The individual once placed in such a position can be sentenced under laws in both states. Only one individual stated that a formalized policy/procedure regarding co-investigation and information sharing would be beneficial. It was his opinion that such related documentation clarifies the role of participating agencies (the respondent was a task force attached prosecuting attorney).

Almost without exception, respondents stated that the need for task forces still exists. The one individual who questioned the continued need for a task force was not so much questioning whether a task force was needed, but whether the type of task force which exists in his area is optimally effective in addressing the type of drug problem which has evolved. Without exception, all respondents stated that **additional resources** are needed to continue the "war on drugs." Primarily these resources have to do with increasing the funding level for personnel. Doubling and tripling the personnel funding amount levels were general statements and, aside from increasing the number of detectives, some highly specific comments were offered. For example, one task force has a half-time secretary who works full-time and another keeps losing its task force detectives because they cannot afford to provide benefits (this task force was located on Tribal property). Other identified personnel needs were seizure specialists, chemists, and foreign language interpreters. Equipment needs included a secure station police radio, thermal imaging equipment, computer equipment with network, upgrading one party consent wire, and a copying machine. Sharing of resources was also a recommendation offered by a number of task forces. These resources had to do with personnel who would assist around the state on a per need basis and equipment including surveillance vans.

All respondents stated that **asset seizures/forfeitures** have the potential for filling part of this resource gap. They also stated that the economic reality is such that they must be careful about what they seize or it could further deplete these resources. It is important to keep in mind that the task force/local jurisdiction is responsible for any maintenance, taxes, storage, auction, and related fees while they are in possession of the seized item (this includes, for example, costs relating to bringing a building up to code). Different task forces have different operational philosophies regarding this matter. For example, one respondent states that they will not seize any vehicle worth under \$4000; another that any house with a lien on it is simply not worth the effort; and another, that their target group (crack dealers) typically do not possess large value assets. A number of respondents stated that their policy is to seize everything the dealer has and, as part of plea bargaining, sell it all back to him.

Some interesting **seizures** have occurred through task force activities. For example, one task force seized a tavern out of which drugs were being sold. Another task force seized some Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Section 8 units which they subsequently returned to

HUD for a fee and an addendum to the local HUD contract requiring that HUD will monitor their units for drug-related activities. Weapons seized through task force activities, particularly guns, are of a particular concern to many respondents. Some task forces, as required by state law, turn the seized weapons over to the designated state agency which then disposes of them at a public auction. Certain respondents relayed that this policy had the net effect of denying to the task force the associated dollar resources. Other respondents stated that all this procedure has accomplished has been to return the weapons to the same individuals they were taken from (i.e. criminals). The respondents in this latter category felt that destruction of the weapon was the most satisfactory solution to the weapon seizure situation. One task force reported that an interpretation of another state law by the local city attorney allowed the task force to dispose of seized weapons themselves and retain the funds for law enforcement use. One informant with the Washington State Patrol voiced the opinion that seized weapons should be treated like seized drugs: reported as a seizure but not convertible to cash.

These **forfeiture funds**, once obtained, serve as buy money, as match funds, as a means to pay for vehicle rental, and also to purchase equipment. One task force even used these funds to purchase an airplane for surveillance work. Two recurrent themes were voiced by almost all respondents: first that the amount of funds available, once related costs are absorbed, is not what was once hoped for; and second, that the idea behind asset forfeiture is not to support the task force but to make drug dealing less profitable. A concern voiced by many respondents was that an overemphasis on asset value could, potentially, dictate investigation targets.

Many of the changes which the respondents stated they would like to see take place regarding the **future direction or operation** of the task force were those which they had been voicing throughout the interview, namely increased funding for personnel and equipment, sharing of resources, and minimizing political influences. For the most part respondents liked the operational structure and general focus, though a number of individuals stated they would like to increase the level of targeted offender (these were task forces which were targeting low level dealers). Increasing available resources was also noted by one respondent as necessary in order to conduct organized crime investigations.

**Facilities** varied throughout the state as did rental amount and furnishings. A number of task forces utilized seized furniture and major appliances. Locations varied from remote field offices in converted warehouses to offices in professional office buildings. Rent also varied from gratis to \$1100 per month. Storage for seized vehicles varied from free outdoor non-secure compounds to \$1300 per month indoor secure storage. In the case of rent, BJA funds were often combined with local funds, especially in high rent areas.

All respondents stated that task force **assignment** has been beneficial for their career. Respondents stated that assignment to the task force is highly educational and allows them to develop skills in budget maintenance, grant writing, and follow-through. Statements such as "a character builder", "proactive," and "intense exposure" were common. Also common was the observation that things have improved. Respondents who had been with the task force for a number of years stated, almost without exception, that during the first year or so politicalization and turf issues were common among participants. Over the years, though, as people became familiar with each other and differences were worked out, these obstacles have been overcome.

### PHASE 3: RETROSPECTIVE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE SUMMARY INDICES

#### **Level 1: Retrospective Analysis**

In viewing the task force performance figures as reported to the Washington State Patrol (WSP) Narcotics Data Tracking Program, it is helpful to group the data into one of two categories: 1) 1988 through 1989, during which there were 11 task forces covering 12 counties; and 2) 1990 through 1991, during which there were 24 task forces covering 28 counties. In addition, it is insightful to view task force performance across the overall four-year period.

Between 1988 and 1989, task force activities related to the number of individuals arrested, increased by a modest four percent. The number of drug-related charges filed against these individuals, though, increased by a not insignificant 23 percent (see Table 52). The average number of charges per individual arrested increased by 17.7 percent during this period.

**Table 52**

Number of Individuals Arrested and Number of Charges Filed During First Two Years of Task Force Operation

Item	1988	1989	Percentage Change
Number of Individuals Arrested	822	855	+4.01
Number of Charges Filed	925	1138	+23.03
Average Number of Charges (per individual)	1.13	1.33	+17.70

Although the one-year increase in the number of individuals arrested does not seem all that impressive, the number of separate individuals convicted of charges brought to bear as the result of task force activities increased by over 100 percent (see Table 53). Also, the proportion of successfully prosecuted cases almost doubled during this same time period (i.e. from 18 percent to 35 percent).

**Table 53**

Number of Individuals Arrested and Number of Individuals Convicted During First Two Years of Task Force Operation

Item	1988	1989	Percentage Change
Number of Individuals Arrested	822	855	+4.01
Number of Individuals Convicted	163	301	+100.67
Proportion of Individuals Convicted	1.13	1.33	+17.70

As previously mentioned, the number of charges filed against individuals increased by 23 percent. During this same time period, though, the number of convicted charges increased by over 100 percent and the proportion of charges which "held up" in court (i.e. successfully prosecuted) increased by 64 percent (see Table 54).

**Table 54**

Number of Charges Filed and Number of Convicted Charges During the First Two Years of Task Force Operation

Item	1988	1989	Percentage Change
Number of Charged Filed	925	1138	+23.03
Number of Convicted Charged	163	329	+101.84
Proportion of Successfully Convicted Charges	17.62	28.91	+64.07

The number of separate individuals convicted, as noted in Table 53, increased by 101 percent and, as noted in Table 54, the number of convicted charges increased by 102 percent. The average number of convicted charges per individual remained fairly constant during this two year period and is realized to be less than a 1 percent increase (see Table 55).

**Table 55**

**Number of Individuals Convicted and Number of Convicted Charges During First Two Years of Task Force Operation**

Item	1988	1989	Percentage Change
Number of Individuals Convicted	150	301	+100.67
Number of Convicted Charges	163	329	+101.84
Average Number of Convicted Charges (per individual)	1.09	1.10	+0.92

The overall value of assets seized by the task forces during the course of their investigations increased by 16 percent between 1988 and 1989. The type and quantities of assets seized, though, varied from year to year. For example, although the incidence in which currency was seized remained fairly constant, the dollar value dropped by 54 percent. This decrease was more than offset by an over 7000 percent increase in seized real estate (see Table 56).

**Table 56****Asset Seizures by Type, Quantity/Incident, and by Dollar Value During the First Two Years of Task Force Operation**

Type	1988		1989	
	Quantity	Dollar Value	Quantity	Dollar Value
Vehicles	199	459,535	214	568,016
Vessels	1	75,000	--	--
Aircraft	1	500	--	--
Currency	237	821,396	257	439,335
Financial Instruments	5	33,726	3	16,190
Real Property	8	8,590	8	614,660
Weapons	120	52,200	188	140,395
Other	126	162,765	114	90,013
Total	697	1,613,712	784	1,868,609

The dollar value of assets actually forfeited is significantly lower than the dollar value of assets seized. During 1988, an amount equal to 14 percent of the assets seized was forfeited and during 1989, an amount equal to 15 percent of the assets seized was forfeited. Also, in certain categories the value of the assets forfeited dropped in 1989 from the 1988 levels, but overall, the dollar value increased during this period by 26 percent. The amount (quantity) of assets forfeited does appear to be substantial (see Table 57).

**Table 57**

**Asset Forfeiture by Type, Quantity/Incident, and by Dollar Value During the First Two Years of Task Force Operation**

Type	1988		1989	
	Quantity	Dollar Value	Quantity	Dollar Value
Vehicles	91	73,778	118	83,722
Vessels	1	100	--	--
Aircraft	1	500	--	--
Currency	134	133,106	170	189,997
Financial Instruments	2	0	2	400
Real Property	4	3,330	2	760
Weapons	21	2,425	32	670
Other	37	5,987	48	1,178
Total	291	219,196	372	276,727

The number of individuals arrested by the task forces during the 1990 - 1991 period increased by 76 percent. The number of drug-related charges filed against these individuals increased by over 81 percent (see Table 58). The average number of charges per individual arrested increased by 4 percent during this period.

**Table 58**

Number of Individuals Arrested and Number of Charges Filed During Second Two Years of Task Force Operation

Item	1990	1991	Percentage Change
Number of Individuals Arrested	968	1699	+75.52
Number of Charges Filed	1087	1968	+81.40
Average Number of Charges (per individual)	1.12	1.16	+3.60

The number of separate individuals convicted of charges brought to bear as the result of task force activities increased by 71 percent (see Table 59). The proportion of successfully prosecuted cases showed a very slight decrease during this period (i.e. six-tenths of one percent).

**Table 59**

Number of Individuals Arrested and Number of Individuals Convicted During Second Two Years of Task Force Operation

Item	1990	1991	Percentage Change
Number of Individuals Arrested	968	1699	+75.52
Number of Individuals Convicted	379	647	+70.71
Proportion of Individuals Convicted	39.15	38.90	-00.64

The number of charges filed against individuals during the 1990-1991 period increased by over 81 percent. During this same time period, the number of convicted charges (70 percent) did not increase at a comparable rate. As such, the proportion of charges which "held up" in court decreased by 6 percent during this period (see Table 60).

**Table 60**

Number of Charges Filed and Number of Convicted Charges During Second Two Years of Task Force Operation

Item	1990	1991	Percentage Change
Number of Charges Filed	1087	1968	+81.04
Number of Convicted Charges	418	712	+70.33
Proportion of Successfully Convicted Charges	38.45	36.18	-05.90

The number of separate individuals convicted, as noted in Table 58, increased by 70 percent and, as noted in Table 60, the number of convicted charges also increased by 70 percent. The net effect of this is that the average number of convicted charges per individual remained virtually unchanged during this two-year period (see Table 61).

**Table 61**

Number of Individuals Convicted and Number of Convicted Charges During Second Two Years of Task Force Operation

Item	1990	1991	Percentage Change
Number of Individuals Convicted	379	647	+70.71
Number of Convicted Charges	418	712	+70.33
Average Number of Convicted Charges (per individual)	1.10	1.10	0.00

The overall value of assets seized by the task forces during the course of their investigations increased by 20 percent between 1990 and 1991. The type and quantities of assets seized, like the previous two years, varied from year to year. Overall, the "quantity" of seized assets increased from 1990 to 1991 by 41 percent (see Table 62).

**Table 62**

**Asset Seizures by Type, Quantity/Incident and by Dollar Value During Second Two Years of Task Force Operation**

Type	1990		1991	
	Quantity	Dollar Value	Quantity	Dollar Value
Vehicles	279	915,222	391	1,192,313
Vessels	4	25,000	5	21,600
Aircraft	--	--	--	--
Currency	395	700,533	551	1,232,597
Financial Instruments	4	1,375	4	30,269
Real Property	7	787,200	7	327,300
Weapons	296	69,940	295	60,275
Other	157	132,127	357	304,540
Total	1,142	2,631,397	1,610	3,168,894

Although the dollar value of assets actually forfeited is lower than the dollar value of assets seized, the percentage is substantially greater than it was during the 1988-1989 period (see Table 57). During 1990, an amount equal to 28 percent of the assets seized was forfeited and during 1991, an amount equal to 38 percent of the assets seized was forfeited. Also, the dollar value of assets forfeited increased during this period by 67 percent. The amount (quantity) of assets forfeited also appears to be substantial (see Table 63).

**Table 63**

Asset Forfeiture by Type, Quantity/Incident and by Dollar Value During Second Two Years of Task Force Operation

Type	1990		1991	
	Quantity	Dollar Value	Quantity	Dollar Value
Vehicles	210	342,386	217	316,339
Vessels	1	5,000	5	10,670
Aircraft	--	--	--	--
Currency	269	205,785	369	690,400
Financial Instruments	2	150	1	9,690
Real Property	3	152,200	6	67,930
Weapons	134	11,149	184	34,665
Other	54	7,626	181	80,851
Total	673	724,296	963	1,210,545

Viewing Tables 56 and 57 together and Tables 62 and 63 together (Table 64) indicates that during a given year the amount of funds actually forfeited does not appear proportionate to the quantity of that particular asset. Tables 56 and 57 indicate that 55 percent of the vehicles seized in 1989, for example, were actually forfeited. However, this 55 percent only accounted for 15 percent of the dollar value of those vehicles. It must be recognized, of course, that an asset seized in a particular year may not be forfeited in that same year and, in fact, even two or three years may pass before the actual forfeiture. Also, a highly valuable single asset may skew the relationship of the ratios. For example, five houses valued at \$750,000 total may be seized and four forfeited (80 percent). If the one house which was not forfeited was valued at \$500,000, then an apparent disproportion occurs (33 percent forfeited).

**Table 64**

**Proportion of Seized Assets Forfeited**

Type		Proportion Per Year			
		1988	1989	1990	1991
Vehicles	- Amount	45.7	55.1	75.3	55.5
	- Dollar	16.1	14.7	37.4	26.5
Vessels	- Amount	100.0	--	25.0	100.0
	- Dollar	.1	--	20.0	49.4
Aircraft	- Amount	100.0	--	--	--
	- Dollar	100.0	--	--	--
Currency	- Amount	56.5	66.1	68.1	67.0
	- Dollar	16.2	43.2	29.4	56.0
Financial Investments	- Amount	40.0	66.7	50.0	25.0
	- Dollar	0.0	2.5	10.9	32.0
Real Property	- Amount	50.0	25.0	42.9	85.7
	- Dollar	38.8	.1	19.3	20.8
Weapons	- Amount	17.5	17.0	45.3	62.4
	- Dollar	4.7	.5	15.9	57.5
Other	- Amount	29.4	42.1	34.4	50.7
	- Dollar	3.7	1.3	5.8	26.5

**Note:** Proportion is obtained by dividing amount seized into amount forfeited and multiplying by 100 (e.g., 91 forfeited vehicles divided by 199 seized vehicles times 100 = 45.7).

Regardless of year of operation, males were arrested at a rate of approximately 3:1 over females. In addition, both within years and over all four years, Caucasians, followed by Hispanics, made up the largest racial groups (Table 65).

**Table 65**

**Race by Year of Task Force Operation**

Race	Year				Number
	1988	1989	1990	1991	Row % Column %
Caucasian	517 19.3 62.9	535 20.0 62.6	591 22.0 61.0	1038 38.7 61.1	2681 100.0 61.7
African American	19 12.5 2.3	30 19.7 3.5	31 20.4 3.2	72 47.4 4.2	152 100.0 3.5
Hispanic	244 18.6 29.7	263 20.1 31.0	277 21.1 28.6	526 40.2 31.0	1310 100.0 30.2
Native American	26 39.4 3.2	12 18.2 1.4	12 18.2 1.2	16 24.2 .9	66 100.0 1.5
Other	3 13.0 .4	1 4.3 .1	5 21.7 .5	14 61.0 .8	23 100.0 .5
Unknown	13 11.6 1.6	14 12.5 1.6	52 46.4 5.4	33 29.5 1.9	112 100.0 2.6
Number	822	855	968	1699	4344
Row Percent	18.9	19.7	22.3	39.1	100.0
Column Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Gender by Year of Task Force Operation**

Male	608 18.5 74.0	656 20.0 76.7	717 21.9 74.1	1298 39.6 76.4	3279 100.0 75.5
Female	214 20.1 26.0	199 18.7 23.3	251 23.6 25.9	401 37.6 23.6	1065 100.0 24.5
Number	822	855	968	1699	4344
Row Percent	18.9	19.7	22.3	39.1	100.0
Column Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Regarding the amount of drugs removed from circulation through task force seizures or purchases, the amounts and types varied from year to year (Table 66).

**Table 66**

**Amount and Types of Drugs Purchased and Seized by Task Forces per Year**

Type	1988	1989	1990	1991	Totals
Cocaine	793,038	55,573	102,288	147,741	1,098,640
Crack	401	0	40	93	543
Heroin	328	235	1345	1783	3691
Hashish	0	480	2440	4205	7125
Marijuana	139,711	35,623	80,949	250,124	506,407
Marijuana Plants	3,532	10,383	11,186	18,119	43,220
Morphine	12	1	0	7	20
Opium	492	0	0	0	492
Other Narcotics	0	1	33	126	160
LSD	836	128	175	2501	3640
Other Hallucinogens	36	171	485	230	922
Amphetamines/Methamph.	1184	26,562	19,552	8401	55,699
Other Stimulants	21	951	0	7	979
Barbiturates	0	2,269	14	0	2,283
Other Depressants	14	8	12	15	49
Other Drugs	43,575	313	34	272,220	316,142
Unknown Drugs	118	25	4	0	147
Precursor Drugs	29,606	55,390	69,231	31,617	185,844

Note: Except as noted, unit of measure is in grams. Also, amounts are rounded to eliminate decimals. For clarification, 1000 grams equals 1 kilogram equals 2.25 pounds.

From the above table, it is seen that nearly twice as much cocaine, as measured in grams, was removed from circulation as was the next most prevalent type of drug, marijuana. A large number of marijuana plants were also seized and as a rough measure, five plants equals one kilogram. "Other drugs" made up the third largest category and precursor drugs, which are used largely in the manufacture of methamphetamine, made up the fourth most prevalent type of seizure/purchase amount. See Appendix L, Charts of Drugs Seized or Purchased, for graphic representation of amounts seized per year.

The dollar value of these drugs is perhaps a better indicator of task force impact. Table 67 presents the street level dollar value per gram for powder cocaine, processed marijuana, and tar heroin over the last four years as reported by the Washington State Patrol Narcotics Section.

**Table 67****Illegal Drug Price List**

Type	Dollar Value Range			
	1988	1989	1990	1991
Cocaine	70 - 120	50 - 100	90 - 180	90 - 180
Heroin	300 - 500	400 - 500	200 - 500	200 - 500
Marijuana	10 - 20	10	10 - 40	10 - 40

As can be seen in the above table, the street level dollar value per gram of illegal drug varies on a yearly basis, as does the within-year range. Looking at just these three drug categories, the dollar value of drugs removed from circulation, using the upper-level dollar amount, either through seizure or purchase, is substantial (see Table 68).

**Table 68****Dollar Value of Drugs Purchased and Seized by Task Forces by Year**

Type	Dollar Value Range				
	1988	1989	1990	1991	Total
Cocaine	95,165	5,557	18,412	26,593	145,727
Heroin	164	118	673	892	1,847
Marijuana	2794	356	3,238	10,005	16,393
Total	98,123	6,031	22,323	37,490	163,967

Note: The above dollar amounts are reported in thousands and rounded to nearest thousand; e.g., \$18,411,840 is recorded as \$18,412. Also, the value is computed using upper-dollar figure.

Over the course of four years, the task forces have removed, by either seizure or purchase activities, exactly \$163,965,950 worth of these illegal drugs. Even when using the lower reported street level dollar value for each year, illegal drugs worth \$86,675,990 were removed from circulation through task force activities during this four-year period. Large amounts of other drugs were also seized and related dollar values varied. As noted, task forces seized 43,220 marijuana plants over the four-year period. The dollar value per plant is reported to range from \$2000 to \$3000 and, as such, the monetary worth of these plants range from \$8,644,000 to \$12,966,000.


## **Level 2: Comparative Analysis**

By comparing task force county-wide performance on a number of variables to non-task force involved law enforcement efforts on the same variables in the same geographic areas, a general level of task force effectiveness can be gauged. As noted in the Methods section (Design, Phase 3: Population Parameters), during the two-year 1988-1989 period, eight task forces covering 12 counties were in operation, and during the 1990-1991 period, 19 task forces covering 28 counties were in operation. By tracking data on three performance levels (Total Drug Arrests, Drug Sales Arrests, and Drug Possession Arrests), both pre and post task force implementation, and viewing it against task force performance figures, it is possible to make some general statements regarding the effectiveness of task force operations.

First, though, it is insightful to view overall narcotic law enforcement activities in the geographic areas of concern. The Washington State Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs collects data on a large number of variables from approximately 97 percent of the law enforcement agencies in all counties of the state as part of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (WUCR). By extracting the number of arrests for drug sales and purchases in the counties where task forces operate, a general law enforcement activity level can be obtained. During 1988 and 1989, 12 counties were covered by Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA) funded task forces, and during 1990 and 1991, although more task forces were funded, these same counties were still covered by the same task forces. By looking at the WUCR reported unadjusted narcotic arrest data for these 12 counties for the past six years, a snapshot can be obtained of law enforcement activity related to such arrests (Graph 1).

Graph 1

**WUCR UNADJUSTED NARCOTICS ARREST DATA FOR 12 COUNTIES**




It is important to keep in mind when viewing the above graph that task force activity effects are included in the yearly data points. It is interesting to note that the total number of arrests increased by 43 percent during the first year of task force operation in these counties (1988) and that the area of greatest impact was in the category of purchase arrests, a 49 percent increase.

During 1990, an additional 11 task forces covering an additional 16 counties were funded by BJA. Although the number of arrests were greater, the overall distribution was very similar to the 12-county distribution (Graph 2). As with the 12-county distribution, task force operation effects have not been isolated out.

Graph 2


**WUCR UNADJUSTED NARCOTICS ARREST DATA FOR 28 COUNTIES**



Graph 1 and Graph 2, despite increases in population/counties served and number and type of arrests, are markedly similar. Part of this effect can be attributed to the inclusion of Graph 1 data in Graph 2, but certainly not all of it. The general bell shape which these graphs display can also be seen on the county/area level (Chart 2).

Chart 2

**WUCR UNADJUSTED DRUG ARREST DATA FOR  
12 COUNTY/8 REGION AREA**



This chart, organized by county groupings, covers the geographic areas of the first eight task forces funded in 1988. With each grouping, although certainly not symmetrical, a general bell shape is approximated, skewed and/or bimodal perhaps, but bell-shaped nonetheless.


By backing the task force (viz. county) data reported to the Washington State Patrol out of the WUCR county level data, it is possible to obtain a non-task force involved drug-related law enforcement comparison group. Keeping in mind that the number of task force personnel is small compared to the number of law enforcement personnel statewide, and as such, with exception, the overall number of arrests are fewer, some valid comparisons can be made between task force performance and other law enforcement agency activities.

