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OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS
ABUSE AND CONTROL

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted a study mission to drug producing and trafficking nations in South America and the Caribbean, January 9-19, 1992. Leading the delegation was Select Committee Chairman Charles B. Rangel (D-NY). Participating were Representatives Lawrence Coughlin (R-PA), ranking minority member; Kweisi Mfume, Donald Payne, Craig Washington, Benjamin A. Gilman, Robert K. Dornan, and Paul Gillmor. Assisting the committee members during the course of the study mission were the following staff: Edward H. Jurith, staff director; Peter Coniglio, minority staff director; George R. Gilbert, counsel; Rebecca Hedlund, Emile Milne, Richard Baum, and William Klein, professional staff members; and Brenda Swygert, personal secretary of the chairman.

The study mission included stops in Caracas, Venezuela (January 9-11); Santa Cruz, Bolivia (January 12-14); Port of Spain, Trinidad (January 15-16); Parimaribo, Suriname (January 16); and Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (January 17-19). During the course of the study mission the delegation met with the following officials:

Venezuela.—President Carlos Andres Perez, Foreign Minister Armando Duran, Interior Minister Alejandro Izaguirre, Defense Minister Ochoa Antich, Minister of Staff for Drugs Enrique Rivas, Secretary General of National Security and Defense Council, Com. Efrain Diaz Tarazon, Venezuelan Parliamentarians.

Bolivia/Santa Cruz Conference.—Vice President Luis Ossio, Interior Minister Carlos Saavedra, Agriculture Minister Mauro Bertero, Subsecretaries Gonzalo Torrico and Jorge Quiroga, Carlos Quintela, and Tito Bohrt, Gaston Encinas, president of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies, delegations from Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and Mexico.

Trinidad and Tobago.—Prime Minister Patrick Manning, Defense Force Chief Brigadier Ralph Brown, Coast Guard Commander Richard Kellshall, Police Narcotics Assistant Superintendent Mayhew Alleyne, special advisor to the Minister of National Security Lance Selman, Foreign Minister Ralph Maraj.

Suriname.—President Ronald Venetiaan, Foreign Minister Soebhas Mungra, Minister of Justice and Police Soeslil Girjasing, members of Suriname Parliament, Netherlands Ambassador to Suriname Pieter Frans Christiaan Koch.

Dominican Republic.—President Joaquin Balaguer, Foreign Minister Juan Aristides Taveras Guzman, Colonel Rafael Guerrero, president of the National Drug Control Directorate [DNCD].

The Committee's study mission saw two contrasting aspects of the hemispheric efforts in the war against drugs. On one hand the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of illicit drugs remains at high levels throughout the region. Bumper crops of coca leaf cultivation are expected in Peru; Bolivia has failed to achieve its coca

eradication targets for 1991. Law enforcement and interdiction efforts, while on the increase have yet to have a meaningful impact on the easy availability of drugs throughout the United States. Increased drug enforcement and financial investigations in the traditional drug source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru have caused trafficking organizations to shift their operations to nations such as Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname where the law enforcement establishment is often unprepared to respond to the financial resources and ruthlessness of the traffickers. The political will of these nations as well as the international community has yet to be fully mobilized to respond to the drug trafficking threat.

On the other hand there is an increasing awareness on the part of emerging political leadership that drug abuse and drug trafficking presents grave dangers to the national security and strength of democratic institutions in the Western Hemisphere. Economic growth and rising living conditions will be kept in check unless the pernicious influence of narco dollars is brought under control. Leaders, President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, Prime Minister Patrick Manning of Trinidad and Tobago, and President Ronald Venetiaan of Suriname all keenly recognize the threat the drug crisis means to the hemisphere and the need for strong regional and international efforts to successfully attack it.

At the Second Andean-American Interparliamentary Conference in Santa Cruz, parliamentarians from eight nations in the hemisphere gathered to discuss legislative approaches to the international drug problem, and issued a joint communique setting forth broad principles of agreement, and to serve as recommendations to the Cartagena II drug summit to be held in the United States in February 1992. Bolivian officials who met with the delegation clearly understood the need for a comprehensive strategy that combines effective enforcement with economic and alternative development programs. President Perez and Prime Minister Manning recognize that the increasing drug trafficking through both Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago must be aggressively responded to before the trafficking organizations gain a stronger presence in their nations. The delegation was particularly impressed with the advice of President Perez that the nation of the region must abandon parochial claims of sovereignty in order to mobilize an effective campaign against the drug trafficking organizations.

Suriname is in a precarious situation. While it attempts to build a new democracy and its economy, it must contend with the corruptive influence of trafficking organizations. The Netherlands, the United States, and other members of the international community must stand ready to come to the assistance of this nation. The delegation was pleased to note the Dominican Republic is maintaining strong drug interdiction efforts. The Joint Information Coordination Center [JICC] serves as a model for drug intelligence sharing in the region. Dominican authorities must, however, make serious reforms in the administration of justice. Corruption is presently hampering the ability of the Dominican Republic to successfully prosecute and incarcerate drug suspects.

VENEZUELA

INTRODUCTION

Venezuela lies on the north coast of South America. It is bordered by Colombia on the west, Brazil to the south and southeast, and Guyana on the east. The twin island nation of Trinidad and Tobago is a mere 7 miles off Venezuela's northeast shore.

In recent years, Venezuela has been growing in importance as a transit country for cocaine from Colombia to the United States and Europe. Precursor and essential chemicals, both domestically produced and imported from abroad, flow through Venezuela to Colombia and other countries for use in processing cocaine.

The Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA] now estimates that 300-400 metric tons of cocaine are leaving Venezuela annually, half destined for Europe and half for the United States. This amount is roughly five times the estimate of just a few years ago. Cocaine is transported through Venezuela in containerized cargo, vehicles, and by couriers using air, sea, and land routes. Information indicates that cocaine is being temporarily stockpiled in several Venezuelan cities pending forward shipment.

Drug seizures are up sharply in Venezuela in recent years. In 1990, nearly 4 tons of cocaine were interdicted, a 75-percent increase over 1989. In addition, almost 2 tons of coca paste and 2.5 tons of marijuana were seized. In the first 6 months of 1991, about 6 metric tons of cocaine were seized by Venezuelan authorities, 50 percent more than in all of 1990.

Venezuela is not a major producer of illicit narcotics crops, but United States and Venezuelan law enforcement officials believe coca cultivation is expanding along the Sierra de Perijo on the border with Colombia. Some coca processing is beginning to occur in the same area. Marijuana also is grown along the border.

Information on the extent of drug money laundering in Venezuela is not available, but United States and Venezuelan authorities speculate that money laundering is already a significant problem due to Venezuela's sophisticated banking system, its proximity to Colombia and the inadequacy of Venezuelan currency regulations. In 1990, the United States and Venezuela signed the first Kerry agreement under section 4072 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 relating to recordkeeping on large United States currency transactions and exchange of financial information.

Little information exists on the extent of drug use in Venezuela, but authorities believe drug use is increasing based on increases in drug-related arrests and rising seizures of cocaine, bazuco—a smokeable form of coca paste—and marijuana.

The delegation arrived in Caracas, Venezuela, on Thursday, January 9, 1992. On Friday, the delegation met with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez and separately with members of his cabinet who have key antidrug responsibilities including the Minister of Interior, the Minister of State for Drugs, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of Defense. In addition, the members had an opportunity to meet a number of Venezuelan parliamentarians and discuss with them a broad range of narcotics-control issues at a

working lunch hosted by the United States Ambassador to Venezuela, Michael Skol.

EMBASSY TEAM BRIEFING

Immediately upon arrival in Caracas, the delegation was briefed on the narcotics situation by Ambassador Skol. The following morning, the members were briefed by the DEA country attaché, Leo Arreguin, prior to their meetings with Venezuelan officials.

Ambassador Skol told the delegation that Venezuela has been used as a transit route for sizeable amounts of cocaine for some time. Public and government awareness of the problem, however, is fairly recent. Only within the past year has the Government of Venezuela recognized the narcotics trafficking threat as the cartels shifted more of their activities out of Colombia in response to increased law enforcement pressure there. As Colombia continues its crackdown, he said, the traffic through Venezuela is likely to get worse.

The Government of Venezuela is just beginning to respond to the problem, Ambassador Skol reported. Having believed for so long that Venezuela was immune from the drug trade, top officials now fear the "Colombianization" of the country. They do not want Venezuela to suffer the ravages of violence and corruption or see the virtual control by the traffickers of governmental and societal institutions that occurred in Colombia. The commitment of the Government to fight the narcotics traffic is unquestioned, he said, but much work remains to be done.

The Ambassador said the Embassy is working with the Venezuelan Government to better organize and coordinate drug law enforcement structures and operations. Interagency cooperation and coordination of antinarcotic efforts within the Government remain serious problems, he said.

Notwithstanding these internal difficulties, Ambassador Skol described Venezuelan law enforcement cooperation with the United States as good and improving. The December 1991 seizure of over 12 metric tons of cocaine in Miami and smaller amounts at the same time in other United States cities was the result of a coordinated operation based on information provided to DEA by the Judicial Technical Police [PTJ] in Venezuela. At the time it occurred, the Miami seizure was the second largest on record.

Corruption is a problem in Venezuela, Ambassador Skol said. He pointed out, however, that United States law enforcement has found Venezuelan counterparts they can trust. The Miami seizure discussed above, for example, was a coordinated investigation with the PTJ that spanned several months, yet no word of the strike against the traffickers leaked.

Ambassador Skol emphasized that the drug traffickers are not running the Government of Venezuela, and the DEA attaché agreed. Although the extent of drug corruption in Venezuela is unknown, the Ambassador said that whenever the United States can present credible assertions to the Venezuelan Government that an official is involved in the drug trade, the person is removed or indicted.

Other points covered by Ambassador Skol in his briefing included the following:

- *Maritime cooperation.* Venezuela and the United States recently signed a reciprocal shipboarding agreement that allows authorities of either country to board flag vessels of the other if suspected of carrying drugs. This agreement, the first of its kind, is a precedent for other Latin American countries.

- *Kerry agreement.* The first such agreement negotiated, it has been used only once so far and that was a request by Venezuela for information from the United States.

- *Asset sharing.* The United States hopes to sign a case-specific agreement soon with Venezuela that would allow \$1.3 million in forfeited drug assets to be transferred to Venezuela. The seizure of these assets arose from a case in which Venezuelan authorities provided invaluable assistance to United States law enforcement officials.

- *Radar network.* Negotiations to give Venezuela two radars as part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network are nearing completion.

- *Chemical controls.* The United States hopes to sign a bilateral chemical control agreement with Venezuela prior to the second drug summit in February.

The DEA attaché said the Colombian drug cartels are increasingly infiltrating Venezuela, investing in land, banks, and other ventures to facilitate their drug-trafficking and money-laundering activities. He said Venezuela lacks strong asset forfeiture and money-laundering laws. The cartels are using smurfs to avoid currency reporting requirements in laundering drug proceeds from the United States back to Venezuela. Forty (40) bank accounts recently seized in New York were traced back to Venezuela.

Both the Ambassador and the DEA attaché said the Sicilian heroin mafia is operating in Venezuela and is being watched closely. At this point, it appears that deals are being arranged in Venezuela, but little, if any, heroin is actually passing through Venezuela on its way to United States destinations.

The attaché said DEA soon will be opening a resident office in Maricao, a seaport in western Venezuela through which substantial drug smuggling occurs. Because of the danger of working there, he is requesting additional agents for the office. Reflecting the danger of the post, he said Maricao has been described as just "a 1-hour trunk ride to Colombia."

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ

The Select Committee delegation met first with the President of Venezuela, Carlos Andres Perez. This meeting was the high point of the delegation's visit, and it established the exceedingly positive tone that marked all of the members' discussions with Venezuelan leaders.

Chairman Rangel opened the meeting by telling President Perez that the committee was greatly honored to be meeting with him. The chairman thanked the President for his cooperation with the United States and praised the friendly relations that the two countries have enjoyed.

In a brief aside, Chairman Rangel spoke on behalf of tens of thousands of Haitian-Americans who he said had asked him to thank President Perez for providing a safe haven to exiled President Aristide of Haiti. The chairman thanked the President for his leadership on this sensitive issue and said President Bush and Vice President Quayle truly value the friendship of Venezuela.

Turning to the narcotics issue, Chairman Rangel noted that the members of the select committee were all appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to develop a strategy to attack drug abuse and drug trafficking. The United States has achieved some successes, he said, but he acknowledged that our country is paying dearly for the indifference shown to the drug problem when it first began to emerge. He recalled that on past select committee visits to drug producing and trafficking nations, foreign leaders always spoke of drugs as a U.S. problem because of the enormous consumption of drugs in the United States. Tragically, he said, the world has discovered that drugs are not just a U.S. problem, but an international problem.

The chairman said the world is fortunate to have people like President Perez. Continuing, he said that although Venezuela now has its own drug problem to confront, "We know we can depend on your leadership to bring countries together" against this common menace of drugs.

In conclusion, Chairman Rangel said the United States looks forward to hosting the upcoming drug summit planned for February 1992. He said the committee is pleased this second summit will include Venezuela and President Perez' leadership.

Mr. Coughlin expressed the gratitude of the select committee and the United States for Venezuela's friendship and for the friendship between the Presidents of our two countries. He said the committee is aware that elements of the Sicilian mafia and the Colombian drug cartels are operating actively in Venezuela. In coming to Venezuela, he said, the committee sought to learn how the United States and Venezuela can work together as friends on the common problem of drugs.

In his forthright and candid reply to the delegation, President Perez acknowledged the seriousness of drug trafficking in Venezuela, and he expressed his unequivocal belief that combating the drug crisis requires nothing less than an all-out international effort.

President Perez first thanked the delegation for its visit to Venezuela and for the members' cordial remarks. Coming quickly to the point, he told the members that the Government of Venezuela is very interested in establishing precise agreements and close international cooperation to face the drug problem which has yet to be controlled or solved.

Until recently, he said, Venezuela did not think of itself as part of the drug problem. Venezuelans believed they were immune to the ravages of drugs. Now, he said, Venezuela sees the problem is becoming greater here.

President Perez told the delegation that Venezuela is not just a bridge country for the transit of drugs destined for other countries. He said Venezuela also is seeing an increase in drug use which,

while not yet at alarming levels, is contributing to a rising crime wave.

President Perez discounted the ability of any country to confront the drug problem alone. What is needed, he said, is a serious, full-fledged cooperative effort of all our countries.

Moreover, he emphasized that a debate over who is more to blame—drug consuming countries or drug producing and trafficking nations—would not be productive. "We have to fight all together," he said. "We must design collective measures" to attack the problem.

The upcoming drug summit with President Bush, he said, is of great importance. He said it would allow the United States and Venezuela to strengthen our bilateral cooperation and project a worldwide concern about drugs. Practical and concrete agreements on many aspects of the problem are needed, he said. He called specifically for an agreement to improve coordination of law enforcement efforts. Stressing once again the need for an international approach, he said talking about national sovereignty will only get in the way. "We must open our borders fully to cooperation," he said.

He noted that different countries face different problems. Drug production is of primary concern in Peru and Bolivia, whereas in Colombia the main problem is processing. He said there is no reason now to think Venezuela is a drug producer, but he again said Venezuela is more than just a bridge country and expressed concern that Venezuela is becoming a processing country. He said Venezuela needs to do more to control chemicals used in drug processing and said he hopes the United States and Venezuela will be able to sign an agreement on precursor and essential chemicals at the February drug summit.

Ambassador Skol added that Venezuela and the United States also need to conclude ongoing discussions on the placement of two ground radars in Venezuela as part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network.

Chairman Rangel assured President Perez that the Select Committee is sensitive to the domestic obstacles the President needs to overcome. He said it is ironic that drug trafficking brings our countries together in a new spirit of cooperation. He pledged the support of the U.S. Congress and made clear that the desire and need for a relationship of mutual respect and cooperation extend beyond the drug issue to trade and other matters of mutual concern.

President Perez expressed Venezuela's firm resolve to cooperate on all aspects of the drug problem. He said it is important to make the summit an opportunity to move forward on all this work. He said both the United States and Venezuela understand how serious the drug problem is. There has been progress, he said, but much more needs to be done, again emphasizing the need to overcome all the obstacles to improve coordination. He called for ongoing, total exchange of information. He praised the inclusion of Mexico in the summit and said the nations of the Caribbean also need to be involved in cooperative antidrug efforts. He said drug trafficking between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago needs to be addressed as well as the emergence of Suriname as a drug-transit state. He said a full network for antidrug cooperation must be established and expressed the hope that the summit will show the benefits of

mutual cooperation that already exist in many areas at the bilateral level. He expressed confidence that the relations between Venezuela and the United States are fully satisfying on both sides.

MEETING WITH MINISTER OF INTERIOR ALEJANDRO IZAGUIRRE

The committee met with Minister Izaguirre on his last day in office. The Minister had submitted his resignation to President Perez earlier in the week. Although leaving the cabinet, the Minister will remain a member of Congress. Ambassador Skol told the delegation that the United States Embassy in Caracas has worked closely with the Interior Minister who, as the Venezuelan "Drug Czar," has a broad mandate to coordinate the activities of many of the agencies involved in Venezuela's antidrug fight. The Embassy's major effort, he said, has been in trying to help the Interior Minister establish an effective drug control infrastructure and a coordinated antidrug strategy focusing on drug interdiction, precursor and essential chemical control, money laundering, and drug awareness. Ambassador Skol said the United States looks forward to the Minister's continuing support and cooperation in the Venezuelan Congress.

Chairman Rangel opened the meeting by telling Minister Izaguirre that Ambassador Skol had shared with the delegation just how indispensable to the U.S. Embassy team the Minister's support has been on the issue of narcotics control. He said the delegation came to Venezuela at the urging of Ambassador Skol to thank the Government for the help Venezuela has given to the United States on the drug problem and to express the hope that through enhanced antidrug cooperation, the United States and Venezuela can expand cooperation in many other areas as well. He emphasized the importance of the upcoming second drug summit as a mechanism to further improve bilateral and regional efforts to combat the drug plague and to strengthen relations and foster a climate of mutual understanding among the nations involved. He said the United States looks forward to the Minister's continued support and cooperation in Congress.