Between 1986 and 1987, total law enforcement efforts related to arrests of individuals for sales and possessions increased from 2095 individuals to 2585 individuals, i.e. an increase of 24 percent. If this rate of increase were to be held constant, 1988 should reflect an increase of 620 individuals over the 1987 level (3205 individuals total). During 1988, though, the non-task force involved law enforcement arrest figures, for both sales and possession, was realized to be 2866 (an 11 percent increase). Part of this apparent lack of performance can be attributed to the impact of the first full year of task force operations in the 12-county area. By the end of 1988,

the eight BJA funded task forces operating in these counties arrested 822 individuals on various drug-related sales and possession charges. Within one year, these task forces increased their arrest totals by an additional 4 percent, while the non-task force law enforcement agencies increased their arrest totals by 2 percent (see Graph 3).

**Graph 3**


**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TASK FORCE 12 COUNTY DRUG ARREST TOTALS**



Between 1986 and 1987, law enforcement arrests for sales of drugs in these 12 counties increased by 12 percent, from 467 individuals in 1986 to 521 individuals in 1987. One year later (1988), the total number of individuals arrested for sales by non-task force involved law enforcement agencies dropped by 82 percent, and one year after that (1989), it increased by 25 percent (91 and 114 individuals respectively). After one year of operation, the eight task forces covering these 12 counties had arrested 515 individuals for sales of drugs. This number increased by 15 percent by year end 1989 (593 individuals) (see Graph 4).

**Graph 4**


**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TASK FORCE 12 COUNTY DRUG SALES ARRESTS**



From 1986 through 1987, total arrests for drug possession increased from 1628 to 2064 individuals (i.e. a one-year increase of 27 percent). The number of arrests for drug possession continued to increase through 1988 (2775 individuals) and 1989 (2897 individuals). The first year of task force activity in these 12 counties (1988) resulted in an additional 307 individuals being arrested. During the second year, the number of individuals arrested by these eight task forces decreased by 15 percent to 262 individuals for the year (see Graph 5).

**Graph 5**

**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TASK FORCE 12 COUNTY DRUG POSSESSION ARRESTS**



See Appendix M for the 12-county, task force and other law enforcement agency two-year (1988 - 1989) performance charts on total, sales, and possession arrests.


Starting in 1990, an additional 16 counties were covered by an additional 11 task forces. As with the 12-county task force and non-task force performance comparison, it is possible to extract overall drug arrest totals, drug sales arrest totals, and drug possession arrest totals for all 28 counties where task forces operated during 1990 and 1991. Also, it is possible to view this performance data against overall non-task force involved drug arrest data extending back to 1986 (task force activity for the 12-county area is backed out of the 1988 and 1989 data).

Between 1986 and 1989, total non-task force involved law enforcement efforts concerning drug arrests increased by an average of 21 percent per year (1986 - 5569 individuals; 1987 - 7915

individuals; 1988 - 8917 individuals; 1989 - 9505 individuals, with yearly increases of 42 percent, 13 percent, and 7 percent respectively). It would appear from these figures that the growth rate of total arrests on drug-related charges was slowing down over the years prior to, and actually dropped during, the 1989-1991 period (see Graph 6). As mentioned previously in the discussion of overall 12-county law enforcement drug arrest activities, much of this apparent drop can be attributed to new task force operations (as well as continuing efforts of previously existing task forces).

**Graph 6**


**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TASK FORCE 28 COUNTY DRUG ARREST TOTALS**



During the 1986 through 1989 period, arrests by other law enforcement agencies in these 28 counties increased and decreased on a yearly basis by approximately 30 percent. During 1990, the first year with all 28 counties covered, the number of sales arrests by task forces increased by 19 percent over the previous years figures (12 counties were covered by task forces in 1989). Sales arrests by non-task force involved law enforcement agencies increased by only 2 percent during this same period. Task force sales arrests in 1991 increased in these 28 counties by a substantial 71 percent over 1990 figures while the non-task force agencies sales arrests decreased by 37 percent (Graph 7). By the end of 1991, task force drug sales were 2 percent greater than the total of all other law enforcement agencies in these counties (n's of 1207 and 1182 respectively).

Graph 7


**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TASK FORCE 28 COUNTY DRUG SALES ARRESTS**



From 1986 to 1989, non-task force involved law enforcement agency arrests for possession of drugs increased by an average of 24 percent per year (yearly increases of 46 percent, 23 percent, and 2 percent). The 1990 non-task force law enforcement agencies possession arrest totals decreased by an additional 19 percent from the previous years totals and the 1991 arrests decreased by 12 percent. Despite the fact that the number of task force increased, the arrest totals for possession remained virtually unchanged between 1989 and 1990. The 1991 arrest for drug possession totals increased by 88 percent, though, over the previous year's figures (Graph 8).

**Graph 8**

**LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TASK FORCE 28 COUNTY DRUG POSSESSION ARRESTS**



See Appendix N for the 28-county, task force and other law enforcement agency two-year (1990-1991) performance charts on total, sales, and possession arrests.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Multi-Jurisdictional Narcotics Task Force Program application prepared by the Washington State Department of Community Development for Federal Fiscal Year 1992, states:

"Drug abuse and trafficking and related crime has a continuing impact on every community, jurisdiction and tribe in the state of Washington. Street-level enforcement efforts, while essential, are not effective at combating this problem alone due to the mobility and profits received by drug traffickers. The federal funding provides Multi-Jurisdictional Narcotics Task Forces with the investigative resources needed to pursue mid- and upper-level drug traffickers beyond those pursued by local law enforcement narcotics. Working in concert with prosecuting attorneys, Multi-Jurisdictional Task Forces are able to achieve a significant impact on drug trafficking and drug abuse through increased prosecution, conviction, and the seizure and forfeiture of drug proceeds." (p.1).

### Summary of Evaluation Effort

A great deal of information was collected through this evaluation activity. This information was obtained primarily through three means:

- o A 21-item, 112 variable survey of task force goals and objectives, accomplishments and direction, submitted to coordinators of all 24 task forces receiving Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funds in Washington State. A 100 percent return rate was obtained.
- o A 29-item unstructured interview relating to task force operation and procedures conducted on site with 18 of the task forces (i.e. 75 percent of the task forces were interviewed on site).
- o A retrospective analysis of task force performance during the four years of BJA support and a comparative analysis of task force performance indicators against a comparable in-state database.

The data interpretations and recommendations offered in the following sections are based on the data presented in the preceding Report sections. The reader is referred to these data for a more in-depth presentation.

### Observations

Since BJA funded its first task force in Washington State in 1988, task forces have experienced varying levels of success. Overall, task forces have arrested large numbers of offenders dealing drugs at all levels, though primarily in the mid and upper level ranges. A substantial number

of those arrested have been convicted and sentenced. Also, large amounts of assets have been seized and significant amounts forfeited. The amount of drugs removed from circulation is not inconsequential. During 1991, BJA provided support to Washington State task forces in the amount of \$4,400,000 and during this period 1,699 individuals were investigated and arrested at an average cost of \$2,590 each. During this same period, \$1,210,545 in assets were actually forfeited at an average of approximately \$713 per offender, lowering the net per offender cost to \$1,877 each. Further, in just three drug categories (cocaine, marijuana, and heroin), drugs worth over \$37,000,000 in street value were removed from circulation in that one year alone. In short, for every \$1.00 of federal funds expended on Washington State Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Forces, illegal drugs worth \$8.41 were removed from the streets by these task forces.

## **Interpretation and Conclusions**

### Goals and Objectives

Goals, of course, are often situation-specific, and a high priority goal for one task force may be a low level priority for another. Investigation, case preparation, and case prosecution are all inter-related enforcement activities and all were recorded as at least a medium priority for the task forces. Most of the task forces, though, recorded these activities as a high level priority and reported that they have been highly successful in meeting these inter-related goals. It is quite possible to have achieved minimal success regardless of the importance of a particular goal. It would seem to make sense that a task force should be at least moderately successful in meeting a low priority level goal. Realistically, though, low priority goals might not be pursued, which is, of course, reflected in the corresponding success level. Another explanation to the low priority/low success level phenomena, is that individuals reporting a certain area as a low priority, really mean, "no priority" or "not applicable". If this is in fact the case, these response matches do not reveal much about task force goals and successes. Any other response combination is much more credible, and even a low priority goal which has achieved a medium success level relays meaningful information.

Goals do change over time and what was once a high priority area may become a relatively low priority area with the passage of time. Of course, the converse is also true, and the change in status may be due to any number of reasons ranging from the realization that a certain goal is not all that important to the overall task force mission, to the realization that what was considered insignificant or ancillary is in actuality of key importance. In addition, changes in task force administration and expertise as well as direction from the state can have a modifying effect on objectives. Perhaps of even more immediate influence on these goals, is change in the community "drug picture." Task forces must remain flexible in setting their goals in order to respond to "what's happening on the streets." Part of what's happening is task force activity. Task forces modify the drug picture through investigation and enforcement and adjust their goals to reflect this new picture.

The question can be asked, though, toward what end do these task force goals and activities lead? Reducing drug manufacturing, distribution, and consumption could be viewed as the primary goals of all drug-related programs. Each of these three aspects of the drug-use chain may be of varying importance to different task forces. Reducing drug distribution was found

to be the one area which most task forces view as a high priority. This link in the drug-use chain is midway between manufacturing and use, and impacting it may have the most immediate impact on the overall drug problem. The difficulty in achieving this goal can be attested to by the fact that only one task force reported being highly successful in reducing drug distribution in its area.

Almost one-half of the Washington State task forces are three to four years old. These task forces note that they have changed the direction of their goals and objectives since they first started. Changes in the level of targeted offender were cited as the most common goal modification and, except for one response, the direction was always toward the upper-end of the dealer chain.

### 1. Targeting dealers

The primary mission or goal of a task force determines its general direction and, to a certain extent, operational procedures. Investigation and apprehension of those involved with narcotics are the two overlapping missions which coordinators report as the primary goal which directs task force operations. Those individuals involved with dealing drugs, as opposed to manufacturing, distributing, or using drugs, is the specific type of individual targeted. Mid- and upper-level dealers were the primary target group for almost three-quarters of the task forces.

The remaining task forces reported that they primarily target low-level dealers; though they also reported targeting mid- and upper-level dealers to a lesser extent. Task forces which were targeting low-level street dealers generally did so for one of two reasons. First, being the only "drug unit" in their jurisdiction they received all cases referred by the community or local police departments; and second, some felt pressure from supervisors who were in turn reacting to pressure from the community or local politicians and policy makers.

The drug dealer serves as the primary means of distribution. Targeting the mid-level dealer was ranked as a medium to high level priority by the largest proportion of coordinators and they reported a medium to high success level in achieving this goal. Respondents stated that they try to work up the drug chain or expand the investigation laterally in an attempt to identify other individuals at the same level.

### 2. Informants and organizations

All task forces reported developing and using informants as well as penetrating organizations involved in manufacturing and distributing drugs. Developing and using informants was seen as a high priority in which the task forces have, overall, been highly successful. Penetrating organizations, perhaps the more difficult and dangerous of the two activities, was not prioritized as highly and the level of success was much more variable.

### 3. Asset seizures and forfeitures

The number of task forces that viewed asset seizure and forfeiture activities as a medium priority was virtually the same as the number that viewed it as a high priority. Those who

placed it as a high priority were more successful than those who placed it as a medium or low priority. This makes sense; task forces which place a high emphasis on seizing assets will devote proportionally more resources to achieving this goal than will those who do not assign it this level of importance.

It is somewhat problematic to analyze the proportion of seized assets which were forfeited. Assets seized during a particular year may not actually be forfeited until one or two years later, if ever. Although assets worth almost \$2.5 million were actually forfeited during the four-year period, this amount represents only slightly more than 26 percent of the total value seized. There are several reasons for this. An asset reported as seized may never actually be forfeited; it may, for various reasons, be returned to the individual. Also, expenses such as mortgage payments and insurance premiums must be paid regardless of eventual disposition. In addition, the forfeiture dollar amount received is seldom equal to the reported seized asset dollar value. Aside from mortgages and insurance payments, buildings must be brought up to code, rent or storage costs must be absorbed, liquidation fees paid, and all this decreases the net value of the assets seized.

The basic idea behind asset seizures and forfeitures is to enhance task force financial self-sufficiency. Regardless of the financial self-sufficiency priority level, a low to medium success level was recorded by almost all coordinators. Even most of those who assigned financial self-sufficiency as a low level priority recorded a low level of success. Many respondents stated that caution must be exercised when it comes to seizing assets lest the task force is unable to recapture funds expended on maintenance and related costs. At two extremes, some respondents stated that they seize everything belonging to the offender, and some that selective seizure is the rule (some even stated that asset seizure is simply not worth the ensuing complications). Recently Washington State passed a new asset seizure/forfeiture law which allows 90 percent of the forfeited asset value to be retained by the task force (see Appendix O).

#### 4. Training activities

Training various individuals was a goal noted in many of the task force funding applications. The training of detectives for task force duty was recorded, understandably, as a high level priority and, due to the nature of the work, it is not surprising that a high level of success was achieved. Training uniformed officers and prosecutors were two additional prioritized goals which experienced varying levels of success. Training the private sector was a high priority for only two task forces with most recording it as a low level priority. Almost 75 percent of coordinators who recorded the private sector as a low priority training group also recorded a low success level.

Training of task force detectives was, in a sense, a fairly standardized process. Completion of the Basic Narcotics School offered through the Washington State Criminal Justice Commission was required of all detectives. Additional training was provided to participants and was conducted both within state and out. This training involved such topics as background investigation, interrogation, informant handling, and surveillance. Restrictions in the amount of training offered was due primarily to a lack of financial resources. To the extent possible, in-service training was utilized to make up for this training deficit. Training

needs were noted in the areas of financial investigation techniques, asset seizure/forfeiture policy and practices, and issues unique to task force coordinator duties.

#### 5. Coordination and outreach

Six goals related to task force coordination and outreach were identified. There was a great deal of variation in both recorded priority level and assessed level of success in meeting these goals. Overall, though, liaison with the private sector and conducting community meetings were the two areas which had the lowest levels of success. Interestingly, interagency coordination was seen as a high priority goal by almost all task force coordinators and over half stated that they had been highly successful in meeting this goal.

Although holding meetings/strategy development and communication/information sharing are goals which experienced a certain degree of overlap, the level of priority and related success is surprisingly dissimilar. Holding meetings and developing strategies was seen primarily as a medium level priority goal by the largest subgroup of task force coordinators whereas virtually the same number of coordinators saw the goal of communication and information sharing as a high level priority. Most of the respondents stated that a medium level of success was achieved for the former goal and a high level of success for the latter.

#### 6. Personnel and equipment

Increasing personnel and purchasing equipment were also noted as separate task force goals. In the case of increasing personnel, most task forces recorded a low level of success, regardless of prioritization. The converse is true when it comes to purchasing necessary equipment; most recorded at least a moderate level of success, regardless of priority level.

### Activities and Effectiveness

The traditional measures used to gauge law enforcement impact are number of individuals arrested and number of charges filed. Also, to a somewhat lesser extent, the number of individuals convicted and the number of charges which resulted in convictions have also been used as effectiveness indicators. It could be argued, however, that such measures are more an artifact of the judicial system than of the law enforcement system.

#### 1. Task force performance indicators

When controlling for variation in the number of task forces operating during the 1988 through 1989 and 1990 through 1991 periods, it was found that task forces arrested more individuals on drug-related charges from one year to the next. Further, except for a slight decrease in the number of charges filed between 1989 and 1990, a general trend of more charges being filed was displayed.

The average number of charges per individual arrested is perhaps a better measure of task force effectiveness than are the simple number of persons arrested and number of charges filed. It is interesting to note that during the first two years of task force operation, the

average number of charges filed per individual was almost five times as great as it was during the second two years of operation. Viewing this phenomena in a purely negative light is an oversimplification of the dynamics of related law enforcement efforts. Examining just the number of charges does not reveal anything about the level of charge filed. As task forces mature, gain more experience, and start to realize the fruits of their long-term investigation efforts, the type of charges filed against targeted offenders should increase in level of seriousness and, logically, the relative number of charges should decrease.

Fewer charges filed, relative to number of individuals arrested, could also be interpreted to mean "better" charges filed. An operational ethic of quality over quantity replaces the previous "throw the book at 'em" mentality. Certainly the data bear this interpretation out. The proportion of individuals convicted of charges filed increased and, despite an almost doubling of individuals arrested and individuals convicted, appears to have plateaued at around 40 percent. Of course it must be remembered that individuals arrested in any particular year may not be sentenced until the following year, if at all. This plateauing effect can also be seen in the average number of convicted charges per individual. In both cases it would appear that law enforcement effort and judicial proceedings have reached a set point.

When viewing task force performance against other law enforcement agency activity related to arrest for drug sales and for possession in the same geographic areas, some interesting findings appear. The number of task force arrests for sales is significantly greater than it is for possession. When looking at other law enforcement agency arrest data, the converse is found to be true, i.e. other law enforcement agency arrests for possession are significantly greater than their arrest figures for sales. Although this relationship is interesting, it is what the data should reveal if the task forces are targeting the appropriate type of offender. In other words, task forces are focusing where they should - at dealers as opposed to users.

## 2. Drugs removed from circulation

The number of individuals arrested, number of charges, and number of convicted charges, as well as dollar value of assets seized and forfeited, certainly are measures of task force effectiveness. In addition to these measures is one which, it may be argued, is a more meaningful measure of task force effectiveness: the quantity and value of drugs removed from circulation. Data presented in the Findings section display that substantial amounts of drugs were confiscated as the result of task force activities. These drugs are valued at tens of millions of dollars, and even when looking at just cocaine, heroin, and marijuana and attaching conservative dollar values, over \$95 million worth of illegal drugs (estimated street value) were confiscated during the four years of task force operation.

Sales of drugs, particularly cocaine, was considered the most serious of drug activity overall. This was followed fairly closely by marijuana and general drug distribution. Further, over one-half of cases which resulted in drugs being seized involved cocaine and one-third involved marijuana. Overall, large amounts of drugs were seized through task force activities. Aside from actual drugs seized, the individuals arrested as part of these seizures were key distributors.

Drugs purchased either as a means to establish an individual case, lead to a higher level dealer, or identify an informant was also a fairly common task force activity. As with seizures, cocaine and marijuana were the most prevalent types of drugs purchased. Unlike seizures, though, purchases of crack cocaine almost equalled marijuana in proportion of cases. The quantity of drugs obtained through purchase was substantially less than that obtained through seizures. The largest amount of drugs confiscated as the result of purchase was reported to be 32 ounces of cocaine; substantially less than the 108 pounds confiscated as the result of seizure activities.

### 3. Drug supply network

The drug supply network overall was assessed by coordinators as being a very dynamic and adaptable system. Respondents often noted that although one segment of the network may be staying the same, another area may be growing. Comments on drug types indicate that one type may be being held constant, or even shrinking, while another type is gaining (e.g. "...reduction in cocaine has been offset by increases in methamphetamine..."). In addition, observations regarding repeat offenders, new dealers replacing arrested targets, and a highly active supply network were common. Not surprisingly, by almost three-to-one, coordinators stated that law enforcement activities have had the greatest influence on the drug supply network. When factors other than law enforcement activities were cited as influencing the drug supply network, market forces (i.e. supply and demand) and education were most commonly identified.

Another influencing factor which is often overlooked is the local economic situation. A reflection of the local economy is the unemployment rate, which in Washington State ranges on a county level from 2.8 percent to 24.6 percent (see Appendix P). These percentages are derived from the number of individuals in the county who are filing for unemployment benefits and does not include the number of individuals who have used up their benefits and are no longer recorded on the unemployment rolls. Regardless of whose figures are used, official or actual, certain counties in the state contain a disproportionate percent of unemployed. A number of respondents noted that as unemployment rises, the number of individuals involved in drug manufacturing, particularly marijuana grow operations, increases.

### 4. Drug use patterns

The case is often made that drug use in the community is reflective of drug availability (i.e. the drug supply network). Certainly the distribution of coordinator responses regarding drug use is very similar to the distribution of responses regarding the drug supply network. Like the supply network, coordinators stated that drug use patterns are dynamic and may, for example, stay fairly constant in one area but grow in another. Comments on the "type" of user were offered, such as, "more users have become dealers", and "black tar heroin becomes more prevalent and users tending to be more in a lower socio-economic class". Also, observations such as a slight increase in crack and LSD use, as well as "hard core narcotics," were presented. This is where the similarities between the drug supply network and use patterns cease. Whereas most coordinators stated that the drug supply network has not been influenced by non-law enforcement activities, most coordinators stated that the drug

use patterns have been influenced by factors other than law enforcement activities. Education was the single largest identified source of this non-law enforcement activity and almost one-half of the coordinators who identified education referenced the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program.

The drug supply network and community drug use patterns, as well as other influencing factors, paint a picture of shifting supplies and demands. Task force activities have put pressure on dealers causing them to adopt new production and sales techniques. Drug use among youth was noted to be declining in some areas but LSD appears to be to be making a comeback.

### Organizational Structure

In order to respond to the changing and adapting drug network, leadership must also adapt. Coordinators stated that interagency coordination and cooperation, asset seizure and forfeitures, and political influences, are areas that have evolved since the task forces were formed. It is possible, though, that these changes would have occurred regardless of the task force activity. Coordinators were asked pointedly whether or not task force activities have influenced a number of areas key to drug interdiction. All coordinators stated that task force activities have increased the likelihood of successful investigation and arrest of drug-involved individuals. Information sharing related to investigation, the likelihood of successful prosecution, and knowledge of the local drug network were also areas upon which task force activities have had a profound impact.

#### 1. General observations

Targeting varying levels of offenders and reducing manufacturing and distribution require a consistency in task force organizational structure and a commitment on the part of policy makers. Over 200 individuals are participating in the 24 task forces in the state, and a sizeable proportion of these individuals are supported at some level by BJA funds. These task forces are composed of a reported 178 agencies statewide. These agencies are organized at the federal, state, county, city, and town levels. In addition, 16 prosecutors are directly assigned to these task forces and eight Tribal agencies are represented.

The stated goals and objectives of a task force are reflected in its operational philosophy and organizational structure. Variation was found in all goal areas and relatedly, task force size and defined measure of success also varied. The task forces varied from being geographically diverse to highly concentrated; from being focused almost exclusively on upper level felony offenders to misdemeanants; from being composed exclusively of law enforcement personnel to exclusively of attorneys. Of course most task forces are at neither extreme and combine various types of personnel and target multiple levels/types of offenders (see Appendices Q and R for descriptions of both a highly generalized and highly specialized task force respectively).

#### 2. Task force coordination, cooperation, and communication

Since task force activities have had significant impacts on the overall drug picture, it is not

surprising that respondents stated that they possess at least some knowledge of other in-state task forces. Well over one-half of the coordinators stated that they possess either a great deal of knowledge, or slightly less, of other task forces. Further, it was found that the most favorable working relationship which task forces experience is with other task forces. This is as one would hope; in order to be truly multi-jurisdictional, task forces must work with individuals outside of their immediate jurisdiction. It was also found that working relationships with county agencies was the next most favorable and, considering that task forces in Washington State are organized around multi-county jurisdictions, this is also what one would hope.

This high level of knowledge comes through coordination of activities, cooperation, and communication. The largest number of coordinators stated that the current level of both cooperation and communication between task forces is an improvement over what it has been in the past. Cooperation and communication between federal agencies and task forces and also city or town Agencies and task forces, showed the next largest level of improvement. Task force coordinators who stated that there is no difference in the level of communication and cooperation between the task force and other agencies are not necessarily assigning a negative rating; cooperation and communication may already have been high. For example, one coordinator, after recording that there was no difference at the state level, wrote that they have "always had good cooperation and communication." No respondent stated that such coordination has deteriorated since task force inception.

Of course coordination must also occur within the task force, and this coordination comes in the guise of meetings and intelligence sharing. There was a great deal of variation in the frequency and intensity of such coordination. Certain task forces reported that daily meetings are held between the supervisor and detectives, while others reported that they meet more infrequently or as need demands.

The intelligence and information sharing component of task force investigation is enhanced by a computerized database maintained by the Washington State Patrol (WSP). Utilizing the monthly reports submitted by each task force, WSP continually updates a database consisting of individuals targeted by the task forces. This database is downloaded to each task force on a quarterly basis. The utility of this database is in the ability to cross-reference task force specific targets with those of other task forces. This procedure facilitates the coordination of efforts, contributes to reduction in duplication of activity, and minimizes the chances of inadvertent interference of investigation activities by other task forces.

The overwhelming response was that task force support by other law enforcement agencies was high. Although for the most part high, the general level of support displayed by the community and media for task force activities was assessed to be not as great. Whether assessing other law enforcement support or the support displayed by the community or media, overwhelmingly, coordinators stated that support for task force efforts was high.

### 3. Staffing patterns

Impacting on the drug network through investigation and apprehension, coordinating with

other agencies and obtaining support from other agencies and the community/media takes a great deal of time and effort. Devoting the necessary amounts of this time and effort requires a certain degree of staffing stability. Credibility can be eroded and effectiveness diminished through erratic staffing patterns. On the other hand, it has been argued that drug enforcement work takes a toll on officers and burnout is an operational reality. The vast majority of coordinators noted that the task force core personnel have remained constant for at least one year, and many of these stated that they have had the same core personnel for over two years. Staggered personnel rotation patterns of two to three years, as well as a pre-productivity period of at least one year, were associated comments.

Agencies contributing personnel to the task forces typically put a cap of two years on officer participation. During this time extensive training takes place and although generalization of investigative duties was the norm, specialization did occur. Respondents reported that it takes approximately 1.5 years before an officer becomes productive in the field, and this time limitation imposed by the home agency is seen as a detriment to successful investigation. Many task forces also have a time limit, though all possess a mechanism for assignment continuation. It should be noted that some task forces recruit experienced narcotics officers and/or officers with other specialized detective level training. These individuals require proportionately less training and relatedly are able to "produce" at a much quicker rate.

The number and type of personnel assigned varied according to task force focus. Most task forces were found to be composed of both police officers of various ranks and prosecuting attorneys. In addition, various miscellaneous staff were identified, such as Financial Investigator for asset seizure/forfeiture activities and Drug Dog Handler for search activities.

Six task forces were found to have no prosecuting attorneys attached, and two task forces had no police officers attached. One county possessed both a task force composed solely of police officers and a task force composed solely of prosecuting attorneys. Two observations should be noted regarding these prosecutor-only task forces:

- a. One such task force targets misdemeanants not necessarily arrested on drug charges (though they must possess at least one prior conviction under the Violation of the Uniform Substance Control Act). Aside from common wisdom, the actions of this task force cannot show a direct impact on the drug network, whether it be amount of drugs removed from the streets, meaningful jail time, or assets seized.
- b. Having a separately funded prosecutor task force and law enforcement task force operating in the same county increases operational expenses.

One of these prosecutor-only task forces operates in a county where two other task forces are located. These two other task forces work out of their immediate jurisdiction and in neighboring counties whereas the prosecutor-only task force does not.

## Future Needs

All individuals interviewed, except one, stated that the task force was needed in their geographic area. This one individual expressed a great deal of consternation over his response and was quick to offer a qualifier. This qualifier was along the lines of, "we are victims of our own success." The task force involved was in a highly rural and agrarian section of the state and has been quite successful in targeting drug manufacturing and distribution, so successful that they have been forced to adjust their goal level to accommodate lower level dealers. The respondent was quite astute and questioned whether a task force of highly trained narcotic interdiction professionals were necessary to go after street level dealers who must go out of the area to purchase drugs. In a sense he offered a potential answer to his own question when he observed that without the task force's continued presence and activity, mid to upper level dealers would shortly move back into the area. It should be noted that this task force works with other law enforcement agencies not only out of its immediate jurisdiction but also out of the state (as did the majority of task forces).

By two to one, coordinators stated that their task force would simply not exist without Bureau of Justice Administration support. The funds made available allow the task force to do their job and comments such as, "These funds are the only reason we exist," "There is not self-sufficient local funding..," "Without the federal assistance...it would cease to exist," were common. Individuals who stated that they would still exist even if these funds were not available, often stated that task force effectiveness would be diminished, and a number indicated that these funds made it possible to prove the effectiveness of the task force model. Regardless of response, all individuals stated that additional resources are needed. Primarily these resource needs are in the areas of personnel and training, but equipment needs were also frequently cited.

## **Issues and Recommendations**

Although the preceding data and discussions are open to various interpretations and can be translated into numerous policy recommendations, a number of issues are immediately apparent and are readily supported by the data.

1. Variability in task force **composition and structure** was found to be fairly wide. Most task forces were composed of police officers and prosecuting attorneys from different agencies and different jurisdictions working in tandem to prosecute offenders at the highest level possible, though in certain cases this was not so. The multi-jurisdictional component of task force structure has been defined by BJA as:

"...involving two or more separate State, local, and/or federal agencies of the same type (e.g., city police for two separate cities) working cooperatively in a drug enforcement or other program effort, even if these agencies have some concurrent responsibilities (e.g., state police and federal agents). A project where two or more agencies of the same government entity work together would not be considered a multi-jurisdictional project (e.g., city police and local/county prosecutor." (Individual Project Report (IPR) Instructions, August, 1991; p.1.)

In short, certain task forces were not operating as a **multi-jurisdictional** task force. It would also appear that due to resource availability, locally defined needs, and political influences, at times certain task forces are constrained to pursuing street-level drug dealers. It must be recognized, though, that in all cases, regarding structure, the task force was responding to local needs. Nonetheless, certain recommendations can be made:

- a. Regardless of source of support for the individual position(s), all task forces receiving BJA funds should be composed of both police officers and prosecutors and should be comprised of representatives from different government entities. This practice would:
  - 1) Ensure compliance with the BJA required multi-jurisdictional component;
  - 2) Assist in building local capacity, enhancing active multi-agency cooperation, and result in the sharing of personnel and information as outlined in the Washington State Narcotics Control Strategy; and,
  - 3) In keeping with the state level task force program goals presented in the state task force application, significantly increase the number of arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and asset seizures and forfeitures.
- b. It is a federal and state requirement that individuals investigated by multi-jurisdictional drug enforcement task force personnel be, at the very least, suspected of involvement in the manufacturing, sales, or distribution of drugs. Past involvement with illegal drug activities does not prove current involvement. Also, not all misdemeanor level offenses are drug-related. It is questionable whether targeting individuals arrested on misdemeanor non-drug-related charges for special prosecution treatment has any substantial impact on the local drug network. All cases investigated and prosecuted should show a direct impact or link with the drug network.
- c. As noted in the Washington State Multi-Jurisdictional Narcotics Task Force Program description and application, targeting street-level dealers has minimal impact on the "war on drugs." It is the federal and state intent that the task force allocated BJA funds be used to enhance local efforts in pursuing mid- and upper-level dealers. All task forces should, in keeping with the intent of the Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force model, target individuals and networks involved in illegal drug trafficking at the highest level possible.
- d. Enhancement of investigative cooperation and communication is a goal of the Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Enforcement Task Force Program. The intent of this goal is to facilitate investigations across established jurisdictional boundaries. Task forces which share jurisdictional boundaries or are located in the same county should seek ways to minimize duplication of effort and maximize utilization of scarce funding dollars.
- e. Seventy-two percent of the counties in Washington State (28 counties) are covered by BJA funded task forces; the remaining 28 percent are not (11 counties). Although neighboring task forces provide investigation and resource assistance upon request, every effort should be made to include law enforcement and prosecution officials from these areas in the actual task force structure. This inclusion will help ensure that individuals

involved in the illegal drug network are not able to escape detection through moving their base of operation to a non-task force covered geographic area.

2. The **training** of task force personnel was an item of recurrent mention. In part this training need is a result of ongoing deficits, the remediation of which is necessary to optimize performance. This need is also in response to a constantly shifting and adapting drug network. Four distinct training-related need areas were identified:
  - a. A number of respondents noted that although they possessed the investigation and management skills necessary to coordinate such a program, they felt they were deficient in areas related to federal and state requirements and administrative procedures.
  - b. All respondents, regardless of rank or role, noted that although a wide assortment of training is available, the resources necessary to access this training is not. No respondents stated that the training which they currently are able to access is ineffective; in fact, just the opposite was relayed. Training provided through the Washington State Criminal Justice Commission, the Washington State Patrol, and through local resources, received high marks regarding content and applicability. Highly specialized training, the type necessary to pursue upper level dealers, is both relatively expensive and, currently, mostly offered out of the state.
  - c. The general issue of asset seizure and forfeiture elicited a wide array of responses. Regardless of attitude, and aside from the somewhat misleading current reporting system, the majority of respondents voiced concern as to both practice and procedure. Training related to the new state asset seizure/forfeiture law should go far in addressing these concerns.
  - d. Related to the general issue of training is the rotation pattern imposed by either the individual task force or the home agency. Considering that a minimum of one and one-half years must pass before a return is realized on task force-provided training, the standard two-year commitment seems inadequate. In order to realize a return on the training-related investment, a two and one-half to three year commitment would appear to be in order.
3. A **resource pool** which task forces across the state could draw upon was also a frequently cited need. The type of resources comprising this "pool" are both equipment and personnel.
  - a. A surveillance van with state-of-the-art equipment is out of the financial reach of most task forces and participating jurisdictions. Having access to such a vehicle, along with appropriately trained personnel, would enhance case investigation and further the chances of successful prosecution. Ideally two such vans would operate, each covering one-half of the state.
  - b. A number of task forces stated that due to multiple labor-intensive investigations and requests from neighboring jurisdictions, they have on occasion found themselves short of personnel. A statewide task force team which could provide assistance in these situations would not only help alleviate pressure on local resources but also provide

needed expertise. Related to the issue of expertise is a stated need for an Asset Seizure Specialist. This specialist could provide technical assistance statewide.

- c. Equipment seized as the result of task force activities could be made available to all task forces. This would include not only equipment such as video cameras and computers, but also office furniture. Weapons which are confiscated during task force investigations, if of high enough quality, could also be made available for task force use. Considering that the cost to purchase this needed equipment is much more than what would be realized as the result of forfeiture liquidation, such a practice would seem to make sound financial sense.
4. Due to the varying operational policies relating to forfeiture of **seized weapons**, it would appear that the removal of weapons from the asset seizure/forfeiture record would be in order. A false economy is created when task forces report a set quantity and dollar value of seized weapons but either have no intention or are unable to capture this dollar value.


**APPENDIX A**

**MAP OF WASHINGTON STATE**

**WITH TASK FORCE JURISDICTIONAL**

**BOUNDARIES**

# FEDERALLY FUNDED NARCOTICS TASK FORCES



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 LAST UPDATE: 08-04-92



## **APPENDIX B**


### **DESCRIPTION OF THE STRATEGY**

## A. OVERVIEW

Washington State's response to drug abuse issues is a coordinated effort between nonprofit organizations, businesses, education, law enforcement, and community leaders. Resources from federal, state, local, and tribal governments are used to provide the foundation for communities to implement drug supply and demand reduction programs. The federal government plays an integral role in the state's response to drug abuse issues through funding provided by the U.S. Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice. Significant amounts of federal funding are allocated to state agencies to provide resources to local communities based upon a demonstrated need and commitment to implementing comprehensive local anti-drug strategies.

### 1. Special Assistant for Drug Abuse Issues

In 1988, Washington State Governor Booth Gardner appointed a Special Assistant for Substance Abuse Issues who reports directly to him. The special assistant is responsible for implementing the state's Drug Control Policy. The Washington State Drug Control Policy is developed by the coordinated efforts of the Governor's Council on Substance Abuse, which addresses issues related to the demand for illegal substances and the Drug Policy Board, which addresses issues related to the supply of illegal substances. The Special Assistant is also responsible for coordinating efforts among various state agencies including the Department of Community Development, the Department of Social and Health Services, the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Washington State Patrol, the Administrator for the Courts, and the Department of Corrections. Chart 5 illustrates the relationship among the key agencies implementing the strategy.



## 2. Policy and Advisory Committees

Two boards assist in developing and implementing the state anti-drug strategy. The Governor's Council on Substance Abuse is comprised of experts in the fields of education, treatment, criminal justice, and health (see Appendix C). The state's Drug Policy Board consists of representatives of local law enforcement agencies, general purpose local governments, federal drug law enforcement agencies, legislators, and state agency administrators (see Appendix D).

In assessing the state's strategy, the Drug Policy Board examined the level of resources dedicated to curtailing both the demand for and supply of illegal substances. Based on the assessment (see Appendix A), the Drug Policy Board recommends that a significant portion of the U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance funding be targeted toward criminal justice efforts to reduce the supply of drugs.

## B. **STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM**

Washington State's goal of a drug-free state parallels and supports the national goal of a drug-free America. The seven priorities of the National Drug Control Strategy are incorporated into the state's strategy. Washington's 1992 overall strategy is to proceed with a comprehensive approach addressing each of the elements of the drug problem. Demand is reduced by community-wide prevention and treatment programs, and supply is reduced by interdiction and prosecution.

The Department of Community Development administers two programs to implement the anti-drug strategy. These programs are the Community Mobilization Against Substance Abuse, and the Washington State Substance Abuse Reduction Program, which includes funding provided by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance. These programs are supported by federal, state, and local resources.

### 1. Demand Reduction

The Community Mobilization Against Substance Abuse program received national attention for its innovative design which provides an avenue for every segment of the community to be involved in the war against drugs. The program raises public awareness so that all community members may help reduce the use of drugs through prevention, education, and treatment. It unifies the anti-drug efforts of parents, youth, educators, treatment experts, law enforcement officials, local governments, businesses, and community leaders. The fundamental premise of this strategy is that communities know what their specific substance abuse problems are and how they can address these issues most effectively.

The Community Mobilization Against Substance Abuse program reinforces and brings together not only individual communities, but all the communities in a county or region. It is estimated that over \$8 million in state and federal resources will be allocated for the Community Mobilization Against Substance Abuse program during the 1991-93 biennium. An additional \$2.6 million in local resources is used to support this effort. These funds will continue to be used by regional coalitions for activities to strengthen local cooperation and to pursue effective, innovative approaches to reduce the demand for substance abuse. This strategy is further reinforced by efforts of the Department of Social and Health Services, the Department of Health, and the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction to provide and foster prevention and treatment of substance abuse problems.

2. Supply Reduction

The Washington State Substance Abuse Reduction Program incorporates law enforcement and adjudication efforts. This portion of the strategy is funded by local, state, and federal resources, including the Bureau of Justice Assistance Drug Control and System Improvement Formula Grant resources. Its objectives are to reduce the supply of drugs by disrupting supply systems, increase the risk and degree of punishment, reduce the economic attractiveness of trafficking through asset forfeiture, and hold traffickers and drug abusers accountable for their actions. Programs designed to address law enforcement and criminal justice issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries are given the highest funding priority.

The Washington State Substance Abuse Reduction Program continues to focus on the reduction of drugs through improvements in the criminal justice system which include resources for the prosecution of drug cases and resources dedicated to the defense of drug cases. Washington State's 1992 expenditure plan also includes resources to focus on crime laboratory analysis, clandestine drug laboratories, law enforcement training, technical assistance and asset seizure, demonstration projects for urban areas, and the statewide coordination of multi-jurisdictional task forces.

The Drug Policy Board's strategy for reducing substance abuse through law enforcement efforts is described in Appendix E. The strategy does not outline measurable objectives because the Board believes that the state's strategy will only be effective through the involvement of each individual community. It recognizes that each community's goals and objectives vary based on their specific needs. Local jurisdictions are required to develop goals and objectives based on their specific needs. This information is submitted to the Department of Community Development in quantified goals and objective statements through the contracting process.

3. 1992 Funding Priorities

The priorities for implementing the Drug Policy Board's Drug Control Strategy include multi-jurisdictional task force funding, drug prosecution, drug defense, crime laboratory enhancement, clandestine laboratory enhancement, and urban area demonstration projects. It also includes statewide task force coordination training and technical assistance, and narcotics task force units. The urban areas demonstration projects will focus on innovative ways for law enforcement to become involved in the war against drugs. It is intended that the demonstration projects will partially satisfy the need to have major metropolitan area funding.

4. User Accountability

In 1989, the Washington State Legislature passed the Omnibus Controlled Substance and Alcohol Abuse Act which provides law enforcement with the tools needed to effectively hold drug users accountable. It also provides for increased sentencing for serious drug offenders as well as sentencing for first-time drug offenders. Similar to federal legislation, it allows for the seizure and forfeiture of property if the property has been used in violating drug laws, or if it has been acquired with the proceeds of drug transactions. The 1989 Omnibus Controlled Substance and Alcohol Abuse Act also provides for law enforcement agencies to internally authorize the interception of drug conversations through one-party consent. This measure allows chief law enforcement officers the same flexibility as federal agents to intercept drug conversations. It is a recognition by the Legislature that law enforcement officers need flexibility to investigate drug crimes by becoming well-acquainted with violent, well-organized, and often very ingenious criminals.

C. **COORDINATION OF STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES**

State and local law enforcement agencies recognize the need to coordinate narcotics investigative strategies with federal agencies. Coordinated investigative efforts are the most effective way to impact major drug trafficking. Since local and state law enforcement agencies have limited resources to investigate major traffickers, increased coordination between federal, state, and local agencies provides law enforcement with the resources needed to apprehend upper level narcotics violators.

Current cooperative efforts include local and state participation in four regional Drug Enforcement Administration Task Forces. The Washington State Patrol has assigned detectives to the Drug Enforcement Administration office in Seattle to provide assistance to local law enforcement agencies in seizing drug trafficker's assets. This program returns significant resources back to local agencies. State and local narcotics investigations involve cooperative efforts with the Internal

Revenue Service, U.S. Postal Inspector's Office, U.S. Customs Services, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An example of local resource coordination between a Narcotics Task Force and a Community Mobilization Against Substance Abuse Program contractor (the Together! program) is exhibited in Appendix F.

Washington is also involved in several efforts to coordinate with local, federal, and multi-state investigations. The state coordinates with border states to investigate and apprehend drug offenders. The Washington State Patrol participates in a joint cooperative narcotics enforcement program with Idaho, Oregon, and appropriate federal agencies. In addition, the Washington State Patrol manages the Drug Enforcement Agency Marijuana Program. This program is also coordinated with the State of Oregon. The Drug Enforcement Agency Marijuana Program provides financial assistance to counties to enhance their marijuana eradication efforts. Several federally funded local task forces provide office space to, and receive technical assistance from, the Immigration and Naturalization Services and the National Guard.

In addition to investigative coordination, Washington also includes federal agencies in developing the statewide supply reduction Drug Control Strategy. The Drug Policy Board, which develops the statewide strategy, includes representatives from the Drug Enforcement Agency. The Drug Enforcement Agency also provides training and technical assistance to Washington's multi-jurisdictional task force commanders. The state continues to be committed to maximizing resources through the coordination of local, state, and federal efforts.

#### **D. EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY**

Evaluating Washington's strategy is essential to assessing the effectiveness of anti-drug programs. The Department of Community Development has conducted an extensive applicant search and is now in the process of hiring an evaluator for the programs funded by the Drug Control and System Improvement Formula Grant. It is anticipated that an evaluator will be hired by February 1, 1992. The evaluator will examine research materials prepared by the Criminal Justice Statistical Association, drug consortium members, and other state drug control contacts to develop Washington's evaluation.

Several techniques will be implemented to assess the anti-drug program's effectiveness. Research methodologies include an analysis of data generated from automated criminal justice reports, development of mail and telephone surveys, interviews, and statistical sampling procedures to be used in conjunction with research design. Since the evaluation is still in the development phase, the Department of Community Development does not have conclusive information on the effectiveness of the state's strategy. It is anticipated that this information will be available during 1992. Initial evaluation results will be included in Washington's annual report to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance.

The Department of Community Development is also coordinating with the Governor's Office on Substance Abuse Issues, the Office of Financial Management (Statistical Analysis Center), the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Department of Social and Health Services, the Washington State Patrol's Research and Analysis Unit, and the Drug Policy Board in the design and implementation of an evaluation of the statewide anti-drug strategy.

## **NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM GOALS**

### **POLICY:**

The State Narcotics Control Program should provide for a unified program which makes the most effective use of limited federal, state, and local resources in order to make the greatest possible long-term impact on the problem of drug trafficking and consumption in the state of Washington.

### **GOAL:**

Reduce trafficking and consumption of controlled substances through a coordinated statewide law enforcement effort.

### **SUBGOALS:**

Establish and execute a program of coordinated regional task forces, including prosecutors, to apprehend traffickers and consumers of controlled substances in a manner consistent with state, local, and tribal priorities.

Prosecute drug traffickers and consumers apprehended by task force operations and other local anti-drug law enforcement efforts, including asset forfeiture.

Adjudicate task force cases and other local anti-drug law enforcement cases in a timely and thorough manner.

Provide support and coordination to cooperative local anti-drug law enforcement efforts against drug traffickers.

Encourage the establishment and enhancement of drug treatment, prevention and education programs with state and local resources.

**APPENDIX C**

**WASHINGTON STATE**

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**APPENDIX D**

**MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT**

**TASK FORCE SURVEY**

# MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE SURVEY

The following general questions relate to the goals and mission of your Task Force. Please be as complete as possible.