The Minister assured the members that he will always remain a friend of the United States, especially on the difficult problem of drug abuse and drug trafficking. He expressed confidence that the next Interior Minister will continue to cooperate fully with the United States on drug concerns because, he said, "Ministers do not act personally but follow the guidelines set by Presidents." He said he had always had open, cordial relations with Ambassador Skol, marked by mutual respect despite occasional disagreements.

Mr. Coughlin explained that the United States Congress created a "drug czar" to coordinate United States drug policy and asked how the Government of Venezuela directs its overall approach to the drug problem.

Minister Izaguirre explained that the use of Venezuela as a significant transit country for illicit drugs is a new experience for the nation. In response, President Perez established a special cabinet council for coordination of drug policy presided over by the Interior Minister. Parallel to this group is an operating committee comprised mainly of Armed Forces officers and top ranking police offi-

cials. He acknowledged candidly, however, that coordination and exchange of information among the various security and law enforcement agencies involved in Venezuela's antidrug effort is hampered by interagency rivalries. Such jealousies exist among enforcement agencies everywhere, he said, but he admitted that this is a drawback the Government of Venezuela has to overcome because the lack of cooperation makes a truly effective antidrug fight impossible. He praised Ambassador Skol for his sincere efforts to help the Government of Venezuela improve coordination of drug strategy and operations. He said the United States has been very helpful on seizures of drugs transiting Venezuela for the United States. He also reported that President Perez asked him recently about the progress of negotiations between the United States and the Ministry of Defense to include Venezuela in the Caribbean Basin Radar Network, and he explained to the President the status of the discussions and the delays encountered.

Mr. Mfume asked Minister Izaguirre about areas other than drug policy coordination in which U.S. assistance would be helpful. Minister Izaguirre noted the Kerry agreement between the United States and Venezuela on exchange of financial information and asked for continued United States advice on money laundering. He also urged the United States to provide leadership in helping Venezuela and other countries in Latin America to develop laws that are more uniform as to the types of evidence that can be used to prove drug trafficking. He said Venezuela's laws are too strict and that certain kinds of evidence of crime, such as video tapes and wiretaps, are inadmissible. He expressed concern that antidrug efforts are discredited when criminal charges are brought without sufficient evidence to convict. Unifying laws of evidence to improve success against drug trafficking is needed, he said, because the drug trade "is something that harms human beings and society itself."

Chairman Rangel expressed concerns about the corrupting influence of the drug trade on law enforcement officials in the United States. Minister Izaguirre agreed that Venezuela faces the same problem, especially in the border areas with Colombia where cocaine is smuggled into the country. He said he opposes leaving a law enforcement official at a border post for more than 6 months because of the danger of corruption.

In response to a question from Mr. Rangel about drug education in the schools, Minister Izaguirre said the Minister of Education is a member of the special cabinet council against drug abuse. He briefly described the Government's efforts to distribute drug abuse prevention materials to the schools. He said drug consumption in Venezuela is especially high among college students and also a serious problem among high school students. He noted that the Central University of Venezuela hosted a conference in 1991 on drug abuse among university students that was attended by other Latin American and European representatives.

Mr. Gilman asked whether the Interior Minister is satisfied with the extent of regional cooperation against drugs. Minister Izaguirre replied that regional cooperation is not too intense. Although Venezuela tries to maintain on-going communication with Colombian

antidrug agencies, he said historical reasons make trust between the two countries difficult.

Ambassador Skol interjected that one of the challenges of the second drug summit will be to develop specific agreements among the participating countries to enhance cooperation against drugs. Emphasizing what President Perez had told the delegation, the Ambassador said the old notion of national sovereignty is good for the traffickers but not for antidrug efforts.

Minister Izaguirre acknowledged the need to break down the mistrust between Colombia and Venezuela and develop a new border culture, but he reiterated that historical reasons make this goal hard to achieve.

The Minister said he believes the traffickers and insurgents along the Colombian border work together and that it is often hard to know where the guerrilla problem ends and the trafficking problem begins in Colombia.

Chairman Rangel said that on previous trips to Latin America Select Committee delegations were briefed on successful joint border operations against traffickers undertaken by Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. He asked if such joint efforts are still carried out. Minister Izaguirre said, "There should be but there are not." Mr. Washington urged Colombia and Venezuela to allow hot pursuit across their common border. The Minister said a recent agreement does allow some flexibility at the border for pursuit of both traffickers and guerrillas.

Minister Izaguirre said Venezuela is currently considering amendments to its drug laws. He said the current law requires substantial revisions, especially to strengthen penalties for drug crimes.

Mr. Rangel asked if Venezuela's judiciary is subject to the same type of drug corruption and intimidation that weakens the judicial systems of other Latin American countries. Minister Izaguirre admitted that Venezuela's judiciary, unfortunately, is no different. Intimidation is not yet a problem, he said, but the judiciary is very weak, nonetheless. Among the reforms being considered, he said, are measures to strengthen the judiciary. The basis for democracy, he declared, is a strong judiciary, but regrettably, he said, the judicial system in Venezuela has lost credibility.

Minister Izaguirre's concluding remarks to the delegation made clear that Venezuela and other Latin American countries neither expect nor want the United States to solve their drug problems, but they believe the United States shares a major responsibility to work in partnership with Latin America against drugs. "There is no American solution to the problem. We need to work jointly, seriously," against drugs, he said. "This is a common struggle for the benefit of mankind." He also reminded the delegation that the United States must not ignore its financial obligation to help Latin America combat the drug scourge. "You have a lot of resources," he said. While adding that he does not believe everything should come from the United States, he argued, nevertheless, that Latin America deserves United States financial support in the fight against drugs as much as former communist states that are now seeking United States aid.

MEETING WITH MINISTER OF STATE FOR DRUGS ENRIQUE RIVAS

Minister Rivas is head of the National Commission Against the Use of Drugs [CONACUID]. The primary responsibility of this commission is to develop a national public awareness/drug education campaign in Venezuela. CONACUID, however, is also involved in some initiatives to improve drug enforcement and prevent drug money laundering.

Minister Rivas thanked the delegation for its visit to Venezuela and told the members that the main concern of CONACUID is to create an awareness of drug problems in Venezuela and establish drug prevention and education programs in the schools. He outlined the structure of CONACUID and highlighted his agency's major initiatives which include:

A major effort with advertising agencies to develop a master communications plan for a national antidrug media campaign.

Distribution of 1 million drug education pamphlets to grammar schools.

Agreements with universities in Venezuela to train drug specialists at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels.

Establishment of regional offices to work in cooperation with State governments.

Creation of a directorate of communities to focus on drug prevention in the barrios and marginal rural areas.

Development of a self-instruction module for teachers that guides teachers on how to instruct children about drugs.

The opening of 2 treatment centers in the past year with plans to set up 10 more around the country. Previously, there were no treatment centers in Venezuela.

Plans to conduct Venezuela's first national survey of drug use and crime in March 1992.

While focusing on prevention activities, Minister Rivas also outlined activities CONACUID is involved in to prevent drug trafficking and drug-related crime. These efforts include:

A joint project with the Ministers of Justice, Health, Finance, Defense, and Interior and the private sector to control and monitor precursor chemicals used in the production of drugs from manufacture to end use.

Steps to monitor and control the creation of private capital to detect and avoid sudden increases in capital that do not have a logical origin.

Consideration of new regulations to require financial institutions to report certain currency transactions.

A first-time effort to develop judicial statistics on drug cases.

In the international arena, Minister Rivas noted that Venezuela has entered into agreements with the United States, France, and Italy on antidrug cooperation. He said Venezuela recently reactivated or established agreements with Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, and Guyana to cooperate in drug interdiction and will soon sign similar accords with the Dominican Republic and the Andean Pact nations to improve regional antidrug cooperation. The most serious problem Venezuela faces at the moment, Minister Rivas said, is not the use of drugs but the use of Venezuela as a bridge for drugs to the United States and Europe. He said Venezuela

wants to have a common understanding with its neighbors as to how to fight drugs so the efforts of countries in the region will not be isolated from each other.

The chairman thanked Minister Rivas for the briefing he provided to the delegation and said he had never seen or heard of a more comprehensive approach to the drug problem. He asked what type of drug abuse is most prevalent in Venezuela and what treatment approaches are used.

Minister Rivas replied that bazuco, a smokeable form of cocaine base that contains many impurities, is prevalent in the barrios whereas cocaine is popular among middle- and upper-class youth. Treatment consists of work therapy, recreation, and other open air activities, educational activities, and counseling. Treatment is voluntary unless ordered by a court for an offender. CONACUID's budget for treatment is 400 million bolivars (about \$6.6 million U.S.). He said CONACUID will soon request an additional 700 million bolivars (about \$11.5 million U.S.).

Mr. Coughlin said the United States' experience with interdiction has not been too successful. As a result, President Bush's drug strategy concentrates on eliminating drug production at the source and reducing demand through education, prevention, treatment, and street-level enforcement. He congratulated the Government of Venezuela for trying to get ahead of the curve on the demand side which ultimately, he said, is the solution to the drug problem.

Mr. Mfume asked about the accuracy of the national epidemiologic survey on drug use to be conducted by CONACUID. Minister Rivas said the Government recognizes the sensitivity in collecting such information and that non-law-enforcement professionals, such as nurses and teachers, will be involved in collecting the data to better ensure accurate results. He said the survey will be conducted every 3 years due to its cost.

Mr. Washington commended Venezuela for undertaking this survey which he said will help the nation better target its antidrug resources and activities. He said Venezuela's effort can be a model for Latin America and asked Minister Rivas to share the results of the survey with the committee.

Mr. Payne asked about programs in Venezuela to expand educational, employment, and recreational opportunities to combat drug use. Minister Rivas described two initiatives CONACUID will be undertaking, one with a national sports association to organize sports activities in the poorest communities and the other with the Ministry of Culture to organize theater and acting programs.

Chairman Rangel noted that the U.S. success in drug abuse education and prevention has been among those who are more affluent and better educated and that U.S. efforts have not been as effective among the poor and the jobless.

Minister Rivas agreed that it is hard to find a message that will reach youngsters at each level of society. He said Latin American youth are not deterred from drug use by images of sick drug addicts because young people generally believe they are immune from addiction and will not get caught up in drug abuse. He said effective prevention for youth requires a more subtle message.

Elaborating on his theme, Chairman Rangel said it is difficult to convince youth who are without opportunities and have lost hope

that they have anything to lose by using drugs. Minister Rivas acknowledged that Venezuela has the same problem and tries to reach these children and adolescents by raising their self-esteem. The chairman agreed that self-esteem is important, but he reemphasized the need to provide jobs and job training to maintain self-esteem.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ARMANDO DURAN

Chairman Rangel opened the meeting by thanking the Foreign Minister for Venezuela's leadership in helping break through the lack of understanding that characterized United States-Latin American relations for so many years.

The Foreign Minister agreed that relations between Latin America and the United States are changing rapidly and dramatically. After years of misunderstanding, cooperation within the hemisphere is improving to the benefit of all nations. He said it is impossible today for any country to survive alone. President Bush understands this well, he said, as evidenced by his Enterprise for the Americas initiative and free trade negotiations with Mexico and Canada. He told the delegation that this attitude in other Latin American countries would evolve with the drug problem.

Much of the discussion with the Foreign Minister focused on what he called the economic factor in the antidrug effort. He pointed out that the drug problem in Venezuela is different from that in Peru and Bolivia. In Venezuela, although some coca processing is beginning to occur, the primary illicit activity is the transshipment of cocaine. In Peru and Bolivia, however, where coca has been grown for centuries, the primary activity is illicit production. Because so many poor peasants depend on coca production for their livelihood, he said, Peru and Bolivia face a serious economic obstacle in eliminating coca production. They need to substitute licit crops for coca, but this is extremely difficult because the price for the substitute crops would never match the price for coca.

Chairman Rangel recounted his discussions a few months earlier in Peru with representatives of the coca farmers' union. These farmers, he said, do not want the stigma of producing coca, nor do they want to grow a crop that is being converted into a substance that is harming other people. They told him, he said, that they genuinely want to get out of coca production but that they need to survive, they need alternatives. In Bolivia, the chairman said, the concept of alternative development is not just substitute crops. It also includes relocating peasants to areas where there are jobs and other, nonagricultural, economic alternatives such as the development of industries using indigenously produced raw materials that are themselves substitutes for coca production.

Several members emphasized to the Foreign Minister that alternative development alone is not sufficient to eliminate illicit coca production. Mr. Coughlin said alternative development has to be combined with law enforcement and eradication. Mr. Washington also stressed the need for a multipronged approach to the drug problem. It is impossible, he said, to discuss law enforcement without talking about prevention and alternative development, too. Mr. Rangel agreed that alternative development and economic ap-

proaches to the problem of illicit narcotics crop cultivation do not work without enforcement. As evidence, he cited Thailand's experience where poor farmers grew opium poppies right next to their substitute crops.

The Foreign Minister agreed that an effective antidrug strategy must combine three elements: law enforcement, prevention, and economic development. He criticized the current approach to the drug war for putting the most emphasis on law enforcement. Law enforcement will never solve the problem, he said. Prevention is needed to reduce drug consumption. As long as demand for drugs exists, we will have a drug problem, he said. Law enforcement only forces prices up which attracts people into illicit production and traffic. The economic plight of the peasants also needs to be addressed, he said. These people are not criminals, they are just making a living.

He likened the antidrug effort to a three-legged table. Law enforcement, he said, is just one leg. The table cannot stand on it alone. All three legs—law enforcement, prevention, and alternative development are needed.

The Foreign Minister noted that Peru, in addition to the economic problems caused by widespread dependence on coca production, must also deal with the violent insurgency led by the Shining Path guerrillas, a difficult problem which is related to the drug issue.

Mr. Coughlin asked why the Organization of American States [OAS] has not played a more active role in antidrug efforts. The Foreign Minister, who had attended the delegation's meeting with President Perez earlier in the morning, said the OAS is hampered by limited resources. He said the problem Mr. Coughlin's question pointed to is exactly what President Perez had addressed earlier that day—the need for a truly international effort to combat the drug problem.

Mr. Rangel said another danger of the drug traffic is that all the efforts to establish democracies in Latin America could be lost.

The problem of drug abuse among the disadvantaged also was discussed. Chairman Rangel noted the strong correlation in the United States between drug and alcohol abuse and the problems of homelessness, unemployment, and hopelessness. For some people, he said, there is no risk that they will lose anything if they use drugs, except the pain in their lives.

The Foreign Minister said Venezuela faces a similar problem. Bazuco, he said, is a ticking time bomb in Venezuela. He cited an increase in murder among young people—revenge killings he called them—that were directly related to the growing bazuco trade. He agreed with Mr. Coughlin that the poor in Caracas and Venezuela generally were more likely to use bazuco.

Finally, he cited two goals that he hoped to see come out of the upcoming drug summit in the United States: a commitment to a long-term campaign against drug consumption; and agreement on specific, concrete measures to improve the economies of areas where coca is grown to provide viable alternatives for the coca farmers.

MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE FERNANDO OCHOA

The Defense Minister warmly greeted the delegation, and in the spirit of establishing a close and open dialog, invited the members to ask any questions they had to get a better understanding of Venezuela.

The chairman thanked the Minister for setting this tone for the meeting and expressed the delegation's pleasure in the improved relations the United States enjoys with Latin America, due in no small part to the leadership of President Perez.

Mr. Coughlin asked the Defense Minister to comment on the capabilities of the Venezuelan Air Force to track suspected drug smuggling aircraft entering and leaving Venezuela and how the United States can be of greater assistance.

The Defense Minister said Venezuela has a radar system to detect aircraft entering Venezuelan air space and a well organized system to intercept drug trafficking planes. He also said Venezuela has intercepted several such planes. While admitting that the system is not totally effective, he claimed it is sufficient for the problem facing Venezuela. Although drugs do enter Venezuela by air, he said the amounts are not large.

The main route for drugs flowing into Venezuela, the Minister said, is over Venezuela's long land border with Colombia. He said Venezuela has made significant efforts with Colombia to improve and strengthen operations along the border and described these measures as largely successful. He said violence along the border with Colombia has been reduced, and drug shipments have been interdicted. He described Venezuela's main problem as the transit of drugs, not drug production or processing, and said Venezuela is exerting sufficient effort to respond to the problem it faces.

Chairman Rangel asked if any efforts are being made by military forces in the region to develop or expand joint operations against drug traffickers such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru carried out along their common borders in the 1980's.

The Defense Minister said Venezuela's armed forces are in constant contact with Colombia's military. The Defense Ministers of Venezuela and Colombia meet every 3 months, and there is a regular system of communications established between subordinates at the working levels of both countries' military establishments to facilitate cooperation, not only on drug trafficking but on arms smuggling and insurgent activities as well. He also said he is satisfied with the good relations Venezuela's military enjoys with Ambassador Skol and the United States military missions in Venezuela.

The Defense Minister stated that Venezuela's military has concluded that drug consumption must be reduced to control drug traffic, and he asked what measures the United States has used to achieve the significant reductions in drug abuse reported in recent years.

Mr. Rangel agreed that reducing drug demand is critical. He said drug use is down among some groups in the United States but that use of cocaine and heroin is growing in Europe. The allocation of antidrug resources, he said, is always the subject of internal political debate. He acknowledged that the U.S. Government concentrates a great deal of resources on enforcement and interdiction

but said that in recent years more resources have been focused on drug abuse education and prevention. He said drug use among educated people and professionals is declining but that among the poor, the jobless, the homeless, and the hopeless the risks of drugs have not been a deterrent to use. Among these groups, he said, we have more use, more crime, and more people in jail. He expressed his personal belief that the root causes of drug abuse need to be addressed.