1. Recognizing that Task Force operations are guided by often unique circumstances, what would you say is the primary goal or mission of your Task Force (you may indicate more than one):

\_\_\_\_\_ Investigation \_\_\_\_\_ Apprehension  
\_\_\_\_\_ Coordination between jurisdictions \_\_\_\_\_ Education  
\_\_\_\_\_ Training of Task Force Members \_\_\_\_\_ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Realizing that different Task Forces have different objectives, please rank order the following using "1" to indicate the most important objective, "2" as the next most important, "3" as the next, and so on (you need not use all objectives and please feel free to use the "other" category to identify those objectives unique to your Task Force):

\_\_\_\_\_ To remove/reduce street level drug supplies.  
\_\_\_\_\_ To cooperate on drug investigation efforts.  
\_\_\_\_\_ To arrest and prosecute drug users.  
\_\_\_\_\_ To arrest and prosecute manufacturers and growers.  
\_\_\_\_\_ To seize property of those involved in use, sale, and manufacturing of drugs.  
\_\_\_\_\_ To arrest and prosecute: \_\_\_\_\_ low-level dealers  
[please rank order level] \_\_\_\_\_ mid-level dealers  
\_\_\_\_\_ upper-level dealers  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Comments (if any): \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

3a. The following general goals have been identified by various Task Forces throughout the state. Please identify the relative level of priority and, in your estimation, the degree to which you feel you have been successful in achieving this goal. (Circle your answer)

<u>Enforcement</u>	---Priority Level---			---Success Level---		
	Low	Med.	High	Low	Med.	High
Case Investigation	1	2	3	1	2	3
Case Preparation	1	2	3	1	2	3
Case Prosecution	1	2	3	1	2	3
Reduction in: Distribution	1	2	3	1	2	3
Consumption	1	2	3	1	2	3
Manufacturing	1	2	3	1	2	3
Target:						
Street level	1	2	3	1	2	3
Mid-level	1	2	3	1	2	3
Upper-level	1	2	3	1	2	3
Develop/use Informant	1	2	3	1	2	3
Penetrating Organizations	1	2	3	1	2	3
Asset Seizure/ Forfeiture	1	2	3	1	2	3

<u>Admin./ Operation</u>	---Priority Level---			---Success Level---		
	Low	Med.	High	Low	Med.	High
Financial Self-sufficiency	1	2	3	1	2	3
Training:						
Detective	1	2	3	1	2	3
Uniformed	1	2	3	1	2	3
Prosecutor	1	2	3	1	2	3
Private Sector	1	2	3	1	2	3
Other: _____	1	2	3	1	2	3
Increase Personnel	1	2	3	1	2	3
Equipment Purchase	1	2	3	1	2	3
<u>Coordination and Outreach</u>						
Interagency Coordination	1	2	3	1	2	3
Meetings and Strategy Development	1	2	3	1	2	3
Communication and Information Sharing	1	2	3	1	2	3
Liaison with Private Sector	1	2	3	1	2	3
Obtaining Public Support	1	2	3	1	2	3
Community Meetings	1	2	3	1	2	3

3b. If there are any goals or objectives missing from the above, or are unique to your Task Force, please identify and rate like the above:

	---Priority Level---			---Success Level---		
	Low	Med.	High	Low	Med.	High
Other(s) _____	1	2	3	1	2	3
_____	1	2	3	1	2	3
_____	1	2	3	1	2	3
_____	1	2	3	1	2	3

Comments (if any): \_\_\_\_\_

4. Since your Task Force's inception, have your goals and objectives changed at all?

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes                      \_\_\_\_\_ No

If "Yes" please explain: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

The impact of law enforcement and prosecution on drug supplies and use patterns is, admittedly, difficult to directly measure. Please provide your professional assessment of Task Force activity impact.

5. Rank the relative level or seriousness of drug use in your area (place a "1" next to the most used/available drug, "2" next to the next most used/ available, "3" next to the next, and so on):

\_\_\_\_\_ Amphetamines

\_\_\_\_\_ Barbiturates

\_\_\_\_\_ Cocaine

(#5 continued):

\_\_\_\_\_ Crack (as separate from cocaine)  
\_\_\_\_\_ Heroin  
\_\_\_\_\_ Hashish  
\_\_\_\_\_ LSD  
\_\_\_\_\_ Marijuana  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other(s) (please identify): \_\_\_\_\_

6. All things being equal, what type of illegal drug related activity is of most concern in your area? (place a check mark next to your selections):

\_\_\_\_\_ Use \_\_\_\_\_ Sales \_\_\_\_\_ Manufacturing  
\_\_\_\_\_ Distribution \_\_\_\_\_ Other (please identify)

7. Please provide approximate percentages of cases/investigations which resulted in drugs being seized during last year (1991). For this question, the disposition of the actual case is not important, so please consider all related activities which resulted in drugs being seized (separate from drugs being purchased). Again, an approximation is all that is necessary; not an absolute percent. [total cannot be greater than 100.0%]

\_\_\_\_\_ % Amphetamines \_\_\_\_\_ % Barbiturates \_\_\_\_\_ % Cocaine  
\_\_\_\_\_ % Crack (as separate from cocaine) \_\_\_\_\_ % Heroin  
\_\_\_\_\_ % Hashish \_\_\_\_\_ % LSD \_\_\_\_\_ % Marijuana  
\_\_\_\_\_ % Other(s) (please identify): \_\_\_\_\_

Comments, (you may want to use this space to describe any unusually large or highly significant 1991 Seizures):

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

8. Please provide approximate percentages of cases/investigations which resulted in drugs being purchased during last year (1991). For this question, the disposition of the actual case is not important, so please consider all related activities which resulted in drugs being purchased (separate from drugs being seized). Again, an approximation is all that is necessary; not an absolute percent. [total cannot be greater than 100.0%]

\_\_\_ % Amphetamines    \_\_\_ % Barbiturates    \_\_\_ % Cocaine

\_\_\_ % Crack (as separate from cocaine)    \_\_\_ % Heroin

\_\_\_ % Hashish    \_\_\_ % LSD    \_\_\_ % Marijuana

\_\_\_ % Other(s) (please identify): \_\_\_\_\_

Comments, (you may want to use this space to describe any unusually large or highly significant 1991 purchases)

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9a. Within your Task Force geographic area, do you feel that during the 12 months of 1991, drug use has generally been (place check mark next to appropriate entry):

\_\_\_ Decreasing.

\_\_\_ Staying relatively the same.

\_\_\_ Increasing.

\_\_\_ Shifting.

Comments regarding this observation: \_\_\_\_\_

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9b. Have the drug use patterns in your area been influenced by factors other than Task Force and other law enforcement activities?

\_\_\_ Yes    \_\_\_ No

(#9b continued)

If "Yes", what was the source of these influences?

- Demographic change
- Market forces
- Education
- Other (please identify) \_\_\_\_\_

10a. Within your Task Force geographic area, do you feel that during the 12 months of 1991, the drug supply network(s) has generally been (place check mark next to appropriate entry):

- Decreasing
- Staying relatively the same
- Increasing
- Shifting

Comments regarding this observation: \_\_\_\_\_

10b. Has the drug supply network(s) in your area been influenced by factors other than Task Force and other law enforcement activities?

Yes  No

If "Yes", what was the source of these influences?

- Demographic change
- Market forces
- Education
- Other (please identify) \_\_\_\_\_

11. Please provide a narrative description regarding; (a) how the narcotics picture has changed in your area of operation since your Task Force was formed, and (b) how Task Force leadership perceptions have also changed during this time.

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12. The following are qualitative questions requiring somewhat of a subjective judgement on your part. Please indicate which items you feel Task Force activities have had an impact on (please add any which are unique to your Task Force):

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
General information sharing related to investigations.	_____	_____
General information sharing related to prosecution.	_____	_____
General community awareness related to interdiction.	_____	_____
The likelihood of successful investigation.	_____	_____
The likelihood of successful arrest.	_____	_____
The likelihood of successful prosecution.	_____	_____
Reduction in duplication of effort between agencies.	_____	_____
Knowledge of the local drug network.	_____	_____
Knowledge of the statewide drug network.	_____	_____
Other: _____	_____	_____
Comments regarding the <u>type</u> of effect: _____		



15. Since your Task Force was formed, please identify the relative degree of change realized related to the following: (It is realized that the Task Force may experience varying degrees of cooperation, for example, with different Federal Agencies, also for example. Please try to generalize your assessment of the relative degree of change for each agency type.)

	<u>Improved</u>	<u>No difference</u>	<u>Worse</u>
Federal Agency cooperation	_____	_____	_____
Federal Agency communication	_____	_____	_____
State Agency cooperation	_____	_____	_____
State Agency communication	_____	_____	_____
County Agency cooperation	_____	_____	_____
County Agency communication	_____	_____	_____
Tribal cooperation	_____	_____	_____
Tribal communication	_____	_____	_____
City or Town cooperation	_____	_____	_____
City or Town communication	_____	_____	_____
Other Task Force cooperation	_____	_____	_____
Other Task Force communication	_____	_____	_____

Comments, if any: \_\_\_\_\_

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16. What do you feel is the general level of support for Task Force activities by other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies?

High      Low      Indifferent      Opposition

Comments, if any: \_\_\_\_\_

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17. What do you feel is the general level of support for Task Force activities by the media and the community?

High

Low

Indifferent

Opposition

Comments, if any: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Please provide information related to Task Force staffing.**

18a. Please describe the staffing pattern of your Task Force:

\_\_\_\_\_ Highly stable (same core personnel for at least two years).

\_\_\_\_\_ Relatively stable (same core personnel for at least 1 year, but less than 2 years).

\_\_\_\_\_ Fluctuating (core personnel have changed within past year).

Comments, if any: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

18b. Does this staffing pattern represent a change from earlier staffing patterns:

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes

\_\_\_\_\_ No

If "Yes", please explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

19. What is the normal, or average, staffing level in number of full-time equivalent positions (FTE's)?

\_\_\_\_\_ FTE Coordinator

\_\_\_\_\_ FTE Detectives

\_\_\_\_\_ FTE Uniformed

\_\_\_\_\_ FTE Prosecutor

\_\_\_\_\_ FTE Clerical

\_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

**Thank you for your time in completing this instrument. Please address these last few items and return to DCD at the address below. Thank you!**

20. If these federal funds were not available, do you think that a multi-jurisdictional interagency task force such as you currently have, would exist in your area?

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No

Whether "Yes" or "No", please explain: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

21. Different Task Forces, both within Washington State and outside, have experienced different levels of success or difficulty in areas related to start-up, administration, case documentation, meeting certain reporting requirements, coordination of effort, and public relations, among others. If needed, would your Task Force be interested in receiving technical assistance (TA) from BJA related to an area of need?

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No

If "Yes", in what area(s): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Would you prefer this TA be presented:

\_\_\_\_\_ On-site \_\_\_\_\_ Off-site

Would you be willing to assist DCD staff in formally composing a proposal to be submitted to BJA?

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No

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**APPENDIX E**

**MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT**

**UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEW OUTLINE**

**MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE  
UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEW OUTLINE**

**Task Force:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date & Time:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Respondent:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Rank/Role:** \_\_\_\_\_

**ROLE & TRAINING OF TASK FORCE MEMBERS**

**1. As a member of the Task Force, please describe your role and responsibilities.**

**2. How long have you been with the Task Force?** \_\_\_\_\_

**3. How did you become involved/recruited for Task Force duties?**  
[what is recruitment procedure]

**4. What kind of training did you receive as a member of the Task Force? What kind/type of training do Task Force detectives receive upon assignment?**

**5. Is this typical of the type of training Task Force members receive? [if not ask why not & what is typical]**

\_\_\_\_\_ **Yes**                      \_\_\_\_\_ **No**

**6. Do you feel that this training was sufficient to prepare you for your Task Force duties? To prepare detectives/officers for duties? [if not, why not/what are deficiencies/what are respondent recommendations?]**



14. Have you noticed any changes in the type of drug dealing in your area (e.g. marijuana to cocaine), since you've been with the Task Force?

\_\_\_\_\_ No

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes (how much of this change in type do you think can be attributed to Task Force activities?)

#### ANECDOTAL INFORMATION

15. Please describe a major Task Force case or accomplishment. This doesn't have to be one you were personally involved in; any one that you know of will do.

16. Any other significant achievements?

17. Any kudos, recognition, that type of thing. Any press coverage, judicial or some other public type of recognition? [obtain copies if possible or citation (e.g. newspaper & date)]

18. Because of the complexity of this kind of work, I'm sure you can tell me a number of horror stories, please tell me about the Task Forces most disappointing case. [why was it disappointing]

**COORDINATION OF TASK FORCE**

**19. How often do the members of the Task Force meet?**

-when (regularly scheduled/as needed): \_\_\_\_\_

-what for (what's the purpose): \_\_\_\_\_

-who attends: \_\_\_\_\_

-where held: \_\_\_\_\_

**20. What about meetings with other law enforcement agencies?**

-who attends: \_\_\_\_\_

-what for (what's the purpose): \_\_\_\_\_

-when (regularly scheduled/as needed): \_\_\_\_\_

-where held: \_\_\_\_\_

**21. Has the Task Force worked with:**

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms \_\_\_\_\_

U.S. Coast Guard \_\_\_\_\_

U.S. Customs \_\_\_\_\_

Drug Enforcement Administration \_\_\_\_\_

Federal Bureau of Investigations \_\_\_\_\_

Internal Revenue Service \_\_\_\_\_

Dept. of Immigration & Naturalization \_\_\_\_\_

Military Police \_\_\_\_\_

Tribal agencies \_\_\_\_\_

Other Law Enforcement (list) \_\_\_\_\_

**22. Does the Task Force share information/co-investigate with other Task Forces? [ask about State & Federal (DEA) and who, what, when, & where]**

23. Any problems with this relationship? Does it work fairly smoothly? [if there are problems, what are they and how can they be resolved]

24. Is there a set procedure/policy regarding sharing information with: [if "yes" try to obtain copy of policy/procedure]

Other Task Forces: \_\_\_\_\_ Other Agencies: (which): \_\_\_\_\_

#### FUTURE DIRECTION AND MISC. INFORMATION

25. Regarding the future of the Task Force: Do you foresee a continued need?

\_\_\_\_\_ No (why not)      \_\_\_\_\_ Yes (where should the focus be placed  
(e.g. arrest, prosecution, asset/seizure  
activities, information sharing, etc.))

\*\*Are additional resources needed: \_\_\_\_\_ Yes      \_\_\_\_\_ No

Please explain:

26. What role do asset seizure/forfeiture funds have in Task Force operation?

27. Are there any changes you'd like to see implemented regarding the direction or operation of the Task Force? [regardless of response; why?]

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes      \_\_\_\_\_ No

**28. Related to your own career, do you see Task Force duty being a positive or negative experience? [regardless of response; why?]**

**29. Inquire about facilities. [where's head quarters, where are activities coordinated out of, any field branches, etc.?]**

**MISC. COMMENTS, OBSERVATIONS, ETC.**

**APPENDIX F**

**SURVEY ITEM 11 - NARRATIVE RESPONSES**

APPENDIX F: SURVEY ITEM 11

MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE SURVEY  
NARRATIVE/OPEN-ENDED ITEM RESPONSES

Question 11: Narrative Description regarding; (a) how the narcotics picture has changed in your area of operation since your Task Force was formed.

"Traffickers have become much more cautious. Undercover officers must nearly always be Hispanic."

"Drug dealers are becoming more sophisticated and are dealing in larger amounts."

"TNET was created in 1986 with hispanic cocaine/heroin organizations providing the majority of the case load. Heroin was readily available in larger quantities than currently and "crack" use was minimal to non-existent. Cocaine hydrochloride was the drug of choice. "Crack" and methamphetamine are now drugs of choice with heroin declining."

"The narcotics in our region was controlled by blacks and whites when the task force was formed and since has been taken over by the hispanic population."

"Many individuals have gotten out of the drug business due to intense law enforcement pressure and higher risks associated with dealing."

"In the early 1980's major drugs such as cocaine and heroin were an inner city phenomena and not much of a problem in the Task Force jurisdiction. Today, the Task Force has experienced a significant increase in the quantity and quality of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and LSD in the Task Force jurisdiction. Those involved in the sale and distribution are well organized, making it difficult to infiltrate major organizations which have no boundary lines to contend with."

"The increase in drug enforcement in the Yakima County area has pushed some of that areas dealers into our area."

"Less "street" presence, fewer arrests for controlled substances by officers through routine patrol. Greater "dealer" caution and sophistication."

"More users have become dealers. More cocaine addicts also use heroin or have switched entirely to heroin. The hispanic supply system which has been bringing cocaine into the area are now bringing tar heroin & cocaine."

"Drugs have not been so visible on the streets. Drug dealers are very much aware of the T.F. which has created more of a challenge to getting at the suppliers and their patterns."

"Cocaine use has been dropping. Grow operations are dropping and becoming more difficult to locate. Low level dealers are now travelling to large populations/drug centers; i.e. Spokane, Seattle, Tri-Cities."

"Our supply seems to be coming more out of the Kelso-Longview-California system as opposed to the California-Yakima system' except for Black Tar Heroin, which is still out of Yakima."

"Heroin and marijuana use and distribution appears constant. Grows moved indoors with greater sophistication of concealment. Cocaine among school age kids may have lessened some but 20-40 year olds still abusing and demand is present enough to allow kilo dealers to be complacent in moving product. LSD returning to schools in a few instances."

"Originally we thought that we had a small street drug problem. Once the Task Force was started we found the problem to be more complex."

"The Narcotics Networks have become more sophisticated, however, so have we. Regardless of our small size in terms of talent & manpower, we continue to have an even greater impact."

"Meth labs had been a major influence in drug investigations. During 1990 and 1991 they subsided slightly. They are now on the upswing."

"The Task Force has put pressure on the mid-level dealers causing them to be less open in their operations. It is costing them more to stay in business."

"The narcotic picture in Lewis County, since the Task Force inception, has changed from methamphetamine use and production to cocaine use and distribution. Labs were a particular problem when we started up, and have dropped off in the past few years as a primary problem. Replacing that have been more organized and larger drug trafficking distribution schemes."

"We are cooperating and sharing more with other agencies. The cost of marijuana is increasing. Methamphetamine is sometimes hard to find. Cocaine is more available. LSD is becoming popular again."

"Dealers are cautious, drive beater cars, do not deal to strangers and hide cash. M.J. growers using sophisticated equipment to hide odor of M.J."

**Question 11 (continued): Narrative Description regarding; (b) how Task Force leadership perceptions have also changed during this time.**

"More manhours are needed to get the dealers convicted."

"Perception of our leadership has changed significantly from the vision of a small local problem to our area providing distribution through multi-state operations. Another leadership perception change is that drugs and dealing outside of the local jurisdiction don't have an effect on the local jurisdiction."

"We have and are targeting these hispanic families that are the source of most of the drugs brought into our area."

"Task Force direction is going for the upper level dealers with assets and the use of financial investigations, Rico's, etc."

"I feel we're more successful in our coordinated efforts. I'm also very pleased with our court conviction rate. The fact that marijuana is going up in price shows an impact on supply."

"We are responding in kind to Yakima's effort."

"Greater awareness of the quality of drugs being dealt and the quantity of illegal "assets" generated by drug sales."

"None."

"Concern has gone from drugs being a nuisance to being a destructive force that needs to be dealt with urgently."

"Asset investigations are necessary to find hidden profits, dealers maintain a low profile."

"Task Force assessment of mid and upper level dealers was high - now concentrating on low-level dealers."

"It is (now) evident that the problem is widespread and major quantity drugs are moving into our area."

"We have become better organized through caring leadership role of the Lt. and our staff. We've improved relations with D.E.A. and Customs which gives our small unit more flexibility. We are beginning to focus on more short range projects with our C.I.'s rather than long range projects."

Gang related drug activity and violence, "...have not been factors in directing task force operations."

"An idea of working "just" major cases was planned at one time. Now we take what we can get."

"Due to local politics, higher visibility targets, generally lower to mid level violators, must be arrested for media/publicity coverage on a semi-frequent basis."

"Realization that reducing supply is a long term project. There will always be suppliers as long as the profits are high."

"Management philosophy has remained relatively constant with one exception and that being an aggressive stance toward asset forfeiture."

"Leadership more knowledgeable as are all TF members. Focus has shifted to higher level distribution, organizations, conspiracy cases. Day to day work with FBI and ATF."

"The perceptions of leadership have also changed in that we realize that law enforcement efforts alone can not resolve this major social issue. It requires the assistance of the judicial system, education, treatment, and each citizen if our efforts are to be realized."

"Leadership perceptions have seemed to change toward the overall approach as opposed to independent geographical areas. In other words, team approach is now the common rule and not the exception."

**APPENDIX G**

**SURVEY ITEM 20 - NARRATIVE RESPONSES**

APPENDIX G: SURVEY ITEM 20

MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE SURVEY  
NARRATIVE/OPEN-ENDED ITEM RESPONSES

Question 20: Comments related to question: Would Task Force exist without these federal funds?.

YES - Task Force would exist without these federal funds.

"It may still exist but on a much smaller scale - maybe 4 or 5 detectives."

"The Task Force has been in existence since October 1981 and would continue to exist if Federal Funding were eliminated. Agency Chiefs are committed to Task Force approach with respect to Narcotics Enforcement."

"It would exist but would not be as efficient or successful due to loss of personnel and purchasing ability (equipment)."

"The need is there. The desire of the respective agencies is also present. The federal funds make it much easier."

"Prior to federal funding this would not be the case. After seeing the success of the Task Force, the agencies have indicated they will keep the Task Force in operation."

"Would still function, but with a skeleton crew. And, would not be as effective without the federal fund support."

"To some extent TNET existed prior to any federal funds. Whether or how long the agencies would maintain this cooperative effort, absent federal funds, is open to question."

"But we would not have the enhancement personnel nor the mandated training or federal standards which has made us more effective and professional."

NO - Task Force would not exist without these federal funds.

"If it did survive, it would be on a much smaller scale, due to monetary support."

"Local ability to fund positions not likely. Would see a reduced level of investigative ability."

"Unable to support staff."

"Most agencies within Task Force are small and not able to dedicate full-time personnel. Without funds our meager 3.25 positions would not exist."

"Expense."

"Because the budget is about \$400,000. The city provides 1 - Sgt. and 2 - Detectives, the County provides 1 - Detective. The Grant is about \$125,000. The City could be very creative with their officers back into the labor pool."

"These funds are the only reason we exist. Local politicians do not spend money in this area on drug enforcement, unless they absolutely have to."

"There is not self-sufficient local funding or overall support by participating agencies."

"Without the federal assistance to operate the Drug Task Force in our area, it would cease to exist, as local funds are unavailable to support it. Being a rural area, with a timber-dependent economy, the general taxing revenue is decreasing."

"The financial burden would be too much for the involved/ participating agencies."

"Cost of the Task Force is primarily wages, most departments in County can not give up staffing without compensation."

"The Task Force takes a lot more to operate than our communities have to offer. We are not able to get the seizures that everyone had hoped we would."

"The federal funds make possible the High Impact Offender Project. Without these funds, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to have both the County and City to fully fund the Project."

"Currently, local law enforcement agencies do not have the funds or manpower to commit to a Task Force without Federal assistance. It is hoped that enough assets will be generated over the course of this operation to make local funding possible."

**APPENDIX H**

**NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS OF SELECT CASES**

# Escaped killer, drug suspect caught after tip from citizen

BEAVER — Two escaped prisoners — a convicted murderer and a man facing a federal drug indictment — were recaptured near Forks Wednesday after authorities received a tip from a citizen.

At 9:30 a.m. three federal marshals and two Clallam County Drug Task Force detectives converged on a mobile home in the Old Chiefs Place trailer park on Highway 101, at Beaver, sheriff's Sgt. Jim Newton said.

The officers had been watching the trailer for about 24 hours. Forks and Port Angeles, along with sheriff's deputies, assisted in the investigation, he said.

Two men who allegedly overpowered a county jail guard in Poulson, Mont., on Oct. 23, were inside. They were arrested without incident, said Sgt. Dan Gates of the task force.

A loaded shotgun was found, he said, adding that one of the suspects was running to that room when officers stormed the trailer.

One man was identified as Donald Dale Gingras, 32, a Montana state fugitive, who was in custody awaiting sentencing for a murder conviction.

The other was identified as Richard Lee Muschik, 42, a federal fugitive who had been in custody awaiting trial on a federal grand jury indictment of selling LSD and conspiracy to sell that drug.

The two were believed to be in Clallam County because Gingras has relatives in Port Angeles, Newton said.

"He was the only of the two that has any contacts in the area, as far as we know," he said.

A 36-year-old woman who lived in the trailer was also arrested on Clallam County Superior Court warrants for failure to obey court orders, he said.

Authorities were assisted in the investigation through "operation enough," a controversial informant program of the task force. Unveiled this month, it involves a flier that asks people to write down information about people allegedly involved in drug activity.

Gates said he received information through one of the coupons, proving the program works.

"Well, I think the proof is in the pudding," he said, adding the program is not an attempt to violate anyone's civil rights.