Mr. Coughlin credited President Bush with shifting U.S. drug policy away from an historical, and largely unsuccessful, reliance on drug interdiction toward a stronger focus on control of drugs at the source and demand reduction through prevention, education, treatment, and street-level law enforcement. He agreed with Mr. Rangel that U.S. demand reduction efforts to date have been more effective among the educated in our society. Mr. Rangel said the drug problem has to be fought on all fronts with more concentration on consumption.

The Defense Minister asked about the involvement of U.S. armed forces in antidrug efforts. Specifically, he wanted to know whether the United States would consider using the military, not just in support of efforts to stop drug smuggling, as is done now, but also for drug enforcement within our borders. He explained that the drug problem in Venezuela is viewed as a low intensity conflict that does not justify the full use of the military except in three states on Venezuela's border with Colombia where the military is fully involved in combating drug traffic and violence. In the rest of Venezuela, the Government believes the police and the antidrug section of the National Guard—which is under the control of the Defense Ministry—are sufficient to control the drug problem.

Chairman Rangel replied that historically the U.S. military resisted involvement in any aspect of the Nation's antidrug effort. This posture, he said, was at odds with the strongly held views of many members of Congress who believed the resources of the Armed Forces to repel outside invaders should be shared with law enforcement to fight drug trafficking. Notwithstanding the military's reluctance, he said, when President Reagan declared drug trafficking a threat to our national security, the military responded. He praised the U.S. military for the strong supportive role they now play in drug enforcement and interdiction including activities such as the exchange of information and equipment with enforcement agencies and Caribbean and Latin American allies and assistance to Customs in checking cargo at the border. He also said the assistance provided by the military to Haitian refugees shows that there is no limit to the humanitarian role the military can play when the President directs.

The Defense Minister said policy in Venezuela is made in much the same way. He said the military's full involvement against drug trafficking and violence only in limited areas along Venezuela's border with Colombia is because of the President's instructions. He cited a significant decline in violent activities since September 1991, when the border with Colombia was militarized. From January through August 1991, he said, 23 people were kidnaped in these border areas. Since then, he reported, only three kidnappings have occurred, and the most recent one, that happened just 4 days ago,

already was solved successfully. "We think we have achieved some measure of control over drug trafficking from Colombia through Venezuela and weapons trafficking through Venezuela to Colombia," he said. "However," he said, "it is essential to find a solution to the drug trade to limit arms smuggling from developed countries." He also emphasized the need for developed countries to get control over precursor chemicals without which drug processing cannot occur.

The chairman agreed and said these issues would be important ones for consideration at the upcoming drug summit. He also said Europe and the United Nations have to get more involved in the fight against drugs and that caution needs to be exercised to make sure that U.S. military support for antidrug efforts in foreign countries is not diverted to internal security uses.

Mr. Coughlin asked about the progress of negotiations with the United States to place two radars in Venezuela as part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network [CBRN].

The Defense Minister said negotiations are continuing, but no agreement has been reached yet due to slight differences over three aspects of the proposed memorandum of understanding from the U.S. Embassy including a political issue, a legal issue, and a technical problem. As he described these problems, it became clear that the legal and political issues both relate to Venezuelan concerns about the proposed agreement's impact on Venezuela's sovereignty. The political problem, he said, is one that Ambassador Skol knows well. Public opinion in Venezuela will be sensitive to any agreement that is perceived as establishing a United States military base in Venezuela. Moreover, such an arrangement is not legal under the Venezuelan Constitution. Therefore, he said, the agreement must make clear that the radars are being provided for Venezuela's use and that Venezuela retains sovereignty over the radars and its own territory. The Venezuelan Government wants language specifying that the radars will be operated and controlled by Venezuelan personnel with United States personnel providing technical advice only. With regard to the technical problem, the Venezuelans want the data from the radars transmitted to their own control center at the same time that data is transmitted to the CBRN control center at the United States Southern Command.

The Defense Minister said he hopes these slight inconveniences can be solved in the near future. "As you know," he said, "President Perez is firmly committed to the antidrug fight." Although he initially had defended Venezuela's air radars as sufficient to handle the drug smuggling threat to Venezuela, he now acknowledged the need to improve Venezuela's air detection system and said the two radars offered by the United States would accomplish this goal. He urged the delegation and the United States Government to understand how sensitive this matter is for Venezuela and asked Ambassador Skol to maintain the patience he has demonstrated throughout the negotiations. "We have good relations," he said, "and I think the small differences we have had on some issues will be resolved soon."

RECOMMENDATIONS

Venezuela is increasingly becoming a transshipment corridor for cocaine, primarily from Colombia but also from other countries, that is destined for North America and Europe. Because of expanding illicit opium cultivation in Colombia and Venezuelan ties to the Sicilian heroin mafia, the committee is also concerned that Venezuela could become a heroin transit center, although the delegation received no direct evidence during our visit of such traffic at this time.

With the increase in illicit cocaine traffic, Venezuelan and United States authorities strongly suspect that significant amounts of narco-dollars are being laundered through Venezuelan financial institutions and invested in land and legitimate businesses to conceal the origins of these illicit proceeds. Information on the extent of drug money laundering in Venezuela, however, is not available.

Venezuelan authorities are keenly aware that the growing drug trade has been accompanied by increased drug use. The Government is attempting to monitor drug use trends closely.

While the drug situation in Venezuela is becoming more serious, the committee found that the Government of Venezuela clearly recognizes the growing danger and understands that drug trafficking and abuse threaten not only Venezuela's national security and the health and welfare of the Venezuelan people but also the stability and well-being of governments and peoples throughout Latin America and the hemisphere. The committee found a strong commitment on the part of President Perez and his cabinet to combat the narcotics threat and to prevent the drug cartels from gaining a firm foothold in their country. President Perez underscored his belief that a successful antidrug strategy requires nothing less than the complete cooperation of the international community. He emphasized that the time has come to dispense with parochial notions of national sovereignty to wage an effective fight against the international narcotics traffic.

The committee was encouraged by its trip to Venezuela and pleased to find a new attitude of cooperation toward this common problem that previous select committee CODEL's have not always encountered in Latin America. The committee delegation expressed its gratitude to Venezuelan officials for Venezuela's leadership in fostering improved relations and greater understanding between the United States and Latin America.

We were, therefore, shocked and saddened when on February 4, 1991, just weeks after our visit, a small group of disgruntled military officers and troops staged a palace coup that nearly succeeded in toppling the legitimate, freely elected government of President Perez and bringing down Venezuela's 34-year-old democracy, the second longest standing democracy in South America following Colombia. Both President Bush and the Congress swiftly condemned the overthrow attempt, praised President Perez for his decisive action to address constitutional and judicial reforms in Venezuela, and pledged continuing support for Venezuela's efforts to preserve its democratic principles and institutions.

Coup leaders cited dissatisfaction with Government policies, which they blamed for worsening social and economic conditions,

and anger at Government corruption as the reasons for their actions. The failed military coup was not narcotics related and is not expected to affect Venezuela's antinarcotics policy or its cooperation with the United States. It did, however, prevent President Perez from attending the March 1992 San Antonio drug summit with President Bush and other Andean and Latin leaders, an unfortunate consequence given his strong commitment to international cooperation against drugs.

Although narcotics apparently did not play a role in the military uprising, the coup revealed a strong undercurrent of civil unrest and political instability in Venezuela that traffickers could exploit to their advantage to undermine democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law. At the very least, the overthrow attempt signals the need for increased vigilance against expanded narcotics operations in and through Venezuela.

As the result of its visit to Venezuela, the committee proposes the following recommendations:

1. The United States should continue its efforts to assist the Government of Venezuela in developing a more effective structure to plan and carry out coordinated, interagency drug law enforcement policies and operations.

2. The United States and Venezuela should conclude negotiations as soon as possible on the transfer of two radars to Venezuela as part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network.

3. The United States and Venezuela should reach agreement as quickly as possible on a bilateral chemical control agreement.

4. In response to requests made to the delegation by Venezuelan officials, in particular the Minister of Interior, the United States should provide whatever advice, technical assistance, and training it can to help Venezuela develop and implement effective laws to combat money laundering, improve exchanges of financial information pursuant to the Kerry agreement, strengthen drug penalties, and facilitate the introduction of evidence to establish drug trafficking crimes in courts of law. In addition, the United States should encourage Venezuela to proceed with reforms currently under consideration to strengthen the judiciary and should offer to provide technical advice and assistance to Venezuela, through the Administration of Justice program and other appropriate means, to improve the ability of Venezuela's judiciary to try drug cases.

5. The United States should encourage Venezuela to assume a leadership role in expanding bilateral and regional antinarcotics cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States should do all that it can to facilitate the negotiation of specific bilateral and multilateral agreements for enhanced narcotics control cooperation among countries in the region. For example, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago recognize the need to address the growing cocaine traffic from Venezuela to Trinidad. The United States should determine what assistance could be provided to spur effective, cooperative operations by Venezuela and Trinidad against this illicit trade.

6. On a broader scale, the United States must work much more aggressively to raise the awareness that narcotics control is an international responsibility. The United States must spearhead a major diplomatic effort through the United Nations and other

international and regional organizations to develop a global strategy to attack drug trafficking and abuse. The industrialized nations of Europe and the Pacific rim, already targeted by the cartels to expand the markets for their illicit products, are key to this effort. Such a strategy must include support for effective law enforcement combined with economic development to provide viable, legitimate alternatives to peasants currently dependent on narcotics crops for their livelihood.

7. The Drug Enforcement Administration should carefully review the personnel requirements of the resident office soon to be opened in Maricaibo, an active drug smuggling seaport in western Venezuela, to make sure it is adequately staffed to minimize the risks to agents and other personnel assigned to this post.

BOLIVIA

EMBASSY TEAM BRIEFING

Upon arrival in Santa Cruz, the delegation assembled with United States Embassy personnel for a review of the situation in Bolivia and of United States policy there. The Bolivia country team briefing included reports from Marilyn McAfee, the Chargé d'Affaires; Garber Davidson, the acting AID director in Bolivia; Michael Shelton, economic counselor; Bob Callahan, public affairs officer; Don Ferrarone, DEA country attaché; Steve McFarland, political counselor; and Col. James Hallums, Milgroup commander. McAfee, Callahan, and McFarland could not arrive until some time into the briefing, as they were attending to affairs associated with the arrival of former Bolivian Ambassador Robert Gelbard—now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs on a mission to prepare for the Cartagena drug summit—whose plane had crash-landed 2 days before after overshooting the Santa Cruz Airport at night. United States Ambassador to Bolivia Charles R. Bowers was in Washington during the time of the delegation's visit.

Acting AID Director Davidson began the presentation with a general overview of United States goals in Bolivia. He noted three major missions: First, aiding the Bolivians in diminishing poverty and developing and sustaining a diversified economy; second, strengthening democracy in Bolivia, which has been a rare commodity there until very recently; and third, assisting Bolivian efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and production.

While Davidson noted that the last item was considered especially important, he stressed that these three elements of U.S. policy were three legs of a tripod, and that without all three legs, the tripod could not stand. The complexity of the political situation and the interrelatedness of the three United States goals are critical to understanding the challenges faced in Bolivia, Davidson emphasized.

Political Officer Henifin then proceeded to describe the recent political history of Bolivia. Noting that prior to 1982, Bolivia's political scene was characterized by a series of coups, he observed that elections held since that time had been clean and a very wel-

come contrast. He stressed the continuing fragility of Bolivian democracy, however.

In the most recent election in 1989, Henifin explained, none of the three major candidates for President received an absolute majority. The politician finishing first, was pushed aside when the number two and three finishers, Hugo Banzer of the conservative [ADN] and Jaime Paz Zamora of the center-left [UDP], respectively, reached agreement on sharing power under Paz's leadership.

Putting the matter of narcotics in the political context, Henifin described the critical issue as being one of the Bolivian Government's "political will," which varies depending on circumstances.

Henifin noted that President Paz's term ends in 1993, at which time he cannot succeed himself. As the parties brace to do political battle once again, Henifin observed, electoral considerations have led the primary contenders for power to assume a lower profile and to demonstrate less determination on narcotics questions.

Mike Shelton, the Economic Counselor, then sought to paint a picture of the economic situation in Bolivia. Shelton noted that Bolivia is the poorest country in South America, and either the second or third poorest in the Western Hemisphere—after Haiti and, perhaps, Nicaragua. Bolivia's per capita gross national product [GNP] stands at \$900, according to Shelton, with leading health indicators like infant mortality and life expectancy bearing witness to the severe poverty of the Bolivian people.

The early 1980's were particularly difficult for Bolivia, Shelton explained. Inflation topped 24,000 percent in 1985. In response, the Government instituted a crash economic reform program. Working with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the Bolivian Government undertook a series of measures—some of them quite painful—including mass firings in the public sector, the freeing of interest rates, a reformation of the law with regard to foreign investment, and more.

These reforms had a significant positive effect. By 1991, inflation was reduced to 14.5 percent. Bolivia's real GDP grew for the first time in 14 years, finally surpassing the 1977 levels. Registered exports in 1991 stood at over \$900 million. Between 1987 and 1991, moreover, Bolivia reduced its external debt by \$1.9 billion, to \$3.5 billion, or roughly \$500 per capita. Bolivia was assisted in this regard by a United States Government decision to eliminate Bolivian debts to AID and for nongrant Public Law 480 [Food for Peace] assistance. Further debts may be renegotiated in accordance with the terms of the "Paris Club" debt relief effort.

Shelton also sought to provide an economic perspective on the question of Bolivia's coca-related earnings. Offering what he called a conservative estimate, he suggested that Bolivia coca exports in 1991 ranged somewhere between \$230 million and \$360 million. He noted that only about one-half of coca export earnings stay in Bolivia. He estimated coca production at between 7 and 10 percent of Bolivia's GNP.

Finally, Shelton outlined recent developments in the trade arena. The Andean nations—Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia—have formed a regional trade bloc, setting common external tariff rates—though Ecuador and Peru each requested and received a 6-month delay in their implementation of the agreement.

The Andean nations see this as a step forward in enhancing their leverage in any future discussions to establish a free trade agreement with the United States. They are watching developments concerning the negotiation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement with interest.

Shelton also suggested that the Andean Trade Preference Act [ATPA], enacted in December 1991, might come up in discussions with Bolivian officials. This act would allow most products from Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia and Ecuador to enter the United States on a duty-free basis. Shelton noted that the ATPA must still obtain approval under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], and that even then, the nations to which it is offered will have to apply formally and meet U.S. requirements. The Bolivians had expressed reservations about ATPA, Shelton continued, because it exempted a number of critical exports, including llama and alpaca wool products, and sugar. Moreover, he explained, some 97 percent of Bolivia's exports to the United States in 1990 already were treated on a duty-free basis. He urged the delegation to be aware that the ATPA was designed to encourage Bolivia's exploration of new areas for export growth.

Acting AID Director Davidson identified six different ways in which the United States Government is providing assistance in its effort to achieve its three major goals in Bolivia: First, assisting in the maintenance of a sound economic policy, including the provision of food aid through Public Law 480 title III grant assistance—and the relief of past debts related to the Public Law 480 program; second, trade and investment promotion initiatives; third, maternal and child health care; fourth, environmental assistance; fifth, support for democratic institution building; and sixth, alternative development aid, which seeks to induce peasant farmers to substitute legal crops for the coca they produce.

The Chargé d'Affaires, Marilyn McAfee, then provided a description of the history of the Alternative Development Program, which dates back to 1983. She noted that the Alternative Development Program had suffered some turbulence in its earlier years as AID struggled to understand what was necessary to achieve the most successful program possible. The program was centered in the Chapare region, where the majority of Bolivia's coca farmers operate. Among other things, the United States learned that the simple substitution of crops was inadequate to Bolivia's needs in the Chapare; an investment in infrastructure, including roads and rural electrification, was necessary if an Alternative Development Program was to be successful in getting alternative products to market.

McAfee informed the delegation that the Bolivian Government had not achieved the goals set by the United States Government for eradication in 1991, falling short of the 7,000 hectare target by some 1,600 hectares. This contrasted with a more successful program in 1990, when 8,000 hectares were eradicated. As a consequence of the Bolivian Government's failure to meet its target level for eradication, the United States Government withheld the final tranche of \$22 million in aid to Bolivia in 1991. The final disposition of this funding was still pending at the time of the briefing, McAfee noted.

Bob Callahan, the Public Affairs Officer, then discoursed on Bolivian public opinion with regard to drug interdiction and eradication. The Bolivian Government, he told the delegation, for many years did not perceive a Bolivian problem with drug consumption, and in fact felt drug production was beneficial to the Bolivian economy, as it employed 100,000 peasants. The Bolivian Government has changed its perception, however, and now accepts that domestic narcotics consumption is a problem shared with the United States. The problem has become serious enough to warrant the production of a new \$12 million antidrug public awareness program, funded by AID, aimed at the Bolivian public.

The delegation subsequently heard from Don Ferrarone, the Drug Enforcement Administration Attaché in Bolivia, who provided background on the DEA's in-country operations. He noted that the DEA had to rebuild Bolivia's entire law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure before successful operations could proceed. He also described the United States strategy in Bolivia, noting the three points in the Bolivian drug chain at which the United States effort is targeted: First, unprocessed coca in the Chapare; second, laboratories used in the production of cocaine and infrastructure related to them; and third, the "corporate headquarters," which consists of the major traffickers and their command and control apparatus; their lawyers, and their bankers.

The DEA strategy calls for collecting enough information about a network of traffickers to take the entire operation down once the decision is taken to act. Without taking such a comprehensive approach, drug kingpins simply experience a temporary setback and can be back in business in short order, Ferrarone explained.

McAfee added that the Government of Bolivia had recently offered traffickers an amnesty plan, called the repentance program, under which 11 major traffickers had surrendered, had accepted guilt, and had been jailed. In surrendering, the traffickers agreed to dismantle their narcotics production and trafficking networks and to forfeit their assets.

Colonel Hallums proceeded to provide a description of the United States military training programs in Bolivia. The International Military Education and Training [IMET] Program makes training available to 200 officers and noncommissioned officers. There is an emphasis on supporting democratic institutions and on abiding by human rights practices. Counternarcotics aid is made available through the Foreign Military Financing [FMF] Program. United States National Guard and Reserve units also visit Bolivia periodically, to inoculate children and provide other humanitarian medical assistance to the peasant population.