**ENOUGH!** I'VE HAD ENOUGH OF DRUGS  
IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD!

I've reason to believe that \_\_\_\_\_  
(Name if known)

\_\_\_\_\_ (Address if known)

---

is using/dealing drugs.

I'm suspicious of activities at \_\_\_\_\_ (Address)

---

I've noticed the following license plates on  
cars in the vicinity of suspected drug activity \_\_\_\_\_

(Include State)

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OPTIONAL

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My Name: \_\_\_\_\_

My Address: \_\_\_\_\_

---

My Phone #: \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL TO: **ENOUGH!**  
CLALLAM COUNTY DRUG TASK FORCE  
c/o 223 E. 4th St.  
Port Angeles, Wa. 98362-3098

OR CALL

Port Angeles-----Sequim      Forks      Clallam Bay  
452-9096                      374-5324      963-2700



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# Four task forces collaborate in drug arrests

By LEW PUMPHREY  
World staff writer

WENATCHEE — Two couples arrested Friday in Wenatchee had been tailed from their homes in Snohomish and Spokane counties by drug task force agents, who moved in on the suspects after two pounds of marijuana allegedly changed hands in a Wenatchee motel parking lot.

The four people arrested Friday night face Chelan County charges, but the investigation which led to their arrests came

from four different drug task forces, according to Sgt. Rick Murray, the supervisor for the local Columbia River Drug Task Force.

Booked into the Chelan County Regional Jail on suspicion of delivery of a controlled substance were Brad C. Wagner, 34, and Deborah C. Wagner, 31, both of Chewelah.

Booked on suspicion of aiding and abetting delivery of a controlled substance were Lee E. Baird, 35, and Cynthia A. Baird, 33, both of Arlington.

Murray said that the Spokane

Regional Drug Task Force was tipped off that a drug transaction was going to happen in Ellensburg sometime Friday evening, at about the same time that the Snohomish Regional Narcotics Task Force was given a tip that people from their area were on their way to Eastern Washington to allegedly buy the marijuana.

Murray said five cars with Spokane County agents followed a Dodge Ram Charger from the Chewelah area, while three cars with Snohomish agents followed a Pontiac from Arlington.

The Kittitas County Regional Drug Task Force was called, because agents originally believed the transaction was planned for Ellensburg.

Murray said the agents eventually figured out the two vehicles were on their way to Wenatchee, so he was called to provide assistance from the Columbia River Drug Task Force, comprised of police officers from Wenatchee, East Wenatchee and Chelan, as well as sheriff's deputies from Chelan and Douglas counties.

Local agents met Spokane

agents near Orondo.

The two shadowed cars stopped at the Red Lion Inn. After the occupants had dinner, a drug transaction was witnessed. Agents arrested the two men in the parking lot, and the two women inside.

One loaded handgun was found in the Pontiac, but Murray said the arrests were without incident.

"We had so much manpower, and everything went down as planned, so it was very uneventful," he said this morning.

Taking part in the arrests

were four Columbia River Drug Task Force agents, plus two from the Wenatchee police, eight from Spokane and five from Snohomish. Kittitas agents arrived at the scene after the arrests.

About two pounds of marijuana, worth nearly \$5,000, was found in an ice cooler. Murray said. He accused the Wagners of providing the marijuana, but he said, Spokane County agents hadn't yet finished their investigation into where the Wagners allegedly got the dope.

Both the rigs were confiscated, Murray said.

# 18 are arrested in drug raids

By LEW PUMPHREY  
World staff writer

CHELAN — A sweep by the Columbia River Drug Task Force Friday night in Chelan resulted in the arrest of 16 people on suspicion of selling drugs. Two others had been arrested earlier, but their names were not released until this morning.

The 18 people were booked into the Chelan County Regional Jail on suspicion of 64 counts of delivery of drugs, mostly cocaine but also heroin and marijuana.

Chelan County Sheriff Dan Breda said the arrests were made by the drug task force agents, Chelan Police Department, the sheriff's department and Liquor Control Board agents.

Breda alleges that drug traf-

ficking went on at three liquor establishments, where some of the arrests were made Friday.

Breda said agents arrested Luis Villa Vargas, 21, Manson, after he allegedly sold four ounces of cocaine to drug task force agents for \$5,000. He was arrested last Wednesday, but his arrest was not made public until this morning. He's being held in jail on suspicion of five counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, suspected to be cocaine.

Breda said a man identified as Carlos Perez was arrested on suspicion of three counts of unlawful delivery of cocaine in conjunction with the weekend sweep. However, no one by that name is lodged at the jail. A man who uses an alias similar to that name has been in jail since Jan. 17 on suspicion of possession of a controlled sub-

stances with intent to deliver. Task force officials could not clarify the confusion over the suspect's name.

Those arrested Friday, all of Chelan, and all arrested on suspicion of delivery of a controlled substance, suspected to be cocaine, include Jose Luis Pena, 32, three counts; Salvador Chavez Munguia, 25, four counts; David M. Garrett, 41, two counts; Clyde F. Mead, 26, two counts; Daniel G. Garcia, 26, five counts; Jay K. Harding, 27, one count; Martin Bravo, 26, four counts; Duain F. Spurgeon, 42, one count; Aurelio Dienez Torrez, 23, three counts; and Juan Garibay Rodriguez, 26, five counts. Also arrested was Benjamin Gonzalez Sandoval, 31, Waterville, on four counts of suspicion of delivery of a controlled substance, suspected to be cocaine.

Also arrested were Jesus Sallas Moreno, 30, Chelan, on six counts of suspicion of unlawful delivery of controlled substance, three counts of suspected cocaine, two counts of suspected heroin and one count of suspected marijuana.

Dennis V. Hammons, 41, Chelan Falls, was arrested on suspicion of delivery of a controlled substance, suspected to be marijuana. J. Dolores Lujano, 23, Chelan, was arrested on suspicion of three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, suspected to be marijuana, and one count of aiding and abetting delivery of marijuana.

Reported on Friday was the arrest of Dianna R. Morris, 36, Chelan, on suspicion of five counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, suspected to be cocaine.

# Drugs make foundation for county's crime

By MATTHEW ERLICH  
of the Herald

## Police make cocaine haul

MOSES LAKE — Perhaps the biggest cocaine bust ever within the city limits here was made Wednesday, Moses Lake police said this morning.

Authorities bought 1½ kilos of cocaine, estimated to be worth more than \$100,000, then arrested two men who allegedly sold them the drug, said Dean Mitchell, assistant police chief.

Gerardo Garcia Saucedo, 19, Moses Lake, and Jeronimo Barragan Nava, 22, Kennewick, were booked into the county jail on suspicion of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.

Both men were armed with handguns, but were arrested without trouble, Mitchell said. The incident occurred at about 6 p.m.

"To my knowledge this is the largest cocaine seizure in

the city limits of Moses Lake ever," he said. "These men are very significant in the drug trade to come up with that much cocaine."

"We feel we've made a significant impact on the cocaine market in Moses Lake with this bust. But there's a lot more out there, I can assure you of that," Mitchell said.

The drug bust was a joint effort involving police, Grant County Interagency Narcotics Enforcement Team, and officers of the Spokane Regional Drug Task Force.

Mitchell said an arrangement was made with the suspects within the past few days to buy cocaine at a local motel. Once undercover drug agents exchanged money for the drug, the arrests were made. Officers also seized a car and \$200 in cash.

According to law enforcement officials, a balance of education and enforcement is necessary in Grant County's fight against drug abuse, a source for a variety of other crimes.

"Just about every crime in Grant County is drug-related in some way," said Sheriff Bill Wiester.

He said a typical example involves residential burglaries and car prowls. Guns, radar detectors and stereo equipment are among the items taken in those instances, eventually to barter for drugs, said Wiester.

"It's quite common at the street level for money not to exchange hands," said Wiester. Instead, he said, there is a trade in stolen property for drugs like cocaine.

It's only at higher levels of the distribution of illegal drugs that stolen items are exchanged for cash or more drugs for dealers, Wiester said.


He said suspects arrested after a series of burglaries have the same comment.

"Every group tells us they have a severe drug problem," said Wiester. Because of its location near the center of the state, Moses Lake is at something of a crossroads of drug traffic, he said. Highways provide easy access between Seattle and Spokane and north from Yakima.

"(Drug-related) cash and narcotics stream through this area," said Wiester.

One solution has been an expanded drug enforcement team, INET, The Inter-local Narcotics Enforcement Team, formed three years ago. It is made up of representatives from the sheriff's office, and Moses Lake, Ephrata and Quincy police departments.

The team expanded from three to five officers with a federal grant obtained last September. The \$110,000 grant is from the federal Department of Justice through the state Department of Community



Grant County Sheriff Bill Wiester displays an Uzi machine gun, one of the weapons in the sheriff's office arsenal to fight drug abuse. Wiester said the drug abuse problem needs to be solved with a balance of education and enforcement.

Development. An additional \$37,844 in county matching funds was added to the total to help get the grant. Wiester credits the county board of commissioners to obtain the funds.

Wiester has said county law enforcement faces a "real problem" from indoor growing operations of marijuana.

According to INET statistics, more than \$20,000 in equipment used to grow marijuana, along with more than 1,000 marijuana plants have been seized in arrests. One of the largest included equipment seized in the arrest of a Moses Lake dentist.

Wiester said he has been pleased with the increase in INET search

warrants served, 53, and resulting arrests, 64. While marijuana growing operations pose a problem, so does seizing other drugs.

Wiester said cocaine has become the drug of choice among users, most of whom are in their 20s. That age has decreased since about seven years ago, said Wiester.

It's an age that could be influenced through education with tips for drug abuse prevention. Wiester has emphasized the need for education like that available through the Moses Lake Police Department DARE program.

"A lot of the younger generation is using cocaine," he said. Since INET's inception, he said the street price per gram of the drug has been

raised from \$75-\$80 to \$120 in what Wiester calls a tribute to INET's efforts.

He explained when the price goes up, it shows active enforcement on the streets.

The drug originates in Mexico and moves through California before arriving in the Tri-Cities area and Moses Lake, said Wiester. INET has coordinated arrests in those areas with other anti-drug task forces.



Ephrata Police Chief Larry Carpenter shows off the anti-drug truck acquired through drug raids

## Pickup now helps in drug fight

EPHRATA — A visible sign of the success of Grant County's war on drugs will be on display at community festivals and parades this summer, say officers of the county's Interagency Narcotics Enforcement Team.

A pickup seized in a drug raid last fall has been converted into a drug awareness

vehicle promoting both INET and the Drug Abuse Resistance Education program (DARE).

Grant County sheriff's officials said the pickup was well-received at its first appearance in Grand Coulee last weekend.

"It demonstrates the type of assets being taken away from

drug traffickers," Sheriff Bill Wiester said.

Dubbed "Flat Foot," the 1974 GMC pickup features a high-lift kit and 40-inch tires.

The truck's engine, carburetor and exhaust system were rebuilt using money seized in drug raids, along with donations from individuals and businesses.

The sheriff's office and police in Quincy, Ephrata and Moses Lake supply officer and money for INET.

Moses Lake's DARE program is slowly spreading to other Basin communities.

"Both programs are working and do work hand in hand," Wiester said.



**DRUG BUST** — David Pitts, commander of the Kittitas County Regional Drug Task Force, looks over the items confiscated yesterday in an undercover drug arrest in the Upper County. (Record photo by Joseph Ross)

## Drug task force makes arrests

In the second major drug bust for the Kittitas County Regional Drug Task Force in two days, investigators arrested two men Friday afternoon outside of Cle Elum and confiscated three-and-a-half pounds of marijuana with an estimated street value of \$10,000. Arrested were a Cle Elum man, 25, charged with delivery of marijuana, and another Cle Elum man, 25, charged with being an accomplice to the delivery. According to John Harris, task force coordinator, the arrests and a one-month undercover investigation by the task force members assisted by the Washington State Patrol, Cle

Elum Police Department and several other agencies. "This is a significant amount of marijuana to be in one place," said Harris. The men were arrested after they reportedly tried to sell an undercover police officer three plastic bags of marijuana, said Harris. Besides the marijuana, task force members also seized a loaded .41-caliber handgun, \$1,750 in cash — used in the controlled purchase — and the vehicle used to transport the illegal substance. "We removed the handgun from the waistband of one of the suspects," said Harris.

The arrests went smoothly with six law enforcement personnel participating, he said. In addition to the above mentioned agencies, others involved were the Central Washington University Police Department, and Kittitas County Sheriff's Office. Funds for the task force are made possible through the state Department of Community Development. The arrests come just two days after the task force coordinated a drug bust in Ellensburg, which resulted in the arrest of four men and the confiscation of one pound of cocaine, a handgun, \$252 in cash and two vehicles in the parking lot of a grocery store Wednesday night.

### In Ellensburg

## Four arrested in drug raids

Members of the Kittitas Valley County-Regional Drug Task Force arrested a man and a woman yesterday on drug-related charges, bringing to four the number of persons arrested in the last three days as part of an ongoing investigation. There is a warrant outstanding for one more person whom investigators expect to charge within the next day or two, said John Harris, task force coordinator. Last night an Ellensburg man, 25, was arrested at his home and charged with one count of delivery

of cocaine, two counts of delivery of controlled substances, and three counts of delivery of methamphetamine. Bail was set at \$20,000. Arrested at the same residence was a woman, 24, who was charged with two counts of being an accomplice to deliver controlled substances. She is being held on \$10,000 bail. Two others arrested on Tuesday in a separate raid were a 31-year-old Ellensburg woman who was charged with conspiracy to deliver cocaine and a 34-year-old man at the same residence who was charged with four counts of delivery of cocaine. The woman is free after posting \$3,000 bail while the man is being held on \$10,000 bail.

The raids are the culmination of a three month investigation by the task force in cooperation with local and county law enforcement agencies. The assistance of the United States Justice Department and Department of Community Development was also instrumental, Harris said.

"We believe we're making progress. Any time we can arrest four of five people I think we make a significant impact on the local drug trade," Harris said.

In addition to a small amount of marijuana and methamphetamine, agents seized an automobile valued at \$1,000, a 30-30 rifle and a 22-caliber rifle, and drug paraphernalia.



**DRUG BUST** — Ellensburg police take away one of two suspects arrested Wednesday after a drug bust in a grocery store parking lot netted approximately one pound of cocaine. The operation, which involved several law enforcement agencies, was coordinated by members of the Kittitas County Drug Task Force. (Record photo by David Grant)

## Major drug bust here nets \$45,000 in cocaine

Investigators arrested two men Wednesday night in the parking lot of an Ellensburg grocery store and confiscated approximately one pound of cocaine with an estimated street value of \$45,000.

Members of the Kittitas County Drug Task Force — lead agency in the month-long investigation, assisted by Ellensburg police, the Grant County Drug Task Force and several other agencies — netted the pair at 8 p.m.

Arrested were an Ellensburg man, 22, charged with delivery of cocaine and a Wapato man, 20, charged with conspiracy to deliver cocaine.

Also arrested were two other Ellensburg men, ages 24 and 20, at a house in the 800 block of North Pine Street. Both were charged with delivery of cocaine.

Besides the cocaine, task force members seized an unloaded .22 caliber handgun, \$252 cash, a

pickup and a second vehicle where the cocaine was found.

"The impact is considerable. We think there's several thousand doses contained in the package. It's a tremendous impact on drug trafficking in Ellensburg," said John Harris, coordinator of the Kittitas County task force.

Harris said the rock-like consistency of the cocaine — which was packaged in a clear plastic bag — indicated it was very high quality and would likely have been cut before being sold in smaller amounts. He estimated the wholesale price of the cocaine at \$12,000.

David Pitts, Kittitas County prosecutor and commander of the five-person task force, said he was not sure of the planned final destination of the drug but he suspected that it had come from Yakima.

"Ellensburg is just like every community in the state. Drugs are a problem," he said.

The arrests went smoothly, with 15 law enforcement personnel participating. Other agencies involved in the bust were the National Guard which sent an interpreter, Washington Department of Community Development, U.S. Department of Justice, and Central Washington University police. Harris said he expects more arrests as a result of the investigation.

## Agencies seize pot plants in two area raids

■ Drug detectives from three law enforcement agencies teamed up to confiscate an estimated \$138,000 in growing marijuana in raids this week, the commander of the Snohomish Regional Narcotics Task Force said Thursday.

The marijuana was found as part of an ongoing investigation into indoor pot farms by task force detectives working with their counterparts at the federal Drug Enforcement Administration and the State Patrol narcotics division, task force commander Bill Karban said.

A total of 54 mature marijuana plants were found in a home in the 13400 block of 239th Place SE on Wednesday, he said. A woman was arrested and her truck was seized.

That raid led to another indoor

pot farm in the 21300 block of 45th Avenue SE, Bothell, where 154 plants, primarily immature starters, were found. A man was arrested and five guns plus computer records were seized, Karban said.

"We are anticipating additional arrests and additional (marijuana) grows," he added.

## Arlington pot bust nets \$235K in mature plants

As part of an area-wide crackdown, a home just north of Arlington was raided and 389 marijuana plants seized by drug enforcement officials.

An Arlington man was arrested and an estimated \$235,000 in nearly mature marijuana plants seized during the April 18 raid, said Snohomish Regional Narcotics Task Force Commander Bill Karban.

Also confiscated were an undisclosed amount of growing equipment and two doberman pinchers. The dogs were taken to the animal shelter, Karban said.

Drug detectives with the Snohomish Regional Narcotics Task Force, federal Drug Enforcement Administration and Washington State

Patrol found the marijuana growing in a home in the 25500 block of Mountain Drive in the Meadow Ridge subdivision, Karban said.

The detectives were backed up during the raid by Snohomish County sheriff's deputies, Karban said.

A man, 52, was arrested for allegedly manufacturing a controlled substance. He has two prior convictions, so federal charges are possible in this case, Karban said.

"He could be looking at 10 years," said Karban.

The task force, DEA and state patrol worked the case together because they received tips about the marijuana farm almost simultaneously, Karban said.

## City drug task force says arrest halts second major cocaine ring

By Bill Morlin  
Staff writer

For the second time in a week, Spokane law enforcement officials said Wednesday they have broken a major cocaine ring capable of distributing a kilogram or more of the drug every week.

In the latest case, Joseph P. Compogno is accused of heading an organization that distributed more than a kilogram of cocaine each week, said officers assigned to the Spokane Regional Drug Task Force.

Compogno, 35, was arrested Sept. 19 at a Spokane motel, where a kilo of cocaine, \$5,500 in cash and a .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun were confiscated, agents said.

A kilo of cocaine — 2.2 pounds — sells for \$28,000 in the Spokane area, but is worth far more when sold in smaller quantities, agents said.

Arrested with Compogno were Arlene C. Bryant, 40, Christopher C. Kettlety, 32, and Daniel K. Langan, 30, all of Spokane. They were booked on state charges of possession of cocaine and may face federal charges, authorities said.

Compogno was indicted Tuesday in U.S. District Court on charges of possession with intent to distribute cocaine

and use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, said Assistant U.S. Attorney Tom Rice.

A search of Compogno's residence at E2328 Rockwell turned up evidence of a cocaine distribution organization, including kilo wrappers, scales and firearms, task force officers said.

A day before Compogno's arrest, officers went to E2501 Queen and arrested Kathleen A. Deardorff, 28, and Mark A. Palozzie, 35, for their alleged involvement in the organization.

They were booked on state charges of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, but also may face federal charges, authorities said.

The case was the second cocaine arrest announced in a week by the drug task force, which is composed of city police, sheriff's deputies and State Patrol officers.

Last week, the task force announced the arrest of Anthony P. Caronna, 53, who was accused of bringing two to four kilos of cocaine into Spokane every six weeks.

Caronna, who had been a federal fugitive since 1977, was arrested at a cabin at Diamond Lake in Pend Oreille County.

He was indicted Tuesday in U.S. District Court on federal drug charges.

# Hoodsport man gets 25 years on drug charges

By Armando Machado  
The Olympian

Klaus Frodert — a Hoodsport man convicted in April for "leading organized crime" in South Puget Sound — was sentenced Monday in Thurston County Superior Court to 25 1/2 years in prison.

Frodert, 38, also was sentenced to 20 years in prison for a conviction of delivery of cocaine, and to lesser terms for convictions of possession of cocaine and delivery of marijuana. But all terms are to be served concurrently.

Frodert was found guilty of the charges by a jury in April, but was acquitted of two other drug

charges. The sentences were handed down by Judge Robert J. Doran, who also ordered Frodert to pay \$50,000 in fines to the Thurston County Interlocal Drug Fund — money used to fight drug-related crimes. In Washington state, leading organized crime carries a maximum penalty of life in prison.

The convictions stemmed from the Oct. 3, three-county bust of Frodert's drug ring, which netted a dozen other suspects, all but two of whom have been convicted on related charges. The two were not charged. Among those convicted were Frodert's wife, Lori Jean Fro-

dert, who was 19 at the time of the arrests.

The drug sweep by the Thurston County Narcotics Task Force and other law-enforcement agencies was conducted at two Thurston County homes, a Mason County home, a Thurston County business, and on Interstate 5 in Vancouver, Wash., the authorities said.

The Martin Way business was F&C Trucking, which was owned by Frodert and one of the others convicted, Steven D. Collins, then 39.

Police said the trucking company was used to launder money from the drug ring. They said the

## Comment

Lacey police Lt. John Suessman, head of the Thurston County Narcotics Task Force, said late Monday Klaus Frodert's prison sentence "it certainly sends a clear message that drug dealing and organizing is not going to be tolerated in our community. This is a substantial sentence. We put a lot of hard work in this case."

money-laundering allegation was part of the leading-organized-crime charge against Frodert.

# County drug task force has most successful year

■ A task-force officer credits federal funding, more detectives and close work between police agencies for seizing over \$100,000 in drug money in 1991.

By Armando Machado  
The Olympian

It was a very good year for the Thurston County Narcotics Task Force.

In 1991, the task force made 160 arrests (141 for felonies) and seized \$4.4 million in cocaine, methamphetamine and other drugs, \$101,400 in suspected drug money and 100 firearms, according to a police report released Wednesday.

## DRUG WATCH

Public safety in South Sound

"We always want to do better, of course — but it was the best year ever," said Olympia police Detective Ken Perkins, task-force intelligence officer. Perkins noted that "the total cash seized for the previous five years was \$94,000. In 1991 alone, we had well over \$100,000."

He attributed the successful year to local police agencies working closer together and having more detectives assigned to the task force.

He also noted that the task force began receiving federal funding for office equipment and a drug-tips hotline in September 1990. The local force is one of 22 drug task

## Drug hotline

Anyone with information about suspected drug-related crimes is encouraged to call 456-4080. All calls are kept confidential.

Informants' tips prove valuable to the Thurston County Narcotics Task Force. In December alone, the task force made 11 arrests and seized \$292,800 in drugs, \$16,500 in suspected drug money and 15 firearms.

forces in Washington state that receive funds through the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Drug Task Force Assistance program. The 160 arrests rank as the task force's

highest total ever for a single year, the report said. Next highest were 138 arrests in 1987 and again in 1989, the report said.

"As for the street value of drugs seized, the last time the force seized more than \$4 million in narcotics was in 1987 — when detectives confiscated \$4.8 million worth, the report showed.

The task force is made up of eight detectives from the Olympia, Lacey and Tumwater police departments, the Thurston County Sheriff's Office and the Washington State Patrol.

Also assigned to the force are two Thurston County deputy prosecutors and a three-member support staff, including a sergeant from the Washington State National Guard.

Drug Watch appears monthly in the South Sound section.

# Narcotics task force registers successes

■ Also, a national organization recognized the Thurston County group for its cooperation between jurisdictions.

By Armando Machado  
The Olympian

Members of Thurston County's narcotics task force say they are making gains in the war on drugs but that they need more help from the public.

More than \$3 million worth of drugs and \$16,000 in suspected drug money were seized during the first six months of 1991, police said this week.

Also during that period, the task force arrested 70 felony suspects and 15 mis-

demeanor suspects; served 30 search warrants; raided 13 marijuana growing operations; and seized 992 marijuana plants, 28 firearms and four vehicles.

"We're making lots of arrests; we're seizing lots of drugs," said task force supervisor John Suessman, a Lacey police lieutenant.

"For all of last year we seized over \$4 million, and for the first six months of this year we seized over \$3 million — so we're doing very well."

Suessman said the unit is receiving plenty of drug tips. However, some potential tipsters "are a bit reluctant to bother the police department — and it's no bother; that's why we're here. We need the involvement, for them to keep in close contact with us."

The task force was recognized by the

Western States Information Network, a federal organization that provides drug intelligence information to law enforcement agencies in Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska and Hawaii.

During the annual WSIN conference in Sacramento last month, the task force — one of 22 in Washington state — was named Washington's Agency of the Year, for exemplifying the cooperation necessary for effective narcotics enforcement.

Because of increased information sharing, for example, a drug case in Spokane or Seattle may lead to an Olympia connection which in turn may lead to an Olympia bust, police said.

Suessman noted that the WSIN award "should not make anybody think that we've won the war on drugs. The street value of drugs has not gone up, and the availability

of drugs has not diminished."

The Thurston County Narcotics Task Force, formed about 10 years ago, consists of eight investigators from the Olympia, Lacey and Tumwater police departments, the Thurston County Sheriff's Office and the Washington State Patrol.

Also assigned to it are two Thurston County deputy prosecutors and three support staffers, one from the state National Guard and two from the city of Lacey.

The unit's biggest success story this year came in April on Tilley Road, when \$2 million worth of methamphetamine was confiscated and one man was arrested. Methamphetamine is a chemical used to produce methamphetamine.

The suspect, Warren Hamblin, later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three and a half years in prison.

## Around South Sound

### 17 arrested on suspicion of drugs, firearms possession

The Thurston County Narcotics Task Force arrested 17 suspected felons and seized more than \$158,000 worth of cocaine, heroin and other drugs during December, a task force spokesman said.

Also confiscated were several sticks of dynamite, a stungun and three firearms, said Lacey police Lt. John Suessman, who heads the force.

The task force, which operates with help from federal funds, is made up of detectives from the Thurston County Sheriff's Office, Olympia, Lacey and Tumwater police, and the Washington State Patrol.

Anyone with information that may lead to drug arrests is asked to call 456-4080, Suessman said. All calls are kept confidential.

## ► SOUTH SOUND SNAPSHOT

### Thurston drug arrests

The following compares drug cases handled by the Thurston County Narcotics Task Force in the first quarter of 1991 and 1992.

First quarter of 1991

Arrests: 48  
Drugs: \$535,600  
Cash: \$12,782  
Firearms: 22

First quarter of 1992

Arrests: 36  
Drugs: \$222,400  
Cash: \$74,047  
Firearms: 11

Source: Narcotics Task Force

Robin Murphy/The Olympian

# Two Grandview residents apprehended in drug raids

BY TOM MCCRADY

Four Lower Yakima Valley adults, including two from Grandview, were arrested last Wednesday, April 17, on cocaine-related charges in a raid involving over 60 law enforcement officers.

Arrested were Mario Mendoza-Ceja, 29, Grandview; Ramon Castillo-Galvan, 35, Sunnyside; Ignacio Barajas-Mata, 34, Sunnyside; and Maria Aurora Garcia, 31, Grandview. Castillo-Galvan and Barajas-Mata were arraigned on charges of delivery of a controlled substance. Mendoza-Ceja was arraigned for sale of a controlled substance, and Garcia for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. All appeared in Yakima County Superior Court on Tuesday, April 23.

According to Sgt. Tom Zweiger, supervisor of the Lower Valley Narcotics Task Force, the investigators came from several undercover purchases of cocaine in the Sunnyside, Mabton, and Grand-

view areas over the last four months. More arrests are anticipated within the next 30 days, he said.

He said over 60 officers from Grandview, Granger, Mabton, Sunnyside, Toppenish, Wapato, the Yakima Nation, Zillah, Yakima County Sheriff's Office, and the Washington State Patrol participated in the drug raids. They were assisted by personnel from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Yakima and Tri-Cities task forces.

Seven search warrants were served on Grandview and Sunnyside area residences beginning at about 8 a.m. Warrants were executed at 206 Douglas Street, Grandview; 1005 Conestoga Way, Grandview; 230 Nicolai Avenue, Sunnyside; 2990 Maple Grove Road, Sunnyside; 501 Continental Road, Sunnyside; 2351 Lincoln

Avenue, Sunnyside; and 413 1/2 South 11th Street, Sunnyside.

In addition to the arrests, officers seized \$21,552 in cash, 14 ounces of suspected cocaine, four semi-automatic handguns, and four vehicles. Sgt. Zweiger said cocaine has a wholesale value of \$800 per ounce. One suspect had about three ounces of suspected cocaine on his person, along with \$1,000 in cash. Police seized \$21,000 in cash from his home.

"It was very successful as far as who we arrested, and what we accomplished," the task force supervisor said of the raids. "It was the best interagency effort I have ever seen. I have never seen anything come close to it."

He said coordinating the many agencies involved was a "monumental effort". It took a week to plan the raids, and one day to brief the officers involved. A command post was established at the Sunnyside Police Department.

Sgt. Zweiger said the suspects were not "street level" violators, but rather "kilo traffickers." A kilo is about 2.2 pounds of drugs.

## Suspect netted in Drug Sting guilty

OKANOGAN - A former Oroville man was sentenced to nearly two years in jail after admitting to one count of delivery of cocaine, according to the Okanogan County Prosecutor's office.

Kevin Bartell, 38, Okanogan, plead guilty to the charge in Okanogan County Superior Court last week. He was sentenced to 23 months in jail, and 12 months of community placement, said Assistant Criminal Deputy Prosecutor Mike McNeff.

"He was allowed 60 days before he has to report to begin serving his sentence," said McNeff. "He will then be sent to a facility at Shelton, WA, before being placed at a correctional facility."

Bartell was one of seventeen suspects rounded up in the largest drug sting operation in Okanogan County history. The drug sting was based on investigations made by the North Central Washington Narcotics Task Force.

"At the time of Bartell's bail hearing Okanogan County Prosecutor Jack Burchard accused the suspect of being "a cocaine dealer and making his living dealing coke". The delivery that Bartell plead guilty

to was on March 28, 1990. He was originally charged with three other narcotics charges as well, but they

were dismissed during plea bargaining. In addition to his sentence Bartell was fined \$1,000.

## Major cocaine bust in Brewster area

BREWSTER - Over a kilo of cocaine with a street value in excess of \$15,000 was seized in what is being called the county's largest drug bust in over two years.

Members of the North Central Washington Narcotics Task Force, the Okanogan County Sheriff's department, and troops from the National Guard were called in to aid in the arrest that occurred in a mobile home located south of Brewster.

Authorities surrounded, then searched a mobile home where more than a kilogram of cocaine, \$4,500 in cash and a small caliber semiautomatic rifle were found.

A woman and two men, all residents of Brewster were arrested. Booked into the county jail were Florencia G.

Portillo, Rafael M. Garibay and Ventura M. Valdobinos.

Valdobinos, 39, was charged with delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver.

Garibay, 45, was charged with delivery of a controlled substance and conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine).

Portillo, 36 was charged for possession of a controlled substance.

Weed said that the bust was the result of over two months of undercover work by the drug task force, adding that a confidential informant for the task force had allegedly purchased a half ounce of cocaine from one of the suspects.

## Feds take pot case

OMAK - The U.S. attorney's office has taken over the case of a rural Omak couple charged with growing about \$100,000 worth of marijuana in their Crumbacher Estates home.

Jerald J. Oakes, 29, and his wife, Colleen M. Oakes, 26, have been indicted on federal charges of possessing, growing and delivering marijuana, said Joe Solseng, deputy prosecutor in Okanogan County.

Concurrently, charges filed in Okanogan County Superior Court against the Oakeses were dropped, Solseng said.

Solseng said penalties against the couple would be much higher under federal law - a minimum of five years in prison instead of about 90 days in jail - than if they were prosecuted and

convicted in Okanogan County.

The federal government also is taking over a case in which the Oakes' \$100,000 house would be confiscated because it was used to grow marijuana, Solseng said.

If the county succeeded in confiscating the house, about 80 percent of which is paid for, the state would take 75 percent of the profit, Solseng said.

With the U.S. attorney's office seeking title to the house, the county would receive about 90 percent of the profit, he said.

The Oakeses were arrested by agents of the North Central Washington Narcotics Task Force Nov. 4 after 232 marijuana plants and five pounds of marijuana buds were found in the basement of their home.

# Two held after body found

## Investigators say victim probably beaten, stabbed

By ANDY NORSTADT  
of the Herald staff

Two 19-year-old men were arrested Sunday evening after the body of a man was found in the Nooksack River just north of Nugents Corner.

Cameron Dee "Buck" Howard, of 5175 Everson-Goshen Road, and Richard Scott Lester of Oak Harbor were booked into Whatcom County Jail without bail on suspicion of homicide.

Deputies are "90 percent sure" of the victim's identity, but will await confirmation

before releasing his name, said Whatcom County Sheriff Dale Brandland. The man thought to be in his 60s, apparently had been living in his car, the sheriff said.

An autopsy is scheduled today to determine the cause of death. Investigators say he may have been beaten and stabbed.

Brandland said.


The two men were arrested without incident at separate locations Sunday evening after investigators received a tip from a confidential source through the Northwest Regional Drug Task Force, Brandland said. Robbery is the suspected motive. The

man probably died Thursday evening at the boat launch near the Nugents Corner Bridge, Brandland said.

The sheriff said one of the suspects apparently was a casual acquaintance of the victim.

The man's body was found caught in a logjam about one mile north of the bridge.

The case began Saturday afternoon when the man was reported missing after his vehicle was found in the Nugents Corner area. He had not been seen for several days.



# Drug raid county's largest

## Two men arrested, street value put at \$50 million

By CATHY LOGG  
of the Herald staff

BLAINE — Authorities arrested two men and seized 100 pounds of cocaine with a street value totaling \$50 million in the largest drug raid ever in Whatcom County, federal officials announced here this morning.

Timothy Andrew Murray, 42, of Surrey, B.C., is being held without bail in Seattle. He appeared before a U.S. magistrate there on Friday after his arrest last Tuesday in

Bellingham.

Federal investigators also arrested Murray's alleged accomplice, Moises Badillo Sanchez, a Panamanian citizen reportedly living illegally in Miami, Fla.

Authorities arrested Sanchez in a New York City hotel room as the cocaine arrived from Bellingham, said Robert D. Parks, Drug Enforcement Administration's agent in charge in Blaine.

The uncut cocaine is valued at \$12 million to \$15 million, according to federal

guidelines. The street value soars after the drug is cut with other substances and packaged in small amounts for sale.

Sanchez was arraigned by a federal magistrate in New York and will be returned to Seattle to face charges with Murray in U.S. District Court, Parks said.

The cocaine shipment is believed to be the largest ever to pass through Whatcom County, said Robert L. Sanford, U.S. Customs enforcement agent in charge in Blaine.

Sanford and Parks said, Bellingham is becoming an increasingly important staging area for shipment of drugs between the U.S. and Canada.

The arrests and drug seizure stemmed from a routine cargo inspection Jan. 17 by customs agents in Long Beach, Calif., Parks said. Agents discovered the cocaine from Ecuador concealed in a shipment of manganese destined for Bellingham.

Investigators seized the cocaine in California and substituted bags of cement so the shipment could continue to Bellingham by commercial carrier, Parks said. The cocaine was seized in Blaine. (See DRUGS, Page A2, Col. 1)

## Drugs

(Continued from Page A1)

plane was flown on a government plane under heavy guard and stored temporarily in a Customs warehouse before being moved to a warehouse where Murray picked it up.

Unaware of the government surveillance, Murray removed the cocaine from the bags of manganese and placed it in two suitcases and

several boxes he bought locally, Sanford said.

Investigators arrested him there on Jan. 28, aided by Whatcom County sheriff's deputies and the drug task force, Sanford said.

Murray agreed to cooperate with investigators and he was accompanied to New York by a DEA agent, Sanford said. The two delivered part of the cocaine to Sanchez, and New York Customs and DEA agents arrested him as he met with Murray, Sanford said.

# County couple accused of second meth lab

By CATHY LOGG  
of the Herald staff

A Whatcom County couple arrested Friday night when authorities raided a suspected methamphetamine laboratory already were awaiting a trip to prison after losing an appeal of a 1988 conviction for operating a similar drug lab.

Jack L. Darwin, 57, and Johanna G. Darwin, 39, of 8760 Custer School Road are each being held in Whatcom County Jail on \$20,000 bail.

The couple's four children, ages 2 months to 15 years, have been placed with Child Protective Services, said Whatcom County Sheriff's Sgt. Jeff Parks.

Parks said investigators seized an undisclosed amount of suspected methamphetamine, chemicals and equipment used to make the drug. A federal Drug Enforcement Administration chemical waste disposal team removed the toxic chemicals and equipment after investigators removed samples and the suspected drugs, said DEA Agent Bob Parks.

The agent said there were enough chemicals to make about four pounds of methamphetamine, known on the street as "crank."

"This case is significant because Darwin was out on appeal on his previous arrest," the agent said. "This guy was a prior offender and he was right back at it. Anytime we have something like that, we would make that a priority. That always peaks our interest."

The Darwins were arrested April 28, 1988, when sheriff's deputies, DEA agents and members of the Northwest Regional Drug Task Force raided the couple's home. Investigators at that time seized a large amount of property, including more than \$6,300 in cash.

In August that year, the couple received a four-year sentence, much stiffer than the standard range of three to nine months in jail, according to court papers.

The two appealed the sentence and were awaiting a higher court review. In January, the state Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence.

Authorities said the prison term

was to be imposed soon in the 1988 case.

Friday's raid adds to the couple's troubles. "It was quite obvious that what they were doing was not just for personal use, it was manufacturing with intent to sell," Sheriff's Sgt. Parks said.

The Darwins were not home when officers arrived about 5 p.m. to serve a search warrant, he said. One of their children and a neighbor child were the only ones at the residence. He said the neighbor child was sent home.

An officer arrested the couple without incident as they approached the house, the sergeant said.

He said about a dozen officers including DEA and U.S. Customs agents, Bellingham police, Whatcom County Sheriff's deputies and state Department of Corrections probation officers participated in the raid.

The drug lab was found in a garage, which now has been posted to warn people that it has been exposed to hazardous chemicals.

Sgt. Parks said the chemicals will be tested.

# Police break up three-state drug ring

By Rick House  
Chronicle Staff

A major cocaine distribution ring, operating out of at least three West Coast states, was severely disrupted during the weekend, according to police who arrested seven people and uncovered \$500,000 buried in a back yard of home in California.

The drug operation, at its peak, was distributing about 100 kilograms of cocaine a month to locations in Washington, Oregon and California, and was funneling millions of dollars a month to locations in the three states, according to Gordon Spanski, coordinator for the Tri-Agency Narcotics Network, a drug enforcement unit in Lewis County.

SPANSKI SAID the arrests and discovery of the buried cash during the weekend were a culmination of a three-month investigation by the drug enforcement team, which uncovered an operation so intricate that police were amazed by its enormity.

The highlight of the investigation

came on Saturday, at a Los Angeles suburb, where officers from Lewis County and the San Bernardino County, Calif., Sheriff's Office served a search warrant and uncovered the buried cash. Police are withholding the exact location where the cash was buried because of an ongoing investigation. More arrests are expected, according to Spanski.

Brent Pfundheller, a task force commander, said Monday that the money was buried in plastic bags, cellophane and inside a plastic pipe. The money was buried nearly two feet deep. The pipe, which contained \$200,000, was buried and then covered with concrete, he said.

LEWIS COUNTY was the hub of the distribution of the drugs, said Spanski. He said 50 to 60 kilograms of cocaine was being funneled through Lewis County and then portioned out to be delivered and sold in the Puget Sound area, Eastern Washington and Oregon.

While the majority of drugs were being shipped elsewhere, some of the cocaine was being sold on the

streets of Lewis County, he said.

A separate operation was used to funnel money back to the original suppliers, said Spanski. Businesses throughout the three states were being used to launder the proceeds from the drug sales, he said.

Police believe the buried money was taken out of circulation long enough to keep it from being traced back to drug sources. After a cooling-off period, it was then transported back to the main suppliers.

As many as 150 people could be involved in the operation, and at least two of those arrested during the weekend were high-ranking administrators of the organization, said Spanski.

"We think we've significantly crippled a major organization for a considerable time," said Spanski, explaining that a similar drug arrest last year by Oregon police resulted in a significant drop in the amount of cocaine being shipped through Lewis County.

In that incident, \$318,000 was seized by police from a man who was transporting it back to California in his car. That seizure and the

one made during the weekend by the Lewis County drug team are part of the same organization, said Spanski.

FOUR PEOPLE were arrested in California in connection with the discovery of the money, and three Centralia residents were arrested in a raid on a Centralia home, at 1208 Windsor Ave., during the weekend.

One of those arrested in Centralia, Jody L. Jacobs, 23, is a "major player" in the organization, said Spanski. He was booked into the county jail for investigation of conspiracy to deliver cocaine.

Luis M. Garcia, 20, and Noel L. Alvarez, 23, were also arrested at the Centralia home and booked into the county jail for investigation of four counts of delivery of cocaine and one count of possession of stolen property.

In addition to the seizure of the \$500,000 in California, two weapons and a vehicle were also taken by police. Authorities will also go through property seizure procedures for the California home.

# Police turn the tables and take away property

By Rick House  
Chronicle Staff

In another move involving an alleged marijuana grower, a drug task force Friday confiscated an 18-foot pleasure boat, a car, jewelry and other goods from a Lacey man who was arrested last month for investigation of running a growing operation.

The seizure of property is an example of the how far police can now go against those alleged to be dealing in drugs, said Gordon Spanski, coordinator of the Unified Narcotics Task Force operating in the Lewis County area.

Officers from the federally-funded drug team pulled up to the Lacey home, located on Sparrow Court in northern Thurston County, and hauled away thousands of dollars worth of property.

The owners of the home, Lynn and Wendy Waters, could only sit and watch as police loaded up furniture, diamond rings and electronic equipment and took it all away. Lynn Waters was arrested in a drug raid last month. He is free on bail, awaiting trial, according to Spanski. Information on Wendy Waters was unavailable Friday evening.

Spanski is hoping UNET will be able to keep the goods, sell them and use the proceeds for future drug stings. The owners have a chance to appeal the seizure, but Spanski said seizure appeals have not been too successful recently, noting that police have been careful to seize goods that have either aided a drug operation or been purchased with drug proceeds.

"We document it pretty well," said Spanski. "As long as we can tack it to that, then we get it."

While there have been many cases in recent years where police have complained about drug dealers receiving relatively light sentences, authorities are singing the praises of seizure laws.

"That's what hurts 'em most—get their assets and get things they profited from (drug sales)," Spanski said.

The task force coordinator said UNET has become much more successful at moving into operations that are being run as a business. The success comes from more experience in dealing with drug sellers, which allows the team to develop more information to set up a more sophisticated intelligence network.

He said that success is shown through statistics that indicate UNET is now bringing in nearly twice as much money as it is spending on drug buys.

Authorities on the drug team said Friday's property seizure was especially satisfying because the original tip on the alleged drug operation came from a concerned citizen. That tip led officers to what they believe is a marijuana-selling business that was feeding areas from the Puget Sound region down into Oregon. Three separate warrants were served, and eight people were arrested, in connection with the information against Waters.

Property taken by police Friday from Waters' home included a 1987 Bayliner inboard-outboard boat, a 1980 Porsche 924, a 48-inch big screen television, a videocassette recorder, a satellite antenna dish and controls, a china hutch, a fox fur coat, two end tables, two diamond rings (1/2-carat and one carat), a 1/2-carat diamond bracelet and a certificate of deposit with a value of \$4,000.

# Sheriff's office seizes tavern in drug probe

By Laura Towey  
Chronicle Staff

A Napavine tavern and the property upon which it sits have been seized by the Lewis County Sheriff's Office as a result of a drug and firearms investigation and raid by the county's Unified Narcotics Enforcement Team.

Frosty's Tavern, complete with appliances and furniture, was seized by law officers Friday.

The county's seizure of the building and real estate stems from a raid last October, in which UNET officers infiltrated narcotics and illicit firearms activities allegedly originating from the tavern, purchasing the illegal drug methamphetamine and a banned firearms such as Chinese machine guns and sawed-off shotguns.

Five people, including Jerry Marks, one of the tavern's owners, were arrested in connection with the raid. Federal firearms charges are expected to be lodged against Marks for the alleged gun sales.

Marks has already pleaded guilty to two counts of methamphetamine delivery and will be sentenced for those convictions later this month in Lewis County Superior Court.

In regard to Friday's property seizure, under state statutes, law

enforcement agencies are permitted to seize property linked to illicit drug activities, and to liquidate those assets for future law enforcement activities.

But what makes the Frosty's Tavern case a landmark is the fact that this is Lewis County's first-ever case in seizing real-estate property as the result of a methamphetamine raid.

According to Lewis County Deputy Prosecutor Ruth Vogel, the county "may well be the first" in the state to deal with such a case.

She added that such matters typically have been dealt with on the federal level, and in this case, her office would be analyzing how such incidents have been handled on the federal level.

Gordon Spanski, coordinator of UNET, agreed with Vogel's statements.

"We're blazing new territory here," he said.

At this point, Vogel said, the tavern building has been shut and a person who temporarily opened the building for business after the raid has been permitted to remove his property from the facility.

"The property has been closed down and sealed," Vogel said.

# Agents seize 4 lbs. of cocaine

By JACK DONLEY

Tri-City area drug agents confiscated more than four pounds of cocaine Tuesday and arrested three people, one of the biggest drug busts in the Mid-Columbia, Benton County Sheriff Jim Kennedy said the arrests capped a four-month investigation that began and ended in Prosser.

Drug agents seized two kilos of cocaine, or about 4.4 pounds, as well as handguns, rifles and two vehicles.

The arrests were made in a pro-

# Drugs

Continued from Page A1

erty store parking lot in Prosser after Metro agents paid the suspects \$50,000.

Kennedy said that is the most money Metro has ever paid during a drug investigation.

The investigation started after Prosser police received a tip. Arrested were:

■ Alberto F. Mojica, 24; Sixto Hernandez, 24; and Angel Pimentel, 27, all of 1855 F. Meade, No. A-3, Prosser. Hernandez and Pimentel are being held on \$50,000 bail, and Mojica is under an investigative hold and bail has not been set.

■ Bertha Sanchez, 29, and Juan Farias Sanchez, 32, both of 1422 W. Fifth Place, Kennewick. Bertha Sanchez's bail was set at \$25,000, and Juan Sanchez's was set at \$50,000.

Agents found a number of weapons at or near the two homes, and found one weapon in a suspect's car. All the weapons were loaded, said Kennedy, and a couple rifles had telescopic sites. They could have been very eas-

ily used to take one of our officers down," he said.