Chairman Rangel asked whether the United States programs have been generally well received by the Bolivian public. Ms. McAfee responded that polls conducted by the United States Government indicated that, despite Bolivia's left-leaning political history, Bolivians seem to be accepting United States involvement more and more. There is still opposition to the very concept of coca eradication. Moreover, there is concern in the Bolivian populace at large over the question of involving Bolivian military forces in the war on drugs, according to McAfee.

Chairman Rangel then asked about the participation of United States allies in the war on drugs in Bolivia, in light of the fact that cocaine trafficking and consumption are increasingly becoming problems in Japan and Europe. Chargé McAfee answered that the Japanese, the Germans, and others have a fairly large commercial presence, but that none of these nations had undertaken a major antidrug program in Bolivia. The Japanese, in particular, seemed not to want to get involved in counternarcotics efforts, she commented.

Mr. Rangel also inquired whether, in the judgment of the Embassy staff, Bolivia intended to reach its eradication goals for 1992. The Chargé replied that, in her judgment, the Government of Bolivia was indeed serious about eradication and that, despite the failure to meet eradication goals in 1991, the Bolivian Government seemed determined to move ahead on this issue.

Representative Coughlin inquired about the possibility that some of the legislators attending the interparliamentary conference might be officials guilty of accepting graft from drug traffickers. McAfee replied that she did not perceive that to be a serious problem.

Chairman Rangel expanded on this point, asking about corruption within the Bolivian Government. McAfee answered that the United States Government had made clear in the past that it would end its assistance program if the Government of Bolivia did not respond to United States concerns about particular Bolivian officials. She recounted how United States concerns over a previous Minister of the Interior and a previous Chief of the National Police had led to the removal of these officials by the Government of Bolivia.

Political Counselor Stephen McFarland ended the briefing with a description of the structure of the Bolivian Congress and of the parties represented in it.

MEETING WITH THE INTERIOR MINISTER OF BOLIVIA, CARLOS SAAVEDRA BRUNO

The Minister told the delegation that the day before he had spoken to the President of the Republic and told him that he was to meet with the U.S. Congressional Delegation. President Paz Zamora, said the Interior Minister, sends his greetings and said to tell the Congressmen that Bolivian-American relations have never been so good and that we have never had so many issues in common, such as fighting narcotics, strengthening democracy, and improving the economy.

The Minister stated that the relationship between the Bolivian Government and the United States Embassy in Bolivia is also exceptional. They also have excellent relations with former Ambassador Gelbard and with Mr. Bowers—the new Ambassador. Mr. Bowers, described the Minister, has a vision of fighting narcotics as part of a global strategy, which we very much respect.

The Minister told the delegation that since August 6, 1989, when President Paz Zamora took office, Bolivia has made significant progress in fighting narcotics. The Government has seized over 30 tons of drugs in these 2½ years. They have seized primarily base

and paste that is produced by the coca farmers. However, the Minister said that they are very concerned about the development of the capability to produce the further refined cocaine hydrochloride like they have in Colombia, either by Colombians moving into Bolivia, or by Bolivian traffickers. If Bolivians get into cocaine hydrochloride production there will be big trouble because of the large sums of money these producers earn. With such resources Bolivian traffickers could take over the country. The Minister stated strongly that the Bolivian Government wants to stop HCl production.

Additionally, since this President took office, 2,348 Bolivians were arrested—1,000 of which were released and some of whom were deported—and a great effort was made to seize the chemicals. The Bolivians have also run a great many interdiction operations in cooperation with the DEA, including a major raid in Santa Ana just a few weeks ago.

The Interior Minister said that the Bolivian Government recognizes that there has been some controversy about the trafficker surrender decree which was promulgated in November 1981, over the objections of the United States Embassy. Some feared that traffickers would be given only 120-day terms, that the decree would be extended indefinitely, or that the program was created only to fool public opinion. The Bolivian Government considers this program a great success. Eight very significant traffickers have surrendered. The Government thought that it might get a large number of minor traffickers, but was surprised by the quality of traffickers which surrendered and believe that these actions have set back the Colombian-Bolivian connection. Further, this 120-day decree does not mean that the traffickers have it easy. The Bolivian Government forces are still destroying labs and arresting traffickers, including seven that are in jail now with the eight that surrendered.

Those traffickers that surrendered have, according to the Interior Minister, given up everything they own, including cars, farms, and some financial assets. The Minister states that he does not know about accounts in the United States or perhaps Switzerland because Bolivia does not have the technical capability to trace such assets. The Government of Bolivia has asked the United States Embassy to help us on this matter.

The Minister stated strongly that it is a false conception also that the surrendered traffickers will not be given severe prison terms. Yes, there has been corruption in the past, but Bolivian trafficker Meco Dominquez just was sentenced to 20 years in Bolivia. The Government of Bolivia would be wasting its efforts and would be the laughing stock of the international community if it gave sentences of only 2-3 years. "I say no," said the Minister, "the Government of Bolivia will have a decisive program."

The Interior Minister told the delegation that Bolivia has a good plan for judicial improvements and some funding from both the United States and the United Nations. However, it is very hard to receive funding from the United States on judicial matters, the Minister noted. Bolivia will continue to employ United States intelligence information and to work with the DEA and the United States military, but it will not use United States judges to try Bo-

livian citizens—an idea which the United States has never proposed.

Until very recently the monthly salary of Bolivian prosecutors was \$200. It has been increased 10 times, to \$2,000, in order to help deter corruption.

The Government strategy is long term. However, the Government doesn't know how much coca is being produced; it only knows how much is seized. There is a need to make an inventory of major producing and trafficking groups and identify the most important ones.

The Minister said that it is his personal opinion that the use of the Bolivian army in the struggle against drugs is not necessary today, but may become so as Bolivians become more involved in HCI production. There is significant opposition from the Bolivian Congress and the media to military involvement in the drug war. He told the group that Bolivia has had many military governments and military coups in its history. Of course, it is not just the Army getting involved, but also the Navy and the Air Force. The Minister added that the military should carry out civic actions.

Chairman Rangel thanked the Interior Minister for his comments and congratulated him on the comprehensiveness and quality of the briefing. Mr. Rangel further explained to the Minister that our democracy in the United States is also being threatened by narcotics, especially with regard to drug-related crime and violence that has severely affected many of the poor people in our cities.

Ranking Republican Coughlin told the Interior Minister that in the past visiting congressional delegations heard presentations by Bolivian officials on what their Government planned to do in the future. In contrast, Mr. Coughlin noted, the Minister's briefing concentrated on what has already been done by the Bolivian Government to fight the narcotics problem, very much impressing the delegation. Mr. Coughlin added that it was important to continue to attack the drug processing laboratories, which are critical choke points in the drug trade, and to have alternative development programs backed up by law enforcement in the coca growing regions. It is important, Mr. Coughlin emphasized, that we be able to tell our constituents back in the United States that their tax dollars are being spent in Bolivia as part of a foreign aid program that brings results.

The Minister thanked the members for their comments and wished the delegation success in the remainder of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference.

HIGHLIGHTS OF LUNCHEON MEETING WITH BOLIVIAN MINISTERS, SANTA CRUZ, BOLIVIA, JANUARY 13, 1992

During the Andean Parliamentary Conference, the delegation conducted a working lunch at the request of Bolivian Ministers who are directly involved with the drug issue. The Bolivian delegation was led by the Minister of Agriculture and the Bolivian Ambassador to the United States.

The Agricultural Minister stated that in September 1989, President Paz Zamora of Bolivia addressed the United Nations and proclaimed a Bolivian strategy against narco-traffickers.

The Minister explained that the strategy includes three modes: interdiction, prevention, and alternative development. He also stated that the strategy needs all three modes if it is to be successful.

The Minister stated that alternative development is intended to create a new condition for the peasants of Bolivia. The present state of affairs finds the peasants involved with growing coca because it is the only commodity with a good market and a good price. And, of course, coca growers are not involved with coca because of mean spiritedness or because they enjoy the fact that the crop they grow causes so much harm and heart-ache. Often the coca grower is involved because of the loss of a job in another market due to economic conditions. In fact, many present coca growers migrated to their present occupation because it is another job in another market. Many present coca growers have not been growing coca for long and it is not a part of their culture.

The Minister emphasized that alternative development is needed to provide alternative income, alternative employment, and alternate goods for export. Alternative development can only be achieved through a multisector and multiregional approach, and it must include the creation of nonagricultural economic activities.

According to the Agriculture Minister, as a commodity, the importance of coca to the Bolivian economy has been reduced. He stated that it now comprises around 15-17 percent of Bolivian GNP. However, Bolivian peasants who are involved with coca receive around \$100 million in annual income from coca. Because coca activity has been so lucrative in the past, some peasants have now become involved with processing it to make up for the decline in price of their coca crops. Having peasants involved in illegal activities also works into the drug traffickers' strategy of diversifying the risk of commerce in illegal coca.

The Minister described how, historically, the drug problem has been a bilateral problem between the United States and the individual countries of the Andean region. Moreover, he noted that each bilateral arrangement had its own set of unique problems.

Colombia contains narcoterrorists who want to take control of the country; Peru's narcoterrorists do not seem to be actively seeking the overthrow of the Government in Lima, but they are aligned with the Marxist-terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso, in order to keep their options open.

Bolivia, on the other hand, does not have narcoterrorists organized either to overthrow the Government directly or aligned with another terrorist organization. But Bolivia's time may be coming, the Minister warned. The Marxists in Peru may have their eyes on Bolivia as a new base from which to open a new front.

Therefore, a multilateral strategy is needed, including involvement by Europe and Japan, in order to provide alternative compensation for the Bolivian coca growing peasant. Narcoterrorism is the scourge of the present day. But, structural poverty has been the plight of the Bolivian peasant since before coca was purchased for cocaine processing. Therefore, alternative development can provide

the necessary different approach to reform the structural poverty. While it may be easier to eradicate coca than to establish a different form of economic activity, we must go beyond eradication of coca and eradicate poverty. This is because someone will always grow coca as long as there is a demand for it.

Meanwhile, Bolivia has had some success on its own in the area of interdiction. In addition, 7 of Bolivia's 10 largest coca producers are now in custody under the country's new surrender conditions. These have allowed for the consideration of lesser sentences based on the producers turning themselves in to the Bolivian law enforcement authorities within a given window of time.

Bolivia does admit that it has had uneven success in eradication. This year's efforts have seemed to get off to a slow start because of the political concerns of the National Government about the farmers, especially during a year leading up to national elections. This might call into question the political will of the Bolivian Government, which still maintains that its goal is to have its people produce other agricultural and nonagricultural products for export.

Chairman Rangel responded that the goal of this portion of the study mission is a better understanding of problems we have in common, and that we are sincere and committed to solving our common problems. In order to help achieve that goal, Bolivia has to know that the United States has political problems, too. While in Bolivia it may be bad politics to speak of extradition and eradication, in the United States it can be political suicide to speak in favor of foreign aid. He also stated that poverty is not only a Latin American problem.

The chairman described how generous Americans are and how they are willing to make sacrifices for others, as long as they know a foreign people are also willing to sacrifice for themselves. The chairman explained that he understands the plight of the Bolivian farmers. But we have asked them not to grow coca and not to be dependent on it; and the Bolivian Government should get this message to its people so they are certain to understand it and so the American people can be assured that that is the case.

The chairman acknowledged that consumption is a major problem and that we must deal with it. We must educate people on the health and legal risks involved with using drugs.

The chairman said that he was pleased to hear a description of coca production that has not tied to the Bolivian culture. If it is true that many of the coca growers migrated to the activity because of the price, maybe they can be directed to grow a different crop. However, if they grow new crops, these should be instead of, not in addition to existing coca crops.

The Minister of Agriculture responded that Bolivia is committed to punishing wrong-doers, not only to make them an example for its people, but to show a commitment to non-Bolivians.

He said that Bolivia cannot always achieve its goals, but that President Paz Zamora and the National Government are committed to achieving the goals, nevertheless. One good result of the Bolivian Government's strategy has been the deglamorization of narcotics traffickers in the eyes of Bolivia's youth. Many traffickers have left Bolivia because of the Government's interdiction efforts. He stated that Bolivia wants a chance to show its good faith, and it

is willing to be told what it is doing right and what it is doing wrong. The Minister was hopeful that Cartagena II would result in many innovative approaches to his country's antidrug efforts.

The chairman responded that Cartagena II has the potential to produce much goodwill for the countries of Latin America in general, and especially the specific participants. In fact, he believes the Cartagena approach goes beyond the drug issue; it includes economic development and cultural ties. Given this broader perspective, we must strive to work on our perceptions of each other, which are based mainly on our own experiences.

Representative Coughlin stated that structural poverty is an American problem, too. We have had poverty before cocaine became a problem, and there will probably be poverty after cocaine is no longer such a pervasive problem.

In any event, President Bush and his administration have instituted a change in the Federal Government's approach to drug use and trafficking. In years past, the Federal Government relied solely on interdiction to attack the drug problem, attempting to build a virtual wall around the country.

Now, the Bush administration has taken a comprehensive, coordinated approach to attacking drugs on all fronts. Its approach works to disrupt cocaine production through the destruction of drug-processing laboratories and clandestine airstrips; works to educate Americans to prevent them from ever starting to use drugs; to provide them with accountable treatment programs when they seek help to stop using drugs; and to strengthen street-level law enforcement to assist neighborhoods in taking back their streets from the drug dealers.

Finally, President Bush has proposed more economic assistance to places like Bolivia, because the President feels strongly about the Americas.

The Economic Minister stated that the problem with drugs is economic. He explained that it is difficult to explain to someone whose crop has been eradicated why you are taking away his livelihood.

He also stated his belief that the coca economy is—all ethical considerations aside—a pure form of free market economics. Some have said the same thing regarding the street-level drug trafficker.

The Economic Minister argued that the American taxpayer should want to contribute to raising the standard of living of Bolivians, because this might result in an individual American being less likely to be affected by the coca economy. With the assistance it has received so far, Bolivia has managed to achieve the lowest inflation in South America; it has achieved its highest growth in 4 years; and it has begun to dismantle 50 years of a state capitalist economy which subsidized everything and which stifled real economic growth. He admitted that it has not been an easy transition to a free market economy and that the Bolivian people have had to be convinced that the conversion to a true market economy does not mean unemployment.

A discussion among the Bolivians, Congressman Mfume, and the chairman concluded that the United States, through the International Monetary Fund and its own balance of payments policy, has

been helpful in promoting reform and providing stability for the Bolivian economy.

The Economic Minister stated that Bolivia's productive sector must be opened up to the private sector. Bolivia must move away from the days when elements of the population exploited special breaks provided by the Government, and when those with economic advantages were able to offer bribes for favors. Bolivia may need to be more creative in its approaches to financing private sector projects.

The Chairman stated that the United States may be able to provide assistance in steering foreign interest to Bolivia, especially if all investors are to be treated equally. Otherwise, special treatment for Bolivia—in whatever legislative form—will be a difficult sell at best to the American people. The American people support the approach taken by the original Cartagena summit, rather than providing a special break for a particular country with an idea or scheme. They would be more comfortable with assistance coming under the Cartagena "umbrella," which the chairman referred to as the most creative approach to South America by any American President. Especially in times of economic downturn, it is difficult to justify singling out a specific country for special treatment.

Congressman Coughlin added that the United States has tried to recognize the differences among the Andean nations, within the Cartagena framework. He believes that it would be in Bolivia's best interest to take advantage of and use the personal relationship that has been forged between Presidents Paz Zamora and Bush.

Congressman Washington spoke of the need for the Bolivians to think seriously about removing the profit motive from drug commerce. If the nonpeasant, money trafficking middlemen are made the target of law enforcement, the cocaine trade might be hampered due to the lack of cash and the consequent lack of trust criminals have for those who do not deal in cash.

PROCEEDINGS OF SECOND INTERPARLIAMENTARY ANDEAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, SANTA CRUZ DE LA SIERRA, BOLIVIA, JANUARY 13-14, 1992

The Parliamentary Conference held in Bolivia during the study mission was organized by the Bolivian Congress in order to allow for an exchange of views on narcotics issues among the elected representatives of Latin American and North American democracies faced with the problems of coca production as well as cocaine processing, trafficking, and consumption. Over 2 days, representatives of Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Mexico, and the United States met in plenary session and in working groups for frank discussion on narcotics related issues. The Conference closed with the signing of a joint declaration by all the heads of the delegations.

The Conference was opened by Mr. Carlos Calvo, President of the Andean Entrepreneurial Confederation, who expressed his hope that the delegates could provide further impetus to initiatives already begun to enhance regional cooperation in alternative development, interdiction, and demand reduction. He also stated that this Parliamentary Conference was important because it would provide some direction to the Presidential Cartagena II Summit,

which would occur during the next month. Following his welcome to the delegates, Mr. Rangel and Mr. Coughlin, in turn, addressed the Conference. They were followed by Mr. Gaston Encinas, President of the Bolivian House of Deputies and Guillermo Fortun S., President of the Bolivian Senate. Later that day the heads of the other delegations addressed the Conference in plenary session.

On the second day of the Conference the delegates met in plenary session to discuss the proposed declaration, which was accepted. The Conference was closed by the Bolivian Vice President who congratulated the parliamentarians for the participation and applauded their efforts to encourage an international approach to the struggle against narcotics.

The following is the text of the declaration:

COMMUNIQUE OF SECOND ANDEAN-AMERICAN INTER-PARLIAMENTARY NARCOTICS CONFERENCE, SANTA CRUZ, BOLIVIA, JANUARY 13-14, 1992

On the eve of the Presidential drug summit to take place in February, 1992, the elected representatives of the nations in the Western Hemisphere met in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, on January 13th and 14th to discuss drug production, trafficking and abuse. The delegates of the parliaments of the countries present agreed to the following declaration.