Cash for the drug buy was obtained from a local bank. Kennedy declined to say which one—and in return, Metro wrote the bank a check for the amount. The check was secured by money and property confiscated in previous busts.

Kennedy said the amount of cocaine shows the operation was sophisticated, and that the sellers were not small-time street dealers.

Although law officers are helping the arrests will put a dent in area drug trade, they doubt it will have much of an impact.

Said Chief Ray Cotey of the Prosser Police Department, "I feel there have been some inroads made, but I don't see any end. There will always be someone to take their place."

Cotey and Kennedy praised the Metro unit for the smooth operation. Although Kennedy agrees there will be no long-term effect from the bust, he said Metro's work has helped keep the Tri-City area from being a dangerous place to live.

**APPENDIX I**  
**TASK FORCE DRUG DEALER**  
**INFORMATION CIRCULAR**

# ENOUGH! I'VE HAD ENOUGH OF DRUGS IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD!

I've reason to believe that \_\_\_\_\_  
(Name if known)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Address if known)

is using/dealing drugs.

I'm suspicious of activities at \_\_\_\_\_  
(Address)

I've noticed the following license plates on  
cars in the vicinity of suspected drug activity \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Include State)

## OPTIONAL

My Name: \_\_\_\_\_

My Address: \_\_\_\_\_

My Phone #: \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL TO: **ENOUGH!**  
CLALLAM COUNTY DRUG TASK FORCE  
c/o 223 E. 4th St.  
Port Angeles, Wa. 98362-3098

OR CALL

Port Angeles-----Squim Forks Clallam Bay  
452-9096 374-5324 963-2700



**YOUR CONFIDENTIALITY WILL BE GUARDED.**

*If you can detail specific information, dates, times or additional information, please use a separate sheet of paper.*

**APPENDIX J**

**INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT**

SKAGIT COUNTY INTERLOCAL  
DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE

NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT  
MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TASK FORCE  
INTERLOCAL AGREEMENT

This Interlocal Agreement is made and entered into pursuant to the provisions of RCW 39.34, between City of Mount Vernon, City of Anacortes, City of Burlington, City of Sedro Woolley, Town of Concrete, Town of La Conner, Skagit County, San Juan County, and Swinomish Tribal Community. The City of Mount Vernon and its Police Department will be the applicant jurisdiction and the following agencies are signed as participating jurisdictions:

1. Anacortes Police Department
2. Burlington Police Department
3. Sedro Woolley Police Department
4. Concrete Police Department
5. La Conner Police Department
6. Skagit County Sheriff's Office
7. San Juan County Sheriff's Office
8. Skagit County Prosecutor's Office
9. Swinomish Tribal Police

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The participating agencies have experienced a crime problem due to drug abuse, which has rapidly increased from the 1970's to 1990. This increase stems not only from an increase in population in all areas and in changing drug abuse trends, but also from the lack of resources to maximize drug enforcement efforts. A significant number of major crimes, such as residential and commercial burglary, robbery, assault and murder are committed by drug abusers. This experience is consistent with national trends that reveal a greater number of crimes committed by drug users.

Enforcement efforts directed at reducing drug trafficking in our area have, until recently, been fought by law enforcement agencies working alone. There has been little coordinated and concentrated effort directed at drug offenders and offenses, despite the fact that drug traffickers and the crime they generate do not respect jurisdictional boundaries of municipalities and counties. Significant drug arrests have occurred because of detailed investigations by existing investigative units; however, multi-agency task force operations have been proven more effective at all levels of investigation. An intensive and concentrated effort directed at such offenders can result in significant crime reductions far in excess of the results of additional manpower devoted to normal police patrol functions.

NEEDS STATEMENT

The criminal justice system must do its part to reduce the drug abuse and related problems in our area by a coordinated and concentrated effort, initiating and conducting drug investigations at all levels possible and enforcing the criminal provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act; RCW 69.32, 69.40 and 69.50.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

It is proposed that a special investigations unit or task force be created within the Skagit and San Juan County areas effective on July 1, 1991. The task force will be comprised of personnel assigned from law enforcement agencies within Skagit and San Juan Counties and the Skagit County Prosecutor's Office. It is agreed that one full-time investigative person or more will be assigned from each of the following agencies:

1. Mount Vernon Police Department
2. Burlington Police Department
3. Anacortes Police Department
4. Skagit County Sheriff's Office

CONTEMPLATED UNIT TASKS

The task force's contemplated tasks are investigations centering around narcotics trafficking and manufacturing to impact all levels of dealer where possible, with the primary focus on mid and lower level dealers.

UNIT OBJECTIVES

This section identifies specific targeted objectives to be met by the task force.

1. Identify, arrest and assist in the prosecution of drug dealers.
2. Identify and seize marijuana grow operations.
3. Intercept illegal drug supplies in transit to or through Skagit and San Juan Counties.
4. Identify and eliminate clandestine drug laboratories.
5. Seize assets and restrict use of structures known to be used by drug dealers and manufacturers.
6. Impact drug trafficking organizations previously untouched.

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the State and Local Law Enforcement Act; the US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Administration has appropriated monies to the State of Washington to fund a coordinated state-wide Narcotics Control Program; and

WHEREAS, the Washington State Department of Community Development, hereinafter referred to as DCD, has been designated to administer the Narcotics Control Program for the State of Washington; and

WHEREAS, eligible applicants include cities, counties, and Indian tribes; and

WHEREAS, DCD is soliciting applications from consortia of eligible applicants for the purpose of funding regional, multi-jurisdictional drug law enforcement task force projects to reduce drug trafficking and consumption in the State of Washington; and

WHEREAS, DCD desires to enter into a contract with one participating jurisdiction, hereinafter referred to as the applicant jurisdiction, to administer the task force project on behalf of the participating jurisdictions; and

WHEREAS, the participating jurisdictions desire to enter into an agreement to enable the applicant jurisdiction to be the receiver of any grant, to administer the grant, and to be responsible for its terms and the task force project on behalf of the participating jurisdictions;

NOW, THEREFORE, the participating jurisdictions do hereby agree as follows:

#### SECTION ONE - PURPOSE

The participating jurisdictions:

1. Authorize their respective representatives to execute any and all necessary documents to obtain grant funds available pursuant to the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistant Act for the purpose of establishing a multi-jurisdictional task force;
2. Authorize personnel from their respective jurisdictions to participate in the activities of the task force according to the work plan established in the application for grant funds; and
3. Authorize personnel from the law enforcement agencies of their respective jurisdictions to enter into operation agreements, such as those pursuant to RCW 10.93, if not already established, to enable these agencies to participate in multi-jurisdictional task forces.

#### SECTION TWO - DURATION

This Agreement shall commence on the day and year it is executed by the respective representatives and, in the event the grant application is funded by DCD, shall continue until such grant is terminated.

#### SECTION THREE - FINANCING

Respective participating jurisdictions in the aggregate agree to provide no less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the financial resources to support task force project activities according to the budget described in the application as attached.

In addition, each respective jurisdiction assures that the financial resources provided by jurisdictions do not supplant or replace currently appropriated resources.

The Executive Board Chairperson shall be responsible for the accounting of task force expenditures.

Jurisdictions entering the Agreement will be required to execute a contract which will specify the degree to which they will contribute to the matching funds requirement of the grant. Explicit in this Agreement will be the manner in which contributions will be documented.

All cash seizures will go to the Skagit County Interlocal Drug Fund to be made available to the task force for continuing drug investigative use.

Assets will stay with the task force in accordance with RCW 69.50.505, Seizures and Forfeitures. In the event the Unit is disbanded, such task force equipment derived from seizures will be held as pool equipment by the applicant agency. However, if only one agency terminates, equipment derived from seizures will remain with the Unit. See Section Six.

#### SECTION FOUR - ADMINISTRATION

The City of Mount Vernon is the applicant jurisdiction. The applicant jurisdiction agrees to provide the necessary documentation to receive grant funds and ensure that the provisions of the application as attached, which is the basis for which any grant is awarded, are met. The participating jurisdictions will arbitrate among themselves any dispute arising under this Agreement.

Any disagreements or disputes concerning property disposition, resources, or any other problems that cannot be resolved between the agencies shall be put in writing by the complaining agency and forwarded to the Executive Board Chairperson. The Chairperson will contact the other agency in the dispute and allow that agency to offer a written rebuttal. Upon receiving both written documents of dispute, the Chairperson shall submit them to the Executive Board at the next meeting for arbitration. The Executive Board will issue a ruling in writing to both agencies as to their decision which will be binding to both agencies.

#### SECTION FIVE - BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ORGANIZATION

Overall governance of the Unit's operations, including the setting of investigative priorities and general operating procedures, will be vested in an Executive Board, comprised of appropriate representatives from each participating law enforcement agency within Skagit and San Juan Counties. Each member of the Executive Board shall have an equal vote in the conduct of its business. One member will be elected by the members as Chairperson and will remain in that capacity for one year. The Chairperson shall be responsible for keeping parties to the Interlocal Agreement informed on all matters relating to the functions, expenditures, accomplishments and problems of the task force. If the task force continues in existence, a new election will occur each year. The Executive Board will convene at least quarterly to review the Unit's activities. The Chairperson may call extra sessions as necessary. When the Board votes on any matter, a majority shall be required for passage.

In emergency situations, the Chairperson may conduct a telephone poll of the Executive Board members to resolve an issue.

Under the direction of the Executive Board, the Project Coordinator, Mount Vernon Assistant Chief of Police Mike Barsness, shall act as principal liaison and facilitator between the Executive Board and the task force. The Project Coordinator shall be responsible for keeping the Executive Board informed on all matters relating to the function, expenditures, accomplishments, and the problems of the task force.

All persons assigned to the task force shall work under the immediate supervision and direction of the Task Force Supervisor, who shall be selected by the Project Coordinator, subject to approval of the Executive Board. All persons assigned to the task force shall adhere to the rules and regulations as set forth in the Unit's Policy and Procedures Manual, as well as their individual departmental rules, policies and procedures.

For the purpose of indemnification of participating jurisdictions against any losses, damages or liabilities arising out of the services and activities of the Unit, the personnel so assigned by any jurisdiction shall be deemed to be continuing under the employment of that jurisdiction and its Police Department, See Section 19.

Each agency contributing manpower to the task force will continue that employee as an employee of the contributing agency and will be solely responsible for that employee.

Any duly sworn peace officer, while assigned to duty with the Unit as herein provided and working at the direction of the Executive Board, its Chairperson, Project Coordinator, and the Task Force Supervisor, shall have the same powers, duties, privileges and immunities as are conferred upon him as a peace officer in his own jurisdiction.

#### SECTION SIX - ACQUISITION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

In the event that any equipment is acquired with grant funds received from DCD, the participating jurisdictions agree to use the equipment only for specified program purposes during the life of the grant. After the grant period ends, the participating jurisdictions agree to use the equipment only for approved law enforcement purposes and to devise a process for disposition that meets federal requirements, should the task force operation end.

The furniture purchased with the initial outlay of grant funds shall be retained by the applicant agency after the term of the grant expires. They shall use the equipment only for approved law enforcement purposes and will dispose of it through a program that meets federal requirements.

#### SECTION SEVEN - INTEGRATION

This Agreement contains all the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties including necessary operational agreements between the law enforcement agencies of the respective jurisdictions, if any. No other understandings, oral, or otherwise regarding the subject matter of this Agreement shall be deemed to exist or to bind any of the parties.

#### SECTION EIGHT - DEFINITIONS

The following terms shall have the following meanings, unless the context indicates otherwise:

- A. "Assisting Agency" - Any or all other police agencies contacted for mutual aid by the primarily responsible agency.
- B. "Task Force" - The consortium of officers from the law enforcement agencies that are responsible for carrying out the terms of the grant and drug investigations.
- C. "Mobilization" - To organize or put into readiness for active law enforcement services.
- D. "Mutual Aid" - Aid or assistance in which two or more agencies agree to perform in common.

- E. "Applicant Jurisdiction" - The primary agency, in this case; City of Mount Vernon, who is responsible for administering the DCD grant.
- F. "Participating Jurisdiction" - Agencies agreeing to participate in the grant with the City of Mount Vernon and Mount Vernon Police Department as an assisting agency.
- G. "Primarily Responsible Agency" - The law enforcement agency within whose local geographical jurisdiction a drug investigation is taking place.
- H. "Signatory Agency" - Agencies agreeing to aid the task force and who signed the Mutual Aid and Interlocal Agreements.

#### SECTION NINE - INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND COLLATION

Each participating agency as well as the applicant agency will use the standardized "information sheet" to gather intelligence to be used for targeting task force attention. The forms, and all other intelligence will be forwarded to the task force headquarters where it will be entered and filed for the use of all participating agencies.

#### SECTION TEN - USE OF RESOURCES

It is the intent of the Mount Vernon Police Department and its participating agencies that the task force be utilized to its fullest potential in combatting the drug problem in the Skagit and San Juan County areas. Operations of the task force shall be in full cooperation and coordination with the local jurisdictions in which the investigations are taking place. In all cases, the local agencies will be kept apprised of the status of the cases within their jurisdiction.

In the event of a drug operation occurring within Skagit or San Juan Counties, the first law enforcement resources to be used after those of the task force, shall be those of the participating jurisdiction within whose area the operation is taking place. In the event that these additional resources are inadequate to control the situation, a request for mutual aid under this plan will be made directly to an assisting agency by the primarily responsible agency's supervisor in conjunction with the Task Force Supervisor. Such requests for assistance shall, if possible, specify the number of police officers and types of equipment required, and shall further specify where and to whom the equipment should be delivered.

In all cases, the task force shall endeavor to work closely with the jurisdictions in whose areas the investigations are taking place in regards to manpower and resources.

#### SECTION ELEVEN - RESOURCE LIST

The parties to this Agreement shall provide the names, addresses and phone numbers of its staff who have the authority to commit or request manpower and/or equipment to any mobilization effort.

#### SECTION TWELVE - PRESS RELEASES

All agencies participating in this Agreement will make all press releases through the Project Coordinator or jointly, if requested by the primarily responsible agency.

SECTION THIRTEEN - ARREST POLICIES

Arrest policies will be determined by mutual agreement of the agencies.

SECTION FOURTEEN - TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

Transportation of prisoners to the county jail will be coordinated by the supervising officer in charge of the incident.

SECTION FIFTEEN - REPLACEMENT OF SUPPLIES

In the event of sudden call outs for assistance, the primarily responsible agency should be responsible for supplying and/or replacing supplies needed and/or used by officers from assisting jurisdictions, whenever possible. These supplies include food, gas for police vehicles or any other supplies that are reasonably needed to sustain the officers in enforcing the law. Each agency will be responsible for any repairs and/or damages done to their own vehicles as a result of participation in mutual aid.

SECTION SIXTEEN - SALARIES AND OVERTIME PAY

The primarily responsible agency will not be responsible for salaries or overtime pay for officers from assisting agencies. Each agency shall only be responsible for the actions of its own employees and shall ensure its own employees for false arrest, assault and battery, false imprisonment or detention, malicious prosecution, libel or slander, wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of rights of private occupancy and/or wrongful death, bodily injury, property damage and comprehensive liability. These conditions will also apply to members of the task force provided by the participating agencies. It is further mutually agreed by the participating agencies that any control exerted by the Project Coordinator and Task Force Supervisor shall not supersede this clause.

SECTION SEVENTEEN - INSURANCE COVERAGE

Each agency shall carry, for the duration of this Agreement, general liability, property damage and false arrest insurance with the following minimums:

General Liability	- \$1,000,000
Property Damage	- \$1,000,000
False Arrest	- \$ 500,000

This insurance policy shall have a ten day cancellation notice in the event of termination or material modification of coverage. In the alternative, any agency may satisfy the requirements of this section by remaining a participant in a self insurance pool with protection equal to or greater than that specified herein.

SECTION EIGHTEEN - INJURY COVERAGE FOR OFFICERS

Whenever any commissioned officer of a signatory agency, acting pursuant to this Agreement is injured and thus unable to perform his/her duties by reason of engaging in mutual aid, but is not at the time acting under the immediate direction of his/her employer, the officer or his/her dependents shall be accorded by his/her employer the same benefits which he/she or they would have received had that

officer been acting under the immediate direction of his/her employer in his/her own jurisdiction.

#### SECTION NINETEEN - COMMISSIONS

Full-time, paid, commissioned officers who are responding to any call for mutual aid shall be automatically commissioned by virtue of this Agreement, through the commissioning authority of the primarily responsible agency and, therefore, shall be empowered to exercise the same police authority during the time of the mutual aid as though they were full-time commissioned officers of the primarily responsible agency. This provision shall apply whether the mutual aid request is of:

- A. A formal nature between department heads;
- B. A less formal nature through agreement of watch commanders or shift supervisors; or
- C. When the officers of one jurisdiction cross jurisdiction boundaries to aid or assist the officers of another jurisdiction signatory to this Agreement.

#### SECTION TWENTY - RESERVE OFFICER COMMISSIONS

If signatory agencies have reserve officers or part-time officers, in addition to full-time, paid commissioned officers, they shall normally be exempt from the automatic commissioning as outlined above in Section Nineteen except those reserve officers working under the immediate supervision of a full-time officer. Reserve or part-time officers may be extended automatic commissioning at the direction of the department head who requests mutual aid, PROVIDED HOWEVER that such determination should be worked out in advance among the heads of the signatory agencies.

#### SECTION TWENTY-ONE - TRUSTEE

The applicant agency, as the base of task force operations and records, shall hold in trust all seized property on behalf of the task force, and shall have the authority, upon approval of the Executive Board, to sell, auction, or otherwise dispose of seized property.

All property seized by the task force or on behalf of the task force shall be stored under the care of the task force. All property forfeited by the court, or hearing examiner, shall become the property of the task force. All seized cash or property converted to cash shall be deposited into the Skagit County Interlocal Drug Fund.

An inventory shall be maintained by the Project Coordinator indicating the nature, disposition and location of all task force assets.

#### SECTION TWENTY-TWO - MOBILIZATION PLAN

Each signatory agency should develop and maintain a current plan for the mobilization of its manpower and other resources in order to effectively provide mutual aid to the other signatory agencies.

SECTION TWENTY-THREE - WITHDRAWAL FROM AGREEMENT

Any signatory agency may withdraw from this Agreement for any reason after sending written notice of its intentions to withdraw and when a period of thirty (30) days elapsed or immediately upon written notification that said agency is unable to sustain the required funding. Said notification is to be made by registered letter to the other signatory agencies at their normal business addresses. Withdrawal or non-execution of this Agreement by any one agency shall not affect the continued efficacy of the Agreement with regard to other signatory agencies.

SECTION TWENTY-FOUR - VENUE

This Agreement has been and shall be construed to have been made and delivered in the State of Washington, and it is mutually understood and agreed by each party hereto that this Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Washington, both as to interpretation and performance.

Any action in law, suit inequity, or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of this Agreement or any provisions thereof, shall be instituted and maintained only in courts of competent jurisdiction in Skagit or San Juan Counties.

SECTION TWENTY-FIVE - MODIFICATION

No changes or modification to this Agreement shall be valid or binding upon parties to this Agreement unless such changes or modifications are in writing and executed by the parties.

SECTION TWENTY-SIX - SEVERABILITY

It is understood and agreed to by the parties hereto that if any part of this contract is illegal, the validity of the remaining provision shall not be affected and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed as if the Agreement did not contain the particular illegal part. If it should appear that any provisions herein is in conflict with any statutory provisions of the State of Washington, said provision shall be deemed inoperative and null and void insofar as it may be in conflict therewith, and shall be modified to conform to such statutory provisions.

SECTION TWENTY-SEVEN - NONDISCRIMINATION

The signatory agencies shall not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The agencies shall take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are considered for employment and treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to, the following: upgrading, demotions, or transfers; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoffs or terminations; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; selection for training, including apprenticeship; and participation in recreational and educational activities. The agencies agree to post, in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment, notices identical to those used setting forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause. In all solicitations or advertisement for employees placed by them or on their behalf, the agencies shall state that all qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

SECTION TWENTY-EIGHT - CONCLUSION

Law enforcement agencies are faced with the responsibility of narcotics investigations with decreasing resources. Nationwide, multi-agency task forces have proven their ability to make significant impacts on crime. Such units are an extremely efficient use of law enforcement funding. The cost effectiveness of this Unit for Skagit County resources is enhanced by the participation of the County Prosecutor's Office and Swinomish Tribal Community. This integrated law enforcement approach to narcotics investigations have been proven throughout the country as a positive approach to combatting the increasing lawlessness that surrounds narcotics within our society.

SAN JUAN COUNTY - DISCLAIMER

(See Attachment "A")


SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY - JURISDICTIONAL UNDERSTANDING


(See Attachment "B")


ATTACHMENT A

It is hereby agreed between the City of Mount Vernon and San Juan County that San Juan County will not be subject to SECTION THREE - FINANCING, of this agreement. San Juan County agrees with all other terms and conditions as outlined in the agreement and requests copies of the fully executed agreement and grant application to the WS Department of Community Development.



BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS  
SAN JUAN COUNTY, WASHINGTON

  
Bruce R. Orchid, Chairman

  
Wm. J. LaPorte, Member

  
Thomas R. Cowan, Member

ATTEST: Si A. Stephens, Auditor  
and Ex-Officio Clerk of the Board

BY:   
Maureen Des Rosiers - Deputy   
6/26/91

ATTACHMENT B

JURISDICTIONAL UNDERSTANDING

Because participation by the Swinomish Tribal Police Department on the Narcotics Enforcement Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force is desirable and necessary to effectively reduce drug trafficking throughout Skagit County, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community signs this Interlocal Agreement subject to the understanding of the parties hereto, that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction within the exterior boundaries of the Swinomish Reservation is subject to and limited by Public Law 83-280 (RCW 37.12.010 et seq.). Accordingly, crimes committed on the Swinomish Reservation are not necessarily subject to State law, but may be, depending on the particular crime, the Indian status of the perpetrator and victim, and the situs of the criminal act, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal government and/or the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community.

Robert J. Sr.

Robert Joe, Sr., Chairman  
Swinomish Indian Senate

Rick J. Balam Sr.

Rick J. Balam Sr., Chief  
Swinomish Police Department

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25<sup>th</sup> day of September,  
1991.

[Signature]  
Notary Public in and the  
State of Washington residing at LA CONNER  
My Commission expires 4-6-94

**APPENDIX K**  
**MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT**

APPENDIX B

STATE OF IDAHO AGENCIES

POLICES AND PROCEDURES

QUAD CITY DRUG TASK FORCE

I

MEMBERSHIP OF THE QUAD CITY DRUG TASK FORCE

The Quad City Drug Task Force is comprised of members from the following law enforcement and prosecution agencies:

1. Lewiston Police Department: Chief Kent Reesor
2. Nez Perce County Sheriff's Office: Sheriff Ron Koeper
3. Moscow Police Department: Chief Dave Cameron
4. Asotin County Sheriff's Office: Chief Robert Anderson
5. Clarkston Police Department: Chief Robert Anderson
6. Pullman Police Department: Chief Ted Weatherly
7. Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office:  
Prosecuting Attorney Steve J. Tobiason
8. Latah County Prosecuting Attorney's Office: Prosecutor  
Craig Mosman
9. Whitman County Sheriff's Office: Sheriff Steve Thomson
10. Whitman County Prosecuting Attorney's Office: Prosecutor  
Jim Kaufman
11. Asotin County Prosecuting Attorney's Office: Prosecutor  
Tim Ohms

Each agency shall be represented by the Chief Law Enforcement

officer or prosecutor set forth above or his or her designee as a member of the Task Force Policy Board, which shall oversee the operations of the Task Force. That said Task Force has applied for and received a monetary grant from the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement to be used in the investigation and prosecution of drug offenses, commencing in the calendar year 1988 and continuing through to the calendar year 1989, if so required, to complete the goals and purposes of said Task Force.