In the words of Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora, "Drugs have become one of the great scourges of the contemporary world. * * * Perhaps for our time they are one of the horses of the Apocalypse as prophesied in the revelations by apostle St. John." However, drugs cannot continue to cause damage to our communities. This problem will be defeated if the world's nations commit their political will and the necessary economic resources.

The first Cartagena summit established a framework for regional cooperation in the Andes. It also complemented the international approach of the United Nation's Vienna Convention; pledged a cooperative, comprehensive strategy to attack the production, transport, and consumption of illegal drugs; to stimulate trade, investment, economic cooperation, and alternative development in the Andean countries; and to increase public awareness of the drug problem. Furthermore, the summit strengthened international support for efforts aimed at curbing illicit drug traffic. It is necessary to complete this framework and bring the resources and skills of all the world community into the struggle against drugs.

We recognize that nations on every continent have been affected by drugs. At one time, consumption of cocaine and other drugs was seen as only a North American problem. Now, drug consumption is expanding in Europe and Asia. Drug consumption is also increasing in the producing countries. Therefore, we appeal to the entire international community to assume its responsibilities and obligations in the fight against the problems caused by the production, trafficking, and consumption of drugs. We also agree to work with the United Nations in support of anti-narcotics programs. In the same way, special efforts must be made to get more assistance from drug consuming nations in Europe and Asia.

As legislators, we all share a common interest in developing programs and agendas that demonstrate performance and yield results for our constituents. All aspects of the drug scourge must be comprehensively attacked, from production to consumption.

We recognize that alternative development and law enforcement are complementary elements of counternarcotics efforts and neither one is viable without the other. Alternative development through crop substitution programs must provide a legal means for coca growers to support themselves and their families.

We believe it is imperative that alternative development policies stimulate the creation of industries in the countries which produce coca leaf. These industries should make use of raw materials which are substitutes for coca. To accomplish this, the developed countries affected by the consumption of cocaine and the producing countries should implement policies which will lead to the creation of industries in the countries which produce coca.

Alternative economic development should not be limited to substitution of coca leaf, but should also include nonagricultural economic alternatives.

The United States delegates recognize their obligation, in cooperation with other consuming nations and the United Nations, to support alternative development. The

producing nations recognize that alternative development should result in permanently reduced cultivation of coca used for cocaine production.

Enforcement activities must be a component of any alternative development program to ensure the effectiveness of projects aimed at curtailing drug production.

We recommend that the United Nations establish a formal process for the review and evaluation of efforts to eliminate illicit drug commerce, and also to stimulate alternative development through the creation of a United Nations economic fund that supports specific development programs.

In order to strengthen economic ties between producing and consuming countries, emphasis should be placed on trade initiatives such as the Andean Trade Preference Act, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the Canada/Mexico/U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

The more developed countries, whether producing, consuming, or transit countries, including European countries and Japan, need to jointly agree on a shared major commitment to some form of international drug control through the United Nations, the Organization of American States or other international institutions.

Considering that, through their organizations, drug traffickers have internationalized their actions, violating the sovereignty of nations, regional cooperation should be increased for the effective prosecution and punishment of traffickers.

For this reason, we ask the Presidents meeting at Cartagena II to stimulate the development of the mechanisms required to promote Andean regional efforts against narcotrafficking.

Wherever drug crops are grown, or drugs are processed or consumed, corruption exists. This is a problem which all of our nations face and which we must attack aggressively. As politicians, we are concerned that, due to their economic power, drug traffickers exercise influence over political, judicial, and enforcement authorities. Corruption weakens essential democratic institutions, tears the social fabric, prevents economic development and erodes the quality of life of all our citizens. Therefore, we have to work together to weed out corruption.

We believe that it is the responsibility of governments to prosecute and incarcerate drug criminals within their own nations and to sentence them appropriately for their crimes, and also to use international mechanisms which guarantee punishment for their crimes.

We pledge to further study proposals to create regional institutions under United Nations auspices, which might improve regional law enforcement efforts.

The delegates of the United States will pursue the creation of an information network for the exchange of legislative information dealing with the complex problem of narcotrafficking.

We express our anger at the environmental damage caused by the seepage of chemicals used in drug processing into the land and rivers of the Andean region.

We agree to work together to study the environmental damage and to cooperate in cleaning up contaminated areas. Further, all nations which, intentionally or not, traffic cocaine processing chemicals to the Andean region must recognize their obligation to control this dangerous and illegal diversion to the drug trade.

Finally, we reiterate our pledge and support for programs within our own nations and the international community to overcome the problems caused by the production, trafficking and consumption of cocaine and other drugs.

The following are the opening statements of Mr. Rangel and Mr. Coughlin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CHARLES B. RANGEL, SPEECH TO THE SECOND ANDEAN-AMERICAN INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON DRUGS, SANTA CRUZ DE LA SIERRA, BOLIVIA, JANUARY 13-14, 1992

To the President of the Bolivian Senate, the Honorable Guillermo Furtun; to the President of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies, the Honorable Gaston Encinas Valerde; to the President of the Confederation of Bolivian Private Entrepreneurs, Carlos Calvog and the distinguished members of the Andean Parliamentary Delegations, I bring you greetings from the United States of America, and especially from our Congress. I also want to recognize the many members from our Congress who are here with me today for

this gathering of legislative leaders to discuss regional strategy in the war on drugs.

I want to extend a special greeting and a special measure of gratitude to the Bolivian Congress for hosting this Interparliamentary Conference.

As many of you know first hand, the first Andean-American Interparliamentary Conference was held in Washington, DC, in June 1988.

We all began the first Andean-American Interparliamentary Conference aware of the magnitude of the problem we faced, and we left feeling that if we truly worked together, and if we truly united under one cooperative front, we could win this war. It is a war being fought for the sake of all our countrymen. The narcotics enemy threatens the sovereignty and stability of all our nations.

Today, we come together not only to follow through from that first conference, but to follow through on what our Presidents put forward at the Andean drug summit held in Cartagena in February 1989, and to make suggestions for the upcoming summit to be held in the United States early this year.

The discussion of the need for comprehensive drug control policies have moved to international fora. February 1990, saw the convocation of the special U.N. session on illicit trafficking in drugs. This unprecedented gathering underscored the strong commitment of the international community to fight against illegal drugs and recognized the grave threat drug trafficking represents to the security of member states and economic stability. The world ministerial summit to reduce demand for drugs and to combat the cocaine threat held in London in April 1990, served to highlight the role demand reduction must play in the international community's efforts to reduce the social, economic, and human costs of the trade.

I was pleased to be a representative of the U.S. Congress to both of these conferences. These international gatherings highlight the commitment of the world community to fight drug abuse and drug trafficking, and the fact that the fight must be waged against our common enemy—the drug traffickers.

It is imperative that we keep this spirited dialog going. Open lines of communication are important if we are going to maintain our resistance to the international drug trade.

The drug problem for all of us is really a double-edged sword. It is a problem of tremendous supply and overwhelming demand. In order to produce an effective strategy that is workable for all of us, we have to be willing to attack both aspects of this problem with all the energy and know-how that we can manage to bring together collectively.

You, as legislative representatives from the nations that are most afflicted by the supply aspect of the problem, know that you must be willing to stand tall within your own countries against the narcoregimes. Your own strategies must include swift and definitive action against the organizations that oversee massive operations that produce and traffic these poisons throughout the region and elsewhere around the world. It also includes the development of enlightened policies in conjunction with U.S. aid and other international assistance to create alternative crops and economies to the cultivation of coca and other illicit drugs.

In this vein I am pleased to note that as the U.S. Congress adjourned in November, it passed the Andean Trade Preference Act [ATPA] and it has been signed into law by President Bush. This legislation, which arose out of the Cartagena summit, will assist the nations of the Andean region in combating illegal drug trafficking through the elimination or lowering of trade barriers to products from the Andean region.

As legislative representatives of the United States, we on the other hand, must be willing to take the bold, necessary steps to reduce the heavy demand for illicit drugs that is present in our own society. We must make a special effort to let you and the rest of the world know that while we want to launch and maintain a full-scale attack on these drug traffickers who import these deadly substances into the United States, we also are willing to work vigorously to break the dependence of our people on these substances. We want you to know that we are serious about improving law enforcement, treatment, prevention, and drug education in our own country to help curtail demand.

Our purpose in being here the next 2 days is to conduct a multi-lateral strategy session. Our discussions are designed to stimulate and exchange ideas. In addition to the Cartagena summit and the other international meetings referred to earlier we have another wonderful example of partnership of our nations in the war against drugs. Many of you are familiar with the Organization of American States' efforts to get all of the American States to improve and harmonize their antimoney laundering activities, precursor chemical controls, and other legal procedures through the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission [CICAD].

In the United States, it has been the Congress that has been at the forefront of the battle against drugs in our country. We in the Congress have not allowed political philosophy to stand in the way of progress in the war against illicit drugs at home.

In the last 5 years, the U.S. Congress has passed into law two very important bills dedicated solely to fighting drugs in our country and around the world. The most significant are the antidrug abuse acts of 1986 and 1988 that took a number of important steps to curb drug demand in the United States.

Since the passage of these laws, antidrug spending in the United States has increased dramatically. In the present fiscal year which began on October 1, the U.S. Federal budget allocates over \$11 billion to the war on drugs. Among the initiatives we have launched are the following which would:

Expand drug abuse education programs in grades kindergarten through 12.

Increase treatment services for those who have fallen into the trap of addiction and target special assistance for IV drug users who are at high risk for AIDS, women and children afflicted by maternal drug abuse.

Get more communities mobilized against drug abuse by expanding the number of community-based prevention programs.

Provide assistance to State and local law drug enforcement, and increase the manpower and resources for Federal drug enforcement agencies.

Increase investigations against marijuana growers and distributors and reduce domestic marijuana production.

Expand resources and technology for money laundering investigations.

Augment drug interdiction efforts by increasing law enforcement and economic assistance to drug producing and transshipment nations, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere.

Increase the role of the U.S. Department of Defense in the detection and monitoring of drug smuggling vessels and aircraft.

A key part of the 1988 antidrug bill enacted by our Congress was the creation of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. For the first time in our Nation's history, we created one high-level position to handle the enormous duties of coordinating all of our national antidrug efforts. The U.S. Congress intended the drug policy coordinator position in our country to be like that of an orchestra director. This is the person who would make sure that all of the musicians playing the different instruments would come together to make the same music.

We have come a long way in fighting the threat of the narcotics traffickers. We have all made great sacrifices in our own countries to keep these outlaw organizations from destroying our freedom and ability to stand tall as flagship states of democracy and self-determination.

But in the final analysis the battle will only be won when we internationalize this war on drugs. For too long we have been waging this effort on a bilateral basis between the United States and its allies in this hemisphere, neither knowing victory nor defeat. At this critical juncture, it is imperative that a vigorous international effort be forged that mobilizes the resources and political will that is necessary to halt the production and trafficking of illegal drugs in this region. We must fight the war on drugs as we fought the war in the Persian Gulf, with leadership and commitment from the top of all nations involved and affected.

When one examines the complexities of the drug problem, the inescapable conclusion is that only on a worldwide basis can we achieve the level of resources and commitment necessary to combat that threat, control precursor chemicals, combat money laundering, halt the flow of illicit arms, develop trade and economic incentives for alternative crops and development, and create an atmosphere where violence is universally condemned.

We need to develop programs that attack the link between drug abuse, drug production, and poverty. I believe it is self-evident that many of the social forces that cause many Americans to abuse drugs—poverty, lack of opportunity, and hopelessness are the same social forces that cause many in the Andean region to cultivate narcotic drugs. The United States must use its trade, foreign assistance, and international investment policies in ways to help the affected nations of the Americas break the dependence of many of their citizens on the drug trade. Similarly, the United States must use its own social policies to attack the root causes of drug abuse.

We look forward to our discussion over the next 2 days. We welcome the opportunity to develop a better understanding of the ways in which drugs affect each of our nations and to discuss mutual efforts we can take to promote improved antidrug coopera-

tion and a heightened international awareness of the need for a united worldwide attack against drugs.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, RANKING REPUBLICAN OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS BEFORE THE SECOND INTERPARLIAMENTARY ANDEAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, SANTA CRUZ DE LA SIERRA, BOLIVIA, JANUARY 13, 1992

Distinguished delegates, I am pleased to join Chairman Rangel in congratulating our Bolivian hosts for holding this important conference and welcoming all the participants.

Our subject over the next 2 days is one which our hemisphere has been grappling with for a number of years already. Stopping illicit coca growing and cocaine processing, trafficking, distribution, and consumption has proved to be a difficult challenge.

There has been some important progress. Demand has been reduced in some sectors of American society and new initiatives in drug treatment and education have been launched, but U.S. consumption is still far too large. The world's most powerful and violent drug cartel has been aggressively attacked, at great cost, by the Colombian Government. The Government of Peru has taken some bold steps to regain sovereignty over its airspace which has been repeatedly violated by airborne drug traffickers. Further north, in Mexico, we have seen the new Northern Border Response Force garner some very significant seizures. Nonetheless, we all need to do more to stop the destruction caused by drugs in all of our societies.

As we try to attack the problem, it has changed. Huge markets for cocaine are emerging in Europe and Asia, to the extent that the total elimination of cocaine consumption in the United States would not end the drug crises in the producing countries. Now, when we address the drug crisis, we cannot only look upon our own hemisphere. The whole world must be involved in any workable solution. It is my hope that we can discuss over these next 2 days how to bring the financial and technical capabilities of the rest of the world into this struggle.

President Bush has repeatedly demonstrated how important the democracies of Latin America are to the United States. The enactment of the Andean Trade Preferences Act, the Enterprise for the America's Initiative, and the negotiation for the Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement signify that both the Bush administration and the United States Congress view Latin America as our most important partner as we prepare to enter the next century. But the bright future which awaits this partnership is threatened by the blight of drugs. Only by working together to overcome the narcotics problem can we hope to build a better tomorrow for all the people of the Americas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States Government should continue to build on interdiction successes in Bolivia through attacking major Bolivian

drug organizations. A special focus should be those groups establishing HCI production facilities within Bolivia.

2. The United States Government should also continue to encourage Bolivia to fight corruption and our Embassy should make every effort to inform the Bolivians of evidence of corruption concerning potential Government appointees. It would be simpler, and less embarrassing to the Bolivians, if corrupt officials could be quietly kept out of office, rather than ousted in a public battle of wills.

3. The United States Government, in concert with its allies and regional and international organizations, should encourage the Bolivian Government to increase involuntary eradication. Such eradication must expand as alternative development programs grow.

4. The United States Government, along with its regional and international allies, must continue to encourage the Bolivians to proceed with judicial reform and assist them to the fullest extent possible.

5. The United States Government, including the United States Congress, must use all means available to consistently inform the Bolivians of the necessity to appropriately try, convict, and sentence those major traffickers who surrendered under the Bolivian plea bargaining decree.

6. The United States Government must continue to hold Bolivia to the obligations they agreed to in joint counternarcotics agreements within the United States Government, even if that means delaying the disbursement of some United States aid.

TRINIDAD

EMBASSY TEAM BRIEFING—JANUARY 15, 1992

The United States Ambassador told the delegation that Trinidad is a land of contradictions. It is located 7 miles from Venezuela, but very little Spanish is spoken there. It claims to have few ties to the United States, and yet 50 percent of its trade is with the United States, along with a great deal of tourism and immigration activity.

Trinidadians often think of themselves as being wealthy, but per capita income has fallen over the last 7 years. The country claims a 98 percent literacy rate, yet its school spending has decreased. And, it now has a 20 percent unemployment rate. Unemployment is especially high among the young black population.

In recent years, narcotics traffickers have begun using Trinidad as a transshipment point for significant amounts of cocaine. In addition, large amounts of high-quality marijuana are grown in Trinidad and shipped to the United States.

In the past 4 years, the United States has provided \$607,000 of International Narcotics Matters [INM] Program funds to Trinidad. This includes funding for: New vehicles for the narcotics squad; two fast patrol boats for the Coast Guard; and \$160,000 in airplane parts and repair work. It also includes \$139,000 for demand reduction efforts and \$18,000 for the joint information control center.

Additionally, over \$1 million in security assistance has been provided through Military Assistance Program [MAP] funding, much of which is counternarcotics related. These funds have provided 25 Jeeps and spare parts for the Coast Guard, diving equipment, and

other supplies. In addition, military training is provided through IMET programs.

The results have been mixed. The capabilities of the Trinidad forces have improved. Patrols by the police narcotics squad, the regiment, and the Coast Guard are up substantially.

Despite this, there has never been a major drug seizure in the country. The basic problem is one of political will.

During December 1991, the Prime Minister's party, the People's National Movement [PNM] campaigned in part on its intention to get serious about the country's drug problem. The new Government has yet to transform its campaign rhetoric into concrete actions. Its inexperience can account for part of the reason for this situation.

The Government of Trinidad needs to coordinate its counternarcotics law enforcement agencies—police, Customs, Coast Guard, Intelligence Center—with an overall master strategy. The Government would be taking a major step in this direction if it would appoint an individual or committee to administer these agencies in this effort.

A very important step to improve the Government's counternarcotics performance would be the establishment of a permanent presence for the DEA in Trinidad. Presently, two agents cover six countries—including Trinidad—and are headquartered in Barbados.

The major drug problem of the area appears to be in Trinidad. The DEA indicates that Trinidad is a transshipment point for narcotics coming from Colombia and moving on to the United States and Europe. Some of this traffic is transshipped via U.S.-based commercial air carriers. Smuggling on containerized vessels has become a primary trafficking method throughout the Caribbean. Also, small fishing-type vessels are used, along with air drops on islands close to Trinidad. In addition, drug traffickers in the area appear to be using more sophisticated methods and technologies.

Nevertheless, the DEA operates out of Barbados. This is the result of the previous United States Ambassador's decision not to have a DEA presence on Trinidad. That decision now is acknowledged to have been a mistake.

The new Government seems to want to be more active and the U.S. Embassy would welcome a DEA agent. However, budget considerations in the United States have delayed the placement of a DEA agent in Trinidad.

The old Government did not seem committed to countering the drug traffickers; it seemed to think that illegal narcotics was a consumption problem of the United States and a production problem of Colombia. However, the old Government did take part in the first joint exercise among the forces of Venezuela, the United States, and the Coast Guard of Trinidad. During the first 9 months of 1991, Trinidad police seized 218.7 kilograms of marijuana and 39.2 kilograms of cocaine.

But mainly, the old Government was not focused on major traffickers. It appeared to concentrate on street-level drug dealers instead. It never arrested any major narcotics traffickers, even though there have been major narcotics seizures at destinations, such as Rotterdam, that transited through Trinidad.

OTHER POINTS COVERED

There is an addiction problem on Trinidad, but there is no mechanism to accurately measure it.

Trinidad has a minor corruption problem in its law enforcement agencies. But its major enforcement problem still seems to be a lack of enforcement, not bribery.

Currently, there are 26 American citizens incarcerated in four different prisons in Trinidad. Mostly, they have been involved in trafficking in marijuana in amounts of between 2 to 12 kilograms. Fourteen prisoners are serving terms of 3 years or longer. The common profile of the American citizen arrested in Trinidad for drug trafficking is an uneducated black woman. Usually, they are enticed by a trafficker who has their confidence. The trafficker arranges for the American women's round trip ticket from New York. The women are met by a contact in Trinidad who provides the illicit drugs and later returns her to the airport.

There have been discussions about transferring these prisoners back to the United States. The State Department has been encouraging Trinidad to sign the multilateral treaty that allows for such transfers.

The U.S. Embassy wants to refocus the new Government to pay attention to drug trafficking and fulfill one of its campaign promises.

Our Ambassador to Trinidad met with the new Prime Minister on the first day he took office. The Ambassador has reinforced the message that the United States is ready and willing to help Trinidad to fight the drug traffickers, as long as the new Government shows that it has the will to match its rhetoric.

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PATRICK MANNING, TRINIDAD-TOBAGO,
JANUARY 15, 1992

The delegation had the honor of meeting with the newly elected Prime Minister of Trinidad-Tobago, Mr. Patrick Manning.

The Prime Minister, who will be 46 in August, was first elected to Parliament in 1971. From that time until 1986, he served in various ministerial positions. In 1986, the political tide turned against his party, the People's National Movement [PNM]. During national elections, the PNM was swept out of office and Manning became one of only three PNM members in Parliament.

The former head of the PNM was defeated in that election, and so, Manning became the leader of the opposition.

Manning is given credit for helping to rebuild the party and its somewhat tarnished image and for putting it in a position to take power again; it did so in the most recent national elections held in late 1991, in which the PNM took 21 of 36 seats.

In response to the Prime Minister's inquiry as to the nature of the committee's visit to Trinidad, Chairman Rangel made several points.

He described how some urban drug traffickers are apparently preying upon young—19 to 25 years old—single, black American females from the metropolitan New York area. Typically, the traffickers—who remain behind the scene—arrange for the female's round-trip ticket from New York; she is met by a contact in Trini-

dad who provides the illicit drugs and later returns her to the airport at Port-of-Spain. When caught, tried, and convicted, a significant number serve prison terms of 3 years or longer.

The chairman indicated that there are apparently 25 American citizens incarcerated in different prisons in Trinidad.

He urged the Prime Minister to consider expediting negotiations so that Trinidad can become a signatory to the international agreements that allow for foreign nationals who are convicted of crimes to serve their prison terms in their country of residence. The chairman also indicated that the United States desires to convey the message to its young people that drug trafficking in the Caribbean is a serious matter, and that if they are caught, they are very likely to spend a substantial amount of time behind bars.

The chairman also stated that the delegation was willing to help expedite Trinidad's request for a drug enforcement administration agent to be stationed in Port-of-Spain because of the nature and scope of the drug trafficking situation in Trinidad. The committee has been convinced of the need for an agent to be based in Port-of-Spain.

Congressman Coughlin stated that, unfortunately, the world knows that the Western Hemisphere is the supplier of the world's cocaine. Trinidad must focus its efforts, summon the will, and contribute to a multinational attack against drugs. Trinidad needs to come up with a strategy and one official to coordinate the country's overall attack on drugs. Mr. Coughlin indicated the delegation was at the new Government's disposal on the issue of assisting it in implementing such a strategy.

Since it is barely 1 month old, the Prime Minister responded that his Government was still settling in. He said he campaigned during the most recent election campaign on a platform of making drug trafficking control a high priority, because he, for one, lives in an area of high drug trafficking; he has witnessed it; and he's seen what it does. He said something must be done, or else the consequences will be dire.

The Prime Minister stated that since 1988, he has known that Trinidad has been a transshipment point for illegal narcotics. Unfortunately, many natives have believed that the drug problem was based only in Colombia, as a producer country. The Prime Minister believes that the people of Trinidad must come to realize that if things are allowed to continue, they could get out of hand and transform Trinidad into another Colombia. The Prime Minister stated that Trinidad, because it is a small country, needs international cooperation. He said he believes that drug cartel operators have too much money and are capable of corrupting anyone.

He is not sure that Trinidad is prepared for what may come. As an example, he said that the drug cartels are starting to launder their profits in Trinidad through the island's legitimate businesses. He believes that some are unwittingly helping the cartels.

The Prime Minister indicated that some of his nation's antidrug laws may be part of the problem; he said that his government will be taking a look at them soon.

He also said that Trinidad is not a producer or consumer of illegal drugs; it is a transshipment point. And since conditions have become a little uncomfortable for some drug lords in Colombia,

they are apparently moving from there to Venezuela. And, since only 7 miles separate Venezuela and Trinidad, there is bound to be a spillover from Venezuela to Trinidad.

Since Trinidad is at a crossroads, action is required. Countries may stand on their sovereignty in an attempt to avoid doing anything. However, if they ignore the drug lords, they risk giving up their sovereignty to a more lethal enemy.

The Prime Minister knows the United States is committed to giving assistance to Trinidad. He said that Trinidad has even greater fiscal constraints than he believed during the campaign. Therefore, it will need to have financial assistance to fight its drug war.

He assured the committee that he is personally committed to controlling drug trafficking and that, as his government organizes, he will be more specific.

The chairman described the "Friends of the Caribbean," which is composed of members of Congress who are interested in seeing the countries of the region succeed. The members understand that countries of the region are smaller, and like Trinidad, they need assistance with resources of many types. The chairman stated that the Prime Minister should challenge the United States and Europe by developing a plan; a strategy, to fight back against the drug traffickers who would otherwise destroy his country. The chairman used the word "Challenge" because he explained that it is hard to help countries without a plan, but it is also hard to turn down those countries with a plan or strategy to attack their own problems. Consequently, if Trinidad has a plan, and implements what it can on its own, that will pose the challenge for the United States. We need to pay attention to our supporters in the region and to those who are trying to pull their own weight to find solutions to their problems.

Congressman Gilman stated that he believes the DEA should be urged to have some permanent presence in Trinidad. He also urged the Prime Minister to place a strong leader in charge of the relevant agencies in order to achieve better coordination of the nation's antidrug effort. He said that Trinidad needs to have in place an effective national strategy, and if need be, it should not hesitate to take advantage of training offered by the United States. He added that Trinidad also needed to have better control of money laundering and to establish asset forfeiture procedures.

Congressman Mfume urged the Prime Minister to have his Government consider signing the Strausburg Convention on narcotics. He too said that money-laundering statutes are only good if other countries have effective money-laundering laws. He concluded by praising the Prime Minister's view that narcotics is a threat to any Democratic Government and congratulated him for his strong stance on this issue. He expressed his hope that Trinidad's leadership will galvanize the region to take the bold actions that will be needed to successfully combat the drug traffickers.

Congressman Payne stated that Trinidad will have far greater problems in the future if its people fail to address existing problems now. Trinidad must be wary of how corrupting illegal drug enterprises can be to an economy that is having difficulty providing adequate opportunities for its citizens.

Congressman Washington said that the people of Trinidad are lucky to have Prime Minister Manning as their leader; he has the opportunity to act, rather than react, to a situation, before it becomes a real problem. So far, he appears to be ahead of the situation because the people understand the Prime Minister and his message. He urged the Prime Minister to follow the money trail, because that is the root of the problem.

DISCUSSIONS OVER LUNCH IN TRINIDAD WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AND THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY STAFF

The Ambassador welcomed the participants to the lunch and introduced Mr. Rangel. Chairman Rangel introduced the members and told the group that they had had a good discussion with Prime Minister Manning and that he had told the delegation that Trinidad looked forward to a new era of cooperation against drug trafficking. Mr. Rangel added that the United States wanted to help Trinidad, but it was difficult to do so until Trinidad develops a specific plan and strategy. However, he added, in the Congress there is a group of Members called the Friends of the Caribbean who want to support the small Caribbean islands.

Charles Shapiro, DCM, introduced the Trinidadian participants in the lunch. They included Prison Commissioner Hercules, Defense Chief Brown, Coast Guard Commander Kelshall, police narcotics squad Chief Alleyne, and Lance Selman, special adviser to the Minister of National Security.

Mr. Shapiro stated that the United States provides \$200,000 for antinarcotics in Trinidad, most of which goes to the joint intelligence coordinating center [JICC].

Mr. Brown stated that the Trinidadian Coast Guard is the prime actor in drug interdiction, using the two fast boats provided by the United States. Trinidad does not produce or process any coca, but Venezuela is just 7 miles away from Trinidad, which makes transshipment by boat or plane an easy matter. Most of the intelligence used in interdiction operations is gained internally. There has been an upsurge in marijuana production which Trinidad would like to combat. Trinidad would like to do more interdiction, but does not have the resources.

Captain Kelshall of the Coast Guard told the group that Trinidad was like a large aircraft carrier which is exploited by drug traffickers. The job of the Coast Guard is to stop them from coming in by the sea. This job is especially difficult because it only takes 20 minutes by sea for a boat to go from Venezuela to Trinidad. Trinidad uses its two fast boats, even at night, to patrol its waters. Captain Kelshall concluded his comments by thanking the United States for providing the boats.

Lance Selman stated that Trinidad has benefited from technical and financial assistance from the United States. What Trinidad wants to do in the coming year in its counternarcotics program is to improve interagency cooperation and coordination, and to enhance the implementation of its programs. Further, Trinidad wants to improve the collection and dissemination of intelligence. Mr. Selman added that Trinidad is a signatory to the Vienna Convention, but that it still needs to ratify it. They are also looking at

more legislation on asset seizure and financial investigations, as well as signing a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an extradition treaty with the United States. He concluded his comments by saying that the JICC had a hard time getting off the ground, but has now advanced significantly.

Prison Minister Hercules, referring to the American prisoners in jail in Trinidad, stated his desire to transfer these prisoners back home so they can be near their families. He described a case where he had to go through a 2-year process to bring a Trinidadian convicted of murder in Africa back home, which gave him an appreciation of how legally and diplomatically complicated it is to transfer prisoners and why an exchange agreement is necessary. He stated that he had attended numerous conferences on prisoner rehabilitation, and that contact with families is essential. Penalties for crimes must be made, but preparations must also be made for a prisoner's return to his community after his release.

Mr. Coughlin suggested to the Coast Guard captain that because of the volume of drugs moving through Trinidad, that there must be powerful Trinidadian organized trafficking groups. Captain Keshall agreed, stating that some groups move 500 kilos a month through Trinidad and Tobago.

DELEGATION VISIT TO PRISON IN TRINIDAD

Members and staff visited a prison on January 15, 1992, to meet with American prisoners, mostly poor African-American women from New York, who were caught trying to traffic drugs out of Trinidad to the United States. The delegation met in turn with the female and male prisoners.

Chairman Rangel opened up the meeting by telling the gathered female prisoners that it was with heavy hearts that the delegation was visiting with them, given the circumstances. He told the women that he was from New York and a former Federal prosecutor. Mr. Rangel stated that he recognizes that drug traffickers sometimes persuade people to do dumb things for dumb reasons. We do not want to raise your hopes falsely, he told the women; rather, he explained, the delegation was there to encourage the Trinidadian Government to sign a prisoner exchange agreement that would allow them to return home to serve the rest of their time.

Mr. Rangel asked if one of the prisoners could explain what they did each day. A woman in the front row stood up and said that first, they get up and have breakfast, and then they do labor, mostly crocheting. Following this, they have lunch, take a short rest, and work some more. Finally, they have dinner, are locked down, and go to bed.

Mr. Rangel asked about the lengths of their sentences and about the quantity of drugs they were attempting to smuggle. Several of the women offered that they were caught with 4 or 5 kilos and received 7 year terms. Additionally, at least one received an extra year's sentence—which a judge may impose under Trinidadian law—when she unsuccessfully appealed her term.

Mr. Rangel asked a series of questions of the women. Many responded that they were born in New York and had children. Some

had family come down to visit them or to help them get a lawyer at one point or another. One woman explained that she had a serious medical problem with her cornea and needed a transplant. However, the prison officials refused her request, saying that a delay in the procedure would not be detrimental. Mr. Rangel told this woman, and all the others, that they should write him and explain the circumstances of their cases and he would have them reviewed.

Chairman Rangel explained to the women that the primary reason the delegation had come was to learn more about how they ended up in these sad circumstances so that they could educate their constituents about the risks of trafficking drugs. In response to a question on what educational activities could be done to help warn women like themselves who might be tempted by free offers of vacations in Trinidad, a number of them said that large posters should be put up in the airports and that there should be commercials showing how people get involved with drug traffickers. A lot of people, one woman said, see trafficking as a quick and easy way to make a living and they do not realize the potential consequences.

Mr. Rangel asked the women to explain how the approach was made to them. Almost uniformly, the women stated that men they knew from their neighborhoods had promised them free vacations, including round-trip transportation and shopping expenses, if the women would agree to bring back a package. The package later proved to contain drugs.

Mr. Gilman asked a woman from his district in Newburgh how she got involved. She answered that a friend from Brooklyn asked if she wanted to go on a trip if he paid for everything. She said yes, and he gave her money. She came to Trinidad with her daughter, who is now 2 years old. She has not seen her daughter since she was arrested over 1 year ago.

Mr. Mfume stated that the delegation felt compassionately about the prisoners' plight and that the members wanted to help, but that the delegation did not want to raise false hope. Mr. Washington told the prisoners that he had practiced criminal law for 20 years. He asked them to not think about how they feel now about what they did. That won't help anybody, he asserted. When they write to Chairman Rangel about their situations, he advised, put your mind back to the time when you became involved in trafficking in the first place. He explained that they are in a position to help educate thousands of young people to not make the mistakes they had made.

Congressman Payne said that he could understand how some of the prisoners were brought into trafficking operations by some fast talking guys in fancy jackets with eight balls on the back. These men asked the women to demonstrate their commitment to them by doing something; in each instance, by acting as a drug courier. Then they've got you, Mr. Payne exclaimed.

The delegation then had private conversations with individual female prisoners and had similar discussions with the male prisoners. Generally, the men seemed to have a better idea of what they were getting involved with than the women and seemed less chastened by the experience.

In conclusion, Mr. Rangel told Minister Hercules that he was the only prison warden he had ever heard of that the prisoners liked and admired. Mr. Rangel thanked him for his treatment of the American prisoners and for his efforts to arrange an exchange to allow the Americans to come home.

BRIEFING BY NATIONAL ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION PROGRAMME

The National Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Programme [NADAPP] coordinator, Mr. Douglas Barzey, provided a briefing on NADAPP's prevention activities. He was assisted by Mrs. Wendy-Ann Wattie, director of research; Mr. Alexander Riley, demand reduction project director; and Ms. Cherry-Ann Millard, public information specialist. NADAPP has existed for just over 2 years and only 2 months ago moved into its own office space. In addition to Government funding, the office has received funding and training from the United Nations for its public awareness campaign and funding from the United States Government for equipment.

NADAPP has stated as its mission goal to "eliminate the production trafficking and use of illicit drugs and the indiscriminate use of licit drugs." To this end, they have identified six means: research, demand reduction; supply control; international cooperation; interagency cooperation; and policy formulation.

Although they have been established for 2 years, they have had little funding and resources with which to carry out the types of aggressive programs they have planned.

There is still very little data available on the extent and nature of drug abuse in Trinidad and Tobago. A high school senior survey was done in 1985. According to its results, over 90 percent of high school seniors had tried alcohol, but less than 5 percent had tried cocaine. With the increased availability of cocaine in Trinidad and Tobago, it is believed that cocaine use has increased. A new high school senior survey has just been completed, but the data is not yet available. They believe the survey will show that the main problem with teenagers, however, continues to be alcohol abuse. The cultural acceptance of alcohol consumption contributes to this problem. The minimum drinking age is 16, and alcohol is often sold at school events and near high schools.

One of the key vehicles for its drug awareness efforts is the establishment of community action groups [CAG]. These are designed to utilize the organization of existing community groups, such as churches, parent-teacher organizations, sports teams, et cetera. NADAPP has published a handbook of guidelines for the establishment and functioning of CAG's. They have also provided training for 12 senior drug prevention trainers, who in turn are expected to train community leaders in drug prevention.

Each CAG develops activities tailored to its community and each is expected to be self-sustaining. One innovative CAG had Christmas greeting cards printed with an antidrug message, and is using the proceeds to further its drug prevention effort.

NADAPP recognizes that in order to be successful, a partnership must be forged with the private sector. To this end, NADAPP staff has been meeting with business leaders. Together, they have initi-

ated a new partnership against substance abuse [PASA], which will be legally established within the next few months.

NADAPP is establishing a drug abuse prevention information center, which will have largely a public relations role. The United Nations has provided staff training for this project. They are going to collect prevention materials from the United States and elsewhere, and hope to adapt some of them to Trinidadian culture. They want assistance from the United States in establishing a computerized data base and access via computer modem linkup to such a data base in the United States. Eventually they plan to have satellite information centers in several communities away from Port-of-Spain.