## II

### GOALS OF THE DRUG TASK FORCE

The primary purpose of the Drug Task Force is to initiate and conduct both overt and covert investigations directed at illicit drug activities within the jurisdiction of each Task Force member to detect, apprehend and seek criminal prosecution for those persons involved in illegal drug activities.

The secondary purpose of the Task Force is to gather and document intelligence information concerning other criminal activities and ensure that such intelligence information is forwarded to any concerned law enforcement agencies, and assist in the detection and arrest of persons involved in other criminal activities.

## III

### DRUG TASK FORCE LEAD AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

The Lewiston Police Department is hereby designated as the lead agency for the Drug Task Force and Lt. Ron Seipert is hereby designated as Project Director and Sgt. Tom Lee is hereby designated as Project Treasurer. The Lewiston Police Department as Lead Agency will fulfill the following areas of responsibility:

1. Manage the grant funds and maintain records of expenditures and prepare any and all reports necessary to satisfy the requirements of the grant administrator.

2. Compile any and all statistics regarding drug investigation and prosecution and prepare any and all reports required by the grant administrator.

3. Schedule periodic meetings of the Task Force Board members to review the status of the investigations and operation of said Task Force. Distribute any information or reports required to be provided to Task Force members by the grant administrator, or necessary to the successful operation and completion of the aforestated project goals.

4. Notify the appropriate law enforcement officer in his or her respective jurisdiction, of any ongoing Task Force investigation, and comply with any directives of said law enforcement officer concerning drug investigations conducted in said jurisdiction.

5. Employ one officer with sufficient training and experience to work full time in the investigation of drug offenses within the jurisdictional area of the Task Force members.

6. Request and obtain either directly or through an appropriate task force member, any legal advice or opinions from

authorized legal counsel that is responsible to provide legal advice for the specific jurisdictional area.

7. The Project Director shall be responsible for the day to day operations, supervision and control of the Task Force investigative activities. The Project Director will report directly to the Task Force Policy Board. The Project Director shall keep the Task Force Policy Board apprised of all Task Force Investigations and activities; provided that the project director shall obtain the consent of the respective chief law enforcement officer prior to release of information of an ongoing investigation to the Task Force Policy Board or anyone else that would jeopardize the safety or effectiveness of any Task Force investigation

8. The Project Director, as well as the Task Force members, will actively seek information concerning illicit drug activities within their respective jurisdictions from other police personnel and agencies as well as assist other law enforcement officers in their drug enforcement.

9. The Project Director shall approve the Task Force funds for the purchase of any and all controlled substances being obtained pursuant to a Task Force investigation.

10. The Project Director shall review all reports concerning any investigation activities of the Task Force members. The Project Director shall provide a summary of said investigations and activities to the Task Force Policy Board on a timely basis. If a problem arises in the preparation of reports by a Task Force member, the Project Director shall consult with the specific member's chief law enforcement officer before any corrective action.

is taken.

#### IV

#### RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL TASK FORCE MEMBERS

1. Participation by Task Force members within the activities and operations of the Task Force is voluntary and does not create any employer/employee relationship, nor any property rights as a result of participation in Task Force investigations and/or activities. Furthermore, the Project Director has the absolute discretion to refuse, restrict, or terminate the participation in any investigation and/or operation of the Task Force of any Task Force member. If the Project Director refuses, restricts or terminates any members participation, it is not to be considered a disciplinary action, and is solely a discretionary decision by the Project Director for the overall effectiveness of the Task Force operations. Because participation is voluntary, there is no legal right to a hearing to be afforded to any Task Force member based upon any decision of the Project Director.

2. Task Force members shall conduct themselves as professional law enforcement officers, and adhere to his or her agency's policies and procedures concerning personnel, conduct and performance of duties. Acts of actual or alleged misconduct shall be reported to Project Director, and the Project Director shall contact the Task Force member's respective chief law enforcement officer to take whatever action, if any, that is appropriate.

3. The Drug Task Force members shall complete reports of

investigations and activities on a timely and accurate basis and submit them for review by the Project Director. All reports of past or pending Task Force investigations shall remain confidential and shall not be released to the general public. Furthermore, any information concerning the identity of a confidential informant shall not be released except as absolutely required by state statute, court rules or case law interpretation thereof. The Project Director is responsible for the effective operation of the Task Force and to ensure that the goals of the Task Force are met and for compliance with the policies and procedures of the Task Force.

4. No press release concerning the Task Force operation or investigation will be made by any Task Force member. All inquiries from the media concerning the Task Force shall be directed to the Task Force media representative. The Task Force media representative may, after contacting the chief law enforcement officer of the respective jurisdiction, release written information concerning the Task Force operations and investigations to the news media, provided that there shall be no release of information by the Task Force media representative that would jeopardize the safety of Task Force members or the effectiveness of an ongoing Task Force investigation.

5. All personnel assigned to the Task Force shall be required to be armed while on duty, unless it is determined to be tactically inappropriate. All Task Force members shall be required to qualify under his or her approved department's policies concerning the use of handguns and/or firearms.

6. Each individual Task Force member shall ensure that proper care, maintenance and security is taken for all issued equipment.

7. While assigned to the Task Force, personnel will be issued varied amounts of Task Force funds to be used in their investigations. Task Force members shall be responsible to account for the use and expenditure of such funds. The supervising law enforcement agency shall comply with the requirements for payment of monies to confidential informants as set forth in the Office of Justice Programs Requirement, Document No. M7100.1C-CHG1, Appendix XI, entitled "Control and Use of Confidential Funds".

8. All overtime to be paid by grant funds will be kept to a minimum and must be approved by the Director.

9. All Task Force members will work under the authority of Idaho Code Section 67-2337, entitled Extra Territorial Authority of Peace Officers, and Revised Code of Washington 10.95.090, which will give the Task Force members reciprocal police power while performing their duties in areas outside of their normally recognized jurisdiction. Any Task Force member operating under said extension of authority shall comply with all the statutory conditions specified in the Idaho and/or Washington statute, whichever is applicable. With the exception of investigations initiated in their respective area, the Task Force personnel will not normally be assigned to duties outside their department's enforcement area. Any extended duties outside their respective area by Task Force personnel will require prior approval by the chief law enforcement officer or his or her designee for said jurisdictional area. The employing law enforcement agency shall be

wholly and completely liable for any actions or inactions of Task Force members operating under the extended authority of the aforementioned statutory provisions. Furthermore, the provisions concerning said extended authority and responsibilities related thereto have been further specified in an intergovernmental agreement that has been executed by the governing body of each respective participating governmental agency. No Task Force agency members shall be liable for the actions, conduct nor practices of any Task Force member committed within the scope of Task Force investigation or prosecution where said member is not an employee of the member's law enforcement or prosecutorial agency. Any salary, pay or benefits for Task Force members shall be the responsibility of the agency which appointed such member to the Task Force.

10. Request for assistance of the Task Force concerning special operations and nondrug investigations shall be directed to the Project Director. Task Force members shall not conduct nondrug criminal investigations, unless the situation involves an immediate threat to person(s) or property. If a Task Force member, based upon immediate threat to person(s) or property, conduct a nondrug investigation said member shall immediately notify the appropriate chief law enforcement officer or designee, and the Task Force Project Director of said investigation.

11. A Task Force investigation may result in the successful forfeiture of assets. If the successful forfeiture of assets does occur, then with the consent of the chief law enforcement officer for the jurisdiction where the seizure occurred, the non-liquidated

assets may be used in future Task Force investigations in that jurisdiction or in other jurisdictions where the Task Force is in operation. At such time as the Chief Law Enforcement officer of the seizing jurisdiction decides to liquidate said assets and said assets are liquidated, the cash proceeds shall be distributed as mandated by State statute. When state statute does not mandate the method of distribution, any proceeds shall be divided between the Task Force and the law enforcement agency where the seizure occurred on a percentage basis with 50% going to the Task Force, and 50% going to the law enforcement agency.

V

PARTICIPATION BY OTHER TASK FORCE MEMBERS

It is hereby agreed by and between all of the participating law enforcement agencies of the Task Force that each particular law enforcement agency will contribute in some manner to the operation of the Task Force in the investigation and detection of drug offenses, and it is understood that participation can be in the form of contribution of monies for the purchase of drugs, payment of informant fees, contribution of the equipment to be used in the scope of the investigation and/or contribution of manpower to be used in the overall operation of the Task Force investigation. The particular level of participation, and the conditions of participation shall be resolved by and between the project director and the particular member's chief law enforcement officer or his designee. The participation by the Task Force member's

prosecutorial agency shall be primarily to provide legal advice to the members of the Task Force while operating within the specific jurisdiction of the prosecutorial agency, and where feasible and legally authorized, to contribute legal assistance in the prosecution of the cases submitted to the respective prosecutorial agencies at or near the conclusion of the investigations conducted by the Task Force law enforcement agency members.


It is understood and recognized that, because of the division of jurisdictions between the State of Idaho and the State of Washington, there is limitation in the ability to contribute prosecutorial assistance across State lines by reason of legal restrictions concerning the practice of law, and therefore any prosecutorial assistance will be primarily between the counties located within the same state jurisdiction.

**APPENDIX L**

**CHARTS OF DRUG SEIZED OR PURCHASED**


**L-1**

**COCAINE AND CRACK  
SEIZED AND PURCHASED**




# L-2

## HEROIN SEIZED AND PURCHASED




CANNABIS SEIZED AND PURCHASED




# L-4

## NARCOTICS SEIZED AND PURCHASED




**L-5**

**HALLUCINOGENS SEIZED AND PURCHASED**




# L-6

## AMPHETAMINE AND METHAMPHETAMINE SEIZED AND PURCHASED




**L-7**

**OTHER DRUGS SEIZED AND PURCHASED**



# L-8

## PRECUSORS SEIZED AND PURCHASED




**APPENDIX M**

**CHARTS OF 12 COUNTY**

**DRUG ARREST COMPARISONS**


# M-1

## OVERALL TOTALS (SALE & POSSESSION) 12 COUNTIES; 8 TASK FORCES




# M-2

## NARCOTIC SALES ARRESTS: 12 COUNTIES; 8 TASK FORCES



# M-3

## NARCOTIC POSSESSION ARRESTS: 12 COUNTIES; 8 TASK FORCES




**APPENDIX N**

**CHARTS OF 28 COUNTY**

**DRUG ARREST COMPARISONS**


**N-1**

**OVERALL TOTALS (SALES & POSSESSION): 28 COUNTIES; 19  
TASK FORCES**




# N-2

## NARCOTIC SALES ARRESTS: 28 COUNTIES; 19 TASK FORCES



**N-3**

**NARCOTIC POSSESSION ARRESTS: 28 COUNTIES; 19 TASK FORCES**



**APPENDIX O**

**WASHINGTON STATE ASSET SEIZURE LAW**

~~be appropriated exclusively for~~ services. ~~Such moneys shall not supplant preexisting funding sources.~~

~~(ii) Money deposited according to this section must be deposited within ninety days of the date of final disposition of either the administrative seizure or the judicial seizure);~~

(3) Request the appropriate sheriff or director of public safety to take custody of the property and remove it for disposition in accordance with law; or

(4) Forward it to the drug enforcement administration for disposition.

(g) (1) When property is forfeited, the seizing agency shall keep a record indicating the identity of the prior owner, if known, a description of the property, the disposition of the property, the value of the property at the time of seizure, and the amount of proceeds realized from disposition of the property.

(2) Each seizing agency shall retain records of forfeited property for at least seven years.

(3) Each seizing agency shall file a report including a copy of the records of forfeited property with the state treasurer each calendar quarter.

(4) The quarterly report need not include a record of forfeited property that is still being held for use as evidence during the investigation or prosecution of a case or during the appeal from a conviction.

(h) (1) By January 31st of each year, each seizing agency shall remit to the state treasurer an amount equal to ten percent of the net proceeds of any property forfeited during the preceding calendar year. Money remitted shall be deposited in the drug enforcement and education account under RCW 69.50.520.

1       (2) The net proceeds of forfeited property is the value of the  
2 forfeitable interest in the property after deducting the cost of  
3 satisfying any bona fide security interest to which the property is  
4 subject at the time of seizure, and in the case of sold property, after  
5 deducting the cost of sale, including reasonable fees or commissions  
6 paid to independent selling agents.


7       (3) The value of sold forfeited property is the sale price. The  
8 value of retained forfeited property is the fair market value of the  
9 property at the time of seizure, determined when possible by reference  
10 to an applicable commonly used index, such as the index used by the  
11 department of licensing for valuation of motor vehicles. A seizing  
12 agency may use, but need not use, an independent qualified appraiser  
13 to determine the value of retained property. If an appraiser is used,  
14 the value of the property appraised is net of the cost of the  
15 appraisal. The value of destroyed property and retained firearms or  
16 illegal property is zero.

17       (i) Forfeited property and net proceeds not required to be paid to  
18 the state treasurer shall be retained by the seizing law enforcement  
19 agency exclusively for the expansion and improvement of controlled  
20 substances related law enforcement activity. Money retained under this  
21 section may not be used to supplant pre-existing funding sources.

22       (j) Controlled substances listed in Schedule I, II, III, IV; and  
23 V that are possessed, transferred, sold, or offered for sale in  
24 violation of this chapter are contraband and shall be seized and  
25 summarily forfeited to the state. Controlled substances listed in  
26 Schedule I, II, III, IV, and V, which are seized or come into the  
27 possession of the board, the owners of which are unknown, are  
28 contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the board.

**APPENDIX P**  
**WASHINGTON STATE**  
**UNEMPLOYMENT RATE MAP**

**May 1992 Unemployment Rates**  
**State of Washington = 6.5%**



**APPENDIX Q**

**HIGHLY GENERALIZED TASK FORCE:**

**AN EXAMPLE**

## THURSTON COUNTY NARCOTICS TASK FORCE

### 3. EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM

Thurston County is located on the Interstate-5 corridor between Portland and Seattle. We are at the southern tip of Puget Sound. We have two airports as well as several private airfields. These unlimited avenues allow easy accessibility for drug traffickers to enter our county. These factors allow for a growing demand of marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin in our community. Thurston County is the home of the Washington State Capitol, Olympia. We have a large commuting work force, especially when the legislature is in session. We have had a population increase of a little over two percent since the end of 1989 (155,100 to 161,800).

The Thurston County Interlocal Task Force was enhanced in September 1990 with the Federal Assistance Grant. It increased our investigator staff by two detectives and it also added one additional support staff person. In June 1991, we added another support staff person from the Washington National Guard.

The Task Force is made up of members from the Thurston County Sheriff's Office, Olympia, Lacey, and Tumwater Police Departments and the Washington State Patrol. The unit serves and provides detective assistance to nine police agencies in Thurston County. These include the Olympia, Lacey, Tumwater, Yelm, Tenino, and the Rainier Police Departments, the Nisqually Tribal Police, the Thurston County Sheriff's Office, and the Washington State Patrol.

During the past five years, the Interlocal Task Force has averaged 127 cases per year. This is through December 1990. These are actual cases that have resulted in either the seizure of drugs, search warrant execution, drug sales to an undercover officer with an arrest made, or referrals made to the Prosecutor's Office. We have seen an increase in intelligence reports on persons who deal in controlled substances. Last year the average was around eighty-five per month, and so far this year, that number has increased to about one-hundred and nine per month.

We have also seen a significant increase in the Interlocal Task Force's seizures during the first quarter of 1991, compared to that of 1990. The street value of drugs seized increased from \$168,820 to \$535,170; a 217% increase. Cash seized was up from \$4,225 to \$16,111; a 281% increase. Fifty-one arrests were made this year, compared to 19 arrests made in 1990; a 168% increase. The most significant increase was in the amount of weapons seized. During the first quarter of 1990 there was one weapon seized, and in 1991, twenty-two weapons were confiscated during drug raids; a 2100% increase. There was also a substantial increase in weapons seized in the year of 1990, over that of 1989; forty-eight weapons versus twenty-one weapons.

This trend is parallel with the increase of methamphetamine cases seen by the Interlocal Task Force. We have noticed that methamphetamine is more and more becoming the local drug of choice. With this comes the more violent drug user, and thus more weapons in our violators' possession.

The Thurston County Interlocal Task Force has not identified any traditional organized crime activity within our jurisdiction. We have connected some of our methamphetamine violators to motorcycle gang organizations. One particular methamphetamine cook had been a member of a motorcycle gang from California. We have also had intelligence information that we consider reliable, that shows motorcycle groups involved in the manufacturing and distribution of methamphetamine within our county.

The Task Force was involved in five laboratory cases, and a substantial increase in methamphetamine cases in 1990. Our prior intelligence information that had been developed from informants, suspects, and arrested persons about the increase in methamphetamine use had been confirmed. We have also found booby traps and dynamite at our methamphetamine lab sites. This not only creates a new drug problem for us, but it also creates an ecological problem to all of our citizens. Because methamphetamine is manufactured in clandestine laboratories, the dangerous, explosive, caustic materials, and by-products are often dumped in secluded areas of Thurston County. We have responded to reports of found glassware and dumped chemicals.

Another problem identified is an economic one to innocent property owners. Innocent citizens rent or lease their property or buildings to someone who purports to be opening a legal business. Later, a laboratory is discovered in the building and the property becomes condemned. The owner is then stuck with a piece of property that he cannot use, lease, or sell.

Methamphetamine is definitely causing problems within Thurston County. We have identified the trend moving towards methamphetamine as the drug of choice in Thurston County. We also continue to have problems with heroin, cocaine, marijuana, hallucinogenics, and pharmaceutical drugs. The heroin is transported mostly from the north, namely Pierce County. We also have intelligence that some heroin is being brought in from the Yakima area. Cocaine is brought into Thurston County through the north-end and the south-end of the Interstate-5 corridor, from Tacoma and Seattle, and from the Tri-City and Yakima area. The marijuana is mostly grown indoors within Washington State, with a lot of it grown locally in Thurston County.

The specific problems that will be addressed by the Interlocal Task Force are diversified and complex. The Task Force will attack all levels and classes of dealers and violators. A zero tolerance attitude is our goal. We stress this in our training of local police officers. We will continue to aggressively pursue the clandestine manufacturers of methamphetamine and marijuana. Our efforts will be coordinated with federal, state, tribal, and local police.

The Western States Information Network selected the Thurston County Interlocal Task Force as its agency of the year in 1990, for the State of Washington. This awards exemplifies interagency cooperation necessary for effective narcotics enforcement. We will continue to disseminate and share intelligence information with these organizations.

With the Federal Assistance Grant, we will continue our current operations; enhance the Interlocal Task Force, continue our involvement in drug education programs and the training of police officers, and prosecutorial support.

**APPENDIX R**

**HIGHLY SPECIALIZED TASK FORCE:**

**AN EXAMPLE**

**SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY  
MARK H. SIDRAN**

CRIMINAL DIVISION  
710 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 1414  
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104  
(206) 684-7757 FAX: (206) 684-4648

LAW DEPARTMENT  
600 FOURTH AVENUE, 10TH FLOOR  
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104  
(206) 684-8200 FAX: (206) 684-8284

UTILITIES DIVISION  
1015 THIRD AVENUE, SUITE 902  
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104  
(206) 684-3361

**HIGH IMPACT OFFENDER PROJECT  
OVERVIEW**

**I. GENERAL:**

The High Impact Offender Project, HIOP, is the first project of its kind in the Seattle, King County area to identify and vertically prosecute habitual criminals who commit misdemeanor offenses. The HIOP team is made up of 2 Seattle City assistant city attorneys and 2 support staff.

The goal of HIOP is to disrupt drug trafficking by incarcerating known drug dealers and users for substantial periods of time following misdemeanor convictions.

The theory behind the project's design is that vertical prosecutions of habitual drug offenders will result in higher conviction ratios and longer terms of confinement upon conviction. The essence of vertical prosecution is that the same attorney has filed the case, dealt with witnesses and officers, prepared for trial and knows the violator's criminal history for sentencing.

**II. CRITERIA FOR "HIOP OFFENDER":**

The criteria for a target offender is : one felony VUCSA conviction, one or more additional felony conviction and three or more misdemeanor convictions within the past five years. Currently, HIOP has identified 952 individuals who meet this profile.

**III. OPERATION AND PROCEDURES:**

The project vertically prosecutes target offenders in the following manner:

A. HIOP staff daily run criminal histories for each person on the Seattle Municipal Court in-custody and intake calendars as well as King County Court "change of venue"/in-custody calendars;

B. After identifying individuals who meet the criteria, complete felony and misdemeanor histories are compiled for upcoming hearings;

C. HIOP Attorneys review each case and prepare each one for the next hearing. This consists of reviewing the police report, making witness contacts, determining whether the defendant has other pending felony and misdemeanor cases, and making a pretrial recommendation;

D. If the case is set for trial, the HIOP attorney will try the case and

E. Follow-up on any post-conviction hearing (i.e. sentencing) and insure that all of the conditions of probations are complied with by the offender.

#### IV. HOW INDIVIDUALS ARE IDENTIFIED:

As noted in section above, III.A., the HIOP staff run criminal histories, for both misdemeanors and felonies, on each individual who appear on both Seattle Municipal Court and Seattle District Court calendars. This procedure was implemented in June, 1991 and has resulted in a dramatic increase in caseload. Originally, HIOP was projected to handle 1,800 cases a year. In actuality, HIOP will process an estimated 2,400 cases a year. Please note the trend in the number of cases which HIOP has handled since June, 1991.

MONTH	NEW CASES IDENTIFIED
JUNE 1991	1
JULY	36
AUGUST	78
SEPTEMBER	21
OCTOBER	56
NOVEMBER	52
DECEMBER	56
JANUARY 1992	106
FEBRUARY	54
	(due to personnel shifts)
MARCH	140
APRIL	144
MAY	145
JUNE	204

#### V. IMPACT:

HIOP's results have borne out one theory behind the Project; well prepared misdemeanor cases can result in higher conviction ratios and greater terms of incarceration. HIOP's conviction rate following trial is approximately 90%, compared to approximately 60% in non-HIOP trials. Similarly, the overall HIOP conviction rate (i.e. all findings of guilty, including guilty pleas and lesser charges) is approximately 76% compared to approximately 60% in non-HIOP cases. HIOP's impact on sentencing is dramatic. In 1991, 261 convictions were obtained and the average sentence imposed was 38 days. This is significantly more than the average term of incarceration for comparable defendants not handled by HIOP, e.g., non-HIOP defendants with at least two prior felony convictions were sentenced to just 11 days. HIOP cases bring terms of incarceration 3.5 times longer than non-HIOP cases.

HIOP sentencing recommendations, backed by complete criminal histories, have gained credibility with the bench; in all but three of the 261 convictions last year, the sentencing judicial concurrence compares very favorably with the level of judicial concurrence in non-HIOP cases, estimated to be approximately 50% upon a guilty plea and only 15% after trial.

Early 1992 results reflect a continuation of the above trends. Since January, there have been 86 convictions; the judge has followed the HIOP recommendation in every case, including a sentencing recommendation of the maximum penalty: one year in jail.

The average sentence length for the first three months of 1992 has increased to 46 days. These longer sentences help slow street crime by keeping habitual criminals with a history of drug crimes off the street, thus slowing the revolving door of criminal activity.