They have plans to establish a school drug education division, but have not yet hired a director. In addition to drug education for the students, they indicated that there were some alcohol abuse problems with teachers.

The briefing closed with a viewing of a new music video with a very strong antidrug message. The video was by a popular local calypso artist and demonstrated a drug-free joie de vivre. According to Mr. Barzay, one of their prevention tactics is to demonstrate the positive side of being drug free rather than only the negative side of using drugs. Because of limited funding, the video has not been widely distributed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Our Embassy in Trinidad should continue to insist on the Trinidadians developing a comprehensive antinarcotics plan and putting someone with proper authority in charge of the fight. U.S. aid should be contingent on the completion of a satisfactory plan.

2. A DEA office should be opened in Trinidad. The proximity of Trinidad and Tobago to Venezuela makes the nation a significant transshipment point. Short of a new office, an effort should be made by DEA to increase the frequency of visits to the islands.

3. The administration and the Congress should continue to press for a prisoner exchange agreement with Trinidad and Tobago so that United States nationals held in prison in Trinidad could serve the remainder of their sentences in the United States.

4. The Customs Service should cooperate with international airports, especially JFK in New York, to design and display large posters explaining the risk of trafficking drugs from the Caribbean and describing the scam commonly used to convince young women to serve as couriers.

5. The delegation commends the NADAPP for the very ambitious program it has planned with its limited resources, and urges it to move expeditiously to implement these proposals. In particular, the delegation commends their efforts to work with the private sector in preventing drug and alcohol abuse and encourages close cooperation. The delegation urges the Embassy to work with NADAPP in providing access to existing prevention materials available in the United States that might be applicable to Trinidad and Tobago.

SURINAME

The delegation spent one day, Thursday, January 16, in Parimaribo, Suriname. During that period they met with the following Surinamese officials:

President Ronald Venetiaan, Foreign Minister Soebhas Mungra, Justice Minister Soeslil Girjasing, the Hon. Ottmar Rodgers, vice chairman of the National Assembly, members of Congress, Ambassador Pieter Frans Christiaan Koch from The Netherlands to Suriname.

EMBASSY TEAM BRIEFING

The delegation was briefed by Ambassador John P. Leonard; John E. Hope, deputy chief of mission; John K. Schlosser, political officer; Maj. Vernon Sorrell, defense attaché; and Robert McCarthy, political-military officer.

Suriname gained independence from the Netherlands in 1975. Geographically about the size of Georgia, Suriname has about 400,000 inhabitants, most of whom live along the northern coast rather than in the dense jungle inland. The population is ethnically very diverse, including Africans, Amerindians, Indians, Javanese, Chinese, and a few Europeans.

When the Dutch granted Suriname independence in 1975, they left behind a prosperous country with a democratic government, but the economy deteriorated rapidly. In 1980 a group of 16 non-commissioned officers overthrew the civilian government. Their leader, Desi Bouterse, assumed the rank of lieutenant colonel. The constitution was suspended, the legislature dissolved, a puppet president was installed, and Lieutenant Colonel Bouterse ruled by decree. In 1982, the military authorities arrested, tortured, and killed 15 prominent opposition leaders. This bloodbath resulted in an international outcry and the suspension of assistance to Suriname by the international community, including the Netherlands, who were the principal benefactors.

The economy further declined under Bouterse and human rights were restricted. In 1986, insurgency by the Maroons—former African slaves that had escaped into the jungle where they still live in primitive conditions—began attacking economic targets in the country's interior. By 1987, with both internal and external pressures mounting, the military government agreed to elections and a new constitution which granted the military a role in politics. The new Government was weak and indecisive; its weakness due in part to efforts by Bouterse to undermine its authority. The economy deteriorated further and in 1990, Bouterse led a second coup d'état. This nonviolent coup was called the telephone coup, as Bouterse and other military leaders basically called up the civilian government leaders and dismissed them.

Although a military government was initially installed, Bouterse bowed to international pressure and allowed elections to take place in June 1991, under the scrutiny of OAS and other international observers. The elections were deemed generally free and fair. No party won a clear majority, so the Government was formed by a coalition of the New Front Coalition and the Democratic Alternative Party. The National Assembly and local elected leaders elected

Ronald Venetiaan President and he was inaugurated in September 1991. The new Government has issued a lot of brave pronouncements about controlling the military and has stated they will not be telephoned out of government.

Suriname has serious economic problems. The economy is stagnant. The Suriname guilder is grossly overvalued, foreign exchange earnings are dwindling, and the Government has established a number of rigid and disastrous economic controls. The local economy has become dependent on a thriving black market, which accounts for about 85 percent of all imports.

Suriname has been increasingly used as a transshipment point for cocaine primarily destined for the Netherlands. It is uncertain whether the cocaine stays there, or goes from there into other European countries, or possibly even back across the Atlantic to the United States. In recent years the number and size of Dutch seizures of cocaine shipments from Suriname have been increasing. Over 1,500 kilograms were seized either in Suriname or coming from Suriname into The Netherlands in 1991.

Suriname law enforcement is weak and the police are intimidated by the military. The police have very limited resources with which to carry out their law enforcement mission, and, by extension, their drug enforcement mission.

The ability to prosecute and convict drug traffickers is minimal. It is widely believed that drug corruption is pervasive within the army and has reached high levels. The police are afraid to confront or accuse the military officials involved in narcotics trafficking. One brave police officer who did try to move against corrupt military officials was tortured and killed in 1990. His body was dumped in front of a police check point in the center of Parimaribo to underscore the point.

One of Bouterse's assistants was convicted in Miami of drug trafficking conspiracy in 1986, and was just released from jail last year. Upon his return to Suriname, he was promoted to commandant and head of the military police and the central intelligence services of the armed forces. He has since been nominated to be the military chief of staff. Bouterse has broad support of the military. Many within the military privately acknowledge the corruption in the military, but they generally close ranks and present a united front to outsiders.

A prominent prosecutor has named two members of the group of 16 that overthrew the Government in 1980 as being involved in drug trafficking. In retaliation, this prosecutor has just been publicly accused of corruption.

The local press is very cautious in its reporting on the military. The Dutch press, however, has printed many allegations and rumors. Some of their reports on alleged drug smuggling sites appear to have little credibility, but the allegations of smuggling in the western border area near Guyana appear both plausible and likely. There is a large airport in that region which is controlled indirectly by Bouterse. It is closed to the public and would be a likely candidate for traffickers. There is better information on how the drugs get out, that is, primarily by commercial air or sea, than how they get into Suriname. River transit is very limited, as there are lots of rapids and unnavigable waters.

The Drug Enforcement Administration does not have a permanent presence in Suriname. At present it is being covered out of the DEA office in Brasilia, Brazil. This is an inefficient and inadequate arrangement. Because of the limited commercial air travel between those countries, it takes 2 full days to fly from Brasilia to Parimaribo.

The Embassy has requested a permanent DEA presence in Parimaribo. As this is unlikely to materialize within the next year, the Embassy has requested that one additional agent be assigned to the existing DEA office in The Hague as soon as possible to cover the Suriname-Netherlands drug traffic. Such an assignment would mirror the trafficking pattern, and the agent would have much better access to Suriname out of the Netherlands than out of Brazil, as direct flights are available from Amsterdam to Parimaribo.

A few weeks before the delegation's arrival, the Surinamese police arrested a prominent Surinamese military officer who had been serving a drug trafficking sentence in Holland. Because of The Netherlands' lenient incarceration rules, this prisoner was permitted to attend a funeral unescorted. He utilized the opportunity to escape and apparently returned to Suriname thinking he would not be caught there.

The Netherlands had reinstated their assistance to Suriname in 1988 after the elections, but resuspended it following the "telephone coup." They now want to work with the newly elected Government and are willing to make substantial economic assistance available if Suriname makes some important economic reforms, such as devaluing the currency, removing Government interference from exports, imports and domestic enterprise, et cetera. They have also indicated that they are willing to provide Administration of Justice assistance.

The National Assembly is taking up proposals for constitutional reform which would strip the military of its political power. If this occurs, the United States Government would be much more likely to provide assistance to the Government of Suriname.

Bouterse does not like the ideas of economic and/or constitutional reform or of Dutch assistance. How much influence he still has in terms of blocking these reforms remains to be seen.

The military, which numbers about 2,500 men, now has a civilian Minister of Defense, but the real power remains in Bouterse's hands. The international community is very supportive of the civilian Minister of Defense and there are some who recommend an international peace keeping force in Suriname.

The military and civilians in Suriname are watching with interest developments in Haiti, as they all feel they have a stake in whether or not Aristide is able to come back. An international embargo against Suriname, similar to that against Haiti, would have immediate, devastating effects.

The Suriname-Dutch legal cooperation treaty had been suspended in 1982 after the massacre. They plan to reinstate it and would like to negotiate an extradition treaty. Both agreements would help the counternarcotics effort.

The Netherlands, United States, Brazil, Venezuela, and France have the most significant presence in Suriname.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT VENETIAAN

The President welcomed the delegation to Suriname and immediately stated that his country, as part of the Americas, has to deal with the serious problem of worldwide production, trafficking, and consumption of drugs.

Although there is some drug use in Suriname, and there are programs to combat consumption, the biggest narcotics-related problem facing Suriname is that of drug trafficking and transshipment. This problem is so large, according to the President, that Suriname cannot handle it alone. He is looking forward to cooperating with the United States in tackling this worldwide problem. In addition, he stressed that they must also work with their neighbors, Venezuela, Guyana, and Brazil to curtail the problem of air trafficking across these borders into the jungle areas, as well as maritime trafficking along the coast. He informed the delegation that Suriname does have treaties with Venezuela and Guyana on this matter, and that they hoped to close the coast to drug traffickers.

He said that the United States had an important position in counternarcotics, and that he hoped Suriname could learn from the United States experience. He felt it was particularly important for the United States, the Netherlands, and Suriname to work together on this, and that Suriname would like assistance from both the United States and the Netherlands.

The country needs better availability of foreign currency. That is one of their main problems. Resources will be needed in the drug fight. They have been able to seize some of the cocaine that flows through Suriname, but much of it goes through their fingers. Their means for detecting and seizing drugs are inadequate and out of date. They would like to have the capability to push back the drug trafficking from their country.

Chairman Rangel assured the President that the delegation was in Suriname as friends trying to be helpful without interfering in their political agenda. The truth of the matter is that drug traffickers have no respect for borders or governments and continually violate the national sovereignty of those nations where they traffic drugs.

The chairman noted that the successes in Colombia have caused a shift of drug trafficking to other South American countries. An increase in drug consumption in Europe has also contributed to a change in the traditional trafficking routes.

International awareness of this problem has increased. The chairman said that we, in the United States, were willing to share our experiences and our mistakes, so that Suriname did not have to make the same ones. The United States is a nation that believes that our democratic principles are threatened when any other democracy is threatened or violated. We stand by our friends. The chairman concluded by asking what role the United States can play to support the President's efforts, and in particular what support the U.S. Congress can provide. He informed the President that although the Congress had partisan problems on many issues, they were united on this important issue.

Ranking Republican Coughlin conveyed to the President his interest in supporting the new democratic institutions in Suriname.

Drug traffickers are trying to increase their activities in Suriname at the same time the new democratically elected Government is trying to consolidate its power. Drugs not only destroy the lives of young people, but can destroy democracy as well.

The President responded that those were two points that were very important to Suriname—the impact of drugs on the community and their impact on democratic stability. The influence of drug trafficking is very corrupt and this corruption can work its way from the bottom up to the top. It has not reached the higher levels of Government in Suriname, but they are concerned about this threat.

The President recognized the serious influence drugs have on health, both physically and mentally. He said that he followed through the international press, the United States' efforts to control this problem, and that there was a strong determination in Suriname, both in the administration and the Parliament to combat this problem. Suriname wishes to be a strong link within the system of a healthy America and world.

The chairman expressed his admiration for the courage of the civilian government in its efforts to reform the constitution to take away the provisions for political control from the military.

The President responded that although the constitutional changes were important, those who would favor a coup d'etat were not the ones who abide by every detail of the constitution. In reference to the 1990 coup, an interpretation of the constitution could possibly have been stretched to have given the legal responsibility to the military to remove the civilian government from power in order to safeguard the state. However, by the results of the recent election, it is clear that the people want it clearly stated that the army does not have constitutional or legal authority to make such changes. Even the military says it does not object to the constitutional changes being proposed in the National Assembly. The Government is trying to move in such a way so as not to create the type of situation that could lead to another coup d'etat.

Representative Mfume shared with the President the pride that North Americans feel about the new democracy in Suriname. It signals a new day and a new era, and hopefully also new cooperation in the struggle to fight drug trafficking and abuse. He said that democracy is not measured by the size of country, but by the courage of its leaders.

Congressman Dornan followed up on Mr. Mfume's remarks by asking how this delegation could best be supportive of the democratic reforms in Suriname.

The President responded by acknowledging that the presence of this large delegation signified strong support for his efforts. With all of the problems in the world, the fact that the delegation was taking time to come to Suriname demonstrated strong concern and support. The Government's most important and immediate goal is to stabilize the democracy. In addition, the nation faces serious economic problems and law enforcement problems. Suriname has appreciated the strong support by the United States following the coup in 1990 when the United States and the international community strongly condemned that action. They have also appreciated the moral support and U.S. presence at his inauguration.

The President said that he was very concerned about the problems facing the people of Haiti, and asked for solidarity of nations in standing up for democracy and against small armed bands that overthrow small countries.

In order to strengthen the democracy here in Suriname, according to the President, they need to also strengthen the economic sector. Basic needs, such as food, lodging, and water are everyday problems for many people in his country. They have a problem with their credit line to enable them to buy grain. As long as these basic needs are not met, there will be some people looking for illegal opportunities to get some action.

Congressman Payne commented on the health care problem in Suriname. He suggested that the United States could provide technical assistance and expertise for a specific disease which is common among the Maroons and is similar to sickle cell anemia.

Representative Coughlin turned the discussion back to the narcotics trafficking problem. He wondered what kind of impact could be had in the Surinamese antinarcotics efforts if the corruption within the military was as severe as reported.

The President noted that drug trafficking corrupts every group it comes in contact with. The legal system in Suriname, as in the United States, requires hard evidence in order to take action. All of the rumors that float around about the military are difficult to substantiate with the means available to them. The government comes with good will but empty hands to enforce the law.

Congressman Gilman said that the delegation was in Suriname to bolster their effort. He inquired about long range national statistics on drug trafficking through Suriname.

The President indicated that more details on that could be provided in the delegation's meeting with the Minister of Justice and Police. He did say that he felt that the antinarcotics brigade was performing pretty well within their limited means. The Government also plans to establish a National Commission on Drugs to look at the social and health aspects of the problem.

The chairman closed by saying he hoped that the President would have a chance to visit the United States soon and that the committee would like to have another chance to share information with him in Washington.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SOEBHAS MUNGRA AND JUSTICE AND POLICE MINISTER SOESLIL GIRJASING

Minister Mungra welcomed the delegation on behalf of the Foreign Ministry and the Justice and Police Ministry, indicating that both Ministers had been looking forward to meeting the U.S. delegation. The Minister said that one of his priority issues was to cooperate with friends all over the world, especially within the region, to fight drug production, trafficking, and abuse. He stressed that this issue could not be tackled unilaterally. To this end they plan to enter into treaties and conventions to better coordinate the international efforts against narcotics.

The Minister pointed out that Suriname is a country of many ethnic and religious groups from native American, to Creole, to African, and to East Indian. In spite of this diversity, there is no seg-

regation or discrimination. The Minister referred to the accompanying staff where all ethnic backgrounds were represented.

He concluded his opening remarks by saying that there was a strong commitment in the new administration to fight drugs. However, they were hampered by a lack of resources, particularly manpower and state-of-the-art equipment.

Chairman Rangel thanked the Minister for the warm welcome and for taking the time to meet with the delegation. He also thanked Ambassador Leonard for arranging the day's meetings.

He commended the Surinamese for seeking international cooperation in the drug war and shared with them the recent experience at the Bolivian-hosted Interparliamentary Conference on Narcotics. The delegations that met there understood how drug traffickers have moved throughout South America and were very concerned about the threats to democracy posed by the illegal traffic. Drug traffickers do not recognize the sovereignty of nations or their borders, and their corruptive influence is an assault on the democratic institutions and principals that freedom-loving people hold so dear.

Ranking Republican Coughlin noted that as there have been some counternarcotics successes in traditional producer countries, particularly in Colombia, there are increasing reports that the traffic is moving to other countries, such as Suriname. He asked whether Suriname cooperated with its neighbors on narcotics control, and also if there had been any prosecutions of major drug traffickers in Suriname.

The Minister replied that Suriname had treaties with three governments in the region to exchange information, and to cooperate in the prevention of the trafficking of drugs. They had made a proposal to Colombia for cooperation 2 years ago, shortly before the military coup. The Surinamese military government did not pursue it. The new civilian government plans to revisit this issue.

Amazon Pact countries recently met in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Suriname has floated a proposal to include drug trafficking in the issues for the region. Signals at the meeting were positive. The proposal will be made official on the February 10 meeting of the Amazon Pact heads of State at Manaus. The Amazon Pact countries include, in addition to Suriname, Brazil, Guyana, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador.

In reference to prosecutions, there were two important traffickers that had been successfully prosecuted, one Surinamese citizen and one Colombian national. In addition, the Surinamese trafficker that had been tried and convicted in Holland and had escaped from there, was now in custody in Suriname. A number of other smaller traffickers are also in jail.

Representative Gilman said that the delegation appreciated the efforts by the new civilian government. He asked about allegations of military involvement in drug trafficking and in particular the allegations that elements within the military were selling weapons to drug trafficking organizations.

The Minister replied that they had no information on these allegations.

Representative Payne commended the government for signing the 1988 United Nations Convention, and asked when they expect-

ed to ratify it. The Minister responded that the convention had been submitted to the State Council which must give its opinion before a law can be passed in Parliament to ratify the convention. They expect the opinion within 2 weeks. The administrative branch does not control the agenda for the legislative branch, but they are hopeful that they will be able to convince the Speaker to give this priority. The Minister was hopeful that it would be ratified by March.

Representative Payne then asked about drug prevention and education efforts in Suriname. He was told that an antidrug campaign was recently established which provides prevention materials from primary school onward. In addition, they have regular ads in the newspapers and other media.

Congressman Dornan noted that many within the U.S. delegation had been working on this problem for 15 or more years. The delegation was not in Suriname to be accusatory; the drug trafficking and abuse crisis is a shared problem. He asked about the allegations that the military had crushed the rebellion of the Surinamese Maroons with drug money. He also asked if there was a cultivation problem in any of the vast inaccessible areas of the country.

Mr. Dornan was told that there was no information on the military's financing the Maroon fight with drug money, and that the army was financed by the Federal budget. In reference to drug cultivation, there were infrequent instances of marijuana cultivation on a small scale, but they had never found any large cultivation sites. The drug problem in Suriname has been principally one of transit, both by air and sea, to Europe and to other parts of the world.

Suriname is a vast territory. The government sometimes receives information that trafficking takes place off shore, but they have no way to control that area due to lack of resources, such as the necessary boats and other equipment. The Minister said that if they could close the coast, they would be cutting off the traffic as the land borders are heavy jungle and largely inaccessible.

The Dutch Ambassador, Pieter Frans Christiaan Koch, arrived during the course of this meeting as the delegation had requested an opportunity to meet with him as well. Chairman Rangel shared with him that in all of the delegation's meetings there was optimism of an improved relationship with The Netherlands. He indicated that he hoped the United States and the Dutch could work together in support of the Surinamese efforts to strengthen their democracy and economy as well as in the important area of narcotics control.

Minister Mungra closed by saying that they anticipated a close working relationship with the Government of The Netherlands and that he looked forward to close cooperation with both The Netherlands and the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The delegation supports the Embassy's request for a permanent DEA presence in the country. As an alternative, the delegation would support the addition of one agent to the existing DEA office in The Hague to cover the Suriname-Netherlands connection.

2. The delegation encourages the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters to provide a small amount of assistance in support of the Surinamese police counternarcotics activities. The police force is lacking resources for basic police gear, such as radio equipment and ground transportation. If this assistance proves productive, the delegation would further support additional funding.

3. The delegation supports Suriname's efforts to develop a system of cooperation with the Amazon Pact nations on the narcotics control issue and encourages the other Amazon Pact nations to join Suriname in this effort.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

EMBASSY TEAM BRIEFING

On the morning of January 17, 1992, the delegation was briefed by Chargé Manuel Rocha and the narcotics country team. The briefers included economics counselor William Falkner, political counselor Paco Scanlan, defense attaché LTC Garry Wright, narcotics assistance Chief Mason Green, DEA Chief Victor Oliveri, and labor officer Allan Langland.

The briefing opened with a discussion of the conditions of Haitian workers on Dominican sugarcane plantations. The briefers reviewed the recent visit of Codel Torricelli which included meetings with representatives of the Government and the private sector, as well as a visit to a sugarcane plantation. Progress was seen in the overall situation. Residency permits have been issued to 3,200 workers, provisions to exchange payment vouchers for cash every 2 to 3 days instead of every 2 weeks, and wages have increased from 18 pesos to 25 pesos a ton. In response to a question from Chairman Rangel, it was pointed out that while abuses of the laborers had been occurring in the past, these abuses were not limited to Haitian workers. Migrant workers of Dominican citizenship have been treated in a similar manner. The Dominican Republic believes it is being unfairly singled out over the conditions of migrant workers, and that similar conditions also exist in the United States.

The Dominican Government is committed to responding to the problems of the migrant workers. Prior to the coup in Haiti, President Balaguer initiated discussions between the Labor Ministers of Haiti and the Dominican Republic to negotiate the conditions of all migrant workers in the Dominican Republic, especially the Haitians. The political situation in Haiti has put this effort on hold, but Mr. Balaguer is committed to this effort.

The Dominican Republic continues to be used as a major transshipment point for cocaine smuggled from Columbia en route to the United States. Colombian traffickers have targeted the Hispaniola Island to establish trafficking routes by land, sea, and air through Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Poverty in the nation and high levels of corruption among the lower ranks of the police and the justice system contribute to the Dominican Republic being a trafficking center.

Moreover, one out of eight Dominicans live in New York City. Organizations with links to drug trafficking groups in New York have been responsible for the high volume of drug trafficking into the United States. The handle "Dominican York" has emerged as a

slang expression to describe an individual involved in the drug trade in the New York area. The close proximity of the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico also facilitates the New York-Dominican Republic drug connection, as well as the large number of tourist visas issued to Dominicans visiting the New York area.

Notwithstanding these problems, cooperation between Dominican drug enforcement officials and the United States remains at the highest level. Successful interdiction tactics have increasingly forced traffickers away from the Dominican Republic into Haiti, Puerto Rico, and Central America for their operations. The Caribbean Basin Radar Network [CBRN] facility near Bani went into operation in July 1990, providing coverage of Southern Hispaniola and the approaches from the south and east. The Air National Guard radar facility was moved to the Dominican Air Force Base in the north, providing for complete coverage of the island. This facility is tactical and movable and as a result can respond to changing trafficking patterns.

As a result of this extensive air coverage, the trafficking has increasingly shifted to boats and cargo containers. The use of cargo containers makes drug enforcement all the more difficult. Often times enforcement agencies get information about the shipments only after they reach New York.

One aspect of Dominican drug enforcement that they are most proud of is the joint information coordination center [JICC]. This computer-centered drug intelligence center tracks the entry of suspected drug offenders, aircraft, and vessels in Dominican territory and shares this information with the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso intelligence center [EPIC] for tactical responses by law enforcement agencies. Both Mr. Oliveri and Mr. Green expressed satisfaction at the constant interfacing of the JICC with EPIC, and the cooperative working relationship of the various Dominican agencies that staff the center.

An important issue discussed was the ability of the Dominican JICC to interface with other JICC's being established in the Caribbean-Central American area, including the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, and Haiti. The delegation was informed that a new software package was introduced in October that will allow these various intelligence centers to talk to each other and provide a unique information sharing network for the region.

The compromise of law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system in the Dominican Republic is the largest challenge to drug enforcement. The narcotics enforcement agencies put together good cases with sufficient evidence for conviction and to warrant tough sentences. A weak and other corrupt judiciary often impedes this. There even have been cases where offenders have escaped after conviction. The Balaguer government has responded to this situation through pending legislation that would establish a special national narcotics court to try drug offenses, and create a system of uniform sentences in drug cases.

There is also a need for Dominican authorities to put in place an asset forfeiture law to allow the seizing and forfeiture of the illicitly acquired assets of drug traffickers. Mr. Oliveri pointed out the frustration of having drug traffickers return to the Dominican Republic from the United States and buying property and investing

in other assets as a result of their criminal activities. There is a need to have legal procedures to identify the source of that income and to seize it after proper proceedings.

There is no known cultivation of coca or opium poppy in the Dominican Republic; however, small-scale cannabis plots are periodically discovered and destroyed by the government agencies. There has been no discovery of major illicit drug conversion labs.

During 1991, approximately 2,521 kilos of cocaine were seized in the Dominican Republic, compared to 2,330 kilos in 1990 and 845 kilos in 1989. Between January and June 1991, 1,590 persons were arrested on drug charges and 598 indicted for drug violations. During the same period, 151 vehicles, 79 weapons, and over \$72,000 were seized.

VISIT TO THE CONSULAR SECTION

The delegation visited the consular section of the American Embassy to observe the higher number of Dominicans who apply for entry visas to the United States, the types of various fraudulent schemes used by those attempting to gain entry into the United States illegally or for improper reasons, and the large workload faced by the consular staff of the Santo Domingo mission.

In 1991, this consular office serviced 60,000 American citizens, provided 17,000 notarial services, issued 3,000 passports, and attended to 42 Americans jailed in the Dominican Republic, mostly on drug charges. In addition, the office also issue 29,000 immigrant visas, processing approximately 250 individuals a day. The office also handles between 500 to 1,000 phone inquiries a day. The staff of this section is 24 Foreign Service personnel and 13 host country nationals.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER JUAN ARISTIDES TAVERAS GUZMAN

The delegation's meeting with Minister Taveras included a discussion of both narcotics issues and hemispheric political issues. The Minister pointed to the loyalty of the Dominican Republic to the United States on most international issues and noted his country's votes in the United Nations as evidence of that fact. The Minister thanked the chairman for his efforts on behalf of Dominicans in the New York area, and underscored the importance that group is to the nation's economy.

Minister Taveras stated that Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer is the most reliable friend of democracy in Latin America. He stated that regardless of the President's age, he is the most important reform figure in Dominican society. Mr. Rangel indicated that President Balaguer is held in the highest regard by the American Government and its people.

The Foreign Minister noted that increased international competition must lead to closer trade and economic relationships between partners in the Western Hemisphere. He indicated that his nation was making the most of the Caribbean Basin Initiative and section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code to spur trade and investment opportunities. Minister Taveras stated that his government has aggressively pursued the use of free-trade zones, which have flour-

ished. Approximately \$1.75 billion in commerce has flowed from these zones, providing over 200,000 jobs.

The Minister stated that there is much economic potential in the Dominican Republic through the presence of a large, available labor market.

Concerning narcotics, the Foreign Minister noted that, as a former interior secretary and attorney general he is very familiar with the work of the Dominican drug enforcement units and knows that their efforts are supreme. He stated that in this important area, the Dominican Republic is a reliable friend, and will do what is necessary to fight the drug threat.

Regarding the situation in Haiti, Minister Taveras stated that his government was mortified by the coup against President Aristide and that his government has done its part to support the OAS initiative in Haiti. But, he noted the problems in Haiti existed before the coup—pleas of aid and to feed the people of Haiti went unheeded. While the political situation needs to be addressed, this underlying problem also must be addressed. If not, the people of Haiti will continue to flee that country and other nations will be forced to receive them.

In response to a question from Mr. Gilman about Cuba, Minister Taveras stated that, "The Cuba file should be archived; it is not worth the importance we attach to it." He suggested that if we talk differently to President Castro, he might respond differently.

VISIT TO THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL DIRECTORATE [DNCD] AND THE JOINT INFORMATION COORDINATION CENTER [JICC]

Chairman Rangel opened the session by noting that the JICC in Santo Domingo has been pointed to by the committee as a model for the international community.

Since the establishment of the JICC in November 1985, the Dominican National Drug Control Directorate has been working with DEA in coordinating joint international drug investigations. Selected information collected by the JICC on suspected individuals, planes, and vessels is passed to DEA's EPIC for record checks and for dissemination to U.S. drug enforcement involved in international drug interdiction operations. At the same time, information on the movement of drug shipments is passed to the JICC. This coordinated exchange of information has brought about numerous significant drug seizures, not only in the Dominican Republic, but in the United States and the Caribbean.

According to Col. Rafael Guerrero, the President of the DNCD, over the last 3 years, the activities of the JICC has resulted in 9,400 arrests, the seizure of 5,350 kilos of cocaine, and 30,078 kilos of marijuana. Guerrero also stated that the major drug organizations in the Dominican Republic have been dismantled as a result of the work of the DNCD. Notwithstanding these successes, the colonel stated that "We still have a long way to go," and that a strenuous effort will continue. Guerrero also noted for the delegation that while to date the efforts of his office have been primarily in the enforcement area, they are increasingly turning their attention to the areas of drug abuse prevention and education. Appropri-

ate materials have been prepared for distribution to Dominican schools.

Colonel Guerrero described three parts of the DNCD: First, controlling the distribution of drugs through enforcement activities; second, improving and expanding technology and personnel training; and third, operation of the JICC. He stated that 1992 is an important year. The increased budget given to the directorate will enable it to expand its geographic reach and human coverage. A new building is planned and 200 more personnel is being brought on line. The office will have to make a strong effort in the area of training, and the situation in Haiti will only increase the pressure on the Dominican Republic as a trafficking target.

Chairman Rangel asked Colonel Guerrero about the status of trafficking through Haiti. He responded because of the coup, drug trafficking from Colombia and other points south have increased through Haiti and over the border into the Dominican Republic for transshipment into the United States and Europe.

The colonel reiterated the same problem the delegation heard earlier about the weakness of the criminal justice system in the adjudication and sentencing of cases developed by Dominican law enforcement agencies. He told the delegation, "Something needs to be done about the handling of these cases in court." The obstacles are not in the investigations, but in the adjudications.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BALAGUER

Joaquin Balaguer is serving his fifth term as President of the Dominican Republic after an 8-year hiatus.

Mr. Rangel praised his leadership in the hemisphere, particularly for his leadership on Haiti. The chairman described the primary purpose of the committee's mission, and told the President of the delegation's admiration for the work of Dominican antidrug authorities. Mr. Rangel did note that shortcomings of the Dominican criminal justice system were repeatedly mentioned to the delegation during the course of its discussions with Dominican officials, and asked the President how the United States could work more closely with the Dominican judiciary to help improve this process.

In response, President Balaguer stated the strong desire of his country to work closely with the United States on drug enforcement matters. He stated: "These issues are important to the Dominican Republic and the world at large." He noted that he had given full support to, and has maintained the independence of Dominican drug enforcement and interdiction agencies. But, he conceded problems in the daily administration of justice in the courts. He told the delegation that in cases where there is a question, and violators are set free, he will always reinstate the decision of the DNCD if contrary evidence is available.

President Balaguer indicated that the judges are easy victims of corruption, and that the legislation pending before the legislature will go far to solve that problem in the disposition of narcotics cases. He underscored his personal commitment to firm drug control by pointing to the fact that when drug-related corruption was identified in the military, he moved quickly to have those involved removed.

The President told the delegation that in recognition of the work of the DNCD he plans to elevate Colonel Guerrero to the rank of general on February 27, 1992.

In response to a question by Mr. Gilman, the President supported present policies toward Cuba. He noted that by keeping the pressure on the regime, it will be forced to change. He stated that he could only support an opening of economic and political relations with Cuba, if it were tied to specific conditions of democratic reform.

Mr. Mfume asked the President what the other important issues were that he felt were facing the nations of the hemisphere. In response, Mr. Balaguer stated that trade and economic development were integral to guarantee the expansion of democratic opportunities. He stated that it was important to maintain and strengthen economic and trading relations in the region.

MEETINGS REGARDING HAITI

Originally the delegation had hoped to also visit Haiti during the course of this study mission, but because of the political unrest and security concerns, the delegation was unable to do so. In lieu thereof, the United States Ambassador to Haiti, Alvin P. Adams, Jr., and several of his staff met with the delegation in Santo Domingo on Saturday, January 18. The extensive, classified discussions included the political crisis since the coup in September 1991, the resulting serious refugee situation, as well as the continued use of Haiti as a significant drug transshipment point.

The meetings with United States Embassy staff were followed by meetings with Episcopal Priest Edwin Paraison, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Consultant Sarah Decosse, and Alan Langland, political counselor at the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo, about the Haitian "bracero" (canecutter) issue in the Dominican Republic. They discussed issues of forced labor, child labor, poor housing, and health conditions, and below subsistence wages. Part of the delegation was able to visit two bateyes, camps where the braceros live while working at Dominican sugar plantations. There they were able to talk directly to braceros about their working and living conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Corruption among the lower echelon and police is a major deterrent to more effective drug enforcement in the Dominican Republic. The Balaguer government has responded to this situation by improving the professionalism of Dominican drug enforcement, proposing legislation that would establish a special narcotics court to try drug offenses, and create a uniform system of sentences in drug cases.

2. The select committee remains impressed with the operation of the joint information coordination center [JICC]. This computer-based drug intelligence center tracks the entry of suspected drug offenders, aircraft, and vessels in Dominican territory and shares this information with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC] for tactical responses by law enforcement agencies. The committee is pleased to note that a new

software package has been developed that will allow the JICC in the Dominican Republic to interface with JICC's that are being developed in the Central America-Caribbean area, including: Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, the Bahamas, and Haiti. This should be a top priority of regional drug enforcement, and will facilitate the interaction of the national drug intelligence centers, and provide a unique information-sharing network for the region.

3. The committee is concerned the political instability in Haiti will lead to increased drug smuggling though that part of the Hispaniola Island. This will increase pressure on Dominican drug interdiction and enforcement agencies. Drug smuggling through Haiti is a situation that will warrant close attention from both Dominican and United States agencies in the near future, particularly as the political situation in Haiti remains unsettled.

4. It was brought to the attention of the select committee that there is a need for Dominican authorities to put in place an asset-forfeiture law to permit the seizing and forfeiture of illicit acquired assets of drug traffickers. Increasingly, drug traffickers return to the Dominican Republic from other nations, particularly the United States, and invest in property and other assets with their criminal proceeds. There is a need to have in place Dominican legal procedures that can identify the source of illegal income and to be able to seize it after proper proceedings.

5. A short time after the delegation's return from the Dominican Republic, information was brought to the select committee's attention about the increasing drug traffic between the United States and the Dominican Republic. The committee was surprised by the extent and scope of this problem. Nouveau drug-rich enclaves such as San Francisco de Macoris and Santiago serve as centers of a thriving drug trade between the Dominican Republic and New York, as well as other United States cities such as Manchester, NH; Reading, PA; and Boston and Lowell, MA.

Although the select committee expressed its concern about corruption in the Dominican judicial and police system while in Santo Domingo, and in this report, the committee is now informed that extent of bribery and intimidation of law enforcement and judicial officials is frequently being referred to as the "Colombianization" of the Dominican Republic.

Immigration laws and procedures to control the entry of Dominican traffickers to the United States appear to have broken down. Extradition authority to return drug fugitives to the United States for trial are in question.

Dominican drug gangs have forged working relationships with Colombian traffickers, and are developing connections to Chinese and other ethnic criminal organizations that traffic in heroin.

The select committee has received briefings on this information from the State Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and will continue its oversight of this issue throughout the 102d Congress. The select committee hopes that an interagency program can be developed to address the many facets of drug trafficking from the Dominican Republic to the United States.

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